BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA

THE FEDERAL TROOPS WERE COMMANDED BY GENERAL McCLELLAN, AND THE CONFEDERATES BY GENERAL JOHNSTON.

WHO WAS FORCED TO RETREAT
STORY OF THE WAR.

PICTORIAL HISTORY

OF

THE GREAT CIVIL WAR:

EMBRACING

FULL AND AUTHENTIC ACCOUNTS

OF

BATTLES BY LAND AND SEA,

WITH

Graphic Descriptions of Heroic Deeds Achieved by Armies and Individuals; Narratives of Personal Adventure; Thrilling Incidents; Daring Exploits; Wonderful Escapes; Life in Camp, Field and Hospital; Adventures of Blockade Life, etc.

CONTAINING

CAREFULLY PREPARED BIOGRAPHIES

OF

The Leading Generals and Naval Commanders.

BY

JOHN LAIRD WILSON,

Special Correspondent of the New York Herald.

EMBELLISHED WITH NUMEROUS FINE STEEL-PLATE ENGRAVINGS OF BATTLE-SCENES, AND WITH PORTRAITS OF LEADING GENERALS.
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DEDICATION

To our brave and heroic countrymen who in the fierce struggle of our Great Civil War battled in the cause of patriotism, whether they marched under the Stars and Stripes or followed the ensigns of the “Lost Cause;” whether they wore the Blue or the Gray; and who still survive to enjoy honors from their admiring countrymen;

To the memory of those who sleeping on battle-field or in cemetery await the trumpet sound of the great resurrection;

To Grant of the North, to Lee of the South—to the followers of both—and to every patriotic Son of America—who would have the true story of this great fratricidal struggle chronicled by an impartial hand with justice to all, extolling virtue, heroism and patriotic devotion to principle wherever found,

This Volume is reverently
DEDICATED

BY THE AUTHOR
PREFACE.

In offering to the public a new History of the Great Civil War, a few words of explanation are necessary. Of histories, general and special, relating to the late struggle a number have been published, but they were nearly all written at a period so close to the war that the writers were unconsciously biassed by the strong feelings which they shared in common with their fellow-citizens during the occurrence of the events they relate. Time had not softened their prejudices sufficiently to enable them to write with the judicial calmness necessary to the proper treatment of such a subject. It is hoped that in the long years that have elapsed since the return of peace enough has been made plain, and sufficient calmness has been gained, to enable the writer to prepare a history which shall do impartial justice to the struggle itself and to the actors engaged in it.

It has been my aim to present a continuous narrative covering the entire area of operations, both military and naval, and free from those interruptions which in general history are unavoidable. I have endeavored to carry the reader with me over sea and land, wherever the sounds of war were heard, and to present to him in a series of vivid and faithful pictures the events which marked the progress of the great struggle. Of the movements of the hostile forces, and of the commanders under whom at different times and at different places these movements were made, I have expressed my opinion with great freedom, awarding praise or blame as truth or justice seemed to call for the one or the other. I do not expect that my judgments will find favor from all classes of readers, but I know that they are the judgments of an unbiased mind, solicitous for the truth and constrained only by the irresistible logic of facts.

My information I have drawn from sources too numerous to be mentioned in detail. Contemporary magazines and pamphlets, private letters and documents of various kinds which have been kindly placed at my disposal,—all have been consulted with more or less profit. In cases of doubt, where testimony was absent or conflicting, I have corresponded with some of the principal leaders in the
strife; and the information thus derived from both Northern and Southern sources has been to me of incalculable value. Of the results of the labors of others in the same field, it is hardly necessary to say, I have taken full advantage. To the exhaustive history of the war by Dr. Lossing, and to the scarcely less exhaustive, but in some respects more philosophical, work of Dr. Draper, I confess myself under great obligations. I have perused with profit and with pleasure Prof. William Swinton's "Decisive Battles of the War;" and in his "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac" I have found much with which to illumine and adorn these pages. Of the "History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de Paris, so far as it has advanced, I cannot speak too highly; and in the preparation of some of the earlier chapters of this work I have found it a useful book of reference. In terms of similar praise I desire to speak of the "Memoirs of General Sherman" and of Badeau's "Military Life of General Grant." From among the many other works which I have consulted with advantage, and to which I cannot refuse to admit my indebtedness, I would mention the "Rebellion Record," "The Great Civil War" by Tomes and Smith, "Grant and his Campaigns" by Dr. Henry Coppée, Tenney's "Military and Naval History of the Rebellion," "The Battle of Gettysburg" by Samuel P. Bates, Pollard's "Lost Cause," and "Chancellorsville" by Hotchkiss and Allan.

As it is, this work is now given to the public; and if it shall be found that, while doing reasonable justice to all the parties concerned, I have in any degree been able to render such disastrous struggles impossible for the future, I shall feel that the hours spent over these pages have not been spent in vain.

J. L. W
PICTORIAL HISTORY

of

THE GREAT CIVIL WAR.

CHAPTER I.

The Aim and Object of this History.—The Causes of the War.—State Rights.—The Tariff and Slavery.—Diverging Interests of North and South.—Effect of the Abolition of Slavery in the British Colonies on American Sentiment.—The Missouri Compromise.—The Fugitive Slave Bill.—Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.—Formation of the Republican Party.—Kansas Struggle.—Triumph of the Anti-Slavery Party.—The Campaign of 1856.—Buchanan elected President.—The Kansas-Nebraska Struggle.—Buchanan’s Unfortunate Administration.—The Dred Scott Decision.—The John Brown Raid.—The Sale of Arms to the South.—Secession and Organization of the Confederacy.—Election and Inauguration of President Lincoln.—His Address.—The Firing upon Fort Sumter.

In many respects the American Civil War was the most momentous struggle that ever marked the history of the world. Not only did it employ larger armies and fleets than were ever called for by other combatants; not only did it exceed the immortal campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon in the magnitude and brilliancy of its operations; not only did its theatre comprise an area larger than the whole continent of Europe, embracing as many varieties of climate, and presenting as many natural obstacles to be overcome; not only did it inaugurate a new era and a new mode of warfare,—but it also served to develop the strength and resources of the country it was supposed to be wasting, and to make plain to the world the true character, the immense resources, and the especial genius for war of the American people, and to offer a convincing proof of the imperishable nature of free institutions when entrusted to the keeping of a race of men trained to understand and value them,—men willing and resolved to maintain them even at the cost of their lives. The magnitude and grandeur of the events of this great struggle give to them a picturesqueness, so to speak, which must make a faithful account of them deeply interesting to our people.

To write the history of such a struggle must be no easy task, for while lauding the glory of the conqueror the virtues of the vanquished must not be forgotten. In such a task passion and prejudice, sectional pride and intolerance of opposition, have no place; the faithful historian must record events as they occurred. Such a task we propose to ourselves in the work now before us.

In the following pages it will be our
aim and endeavor to carry the reader with us, as we follow the contending armies and mark the progress of the conflict; to halt, from time to time, as the embattled hosts confront each other, listening to the roar of battle and witnessing the wild work of war—the devastation of fields, the desolation of homes, the carnage, the slaughter, the tortured agony of the wounded, and the ghastly features of the dead; to rejoice with the triumphant defenders of the right, without being ungenerous to the erring and the vanquished; and finally, to point out the blessed results which flowed out of the terrible struggle, not to the United States alone, but to all nations and to all peoples.

Preliminary to this, however, and in order to enable the reader intelligently to follow us in our descriptions of the different battle scenes, it is necessary to recount briefly, but clearly and impartially, the remote and proximate causes of the rebellion and the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of hostilities. The antagonism between North and South which came to a head in December, 1860, in the secession of South Carolina from the Union was not new. It was old almost as the Union itself. It had its roots deep down in the nation’s history. It might be interesting, if it lay within the scope of this work, to show how much of this antagonism was due to race, how much was due to climate, how much was due to interest, and the pursuits of life. In all these particulars, it could be easily shown, there was difference between North and South. But to enter into these details with any degree of fulness would be foreign to our plan. From the very commencement of our national history difference of opinion prevailed as to the nature of the bond which held the States together. It was held by one class of statesmen that the Federal Union was a league or confederation which might be dissolved at will by any of the States. It was held by another class of statesmen that the Federal Union constituted a nation, with a national government, and that no one State could secede from the Union without the consent of all the others. This was the radical difference out of which ultimately grew the rebellion. It was not until certain material questions arose that any serious practical point was given to this difference of opinion. In course of time such questions did arise. Chief among these were those which related to the tariff and to slavery. The South, which depended on the products of the soil, demanded free trade. The North, which derived its wealth from the manufacturing industries, called for protection. And while great statesmen advocated these conflicting views, Congress witnessed many a stormy scene. The question, however, which was a permanent source of division, and on which agreement was found to be impossible, was that of slavery.

At the time of the formation of the Union, slavery was more or less common in all the States. It was more common in the South than in the North, but it existed in all the States. The invention
of the cotton-gin by Whitney, in 1793, rendering, as it did, the cultivation of cotton the leading branch of Southern industry, largely increased the demand for slave labor. While slavery, for a variety of reasons, had ceased to be a source of wealth in the North, and was gradually dying out, it had become a source of great wealth to the Southern planters and a conspicuous feature of Southern life. In the year 1860, the negro population of the Southern States had increased to about four millions. In the North, slavery had completely died out, and in the States of the Northwest, which were now being rapidly filled up with free immigrants, it never found a place. Slavery was thus found to be a root of bitterness. It determined and rendered permanent the natural antagonism between North and South. Year by year the gulf was widening; and it became more and more apparent that if the South were not to be allowed to maintain its peculiar and favorite institution, and would not be permitted to secede, a gigantic civil war was one of the certainties of the not distant future.

The slavery question, as we have said, was a cause of division from the beginning of our history. The anti-slavery agitation in England, and the passing of the memorable law in 1807, abolishing the slave trade in the British colonies, had naturally enough a powerful influence on this side of the Atlantic. It helped to determine the purpose of the North, and it infused new life into all those who were in favor of abolition. It was not, however, until about the year 1820 that the real political struggle began. With the famous Missouri Compromise began that political contest out of which grew the civil war. It was the first of a series of steps which led up to the act of secession and the firing on Fort Sumter. The Missouri Compromise, it was supposed, was a complete and satisfactory settlement of the dispute between the North and the South. It turned out to be a great source of trouble. Its history is as follows: Missouri formed part of the Louisiana purchase. After the organization of the “Territory of Orleans,” in 1803, Missouri formed part of the “District of Louisiana.” Later it took the name of “Missouri Territory.” The State of Missouri was a part of that Territory. In 1820, Missouri applied to Congress for admission into the Union as a State. It was proposed that the application be granted only on condition that slavery be prohibited in the new State. The pro-slavery party were indignant. Both in and out of Congress party feeling ran high. The discussion, which was conducted with great bitterness, resulted in what was called a compromise. It was agreed that slavery be allowed in Missouri, but prohibited in all the territory of the United States north and west of the northern boundary of Arkansas. On these terms Missouri entered the Union as a State. The compromise, from which so much was expected, settled nothing. The Southern people continued to feel and act as if they had been hindered in the exercise of their rights. In 1850, they succeeded in passing the.
Fugitive Slave Bill, which enabled masters to recover their slaves who might have escaped to a free State. This act gave great umbrage to the North. In 1854 the South gained another triumph by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. This act, which had for its object the organization of a territorial government in Kansas and Nebraska, provided that the people of the Territories should be at liberty to adopt or exclude slavery, as they thought fit. State Rights were thus again in the ascendant; and the Southern planters were left at liberty to establish their favorite institutions all over the Southwest. At this juncture was formed the Republican party—a party whose principal doctrine was opposition to the extension of slavery. The organization of the Republican party made it plain to all the world that the struggle between the South and the North—between the pro-slavery party on the one hand and the anti-slavery party on the other—meant war to the knife. A truce was now no longer possible.

These preliminary remarks would be incomplete without a passing reference to what is known as the Kansas struggle. Kansas, like Missouri, originally formed part of that immense territory which went by the name of Louisiana. It will be remembered by the reader that the Missouri Compromise left the southwestern provinces open for the introduction of slavery. The repeal of that act by Mr. Douglas's bill did not destroy the hopes of the southern planters with regard to Kansas. From the date of the Missouri Compromise it had been the battle-ground of the two contending parties. Both the pro-slavery party and the anti-slavery party did their best to colonize it. From the East and the Northwest freemen poured into the new territory, and "emigrant aid societies" were formed in all the Free States to lend the freemen a helping hand. The South was not less industrious in its efforts. "Border ruffians," as they were called, rushed in from the neighboring State of Missouri, and a reign of violence ensued almost if not entirely unparalleled in the history of the country. The Kansas struggle, as can easily be imagined, deeply embittered feeling on both sides, and had a powerful influence in hastening the "irrepressible conflict." At last, after some years of weary fighting, the anti-slavery party triumphed, and Kansas was admitted a free State 30th January, 1861. While this struggle was at its height, took place the presidential election of 1856. It was one of the keenest contests in the history of the country. Mr. Fremont, the Republican candidate, polled a large number of votes; but the Democrats carried the day, and Mr. Buchanan, a warm friend of the South, came into power. The election of a Democratic president was more an apparent than a real gain to the South. Mr. Buchanan, with all his immense influence, could not hinder the admission of Kansas as a free State; and the settlement of the Kansas difficulty was justly regarded as an anti-slavery triumph. "The Kansas-Nebraska struggle," as Dr. Draper well puts it, "marks an epoch in the great contro-
versy between the North and the South. It closes the period of parliamentary or congressional debate between them, and introduces one of violence and open war. The South clearly perceived that nothing more was to be hoped for from peaceful measures, and that, if it were its intention to perpetuate or even to protect African slavery, it could do so only by force.”

The history of the next four years is the history of a war of opposing views and conflicting aims. The South was becoming more embittered, the North more resolute. The Buchanan administration was in fact a great misfortune to the country. Of all the public men of his time, he was perhaps least fitted for the stern duties which devolved upon the chief of the State. Men like Cromwell or Napoleon or General Jackson would have been equal to the situation; but Buchanan was neither a Cromwell nor a Napoleon, nor is he to be mentioned in the same breath with General Jackson. Admirably adapted for the high position in times of peace, he was altogether unequal to the stirring times in which he found himself. A strong hand would have seized the helm and acted with decision. The prospect of war unnerved him; he hesitated, and the vessel floated to destruction. His term of office was marked by four great events—the Dred Scott decision in 1857; the John Brown raid in the fall of 1859; the sale of arms to the South, and the organization and retirement from the Union of the Southern Confederacy. The Dred Scott decision was very properly regarded in the North as the virtual establishment of slavery throughout all the States of the Union, and converting it from a local into a national institution. According to the decision given by Judge Taney of the Supreme Court in this case, a slave owner might carry his slaves with him into any State of the Union. Some of the Northern States resented this decision by passing “Personal Liberty Laws,” declaring freedom to every slave who came within their borders. The bitter feelings engendered on both sides by the Dred Scott affair were aggravated by the John Brown raid. It was no doubt a foolish affair, which never had the approval of any large or influential section of the Northern people; but it was felt by the South to be a demonstration of Northern sentiment, and it was treated accordingly. The execution of Brown and his associates was no doubt justified by the law of the land, but it was nevertheless a great blunder. It exalted a foolish filibustering raid into the character of a crusade for liberty, and it transformed a crazy old man into a hero and a martyr. Blood had now been shed, and reconciliation had become impossible.

In the midst of the heat and excitement occasioned by the Dred Scott decision and the John Brown raid, the South was secretly and busily preparing for war. Through the indifference of the government at Washington, and through the treachery of the secretary of war, large stores of arms and ammunition were transferred to the South; and while the North was dreaming of war only as a probability, the South
was armed to the teeth. Such was the condition of things North and South when the time came to nominate a candidate for the presidency in the spring of 1860. The people were divided into four parties. Each party had its own candidate, and each candidate had his own platform. The candidates were Breckenridge, of the Southern Democracy; Douglas, of the Northern Democracy; Lincoln, of the Republican party; and Bell, of the Union Constitutional party. On the platform that "there is no law for slavery in the Territories, and no power to enact one; and that Congress is bound to prohibit it in or exclude it from every Federal Territory," the Republicans carried the day. The election of Lincoln on the 6th of November, 1860, crushed the hopes of the South. It was the signal for secession. South Carolina was the first to move. At a special convention, held on the 20th of December, 1860, her connection with the Union was dissolved by an unanimous vote. The example of South Carolina was promptly followed by Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, and later by Texas. As Buchanan held the opinion that neither he nor Congress had the right to coerce a State into submission, nothing was done to hinder the progress of secession. On the 4th of February, 1861, a convention of the seceded States was held at Montgomery, Alabama; and there a constitution was adopted and a government organized, under the name of the Confederate States of America. Jefferson Davis, late United States senator from Mississippi, was elected president, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia vice-president. The seceders took possession of all the forts, arsenals, custom-houses, ships, and all other Federal property within their boundaries. In the South, in the possession of the United States there remained only Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, Fort Pickens, near Pensacola, and the forts off the southern extremity of Florida.

On March 4th, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated. In his address, the president declared it to be his duty to "hold, occupy and possess the places and property" belonging to the Federal government in the South. This was accepted by the Southern leaders as a declaration of war. Several of the southern-born officers in the United States army and navy, who had not yet declared themselves, now entered the Confederate service. Without delay, General Beauregard was placed at the head of the forces, about four thousand men, who were already investing Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor. Fort Sumter was held by a garrison of about eighty men under Major Anderson, whose name will be memorable in American history. At the time of the secession of South Carolina, in December, 1860, Anderson was stationed at Fort Moultrie, but for greater security he removed to Fort Sumter. It was known that the garrison was reduced to great straits, and must soon surrender, unless supplies and reinforcements came from Washin-
ton. It was believed that the president and his advisers were disposed to withdraw the garrison. Early in April, however, it became known that the government had decided to send a fleet with supplies to Major Anderson and his garrison. Beauregard received instructions from the authorities at Montgomery to demand the surrender of the fort; and, if his demand was not complied with, he was to reduce it by force. On the afternoon of the April 11th of April, 1861, the demand to surrender was made. Major Anderson refused to comply. Early on the following morning the threat which was made was carried out, and fire was opened on Fort Sumter by the Confederate land batteries. The American Civil War had commenced.

CHAPTER II.


Before the close of 1860, public attention was centered on Charleston Harbor. It was here that the first indications of actual war were revealed. The harbor of Charleston is one of the finest on the South Atlantic seaboard. During the years of peace and prosperity, great care had been taken of it by the State and Federal authorities; and when South Carolina, yielding to the fierce impulses of rebellion, took the bold step of retiring from the Union, it was one of the best guarded harbors in the States. It had the advantage of four powerful fortresses—Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, Fort Johnson, and Fort Sumter. Castle Pinckney was situated upon the southern extremity of a tract of marshy land known as Shute's Folly Island, and was near the city of Charleston. Fort Moultrie stood on Sullivan's Island, distant from Charleston between three and four miles, and not far removed
from the famous little palmetto-log fort of that name, made memorable during the War of Independence by its heroic defiance of the British fleet in 1776. Fort Johnson stood on James Island, and to the west of Fort Sumter. As a fortification it was of comparatively little account. Fort Sumter was by far the largest and most important of these strongholds. Its position gave it an immense advantage over all the others. It was built in the middle of the entrance to the harbor proper; and its walls of defiance towered up on the southwestern edge of the ship channel. Fort Sumter was about three and a half miles from the city. A truncated pentagonal in form, its walls were of solid brick and concrete masonry. The island on which the fort was erected rested on a mud bank. The materials of which the island was composed were chips of granite from the quarries of New England. In the conveyance of these materials and in the construction of the island ten years were consumed, and the actual cost amounted to over half a million of dollars. The fort itself cost another half million. The walls, which were sixty feet high and from eight to twelve feet thick, were pierced for three tiers of guns on the north, east and west sides. The two lower tiers were under bomb-proof casemates. The first tier was intended for forty-two-pounder Paixhans, the other two were intended for eight and ten-inch columbiads. The full complement of guns was one hundred and forty, but when the war broke out there were only seventy-five guns in the work.

In 1860 Colonel Gardiner was commander in Charleston Harbor. A variety of circumstances encouraged the belief that Gardiner was in league with the enemy. The strange conduct of War Secretary Floyd and the cunning efforts of Jefferson Davis to secure arms for the South, had created a spirit of watchfulness, and Gardiner having revealed an inordinate amount of anxiety to have his supply of ammunition increased, incurred the displeasure of the government and was removed. The vacant place was filled without delay by Major Robert Anderson, a native of Kentucky, and an officer who had won some distinction in the Mexican campaigns. On the 20th November Anderson arrived and assumed the command, his head-quarters being at Fort Moultrie. It would have been strange if a man of his discernment had been deceived by the peculiar state of things which prevailed all around him. Anderson was not deceived. On the 23d of November he wrote to Adjutant-General Cooper, describing the situation. In that letter he uses the following remarkable words: "That there is," he says, "a settled determination to leave the Union and to obtain possession of this fort is apparent to all." All the forts in the harbor, he assured General Cooper, were in a wretched condition, Fort Moultrie particularly inviting attack by its weakness. "Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney," he went on to say, "must be garrisoned immediately, if the government determines to keep command of this harbor." Major Anderson's letter to
General Cooper, which contained much more to the same effect, must ever be regarded as one of the most important official documents connected with the early history of the Civil War.

Anderson did not know—did not even suspect—that the ears to which he addressed his appeals were deaf, and that the heart which he hoped to touch was callous, by reason of rank treason. Adjutant-General Cooper, who was a native of the State of New York, but who had married a sister of Senator Mason of Virginia, was already sold to the Confederate cause. At the very moment that Major Anderson was writing his memorable letter, Cooper was making use of his position to obtain and communicate valuable information to the authorities at Southern headquarters. Three months later, he left his office at Washington, hastened to Montgomery, Alabama, and was made adjutant-general of the Confederate forces, then busily preparing for war. Cooper, however, was not alone in his iniquity. The national capital had become a hotbed of treachery. Weak, undecided, and in the last months of his four years of office, the president would do nothing. The people of the North little imagined that the entire machinery of the government at Washington had been worked for an entire year in the interests of the Southern malcontents. On the 31st of December, Senator Wilson of Massachusetts offered a resolution in the Senate, asking the secretary of war to furnish information concerning the disposition of arms manufactured in the national armories or purchased for the use of the government during the past year. Mr. Holt was now at the head of the War Department, and the needed information was not long delayed. From the report submitted to the Senate, it appeared that as early as the 29th of December, 1859, Secretary Floyd had ordered the transfer of seventy-five thousand percussion muskets, forty thousand muskets altered to percussion, and ten thousand percussion rifles from the armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, and the arsenals at Watervliet, New York, and Watertown, Massachusetts, to the arsenals at Fayetteville in North Carolina, Charleston in South Carolina, Augusta in Georgia, Mount Vernon in Alabama, and Baton Rouge in Louisiana. These arms, it appeared, were distributed in the spring of 1860. Only eleven days after this order had been issued by Floyd, Jefferson Davis introduced into the Senate a bill "to authorize the sale of public arms to the several States and Territories, and to regulate the appointment of superintendents of the national armories." The real object of this bill was not at first or at all generally perceived. It was not until the Senate was asked by Davis, on the 21st of February, to take up what he called "a little bill," which he hoped would "excite no discussion," that treachery began to be suspected. On the 23d, two days afterward, Mr. Fessenden, senator from Maine, asked for some explanations on the subject. Davis was ready with his reply. "The secretary of war," he said, "had
recommended an increase of the appropriation for arming the militia of the country, and he thought it best for volunteers to have arms made by the government, so that in case of war the weapons would all be uniform." Fessenden offered an amendment, but the bill was carried by a strict party vote. It was smothered, however, in the House of Representatives. The southerners were not to be driven from their purpose. An old law, bearing the date of March 3d, 1825, authorized the secretary of war to sell arms, ammunition, and other military stores which were no longer suitable for the public service. Under cover of this law, Floyd sold to States and individuals over thirty-one thousand muskets, altered from flint to percussion, for two dollars and fifty cents each. On the very day Major Anderson addressed the letter previously mentioned to Adjutant-General Cooper, Floyd sold ten thousand of these muskets to G. B. Lamar of Georgia; and, some eight days before, he had sold five thousand of them to the State of Virginia. It was openly boasted by a Southern newspaper that during the year which preceded the outbreak of hostilities, one hundred and thirty-five thousand four hundred and thirty muskets had been quietly transferred from the northern arsenal at Springfield alone to the Southern States; and Secretary Floyd was thanked for the foresight he had displayed in thus disarming the North and equipping the South for the emergency. A similar boast was made by a prominent Virginian, who declared that, what with the arms distributed by the Federal government to the States in preceding years and those purchased by the States and by private citizens, the South entered upon the war with one hundred and fifty thousand small arms of the most approved modern pattern, and the best in the world. According to a statement made by General Scott, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Texas had not drawn, at the close of 1860, their annual quota of arms, and Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Kentucky had drawn only in part; while Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Kansas were, by order of the secretary of war, supplied with their quotas for 1861 in advance. For some reason, possibly as a blind, partial advances had also been made to Pennsylvania and Maryland. This, however, did not exhaust the demands of the South, nor the intentions of the secretary of war. On the 20th of December, 1860, Floyd ordered forty columbiads and four thirty-two-pounders to be sent immediately from the arsenal at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to the unfinished fort on Ship Island, off the coast of Mississippi; and seventy-one columbiads and seven thirty-two-pounders were ordered to be sent from the same arsenal to the embryo fort at Galveston, which could not be ready for its armament in less than five years. This bold attempt was happily frustrated by the vigilance and prompt action of the people of Pittsburg. Floyd soon afterwards fled to Virginia, and the order was countermanded by his successor, Joseph Holt.
Such being the state of things generally, it is not difficult to understand the desperate situation in which Anderson was placed. From such men as Floyd and Cooper he had certainly small hope of succor. The reply given to his letter was worthy of men who had been working so zealously in the interests of the South. It was contained in fewer than a dozen lines, and permission was given him to send a few workmen to repair Castle Pinckney. In the future, he was told, he was to be careful to address all communications to the adjutant-general's office or to the secretary of war. Anderson, as we have seen, had his head-quarters in Fort Moultrie. It became daily more manifest that, unless some unexpected aid arrived, he would be entirely at the mercy of the enemy. He had abundant evidence that the Carolinians regarded the forts as their own, and that they were making vigorous preparations to get ready for the attack. In a conference which he had with some of the leading citizens of Charleston, he was assured that the forts "must be theirs after secession." Secretary Floyd was still playing into the hands of the enemy. One of his latest orders to Anderson was that he should deliver over "any of Captain Foster's workmen, should a demand be made for them." The avowed reason for this order was that "they had been enrolled into the service of the State." The actual reason was that the conspirators might have the benefit of the experience of men who thoroughly understood the forts. Anderson felt that his position was becoming daily more desperate. His communications to the government were frequent, and his calls for help were urgent. To his entreaties were now added the recommendations of General Scott, who had become fully alive to the perils of the situation. While Anderson was informing the government that "Fort Sumter was certain to be attacked on an early day, and that if Fort Sumter was lost all was lost," the commander-in-chief of the army urged the president to "reinforce the forts on the coasts of the slave-labor States." On the 31st Oct. of October, he asked permission to admonish the commanders of southern forts to be on their guard against surprise or sudden assault. All was in vain. It seemed as if nothing could arouse the government to a sense of the imminence of the danger. General Scott's advice was unheeded; his request was disregarded; and Anderson was advised to be prudent—to avoid any attempt which might seem like forcing hostilities, but "to hold possession of the forts, and, if attacked, to defend himself to the last extremity."

Poor comfort, certainly, in the circumstances! After long and vexatious delays, and after a treacherous attempt had been made by Floyd to weaken the garrison at Fortress Monroe, under the guise of strengthening the forts at Charleston, the authorities began to feel that the situation was critical. The president, however, was weak as water; the Cabinet was full of conspirators; and so resistance was made in every conceivable way to prompt and effective action. At this moment Gen-
eral Cass, who will ever be honorably mentioned in American history for the bold stand he made at this particular juncture, urged the president to order reinforcements to be sent at once, not only to Charleston but to other menaced points. His advice was not taken, and he retired from the Cabinet.

During the night of December 26, Anderson, with his small garrison, moved into Fort Sumter. Of his own volition, Anderson undertook the responsibility of abandoning the weaker and of occupying the stronger fort. As commander of all the forts, he had a perfect right to do so. It was a difficult task to perform, but it was done with skill and caution, and with complete success. His first care was bestowed on the women and children. It was given out that they were to be removed to Fort Johnson, because he wished the helpless ones, with sufficient food, to be in a place of safety. The stratagem was successful. The suspicions of the people of Charleston were disarmed. Anderson’s course was approved of as wise and prudent. Secret instructions had been given that the women and children were not to be landed at Fort Johnson, but, at a given signal, to join the remainder of the garrison and enter Fort Sumter. The evening twilight was just passing away, and the full-orbed moon had scarcely taken her place as Queen of the Night when the evacuation began. At the proper time the signal was given, and the vessels containing the women and children moved away from before Fort Johnson, the entire garrison being quickly and without any mishap landed at Fort Sumter. At eight o’clock the same evening, Anderson wrote to the adjutant-general, “I have the honor to report that I have just completed, by the blessing of God, the removal to this fort of all my garrison, except the surgeon, four North Carolina officers, and seven men.” Long, however, before this letter arrived, the intelligence had passed along the wires; and while dismay, indignation, wrath filled the minds of all conspirators, the hearts of loyal men everywhere were thrilled with delight. Of course Secretary Floyd was indignant. A telegraphic message was sent to Anderson, asking him to explain. The reply was prompt and to the point. “The report quoted,” said Anderson, “is correct. I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain that, if attacked, my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages, to keep the guns from being turned against us. If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight.”

Excitement now ran high. The conspirators at Charleston and at Washington were filled with rage. Floyd declared that “the solemn pledges of the government had been violated,” and demanded permission of the president to withdraw the garrison from Charleston Harbor. The president refused, and Floyd resigned. Postmaster-General Holt assumed the duties of the War Office, and telegraphed to Anderson without delay that his movement in transferring the garrison from Moul-
Fort to Sumter was "in every way admirable, alike for its humanity and patriotism, as for its soldiership." In all parts of the loyal North, Anderson's conduct was warmly and loudly approved; and five days after the flag had been raised over Fort Sumter, the Legislature of Nebraska, two thousand miles away, greeted him by telegraph with a "Happy New Year." Praise of Anderson was on every lip; and it is not too much to say that no public servant ever received more spontaneous praise from a grateful people.

Anderson's position, from the moment he entered Fort Sumter with his little band, was one of extreme peril. The brief visit made to him at this period by his heroic wife, who brought to him his old and faithful servant, Peter Hart, forms one of the most agreeable episodes in the early history of the war. The people of Charleston became wild with rage when they learned what had happened. The fire and smoke which they saw arising from the burning material in Fort Moultrie, on the morning of the 27th, was to them a mystery, which was quickly dispelled by the arrival of some workmen from the neighborhood of the abandoned fort. The truth was out. Anderson was safe with his garrison, including even the women and children, in Fort Sumter.

What was to be done? The cry for immediate action was loud and general. Some of the more excited of the multitude wished to be led immediately to the attack of Fort Sumter. Governor Pickens was at once requested by the South Carolina Convention to take possession of Forts Moultrie and Johnson and Castle Pinckney. The order was speedily given. Meanwhile the public squares of Charleston were filled with armed men. An excited populace thronged the streets. The Citadel Academy, the great military school of the State, opening as it did on one of the squares, was made the place of rendezvous. The government arsenal, containing some seventy thousand stands of arms and a vast amount of military stores taken from Massachusetts and New York, was seized in the name of the State. Within three hours after the old banner of the republic had been raised over Fort Sumter, two armed steamers, the General Clinch and the Nina, with about four hundred men on board, left the city for the purpose of taking possession of Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie. One half of these, led by Colonel J. J. Pettigrew, made for Castle Pinckney. A landing was easily effected. The garrison, the commander of which fled to Fort Sumter, made but little resistance. On entering the fort, it was found that it was worthless alike for attack or defence. The guns were spiked, the carriages were ruined, the ammunition removed, and the flag-staff laid prostrate. A palmetto flag was brought from one of the steamers, and Pettigrew unfurled it over the Castle. It was the first secession flag which waved over a national fortification. The remainder of the troops, about two hundred and twenty-five in number, under the command of Colonel Wilmot G. DeSaussure, proceeded towards Fort Moultrie. Of course there was no re-
sistance. The sentinel, following instructions, surrendered the fort at once. Here again the palmetto flag was raised; but as the darkness rendered it invisible, the ascent of three rockets intimated to the people of Charleston that the expedition had been a success. Anderson's position was one of peculiar delicacy. He might have opened fire upon the insurgents when they landed on Sullivan's Island; and a few shots from the guns at Fort Sumter would have been sufficient to drive DeSaussure and his men out among the sand-hills. But his hands were tied. He could not open fire without incurring grave responsibilities. It was well, as the result proved, that he acted as he did. On the same day that Fort Moultrie was seized, Anderson had the further humiliation to learn that the revenue cutter William Aiken, then lying in Charleston Harbor, had been surrendered to the insurgents by its faithless commander, N. L. Coste. His subordinate officers, behaving like true men, refused to follow him, and at once reported themselves for duty at Washington. This was the defection of a naval officer who had been born in the slave-labor States.

On the afternoon of the 27th, Governor Pickens sent a message to Anderson, requiring him to leave Sumter and return to Moultrie. Anderson refused. On the day following, he sent his post-adjutant to Fort Moultrie to ascertain from the commander there by what authority he and armed men were in that fort of the United States. The answer was, "By the authority of the sovereign State of South Carolina, and by command of her government."

Governor Pickens henceforth treated Anderson as a public enemy within the domain of South Carolina. It was boldly declared by the Charleston press that the "holding of Fort Sumter by United States troops was an invasion of South Carolina." In a letter written to Adjutant-General Cooper on the 28th, Dec., Anderson expressed regret at the course the governor had taken. "He knows," he said, "how entirely the city of Charleston is in my power. I can cut his communication off from the sea, and thereby prevent his reception of supplies, and close the harbor, even at night, by destroying the light-houses. These things, of course, I would never do, unless compelled to do so in self-defense." On the same day the South Carolina authorities seized the custom-house and the post-office. For three weary months more, until the close of Buchanan's administration, Anderson and his little band remained locked up in Fort Sumter, not permitted to fire a shot, although he knew the insurgents were gathering by thousands in Charleston, and saw daily fortifications rising up around him, and other works intended for his destruction. So much self-denial has rarely been exercised.

During the interval from the close of December, 1860, to the first week of April, 1861, the struggle was going on; but the fighting was done in Washington rather than in Charleston Harbor. The secession contagion continued to spread; a great defalcation had been discovered in the Indian trust fund of
§830,000, and Thompson, secretary of the interior, and Floyd, secretary of war, were openly charged as accomplices in the fraud, if not for personal advantage, at any rate for the advancement of southern interests; but the most important event of that period was the arrival in Washington of the “commissioners” from South Carolina, Messrs. Dec. Barnwell, Adams, and Orr. On 28th of December, 1860, they addressed a formal diplomatic note to the president, claiming that they were authorized and empowered to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and their real estate, with their appurtenances, in the limits of South Carolina; and also for an apportionment of the public debt, as well as for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States as agent of the confederated States of which South Carolina was recently a member. In brief, they claimed to act as plenipotentiaries having the right to negotiate as to all measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relations of the parties. They furnished the president with a copy of the Ordinance of Secession. They loudly complained of Anderson’s conduct in transferring his garrison from Moultrie to Sumter—an event, they said, which had seriously altered the condition of affairs under which they came. They urged the president to withdraw immediately all the national troops from Charleston Harbor, as, under present circumstances, they were “a standing menace,” rendering negotiations impossible, and threatening to “bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.” The letter was felt to be arrogant and insulting in the last degree. The president, in his reply, was firm; but he was cautious, perhaps, to a fault. He referred them to his Message for a definition of his policy, to the instructions given to Major Anderson, to the fact that the South Carolinians had already committed an act of war by seizing two forts and by supplanting the old flag of the Union. “It is under all these circumstances that I am urged to immediately withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do.” To this the commissioners replied by a letter more arrogant and more insulting than the first. It concluded as follows: “By your course you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of Justice as well as Lord of Hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her bravely and thoroughly.” This letter was returned to the “commissioners,” endorsed with these words, “This paper, just presented to the president, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.”

The year 1861 opened gloomily on the land, and perhaps New Year’s Day never was so dull. On the 5th of Jan-
government and quickly laden with supplies. To prevent suspicion, she was cleared for New Orleans and Havana. At sundown on the 5th Jan. of January she left her wharf at 5. New York, and when well down the bay she took on board, under cover of the night, four officers and two hundred and fifty artillerists and marines, with their arms and ammunition. At nine o'clock the same evening she crossed the bar at Sandy Hook, and proceeded to sea. Government purposes were destined once more to be disturbed, and the fates seemed to stand in the way of the mission of the Star of the West. Intelligence was received from Anderson that he regarded his position as secure, and that the insurgents had erected at the mouth of Charleston Harbor powerful batteries, which made it unsafe for an unarmed vessel to enter. In consequence of this intelligence, the order for the sailing of the Star of the West was countermanded. It was too late; the vessel was well on her voyage.

Meanwhile every preparation was being made by the insurgents for an early attack on Fort Sumter. Every able-bodied man in Charleston, liable to do military duty, was put under arms. Fort Moultrie was strengthened. Fort Johnson was garrisoned by a company of the Charleston Rifles. New batteries were hurried forward, commanding the ship channel and bearing heavily on Fort Sumter. No boat was allowed to approach the wharf-head except by permission. The city was placed under military control; lookout boats scouted

February the "commissioners," crestfallen and enraged, left Washington. War, it was now felt, was all but inevitable. The loyal people of the North, however, began to have more faith in the government. Under wiser and more patriotic counsellors, the president seemed to have gathered courage. It was resolved to strengthen the garrisons of the forts on the coasts of the slave-labor States, and particularly those in the forts of Charleston Harbor. With this end in view, it was agreed to send south the steam-corvette Brooklyn, which had just arrived at Norfolk after a three years cruise. It is said that the secretary of the navy refused to give the order, and that the president yielded. Under the influence of General Scott and Secretary Holt, the president was aroused again, and orders were given that the Brooklyn should be ready to start at a moment's notice. The secret was betrayed. Information was received that the Virginians were prepared to seize any vessel which might attempt to leave Norfolk with troops. It was reported at the same time that the lights of the shore-beacons in Charleston Harbor were extinguished, and that the channel buoys had been removed. The order was, in consequence, countermanded. There was treachery committed by some one. General Scott and Secretary Holt continued to urge the president. If the Brooklyn could not be sent, some other means must be adopted to accomplish the end in view. The Star of the West, Captain John McGowan, a well-known merchant steamer, was chartered by the
the outer harbor at night; the telegraph was placed under the strictest surveillance, and Anderson for the first time found himself cut off from all communication with his government. The news that the "commissioners" had completely failed in their mission had roused the people to the highest pitch of furious excitement; and the wildest language was used and the wildest schemes for revenge were suggested and encouraged.

On the morning of the 9th of January the Star of the West was seen by the imprisoned garrison of Fort Sumter, coming over the bar and making her way toward the fort. It was a gladsome sight to Anderson and his little company; for now, as we have seen, Fort Sumter was completely isolated. Anderson, however, had no means of knowing whether his appeals for supplies and reinforcements had reached the government, or whether they had been heeded. The appearance of this vessel inspired hope; but it was hope clouded by despair, for Anderson knew well the difficulties which lay in her way before she could bring him any relief. Having reached the bar and found all the lights extinguished, the Star of the West extinguished her own, and lay there until the morning. As the day broke she was sighted by the scouting steamer General Clinch, which at once burned colored lights as signals, and ran for the inner harbor. McGowan ordered all his men below, and steered after the little steamer, hoping that the Star of the West might be regarded as a mere merchant vessel.

It was a vain hope. The authorities at Charleston were well informed. The name of the vessel was known, nor was the object of her visit any secret. Thompson, secretary of the interior, a man whose character was afterwards fully revealed, had telegraphed to one of his friends, "The Star of the West is coming with reinforcements." It is said that Thompson ordered another despatch to be sent, in these words, "Blow the Star of the West out of the water." This despatch was prudently withheld. The General Clinch was moving on, about two miles ahead, the Star of the West following. When the latter was a little short of two miles from Fort Moultrie and about the same distance from Fort Sumter, a masked battery on Morris Island, from which a palmetto flag was flying, opened fire; and a shot came ricocheting across her bow. The national flag was flying over the Star of the West at the time the first shot was fired. Quick as lightning McGowan hoisted, in addition, a large American ensign. It was no use; these emblems were no longer respected. The shot from Morris Island fell thick and fast. Several balls passed clear over the steamer; one passed between the smoke-stack and the walking-beam; one struck the ship just abaft the fore-rigging, and stove in the planking; and "one," said the captain, "came within an ace of carrying away our rudder" Some shots were fired from Fort Moultrie, but without producing any serious damage. During the few minutes this firing lasted, McGowan saw moving out from Fort Moultrie two steam-tugs, one
of them with an armed schooner in tow. The purpose was unmistakable. McGowan perceived that his position was one of imminent peril. Hemmed in by the forts and about to be overhauled by an armed vessel, his own unarmed, there was no prospect for him, if he persevered in his course, but capture or destruction. After seventeen shots had been fired at the Star of the West, the captain steered the vessel around, put to sea, and returned to New York. It was only seven days since she had cleared from the same harbor. It was in some respects an inglorious voyage; yet it cannot be said that the captain or his crew were to blame. If there was fault or guilt anywhere, it lay with the government. It would have certainly been a nobler and more dignified policy to send a war vessel to reinforce Fort Sumter. Such a course would no doubt have been resented by the South, and it might have given a different shape to the "irrepressible conflict;" but it might also have been better for all concerned. Anderson's conduct in the matter is above all reproach. He was ignorant of the character of the vessel when he first saw her in the harbor. He was equally ignorant of her errand. When the first shot was fired he took her to be a relief ship. When the old ensign was raised aloft, there was no longer any mystery. The national flag had been dishonored. His guns were shotted; his men desired him to open fire; but his instructions were peremptory—he had not been attacked. Anderson's self-restraint and long-suffering patience are to be com-

mended; but less caution and more daring, whatever might have been the result otherwise, would not have estranged from him the sympathy of his countrymen, or lost him any of his well-won laurels.

Undeniably the firing upon the Star of the West was an act of war. It touched every principle which was involved in the assault made at a later date on Fort Sumter. The national flag was wantonly insulted. It was so regarded by Anderson, who promptly sent a letter under a flag of truce, borne by Lieutenant Hale, asking Governor Pickens whether the outrage had been committed under his orders. He notified the governor that if this act was not disclaimed, he would regard it as a cause of war, and should not, after a reasonable time was allowed for the return of his messenger, permit any vessel to pass within range of his guns. He was anxious to avoid, as far as was possible, the shedding of blood; but he asked the governor to take note of his decision, for the good of all concerned. Governor Pickens refused to make any apology. It was the act of South Carolina; and he assured Anderson that any attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter would be stubbornly resisted. He left him to decide for himself whether he would carry out his threat in regard to intercepting vessels, and stated that he would regard such action as an attempt to "impose on the State the conditions of a conquered people." Anderson felt that the responsibility was grave; and, obtaining a promise from the governor that his messenger would not be his
dered, he sent Lieutenant Talbot to Washington, as the bearer of messages in which the whole subject was submitted to the government. Talbot was the first to carry north the full tidings of the outrage. His report, as was to have been expected, created the wildest excitement in all the free-labor States. Two days after the attack on the Star of the West, Governor Pickens sent his secretary of state, McGrath, and secretary of war, Jamison, to make a formal demand on Major Anderson for the immediate surrender of Fort Sumter to the authorities of South Carolina. Anderson's answer was firm and decided. "No," said he, "sooner than suffer such humiliation, I would fire the magazine and blow fort and garrison in the air." The commissioners returned to the governor impressed with the conviction that only starvation or assault could reduce the fortress. Preparations for attack were, therefore, carried on with energy.

The action of Governor Pickens was approved by the State Legislature, which learned with pride and pleasure of the successful resistance made by the troops of the State to the reinforcement of Fort Sumter. The newspapers howled with delight. Said one of them, "The expulsion of the Star of the West from Charleston Harbor yesterday morning was the opening of the ball of the revolution." The article referred to concluded with these words, "If the red seal of blood be still wanting to the parchment of our liberties, and blood they want, blood they shall have, and blood enough to stamp it all in red." In this trying position, shut out from his friends, without hope of succor, and surrounded by these hostile elements, we must leave Anderson for a space.

It is not a part of our plan to follow out and describe all the minute details which occurred in the interval between the assault on the Star of the West and the fatal firing on Fort Sumter. Some facts, however, it is impossible to omit without disturbing the continuity of the narrative. From week to week public indignation was waxing fiercer in the North, while in the South the secession sentiment grew stronger and took more practical shape. Before the 2d day of February, six States of the Union had followed the example of South Carolina, having passed ordinances of secession and appointed delegates to a general convention: Mississippi on the 9th of January, Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, Georgia on the 19th, Louisiana on the 26th, and Texas on the 1st of February. On the 4th of February, 1861, the delegates of the seceded States met in general Congress at Montgomery, Alabama. In the course of a few days, a provisional government was formed and a Constitution agreed upon, after the adoption of which, the Congress proceeded at once to the election of a provisional president and vice-president. On the 18th Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was inaugurated president, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia vice-president of the "Confederate States of America." The Confederacy
lost no time in seizing all the forts and arsenals in their respective States. The South was becoming more and more a unit, and, in spite of differences of opinion here and there, it was evident that the great North, realizing its duty and becoming conscious of its strength, was about to rise in its might and majesty. The debates in Congress in the early weeks of the year were protracted and keen; and they were conducted with great ability. The atmosphere of Washington became too hot for the conspirators; and they departed in great numbers to fling themselves into the Southern cause. Love of the Union lingered in many hearts. On the 4th of February, a convention known as the Peace Congress or Conference assembled in Willard's Hotel, Washington. In this Congress twenty-one of the States were represented—fourteen of the free and seven of the slave-labor States. It was all in vain. In spite of the hopes which it created, it resulted in complete failure. Such was the state of things generally when a new man was about to appear on the scene—a man who had not hitherto figured greatly in the political arena, but who will ever be remembered as the saviour of his country and one of the world's greatest heroes.

On the 14th of February, Abraham Lincoln of Illinois and Hannibal Hamlin of Maine were declared duly elected president and vice-president of the United States, for four years commencing on the 4th of March, 1861.

Lincoln bade farewell to his friends and fellow-citizens in Springfield on the 11th, and set out for Washington. His progress was one continued ovation. Everywhere throughout his long journey of many hundreds of miles, in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, he was greeted with demonstrations of the most profound respect. During the course of his journey, he was frequently called upon to address the assembled multitudes. His words were always well chosen, generally hopeful and encouraging, but sometimes tinged with sadness, as if he felt the terrible responsibility which rested upon his individual shoulders. He was studiously noncommittal, yet there was a firmness in his utterances which left the public in no doubt that he was a man of strong will and decided character. He was in Philadelphia on Washington's Birthday. In the course of a short address, speaking of the principle of liberty embodied in the Declaration of Independence, he said, "If this country cannot be saved without giving up this principle, I would rather be assassinated on this spot than surrender it." At Trenton, while expressing himself in favor of peace, he said, "The man does not live who is more in favor of peace than I am—no one will do more to preserve it; but it may be necessary to put the foot down firmly." The feelings entertained regarding him by the slave-holding oligarchy of the South may best be understood from the fact that by some of them it was resolved that he should never reach the national capital alive.
GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
The secret oozed out, and the conspirators, for the time being, were foiled. At Baltimore, it is now understood, arrangements were made for the assassination of the president elect; and there is every reason to believe that but for the timely discovery made by Lincoln's friends and their subsequent watchfulness, the plot might have succeeded. As it was, he and his party reached Washington in safety.

Monday, the 4th of March, will long be remembered in the national capital, and, indeed, throughout the length and breadth of the republic. On that day Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated sixteenth president of the United States of America. The inauguration ceremonies were performed quietly, and the day, contrary to the expectations of many, passed off without disturbance. It was known that a conspiracy existed, having for its object the capture of the city and the person of the president, and the placing in the executive chair some one devoted to Southern interests; but General Scott had taken ample precautions, and the project failed. The inaugural address, which was impatiently awaited, gave abundant satisfaction to the adherents of the Union cause. It was an able and exhaustive document. The president stood firm on the Constitution. The union of the States he said was perpetual. It was older than the Constitution. It preceded the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was not competent, therefore, for any one State or for a number of States to retire from the Union at will. He held that in view of the Constitution and the laws the Union was not broken. He would take care that the law should be executed in all the States. He would avoid violence, unless it was forced upon the national authority. He would not interfere with slavery in the South. In accordance with the trust reposed in him, he would feel it to be his duty to "hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government." Addressing his dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, he said, "We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature." These are thoughts that breathe, words that burn. There was a man now at the helm of the ship of state.

Anderson could not long be left unheeded now. The attention of the president and his cabinet was first called to the condition of public affairs. Matters had come to a wretched pass. The treasury was empty, and had to be attended to. The army and navy were found to be comparatively useless. There were but sixteen thousand men in all, and these were mostly in the West. Sixteen forts had fallen into the hands of the Confederates. Of the southern forts, only Fortress Monroe, Forts Jefferson, Taylor, and Pickens...
remained to the government. Fort Sumter, of course, was not yet lost; but for government use it was not now available.

On the day of inauguration a letter was received from Anderson, of a rather discouraging kind. He could not see how any effective assistance could be rendered him by a force of less than "twenty thousand good, well-disciplined men." This letter was laid before the president and his cabinet on the following day. The government was not in a position to send any such aid—all the more that it was wanted at once or not at all. It was suggested that Anderson should be advised to make terms with the enemy and provide for his own safety and for that of the garrison. The president was urged to adopt this course, for the sake of peace; and for a time it was the hope and belief of the South that this would be his final conclusion. Better counsels prevailed. Gustavus G. Fox had suggested a feasible plan for the relief of Fort Sumter. He urged the president to take immediate action, as any attempt to succor Anderson must be made before the middle of April. At last the president did "put down his foot firmly." Fox was sent for; preparations, in spite of some official hindrances, were hurried forward, and on the 9th April he sailed with two hundred recruits in the steamer Baltic, commanded by Captain Fletcher. The relief squadron consisted of the Baltic, the United States sloops-of-war Powhatan, Pawnee, and Pocahontas, with the cutter Harriet Lane, the tugs Yankee, Uncle Ben, and Freeborn. The order was to rendezvous off Charleston. The expedition might have had better luck if it had been sent at an earlier day. As it was, some of the vessels came to grief. Only the Baltic, the Pawnee, and the Harriet Lane succeeded in reaching the place of meeting.

Events had taken place in Charleston Harbor before the arrival of the relief ships which had not been calculated upon by the government at Washington. As soon as it became known that an attempt was to be made to sustain Major Anderson and his garrison, all communication between the people and the fort was at once stopped. On the arrival of the Federal messenger, announcing the intelligence, Beauregard telegraphed to the Confederate secretary of war, Leroy P. Walker. "An authorized messenger," wrote Beauregard, "has just informed Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter peaceably, or otherwise by force." The secretary's reply was to the effect that if Beauregard had no doubt of the authorized character of the agent, to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter, and in case of refusal to proceed to reduce it. "The demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o'clock," was Beauregard's answer. On the 11th of April, about two o'clock in the afternoon, Beauregard sent Colonel James Chesnut, Colonel Chisholm, and Captain Stephen D. Lee, with a letter to Anderson, demanding the surrender of the fort. Anderson was not taken by surprise. He had been expecting some such demand. In his reply to Beaure-
gard, which he handed to the aids, he said that "his sense of honor and his obligations to his government would not allow him to comply." To the gentlemen themselves, however, he made no secret of the fact that the condition of his supplies was such that he could only hold out a few days more. These latter words were immediately communicated by Beauregard to Walker, who without delay telegraphed back to Beauregard that if Anderson would state the time when he would evacuate, and if he would agree meanwhile not to use his guns against them, unless theirs were used against Fort Sumter, they would wait, and thus the useless effusion of blood would be avoided. To this proposal, which was conveyed to him by Roger A. Pryor and the three gentlemen above named, Anderson agreed, stipulating that he would leave the fort by noon of the 15th, should he not before that time "receive contrary instructions from his government or additional supplies."

Here let it be remembered that Anderson had no knowledge of what his government had been doing for him for some days. That they intended to send him assistance and supplies he was sure; but as the authorities at Charleston had prevented his special messenger, Talbot, who had been to Washington, from returning to the fort, he knew nothing of the mission of Fox or of the fact that a squadron had sailed to his assistance. In this respect his adversaries had the advantage. Of the sailing of the squadron intended to relieve Anderson they were fully aware, and its appearance in Charleston waters had been awaited with considerable anxiety. On the evening of the 11th, and even before the "f" left with the message to Anderson, the Harriet Lane and the Pawnee had been sighted by scouts outside the harbor, and Beauregard had been notified of the fact. His aids were therefore invested with discretionary authority. If not satisfied with Anderson's reply, they were to act as they thought fit. Before leaving the fort, and after a few minutes' consultation, they addressed a note to Anderson, saying, "By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding the provisional forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in an hour from this time." This note is dated April 12, 3.20 A.M. They immediately left the fort. Anderson accepted the situation. The flag was raised, the postern was closed, the sentinels were withdrawn, and the men were ordered not to leave the bomb-proofs until they received further instructions.

It was known in Charleston on the evening of the 11th that the bombardment was about to begin. From an early hour, therefore, the streets were crowded; and what with the roll of the drum, the marching of armed men, the tramp of horses and the rumbling of wagons, the utmost excitement prevailed. All was still within Fort Sumter. The passing minutes of that hour were counted one by one. At twenty minutes past three o'clock, precisely one hour from the receipt of the
last letter by Anderson, the dull booming of a gun was heard on James Island, and from a signal battery there a shell came whizzing through the darkness and exploded over Fort Sumter. It was the signal gun. Immediately thereafter, from all the batteries around, a deadly fire was opened. Full thirty heavy guns and mortars opened their throats at once. The extent of the enemy's fire greatly surprised the garrison. The most destructive work was being done by a battery on Sullivan's Island, of which formerly they had no knowledge. This battery had been masked by brushwood and other materials. It was constructed with great skill, and heavily mounted, showing seventeen mortars throwing ten-inch shells, and thirty-three heavy cannons, most of which were columbiads. The firing was maintained with vigor; and the shots from some of those powerful guns struck the walls of Fort Sumter with a "terrific crash," as the defenders said, some of the shells bursting inside the fort. For two hours this firing continued, Fort Sumter remaining silent as the grave. At half-past six the men were summoned to breakfast, which they ate "leisurely and calmly," as if undisturbed by the terrible uproar around them.

It was now broad daylight. Breakfast over, Anderson arranged the officers and men, about eighty in all, into three reliefs. The first was under the command of Captain Doubleday, the second was under Surgeon Crawford, and the third under Lieutenant Snyder. The garrison labored under many serious disadvantages. They had plenty of powder, but few cartridges. They had no scales for weighing the powder, and only some six needles for sewing cartridge bags. They were also without instruments for sighting the guns. The first gun was fired at seven o'clock in the morning, by Captain Doubleday. It was followed immediately by a general firing from the fort on all the principal attacking batteries. For four hours the firing was kept up so vigorously by Fort Sumter that the enemy for a time suspected that it had been reinforced during the night. The fire told with effect on Fort Moultrie, the embrasures of which were considerably damaged. On the battery on Cumming's Point, which seemed invulnerable, it had little effect, the shot and shell glancing harmlessly off.

As the hours rolled on, the firing of the assailants was becoming more effective. Their guns were under complete control. Every shot told. The walls and parapets of Fort Sumter began to give evidence of their destructive work. It seemed to be the purpose of the enemy to destroy the barbette guns. With this end in view, they poured their heaviest fire on the parapet of the fort. A large portion of the parapet was carried away; several of the heavy guns were dismounted or otherwise disabled, and the garrison was thus limited to the use of the two lower tiers of guns, which were protected by casemates. About the same moment it was discovered that the barracks were on fire. It was now about noon. Surgeon Crawford, who had volunteered to ascend
the parapet for the purpose of making observations, and who had succeeded, in spite of the tempest of shot and shell which raged around him, on returning below reported, to the delight of the now almost despairing garrison, that through the fog and blinding rain he saw two vessels, bearing the dear old flag. It was part of Fox’s relief squadron. The Pawnee, ten guns, the Harriet Lane, five guns, and the transport Baltic, were lying outside the bar. They could not cross. The buoys had been removed, and ships laden with stones had been sunk in the channel. The vessels dipped their flags by way of greeting; but Sumter could not respond. Its ensign was still flying, but it was entangled in the halyards, which had been cut by the enemy’s shot. In the afternoon the enemy’s fire had been particularly severe; shot came rattling into the embrasures; and severe injuries were inflicted by flying splinters of masonry. The shells bursting in rapid succession against all parts of the fort, scattered the loosened brick and stone in every direction, broke the windows, and set fire to the woodwork. The men in the fort worked with a will. The day, however, had told sadly on their strength. Their firing had become less rapid. Their cartridges were now well-nigh exhausted; and before sunset it had been found necessary to abandon all the guns but six. When darkness came on, Anderson ordered the port-holes to be closed. Some of the men were permitted to rest while others watched. So ended the first day of the war.

The storm, which had lasted all day, continued throughout the night. The firing of the insurgents was maintained at intervals, until the morning. Every fifteen minutes the little garrison cooped up in Fort Sumter heard another shot or shell rattling against their shattered walls. It was a weary night for Anderson and his men. But there was no murmur, no complaint. The provisions were all but exhausted. In a few hours more the last parcel of rice would be cooked, and nothing would be left for the garrison but salt pork. The relief ships were outside the bar; but the storm made it impossible for them to complete their mission of mercy.

The sun of Saturday morning rose in splendor. The storm had ceased April 13, before the early dawn. The bombardment was resumed with tremendous energy. It seemed to be the purpose of the assailants to force matters to an early conclusion. Red-hot shot was now freely used. On Friday the buildings in the fort had been on fire four times. Four times the flames had been extinguished. Now the barracks and the officers’ quarters were again on fire. The situation of Anderson had become desperate. Yet he clung to the skirts of hope with undying tenacity. There was provision to last for three days, and for three days more he was anxious to hold out. With the exception of the magazine, the buildings were left to their fate. No attempt was made to extinguish the flames. The red-hot shot which the enemy were pouring in upon them made such efforts useless. The conflagration spread rapidly. It was feared that the magazine
might explode, and its doors were locked. The main gate took fire and was soon destroyed; and the sally-port was now open to the besiegers. The heat had become intolerable; and the clouds of smoke were suffocating. The crashing of the shot, the bursting of the shells, the falling of walls, and the roaring of the flames were terrific, and made, says an eye-witness, "a pandemonium of the fort." The garrison was now reduced to its last three cartridges. Still no thought of surrender. The flag still waved. Eight times its staff had been hit by the enemy's shot, without serious injury. At twenty minutes before one o'clock it was hit again, and this time with success. "The flag is down—it has been shot away," was the cry, when Lieutenant Hall rushed out and snatched it from the glowing embers, before it could take fire. Carried immediately by Lieutenant Snyder to the ramparts, he handed it to Sergeant Hart, who, springing upon the sandbags, and with the assistance of one Lyman, a mason from Baltimore, planted again the broken staff, and left the soiled banner flying proudly and defiantly, in spite of the shot and shell which fell like hail around.

Soon after the flag had fallen, and towards the close of the day, a man presented himself at one of the embrasures of the fort, with a white handkerchief tied to the point of his sword. Private Thompson of the fort was the first to whom he addressed himself. "I am General Wigfall," he said, "and I want to see Major Anderson. For God's sake," he added, as Thompson left him to find his commander, "let me in. I can't stand it out here in the firing." On being admitted, he met Captain J. G. Foster, Lieutenant J. C. Davis, Surgeon J. W. Crawford, and Lieutenant B. K. Meade. "I am General Wigfall," he repeated, under great excitement; "I come from General Beauregard, who wants to stop this bloodshed. You are on fire, and your flag is down; let us stop this firing." "Our flag is not down," was the reply. "It is yet flying from the ramparts." "Well, I want to stop this," he said; and holding out his sword and handkerchief to one of the officers, he added, "will you hoist this?" "No, sir," was the answer. "Will any of you hold this out of the embrasure?" he asked. Receiving no reply, he asked, "May I hold it, then?" "If you wish." Springing into the embrasure, he waved the white flag several times. The firing did not abate; and Wigfall, frightened out of his wits by a shot which struck near him, abandoned his position. The handkerchief was taken up and waved out of the port-hole by Corporal Brighurst; but he, too, finding that no heed was paid to it, sprang from the perilous post. Addressing Lieutenant Davis, Wigfall said, "If you will show a white flag from your ramparts, they will cease firing." "It shall be done," said Davis, "if your object is to hold a conference with Major Anderson." At this point Anderson appeared. "I come from General Beauregard, who wishes to stop this, sir." "Well, sir," said Anderson, eyeing Wigfall keenly. "You have defended your flag nobly, sir," continued Wigfall. "You have
done all that can be done, sir. Your fort is on fire. Let us stop this. On what terms will you evacuate the fort, sir?” “My terms are already known to General Beauregard,” replied the Major. “Instead of noon on the 15th, I will go now.” “I understand you to say,” said Wigfall, “that you will evacuate the fort now, sir, upon the terms proposed the other day.” “Yes, sir, on those terms only.” Then said Wigfall, “I understand the fort is to be ours.” “Yes, sir,” said Anderson, “on those conditions only.” “Very well,” said Wigfall, “I will return to General Beauregard.” Believing that Wigfall was telling the truth, Anderson caused a white flag to be hoisted over the fort.

The Major was not undeceived until a little before two o’clock, when Colonels Chesnut, Pryor, Miles, and Lee arrived at Fort Sumter, with instructions from their chief to ascertain the meaning of the white flag. When they stated the object of their mission, Anderson observed that there was something wrong. There was confusion on both sides. Wigfall, it appeared, had not seen Beauregard in two days. He had no instructions from him. He had acted on his own responsibility. Having been on Morris Island, he had, by false misrepresentations, obtained leave from the commander there, to visit the beleaguered fort. Anderson, fired with indignation, at the deception played upon him, threatened to haul down the white flag. “That white flag,” he said, “shall come down immediately.” He was entertained, however, to leave matters as they were, to put in writing what Wigfall had said, and to wait till they saw Beauregard. This he consented to do; and the firing ceased. Several deputations waited upon Anderson during the course of the afternoon, to obtain, if possible, better terms. He was not to be moved. At last, between seven and eight o’clock, Major D. R. Jones, accompanied by Colonels Miles and Pryor and Captain Hartstene, arrived at the fort and announced that Beauregard had accepted Anderson’s terms. The garrison was to be allowed to depart, with company arms and property, with all private property, and with the privilege of saluting and retaining their flag. Thus ended the bombardment of Fort Sumter.

One of the most extraordinary circumstances connected with this remarkable siege was that not a single man had lost his life either at Fort Sumter or in the ranks of the Confederates. It deserves to be remembered, too, that the fort had been evacuated, not surrendered. Anderson retained the flag, and exactly four years afterwards, as Major-General in the armies of the United States, raised the same old tattered flag over the fortress, then a heap of ruins.

On Sunday morning, the Isabel came down from Charleston and anchored near Fort Sumter. The steamer Clinch lay alongside the wharf, to convey Anderson and his men to the larger vessel. An unfortunate circumstance occurred at the last moment. The baggage had all been put on board the Clinch. Of the soldiers who were still inside the fort, a number were detailed to salute the flag of the United
States. At the firing of the fifteenth gun, a premature explosion took place, killing one man, seriously wounding another, and inflicting upon other two injuries more or less dangerous. They were the first casualties of any moment from the beginning of the conflict. On Monday Anderson and his men were transferred to the Baltic and sailed for New York, where they were destined to receive the plaudits and the honors of a delighted and grateful people.

CHAPTER III.

The Fall of Fort Sumter the First Link in a Chain of Great Events.—War now a Necessity.—The Grief and Rage of the North.—Lincoln's Proclamation.—Congress Summoned to Meet.—Secession Sentiments finding Expression.—The probable Theatre of War.—Conspiracy to Seize Washington.—Confederate Troops on the March.—Manassas Junction.—Arlington Heights.—What the President could see from the White House.—Military Movements.—Delay.—The Impatience of the People of the North.—"On to Richmond."—General Irwin McDowell.—The two Armies.—General Joseph E. Johnston.—General Beauregard.—Centreville.—The Onward Movement.—Tyler's Mistake.—McDowell's Delay.—The Three Months' Term of Service Expiring.—The Battle Ground.—The Relative Strength of the two Armies.—McDowell's Plan.—Sunday Morning.—The Battle Begun.—The First Hour of the Fight.—The Confederates Driven Back.—McDowell's Mistake.—"Stonewall" Jackson.—The Tide of Battle Turned.—Noon.—The Second Phase of the Battle.—The Confederate Position.—The Rising Ground near the Henry House.—Terrific Struggle for the Plateau.—Ellsworth's Zouaves.—The Seventy-Ninth and Sixty-Ninth Regiments.—Death of Colonel Cameron.—The Critical Moment.—Arrival of Kirby Smith.—Panic among the National Troops.—The Battle Lost.—A Rout.—Terrible Losses.—Reflections.—The Victory Complete, but the Battle not Decisive.—Effects of the Battle North and South.—The President's Call for Half a Million of Men.—McClellan Superseded by McClellan.

It is useless now to discuss the question whether Fort Sumter could or could not have been reinforced. Our experience to-day is very different to what it was when the relief ships anchored in the outer harbor; and the presumption is that if the attempt at reinforcement had to be made now, it would be made with more daring and perhaps with complete success.

As it was, the fall of Fort Sumter constituted the first link in a chain of great events which culminated in one of the most gigantic revolutions in modern times. Its immediate effect was to make an end of all possibility of compromise. War was now a necessity. There was but one arbiter possible; and that was the sword. In the South the intelligence was received with a wild yell of delight. In the North, the news produced generally a feeling of sadness. Momentarily there was silence—not the silence of despair, but that silence which comes from surprise, from vexation, from an overburdened heart. Soon, however, the strong man recovered himself; and from the confines of the British provinces to the waters of the broad Ohio there arose
that hearty cheer—a cheer which can only come from Anglo-Saxon throats and from men devoted to truth, to right, to liberty—a cheer deep-toned and firm, full of hope and full of confidence. Henceforth the division was complete. Minor differences among the population on either side were overlooked; and the waters of the Ohio rolled between two powerful confederations, united and prepared for battle.

On Sunday, the 14th day of April, the garrison of Fort Sumter lowered their flag and marched out of the work. On the day following, President Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men to serve for three months. At the same time, in consideration of the gravity of the situation, he summoned an extra session of Congress—senators and representatives being instructed "to assemble at their respective chambers in Washington City, at noon on Thursday, the 4th day of July next ensuing, then and there to consider and determine such measures, as in their wisdom the public safety might seem to demand." The authorities at Montgomery were equally active. A call was made for thirty-five thousand additional troops; and the call was responded to with alacrity and enthusiasm. Up until the date of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the Southern Confederacy consisted only of the seven cotton States. The other eight slave States—Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, embracing the larger half of the population of the South, had stood aloof from the secession movement. Their sympathies were illly concealed; but they had resolved not to declare themselves until circumstances rendered a decision necessary. The proclamation of President Lincoln left them no choice. Being still in the Union, these several States were called upon to furnish their proportion of troops. From almost all of them came replies of the most defiant kind. Maryland and Delaware were less pronounced than some of the others. Secession went on apace. Virginia openly joined the Confederacy on the 17th of April, two days after the proclamation; she was followed by Arkansas on the 6th of May; by North Carolina on May the 20th; and by Tennessee on the 8th of June. In the remaining slave States—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri—sentiment was divided; and although the contest was protracted and keen, it was found possible to retain them in the Union. The cause of the South was immensely strengthened by the adhesion of the above-mentioned States; and Virginia was justly regarded as a great acquisition. As soon as that State withdrew from the Union, Richmond was made the head-quarters of the Confederate government. In the loyal States of the North the proclamation of President Lincoln was hailed with rapturous enthusiasm; from the pulpit, from the platform, and through the press burning words went forth to the people; and, within a few days, the militia of the different States were out in force, and large bodies of men were converging towards the national capital.
It soon became manifest that Virginia in the east, and the border States, Kentucky and Missouri in the west, would be the principal theatre of the war. Towards those States a general movement was made by the forces of both North and South. From the moment that Virginia joined the Southern Confederacy, and that Richmond became the rival capital, it was seen and felt that the war struggle in the first instance at least, would be limited to a comparatively narrow area. The fall of Fort Sumter inspired the South with, perhaps, a little too much confidence. "No man," said Walker, the Confederate war secretary, "can foretell the events of the war now inaugurated; but this, I will venture to predict that the Confederate flag will, before the 1st of May, float over the dome of the capitol at Washington." Walker was not ignorant of the fact that a conspiracy existed having for its object the capture of Washington, the seizure of the government officers, and the inauguration of a provisional government, in the interests of the South. Of the existence of some such conspiracy there can be no doubt. Southern men, supposed to be in the secret, have since confessed that if Washington could not be held, after it fell into their hands, the intention was to fire it, destroy the national archives and leave the city a mass of ruins. "If Maryland secedes," said Alexander H. Stephens, "the District of Columbia falls to her by reversionary right, as Sumter fell to South Carolina." The designs of the Confederates on Washington while they determined the movement of Southern forces, gave zeal and energy to the North. To protect Washington became the great primary object of the North. Manassas Junction, a point on the railroad between Washington and Richmond, where a branch comes in from the Shenandoah Valley, was singled out as the rendezvous for the South; and thither their troops were hurried forward with all possible rapidity. Manassas Junction is only thirty miles from Washington; and it was doubtless selected, because it threatened Washington, rather than because it might cover Richmond. It was a daring movement on the part of the South. If they were able to make their position good at Manassas, their next move would have been to occupy Arlington Heights, which overlook and command the national capital. Arlington Heights secured, it was not unnatural for them to conclude that Washington might be in their hands, before the 4th of July, when Congress was summoned to meet. It was a splendid vision—it can hardly be called a dream; had it been realized, the Civil War, if not prematurely brought to a close, would certainly have rolled on in other channels, and the condition of the United States to-day would have been different.

While the South was busy, the North was not idle. After not a little difficulty and some bloodshed, the loyal forces found themselves in considerable strength in Washington. Maryland had foolishly interfered with the passage of the loyal troops through her territory. It was a bad blunder; but force and
persuasion ultimately prevailed, and the right of way was resumed, not again to be called in question. Towards the end of May, a large army, under General Scott, was assembled in and around the capital. Notwithstanding all that had happened, Lincoln was extremely unwilling to invade the South. Delay, however, had been perilous in the extreme. From the window of his chamber in the White House, the president could see, on the other side of the Potomac, the waving folds of the Southern flag; and with the aid of his field-glass, he might observe the Confederate engineers at work. By night their camp-fires lit up with a lurid light the southern sky. A forward movement was resolved upon. On the 23d of May, a strong column, under the command of General McDowell, was thrown across the Potomac, and Arlington Heights and the town of Alexandria were occupied. Before the end of the month, General Butler, with a body of twelve thousand men, held possession of Fortress Monroe; General Patterson, with another column, was posted near Harper's Ferry; while General G. B. McClellan, with another powerful body, had crossed the Ohio River and taken a strong position in Western Virginia. The main body of the Confederates was stationed at Manassas Junction, and was under the command of General Beauregard. General Magruder held General Butler in check on the Peninsula. General J. E. Johnston confronted Patterson in the valley of the Shenandoah. Another strong force was posted in the high lands of West Virginia, prepared to meet any aggressive movement on the part of the Union soldiers.

Such was the state of affairs in June and the early days of July, 1861. McClellan's West Virginia campaign—including the battle at Philippi, June 3d, the later action at Rich Mountain, July 11th, and the subsequent encounters at Carrack's Ford and at Beverly—all-important as they were, must be regarded as forming part of the prelude to the first great battle which was soon to be fought. The same may be said of General Butler's less successful effort at Big Bethel, June 10th. Patterson was still idly confronting Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley.

Public impatience, at length, reached a climax. The new regiments were coming in slowly; and the term for which the three months' troops had been called out would expire about the end of July. The people felt that if something was not done at once, the Confederates, having opposed to them only raw and undisciplined recruits, would have all things their own way. The soldiers themselves were disgusted with their life of inaction. The cry became general, "On to Richmond"; and it was echoed as loudly by the men in the field as by the public.

Arrangements had been made to make a forward movement on the 8th day of July; but it was deemed unsafe to break up the camp before the 15th. General Scott, the commander-in-chief, in consequence of age and infirmity, did not feel himself equal to the task of taking command in the field. For this
highly responsible position, he selected Brigadier-General Irwin McDowell. McDowell was a native of Ohio, a graduate of West Point; he had seen service in Mexico under General Wool, and had acquired the reputation of being an excellent soldier. He had already been placed at the head of the Union forces in Virginia, and as we have seen had made himself master of Arlington Heights, where were his head-quarters.

The forces on the one side and on the other were disposed as follows. The main body of the Northern army, under McDowell, numbering about forty-five thousand men, lay in front of Washington, its back upon the Potomac, and extended from Alexandria to the Chain Bridge. At Martinsburg, toward the northwest, and beyond the Blue Ridge, with its back also on the Potomac, there was the army of General Patterson, numbering some eighteen thousand men. The position was strong. The three bridges which span the Potomac at Washington City were well guarded by batteries and earthworks. The fortifications on Arlington Heights covered all the positions which commanded Washington and Georgetown. The Confederate forces, numbering some twenty thousand, and under the command of Beauregard, already familiar to the reader as the commander-in-chief in Charleston Harbor, were strongly posted at Manassas Junction—a place of great natural strength, and made almost impregnable by the Confederate engineers. Manassas is situated about half-way between the eastern spur of the Blue Ridge and the Potomac below Alexandria; and it had the advantage of being connected by railroad with Richmond and the valley of the Shenandoah. Regarding Manassas as their centre, the right swung out and rested on the Potomac, below Alexandria, holding the forts which blockaded the river. Their left consisting of some eight thousand men under Joseph E. Johnston, lay at Winchester, confronting the Federal army under Patterson. Such were the relative positions of the rival armies on the eve of the battle of Bull Run, or as the Southerners prefer to name it, the battle of Manassas. In point of numerical strength, the advantage most certainly lay with the North; but the South had chosen a splendid position and made admirable use of its natural advantages.

On the 15th of July McDowell received instructions to advance and attack the Confederate position at Manassas Junction. It deserves to be remarked here that Patterson, who, as we have seen, was stationed at Martinsburg, received strict orders not to abandon his position, but to hold the Confederates under Johnston in his grip, and to prevent them by every possible means from coming to the aid of Beauregard at Manassas. This was part of the battle-plan; and although, as we shall see presently, it led to disastrous results, it was at once well conceived and well-intended. On the 16th the forward movement began. Leaving some fifteen thousand men to guard the seat of government, McDowell, at the head of some
thirty thousand men, arranged in four divisions, and commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Taylor, Colonels Hunter, Heintzelman and Miles, advanced towards Fairfax Court House. This place was about ten miles distant and was known to be in the possession of the Confederate forces. The army moved in four columns—Tyler with the right wing taking the Georgetown road; Hunter with the centre taking the Leesburg and Centreville road; Heintzelman with one portion of the left taking the Little River turnpike, and Miles with the remaining portion of the left proceeding along the old Braddock road, which, as it passes through Fairfax Court House and Centreville, becomes the Warrenton turnpike. The movement was made in good order, and with complete success. It was a success, however, coupled with disappointment; for at Fairfax Court House, where they expected to find the enemy in strength and ready to offer battle, they found on a deserted camp and an almost ruined village. The Confederates, hearing of their approach, had retired hastily but in good order through Centreville to Bull Run, a stream flowing in front of their position at Manassas Junction. The national forces were naturally enough elated with easy victory. Some little excesses were indulged in; but they were promptly rebuked and they were not repeated.

On hearing that the enemy had evacuated Centreville, McDowell's first intention was to make a vigorous demonstration on their front with a view of turning their right. On a closer examination of the situation, he saw that this course was beset with some peril. He deemed it expedient, therefore, to change his plan, and resolved to turn, if possible, the Confederate left, and seize the railroad in their rear. While thus engaged, McDowell's plans were well-nigh frustrated by the rash enthusiasm of one of his subordinates. About noon of the 18th, General Tyler, believing that he could, without much difficulty, march directly on Manassas, moved down from Centreville towards Blackburn's Ford. He took with him Richardson's Brigade, a squadron of cavalry and Ayres' battery, Sherman's brigade being held in reserve. Beauregard, who had been well advised of all that was taking place, was there in position and ready to receive him. The ground was thickly wooded; and the opposing forces were concealed from each other's view. Opening an artillery fire on the forest in front, Tyler soon perceived the glittering points of the bayonets of the enemy; and a rattling discharge of artillery and musketry taught him the danger of his position. The affair was brief; but it was bloody. In vain Tyler attempted to dislodge the enemy. In vain he pushed forward his regiments. In vain he brought up Sherman's brigade. After an hour's ineffectual efforts he was compelled to retire. The skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, called by the Confederates the battle of Bull Run, was justly claimed by them as a victory. The Nationals lost about one hundred men; the Confederate loss was about twenty. The losses, it is true, were not great;
but the lesson was emphatic. It naturally enough emboldened the South; while it taught the military politicians and enthusiasts of the North that the putting down of the rebellion was not to be a mere holiday exercise.

McDowell felt the necessity for immediate and vigorous action. The situation had become critical. Every hour was increasingly precious. In a few days more, he knew he would lose the flower of his army. The three months' term of service for which the first call of volunteers was made, had all but expired. In his own report the General says, "In the next few days, day by day, I shall have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army." The Confederate army meanwhile was steadily increasing in numbers. Adhering to his plan to turn the Confederate left, he concentrated his forces at and around Centreville, and made instant preparations for an attack. In addition to a force of five thousand men within call, he had around him and ready for immediate action some twenty-eight or thirty thousand men, with forty-nine guns. On the 19th a reconnaissance was made; and it was intended to make the attack on the following day. His supplies, however, came late; and another day was lost. The 20th was Saturday. On the evening of that day McDowell's army began to melt away. The term of service of the Fourth Pennsylvania and Varian's Battery of the New York Eighth having expired, those troops could not be induced to remain; and the historian must regretfully chronicle the fact that on the following morning they "moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon."

At this stage it is necessary for the reader to form something like a clear and accurate conception of the ground on which the impending conflict was to take place. Bull Run, it is to be remembered, flows from the northwest to the southeast. During a part of its course, it is equidistant about three miles from Centreville and Manassas Junction, the head-quarters respectively of the Union and Confederate armies. There are three roads running out of Centreville, which cross the stream at different points. There is the Warrenton turnpike which crosses by the Stone Bridge. There is another road which crosses at Blackburn's Ford. There is a third road further to the south, which crosses at Union Mills Ford. These are the three principal fords; and in the order in which we have named them, they mark consecutively the Confederate left, centre and right. In addition to these are Sudley's Spring Ford about two miles to the northeast of the Stone Bridge, Red Hill Ford, between the Stone Bridge and Sudley's Spring, and McLean's Ford, between Blackburn's and Union Mills. Cub Run, a branch of Bull Run, and flowing from north to south, is another feature of the landscape which deserves to be noted. Along the line of Bull Run, over a distance of eight miles, the Confederates were posted as follows. There were six brigades—Ewell's at Union Mills Ford; Jones' at McLean's...
By the we Johnston Patterson all By was In and The Manassas. The pursu and certain He detour and Avere Avas Tates of under of twenty-two cal partment gar

and of the Confederate army was about twenty-two thousand men. In numerical strength, it was inferior to the army under McDowell; but in the strength of their position and their thorough knowledge of the ground the Confederates had immeasurably the advantage.

We have seen already that Patterson was stationed in the valley of the Shenandoah, and that it was his special business to hold Johnston at Winchester and prevent him from joining Beauregard at Manassas. When McDowell advanced to Fairfax Court House on the 17th, information of the fact was conveyed to the Confederate War Department; and Johnston was immediately telegraphed to join the army of the Potomac with all his forces. The despatch was received on the 18th in the morning; and by noon of the 20th, having eluded Patterson, Johnston reached Manassas Junction, with six thousand men. He had marched unmolested through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont; and thence by railroad he hurried forward his infantry to Manassas, leaving the cavalry and artillery to pursue their journey as before. The arrival of Johnston was an immense gain to the Confederates. Being senior officer, he immediately took command of the army, without interfering in the least, however, with Beauregard's plans. The Confederates were now as eager to join battle as were the Unionists, because they feared that unless they struck at once, Patterson, discovering that Johnston had outgeneralled him and made good his escape, would hurry forward and reinforce McDowell. It was a groundless fear, as the result proved; but it was surely most natural in the circumstances.

McDowell's plan, as we have seen, was to turn the Confederate left, drive them from the Stone Bridge and from the Warrenton turnpike, and so make himself master of the Manassas Gap railroad in their rear. By this means, he hoped to prevent the junction of the forces of Johnston and Beauregard. He did not know that through the blundering of Patterson the junction had already been effected. To carry out his plans, Tyler was instructed to move along the Warrenton turnpike and open fire on the Confederate left at Stone Bridge. Hunter and Heintzelman were to follow him for a certain distance, then to make a detour northward, crossing Bull Run near Sudley's Spring, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Confederates, when already under fire from Tyler's men. Miles with Richardson's brigade attached, was to remain at Centreville and guard the position. The movement was to commence at half-past two o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the 21st. By midnight everything was in readiness. The night had been more than ordinarily beautiful. The surrounding country was in all the glory of midsummer. Innumerable camp-fires shed a strange light on the
dense foliage of the neighboring forests. The air was fresh, and not a breath rustled the lightest leaf. The moon was full; and from the blue vault of the cloudless heavens it diffused over the scene below a soft, mellow light. As night wore into early morn, and the summer sun began to gild the summits of the distant hills, Nature, beautiful in her brightest robes, seemed all-unconscious of the terrific struggle which was to disturb the stillness of that Sabbath day.

The onward march of the three divisions from Centreville, was, as we have seen, to begin at half-past two o'clock on Sunday morning. It was calculated by McDowell that, if his orders were faithfully carried out, Tyler would reach the Stone Bridge about four, that Hunter and Heintzelman having accomplished their semicircular detour, would be at the appointed spot about six, and that when Tyler had fairly engaged the attention of the enemy in front, the other two divisions should unexpectedly make a vigorous attack on his flank and rear. That demon of delay which had prevented him reaching Centreville until the 18th, a day later than he had intended, and which hindered him from offering battle on the 20th, was again fatal to McDowell's plans. It was six or a little later when Tyler reached the Stone Bridge; and it was nearly four hours later, the hot July sun being already high in the heavens, when Hunter and Heintzelman arrived at their destination. McDowell, who was ill, had followed in a carriage; but impatient of the ruinous delay, he mounted his horse, and, followed by a few attendants, was the first on the battlefield. Before the battle began, he saw that his plans had been frustrated.

The discharge of a shell from a thirty-pounder Parrott gun, which fell among a band of Confederates, seen in a July meadow below Bull Run, and scattered their ranks, was the signal for battle. Although other shells were fired in quick succession, the Confederates were slow to reply. McDowell dreaded that an attack was contemplated on his left, further down the stream. He therefore held in reserve one of Heintzelman's brigades (Howard's), in case, as he said, "he should have to send any troops back to reinforce Miles' division." Colonel Evans, who, with a very small force, held the Stone Bridge for the Confederates, naturally enough believed at first that the attack made in front by the force under Tyler was the real one. He was soon, however, undeceived. As early as half-past nine, he was made aware that a large force of the enemy was passing through the woods on his left and towards his rear. By ten o'clock, the advance brigade of Hunter's column, commanded by Burnside, had reached the open fields. In the interval, however, he had found time to send for reinforcements, to wheel around, making an entire change of front, and to post himself in a first class position to receive the enemy. His right rested in a long and narrow grove in front of Young's Branch—a petty tributary of Bull Run; his centre crossed the Sudley road to the north of the Warrenton turnpike;
and his left was concealed among the outhouses, sheds, haystacks and fences of a neighboring farm. The position was somewhat elevated, enabling him to pour a destructive fire of artillery and musketry on the forces of the enemy, as soon as they emerged from the woods, and while yet distant many hundred yards.

The appearance of the head of Burnside's column at the edge of the wood was the signal for the opening of the Confederate fire. It was sharp and severe, and well fitted to produce confusion among comparatively raw recruits, as yet but little experienced to the severities and sudden surprises of the battle field. But the men under Burnside were full of purpose; and having enjoyed half-an-hour's rest at the ford, where they filled their canteens with water, they were well refreshed. Not waiting to form proper line of order, they sharply responded. The Second Rhode Island, under Colonel John Slocum, was the first under fire. Burnside was not slow in getting his troops in hand; while Porter's brigade, quickly emerging from the wood, formed on his right, Griffin's battery also getting into position and replying with effect to the Confederate artillery. The battle was now fairly begun. Evans was already sorely pressed, when he received some welcome assistance. General Bee, who was next in what had now become his rear, with detachments of his men and Burton's Georgia brigade, and carrying with him six guns of Imboden and Richardson, rushed down the slope towards the turnpike.

It was a critical moment for the National troops. Burnside, realizing the situation, called for help. Sykes' battalion was promptly hurried forward from Porter on the right. The national line was thereby greatly strengthened. The battle raged fiercely, the Confederate artillery, particularly from its superior position, telling with deadly effect on the Union ranks. Colonel Hunter fell, severely wounded, and had to be carried from the field. Colonel Slocum was mortally wounded; and his major, Sullivan Ballou, had his horse killed under him, and his leg badly crushed by a cannon ball. The battle had lasted an hour; and the result was still doubtful, when Porter, having arrived on the scene, poured a heavy fire on Evans' left, making his whole column waver and bend. Almost at the same moment, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division, which had been ordered forward, successfully crossed the ford just above the Stone Bridge, and added its strength to the Union forces. Hunter's success, however, was already assured; the Confederates were in retreat; and Sherman was ordered, his troops being still fresh, "to join in the pursuit of the enemy, who was falling back towards the Sudley's Spring road." The first part of McDowell's plan had been carried out with success. He had turned the enemy's left; he had forced him from the Warrenton turnpike; he had uncovered the Stone Bridge; he had pressed the opposing lines at least a mile and a half, and had occupied the vacated ground.

At this stage occurred McDowell's
mistake—a mistake which, with the light we now enjoy, we can afford to call fatal. The left wing of the Confederates had been turned and broken, and was now in full retreat. We have already given a general view of the ground on which the opposing forces were encamped; and we have already, in a passing way, referred to Young's Branch. At this point, it will be well for the reader to form an accurate conception of Young's Branch or Creek and the plateau on which the final struggle took place. Young's Branch flows from the west in a valley which forms a curve concave to the south, and joins Bull Run a short distance below the Stone Bridge. It was down the northern slope of this valley that the national troops had descended. It was up the southern slope that the Confederates were being driven. On the summit of this southern slope, and about the height of a hundred feet, there is a piece of table land or plateau, oblong in form, a mile in length from northeast to southwest and about half-a-mile in width. On the eastern and southern brows of this plateau, there is a pine forest; while to the west there is a broad belt of oaks through which runs the Sudley road. On the plateau there were three houses—Robinson's to the north, Henry's to the southwest of Robinson's, and Lewis's or the "Portico," as it was called, still further to the south. Across the Warrenton turnpike and up towards this plateau, the defeated Confederates rushed; and by the aid of Colonel Hampton's splendid legion, which had come from Richmond too late to take part in the furious struggle, the retreat was conducted in good order. Up towards the plateau McDowell pursued his flying antagonists. When Bee's discomfited troops reached the summit of the slope, there stood a full brigade, solid, strong and immovable, in line, and ready for battle. It was the brigade of General T. J. Jackson who had just arrived and taken a position behind Bee. "They are beating us back," exclaimed Bee. "Well, sir," said Jackson, with the utmost coolness, "we will give them the bayonet." Bee rallied his men. "Form! form!" he cried. "There's Jackson, standing like a stone wall." The words were electric. "Stonewall Jackson," shouted the soldiers. The name which was yet to be a watchword and a rallying cry on many a bloody battle field, was from that moment immortal. The circumstance turned the tide of battle. In the opinion of many, if McDowell, instead of pursuing the Confederates up to the hill forest, had moved direct for Manassas Junction, the day would have been decided and the victory his. This of course implies that the effect of "Stonewall" Jackson's stubborn resistance checked the tide of victory which had already set in in McDowell's favor, and gave the Confederates the opportunity which they needed. We incline to this view of the case; but we are unwilling to forget that we judge the situation with a larger knowledge than McDowell at the time possessed. He was ignorant of the position of General Jackson; and even if he had known that such a force under such a man stood firm and
fresh on the heights, he might have doubted whether a routed army could be so easily checked and forced to turn round and face the pursuing foe.

It was noon. The heat had become intense. Clouds of dust and smoke filled the air and blinded the assailants as they rushed up the sloping hillside. Johnston and Beauregard, alarmed by the heavy firing, and by the intelligence which they had received of the successful movements of the national troops, ordered Generals Holmes, Early and Ewell to hurry forward with their troops in the direction of the sound of the battle, while they themselves galloped from their position, four miles distant, to the plateau. They found upon it a force of seven thousand men, with fourteen guns; but they were well sheltered in a dense thicket of pines. The battle was all but lost; the situation was desperate; but the brigades of Holmes and Early and Ewell and Jonham, with the batteries of Pendleton and Alburtis, would soon be on hand. Johnston rallied the shattered regiments on the right; Beauregard those on the left. This done and something like order restored, Beauregard took command of the field, and Johnston retired and established his headquarters at the house of Mr. Lewis, called “The Portico,” from which he had a full view of the entire field of battle, and where he could exercise a general supervision. When the battle entered upon its second phase and the struggle began for the possession of the plateau, the Confederate strength was increased to ten thousand men and twenty-two guns. It was discovered that at the lower fords nothing was intended by the enemy. Every available man was, therefore, hurried forward to the “focus of the fight.”

On the national side, the most vigorous measures were adopted to make the attack a success. It was felt that the Confederates had an immense advantage in the position which they occupied. To drive them from that position was the task now on hand. The attacking force consisted of five brigades, Porter being in command on the right, Franklin and Wilcox in the centre, and Sherman and Keyes on the left. Howard’s brigade was upon the Run. Burnside’s brigade, whose ammunition had been exhausted in the morning battle, had been withdrawn into a wood for the purpose of being supplied, and had not yet returned to the scene of action. Schenck was on hand and ready to cross the bridge. With the attacking force were Griffin’s, Rickett’s and Arnold’s batteries, and a body of cavalry under Major Palmer. The entire strength was thirteen thousand men and sixteen guns. Eighteen thousand men still remained on the west side of Bull Run. The five brigades, the batteries and the cavalry moved boldly and steadily up the slope south of the Warrenton turnpike, McDowell being present in person, with Heintzelman, who acted as his chief lieutenant on the field. They were exposed to a raking fire from the Confederate batteries. Onward, however, they pressed; and having outflanked the enemy, they were soon in possession of the western edge of the
plateau. A little to the southeast of the Henry house, to which we have already made reference, there was a swell of rising ground, which, it was seen, at once, commanded the field of action. It was the key of the position. Whoever held it had command of the entire plateau. Orders were given to Rickett’s and Griffin’s batteries to advance and plant themselves upon it. The batteries were supported by the Eleventh New York, the Twenty-seventh New York, Fifth and Eleventh Massachusetts, the Second Minnesota, and Corcoran’s Sixty-ninth. The attack was bravely made. The artillery, with the New York Eleventh (Ellsworth’s Fire Zouaves), who were in immediate support of the batteries, in the face of a terrific cannonade moved gallantly forward. All of a sudden, an Alabama regiment emerged from behind a clump of pines, and poured a deadly fire on their flank. This surprise was all the more demoralizing that the attacking regiment was mistaken at first for one of their own. When staggering under this deluge of fire in front and on flank, two companies of Stuart’s Black Horse Cavalry rushed furiously upon their rear. The regiment was ruined. The batteries, the horses of which had been killed, were in utmost peril. Other regiments were sent forward, but in vain. Three times were the batteries overrun by Confederates; and three times were the troops of the enemy repulsed and the batteries reclaimed. While this struggle was raging with alternate success and defeat on the right, an attempt was also being made by

McDowell’s left to carry the plateau. The fighting in this direction had been equally severe. Sherman had been ordered to charge the batteries of the Confederates with his entire brigade, and sweep them from the hill. In the encounter the riflemen of Quimby’s Thirteenth New York, the Seventy-ninth (Scotch) New York, and the Sixty-ninth (Irish) New York, especially distinguished themselves. The gallant Cameron of the Seventy-ninth was killed when, for the third time, he led his brave Highlanders to the charge. Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth, had his horse shot under him, and was made prisoner. Keyes had little better success on the extreme left. He had forced his way up the slope, and reached the Robinson house; but the fire from the enemy’s batteries was so severe that he was compelled to retire.

The critical moment had arrived. The slaughter had been terrible on both sides. The Union advance had been checked; but the Confederate strength was well-nigh exhausted. Several of their best officers were killed, and not a few were disabled. Bee and Baxter had fallen in the heat of the fight, near the Henry house. Hampton and Jackson had been wounded. Beauregard had his horse shot under him. McDowell had still two brigades fresh, besides Burnside’s, in reserve. It was now three o’clock, and there was no appearance of Early and his three fresh regiments. The order had been sent him at eleven, but by some mishap it had not reached him till two. “Oh, for four regiments,” cried Johnston to Colonel Cocke. His
wish was soon to be gratified. The mistake made by Patterson in allowing Johnston's army to escape from Winchester is now to be revealed. A cloud of dust was seen in the direction of Manassas Gap. Johnston's first fear was that it might be Patterson; but no; it was the remainder of his own army, Elzey's brigade, led by Kirby Smith. They were about three thousand strong. Hearing the sound of battle, they had stopped the cars before they reached the Junction. Hurrying up at the supreme moment, they struck the National right full on its flank. The fate of the day was decided. The battle was won. The cross fire of the newly arrived troops was irresistible. The cry went up from the National ranks, "Here's Johnston from the Valley." In a moment the battle was ended. There was no more fight in the Union men. Helter skelter they ran down the plateau. It was not a repulse. It was a rout. Never was victory more complete. Never was rout more disgraceful. In vain did McDowell try to rally his men. They would not, they could not, hear. At Cub Run the rout became a panic. Arms and all encumbrances were flung away. Everything was left on the field. Soldiers, citizens and camp followers rushed to Centreville and thence on to Washington, there to describe to the astonished and bewildered multitude another than the holiday scene which some of them had gone forth to witness. At night Jefferson Davis, who had witnessed the greater part of the fight, telegraphed to his Congress, "Night has closed upon a hard fought field. Our forces were victorious. The enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandoning a large amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks and baggage. The ground was strewed for miles with those killed, and the farm houses around were filled with wounded. . . . Our force was fifteen thousand; that of the enemy estimated at thirty thousand." The report did not speak the truth; but it bespoke the triumph of the situation—the pride and spirit of the man.

The loss on the part of the Confederates was 378 killed, 1489 wounded. The national loss was 481 killed, 1011 wounded, and 1460 prisoners.

Not one of all the battles of the war has been so variously, and in some instances so unjustly, commented on as Bull Run. It is not our business in these pages to combat or endorse the opinions which have been expressed. There are, however, some things which, in justice to the one side and the other, must be said. It is not to be denied that on both sides there was displayed much bravery and not a little skill. Never, perhaps, before, in the whole history of the world, was such fighting done by comparatively raw and inexperienced men. On the part of the South, the battle was skillfully fought and fairly won. In a better cause, Beauregard and Johnston would have covered themselves with glory. On the part of the North, there was certainly bad management. Some serious blunders were made. General Scott blundered by the disposition he made of his forces. He had eighty thousand men at his dis-
posal; he had divided them into three parts, and had foolishly allowed one of these parts to be flung unsustained on the enemy. Patterson blundered when he allowed Johnston to escape from him at Winchester. He blundered still more when he remained idle in his position after he discovered that the enemy had escaped. Patterson has since endeavored to explain; but, in spite of all explanation, he will forever remain accused before the bar of history of culpable inaction. McDowell blundered by not taking pains to make himself master of the topographical features of the ground before he commenced his march from before Washington. He blundered on three different occasions by losing time. He blundered most of all in not bringing his three fresh brigades into action before the arrival of Kirby Smith. Even at the last critical moment, the appearance of so many fresh troops might have prevented the rout, and nailed victory to the Union standards. The retreat was unusually well conducted; but this was due largely to the fact that the Confederates were too exhausted and too fearful to continue the pursuit. The battle of Bull Run, decisive as it was, settled nothing. The South gained the victory, but they failed in their purpose. Washington was more safe than before. The South was jubilant. The North was humbled; but it was also more determined than ever to prosecute the war. It was evident to all that a protracted struggle was before the country. Both sides began to raise and organize armies on a gigantic scale. President Lincoln called for half a million of men. General McDowell was removed; and General George B. McClellan was placed in command of the army around Washington.

CHAPTER IV.

Importance of some of the Minor Battles.—Where they were Fought.—The Border States.—Armed Neutrality.—Lincoln's Message.—Maryland and Delaware.—Virginia, the Focus of the Rebellion.—Occupation of Harper's Ferry.—The Capture of Romney.—Beverley.—Carrack's Ford.—Change of Commanders.—McClellan.—His Past Career.—Rosecrans.—Floyd.—Carnifex Ferry.—Drainsville.—Ball's Bluff.—A Butchery.—Death of Colonel Baker.—Fremont in Missouri.—Dug Springs.—Lyon.—Sigel.—Lyon Wounded.—Colonel Mitchell Killed.—Battle of Wilson's Creek.—Capitulation of Lexington.—Halleck Supersedes Fremont.—Kentucky.—Governor Magoffin.—Kentucky in favor of the Union.—Lincoln's Reply to Magoffin.—The Young Men of Kentucky.—The Older Men.—Kentucky Forced into Secession.—General Polk.—Fort Columbus.—Polk's Invasion of Kentucky.—Grant in Command at Cairo.—Grant's Determination.—His Proclamation.—Battle of Belmont.—The Attack.—Terrible Fire from Fort Columbus.—The Victory of the Nationals.—The License of the Soldiers.—The Victors Compelled to Retreat.—Showers of Bullets.—The Retreat Successfully Made.—The Confederates Claim the Victory.—It Might Have Been Different.—General Grant Learns a Lesson.

The year 1861, subsequent to the battle of Bull Run, was not marked by any great or decisive battle. There were, however, numerous engagements of a minor character, each of which was attended with consequences of greater or less importance, and all of which tended to fan into
more furious flame that growing war sentiment which was soon to find development on a more gigantic scale. These engagements can hardly be said to have been the result of any general plan, or to have formed essential links in the chain of events which were soon to culminate in what may be called the great campaigns. But because of the heroism with which they were illustrated, and the examples of self-sacrifice which they called forth, as well as for the influence which they exerted in their several sections, they cannot, in a work like this, be passed over in silence.

These minor battles occurred principally in the border States, Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia. We have seen already that the five border States, including, in addition to those just mentioned, Maryland and Delaware, were eagerly coveted by both North and South. It was evident from the first that in those States the great struggle for supremacy should take place. With the border States secured, and bearing the principal burden of the war, it was the hope of the Southern leaders that the cotton crop might be raised without molestation. It might still be possible for the National government to establish a blockade by sea and by river; but England needed cotton; and the South counted with confidence alike on English sympathy and on English necessity.

Situated midway between the rival influences of North and South, and placed necessarily in the very front of the conflict, it was very natural that among the inhabitants of those States there should be great division of sentiment, Every effort was made by the Southern leaders to excite the slaveholding interest, by making it appear that the North had at last entered upon a crusade against slavery, and that the Republican party, now in power at Washington, were bent upon the most tyrannical measures. The National government was just as anxious that the border States should remain steadfast in their loyalty. How to deal with slavery was the great difficulty which lay in the way of the North. To pronounce against slavery, it was felt, would be to fling the entire slaveholding interest into the arms of the Confederacy. All through the summer of 1861 every precaution was taken to avoid giving offence to the slaveholding interest. As the situation became more pressing, different views began to be entertained and expressed by those in power. General McClellan, who was in command in Northeastern Virginia, declared it to be his purpose not only not to interfere with the slaves, but to crush with a hand of iron any attempt made by them at insurrection. General Butler, on the other hand, who was in command at Fortress Monroe, decided, on the same day, to regard them as "contraband" of war. Armed neutrality found favor with not a few; but President Lincoln, in his message to Congress at its extra session in July, clearly pointed out that armed neutrality would be more a gain to the South than to the North. "In the Border States, so called, in fact, the Middle States," he said, "there are those who favor a policy which they call 'armed neutrality'; that is, an arm
ing of these States to prevent the Union forces passing one way or the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be building an impassable wall along the line of separation—and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality, it would tie the hands of Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which could not be done if they were open enemies. At a stroke, it would take all trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the internal blockade. It would do for the disunionists that which of all things they most desire—feed them well, and give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union."

The geographical positions of Maryland and Delaware, as well as their special interests, prevented them making any very strong demonstration of Southern sympathy. Delaware was too weak and too thoroughly hemmed in to be allowed to think either of secession or of neutrality; and General Butler's vigorous efforts, at the commencement of the war, had effectually secured Maryland to the Union. It was quite otherwise with Virginia, Missouri and Kentucky.

Virginia, as we have seen, and as had been evident from the first, had become the focus of the rebellion. The Richmond authorities had seized Harper's Ferry, immediately upon the passage of the ordinance of secession. Occupying it with as large a force as they could spare for the purpose, they held the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and thus cut off all communication between Western Virginia and Washington along that line. No movement was made by the National government until the ordinance of secession had been ratified, the general feeling at Washington being that every care should be taken to do nothing which was capable of being interpreted as interference with the Border States.

Immediately after the ratification of the ordinance, General George B. McClellan, to whom had been assigned the command of the Department of the Ohio, including Western Virginia, was ordered to cross the Ohio and advance along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as far as Harper's Ferry. Having issued addresses to the people and to his soldiers, in one of which he denounced "the infamous attempt of the traitorous conspiracy dignified by this name of the Southern Confederacy," he moved forward and occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the railroad on the Ohio River. There was a Confederate force at Grafton Junction, not far distant. There was another Confederate force of 12,000 men at Romney. In addition to these, General Joseph E. Johnston, at the head of a large army, lay at Harper's Ferry.

The force at Grafton was under the command of General G. A. Porterfield. On the appearance of McClellan at Parkersburg, Porterfield issued an address in which he called on the people to arise
GENERAL "STONEWALL" JACKSON
THE FAMOUS CONFEDERATE COMMANDER
and resist the intruders, who, coming from other States, sought to rule over them. McClellan having ordered an advance to Philippi, Porterfield was pressed back, first to Beverley and then to Huttonsville, where he was joined by Governor Wise, who came up with large reinforcements and assumed command. In this engagement at Philippi, Colonel Kelly, who performed deeds of great valor, was severely wounded.

In the meantime an encounter took place at Romney, which shed some little glory on the National arms. Early in June General Patterson, who was in command of the Department of Pennsylvania, was making preparations for an attack on Maryland Heights, which overlook and command Harper's Ferry. Colonel Lewis Wallace had been directed to join Patterson. As he drew near the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Wallace learned that the Confederates were assembled in some strength at Romney. In twenty-four hours Wallace had accomplished a march of eighty-seven miles, forty-six of which were on foot. Coming up with the Confederates at Romney, some severe fighting took place. The Confederates were driven from the place; and Johnston was so alarmed that he evacuated Harper's Ferry, having first burned the railroad across the Potomac, spiked the guns he could not carry off, and obstructed in every possible way the railroad and the canal. Whatever glory resulted from the capture of Romney must be set down to the credit of Colonel Lewis Wallace. It was he who conceived and carried out the enterprize.

The evacuation of Harper's Ferry, if not directly caused by it, was at least an almost immediate and perhaps necessary consequence.

McClellan's forces were still at Grafton. His army, since his encounter with Porterfield, had been greatly increased; and by the 4th of July he had under him twenty thousand men. Porterfield had been superseded by General Garnett, an officer who had won distinction in the Mexican war. The Confederates were afraid that McClellan might make an effort to push his way through some of the mountain passes which lead into the Shenandoah Valley, and so effect a junction with Patterson. Garnett was ordered so to dispose of his forces as to guard the mountain gaps and make this junction impossible. Garnett, with the main body of his army, had taken a position at Laurel Hill, near Beverley. A detachment under Colonel Pegram was stationed at Rich Mountain. McClellan saw that his forces greatly outnumbered those of the enemy, and concluded to take action at once. On the 11th of July, therefore, Rosecrans, with eighteen hundred men, fell upon the detachment, which was about nine hundred strong. Pegram was put to flight, and lost nearly half of his men. McClellan now came up with his main army. Garnett, who had been joined by some remnants of Pegram's force, offered resistance; but his rear being exposed to Rosecrans, he was speedily compelled to abandon his camp and his cannon and fall back towards Beverley. McClellan, however, had reached that place
before him; and Garnett turned his face from the foe and made a precipitate flight toward the north. Pegram, cut off from all support and reduced to great extremities, having been two days without food, surrendered with six hundred of his men. Garnett was pursued and overtaken by General Morris at Carrack's Ford. Here the Confederates were brought to bay. Turning upon their pursuers, they offered a spirited resistance. It was impossible, however, to withstand the onward rush and the overwhelming numbers of the triumphant Nationals. General Garnett, who fought like a true hero, was shot through the heart while vainly attempting to rally his men. When the general fell, the Confederates broke and fled. The pursuit was continued for two miles, when the exhausted troops were recalled.

Before proceeding with our narrative, it is necessary to notice certain changes which took place in the principal commands of the army. General George B. McClellan, in his campaign in Western Virginia, had been singularly successful. Hitherto he had been the most fortunate or the most skilful of all the generals of the North. After the battle of Bull Run, there was a universal desire that he should take the place of McDowell and reorganize the shattered army which was principally depended upon for the protection of the capital. On the July 25th of July McClellan took command of the Departments of Washington and of Northeastern Virginia, his head-quarters being at Washington City. At the time of his appointment to this high position McClellan was only thirty-five years of age. He was born in Philadelphia in 1826. At the age of sixteen he entered the Academy at West Point, where, among others who rose to distinction on both sides during the war, he had for fellow students "Stonewall" Jackson and A. P. Hill. After four years' study at West Point, he graduated as second-lieutenant of engineers. Before the close of the Mexican war he had won his captaincy. His Manual for the Army, and his Introduction to the Bayonet Exercise, published a few years afterwards, and while stationed at West Point as director of field labors and instructor of infantry, gave proof at once of his military skill and of his devotion to his profession. Having filled various military positions under the government, he was appointed in 1855 one of the United States Military Commissioners to the Crimea. His report, which contained some sharp criticisms on the operations before Sevastopol, was generally well received, and showed that he had studied the art of war to no small advantage. Some years before the war broke out he had resigned his commission, and occupied himself with the management of railroads. He had been three years vice-president of the Illinois Central; and at the beginning of the year 1861 he was general superintendent of the Ohio and Mississippi. The war furnished him the opportunity for which he had been longing. His successful career in Western Virginia fully justified his promotion in July; and his appointment a little later, on
the occasion of the resignation of General Scott, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, was hailed with universal satisfaction.

After the encounter at Carrack's Ford, McClellan in his despatch to the government was able to make the proud boast: "We have completely annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia. Our loss is about 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded, while the enemy's loss is not far from 200 killed; and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least 1000. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns in all." There was still, however, some hard work to be done before the campaign was completed. On the appointment of General McClellan to the command of the Federal forces on the Potomac, General Rosecrans succeeded him and took charge of the troops which had done so well in Western Virginia. Rosecrans was a graduate of West Point; and for four years, from 1843 to 1847, he had filled some of the most important chairs at that institution. At the outbreak of the war he was engaged in business; but he lost no time in volunteering his services; and to his skill and energy not a little of the success which had attended the army of Western Virginia was due.

General J. B. Floyd, formerly secretary of war under Buchanan's administration, had, since the death of Garnett, who was killed at Carrack's Ford, assumed the command of the Confederate forces. A plan of campaign had been agreed upon at Richmond; and it was confidently expected that the Confederates would be able not only to drive the Federals out of Western Virginia, but to menace both Pennsylvania and Ohio. Floyd was to sweep down the Kanawha Valley and force Cox of Ohio beyond the border, while General Robert E. Lee, who now appears for the first time prominently on the scene, was to scatter the Union army under Rosecrans. The plan was Lee's; and it has been admitted by the most competent strategists that the rules of war, as shown by the finished drawings, never found more perfect illustration. The scheme, however, was not to succeed. Floyd, who, as we have seen, had taken the command of the Confederate forces in Virginia after the death of Garnett, moved forward with a view to carry out the part of the plan assigned to him. He relied with confidence on being joined by Wise before he encountered the Federals in any force. He had encountered Tyler, and having handled him somewhat severely, scattered his forces. He had hoped to gain the rear of Cox, and inflict upon him similar punishment. But Rosecrans was hurrying forward. Over the western spurs of the Alleghanyes, through the ravines and up the rugged hillsides, he had, with almost incredible rapidity, led his little band. At noon on the 9th of August he had reached the summit of Powell Mountain, which looks down upon one of the most beautiful scenes of that lovely region. It was no time, however, to halt and admire the beauties of nature. The two armies sighted each other. On the following day, about three
o'clock in the afternoon, the firing commenced. For nearly four hours the battle raged, both sides performing deeds of great valor. The Federal forces suffered severely at the commencement of the conflict. Colonel Lytle of the Ohio Tenth was wounded in the leg and had his horse shot under him. Colonel Lowe of the Ohio Twelfth, while hurrying forward his regiment, was shot through the head and killed instantly. Floyd, however, was outnumbered; and Wise failing to come to his support, he was unable to do more than hold his ground. At twilight, when McCook's German brigade, although exposed to a terrific fire, seemed on the point of carrying the Confederate batteries, Rosecrans, fearful for the safety of his men, ordered a recall. The onward movement was thus checked in mid-career. It was the intention of Rosecrans to resume the attack on the following morning. When the morning dawned the enemy was gone, Floyd having retired and taken a strong position on Big Sewell Mountain, some thirty miles distant from the battle field. But for the caution of Rosecrans the previous evening, the Confederates might have been completely routed. As it was, the battle at Carnifex Ferry was a substantial victory to the Federal arms.

Lee was not more successful in carrying out his part of the plan. At a critical moment, when the enemy, 25,000 strong, had entrenched themselves at Big Sewell and called it "Camp Defiance," and were threatening an aggressive movement, Rosecrans contrived to effect a retreat and was not pursued. After some other unimportant engagements, winter intervened and the campaign was ended. Lee was recalled and sent to take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina; Wise was ordered to report at Richmond, and Floyd was sent to the West. This campaign added fresh lustre to McClellan's name, who, although he was not personally in command at Carnifex Ferry, nor indeed since the encounter at Carrack's Ford, was supposed to be giving a general direction. It was temporarily greatly discouraging to the Confederates, who had expected much from General Lee.

Later in the year a serious disaster befell the National forces at Ball's Bluff. The Nationals and Confederates were confronting each other on opposite sides of the Potomac between Washington and Harper's Ferry. A slight skirmish had occurred at the latter place on the 8th of October. On that occasion W. Geary, gained a decided advantage. About the middle of the month, General McClellan, deeming it desirable to ascertain the Confederate strength in the neighborhood of Drainsville, caused a reconnoissance to be made by General McCall. From Major-General Banks, whose troops held the river on the Maryland side, from Darnestown to Williamsport, McClellan received a despatch saying that the enemy had moved away from Leesburg, the capital of Loudon County, Virginia. On the strength of Banks' despatch, McClellan notified General Stone, who was at Poolesville, of the movement of McCall,
and suggested that while keeping "a good lookout on Leesburg, a slight demonstration on his part might have the effect of moving the enemy." Both McCall and Stone acted promptly and as desired. On the night of the 20th Stone telegraphed to the chief that he had made a feint of crossing the river during the afternoon, at two places, and that he had sent out a reconnoitering party toward Leesburg, adding, "I have means of crossing one hundred and twenty-five men once in ten minutes, at each of two points." This despatch brought no reply.

In obedience to instructions from Stone, Colonel Devins, in two flat-boats from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, carried over to Harrison's Island four companies of his Massachusetts Fifteenth. One company was on the island already. A reserve of about three thousand men, including what was called the First California Regiment, under Colonel E. D. Baker, was held in readiness to co-operate, should any difficulty arise. After landing his troops, Devins sent a detachment to the Virginia shore to make an exploration towards Leesburg. A scouting party of about twenty men, under Captain Philbrick, having ascended the steep bank on the Virginia side opposite the island, and known as Ball's Bluff, believed they saw a small camp of Confederates, about a mile from Leesburg. This being made known to Stone, he ordered Devins to land on Ball's Bluff, and proceed at dawn to surprise the camp. The order was promptly executed. He set out about midnight. By daylight his men had all worked their way up the wet and slippery sides of the bluff, and stood on the summit. Without delay, he advanced towards Leesburg, in the direction of the supposed camp; but no trace of the foe could be seen; what seemed a camp in the distance was only an illusion due to certain openings in the woods. Here Devins halted his men and sent to Stone for orders.

Meanwhile Devins' movements had been carefully watched by the Confederates, who, under Evans, lay in considerable force on Goose Creek. It was not long until the National troops began to have glimpses of the Confederate cavalry and riflemen. Perceiving that the enemy were gathering around him, Devins, after a slight skirmish, fell back towards the bluff, and halted his men in an open field surrounded by woods. Here he received orders to remain, Stone promising, at the same time, to hurry forward reinforcements. About noon a fierce attack was made upon Devins' little band (about six hundred and fifty men) by the Confederates under Colonels Jenifer and Hunton. Pressed by the cavalry in front and by the infantry on the left, Devins was compelled to fall back towards the edge of the bluff. He retired about sixty paces, and took a position about half a mile in front of Colonel Lee, who had advanced and occupied Harrison's Island and the heights after the departure of Devins in the morning. Meanwhile Baker, who had been ordered forward to reinforce Devins, if he judged such a course desirable, otherwise to withdraw all the troops to the Maryland shore, had
arrived on the scene. In circumstances of almost unparalleled difficulty, he had succeeded in getting his men across the river. At a glance he saw that he had no choice. It was too late to attempt to withdraw the troops. Outranking Devins, he immediately took command, and assumed the responsibility of carrying on the fight. He had reason to believe that McCall was close at hand; and he naturally enough concluded that on hearing the sound of musketry he would hurry to the scene of action. He did not know that McCall, having been ordered to withdraw his troops from Drainsville, was already on his way back to his camp near the Chain Bridge, and that General Smith, who, with one of McCall’s divisions, was within supporting distance, was without any special instructions. Getting his men into battle order, Baker put forth almost superhuman efforts to resist the attack of the enemy. But the ground was unfavorable, and the opposing force was strong. About three o’clock in the afternoon the firing became general. Bramhall and French had scarcely got their guns into position when they were both wounded and carried from the field. Shortly afterwards a greater calamity followed. Baker, who seemed everywhere present, encouraging the men by word and deed, fell dead upon the field, pierced by many bullets. The battle had lasted two hours. On the death of Baker, first Lee, then Coggswell, his superior, took the control of affairs. The situation had become desperate; and there was no sign of reinforcements. Pressed on flank and front with an overwhelming force, and with the deep waters of the turbulent river in their rear, Coggswell resolved to move to the left and cut his way through to Edwards’ Ferry. At this moment, and just as the movement was about to be made, the Tammany Regiment, mistaking a Confederate officer for a National one, made a rush in the direction indicated by his signs. Thrown out of position, a decimating fire was poured upon the whole column by the Thirteenth Mississippi. Coggswell’s plan was now impossible. The enemy was closing in upon them at every point. A retreat was now ordered to Harrison’s Island and thence across to the Maryland shore. The retreat soon became a rout. The Confederates pressed forward, and driving the Nationals before them with bayonet and bullet, they quickly took possession of the heights. Down the slippery sides of the bluff the Nationals rushed in the wildest confusion; and while the struggling mass, crowding to the water’s edge, sought for boats in vain, some of them plunging into the water and attempting to swim to the island, others floating on logs, the enemy continued to pour down upon them the most destructive fire. It was no longer a battle. It was a butchery. Of the National troops at least 300 were killed; and more than 700 were wounded or made prisoners. At least one-half of Coggswell’s command, including himself and Colonel Lee, fell into the enemy’s hands. Colonel Devins escaped on horseback and swam across the river. Ball’s Bluff can only be regarded in the light of a temporary
misfortune. It did not seriously affect the future of the war. The mishap was brought about partly by the rashness of General Stone and partly by the imperfect arrangements made by General McClellan. It was a misfortune, however, redeemed by the bravery exhibited by the National troops. The army of the Potomac did much on that sad day to wipe out the disgrace incurred by the battle of Bull Run. By the death of General Baker the Union cause lost one of its ablest men—a man as brave in the field as he was skillful at the bar and powerful in the Senate.

While these events were taking place in Virginia, there was some severe fighting going on in Missouri. The Confederates had put forth their best efforts to secure the State. When the battle of Bull Run was fought, General Lyon, who had succeeded General Harney in the chief command of the National forces in the West, was lying at Springfield waiting for reinforcements. Meanwhile General John C. Fremont, who had been prominently before the people as the Republican candidate for the presidency in 1856, in obedience to a popular call, had been appointed to the command of the Western Department. Great things were expected from Fremont. It was the general belief that those qualities which he had revealed as an explorer would stand him in good stead on the battle field. Whether from incapacity or from radical difference of opinion between himself and the government at Washington, Fremont proved a failure. The high hopes which had been formed of him were not to be fulfilled. Towards the close of July, Lyon, dreading that if he should wait longer he would soon be overwhelmed by the Confederate troops which were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, resolved to strike at once with the forces at his disposal. He had not more than five thousand five hundred men. The enemy numbered at least twelve thousand. On the 1st of August a skirmish occurred at Dug Springs. Lyon gained some slight advantage; but he found it impossible to hinder the junction of the two columns of the enemy. Retreat in the circumstances would have been attended with great peril. He therefore resolved to resume the offensive. Audacity he thought might compensate for the want of numbers. Ordering Colonel Sigel, with 1200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy’s rear by the right, he was ready by the early dawn to strike the meditated blow. Sigel was at the appointed place in time. It was the 10th of August. At five o’clock in the morning the line of battle was formed. The forward movement was towards the extreme northern point of the Confederate camp. The first onset was terrific. The Confederates’ pickets were driven in; and Totten’s battery being hurried forward, the enemy yielded and were driven by Lyon’s infantry to the adjoining heights. No such hand to hand fighting had occurred since the commencement of the war. But the enemy had the advantage in numbers. Lyon behaved admirably. He was twice wounded, and his horse
was shot under him. Colonel Mitchell of the Second Kansas was killed when leading his men to the charge. As Mitchell fell, the cry was raised by his troops, "Who shall lead us now?" "I will lead you. Come on, brave men," said the wounded and bleeding Lyon. A few moments afterwards he was shot through the heart. The battle continued to rage, Major Sturgis having taken command. Meanwhile Sigel's brigade had been overwhelmed. He had lost five of his guns and more than one-half of his men. Like a rock in mid-ocean the Union men stood firm, the Confederate forces dashing against them in vain. At one moment, it seemed as if the line would break. But Dubois' battery dashed forward from the rear, and poured a destructive volley into the Confederate right wing. The entire line was thrown into confusion; and in broken masses they fell back to the shelter of the wood. At the same time their wagon train was seen to be on fire. It was now eleven o'clock. The battle had lasted nearly six hours. A retreat was ordered to Springfield, about nine miles distant. The enemy did not pursue. On the following morning at three o'clock the entire army under General Sigel retreated to Rolla, one hundred and twenty-five miles distant, in a government train. The battle of Wilson's Creek, as this fight was called, is claimed as a Confederate victory. It would be more correct to call it a drawn battle. The Nationals lost 223 killed, 721 wounded, 292 missing. The Confederate loss was correspondingly great.

The capitulation of Lexington, after a siege of eight days by General Sterling Price, followed close upon the battle of Wilson's Creek; and Fremont, partly because he failed to come to the aid of Colonel Mulligan and his heroic garrison at Lexington, and partly for other reasons, was relieved from his command. General H. W. Halleck arrived at St. Louis, and took charge of the Western Department on the 18th of November.

Kentucky, as may readily be imagined, was eagerly coveted by the Confederacy. The slaveholding interests were large; and it was necessary for the welfare of the secession movement that they should be protected. The occupation of this State was in fact considered a military necessity. From the first, however, Kentucky had manifested great unwillingness to sever itself from the Union. But the governor, Magoffin, who had been elected as a Democrat in 1859, was a red-hot secessionist. To President Lincoln's call for troops he had rudely responded, refusing to furnish the quota required of the State. On two successive occasions—on January 18th and on April 28th, 1861—he summoned an extra session of the Legislature for the purpose of calling a State Convention. On both occasions the Legislature refused to call a Convention or in any way comply with his wishes; on the latter occasion going so far as to resist his demand for three millions of dollars for the purpose of arming the State, and even amending the militia laws so as to require the State Guard to take an oath of allegiance to the
Union. At a meeting held in Louisville April 18th, immediately after the capture of Fort Sumter, it was resolved that Kentucky was in sympathy with those who have an interest in the protection of slavery, but that she acknowledges her fealty to the United States, until its government becomes regardless of her rights in slave property. The loyal sentiments of Kentucky were still further manifested at the election of delegates to the Peace Convention (May 4th). On this last occasion Kentucky gave a Union majority of fifty thousand votes.

Kentucky, it is thus seen, had by large majorities, and on repeated occasions, declared her unwillingness to join in the secession movement; but Governor Magoffin, being in perfect sympathy with the rebel cause, was the willing and useful instrument in the hands of the Confederate leaders. In a letter to President Lincoln, dated August 19th, he declared that the people of his State earnestly desired to avoid any war entanglements, that they had been guilty of no rebellion, and that therefore the National troops now encamped on their soil ought at once to be removed. In his reply, the president, after reminding him that the troops complained of were all Kentuckians, said, "I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky; but it is with regret I search for and cannot find in your not very short letter any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union."

On the 3d of September, in a message to the Legislature, the governor again complained of the aggressions of the North, and declared it to be his opinion that Kentucky would never renounce her sympathy with her aggrieved sister States of the South. The Legislature was not to be moved. They resolved that the neutrality of Kentucky had been violated by the Confederate forces, requested the governor to call out the militia to expel them, and at the same time invoked the United States to grant aid and assistance. These resolutions the governor had the hardihood to veto; but the Legislature returned to the charge, and passed them over his veto by large and overwhelming majorities.

The young men of the State had most of them, yielding to the enthusiasm of the moment, adopted the cause of secession; but the older men, the fathers of the State, true to the principles of their youth, and wisely fearful of the risks of rebellion, remained faithful to the Union. Crittenden, the United States senator from Kentucky, who had persisted so devotedly in his well-meant effort to avert civil war by conciliation and compromise, now that he despaired of peace, did not hesitate to take a firm stand for the Union. By this action his house was divided. One of his sons had taken up arms in behalf of the Southern Confederacy, a cause which his father proclaimed to be unholy, and its promoters deserving of the severest punishment. Prentiss, too, the veteran editor of the Louisville Journal, while manfully serving his country with all the
power of his vigorous pen, was forced into a conflict with his own child, who fought in the ranks of the Confederates. These are but two illustrations of the effects of the unhappy civil struggle in Kentucky, where it had not only destroyed political harmony, but domestic concord. "Thousands of other examples," wrote one who was deeply grieved by the state of things around him, "might be readily gathered in the Border States. Those at the extreme North and South, though they may be suffering from the ordinary evils of war, have no conception of its horrors as waged in Kentucky and Missouri."

As if impatient of further delay, the Confederates resolved to disregard the sentiments of the people of Kentucky, and take a firm footing in the State. If they could not use it as a bulwark, they were resolved to use it as a battle field. It had always been the favorite plan of the Confederate General Pillow to seize Columbus, a commanding position about twenty miles below the mouth of the Ohio, and so fortify it as to make it command the Mississippi, and blockade that river completely. The position was all the more advantageous that from Columbus to Bowling Green there was a railroad connection. General Polk, who had formerly been a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, but who had exchanged his ecclesiastical vestments for those of the soldier, and abandoned the crosier for the sword, resolved to carry out this plan. In his first general order he showed that, although he had temporarily retired from the sacred office, he had not forgotten how to use his spiritual weapons. "The invasion of the South," he said, "by the Federal armies has brought with it a contempt for constitutional liberty, and the withering influences of the infidelity of New England and of Germany combined." Polk had previously been assigned to the command of a department which extended from the mouth of the Arkansas northward on both sides of the Mississippi. On the 4th of September he advanced and seized Hickman and Columbus. A pretense of opposition was made by the Confederate secretary of war, Walker, who ordered Polk to withdraw his troops from Kentucky; but from Jefferson Davis, whom Polk had notified of the movement, a telegram was received saying, "The necessity justifies the act." On the same day that Polk invaded Kentucky on the west, General Zolliker entered it on the east, on the ground that the step was necessary for the safety of Tennessee. In a brief space of time Polk was successful in converting Columbus into an almost impregnable fortress, having got into position not fewer than one hundred and twenty heavy guns, and having gathered around him from 25,000 to 30,000 men. At this time Anderson, of Fort Sumter renown, was in command of the army of the Cumberland. General William T. Sherman was Anderson’s lieutenant. It was the earnest desire and hope of the loyal people of Kentucky that Anderson would promptly come to their aid and drive out the invader. Neither Anderson nor Sherman came up to the requirements of the situation. Ander-
son fell sick; and the command devolved upon Sherman, who brought upon himself some ridicule by declaring that it would require an army of two hundred thousand men to expel the Confederates from Kentucky. An attempt at relief was to come from another source.

As soon as it became known that General Polk had invaded Kentucky with the troops of another State, General Ulysses S. Grant, then in command of the district around Cairo, made up his mind to disregard the delusive neutrality which had been so long maintained, and to take possession of Paducah, a town situated at the junction of the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, and some forty-seven miles east of Cairo. The strong position which the enemy had taken at Columbus and Hickman on the Mississippi, and the advance of troops from Tennessee into other parts of Kentucky, had rendered the possession of Paducah absolutely necessary for the protection of Cairo. In his proclamation, Grant said he had come solely for the purpose of defending the State from the aggressions of the Confederate troops and to protect the rights of all citizens. If, however, it should be manifest that they were able themselves to maintain the authority of the government, he promised to withdraw the forces under his command. The foresight and promptitude exhibited by Grant in making himself master of Paducah were characteristic of the man. The same qualities were destined to secure him victory on many a battle field, and to carry him afterwards to the highest position in the land. In obedience to instructions from General Fremont to make some co-operative movements, Grant, who had already greatly strengthened Paducah by erecting fortifications, had thrown a pontoon bridge across the Ohio, half a mile below the town, had seized and occupied Smith Bend, and had thus cut the Confederates off from two important sources of supply, resolved to threaten Columbus by attacking Belmont, a small village and landing place on the Missouri side of the river and directly opposite Columbus. He had learned that the Confederate General Price was receiving reinforcements from Polk; and he hoped that, by making himself master of Belmont, he would break up the connection between them. Having arranged some side movements for the purpose of distracting the attention of Polk, Grant, with about three thousand troops, in four steam transports, and having for convoy the two wooden gunboats Tyler and Lexington, commanded respectively by Captains Walke and Stemble, sailed down the Mississippi from Cairo on the evening of November 6. At Nov. Island No. 1, eleven miles above 6, Columbus, they halted for the night. There Grant learned that Polk was sending troops across to cut off Oglesby, whom, in compliance with Fremont’s request, he had previously sent off to assist Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas. At an early hour on the following morning he landed his Nov. forces at Hunter’s Point, on the 7. Missouri side of the river, and about three miles above Belmont. A battalion was left to guard the transports. The
remainder advanced and formed in line about two miles above the village. The gunboats meanwhile moved down and opened fire on the Confederate batteries on the Iron Banks. The centre of the attacking column was under Colonel Fouke, the right under Colonel Buford, the left under Colonel Logan. It was evident that Polk had been taken by surprise. General Smith, whom Grant had sent ahead the day before, was threatening him at Mayfield, in his rear, and he had been making his preparations to resist an attack in that direction. Dollins and Delano’s cavalry were ordered forward to scour the woods. It was not long before they encountered the enemy, in considerable force. About a mile and a half from the enemy’s camp the line of battle was formed. Behind an abatis of felled trees which surrounded the camp lay the Thirteenth Arkansas and Ninth Tennessee. There was also opposite Grant’s left a battery of seven guns, commanded by Colonel Beltzhoozer. This battery was protected by Colonel Wright’s Tennessee regiment. In the face of a destructive fire, on the National forces rushed. Meanwhile the batteries of Columbus had shifted the heavy fire from the gunboats to the advancing line. The guns, however, were not in range, and as yet they did no harm. Nothing daunted, Grant pressed forward his men. In spite of the galling fire, onward they moved, charging over the fallen timber, capturing the battery and driving the enemy back across the low ground towards the river, and compelling some of them to take to their boats. In a brief space of time the heavy guns at Columbus were got into range, and the deadly bullets crashed through the woods, over and among the advancing and triumphant Federals. A second and a third time was the retreating foe overtaken; and although reinforced and disposed to resist to the last, they were ultimately routed, some of them seeking shelter behind buildings near the river, some in the woods above the camp, and others under cover of the batteries at Columbus. It was a complete victory. The National troops gave themselves up to the wildest excitement. As yet discipline in the army was loose. In the face of Polk’s batteries, three cheers were given for the Union; and while some of the soldiers were delivering stump speeches, others were rifling the baggage or supplying themselves with the arms which the discomfited rebels had thrown down in their flight.

Although the victory was complete, the place was untenable, commanded as it was by the heavy guns of Columbus. While these were brought to bear upon the National troops in the midst of their wild abandonment, Polk ordered General Cheatham to cross the river above with his regiments, for the purpose of cutting Grant off from his flotilla. At the same time he himself crossed with two regiments to take part in the pursuit. Five thousand fresh men were thus at hand to hinder or harass the retreat. Grant, however, was equal to the situation. Getting his men in order, he pressed forward to the landing place. While compelled to cut his way through the ranks of the ene-
my, he was exposed to a raking fire from the Confederate batteries on the Iron Banks. The fighting was terrific. After severe suffering, the landing place was reached; and under cover of the gunboats, which had come up, and which kept the enemy at bay, the embarkation was completed. By five o'clock in the afternoon, the flotilla, with the entire force on board, was on its way back to Cairo. Grant carried with him, in addition to all his own men, two of Beltzhoover's heavy guns. The estimated National loss was 480 men in killed, wounded and missing. That of the enemy was 642. The Confederates claimed the victory at Belmont, and exulted accordingly. "Accept for yourself," wrote Jefferson Davis to General Polk, "and the officers and men under your command, my sincere thanks for the glorious contribution you have just made to our common cause." Belmont was nevertheless abandoned as untenable the day after the battle. It is no disparagement to the men who fought on the Confederate side to say that if the opposing forces had been equal, the result might have been different. Belmont taught General Grant a lesson which he never afterwards forgot—the value of numbers.

CHAPTER V.

Stockade of the Southern Ports.—Naval and Coast Operations.—General Butler.—Big Bethel and Little Bethel.—Death of Winthrop and Greble.—Butler Relieved of his Command.—General John E. Wool.—The Hatters Expedition.—Butler and Stringham in Command.—Forts Hatteras and Clark.—Landing the Troops.—The Bombardment.—The Monticello Aground.—The Nationals in Fort Clark.—The Mistake.—The Second Day.—Deception on the part of the Confederates.—The Bomb-Proof.—The White Flag.—The Forts Occupied by the Nationals—Great Joy in the North.—Colonel Hawkins Closing up the Passages to the Sound.—Roanoke Island.—The Scheme of the Ocraoke.—Chicamaugomico.—The Steam tug Fanny.—Capture of the Fanny by the Confederates.—The Failure of the Expedition to Chicamaugomico.—The Confederates Land on Hatteras Island.—Brown's Retreat.—The Confederates Driven from Hatteras Island.—Gulf of Mexico.—Fort Pickens.—"Billy" Wilson and His Zouaves.—Warrington Navy Yard.—Burning of the Dry Dock.—Burning of the Juda.—Battle of Santa Rosa.—"Death to Wilson."—The Confederates Defeated.—"Billy" Wilson's Letter.—Fort McRae.—General Braxton Bragg.—Fort Pickens Opens Fire on Bragg's Works.—Two Days' Bombardment.—The Mouths of the Mississippi.—The Southwest Pass.—The Boats of Hollins.—The Manassas.—Her Attack on the Richmond.—What She Might Have Done.—The Port Royal Expedition.—General T. W. Sherman.—Samuel F. Dupont.—Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Roads.—A Magnificent Spectacle.—Sealed Orders.—The Storm.—The Fleet Dispersed.—Saved from the Perils of the Deep.—Place of Destination Known.—The Confederates Forewarned.—Port Royal.—Forts Walker and Beauregard.—Preparations for the Attack.—The Plan.—The Attack.—The Forts Abandoned.—A Great Victory.—Negro Misrule.—Bay of St. Helena.—Warsaw Sound.—The Union Flag Floating over Georgia.—Port Royal Ferry.—Naval and Land Expedition to Port Royal Ferry.—Heavy Cannonading by the Gunboats.—The Fort Abandoned.—The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders.—The Eighth Michigan.—A Flag of Truce.—Sunset.—The End of the First Day.—The Enemy Reappears in the Morning.—The Gunboats Bake the Woods.—The Battle Ended.—The Coast Expeditions so far Successful.

Almost immediately after the inauguration of President Lincoln, the attention of the government was directed to the necessity of blockading the southern ports. A proclamation was accordingly issued, announcing that
an insurrection had broken out in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, that in those States the revenue dues could no longer be collected, that the persons combined in this insurrection had threatened to grant letters of marque against the commerce of the United States, and that therefore the ports of the aforesaid States were forthwith blockaded. A April little later, on the 27th of April, 27 another proclamation was issued; and the ports of Virginia and North Carolina were included. This was followed on the part of the South by the authorization of privateers. The attempt to effect a blockade on the part of the North, and the authorization of privateers on the part of the South, necessarily gave birth to land and naval encounters of greater or lesser importance. In a history of the Battles of the Civil War, these cannot be omitted without marring the completeness of the work. It will, therefore, be our object in this chapter to group together a few of the more important of these naval and coast operations.

Attention is first called to the coast of North Carolina. At the commencement of the war, General Butler made himself conspicuous by his vigorous conduct in suppressing the Baltimore riots, and by so establishing order in Maryland that that State never again wavered in its loyalty to the government at Washington. Butler's conduct of affairs at Baltimore, successful as it was, did not meet the approval of General Scott. It could hardly have been otherwise. General Scott had spent a long lifetime in camp and field. He was a strict disciplinarian, and, from natural instinct as from training and lifelong habit, a man of order. General Butler had purpose and will; but he was totally without military experience; and it was of all things the most natural that, judged by the high standard of such a man as General Scott, he should be found wanting. Butler was ordered to take command at Fortress Monroe. Soon after his arrival there, he found himself at the head of twelve thousand troops. Magruder lay in front of him at Yorktown, having outposts at Big Bethel and Little Bethel, with a force amounting in all to not more than eight thousand. With the exception of the fortress, the entire peninsula was in the hands of the Confederates. Butler being considerably reinforced, resolved to extend the area of his authority. He had but little difficulty in making himself master of Hampton and Newport News. His subsequent efforts against Little Bethel and Big Bethel were less fortunate. Little acquainted with the ground—little acquainted, indeed, with the art of war, and influenced by the counsels of men who were less experienced than himself, he fell into a series of blunders, the very reverse of creditable to the National army. There was no lack of heroism on the part of the troops; but the management was wretched. In Major Theodore Winthrop and in June Lieutenant Greble, both of whom were killed, the North lost two promising young officers; but Big Bethel and Little Bethel will be remembered i>
connection with National disaster and National disgrace. It was an ill-fated expedition; and it was visited with the worst of all kinds of punishment—condemnation by the whole people.

Butler was relieved of his command, Major-General John E. Wool having been appointed to take his place. Butler had no duty assigned to him. Wool, as generous as he was far-seeing, gave him command of all the volunteer troops outside the fortress. Butler again found his opportunity. Information had, some short time before, been conveyed to Commodore Stringham, then commanding at Hampton Roads, that Hatteras Inlet was being freely used by English blockade runners, which were supplying the Confederates with arms, ammunition, and clothing. Stringham communicated the fact to Butler; and Butler reported to Washington, suggesting that land and naval forces should be sent to capture the forts at the inlet, and close up the passage. The suggestion was acted upon; and a squadron of vessels, on which were to be conveyed some nine hundred men, now lying in Hampton Roads, was got in immediate readiness. To General Butler was assigned the command of the troops. Commodore Stringham took command of the squadron.

Silas H. Stringham was born at Newburg, New York, in the year 1796. His first naval service was as midshipman, on board the frigate President, Commodore Rodgers, in 1809. In 1830 he commanded on the West India station. From 1835 to 1837 he held a command in the Mediterranean. He subsequently commanded the Porpoise, the Independent, and the Ohio. When the Mexican war broke out, he was in command at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. He again took charge of the Ohio; and in the successful bombardment of Vera Cruz and in the capture of the Castle of San Juan d’Uulloa, it was he who led the squadron. From 1852 to 1855 he was in command of the Mediterranean squadron. From the time of his return to the commencement of the war, he was in charge of the Charlestown Navy Yard, Massachusetts. He left that post to take chief command of the naval force blockading the hostile States. While on this service, he was called to take charge of the first naval expedition. Stringham, it will thus be seen, was a man of large experience; and it was everywhere felt that the expedition was safe in his hands.

Butler took passage by the Minnesota. His troops were on the transports George Peabody and Adelaide. In addition to these vessels there were the Pawnee, Monticello, and Harriet Lane. The frigate Cumberland also was ordered to join the squadron. On the afternoon of Tuesday, August 27th, the Aug. ships were brought to anchor, 27. about eighteen miles from the cape; and preparations were made for landing the troops early on the following morning. On the west end of Hatteras Island, and commanding the inlet, were two forts, named respectively Hatteras and Clark. It was arranged that the troops should land a short distance up the beach, so as to be able to attack the forts in the rear, while the
vessels should advance and assail them in front. Breakfast was served at four o'clock. The Cumberland, a sailing vessel, was taken in tow by the Wabash and dragged to her position. Both vessels opened fire about a quarter to ten o'clock. The flag-ship Minnesota shortly afterwards passed inside the other two and joined in the fight. Later, the Susquehanna, which had also joined the expedition, came up and opened fire. Great difficulty was experienced in landing the troops. The breakers were high and beating heavily. The boats were dashed against the beach with great violence; and one of them, belonging to the Pawnee, was actually capsized. Fortunately no one was drowned. About three hundred men succeeded in effecting a landing, under cover of the guns of the Monticello and Harriet Lane. After four hours continuous work, the firing ceased on both sides. The flags of the forts were taken down. It was believed by the Nationals that both works were about to be surrendered. The Monticello moved cautiously into the inlet, followed by the Harriet Lane. As they entered, fire was immediately opened by Fort Hatteras; and it fell heavily on the Monticello. The other vessels, the Minnesota, Susquehanna, and Pawnee now reopened fire. The contest was continued until half-past six o'clock, when the whole squadron, with the exception of the Harriet Lane and the Pawnee, was withdrawn for the night. During the fight the Monticello unhappily ran aground; and although she kept up a most vigorous fire on Fort Hatteras, dis-

charging fifty-five shells in fifty minutes, it seemed for a time as if she could not escape destruction. At the close of the day's struggle she got off, and floated out of range of the guns. She had received seven eight-inch shot in her hull. The damage done, however, was not serious; nor had she sustained the loss of a single man. Meanwhile some of the troops who had got on shore had had a singular experience. When the forts ceased firing, and the flags were taken down, they discovered that Fort Clark was abandoned, the men having fled to Fort Hatteras. Taking possession of the abandoned fort, they raised over it the Union flag. Seeing the flag again raised, but unable to recognize it as their own, the war ships reopened fire upon Fort Clark, and the National troops were compelled to retire to the landing. There they spent the night as best they were able. In the morning they did some good service by turning their rifled howitzer, which they had managed to carry with them, on some Confederate steamers which were lying off in the bay, compelling them to retire, and thus preventing any other than signal communications with Fort Hatteras. They were again placed in peril by the firing of the Pawnee; and it was not until the white flag was hoisted that they were perfectly safe.

In the morning the ships resumed the bombardment. An eleven-inch shell was flung from the Minnesota, Susquehanna. Her example was followed by the Minnesota and the Wabash. The guns were admirably man-
aged; and it was seen that every shell was falling and exploding inside Fort Hatteras. The Harriet Lane and the Cumberland came up a little later, and, taking part in the fight, greatly added to the severity of the fire. For a time the Confederates continued to resist with great spirit. Once again they attempted to deceive by hauling down the flag. This time, however, the Nationals were not to be caught. The firing from the ships continued, the shell falling thick and fast within the fort, and working terrible destruction. The garrison, unable any longer to endure the tremendous punishment they were receiving, had taken refuge inside the bomb-proof. Here, however, they were not long to be safe. An eleven-inch shell found its way through the ventilator and exploded in the midst of them. This was the determining shot of the day. Resistance now was no longer possible. The white flag was raised and the firing ceased. General Butler, on board the tug Fanny, landed at the fort and demanded an unconditional surrender. To this the Confederate commander, Commodore Barron, objected, and Butler yielded so far as to agree that the officers and men should be treated as prisoners of war. A treaty was signed by Commodore Stringham and General Butler on the one hand and by Commodore Barron, Colonel Martin, and Major Andrews on the other; and the Union flag floated once more over the forts commanding Hatteras Inlet. Although the firing had been severe, there was little loss of life. The loss was all on the side of the Confederates. On the National side, according to General Butler's report, not a man was killed or injured.

The result of the Hatteras expedition was a great triumph for the North. All over that section the intelligence was received with transports of delight. It had, as was natural, a correspondingly depressing influence on the South. It was a gain to General Butler. He had redeemed his reputation, or rather he had made it. His instructions were to destroy the forts and not to hold them. Convinced that the forts should be held, he hurried to Washington, and explained his views to the government in person. The forts were held; and Butler was commissioned by the secretary of war to go to New England and "raise, arm, uniform, and equip a volunteer force for the war."

It was confidently expected that the success of the Hatteras expedition would enable the Nationals to seize and hold the whole coast of North Carolina washed by the waters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. This expectation was not to be realized. On Butler's departure for Washington Colonel Hawkins was left in charge of the post at Hatteras. He had with him a portion of the Ninth New York, a Zouave regiment. In September he was joined by Colonel Brown and the Twentieth Indiana regiment. Hawkins held the island of Hatteras and guarded the inlet. He proceeded to close up the passages from the sea to the two sounds. Attention was first given to Ocracoke Inlet, a few miles down the coast from Hatteras. Lieutenant J. T. Maxwell was sent
thither, with a detachment of marines and soldiers, on board the tugboat Fanny. An earthwork called Fort Ocracoke and the older Fort Morgan had been abandoned. Maxwell destroyed the forts and returned.

Another expedition, to which even greater importance was attached, was sent up the island to a hamlet named Chicamacomico. It had become known that the Confederates had taken possession of Roanoke Island with three thousand men, and it was believed that their intention was to land on Hatteras and make an attempt to recover what they had lost. Colonel Brown, with his Twentieth Indiana, was ordered to Chicamacomico to hold the enemy in check. The regiment, which was landed in small boats, was destitute of everything except a small quantity of provisions. All the supplies, camp equipment, and intrenching implements had been put on board the steam tug Fanny. This vessel was detained at the forts a day beyond the appointed time. She did not sail before the 1st of October. On the evening of that day she appeared off the point; and when she was about to land her stores, three gunboats hove in sight and opened fire upon her. The Fanny had time neither to land her stores nor to make her escape. One boat only, with ten persons on board, had put off for land. These ten escaped. All the others, to the number of thirty-one, including soldiers and sailors, together with the tug-boat and its precious freight, the latter equal in value to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, fell into the hands of the Confederates. The enterprise was completely defeated. Encouraged by this success, the enemy grew more bold; and on the 4th of October a squadron of six steamers, having on board over two thousand men, appeared off Chicamacomico. Shells were immediately flung into the National camp; and under cover of the fire, two bodies of men were landed, one above and one below the encampment, the object evidently being to surround the regiment and cut off its retreat. Brown succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the enemy and carried off his men; but it was not until he had reached the lighthouse at Cape Hatteras, after having marched twenty-eight miles and experienced great privation, that he felt himself perfectly safe. It was not without good reason that the Confederates boasted loudly of this victory. It was a real victory, and was, besides, a positive gain. It enabled them to hold on to Roanoke Island—a possession which, so long as they held it, gave them control of Loggerhead and Oregon Inlets, and thus neutralized to a large extent the victory won by Stringham and Butler. They were not, however, long permitted to remain on the island of Hatteras. Under the heavy firing of the Monticello and Susquehanna, they were soon compelled to take to their boats and fly for their lives. The great mistake committed in this expedition was in allowing the steam tug Fanny to sail without a proper convoy. Skilful management should have made such a disaster impossible.

Movements of this description were
not confined to the coast of North Carolina. Events quite as thrilling were taking place in the neighborhood of Fort Pickens, on the waters of the gulf of Mexico. That place had narrowly escaped being seized by the Pensacola insurgents in the spring; and the island of Santa Rosa, on which Fort Pickens is built, had since June been guarded by the New York Sixth, known as Wilson's Zouaves. Besides these troops there was a small blockading squadron, with a garrison in the fort. Colonel "Billy" Wilson was somewhat of a character. His regiment, which had been raised almost entirely in New York, was composed of men who were never indisposed to a little riotous sport, and who knew nothing of fear. For some months life was rather tame at Santa Rosa. Wilson and his men had, however, contrived to make themselves specially obnoxious to the Confederates on the mainland. Descents on the coast were frequently threatened; and the Confederate supply boats were always in danger. It was not till the night of the 2d of September that anything of a serious nature occurred. On that night a party from Fort Pickens, under Lieutenant Shepley, crossed over and burned the dry dock at the navy yard at Warrington. On the night of the 13th the experiment was repeated. At the head of about one hundred men, Lieutenant John H. Russel, of Commodore Merwin's flag-ship Colorado, reached the navy yard; and before morning had boarded a large schooner called the Juda, then being fitted out as a privateer, had spiked a ten-inch columbiad with which she was armed, and burned the vessel to the water's edge. With the help of muffled oars, they managed to reach the ship, accomplish their purpose, and get out of the reach of danger before the Confederates were aware of what had happened.

Naturally enough, these repeated acts of daring and of violence roused the Confederates to a high pitch of excitement and of indignation. Such doings were no longer to be tolerated. The Nationals must be driven from Santa Rosa. Wilson's troops especially must be captured or destroyed. With this end in view, General Anderson, assisted by General Ruggles, gathered together about fifteen hundred men, mostly volunteers for this special service, from the various camps in the neighborhood of Pensacola. Embarking this force on the night of October 8th, on several steamers, Anderson landed next morning at Deer Point, Santa Rosa Island, some four or five miles to the east of the Zouave encampment. Arranging his force into three divisions, he marched immediately upon the camp. The pickets were driven in; and the Zouaves, little dreaming of their danger, found themselves beset by their furious antagonists. "Death to Wilson," "No quarter"—such were the cries which intimated too plainly the near presence and the deadly purpose of the Confederates. The night was unusually dark. The Zouaves, however, were not found wanting. Offering a stout resistance, and contesting the ground as they retired, they fell back in good order,
under cover of the two batteries Lincoln
and Totten, situated on either side of
the island, and about four hundred
yards from Fort Pickens. Here they
were met by reinforcements from Fort
Pickens—two companies under Major
Vogdes and other two under Major
Arnold; and the combined force turned
and charged upon the Confederates. The
latter, meanwhile, had been rifling the
camp and setting fire to the tents and the
barracks. Not suspecting the sudden re-
turn of the Nationals, Anderson’s men
were somewhat disorganized. It was
their turn now to be taken by surprise.
In the wildest confusion they rushed
towards the boats, the Nationals pursu-
ing and pouring volley upon volley into
their disordered ranks. While embark-
ing and making sail they suffered se-
verely, one of their launches, loaded
with men, being so riddled with bullets
that it sank. The Confederates, it was
estimated, lost by this affair about one
hundred and fifty men. The National
loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
amounted to sixty-four men. Among
the prisoners carried off was Major
Vogdes. In a characteristic letter, sent to
General Arthur of New York, “Billy”
Wilson says, “They are exhibiting my
head and hair in Pensacola. The re-
ward is already claimed; also, an old
flag which I nailed to a flagstaff on the
Fourth of July, which has been left
there ever since; nothing left, however,
but the stars. The ladies have cut it
up in pieces, and have it pinned on
their bosoms as a trophy. Every one
in Pensacola has my sword and uniform.
I must have had a large quantity of
hair, plenty of swords and uniforms.
They say if I was to be taken alive, I
was to be put in a cage and exhibited.”
Such was the battle of Santa Rosa.

During the course of the next month
Colonel Harvey Brown, who had charge
of the garrison at Fort Pickens, acting
in conjunction with flag-officer McKean,
who was in command of the little block-
ading squadron in the neighborhood,
opened fire upon the Confederate works
which lined the shore from the navy
yard to Fort McRae. After a bom-
bardment of two days, November 22–23, the firing ceased, but not
until the village of Warrington was
burned, Fort McRae practically silenced,
and great damage done to the navy
yard. The Confederate fortifications
on the mainland surrounding the harbor
of Pensacola and in front of Fort Pick-
ens were in charge of General Braxton
Bragg.

Still following along the coast in a
westerly direction, we come to the
mouths of the Mississippi. Here, late in
the year 1861, occurred one of the most
memorable, if not one of the most im-
portant, of those coast engagements to
which in this chapter we have been con-
fining our attention. On the 12th of October the following despatch
startled alike North and South:

"Fort Jackson, October 12, 1861.

"Last night I attacked the blockaders
with my little fleet. I succeeded, after
a very short struggle, in driving them
all aground on the Southwest Pass bar,
except the Preble, which I sunk. I
captured a prize from them, and after
BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

ONE OF THE BLOODIEST OF THE CIVIL WAR, THE UNION TROOPS BEING COMMANDED BY GENERAL McCLELLAN AND THE CONFEDERATES BY GENERAL LEE
BATTLE OF MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., DECEMBER 31ST, 1862

THE CONFEDERATES WERE COMMANDED BY GENERAL BRAGG AND THE FEDERALS BY GENERAL ROSECRANS, WHO HELD THE FIELD;

THE LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES WERE ABOUT EQUAL
GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN
GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER
FAMOUS CAVALRY COMMANDER, ASSOCIATED WITH GENERAL SHERIDAN IN THE PURSUIT AND CAPTURE OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY; AFTERWARD CELEBRATED INDIAN FIGHTER; KILLED BY THE INDIANS, JUNE 25, 1876
they were fast in the mud, I peppered them well. There were no casualties on our side. It was a complete success. Hollins.'"

What were the facts in this case? The Confederates had extemporized a flotilla, consisting of a steam-ram called the Manassas, mounted with one sixty-four-pounder Dahlgren; the steamer Calhoun, with one twenty-four-pounder Dahlgren; the steamer Ivy, with an eight-inch thirty-two-pounder, rifled; the steamer Jackson, with two eight-inch cumbriads and a twenty-four-pounder, rifled; and the cutter Pickens, with an eight-inch cumbriad and four twenty-four-pound carronades. The Manassas was originally the steamer Enoch Train, but had been completely reconstructed. In her new form she had a peculiar "ram"-like shape, and altogether had a formidable appearance. She was double planked all over with wood of six feet in thickness. Her bow extended to a length of nine feet, and was made of the thickest and the strongest oak. The whole surface of the vessel was covered with iron plates two inches thick. Her hull rose above the water only about two feet and a quarter; and her deck was covered in with a slanting roof of heavy wood covered with iron plates. Below the water-mark, and projecting from her bow, was an iron prow or borer, as thick as a man's arm, intended to pierce and sink any vessel she might choose to strike. She was one of the first of the ironclads; and to the only ships which the National government could as yet oppose to her, she was most undoubtedly a dangerous antagonist.

This flotilla was put under the command of Captain Hollins, an officer of immense pretension, but one who was remembered chiefly in connection with an exploit at San Juan, where he had indulged his vanity and passion for authority by burning an unoffending town. The blockade fleet on which Hollins intended to operate was composed of the war steamer Richmond, fourteen guns; of the Vincennes, a sloop-of-war, twenty-one guns; of the Preble, another sloop-of-war, sixteen guns; and of the Water-Witch and Nightingale, both small steamers of one gun each. Hollins chose a dark night for his experiment. The Manassas was close to the Richmond before she was discovered; and by the time the watch could give the alarm, her iron prow struck the Richmond "abreast the port fore-channels," tearing a coal schooner that was alongside from her fastenings, and penetrating the ship's side, making a hole about five inches in circumference and about two feet below the water-line. The ram drew off, and falling aft, made an attempt to strike with her prow the Richmond's stern. The attempt was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, as the monster passed, the Richmond gave it a volley from the port battery. The other sloops had been notified of the appearance of the Manassas; and having slipped their cables, they ran down to the Pass, the Richmond covering their retreat. At about eight o'clock in the morning, the other vessels being inside, the Richmond and Vincennes grounded
while attempting to pass the bar. There they were bombardcd by the Manassas; and fire rafts were sent down to burn them. The fire rafts proved perfectly harmless; and at ten o'clock the Confederate commodore withdrew, ran up to Fort Jackson, and sent news of his splendid victory to Richmond. After a fashion, Hollins had no doubt won a victory; but he had done little damage to the National ships. A coal schooner had been bruised; a boat had been sunk; and Captain Pope's gig had been staved in. That was all. It was not wonderful, therefore, that when the true facts of the case became known, Hollins' famous exploit was made the subject of much merriment and ridicule. The Manassas, at this date, was by far the most powerful and efficient ship of war in North American waters; and, in capable hands, she might have annihilated the small blockading squadron, cleared the gulf, and swept the coast from Florida to Maine. As it was, she did little harm and some good. She taught the government at Washington that other than wooden walls were now necessary, and that if the battle was to be fought at sea with any hope of success, ironclad must be confronted by ironclad, if not of equal tonnage, at least of equal power for resistance and attack.

Later, in the fall, Hampton Roads presented a spectacle not unlike, but in some respects more imposing than, that witnessed towards the close of August, when Butler and Stringham set sail for Hatteras. It was also a land and naval armament, but on a grander scale, and was fitted out for the purpose of making a descent on the borders of lower South Carolina. The land force of the expedition had been assembled at Annapolis, in Maryland. It was about fifteen thousand strong, and was placed in charge of Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman. The fleet, which consisted of some seventy-seven vessels in all, including fourteen gunboats, thirty-four steamers, and twenty-six sailing vessels, was placed under the command of Commodore S. F. Dupont.

The commanders to whom this expedition was entrusted were well chosen. Thomas W. Sherman, not to be confounded with W. T. Sherman, was a native of Rhode Island. He graduated at West Point in 1836, taking a high place in his class, and was appointed second lieutenant in the Third U. S. Artillery in July of the same year. In 1837 he was promoted to a first lieutenantcy; and on May 28th, 1846, on the outbreak of the Mexican war, he was made captain. For his gallant conduct at Buena Vista, February 23d, 1847, he was brevetted major. On the formation of the Fifth Artillery, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel, and in this capacity took part in the battle of Bull Run. He was advanced to the rank of brigadier-general May 17th, 1861.

Commodore Samuel F. Dupont was born at Bergen Point, New Jersey, in 1803. His father, a Frenchman, as the name indicates, came to the United States in 1799. The Delaware Mills, where is manufactured the famous "Dupont powder," were founded by an uncle; and the works still remain in
the possession of the family. Young Dupont entered the United States navy December 19th, 1815, having received from President Madison his warrant as a midshipman. His first cruise was in the Franklin. When the Mexican war broke out, he was in command of the frigate Congress, but was transferred to the Cyane. It was he who transported Colonel Fremont, with his band of trappers and Indians, to San Diego, the Cyane being the first United States man-of-war to enter that harbor. After his return from the Pacific, he was employed in various ways and in different capacities, his high character, his knowledge of his profession, his powers of organization, and his business habits always revealing themselves and justifying the confidence reposed in him. In 1857 he sailed for China in the Minnesota; in 1860 he was placed in charge of the navy yard at Philadelphia; and now, at the close of 1861, we find him at the head of this great naval expedition.

The fleet, with the troops on board, sailed out of Hampton Roads and proceeded to sea on the morning of Oct. 29, the 29th of October. Never did any such expedition leave port under auspices, to outward appearances, more favorable. The sun rose and shone with unusual splendor, revealing the rich robes with which, in the late fall, nature in those regions clothes herself. From an early hour the ramparts at Fortress Monroe were crowded with soldiers; hearty hurrahs greeted each vessel as it took its position; while the military bands on the transports, striking up a succession of favorite tunes, intensified the general excitement and inspired all with hope. Sherman's troops were divided into three brigades, and were commanded respectively by Generals Egbert L. Viele, Isaac I. Stevens, and Horatio G. Wright, each of the commanders, like Sherman himself, being a graduate of West Point Military Academy. The flag-ship Wabash led the way, the others following in three parallel lines, and from the vast space which they covered, as well as from the order which they preserved, presenting a most magnificent spectacle. The weather continued good all day. It was a glorious night. The next day was all that could be wished. The vessels were still in the same order in which they started. On the second night it was still calm. There was no moon; but the stars shining bright and clear, looked down upon a scene of rare and matchless beauty. With such weather dawned the morning of the third day; and so clear was the atmosphere and so unruffled the water, that a passenger on the Atlantic was able to count no fewer than thirty-eight of the vessels of the fleet.

The objective point of the expedition had been studiously concealed from the public; and it was unknown to the masters and men of the different ships. It was known only to the government and to those in immediate command. To provide against mishap, however, sealed orders were on board every vessel. The great object of this secrecy was to enable them to strike the intended point by surprise, and to accomplish their mission before the Confederates should
have time to make preparations for their arrival. Such a course had been deemed advisable; as recent experience had shown that, from the number and efficiency of Southern spies, male and female, in the National capital, the plans of government were known to the authorities at Richmond before they were known to the public at Washington. It even seemed as if the Richmond spy had found his way into the very council chamber of the president and his ministers. The precaution unfortunately was doomed to fail of its purpose; but the failure itself disclosed the wisdom and foresight with which all the arrangements had been made.

Toward the evening of the third day heavy clouds gathered and darkened the face of the sky, the wind began to rise, and everything indicated a coming storm. Come it did, and quickly; and such a storm as has seldom raged along the southern coast. It literally scattered the fleet to the winds; and for a time it was feared that the "Great Armada," as it was fondly but somewhat ominously called, had been completely destroyed. On the morning of Nov. 2, the 2d of November only one vessel could be seen from the deck of the Wabash. The first intelligence of the disaster reached the North through Southern sources, and, of course, was highly colored. The South was jubilant. The North, it was said, was opposing itself to fate. The elements were fighting in the interests of the Southern cause. "The stars in their courses fought against Sisera. The winds of heaven were now fighting for the good cause of Southern independence. Let the Debo-
rahs of the South sing a song of deliverance." Such was the highly-wrought style in which Southern enthusiasm found expression. Affairs, however, were not quite so desperate as they seemed. The fleet, although dispersed, was not ruined. In the isolated state in which the different vessels found themselves, the sealed orders were opened; and it was found that Port Royal was the place of rendezvous. On Sunday morning, the 3d of November, the storm began to abate; and the scattered vessels one by one gathered around the flagship. On the following morning, Nov. 4, as early as eight o'clock, the Wa-
bash anchored off Port Royal, accompanied by twenty-five vessels, and being rapidly joined by the rest of the fleet. It was found that, during that fearful storm, some of the war-ships were saved by throwing their heavy guns overboard, that four transports went down, but that, happily, not more than a dozen persons lost their lives.

Saved from the perils of the deep, they were now to encounter perils of a different but not less alarming kind. The Confederates had done their best to make the navigation of the coast difficult, if not impossible. All the light-
houses were destroyed; and all the beacons and buoys had been removed. Scientific skill, however, soon overcame these difficulties; and with the help of Commander Charles H. Davis, the chief of staff, and Mr. Boutelle of the Coast Survey, the entrance to Port Royal Sound was found, and so marked off with buoys that Dupont was able to
enter with his fleet. He was told that he could count with confidence on eighteen feet of water. The movement commenced shortly after three o'clock; and by twilight all the vessels, which had arrived, were, with the exception of the Wabash, over the bar and anchored in the roadstead of Port Royal. Other difficulties, however, had to be encountered. The Confederates, in consequence of the mishap which had befallen the fleet, had had ample time, after they became aware of the destination of the expedition, to strengthen the works in the neighborhood of Port Royal, and otherwise to prepare themselves for a vigorous and stubborn resistance. The time had not been lost. On the right of the entrance, on St. Philip's Island, at what is called Bay Point, stood Fort Beauregard. This was an earthwork; but it was carefully built, and mounted some twenty guns, several of them heavy rifles. It had an outwork, toward the sea, mounting five guns. On the left, on Hilton Head, stood Fort Walker. This was a regular work, with bastions and curtains. Built upon a bluff eight feet high, and mounting twenty-three guns, with an outwork on the sea front having a rifled gun, Fort Walker commanded not only Port Royal entrance, but the approach to the town of Beaufort by the Beaufort River. Of the two works, it was by far the more formidable. When the expedition arrived, Fort Walker was manned by some six hundred and twenty men, and was in charge of General T. F. Drayton, a rich land-owner of the neighborhood. At Camp Lookout, about six miles from Fort Walker, was a small body of Scriven's guerillas, which was ultimately increased in strength to the number of nearly two thousand men. There were over six hundred men at Bay Point, under Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant. Of this force one hundred and forty-nine garrisoned Fort Beauregard, under the command of Captain Stephen Elliott, jr., of Beaufort. Two miles further up, at the junction of the Beaufort and Broad Rivers, there was a fleet of five or six gunboats, under Commodore Josiah Tatnall, a veteran of the war of 1812.

A reconnaissance of the Confederate works was made on the 5th by the Commodore Ottawa, supported by the Curlew, Seneca, and Smith, when it was ascertained that of the two forts, Fort Walker was greatly the more powerful. The Wabash, which had been unable to cross with the other vessels, was now safely over the bar, and everything was ready for a movement against the enemy and his works. "The order of battle," to quote from Dupont's report, "comprised a main squadron, ranged in a line ahead and a flanking squadron, which was to be thrown off on the northern section of the harbor, to engage the enemy's flotilla, and prevent them taking the rear ships of the main line, when it turned to the southward, or cutting off a disabled vessel." If this plan could be carried out, it would be impossible for Tatnall with his gunboats to hinder or in any way annoy the main body while carrying out instructions. "The plan of attack," to quote from the same authority, "was to pass up midway be-
between Forts Walker and Beauregard, receiving and returning the fire of both, to a distance about two and a half miles north of the latter. At that point, the line was to turn to the south around by the west and close in with Fort Walker, encountering it on its weakest flank, and at the same time enfilading in nearly a direct line its two water faces."

"When abreast of the fort, the engine was to be slowed, and the movement reduced to only as much as would be just sufficient to overcome the tide, to preserve the order of battle, by passing the batteries in slow succession, and to avoid becoming a fixed mark for the enemy's fire. On reaching the extremity of Hilton Head, the line was to turn to the north by the east, and passing to the northward, to engage Fort Walker with the port battery nearer than when first on the same course. These evolutions were to be repeated."

The ships were to pass the forts at eight hundred yards when moving to the south for the first time, but when making the second circuit they were to sight their guns for five hundred and fifty yards. This arrangement would make it next to impossible for the guns of the fort to strike the vessels. The latter would be in motion; and they would be three hundred yards nearer than when they passed at first.

The captains were summoned on board the Wabash and received their instructions. It was the 7th of November. At eight o'clock the signal was made to get under way. At nine o'clock the signal was made for "close order." At about half-past nine the action was commenced, the first shot being fired from Fort Walker. The Wabash responded promptly. The Susquehanna quickly followed. The first prescribed turn having been made, the signal was given at a quarter past ten for "closer action." The Wabash came up, and passed Fort Walker at the distance, when abreast, of eight hundred yards. The Susquehanna and the others followed. A second time was the elliptical movement performed, the ships this time passing the fort and firing at a distance of less than six hundred yards. About this time, half-past eleven, the enemy's flag was shot away. Meanwhile good and effective work was being done by some of the smaller vessels, which had taken their stations at the enfilading point. It was evident that the garrison was becoming exhausted. The firing was already feeble, from few guns, and at long intervals. After the third circuit, "the enemy had entirely ceased to reply, and the battle was ended." At a quarter past one P. M. the Ottawa signalled that the fort was abandoned. It was discovered a little later in the day that Fort Beauregard, whose guns had been silent for some time, was also abandoned. At twenty minutes past two o'clock, Captain John Rodgers, who had been sent on shore with a flag of truce, hoisted the Union flag over the abandoned work. At sunrise on the following morning the old flag was raised also over Fort Beauregard. The National loss during the engagement was thirty-one, of whom eight were killed. The Confederates reported a loss of fifty in all, of whom
ten were killed. No life was lost in Fort Beauregard. Both forts were formally taken possession of, Fort Walker on the day of the battle by General Wright's brigade, Fort Beauregard on the morning of the 8th by the brigade of General Stevens. The great object of the expedition had thus been accomplished.

It was of all things most natural that there should be great joy and rejoicing in the North. Over the soil of South Carolina, which was the first State to raise the standard of rebellion, the Union flag was again floating. It was just as natural that the loss of Port Royal should have been felt to be an irreparable blow by the South. The feeling was universal that an important step had been taken on the part of the Nationals towards the recovery of the entire southern coast.

General Sherman was not slow to take advantage of his victory. Hilton Head was greatly strengthened, and made a depot for supplies. An immense wharf was constructed; buildings of various kinds were multiplied; and Hilton Head and Port Royal Island soon became great centres of life and industry. Beaufort, a delightful little town on Port Royal Island, and the favorite summer retreat of the aristocracy of South Carolina, where some of them had built luxurious homes, hid from view by vine-covered verandahs, embosomed in groves of orange and lemon, and surrounded on all sides by the gorgeous plants and rich fruitage of the tropics, was entirely abandoned by the white population. For a few days Beaufort was entirely at the mercy of the negroes, who, in the homes of their former masters, gave themselves up to all manner of licentiousness, indulging in scenes of wildest revelry and wastefulness. Beaufort was soon occupied by the National troops; and military order was substituted for barbarous license. Meanwhile Du Pont had sent his vessels in various directions, up the rivers, among the islands, and along the coast. Everywhere, it was found, the whites had fled, the slaves who had refused to accompany them remaining behind and occupying the plantations and houses. Expeditions were sent north towards the bay of St. Helena and south towards Warsaw Sound. Both were completely successful. The Confederates in truth having disappeared, there was no one to offer resistance. Both positions were of great strategic value, in view of future operations.

The possession of the bay of St. Helena secured the command of large rivers communicating with the interior of South Carolina, as well as an excellent harbor—a harbor almost equal to that of Charleston itself. The possession of Warsaw Inlet and Sound secured the command of an entrance to the Savannah River, with a passage little inferior to that of Tybee, a little more to the north. Some days later, on the Nov. 25th, Big Tybee Island was also seized; and Du Pont was able to write to the secretary of war: "The flag of the United States is flying over the territory of the State of Georgia." All along the coast, from Warsaw Sound, below the mouth of the Savannah.
northward as far as the North Edisto River, the National authority was supreme. With but two exceptions, every fort on the islands throughout that region had been abandoned. Forts Pulaski and Jackson, the one on Cockspur Island, at the mouth of the entrance, the other on the mainland of Georgia and above the other approaches from the sea, still remained in the hands of the Confederates, and effectually guarded the river and city of Savannah.

At one place only did the Confederates make a stand in defence of the islands off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia. It was known that they had a fortified camp at Port Royal Ferry, on the Coosaw, and that they had collected a force there, under Generals Gregg and Pope, some eight thousand strong. It was evidently their intention to shut up the Nationals in Port Royal Island—at least so to shut them up as to prevent them crossing to the mainland in the direction of Savannah. To this end they had placed obstructions in the Coosaw River and the other streams and creeks which separate the island from the mainland, and erected batteries at Seabrook, at Boyd's Creek, at Port Royal Ferry, and at other commanding positions. Dupont had already made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the Savannah River by way of Augustine Creek, in the rear of Fort Pulaski. This accomplished, he might have been able to cut off all communication with the fort, and take possession of the city of Savannah. The Confederates, however, had been on their guard; and the expedition failed. It was felt to be necessary to break up the fortified camp at Port Royal Ferry; and with this end in view a joint land and naval force, under Brigadier-General Stevens and Commander C. R. P. Rodgers was organized. The troops under Stevens consisted of Colonel Frazier's Forty-Seventh and Colonel Perry's Forty-Eighth New York regiments; the Seventy-Ninth New York Highlanders, Major Morrison; the Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Colonel Crist; the Eighth Michigan, Colonel Fenton; and the One Hundredth Pennsylvania (Roundheads), Colonel Leasure; in all about five thousand men. The naval force assembled at Beaufort, and was composed of the Ottawa, Seneca, Pembina, and Hale, with the ferryboat Helen and four boats belonging to the Wabash, each of these last carrying a 12 pound howitzer.

The expedition moved on the evening of the 31st of December. The greater portion of this fleet went up the Broad River, on the west side of Port Royal Island, their purpose being to approach the ferry by Whale Creek. The land forces made their way to a point where the Brick-Yard Creek, a continuation of the Beaufort River, unites with the Coosaw. There Commander Rodgers met Stevens with launches; and the troops were embarked. It was the first morning of the new year 1862. Some of the troops landed at Haywood's plantation, and the remainder at Adams' plantation, the next landing. A forward march against the Confederates was at once begun. The Eighth Michigan were thrown out
as skirmishers, the gunboats opening a brisk fire into the woods in their front. The Seventy-Ninth New York (Highlanders) were in front of the main body. They were now near the ferry, when a concealed battery opened upon them with grape and cannister. The brunt of this fire was borne by the Highlanders and the Eighth Michigan. The Fiftieth Pennsylvania rushed forward to their support. The boats, coming up one after the other, brought so heavy a fire to bear on the works that they were soon abandoned. Immediately after the Ottawa was anchored the ferry was opened; and the Pennsylvania Roundheads passed over and took possession of the abandoned fort. At four o'clock they were joined by General Stevens with the advance guard. About this time the Confederates appeared in force and in line of battle on the National right. The Ottawa and the Pembina were ordered to move a short distance down the river, where they opened fire with their 11-inch and Parrott guns, flinging their shells into the midst of the Confederates, driving them through the woods and clearing the National flank. It was now sunset. There was a pause in the battle.

A messenger from the Confederates appeared at one of the outposts, bearing a flag of truce, and asking permission to carry off their dead and wounded. At this moment the gunboats reopened fire; and before General Stevens' messenger could convey his reply, granting one hour to carry off the wounded, the officer who brought the flag of truce had galloped off. The enemy reappeared in the morning, when the gunboats Ottawa, Seneca, Pembina, Helen, and Hale all opened fire, flinging shot and shell into the woods. It was, however, but of short duration. At forty minutes past nine o'clock the troops, having demolished the works and fired some houses in the neighborhood, began to recross the ferry. The Confederates made no further demonstration. By noon the troops were all over; and the field guns, at the request of General Stevens, were landed for the purpose of covering the rear of the returning column. So ended the attack on Port Royal Ferry. General Stevens lost nine men. Major Watson of the Eighth Michigan was mortally wounded.

So far these coast expeditions had been successful. The Nationals were masters of Hatteras Inlet; and on the southern borders of South Carolina and the northern borders of Georgia the Confederates had been driven from every stronghold, with the two exceptions, Fort Jackson and Fort Pulaski.
CHAPTER VI.

The year 1862 opened rather gloomily. The campaigns of the previous year had not been particularly encouraging to the Northern cause. At Washington there was much excitement, not a little activity, but no rejoicing. The army of the Potomac had been reconstructed and put in splendid condition. Never was army more thoroughly drilled or more perfectly equipped for battle. It reflected the highest credit on General McClellan, and gave abundant evidence that, whatever might be his qualities on the field of actual warfare, he had as a military organizer few, if any, equals among the commanders of his time. But armies are not intended to be splendid toys, magnificent playthings. When the army of the Potomac was brought up to a fighting condition, no haste was made to turn it to account. The enemy, who had mightily increased his strength, was all but knocking at the gates of the capital; but the general-in-chief seemed to have no other use for his well trained and gorgeously equipped army than to exhibit its skill in evolution, to the daily delight of the people of Washington. The toy was splendid; McClellan seemed unwilling to mar its beauty. It was not at once that these thoughts entered the minds of even the more thoughtful and reflective of the people of the North. For a time they approved and applauded. As the army of the Potomac grew in beauty and in strength, it was as much a source of delight and hope to them as it was evidently a pride to its commander. Hope deferred, however, maketh the heart sick. Delay gave birth to impatience. Before the
end of October the previous year, the army under the immediate care of McClellan had reached a strength of nearly one hundred and twenty thousand men. It was his opinion that the advance upon Manassas should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November; and it was his desire that, as far as was possible, all the other armies should make sacrifices, so as to add to the actual strength under his command. In the interval, on the 31st of October, he was made commander-in-chief, on the resignation of General Scott. With the change in his position there came a change in his views. Up until this time he had undervalued the importance of possible effort in the West. Now he wished to make a simultaneous movement in East Tennessee and Virginia, and capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. In order to bring up the armies of the West to the same high standard with the army of the Potomac, further delay was necessary. So the month of November rolled past, the weather having been fine and the roads in excellent condition for military movements; and to the impatient millions scattered over the Northern States, who hourly expected to hear of a dashing movement and a brilliant victory, no other message came but the same wearisome iteration, "All quiet on the Potomac." Impatience at last reached its height. "When will McClellan move?" "What does he mean to do?" These and such like questions were in every mouth; and by many the opinion began to be entertained that the commander-in-chief either had no plan or was afraid to move.

Such was the state of things in the opening weeks of the second year of the war. In the second week of January an important change was made in the War Office. On the 13th Mr. Jan. Edwin M. Stanton took the place of Mr. Secretary Cameron, who was offered the position of Minister to Russia. The change was not intended in any way to reflect on Secretary Cameron. On the contrary, it was his own desire, as well as the desire of the other members of the government, that the position, which was onerous and exacting in the extreme, should be filled by some man who to more than ordinary intellectual ability and force of character added great powers of endurance. Of all the available men at that moment, as the result proved, Stanton was the man in whom those qualities were most united. He had already made himself conspicuous, during the administration of Buchanan, by exposing and defeating the schemes of the conspirators who plotted the seizure of Washington. It was said of Stanton by some of his jealous rivals that he was a man of only one idea. The remark, though otherwise intended, actually conveyed a compliment. The times preeminently required concentration of thought and purpose; and if Stanton was a man of one idea, his idea was the preservation of the Union—the grandeur and immortality of the Republic. Stanton was one of those whose patience was completely exhausted by the inactivity of McClellan. It was at his suggestion that the
president issued the order that on the 22d of February a general forward movement of the land and naval forces of the Union should take place; that "especially the army at or about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumphordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla near Cairo, and the naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day; that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given; that the heads of departments, and especially the secretaries of war and the navy, with all their subordinates, and the generals-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order." A special order, which in some particulars was afterwards modified, was issued on the 31st of January, to the effect "that all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next." These orders were too plain to be misconstrued. If they did not imply mistrust of McClellan, they certainly contained a rebuke. His dilatory conduct had not only disappointed

—it had disgusted all ranks and classes of the people.

The war, in what might be called systematic form, was now about to begin. Hitherto the forces had been scattered, and the battles fruitless of result as they had been without plan or purpose. Now there was a recognized central authority, there was a general plan, and arrangements were made for concerted action. A variety of circumstances had made it evident as well as necessary that the first battles of 1862 should be fought in the West. General Halleck, as we have seen already, was now in command in Missouri, and General Buell had charge of the Department of the Ohio. The Confederates, under Albert Sidney Johnston, held a strong defensive line running from the Mississippi River eastward to the Cumberland Mountains. The left was at Columbus on the Mississippi. Forts Henry and Donelson guarded the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. An intrenched camp at Bowling Green, with a considerable army, covered the great railroad lines southward to Nashville. The right flank was held by a force posted at Mill Spring, Kentucky. General Halleck, who had divided his large command into districts, had assigned to General Grant the District of Cairo, which included Paducah, in Kentucky. General Buell who had a large force under him, arranged it into four grand divisions, himself, with a portion of his troops, threatening Bowling Green, and General George H. Thomas, one of his subordinates, threatening the Confederate force at Mill Spring. A glance at the map.
will show that on the part of the Confederates these positions were singularly well chosen. If they could hold this line, the great cotton-producing States would be comparatively safe; and while the sinews of war would thus be provided for another year, they would be the more easily able to concentrate their strength against the army which threatened them in the east.

Early in the month of January, General Thomas came into collision with the Confederate forces stationed at Mill Spring. The battle lasted the greater part of Sunday, the 18th, and was fought with great spirit on both sides. Early in the fight the Confederate General Zollikoffer was killed, and before the close of the day the National arms were completely victorious, the Confederates being driven from their position and compelled to retreat towards their camp in the wildest confusion. In the struggle the Nationals lost two hundred and forty-seven men, of whom thirty-nine were killed, the remainder wounded; the Confederates lost three hundred and forty-nine, of whom one hundred and ninety-two were killed, sixty-two wounded, and the remainder made prisoners. As the spoils of victory, General Thomas captured and carried with him twelve pieces of artillery, with their caissons packed, two army forges, one battery wagon, a large quantity of arms and ammunition, over a thousand horses and mules, together with wagons, commissary stores, intrenching tools, and a considerable amount of camp equipage. It was felt to be a damaging blow by the South, as it broke their line in Kentucky and opened a door of deliverance for East Tennessee. It was hailed as a great victory by the North, and called forth a spirited proclamation from the secretary of war, who declared it to be the purpose of the war "to pursue and destroy a rebellious enemy, and to deliver the country from danger." "In the prompt and spirited movements and daring at Mill Spring," he said, "the nation will realize its hopes. It will also delight to honor its brave soldiers."

In Zollikoffer the Confederates lost one of their ablest generals. Of Swiss origin, he was born in North Carolina in 1812. At an early age he emigrated to Tennessee, where he worked as a printer and afterwards became an editor. In 1834 he edited and published the Columbian Observer; and from 1835 to 1837 he held the profitable place of state printer of Tennessee. In 1842 he had editorial charge of the Nashville Banner; and through the influence of that partisan journal he succeeded in obtaining several political offices. At the beginning of the secession movement in Tennessee, Zollikoffer was opposed to it; but he was finally induced to yield; and on joining the army he was appointed a brigadier-general. He had only joined the secession force at Mill Spring a few hours before the battle. The chief in command was General Crittenden; but the attack at Mill Spring has generally been attributed to Zollikoffer, who was a man of great energy and courage.
General George H. Thomas, who on that day at Mill Spring first chained victory to the Union standard, and began that series of brilliant and substantial achievements with which his name is associated, was a man of another mould. A Virginian by birth, he was educated at West Point, and in 1841 was appointed a lieutenant of artillery. During the Mexican war he rose to the rank of major. In 1850 he accepted the position of teacher of artillery and cavalry at West Point. At the beginning of the war, Thomas, who held the rank of major of the Second Cavalry, was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of his regiment, and a little later he became colonel. On the 17th of August, 1861, he was made brigadier-general; and after having served under Generals Anderson and Sherman, he was appointed by General Buell to the command of the Tenth Division.

It will be observed that the battle of Mill Spring was fought and won before the date of the president’s general order for the forward movement of all the armies; and there can be little doubt that the spirited conduct of the National troops on that occasion gave the spur to that impatience of further delay which President Lincoln shared with the rest of the Northern people. The president was not more anxious for immediate action than were the officers in the field and the rank and file under their care. We have seen that the victory at Mill Spring broke the Confederate right, and by opening a door of deliverance for East Tennessee, prepared the way for the aggressive and successful efforts which were to follow. The Confederate line, however, remained strong and intact from Bowling Green to Columbus. The ground was also well guarded from Bowling Green to Nashville, further to the south. At Bowling Green there was an intrenched camp. Fort Henry, on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson, on the west bank of the Cumberland, were bastioned earthworks, about twelve miles apart and connected by a well constructed road. There were redoubts on Island No. 10, in the Mississippi River; and Columbus, which was still in charge of General Polk, had been so strengthened as to be proudly spoken of as the Gibraltar of America. To defend this line the Confederate commander had under him at least 60,000 men. The forcing of this line by the National armies had become a necessity, if any serious effort was to be made to bring the South back to its allegiance. The question was how to strike and where. Various plans had already been suggested; but there is some difference of opinion as to who is entitled to credit for the plan which was ultimately adopted, and which proved completely successful. It is known that General Buell had suggested some such plan as that adopted, in a communication made to General Halleck early in the month of January, 1862. It is also known that about the same time or shortly afterwards, General Grant, without any knowledge of what Buell had done, wrote to Halleck and asked permission to carry out the plan which was afterwards accomplished. It is recorded that one evening
late in December, 1861, Generals Halleck, Sherman, and Cullum were together at the Planters’ Hotel in St. Louis, when the conversation turned upon the proper line of invasion. “Where is their line?” asked Halleck. “Why, from Bowling Green to Columbus,” replied Sherman. “Well, then, where is the true point of attack?” “Naturally the centre.” “Then let us see in what direction it should be made.” A map was at hand. With a blue pencil Halleck drew a line from Bowling Green to Columbus, past Forts Donelson and Henry. He drew another line perpendicular to its centre. The latter line coincided nearly with the Tennessee River. “There,” said Halleck, “that is the true line of attack.” After all, it was the natural and obvious course to follow; and it is more than probable that to the minds of each of these men, educated in military tactics and experienced in military affairs, the same plan at the same time was independently suggested. One thing is absolutely certain regarding this matter: Grant had written his second letter to Halleck, urging the propriety of his allowing him to proceed at once by land and water against Fort Henry, to take and hold it as a base for other operations, before the order of the 30th came authorizing the desired movement.

It has already been shown that the Confederate line stretched from Bowling Green to Columbus, and that the strength of the entire force holding the line was about sixty thousand men. The Confederate general in command was Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the oldest and most experienced officers on the American continent. The garrison of Fort Henry, which was 2734 strong, was under the immediate charge of General Tilghman. The armament of the fort consisted of seventeen guns. Johnston’s headquarters were at Bowling Green, where he was confronted and held in check by General Buell, an able officer, who held the chief command of the army of the Cumberland.

Immediately on receiving permission from Halleck to proceed with his proposed plan, Grant made arrangements for the attack on Fort Henry. He had at his disposal some seventeen thousand men. It was arranged that flag-officer Foote, with a flotilla of seven gunboats, should move along the Ohio, steer up the Tennessee, and open the attack, while Grant, on the land side, should render what assistance was necessary and cut off all retreat. On Monday, the 2d of February, Foote left Cairo, and on the morning of Tuesday he was a few miles below Fort Henry. Grant, in the meantime, with the divisions of McClernand and C. F. Smith, had embarked in transports which were convoyed by the flotilla. These landed a few miles below the fort; and Foote proceeded up the river, having orders from Grant to move slowly and shell the woods, in order to discover whether there were any concealed batteries. On the morning of the 6th it was understood that every thing was in readiness for the attack, which was to be made simultaneously on land and water. A heavy thunder
storm had raged the previous night; and, as a consequence, the roads were heavy and the streams so swollen that bridges had to be built for the passage of the artillery. The land forces, thus encountering unlooked-for obstacles, were considerably delayed. Shortly after 12 o'clock Foote opened fire upon the fort. Beginning at a thousand yards distance, he gradually ran his vessels to within six hundred yards of the enemy. The firing for a time was vigorously returned; but Foote pressed forward with irresistible bravery, and his men worked with a will and as if they meant to win. It was evident to Tilghman from the first that it was next to impossible for him to hold the fort. He nevertheless exerted himself to the utmost, encouraging his men alike by word and example, going so far as to work one of the guns himself. A series of accidents, meanwhile, occurred inside the fort. A rifled 24-pounder burst, killing and wounding a number of the men. A 42-pounder burst prematurely, and killed three of the gunners. In a short time the well-directed fire from the gunboats had dismounted seven of the guns and made them useless; the flag-staff also was shot away. The garrison became completely demoralized. It was in vain that Tilghman attempted to replace the exhausted gunners. The troops in the camp outside the fort made good their escape, some by the Dover road, leading to Fort Donelson, others on board a steamer which was lying a little above Fort Henry. Foote had promised to reduce the fort within an hour. When he made that promise he counted on assistance from the forces on the land side. Without any such aid—for the land forces had not yet arrived on the scene—he made good his word; for the hour had scarcely expired when the white flag was raised. There was no unnecessary delay. The main body of his troops having made good their escape, Tilghman, with his staff and some sixty artillerists, surrendered to the victorious Foote. In killed and wounded the Confederate loss was twenty-one men. The only serious damage sustained by the fleet in the river was on board the ironclad Essex. A shot from the enemy had penetrated her boiler; and some twenty-nine officers and men, including Commander Porter, were seriously scalded.

The capture of Fort Henry was felt by the South to be a damaging blow; and it led to bitter murmuring and even loud complaints against the authorities at Richmond. It was justly regarded by the North as a victory of great importance. It was full of instruction, inasmuch as it proved the value of gunboats on the narrow rivers of the West, especially when acting in conjunction with land forces. It inspired hope, inasmuch as it reclaimed lost territory and restored the old flag. “Fort Henry is ours!” said Halleck in his despatch to McClellan. “The flag of the Union is re-established on the soil of Tennessee. It will never be removed.” Foote was formally thanked by the secretary of the navy. “The country,” he was told, “appreciates your gallant deeds, and this Department desires to convey to you and your
brave associates its profound thanks for the service you have rendered.”

After the fall of Fort Henry, preparations were made for an attack on Fort Donelson with as little delay as possible. General Halleck felt it to be his duty to do his utmost to strengthen the army under Grant’s command; and accordingly reinforcements were hurried forward from Buell’s army, from St. Louis, Halleck’s headquarters, from Cincinnati, and from Kansas.

Fort Donelson, as has already been stated, was distant from Fort Henry about twelve miles, and was situated near the town of Dover, on the west bank of the Cumberland, on a platform of elevated ground, which at its highest point rises from the river about one hundred feet. It was about forty miles above the point where the Cumberland, after draining the highlands of southeastern Kentucky and northeastern Tennessee, empties its waters into the Ohio. The entire work covered one hundred acres. The country around was rugged and heavily wooded. Naturally a strong position, everything had been done which art and science could accomplish to make it impregnable. On the water side it was especially strong, the batteries being admirably planted and well mounted. Including the light artillery, there were in the fort at the moment of the attack not fewer than ninety-five pieces. With the men who had made good their escape thither from Fort Henry, the strength of the garrison amounted to twenty-one thousand men. All around the works on the land side, abatis had been formed by felling timber and half chopping off the smaller trees.

As soon as it became evident that Fort Donelson was likely to be attacked, Johnston exerted himself to the utmost to make the position invulnerable. Reinforcements were hurried forward from Bowling Green; the work was pushed day and night; and a fortified line two and a half miles in length, enclosing the town of Dover, was drawn along the high ground, which commanded the avenues of approach. Gideon J. Pillow arrived with his command on the 10th and took control. Simeon B. Buckner, at the head of the reinforcements from Bowling Green, arrived on the 11th. On the 13th John B. Floyd, who had fled from Virginia with his followers, in obedience to orders received from Johnston, appeared upon the scene, and, outranking Pillow, took the chief command.

Meanwhile Grant was not idle. On the evening of the day which witnessed the capture of Fort Henry, a flotilla under Lieutenant Phelps sailed up the Tennessee River, for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the banks in the upper waters. The reconnaissance was completely successful. It was found that there was no real hindrance to a southward movement. The country was comparatively unprotected; and the people seemed impatient to be delivered from the dreadful tyranny under which they were groaning. On the 11th a council of war was held; and the question was put, “Shall we march on Donelson, or shall we wait for further reinforcements?” The de-
cision was in favor of immediate action. Foote was busy getting ready with his gunboats; and the delay hitherto was mainly on that account. It was all-important that the gunboats should participate in the attack; but it was felt that every hour was adding to the enemy's strength. At the head of fifteen thousand sand men, on Wednesday, the 12th, Grant moved from Fort Henry upon Donelson. The foremost brigade advanced by the telegraph road; the others moved by the road which leads to Dover. For the month of February, the day was beautiful. The atmosphere was warm and balmy, like a day in spring. In their march over the hilly country, the advancing troops experienced but little difficulty. Before sundown Grant was before the fort; and what remained of daylight he spent in bringing his troops into position. During the night there was little idleness. Batteries were posted, and the line of battle was formed. Meanwhile Foote was moving up the Cumberland with his gunboats, conveying transports which were to constitute Lewis Wallace's Third Division. It was Grant's intention, should the gunboats arrive, to begin the attack in the morning. McClernand's Division, consisting of the four brigades of Oglesby, Wallace, McArthur, and Morrison, was posted on the right. C. F. Smith's Division, composed of the brigades of Cook, Lanman, and M. L. Smith, was posted on the left. Lewis Wallace's Division, so soon as it arrived, was to take its position in the centre. The line extended some four miles, the right sweeping round almost to Dover, the left resting on Hickman's Creek, where, at the house of a Mrs. Crisp, Grant established his headquarters.

Morning dawned, but there was no sign of the gunboats. Grant was unwilling to hazard a general engagement until the expected forces arrived. Early in the forenoon, however, a cannonade was opened; and some lively work was done by Berge's sharpshooters, who, concealed behind the trees, picked off not a few of the Confederate gunners. About noon an attempt was made to effect a lodgment upon the Confederate intrenchments. McClernand ordered Colonel Wallace to capture a formidable battery, known as the Middle Redoubt. The troops employed for this purpose were Illinois regiments—the Seventeenth, Major Smith; the Forty-Eighth, Colonel Hayn; and the Forty-Ninth, Colonel Morrison. McAllister's battery covering them. Hayn, being the senior colonel, took command of the attacking party. The attack was made in the most spirited manner. But the enemy was strongly posted; and although the National troops behaved with the utmost gallantry in the presence of overwhelming numbers and under a most galling fire, they were ultimately repulsed. An equally unsuccessful effort was made on the left by a portion of Lanman's brigade. In both cases the National loss was heavy. When the darkness came on, the troops, not a little dispirited, had fallen back to the ground occupied by them in the morning.

The night of the 13th presented s
ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS.

striking contrast to the beautiful spring-like morning. The afternoon had become chilly; and towards evening rain fell in torrents. The rain was succeeded by sleet and snow; and at midnight a severe frost set in, the mercury falling to ten degrees below zero. The besieging force was without tents; and many of the soldiers were not even provided with blankets. Fires were not permitted, as they would prove marks for the enemy's guns. Scantily supplied with food, and with the pitiful cries of the wounded calling for water resounding in their ears, they were compelled to spend the weary hours, resting on their arms. It was one of those sad nights, often, alas! repeated before the war reached its close.

The morning of the 14th dawned with apparently brightening prospects for the Federal arms. Fully realizing the peril of the situation and the necessity of using every available man, Grant had, at the close of the contest the night previous, sent a courier to General Lewis Wallace, who had been left behind with a small garrison at Fort Henry, commanding him to hasten at once to the scene of action. Wallace, with his garrison, which consisted of the Eleventh Indiana, the Eighth Missouri, and Company A, Chicago Artillery, in charge of a battery, was ready by the break of day. After such a night, the ground was not in the best condition for the movement of infantry and artillery; but the men were in excellent spirits; and in spite of the drifting frost which blew in their faces, they made good time, Wallace being able to report at Grant's headquarters before the hour of noon. On their arrival Lewis Wallace's little band found the Union soldiers in high hope and expectation. During the course of the night Foote, with the gunboats and transports, the latter bringing the Third or Wallace's Division, about ten thousand strong, had arrived. Their landing had been safely effected; they were already around Grant's headquarters; and when Wallace appeared on the scene he was immediately placed in command and took his position in the centre, with Smith on the left and McClemand on the right. By this fresh accession of strength, Grant was enabled to complete the investment of the fort and its outworks; and for the first time since he commenced to grapple with the enemy, he had the advantage of superior numbers. Supplies having arrived in abundance, rations were liberally supplied to the half-famished men, and preparations were made for a general assault.

The experience of the previous day had been such that, even with largely increased forces, General Grant was unwilling to make any rash attack from the land side. The fort was powerfully mounted; and without the aid of earthworks and trenches, an attack made from the land side, whether upon a particular point or on the entire enemy's works, however it might result finally, could not fail to be attended by an enormous sacrifice of life. Grant's instructions to his generals were that they should preserve the line of investment intact, being ready to repel any attempt
which the enemy might make, either in the way of assault or escape.

The gunboats had done so well at Fort Henry that perhaps too much was expected of them at Fort Donelson. At all events, it was arranged that the gunboats should have the honor of opening the assault. At three o’clock in the afternoon Foote moved forward with four ironclads and two wooden boats. In addition to these, there was the gunboat Carondelet, Commander Walke, which had arrived two days before. The armored vessels moved in front. While yet a mile and a half distant, the gunboats opened fire, the batteries on the fort remaining perfectly silent. It was not the silence of a helpless, paralyzed foe: it was the silence of conscious strength—of a determined and deadly purpose. Onward the little fleet moved, still belching forth destruction, but meeting with no response. Suddenly, however, when within four hundred yards of the batteries, a plunging fire was opened upon it by twenty heavy guns, placed high on the hillside, the shot falling with dreadful precision and effect. In face of this terrific fire, Foote pressed closer and closer. The well-directed fire of the gunboats had silenced the upper battery of four guns. The fighting, however, was not equal. The columbiad and 32-pound rifle now told with fatal effect on the ironclads; while the shot and shell from the ships fell powerless on the heavy sand-banks which protected the enemy’s guns. A heavy shot had cut away the rudder-chains of the Louisville, and she drifted helplessly down the current. The flag-

ship St. Louis was soon in a similar plight, Commodore Foote himself being wounded. The other two armored vessels had suffered severely, a heavy rifled cannon having burst on board the Carondelet. The battle had lasted one hour and a half. It was useless to prolong the struggle. Orders were given to withdraw; and as the flotilla moved back down the river, it received some severe parting blows from the shore batteries, some of the fugitives from which had returned and resumed their guns. It was another failure. The strength of the place had not been properly gauged. What was practicable and easy at Fort Henry was impossible at Fort Donelson. In the attack the Nationals lost fifty-four men in killed and wounded. The Confederates lost not a man, nor were their batteries in any way injured. Fifty-nine shots had struck the St. Louis; thirty-five the Louisville; thirty-five the Carondelet, and twenty-one the Pittsburg.

Two days had now been wasted; and two experiments in the way of attack had been made, with signal want of success. All had been done on the river side which could be done with the means now at Grant’s command. Any fresh attempt made on the land side was certainly as perilous as ever; nay, it seemed to involve even greater risks, for the Union commander could no longer count with confidence on the gunboats, which he had hoped would greatly aid him in the accomplishment of his difficult task. The original plan had failed. A new plan had become necessary. It was accordingly arranged
in a conference between Grant and Foote, on the evening of Friday, that the Commodore should return to Cairo, repair and augment his fleet, and return with a naval force adequate to the requirements of the situation. Grant resolved meanwhile to go on perfecting his line of investment, so strengthening his weak points as to shut the Confederates effectually within their intrenchments, and so cutting off their supplies as possibly to starve or frighten them into a surrender.

While the Union commanders were thus deploring their ill fortune and making arrangements for future and more effective operations, events had taken a peculiar turn inside the Confederate lines. Floyd, the commander-in-chief, was not in the least elated by the effective resistance which he had been able to offer to McClernand's attack on the 13th, or by the defeat of the gun-boats on the 14th. He felt that, in spite of his strength, he was effectually hemmed in. There was not a point within the intrenchments which might not be reached by the enemy's artillery from the boats on the river or from the batteries on land. It would be easy, by passing a column above him on the river, to cut off at once his only source of supply and his only means of egress. Moreover, he had seen that day a fleet of transports arrive, bringing a powerful addition to the ranks of the enemy; and he knew that the whole available Union force in the Western States could be speedily concentrated against Fort Donelson. It was Floyd's opinion that the fort could not be held with a garrison of less than fifty thousand men.

At a council of war, held on the evening of the 14th, it was unanimously resolved to abandon the place, force a way past Grant's right, and pass into the open country around Nashville.

From the position enclosed within the Confederate lines two roads led towards Nashville—the Wynn's Ferry road, running from Dover through Charlotte; and the other an obscure and at best an undesirable road, crossing the flats of the Cumberland. The latter road was submerged by the overflow of the river. There remained, therefore, but the one way of escape, if escape was to be attempted, and that was the Wynn's Ferry road. But this road was effectually covered by McClernand's Division, the right wing of the Union army. What was the Confederate plan of attack? Pillow's Division, which formed the Confederate left, was to make a vigorous attack upon the Union right flank; and Buckner's Division, drawn from the right, a few men being left in the intrenchments to maintain an appearance, was to strike at the same time the right flank of the Union centre, which rested upon the Wynn's Ferry road. It was hoped that if Pillow's attack should prove successful, McClernand's Division, the Union right, would be forced back upon Wallace's Division, the Union centre, and that Buckner, striking the divided masses in flank, would roll both divisions back in confusion on that of Smith, the Union left. In such a case, the Wynn's Ferry road would be effectually opened as a way of escape, and possibly Grant's
forces might be routed and driven to their transports. It was a daring and well-conceived plan; and, as we shall by and by see, so far as it was faithfully executed, it was a complete success.

On the morning of Saturday, the Feb. 15th, at the early hour of five o’clock, Pillow’s column, eight thousand strong, accompanied by Forrest’s cavalry, thirty heavy guns, and a full complement of artillery, was already in motion. Pillow was resolved, as he said in his high-sounding style, “to roll the enemy in full retreat over upon General Buckner,” and then, by an attack in flank and rear, to “cut up the enemy and put him completely to rout.” He went to his work with a will, and as if he meant to make his purpose good. McClernand was well posted to resist the assailants; but, although this point has been disputed, there can be no reasonable doubt that he was taken by surprise. His division was arranged in three brigades—McArthur’s on the right, Oglesby’s in the centre, W. H. L. Wallace’s on the left. Pillow’s onslaught was swift and furious. It fell mainly upon the two right brigades, McArthur’s and Oglesby’s. The Confederate line covered the front of these brigades, and extended some distance beyond the right flank. In the struggle which ensued, there was no lack of heroism on either side. At a critical moment, timely and effective assistance was rendered by the sister brigade of W. H. L. Wallace, Colonel John A. Logan, at the head of his brave regiment, the Thirty-First Illinois, exerting himself by word and deed to sustain and cheer the men. In such a struggle, however, enthusiasm is but a sorry compensation for lack of numbers. The soldiers did their best. Inch by inch the ground was contested. Overpowered, however, and outflanked, the two brigades were turned and forced from their position. Meanwhile Buckner, who had moved his troops over from the extreme Confederate right, formed them in front of McClernand’s left brigade, Colonel W. H. Wallace. It will thus be seen that the whole hostile mass—the entire concentrated strength of the Confederate army—was pressing upon McClernand’s Division, the right wing of the Union army. The left brigade soon followed the example of the other two—it fell back from its position; and by nine o’clock the entire position occupied in the beginning of the contest by the right wing of the National army was in the possession of the Confederates. The Wynn’s Ferry road was open.

The tide was still in favor of the Confederates. So far they had boldly carried out their plan, and successfully accomplished their purpose. The National army was, indeed, at this particular moment in a very critical condition. The situation was all the more alarming that the general-in-chief, who had not been present all the morning, was not yet on the field. At 2 A. M. he had gone on board a gunboat to hold a consultation with Commodore Foote, who, it will be remembered, was wounded in the struggle the day previous. It is more than possible that if Grant had been on the field from the commence-
ment of the contest, McClernand would have been able to hold his ground. In the absence of the general-in-chief there was no officer, during all those pregnant hours, who could assume the right to combine and direct the entire forces in the field. The division next to McClernand was that of Lewis Wallace. When Wallace first heard the firing, he concluded that McClernand had resumed the attack. At about 8 A. M. he received a message from McClernand asking assistance. Not knowing what to do, he sent the message to headquarters; but General Grant was still absent. Later he received another message from McClernand, disclosing the fact that his men were being pressed back by overwhelming numbers. Thereupon Wallace detached two brigades, and sent them under Colonel Cruft. Cruft, however, was in some way misled too far to the right, and being forced to fight his way, he arrived only in time to share the fate of the whole right wing. Seeing flocks of fugitives crowding up in the rear of his own line, Wallace promptly put in motion his remaining brigade under Colonel Thayer. The column had marched but a short distance when McClernand's brigades were met, retiring to the left—retiring in good order and slowly, complaining of many things, but complaining most of all that their ammunition was exhausted. The brave fellows seemed to feel as if they had no right to be in that position. The enemy was following but slowly. Wallace had time to deploy his brigade on the crest of a hill which crossed the line along which the enemy was moving towards the left. Here he presented a firm front at right angles to his former front, and behind him the defeated troops of the right wing rallied and re-formed. In this position they awaited the approach of Pillow and Buckner. Mortified with the defeat of the morning, the troops of the right wing had no sooner filled their cartridges than they took their places and were ready for action. When, therefore, the Confederates advanced and began to ascend the crest, so terrific was the fire that they reeled and staggered and broke, falling back in wild confusion. A second time they attempted to charge; but the second repulse was more disastrous than the first. The men could not again be brought into line. Some of them fled precipitately to their works; the remainder were brought to a stand on the ground occupied by the National right wing in the early morning.

Grant had now appeared on the field. It was about noon when the Confederates were driven back to their trenches. The battle had lulled; but everything was yet in confusion. The chief must have bitterly regretted the fact of his own absence from the scene of action in the early part of the day. But it was no time now for idle and worthless lamentation. It was action that was needed—prompt, decided, vigorous action. Grant was not slow to come to a conclusion, although it is simply absurd to say that in this instance he made up his mind at once. About three o'clock in the afternoon he called McClernand and Wallace aside for consultation. They were all on horseback. Grant held in
his hand some despatches, to which now and then he nervously turned his eyes. His face was flushed and revealed high excitement. He was evidently swayed by strong emotions. He said something about the necessity of falling back and intrenching—about waiting for reinforcements and Foote's new flotilla. It was suggested by one of the other two that in consequence of McClernand's defeat the road to Clarksville was uncovered, and that the enemy might escape if he chose. Whether Grant had merely been sounding the opinions of his subordinates, or whether new light at the moment dawned upon him, we know not; but all of a sudden he gave orders that the right wing should re-take the ground which it had lost in the morning, and that the left wing, under Smith, should make a simultaneous attack on the Confederate right. General Grant has since given us his own reason for the course which he resolved to pursue. "On riding upon the field," he says, "I saw that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. I took the opportunity, and ordered an advance of the whole line."

The orders were promptly executed. Wallace took charge of the troops which had been engaged and which had suffered so much in the morning and early part of the day, and whose duty it was to resume lost ground. The ground was rough and badly blocked with wood. There were, besides, bloody memorials of the morning's struggle. The Nationals, however, pressed on, the Confederates vigorously resisting.

For more than an hour the conflict raged fiercely, and the result seemed doubtful. Ultimately, however, the Confederates yielded to the fierce energy of their assailants, and were compelled to retire within their own intrenchments. In the hour of victory almost complete, when within one hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's works, Wallace was astonished by an order from the general-in-chief, commanding him to halt and retire his troops, as a new plan of operations had been arranged for the morrow. He felt satisfied that Grant was ignorant of the success which had attended his movement. Darkness, however, was at hand. He contented himself, therefore, with holding the ground he had taken, and disobeyed orders only to the extent of bivouacking on the field of victory. Smith was equally successful in his attack on the Confederate right. Buckner, who in abandoning the left made it the easy prey of Wallace, arrived too late at his old position on the right to save it from the dashing energy of Smith. In spite of all that he could do, the Confederates were forced from their intrenchments and driven inside the work.

All along the line, the ground lost in the morning had been reclaimed. Nay, more:—On both the left and the right the enemy had found it necessary to abandon his own chosen ground and to retire more and more under the work of the fort. When darkness fell, Grant had reason to feel satisfied. He had by his single will converted a day of disaster into a day of triumph. The fruit of victory was not yet in his hands, but
it was ripe and ready to fall. So ended the third day at Fort Donelson.

The night which followed was one of the saddest yet experienced in the history of the war. The cold was intense, the thermometer indicating more than twenty degrees below the freezing point. The ice-covered branches of the trees swayed and crackled in the night breeze. Camp life had not yet become a luxury. There were no tents, and even the blanket had not become a necessary part of the soldier’s equipage. General Grant found a sleeping-place in a negro hut. General Smith lay down on the frozen ground. The soldier slept as he best might, leaning on his musket or resting on his knapsack. Four thousand brave Americans lay scattered over the battle field, many of them dead, some of them freezing to death, the feeble but piteous cries of the latter filling the weary hours with woe. It is in scenes such as these that true humanity stands forth conspicuous and commands universal admiration. With such a background, goodness, pure, true, and unselfish, shines as if with a heavenly light. General Lewis Wallace, to his honor be it said, with many of his men, who, filled with his spirit and fired by his example, worked far into the morning hours, ministering to the wounded on both sides, and with kindly hands burying the dead.

Grant had made all necessary arrangements for resuming the attack along the whole line on the following (Sunday) morning. Such attack, however, was not to be necessary. A council of war was held at Pillow’s headquarters, late on Saturday night. Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and their staff-officers were all present. Some bad temper was revealed; and on many points there was difference of opinion. On one point they were agreed—that another sortie would be absolutely disastrous. Buckner did not believe that he could hold his position half an hour after daylight. In his judgment there was no escape from a surrender. Floyd and Pillow were equally of opinion that the situation was desperate, and that there was nothing for them but immediate capitulation. The one absorbing question with Floyd and Pillow was “How shall we escape?” Floyd knew what he had done, and he trembled to fall into the hands of the enemy. “You know,” he said, “the position in which I stand.” Pillow seemed to feel himself in a similar plight, although he perhaps somewhat overestimated his individual importance. It was ultimately agreed that Buckner should assume the command, and that Floyd and Pillow should be allowed to make their escape, Floyd taking with him his Virginia brigade. Floyd surrendered the command. Pillow, who was next in rank, said “I pass it.” Buckner called for writing materials and a bugler; and Floyd and Pillow hastened off to save their precious lives. Pillow crossed the river in a scow. Floyd and his men went on board a steamer at the wharf, and steered off amid the curses and hisses of their former companions in arms. It was a shameful transaction; but Buckner’s conduct was honorable throughout. Floyd had now appeared in his true character.
When on the morning of Sunday, the
Feb. 16th of February, the light broke
along the lines, there was no con-
viction more general among the Na-
tional soldiers than that the stirring scenes
of the previous day were about to be re-
peated, and repeated, perhaps, in more
aggravated and bloody form; nor was
there disposition anywhere to shirk the
ordeal. Suddenly, however, the clear
notes of the bugle were heard sounding
a parley; and as the gray dawn passed
away before the brighter light of the
opening day, a white flag was seen wav-
ing over the fort. It was a token of a
willingness to surrender. We can read-
illy imagine that the altered situation
was gladly welcomed by all. A letter
was received by Grant from Buckner,
asking for the appointment of commis-
sioners to settle upon terms of capitula-
tion, and suggesting an armistice till
noon. To this Grant returned his char-
acteristic reply, "No terms other than
an unconditional surrender can be ac-
cepted. I propose to move immediately
on your works." Buckner regarded
these terms as "ungenerous and unchiv-
alric"; but he was nevertheless obliged
to accept them. The old flag was im-
mediately raised; and the stars and
stripes floated over the stronghold of
the Cumberland. About 15,000 pris-
oners, 17,600 small arms, and 65 guns
constituted the prize which fell into the
hands of the National commander. His
losses were 2041, of whom 425 were
killed. Grant paid a high compliment
to his soldiers. He told them that "for
four successive nights, without shelter
during the most inclement weather
known in this latitude, they had faced
an enemy in large force, and in a posi-
tion chosen by himself, and had com-
pelled him to surrender without condi-
tions, the victory achieved being not
only great in the effect it must have in
breaking down the rebellion, but also
in this, that it had secured the greatest
number of prisoners of war ever taken
in any battle on this continent."

The investment of Donelson had been
followed by the evacuation of Bowling
Green; its fall was followed by the
abandonment of Nashville. This, how-
ever, was not all. Polk found it neces-
sary to evacuate Columbus and fall back
on Island No. 10. The so-called Gib-
raltar of the West was forthwith occu-
pied by National troops. The Southern
line of defense was completely broken
down. General Grant had nobly accom-
plished the task which he had under-
taken. Henceforward he was regarded
as one of the strongest pillars of the
National cause.
CHAPTER VII.

The Effects of the Fall of Donelson.—Johnston's Mistake.—The Enemy's Centre Broken.—Evacuation of Columbus.—Island No. 10 and New Madrid.—Surrender of Island No. 10.—Vexation of the South.—National Victories in the West.—Popularity of Grant.—The Importance of Corinth.—Grant Preparing to Advance.—Grant Removed from Command.—C. F. Smith put in Charge of the Army.—Halleck Gives His Reasons.—Grant's Answer.—Movement up the Tennessee.—Crump's Landing.—The Gunboats.—Sherman in Advance.—Pittsburg Landing.—The Confederates at Corinth.—Description of the Ground at Pittsburg Landing.—Shiloh Church.—The Illness of General Smith.—General Grant again in Charge.—Disposition of the National Troops.—The Confederates.—How Disposed.—Their Plans and Prospects.—General Beauregard.—Arrival of Johnston.—Buell Ordered to Join Grant.—Johnston's Proclamation.—The Confederates Moving Forward.—Grant's Plans Well Laid, but the Troops Scattered.—The Morning of the Sixth of April.—The Nationals Attacked.—A Tremendous Onslaught.—Grant not on the Field.—His Arrival.—Sherman's Bravery.—Sherman and Prentiss Driven from their Ground.—The Battle Doubtful.—The Confederates Gaining Ground.—The Ammunition Train.—Four Division Camps Plundered.—Three Divisions Routed.—W. H. L. Wallace Comes to the Rescue.—Wallace Mortally Wounded.—The Situation Desperate.—Neither Lewis Wallace nor Buell yet on the Field.—Driven to a Corner of the Field.—Will Grant Surrender?—Both Armies Exhausted.—Johnston Wounded and Carried from the Field.—A Lull in the Fight.—Beauregard in Command.—The Ravine.—The Battery on the Crest of the Hill.—The Gunboats.—The Terrible Struggle.—The Slaughter.—A Valley of Death.—End of the First Day.—The Second Day.—The Battle Resumed.—Wallace and Buell now on the Field.—Beauregard Attempts to Turn the National Left.—An Artillery Duel.—The Confederates Pressed Back.—The Nationals Gaining Ground all along the Line.—A Cheer of Victory.—The Battle Ended.—Reflections.—Unexampled Bravery on Both Sides.—Magnanimity of General Grant.

The fall of Fort Donelson, as we mentioned at the close of the last chapter, completely broke up that line of defense stretching from Bowling Green to Columbus—a line of defense which the Confederates fondly imagined to be invulnerable. It carried the whole Union front forward two hundred miles. It had the immediate effect of driving the insurgents completely out of Kentucky. It threw them back into the centre of Tennessee, and brought the capital of that State under Union authority. It practically unbound both the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers—an immense gain to the Union commanders, as they fully appreciated the great advantage of gunboats on those inland rivers.

There can now be no doubt in any mind at all familiar with the subject, that the Union victories at Forts Henry and Donelson were rendered comparatively easy by the bad management of the Confederate commander-in-chief. Had General Johnston, in place of attaching so much importance to the protection of the two forts on the Tennessee and the Cumberland respectively, concentrated his various armies and forced either Grant or Buell or both to risk the chances of battle in the open ground, the result might have been very different. Johnston saw this himself when it was too late; and in a remarkable letter addressed from Murfreesboro' to Jefferson Davis, he said, "If I join this corps to the forces of General
Beauregard, then those who are now declaiming against me will be without an argument."

Bowling Green had been evacuated before Fort Donelson fell; for, believing it to be untenable, Johnston had moved on towards the south. Nashville was thrown into a perfect panic by the report of the capture of Donelson; and as Johnston had declared that he fought for that city while endeavoring to save this fort on the Cumberland, the capital of Tennessee fell an easy prey to the troops of General Buell. Six days after the capture of Nashville, General Mar. 4 Halleck telegraphed to General McClellan from St. Louis, "Columbus, the Gibraltar of the West, is ours, and Kentucky is free. Thanks to the brilliant strategy of the campaign by which the enemy's centre was pierced at Forts Henry and Donelson, his wings isolated from each other and turned, compelling thus the evacuation of his stronghold of Bowling Green first, and now Columbus." Driven from all these strongholds, it became necessary for the Confederates to select some defensive position further to the south. In obedience to instructions from Richmond, Polk fell back some miles, still clinging to the shores of the Mississippi, and established himself at Island No. 10 and at New Madrid. These places, although fortified with great strength, Island No. 10 particularly, having had the special attention of General Beauregard, and being deemed the most impregnable of all the posts on the Mississippi, the Confederates were compelled in succession to evacuate. The attack on Island No. 10 reflected the highest credit on the skill of the Union commanders and on the bravery of the Union troops. It was not until a canal had been cut across Donaldson's Point, between Island No. 8 and New Madrid, that the Nationals had any hope of dislodging the enemy. The canal was twelve miles long and fifty feet wide; and nineteen days were consumed in cutting it from point to point and making it navigable for the largest of the gunboats. Commander Foote reported to his government that Island No. 10 was "harder to conquer than Columbus, its shores being lined with forts, each fort commanding the one above it." Beauregard telegraphed to Richmond that the National guns had "thrown three thousand shells and burned fifty tons of gunpowder," his batteries being uninjured and only one man killed. The canal made a complete change in the situation. New Madrid had been evacuated on the 12th of March; and on the April 8th of April, four days after the completion of the canal, Island No. 10 had ceased to be a Confederate stronghold. The defenders of the batteries had fled in confusion; but they were pursued by Pope and compelled to surrender. The garrison on the island, learning what had taken place and believing the situation to be hopeless, sent a flag of truce to Commander Foote, offering to surrender. The immediate fruits of victory were some seven thousand prisoners, including three generals and two hundred and seventy field and company officers, one hundred heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of
field artillery, a large quantity of ammunition, several thousand stands of small arms, with tents, horses, and wagons innumerable. "No single battle field has yet afforded to the North such visible fruits of victory as have been gathered at Island No. 10." Such was the language used by the high officials at Richmond. The Mississippi was now open as far south as Fort Pillow.

While these events were following each other in rapid succession in Middle Tennessee and Western Kentucky, successes of a scarcely less substantial kind were attending the National arms in Arkansas, in the grand movement, conducted by Curtis, Sigel, and others, down the Mississippi valley toward the gulf. Early in February the Confederate General Price had been compelled to retreat from Missouri into Arkansas.

On the 18th of that month he was closely followed by the Nationals under General Samuel R. Curtis of Iowa. On the same day, joy was created throughout the Union by a telegram sent by General Halleck to General McClellan. "The flag of the Union," said Halleck, "is floating in Arkansas. . . . The army of the Southwest is doing its duty nobly." Curtis foresaw, however, that he was certain soon to be taken at a disadvantage, as the Confederates, in retreating, had really been falling back upon reinforcements. He therefore took post upon Sugar Creek. His entire force consisted of twelve thousand five hundred men, with forty-nine guns. The enemy, under General Earl Van Dorn, a dashing Confederate officer, was at least twenty thousand strong. On the morning of the 7th of March, the two armies came into collision.

There had been much previous manœuvring; and in consequence of a skilful and successful flank movement made by Van Dorn, Curtis was compelled, almost at the last moment, to change his front. When the struggle began, the First and Second Divisions, under Sigel and Asboth, were on the left, the Third, under Davis, was in the centre, and Carr's Fourth Division formed the right. The line extended between three and four miles, from Sugar Creek to Elkhorn Tavern. On the opposite side of a ravine called Cross Timber Hollow, the Confederate line was stretched out before them, with Price on the right, McIntosh in the centre, and McCulloch on the left. The attack fell heavily upon Carr's Division, which during the course of the day was driven back nearly a mile, but was not disorganized. An attempt was made by McCulloch, by a movement of his force to the left, to join Van Dorn and Price in their attack on Curtis' right. To arrest this movement, Sigel pushed forward three pieces of artillery, with a body of cavalry to protect and support them. The cavalry were immediately overwhelmed and the guns captured. Davis hurried to the assistance of Sigel; a desperate struggle followed, victory oscillating like a pendulum, the Nationals and Confederates recoiling and recovering alternately; ultimately, however, the Confederate right was broken and routed, and among those left on the field were Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, mortally wounded. At the close of the
fighting on the 7th, Price was on the Fayetteville road, in Curtis’ rear. Van-Dorn had his headquarters at Elkhorn Tavern. On the right the National army had been defeated; it was cut off from its line of communication; its provisions were all but exhausted. The Confederates, however, had been defeated on their right, and nearly driven from the field. During the night the Confederates united their forces on the ground held by their left wing. A change was also effected in the National line, Davis taking the right, Carr the centre, and Sigel the left. At sunrise the battle was resumed, Sigel opening a heavy cannonade, and advancing round the enemy’s right, Davis at the same time turning the enemy’s left. It was a daring and skilful movement, and had all the effects of a surprise. All at once the Confederates found themselves exposed to a destructive cross fire. They made a brave resistance, but in two hours, such was the precision and rapidity of Sigel’s gunners, they were in full retreat through the defiles of Cross Timber Hollow. Thus ended what is known as the battle of Pea Ridge. In the two days the Nationals lost over thirteen hundred men. The Confederate loss must have been greater. This battle had no direct connection with the movements more immediately under consideration. It did not result from the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. It did not in any way affect the impending struggle at Pittsburg Landing. But inasmuch as the movements of the army under Curtis were part of Halleck’s general plan, as that plan contemplated quite as much the opening of the Mississippi from Cairo to the gulf as the driving of the enemy out of Kentucky and Tennessee, and as the battle of Pea Ridge was noted for skill on the part of the officers and bravery on the part of the men, it has been deemed wise, the more especially as it occurred simultaneously with the events now under review, to give it a place in these pages, which are intended to be preliminary to the most gigantic effort yet made on either side since the commencement of the war.

After the fall of Donelson, it was only natural that General Grant should, for a time at least, become the popular favorite. All over the Union his praises were liberally sounded; and by not a few who had acquired an insight into his character he was hailed already as the coming man. His sphere of action had been greatly enlarged. General Halleck, as if to mark his appreciation of Grant’s noble services, had assigned him to the command of the new District of West Tennessee, a command which extended from Cairo to the northern borders of Mississippi, and embraced the entire country between the Mississippi and Cumberland Rivers. General Grant took immediate steps to turn to account the victories which he had won, and to press the enemy still further to the south. He established his headquarters at Fort Henry, where General Lewis Wallace was in command. We have seen already that Foote’s flotilla was withdrawn from the Cumberland, that part of it had gone up the Tennessee River, and that Foote himself, with a
powerful naval armament, had gone down the Mississippi for the purpose of co-operating with the land troops against Columbus, Hickman, Island No. 10, and New Madrid.

It seems to have been the conviction of all the Union commanders—of Halleck, of Buell, of Grant—that a lodgment should be made at or near Corinth in Northern Mississippi. The possession of Corinth or Florence or Tusculum, but particularly Corinth, would give the National forces control of the Memphs and Charleston Railroad, the key to the great railway communications between the Mississippi and the East, as well as the border slave States and the Gulf of Mexico. It would facilitate the capture of Memphs, because it would place it more completely at the mercy of the troops now moving down the Mississippi; and it would render effective assistance to General Curtis, who, as we have seen, was at this moment carrying on important operations in Arkansas. While adopting vigorous measures for the purpose of giving effect to the general plan, Grant had the mortification to receive an order from Halleck, instructing him to turn over his command to General C. F. Smith, and to remain himself at Fort Henry.

In such circumstances such an order must have been humiliating in the last degree to General Grant; and it is not surprising that, stung to the quick as he must have been, he should have asked to be entirely relieved from duty. As a general rule, it is unwise to attach too much importance to individuals in a great national contest. No one man is absolutely indispensable. It is undeniable, however, that the retirement of General Grant at this particular juncture might have materially affected the future history of the great national struggle now fairly begun, and already bearing upon it somewhat of the impress of his character and genius. The story of this short-lived difficulty is easily told. Complying with a request for an interview, Grant had on the 27th of February gone on a visit to Buell, up the Cumberland to Nashville. In the meantime Halleck had ordered him to ascend the Tennessee, then in full flood, and establish himself on the Memphs and Charleston Railroad at or near Corinth. On the 1st of March, Mar 1, Halleck ordered him to fall back from the Cumberland to the Tennessee, with the view of carrying out the orders previously given. It was supposed at this moment that the Confederates had retreated to Chattanooga. Sherman meanwhile received orders to seize all steamboats passing Paducah, and to send them up the Tennessee for the transportation of Grant’s army. On hearing that Grant had gone up the Cumberland, Halleck telegraphed to him: “Why don’t you obey my orders? Why don’t you answer my letters? Turn over the command of the Tennessee expedition to General C. F. Smith, and remain yourself at Fort Henry.” At the same time Halleck wrote complainingly to McClellan at Washington, saying he could get no reports from Grant, whose troops were demoraled by their victory. To Grant himself Halleck wrote,
stating that his repeated neglect of positive orders to report his strength had created great dissatisfaction, and seriously interfered with the general military arrangements; and that his going to Nashville when he ought to have been with his troops, had given such offense at Washington that it had been considered advisable to arrest him on his return. It is possible that, judged by the highest forms of military law, Grant, in some of the particulars charged, was to blame. It is possible, too, that Halleck, who was a man of the old school, and strict to the letter of the law, was officious overmuch. Grant, however, had his explanation ready. He had not received Halleck's orders in time; he had gone to Nashville for the good of the service, and not for personal pleasure or for any selfish motive; he had reported every day, had written on an average more than once a day, and had done his best to obey orders from headquarters; he had not permitted his troops to maraud; on the contrary, he had sent the marauders on to St. Louis. He submitted to instructions by turning the army over to General Smith. He asked, however, that he might be relieved. The explanations so far satisfied Halleck that he requested the authorities at Washington to allow the matter to drop. Smith, however, remained in command, but, as the reader will soon discover, only for a brief period.

The temporary change of commanders did not allow any intermission of the work. The expedition up the Tennessee was hurried forward. An acquisition was found in Sherman, who, in compliance with orders from Halleck, reported to Smith. It was not many days until seventy transports, carrying over thirty thousand troops, were ready to move to the point agreed upon. As the boats steamed up to Savannah, where the depot of supplies was established, bands playing and banners flying, it was perhaps the most splendid pageant seen since the commencement of the war. On the 11th of March (Mar. II.) the greater portion of the army was debarked at Savannah in perfect safety. General Lewis Wallace, with his division, disembarked on the west bank of the river at Crump's Landing, about four miles above Savannah, and took post on the road to Purdy. His instructions were to destroy the railroad bridge in the immediate neighborhood of that village. This was a hazardous undertaking; for the Confederates, as was afterwards learned, were lying close at hand; but it was successfully accomplished, and that, too, under the inconvenience and discomfort of a series of heavy thunderstorms. A Confederate train approached while the bridge was burning, and narrowly escaped capture by reversing the engine. Sherman was ordered by Smith to take his own division and the two gunboats Tyler and Lexington, to proceed further up the river, and to strike the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Sherman went up as far as Tyler's Landing, at the mouth of Yellow Creek, just within the borders of Mississippi; but the roads were so flooded by the heavy rains that he found it impossible to reach the rail
road. Had the enemy known his opportunity, Sherman’s division might have been cut to pieces; for it was with the utmost difficulty, and not until many men and horses had perished in the swollen streams, that he got back to his boats. On his way up the stream, Sherman made one important discovery. On passing Pittsburg Landing the gunboats were fired upon by a Confederate regiment. It had already become known that the Confederate army was concentrating at Corinth, and that two batteries were already posted in advance, one at Eastport, the other just above the mouth of Bear Creek. Sherman learned that a road led from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth; he conveyed the information at once to Smith, and declared it to be all-important, in his judgment, that Pittsburg Landing should be occupied. The advice was taken; and the place became sacred—the name immortal.

After a personal examination of the ground, Smith was satisfied that Sherman’s advice was sound; and Hurlbut was ordered to occupy Pittsburg Landing; while Sherman was directed to bring his division on the ground, but to take a position out from the river, leaving space enough behind him, as Smith put it, “for a hundred thousand men.”

Pittsburg Landing is about eight or nine miles above Savannah, and lies on the west side of the Tennessee. The river banks at the Landing rise about eighty feet, but are cloven by a number of ravines, through one of which runs the main road to Corinth to the southwest, and branching off to Purdy to the northwest. The Landing is flanked on the left by a short but precipitous ravine. On the right and left are Snake and Lick Creeks, streams which rise near each other and gradually diverge, falling into the Tennessee some four or five miles apart on either side of the Landing. Between these streams, which form a good flanking arrangement, making attack possible only in the front, lies a plateau or table-land rising some eighty feet high, of irregular surface, cleared near the shores, but covered with tall oaks and thick brushwood further from the river. About three miles from the Landing, and embowered in trees, stood a little log building—a place used occasionally by the Methodists for holding camp meetings. It had neither doors nor windows, and was only half-floored. Some corn in the husk lay piled on the floor. This was Shiloh Church, destined to give its name to the neighborhood and to the bloody contest which was so soon to disturb its quiet surroundings.

The illness of General Smith, which resulted in death on the 25th of April, brought Grant again to the front. Mar. On the 17th of March he arrived at Savannah, established his headquarters at the house of Mr. Cheney, and assumed the command. He found the army already in position, and made no radical changes. The Landing was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington. Sherman’s Division, eight thousand strong, formed a sort of outlying force, covering all the main roads leading to the Landing. There was a gap between his centre and his right,
and a still wider gap of about two and a half miles between his centre and his left. Hurlbut's Division was put in line on the left of the main Corinth road, and Smith's own division, under General W. H. L. Wallace, was on Hurlbut's right. Lewis Wallace's Division was detached and stationed at Crump's Landing, to observe any movements which might be made by the Confederates at Purdy, and to cover the river communications between Pittsburg Landing and Savannah. McClernand's Division was about a mile in front of W. H. L. Wallace, with that of Prentiss to his right. These two divisions—that of McClernand and that of Prentiss—formed the real line of battle. The entire force was about thirty-three thousand men. In estimating the possible strength of the Union army, the aid which might come from Buell must be taken into account. This general, after repeated solicitations that he might be permitted to abandon Nashville, cross Tennessee and join his forces to those of Grant, with a view to counteract the Confederate concentration at Corinth, had at last obtained Halleck's consent. The army of the Ohio, which numbered some forty thousand men, was therefore already on its march; and by the 20th of March it had reached Columbia. The roads were bad and the weather stormy in the extreme; but it was not unreasonable to conclude that Buell would be able to accomplish the distance in time. Should this large increase of strength arrive before the commencement of hostilities, Grant could have but small reason for any misgivings as to the issue of the contest.

Let us now glance at the position of the Confederates, and consider their plans and their prospects. When the first line of the Confederate defense had been swept away by the capture of Fort Donelson, Johnston retired first of all to Murfreesboro; but the great object aimed at both by him and Beauregard was to concentrate the Confederate forces and establish a second line of defense on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Concentration had for some time past been the favorite idea of Beauregard. If his advice had been taken in time, Donelson might not yet have fallen. Beauregard selected Corinth as the most desirable point for concentrating the scattered forces of the Confederacy. Here the two great railroads which connect the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi with the Atlantic Ocean form a junction. It is the key of the railroad system of Mississippi. Orders were issued to the commanders of all the outlying positions; and Beauregard was soon joined by Bragg from Pensacola, by Polk from the Mississippi, Johnston also coming up with his entire army from Murfreesboro. Corinth, therefore, became a great military camp; and, in addition to its other advantages, it afforded complete protection to Memphis. In three weeks the Confederate strength had risen from eleven thousand to forty-five thousand men. This, however, was not all. VanDorn and Price, whom we recently saw retiring before Curtis and Sigel at Pea Ridge, were known to be coming up from Arkansas
with other thirty thousand men. Since the commencement of the war the Confederates never found themselves in circumstances more favorable for striking a bold and decisive blow. After the junction with Johnston, that general took the command, Beauregard being nominally second, but remaining really the soul of the movement.

It had been the intention of Halleck, under whose instructions the entire movement on the part of the Nationals was conducted, to intervene between Johnston and Beauregard. When, therefore, he heard that Johnston had disappeared from Murfreesboro', and that his object was to join Beauregard at Corinth, he ordered Buell to hurry forward to the aid of Grant, and counteract as far as possible the Confederate concentration. There had been unnecessary delay, which permitted the Confederate generals to unite their strength; and now the weather and the roads were such that, although Buell's army was at Columbia on the 20th, it took full seventeen days to reach Pittsburg Landing, a distance of only ninety miles.

To the Confederate general two questions presented themselves. Shall I wait for VanDorn and Price? or shall I strike Grant at once, before Buell has time to come up? At this time Breckenridge, with the Confederate right, which consisted of eleven thousand men, was stationed at Burnsville; Hardee and Bragg, with more than twenty thousand men, formed the centre at Corinth; and Polk and Hindman, with ten thousand men, were on the left, to the north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Johnston, on assuming command, had issued a flaming proclamation: "You are expected," he said to the soldiers, "to show yourselves worthy of your valor and courage, worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in any time." On the 3d of April, their available strength being forty thousand 3d men, the Confederates commenced their onward march. Their plan was first to destroy Grant and then to fall with all their weight on Buell. The roads were in a terrible condition, and in consequence the progress made was slow. It was intended to attack the National army on the 5th; but the attack was delayed in consequence of a heavy rainstorm which fell in the afternoon. They were the less unwilling to delay the attack that information had just reached them that the troops from the west, under VanDorn and Price, would certainly join them the next morning. That night they were distant from the National pickets only about three-quarters of a mile. Hardee was in front Bragg was in a second line behind Polk was behind Bragg; and Breckenridge brought up the rear. During the course of the evening a council of war was held. There was a disposition to wait for VanDorn and Price. But there was peril in waiting. If Buell should arrive, Johnston would lose his golden opportunity. It was the general conviction that their forward movement was unknown to Grant; and, after a consultation of some two hours, it was
resolved to strike a blow before dawn of the coming day. "Gentlemen," said Beauregard at the close of the council, while pointing in the direction of Grant's army, "we sleep in the enemy's camp to-morrow night."

The Confederate generals made a mistake in supposing that Grant was ignorant of the fact that they were moving forward upon him with the view of making an attack. That the enemy was massed at Corinth he was well aware; but he was in the enemy's country, and information was not willingly obtained from the people of the neighborhood. That he expected to be attacked is proved by the instructions which he gave to his officers, particularly to Lewis Wallace and Sherman. But he had no means of knowing the enemy's strength. He did not know that concentration was taking place so rapidly; and a vague idea prevailed in the Union camp that the force opposed to them did not exceed ten thousand men. Of the forward march of the enemy he could not be ignorant; for on April 4th an infantry picket belonging to Colonel Buckland's brigade, having been captured, Sherman took that brigade, with some cavalry, and drove back the Confederate horsemen some six miles from the front of the camp. The firing of cannon was heard in the evening. On the same day Lewis Wallace reported eight regiments of infantry and twelve hundred cavalry at Purdy, and an equal force at Bethel. It is not to be denied, however, that Grant was in doubt from what direction the onslaught would be made. They might attack his main camp; or they might cross over Snake Creek to the north and west of him, establishing themselves on the Tennessee below and forcing him to fight or cross to the east side of the river. Grant had his feelers out all around; and, as the result proved, he did best to risk a battle on the ground which had been chosen and on which he stood.

The uncertainty which prevailed in the Union camp as to the point which might first have to bear the shock of battle, proved an immense gain to the Confederates. It enabled them to mass themselves in great force and fall with destructive effect on one part of the Union line. So great, indeed, was the advantage which they thus obtained that the wonder is not so much that victory leaned to their standards during the greater part of the first day's fighting, but that they did not succeed, in a few hours, in completely sweeping the Union army from the field. Their plan was to penetrate the Union centre, divide the army in two and cut it up in detail. This done, it would not be difficult to make short, sharp work with Buell. The plan was good enough; but in their calculations the Confederate generals made one mistake—they did not take into account the cool pluck and skill of the Union commanders and the stern courage and determination of the Union men.

The night of the 5th was, as we have seen, wild and stormy. The next April morning (Sunday) rose bright and clear. The recent rains, while they had filled the creeks and streams, had given
an air of freshness to the surrounding country. The breath of spring was everywhere. The trees were robed in the most delicate green; and the sweet, rich voices of the morning songsters filled the air with melody. In the Union camp it was still unknown towards what point the enemy might be moving; but there was watchfulness everywhere. Prentiss' grand guards had been doubled the night before; and his pickets were out one mile and a half. Sherman's troops had already breakfasted, and were formed into line. With the early dawn Hardee's corps, which formed the first Confederate line, was in motion. Quickly but silently they passed across the ravine of Lick Creek and the ground which separated it from the outlying divisions of the Union army. It was the more easy for them to move noiselessly that the fallen leaves, being soaked with rain, made no rustling sound under the footsteps of the men. The onslaught was tremendous. Avalanche-like, it overcame all resistance. The Union outposts were driven like chaff before the wind. On Hardee moved, falling heavily on Sherman's left, and then, as if rebounding from that firm phalanx, his entire force rolled with resistless and crushing weight upon Prentiss' division. The fierce yells of the charging regiments, the sharp, shrill sounds of musketry, the booming of cannon, the bursting of shells, the crashing of timber, and the clouds of sulphurous smoke which filled the woods, too plainly told that the battle of Shiloh had begun.

When the first shots were fired, Grant, unfortunately, was not on the ground. He had gone down the river to Savannah, some nine miles off, to have an interview with Buell. Soon as he heard the first guns, he hastened to the scene of action. Leaving a letter for Buell, and ordering Nelson, who had arrived with a portion of Buell's forces, to hurry forward, he took a steamboat for Pittsburg Landing. Halting at Crump's Landing, he gave directions to Lewis Wallace to follow at once, unless it should turn out that the firing they heard was intended to deceive and that the real attack was to be made upon him. In the latter event he was to defend himself to the utmost, and to rely with confidence on reinforcements being sent him with the least possible delay. The attack had been made at the first streak of early dawn. It was eight o'clock before Grant reached the field of Shiloh. He saw that he had to fight the combined Confederate force, and without the aid of Buell. What the Confederate strength was Grant could only guess. We know that the combined army was over forty thousand strong. Grant had an available force of thirty-three thousand men. He believed he could depend upon Lewis Wallace, who had five thousand more. Some severe work, however, had already been done. There was a considerable gap between Prentiss' right and Sherman's left. It was into this gap that Hardee tried to force himself, his object being to outflank and turn both lines. In the beginning of the conflict Sherman's left, as we have indicated, was sorely pressed and suffered terribly. But that active and
skilful general was present in the thickest of the fight; and by his cheering words and personal bravery, as well as by the admirable manner in which he handled his men, he laid that day the foundation of a fame which the American people will not willingly let die. Hildebrand’s brigade, which had been driven from its position by the first onset of the enemy, he tried in vain to rally. While thus engaged, he received a severe bullet wound in the hand. Nothing, however, could daunt his energy or induce him to relax his efforts. McClernand pushed forward a portion of his troops to aid the smitten Hildebrand; and these for a time bore the shock of battle.

All, however, was in vain. In poured the Confederates in ever-increasing numbers. Bragg had come to the aid of Hardee; and Polk, with the third Confederate line, was already moving toward Sherman’s rear. By nine o’clock a very large portion of Sherman’s division was virtually out of the fight; and before ten Prentiss had been forced from his ground, his camp captured and plundered, his division thrown into confusion, and he himself isolated from his men. But for the pluck and skill of Sherman, the battle at this stage might have been lost, although it cannot be said that there was any lack of bravery on the part of any of the Union divisions. Officers and men everywhere vied with each other in deeds of daring. But Sherman showed strategy as well as pluck. Feeling the pressure of the enemy and in danger of being caught in the rear, he swung round upon his right as upon a pivot, coming out at a right angle and taking entirely new ground. Here he took a firm position and held it tenaciously for several hours, the repeated and vigorous attacks of the enemy falling upon the solid front of his well arranged battalions as upon a shield of shining steel.

The falling back of Sherman, while it enabled him to prolong the contest and successfully to prevent attack in the rear, left McClernand’s division completely exposed. On this, therefore, the Confederate forces fell with tremendous energy. For a time McClernand boldly and even successfully resisted, most effective aid being rendered by Dresser’s powerful rifled cannon. Regiment after regiment of the Confederates rushed through the abandoned camps and pressed forward only to be cut to pieces by the deadly rifle shot. Ultimately, however, the force of overwhelming numbers began to tell on McClernand’s lines. He was forced to retire, not, however, except in the most perfect order, fighting as he went, and bravely contesting every inch of ground. By eleven o’clock this division was on a line with Hurlbut, close to W. H. L. Wallace, with Sherman to the right.

Meanwhile Stewart’s brigade, of Sherman’s division, which was posted on the extreme left of the National line, about two miles from Pittsburg Landing, on the Hamburg road, near Lake Creek, where Buell was expected to land, was, in consequence of the falling back of the other divisions, in an extremely perilous position. The screaming of a shell in its passage through the
branches of the trees overhead apprised Stewart of the approach of the enemy in his direction. It turned out to be a column of cavalry and infantry, composed for the most part of Breckenridge’s reserves. They were moving along the road leading from Corinth to Hamburg. Notifying W. H. L. Wallace of his difficulty, and calling for aid, he calmly awaited the attack. It was fiercely made and gallantly resisted. Wallace sent McArthur to the aid of Stewart; but McArthur missed his way, and came directly on the Confederates under Withers. It was impossible for Stewart to maintain his position; but so vigorously did McArthur engage the enemy that Stewart managed to avoid capture, and succeeded in reaching a place of comparative safety, where he restored his shattered force to something like order.

The battle had raged since the early morning. It was fiercest about ten o’clock. There was but little intermission, however, until two. About ten Grant visited Sherman’s camp, and finding that the supply of cartridges was short, he organized a train of ammunition wagons to run between the camp and the Landing—an arrangement beset with great difficulty, in consequence of the large number of fugitives who were forcing their way through the narrow road. By twelve o’clock noon, the Confederates had possession of the ground occupied in the morning by the first line of the National army; and the camps of Sherman, McClerand, Prentiss, and Stewart had been captured and plundered. Three of the five divisions of that army had been completely routed. The ground being entirely cleared before them—Prentiss’ brigade, as we have seen, being demolished and Stewart having been compelled to retreat, McClerand, too, and Sherman having both yielded on the right—the Confederates, apparently resolved to push matters to a crisis, rushed with tremendous fury upon Hurlbut, who still maintained his original position, and who had been joined by Prentiss and some two thousand of his men. W. H. L. Wallace flew to the aid of Hurlbut, taking with him the Missouri batteries of Stone, Richardson, and Webber. Hurlbut, who had hitherto been in the open fields, now fell back into the woods which lay between his camp and the river, and there, nobly aided by Wallace, who fought like a hero of old, gallantly resisted the foe for several weary hours. Upon this compact body of National troops, who knew that if they had death in front they had certain death in the rear, three most desperate charges were made, as if upon a wall of iron. In one of these encounters General W. H. L. Wallace fell, mortally wounded. McArthur took the command; but in spite of their best efforts, both he and Hurlbut were compelled to retire a little further down and towards the river. In the confusion, Prentiss and his company getting isolated, were captured, sent to the Confederate rear, and finally marched to Corinth as prisoners of war.

The situation now seemed desperate. It was between three and four o’clock. Sherman and McClerand, all but ut
terly exhausted, and having lost many of their guns, had fallen back and taken a position in front of the bridge which crosses Snake Creek. It was over this bridge that General Lewis Wallace was momentarily expected to come. Grant had been pressed into a corner of the battle field, his army at this time occupying a space of not more than four hundred acres on the very verge of the river. As yet there were no signs of Wallace, nor any explanation of his delay. Buell, too, had failed to come to time. Five of the Union camps had been captured; and many guns and prisoners had fallen into the enemy’s hands. Fatigue and disorder had done and were still doing their terrible work. Cooped up in this narrow corner of the field, with the triumphant enemy in front and the dark rolling waters of the Tennessee in the rear—death before and death behind—what more can Grant do? Will he surrender? No. The word had no place in his system of tactics.

The Confederates, however, were less strong than they seemed. Success had broken their ranks; and the hard work of the day had produced its natural fruit. The men were completely worn out. Some of their best men had perished. Generals Gladdon and Hindman had been killed; and about half-past two o’clock, when pressing his men towards the Landing, and almost recklessly exposing himself, Commander-in-chief Johnston received a rifle bullet in the leg, which proved fatal. There was a lull in the fight after Johnston fell; but Beauregard assumed command; and the struggle for possession of Pittsburg Landing was resumed with fresh energy. Beauregard felt that there was no time to lose; for night and Buell were coming.

The entire strength of the Confederate army was at this stage being pressed against the National left. It seemed to be the object of Beauregard to turn the National line or force them into the river. In any case, he was determined to seize the Landing. Happily, as the result proved, a deep ravine lay between the Confederates and the Nationals, who, cooped up as they were, still covered the Landing. This ravine was impassable for artillery and cavalry. In consequence of the heavy rains, the bottom was wet and the sides slippery. The ravine led down to the river; and at its mouth the two gunboats Tyler and Lexington had taken position, their commanders having obtained permission from General Grant to exercise their discretion in shelling the woods and sweeping the ravine. On the brow of his side of the ravine General Grant had hastily flung up some earthworks in the form of a half-moon. To several siege guns which were parked there, Colonel Webster, Grant’s chief of staff, added a number of guns which had belonged to light batteries, now broken up, and thus secured a semi-circular defense of about fifty cannon. This hurriedly-improvised battery reached round nearly to the Corinth road. The wretched condition to which the National army had been reduced may be gathered from the fact that it was with the utmost difficulty men could be got to work the guns. The men were exhaust
A VALLEY OF DEATH.

ed and demoralized. Volunteers were called for; and Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of the First Missouri Artillery, having offered his services, his example was quickly followed. The Confederate assault was led by Chalmers, Withers, Cheatham, Ruggles, Anderson, Stuart, Pond, and Stevens. It was a perilous attempt, but it was bravely made. Down the steep sides of the ravine they rushed, uttering their favorite and familiar cry. For a moment it seemed as if all was lost, and as if Beauregard was about to crown the day’s work by a final crushing blow. But no. It was destined to be otherwise. The slippery sides of the ravine, and the slush and mud at the bottom, greatly hindered the movements of the attacking party. Once in the deadly hollow, there was literally no way of escape. At a signal given, Webster’s guns from their fifty mouths opened fire in front; while the Tyler and Lexington, striking the Confederates on the flank, swept the ravine with their eight-inch shells. It was now a most unequal contest. The Confederates had fallen into a trap. Every onward movement was vigorously repulsed. The National troops began to rally, and finding position, contributed to the work of destruction by the unerring aim of their rifles. Again and again and yet again did the Confederates face the terrible fire, rushing across the ravine as if they would storm the battery in front; but it was only to be mowed down like grass or driven back like sheep. The ravine was filled with the wounded and the dead. So dense was the smoke that the entire scene was wrapped in almost midnight darkness—a darkness relieved only by the swift-recurring rifle flash and the cannon’s blaze. It was a virtual hell—a real, a veritable valley of death itself. The tide had turned. The crisis was past. Beauregard, seeing that it was useless to prolong the struggle, withdrew his men. He professed himself satisfied with what he had done; and, as it was near nightfall, he thought he might rest for the night and give the finishing touch in the morning. The firing now ceased, and Grant was left master of the ground. Before the close of the struggle, Nelson, with Buell’s advance, had arrived on the field; and Lewis Wallace, having at last found his way, was coming up with his five thousand men. For the National cause, the first day at Shiloh had ended not ingloriously; and with these fresh accessions of strength, the prospect was bright for the coming day.

The dreary hours of the night were sufficiently filled with horrors. The gunboats kept up an incessant cannonade, in some places setting the woods on fire. The wounded on both sides vainly sought to escape from the grasp of this new and terrible destroyer. Happily a heavy rain-storm fell upon the scene of agony, and the fire was extinguished. Shortly after the firing had ceased, Grant visited Sherman; and as it was the opinion of both that the Confederates were exhausted, it was agreed that the attack should be resumed early in the morning. Subsequently Grant visited each of the division commanders, giving the necessary instructions.
and then flung himself on the wet ground and snatched a few hours’ rest, with his head resting on the stump of a tree. During the night Lewis Wallace came up, and Buell arrived in person. All night through, steamboats kept busily plying between Savannah and Pittsburg Landing, bringing up the remaining divisions of Buell’s army. Nelson’s Division was all on the field by nine o’clock, P. M. Crittenden’s arrived a little later; and by five in the morning McCook’s division, which was the last to come up, having had to wait for boats, was all safely disembarked. Twenty-seven thousand men were thus added to the National army.

With the early light of the morning of April 7, drizzling rain, the troops were in position and ready to make the attack. The fresh troops were placed in line, as they came upon the field, considerably in advance, and upon the ground abandoned by Beauregard after the failure of his last attack. Nelson was on the left; then in order, Crittenden, McCook, Hurlbut, McClemand, Sherman, and Lewis Wallace. Thomson, of Wallace’s division, with his field guns, was the first to disturb the silence of the morning and to awaken the echoes of the forest. The response was vigorous; but the fresh troops of Wallace stood bravely to their work. At this moment Grant arrived, and ordered Wallace to press forward and attack the Confederate left under Bragg, who, since the death of Johnston, was second in command. This was gallantly done, the Confederates being compelled to abandon the high ground, which was soon occupied by Wallace’s troops. Here a halt was made, Wallace expecting Sherman to come to his aid.

Meanwhile the two armies had come into collision at the other extremities of their lines. From what has been said above, it will be seen that Buell’s force, which lay nearest to Pittsburg Landing, composed the centre and left of Grant’s new line of battle. The divisions of Nelson and Crittenden only were ready, when Wallace’s guns were heard booming to the right. They moved forward at once, Nelson’s division leading. Their artillery had not yet arrived; but the batteries of Mendenhall and Terrill, of the regular service, were placed at their disposal. Nelson had moved half a mile, at least, before he felt the enemy. At the first touch he seemed to yield; but it was only for a moment. At this point Beauregard had gathered up his strength and was resolved to strike a deadly blow. If he could turn the National left, he might still accomplish his purpose of yesterday, and make himself master of the Landing. His onslaught was tremendous. For a second Nelson’s troops wavered; but it was only for a second. Mendenhall’s battery was hurried into action; and the advancing Confederates were driven back in confusion by a tempest of grape and canister. Hazen’s brigade charged, captured one of Beauregard’s batteries, and turned it with deadly effect on the foe. Once more the Confederates came up, with redoubled strength, and Hazen fell back before the advancing tide. Terrill’s
battery of McCook’s division was now got into position. Pouring forth shell from his ten-pounders and grape and canister from his brass twelve, Terrill did splendid and effective work. For two hours the artillery conflict raged. Crittenden was on Nelson’s right, and McCook was to the right of Crittenden, fronting the Confederate centre. Buell had taken general command of his own troops. The terrible artillery duel began to tell on the Confederate line. Nelson, becoming more daring, began to move forward. Crittenden and McCook advanced abreast at the same time; but every inch of ground was keenly contested; and victory, now leaning to one side and now to the other, seemed undecided as to which to award the palm.

Sherman’s captured camp was still in the Confederate rear; and to this as an objective point the National line kept slowly but steadily advancing. Sherman and Wallace, carrying out Grant’s instructions to the letter, have advanced under a terrible fire and have reached the ridge occupied by the former on Sunday morning. The little log church in Shiloh has again become a conspicuous object in the battle field. Around it the tempest of battle is again to rage. Beauregard, despairing of success on the left, had, by countermarching his troops, greatly strengthened himself in front of the enemy’s right. The struggle at this point was protracted and severe. Sherman and Wallace held their ground; and it soon became apparent that Beauregard’s strength was all but exhausted.

At the same time that the Confederate general had concentrated his troops against the National right, he did not neglect an opportunity which seemed to present itself more towards what might be called the National centre. Noticing a slight gap between Crittenden and McCook, he endeavored to force a passage between them. Here he made his last effort—his last decided stand. It was all in vain. McCook’s division stood like a wall of iron. The Confederate centre now began to yield. All along the line from Nelson on the left to Sherman and Wallace on the right, the Nationals were pressing forward. Everywhere the enemy was seen retiring. “Cheer after cheer,” says Wallace, “rang through the woods, and every man felt that the day was ours.” The battle of Shiloh was ended. “Don’t,” said Beauregard to Breckenridge, as he ordered a retreat, “don’t let this be converted into a rout.” It was now half-past five o’clock; and the wearied National troops being in no mood to pursue the foe, the retreat was the more easily conducted. The two days’ fighting had resulted in the loss of over twenty thousand men—the Confederate killed and wounded amounting to more than ten thousand, the Nationals to nearly twelve thousand.

General Halleck only did what was right when he thanked Generals Grant and Buell, “and the officers and men of their respective commands, for the bravery and endurance with which they sustained the general attack of the enemy on the 6th, and for the heroic manner in which on the 7th they defeated
and routed the entire rebel army.” General Grant showed his magnanimity when, in writing to the War Department, he said, “Sherman held with raw troops the key-point of the Landing. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say that I do not believe there was another division commander on the field who had the skill and enterprise to have done it. To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of the battle.”

Lewis Wallace was greatly blamed for his non-appearance on the field of battle on the 6th. It was not difficult, however, for that brave officer, who did such effective work on the 7th, to give sufficient and satisfactory explanations. He had, it appeared, obeyed his first orders, which were that he should join the right of the army, but not knowing that it had fallen back, he had wasted the whole afternoon in a fruitless march.

There has been much useless discussion as to how much Grant was indebted to Buell for the victory at Shiloh. What did happen we know. What might have been we cannot tell. Some of the facts of the case are plain, and admit of no double interpretation. During the greater part of Sunday, the Confederates marched triumphantly from point to point. The Nationals were driven back entirely from their original ground; five of their division camps were overrun and captured; and Grant, with his whole army, was pressed into a corner of the field. The situation was desperate. One blow more, and it seemed as if Beauregard would reap a glorious victory. Of all this there can be no doubt. It is as little to be denied, however, that at the last moment Grant snatched victory from his triumphant rival. The advancing Confederates were not only successfully resisted, but driven back in confusion and compelled to give up the struggle. All this Grant accomplished before any effective assistance arrived from Buell. It would simply be absurd to deny that the arrival of reinforcements, which, including Wallace’s division, amounted in all to twenty-seven thousand men, made victory on the following day comparatively more easy. But we are not at liberty to say that, without the aid of Buell, Grant might not have accomplished his purpose and driven the enemy from the field. We simply cannot tell. We know that both Grant and Buell did their best, and that their best was needed. From earliest dawn till half-past five in the afternoon the battle raged without intermission. It was no easily won victory; and if praise is due to the Union commanders, justice compels us to be equally generous to General Beauregard. If for the moment we could forget the cause, and think only of the skill and heroism displayed, we should say that on those two days he covered himself with glory. In Beauregard the Union commanders found a foe a worthy of their steel. He was by far the ablest general who had yet appeared in the Confederate ranks.

There is one other point on which it is necessary to make a remark before closing this chapter. It is to be borne in mind that Grant was not responsible either for the selection of the battle
ground or for the disposition of the troops. Whatever praise or blame resulted from the one or the other was due to General C. F. Smith. When Grant was restored to the chief command of the army of the Tennessee, it was only a few days before the commencement of the fight; and any attempt to make radical changes in the arrangements, carried out, as these must have been, in the presence of a vigilant and powerful enemy, would have been perilous in the extreme. If the battle of the 6th had ended differently, General Grant might have been justified in making some complaint as to the circumstances in which he found the enemy on resuming command. As it is, his mouth has been shut. He has shown himself a true man by nobly respecting the memory of General Smith—a capable commander and a brave man.

CHAPTER VIII

The Confederate Lines of Defense.—The Second Line all but Abandoned.—Beauregard's Retreat to Corinth.—First-rate Strategy.—Beauregard Strengthening His Position.—Position and Importance of Corinth.—Mitchell at Shelbyville and Huntsville.—Stevenson, Decatur, and Tuscumbia.—Mitchell's Address to His Soldiers.—Mitchell Promoted to the Rank of Major-General.—Sherman at Bear Creek.—The Memphis and Charleston Railroad.—Halleck at Corinth.—Grant Second in Command.—Halleck's Complaint against Grant.—Halleck too Cautious.—The Position of the two Armies.—The Confederates in High Hopes.—The National Army Resolved to Win.—The Composition of the National Army.—The Nationals Move Forward.—Marmaduke's Retreat.—Farmington Reoccupied.—Russell's House.—The Nationals Win and Hold the Position.—The National Army in Line.—Beauregard's Delay.—Corinth Evacuated.—The Retreat equal to a Victory.—The Pursuit.—Beauregard at Tupelo.—The Pursuit Abandoned.—The National Army in Corinth.—Repairing the Railroads.—Buell sent to Chattanooga.—Halleck the Rising Man.—Beauregard had Reason to be Satisfied.—A good General, but given to Extravagance of Language.—Remarks upon Shiloh and Corinth.—Their Importance.—Remarks on some of the Principal Generals.—Beauregard, Halleck, Grant, and Sherman.
ceptioiis of Corinth and Fort Pillow, the enemy had been forcibly driven or had voluntarily retired. Fort Pillow was now useless, and was soon abandoned. All over the North and throughout the army and navy there were enthusiastic demonstrations of joy and gratitude; and the action of the government at Washington was in perfect harmony with the sentiments of the people when it recommended a general thanksgiving for the victories gained at Pea Ridge, at New Madrid, at Island No. 10, and at Shiloh.

After his defeat on the 7th of April, April 7, Beauregard retired, and, as we have seen already, in good order, to Corinth. The retreat was conducted in circumstances of great inconvenience and hardship; and the successful manner in which it was accomplished will ever be regarded by impartial judges as a triumph of military genius on the part of the Confederate commander. The principal way of escape from the field was along a narrow and all but impassable road, some seven or eight miles in length; and all the difficulties inseparable from the attempt to preserve order in a routed army, burdened with the care of wagon-loads of wounded and dying men, were aggravated by a pitiless storm, which, beginning about nightfall, raged with unrelenting severity for several hours. It is not to be wondered at that many of the wounded perished by the way. The wonder rather is that the losses during the retreat did not amount to several thousands in place of a few hundreds. The retreat from Shiloh on the night of the 7th furnished a strange commentary to Beauregard's boastful language, on the night of the 5th; but it is not the business of the historian to load with abuse a defeated general who narrowly escaped reaping a great and signal victory, and who, in the hour of unlooked-for misfortune, proved himself equal to the emergency.

Arrived at Corinth, Beauregard lost no time in making all needed preparations for whatever attack might be made upon him. If he could hold this position and successfully repel the onslaught of the National troops, he might even yet convert defeat into a victory, and re-establish in some form his second line of defense. If unable to hold Corinth, he had no choice but fall back upon his third line, thus leaving the entire valley of the Mississippi, as far south as Vicksburg, in the hands of his enemies. While Beauregard was busy strengthening his position, the Nationals were making all necessary preparations to advance upon the Confederate lines. Corinth, it thus became manifest, was to be the point at which the armies of the North and South, each of them greatly increased in numbers and efficiency, were next to come into deadly collision. A small and insignificant village, and at that time unmarked on common maps, Corinth owed its military importance to the fact that it was situated at the intersection of two great arterial railroads—the 'Mobile and Ohio' and the 'Memphis and Charleston.' The importance of these railroads is indicated by their names. Corinth was about forty miles east of the Grand
Junction, and some twenty odd miles from the closing scenes of the last great struggle. It is built upon a low and clayey plain, but has for natural defenses ridges at some distance outside. The country beyond, to the banks of the Tennessee, is very much broken by ridges, valley streams, and marshes. The approach was rendered more difficult from the fact that, in his retreat from Pittsburg, the bridges over the creeks had been destroyed by Beauregard, and the roads heavily obstructed by timber. Farmington, on the east, and College Hill, on the north, are the highest points in the immediate vicinity of Corinth; and these were occupied by the enemy as the signal outposts of his vast intrenchments, encircling the town.

As a strategic point, for the South at least, Corinth had already been shorn of much of its value. When Buell set out from Nashville to reinforce Grant at Shiloh, he sent General Mitchell southward, with instructions to destroy, as far as possible, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. On the 4th of April Mitchell was at Shelbyville, whence he hastened forward by forced marches to Huntsville, taking the town April by surprise at an early hour on the morning of the 11th, and capturing seventeen locomotives, more than one hundred passenger cars, a large amount of supplies of every kind, with about one hundred and sixty prisoners. At Huntsville the railroad lines were torn up both to the east and west of the town. From Huntsville he sent one expedition eastward as far as Stevenson, and another expedition westward as far as Decatur and Tuscumbia, the object of both expeditions being to capture what could be had and to destroy the railroads. On the 16th of April Mitchell could say to his soldiers: "You have struck blow after blow with a rapidity unparalleled. Stevenson fell, sixty miles to the east of Huntsville. Decatur and Tuscumbia have been in like manner seized and are now occupied. In three days you have extended your front of operations more than one hundred miles, and your morning guns at Tuscumbia may now be heard by your comrades on the battle field made glorious by their victory before Corinth." Mitchell had placed his army midway between Corinth and Nashville, had opened communication with Buell, and had added another hundred miles of the Tennessee to the free navigation of the North. It was Mitchell's intention to move eastward as far as Chattanooga, to destroy the railroads there, especially that leading to Atlanta, and to burn the foundries and machine shops at Rome. This, however, he was unable to accomplish without reinforcements; and as these were not to be had, he was compelled to retire before the superior strength of General Kirby Smith. Mitchell, however, had already done great things, and shown what might have been accomplished if his spirit had been shared by some of his superiors. Under date of May 1st, writing to the secretary of war, he could say: "The campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security; while all of Alabama north of the Tennessee River floats no
flag but that of the Union." It was not without good reason that Mitchell was commissioned a major-general of volunteers. The importance of Corinth had been fully recognized by Halleck and Grant as well as by Buell and Mitchell. A few days after the battle of Shiloh, General Sherman, with some fresh troops from Buell's army, moved up the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear Creek, and there destroyed the railroad bridge which spans the river at that place. It will thus be seen that before the struggle, suspended on the field of Shiloh, was resumed in the immediate neighborhood of Corinth the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, broken in many places, had ceased to be useful as a line of communication between the Mississippi and the Atlantic States. In proportion as Corinth became a railroad centre in name only and not in reality, so did it lose its value as a strategical point in the estimation of the Confederate general. A proper appreciation of this fact will help the reader to understand the issue of the siege.

As soon as the battle of Shiloh had been fought and won, Halleck made up his mind that the occupation of Corinth was the next necessary step in the onward movement against the enemy. On the 9th of April he left St. Louis for the scene of action. On the 12th he arrived at Pittsburg Landing and took command in person of the "Grand Army of the Tennessee"; for such now was its style and title. Grant was placed second in command, without any real duty. The manner in which he had fought the battle of Shiloh was not satisfactory to his chief; and the greatest captain in the Northern army, as the result proved, was compelled for a second time to submit to uncalled-for humiliation. Grant bore his punishment—for punishment it was—with the best grace possible. Halleck, as if on second thoughts, did what he could to reassure him, informing him that no censure was intended, and that his strangely anomalous position was that which was due to his rank. Halleck's objection to Grant's conduct in the late contest was that he had not shown sufficient caution—that he had erred, in fact, in not throwing up whatever fortifications were possible in the circumstances between himself and the enemy. As if to justify his complaint, and to show what should have been done at Shiloh, Halleck moved forward with a caution which became painful, intrenching himself at every step. Blame now fell upon him in turn. He was cautious overmuch. It was tauntingly said that it took him six weeks to march fifteen miles; and there are not a few who, to this day, incline to the opinion that Halleck's excessive care robbed the National forces of the proper fruit of the victory at Shiloh.

Let us see now what were the relative positions of the two armies. The Confederate defenses were very strong; and considering their strength, it was not wholly without reason that Halleck advanced with cautious and well-guarded steps. In one continuous line, and occupying the brow of the first ridge outside of the town, the intrenchments extended over fifteen miles. All the
Portraits of some of the generals of the Army of the Potomac.
POETARY

PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS.
PORTRAITS OF SHERMAN AND SOME OF HIS COMMANDERS.
PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS.
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS.
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS.
Portraits of the Principal Naval Commanders during the War.
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS
PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS.
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS.
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERALS.
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERALS.
PORTRAITS OF SOME OF THE LEADERS OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.
roads and bridges which could facilitate the approach of the National troops had been destroyed. On the east there was a ravine, and Philip's Creek in front. On the north there was a heavy abatis, with a cleared space in front. At every road-crossing, along their exterior lines there were either strong redoubts or batteries with massive epaulets. Beau-regard was nothing if not an engineer; and it is not at all unreasonable to conclude that in throwing up those powerful works around Corinth, he bore in mind that he was about to test the skill of an engineer like himself and a fellow West-Pointer.

The Confederate army concentrated at Corinth was composed of first class elements. There were the "soldiers of Shiloh," the army which had fought at Pittsburg Landing; those of "Elkhorn," the combined army of VanDorn and Price, from Arkansas and Missouri; and the forces under General Lovell, which had evacuated New Orleans when, on the 28th of April, the gun-boats appeared before it. In addition to these, a large militia force had been hastily sent forward from Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Bragg, as second in rank, had command of the "Army of the Mississippi." The old organization of the corps—under Hardee, Bragg, Breckenridge, and Polk—was retained. Breckenridge commanded the reserve, and VanDorn the reinforcements. The whole force was about sixty-five thousand men, most of them the best troops in the Confederacy. The retreat from Shiloh had discouraged, no doubt, but it had not damped the hopes of the authorities at Richmond; neither had the Confederate soldiers lost their spirit. High hopes, therefore, were entertained that the efforts about to be put forth at Corinth would turn the tide of battle and cloud, if not efface, the memory of Pittsburg Landing.

Confronting this large and well-appointed army, the very flower of the Confederacy, and resolved to expel it from its stronghold and to capture it, if possible, General Halleck had under him over one hundred thousand men, not all of them experienced, but all of them imbued with the spirit which is inseparable from a righteous cause, and determined once again to chain victory to their standards. There were three armies—the army of the Tennessee, originally Grant's, now confided to General George H. Thomas, and containing the divisions of Hurlbut, Sherman, Smith, and Davies; the army of the Ohio, commanded by Don Carlos Buell, and composed of the divisions of McCook, T. J. Wood, Nelson, and Crittenden; the army of the Mississippi, General John Pope, originally containing three divisions, and reinforced by one division from General Curtis. Thomas formed the right wing, Buell the centre, and Pope the left. Grant, being in orders second in command, had a general supervision of the right wing, under Thomas, and the reserves of McClerand and Wallace's divisions, commanded by McClerand.

On the 23d of April General Halleck commenced a cautious forward movement. On the 3d of May his advance under General Sherman,
was in the vicinity of Monterey, within six or seven miles of Beauregard’s lines.

May 3. On the same day, Pope sent Paine’s division to reconnoitre, and, if possible, occupy Farmington, one of the most important outposts of the enemy. Marmaduke, who had under him some four thousand five hundred men, made but little resistance. On the contrary, he retired rapidly to Corinth, leaving his camp with all its supplies, and only thirty dead. At the time it seemed as though his orders had been to withdraw, but the subsequent efforts of the Confederates to recover Farmington prove that this could not have been so. An artillery reconnaissance, well supported by cavalry, as far as Glendale, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, was successful in destroying the track and breaking up two important trestle-bridges. In the meantime, General Wallace had sent out General Morgan L. Smith, with three battalions of cavalry and a brigade of infantry, upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. They met and fought the Confederates in a wood, destroying a bridge and the track not far from Purdy, and thus cut off Beauregard from Jackson, Tennessee, whence supplies and reinforcements were expected. Halleck’s scheme was working well; the National troops were gradually approaching in front, and at the same time cutting and recutting the communications on both flanks.

Pope was not to be allowed to hold the position which he had so easily won. He had miscalculated the enemy’s vigilance, and underestimated the value which they attached to Farmington. Generals Paine and Palmer, who were left in charge, had under them only a single brigade. On the 9th of May the Confederates, some twenty thousand strong, fell upon this advanced brigade with terrific force. It resisted the attack for several hours, but at length fell back, because it was believed that General Halleck did not desire, by supporting it, to bring on a general engagement. The front attack of the enemy was conducted by VanDorn, while Price had been ordered early in the day to make a detour to the left, and get into the rear of these isolated troops. Either he was too late, or VanDorn too early. The combination was a failure; they did not capture any portion of Pope’s army, although they occupied Farmington, and found a small quantity of baggage there. Eight days afterwards Pope reoccupied the post with his whole force.

On the 17th, and while the army was impatient to be led to the attack, May there was a lively fight for the capture of what was called Russell’s house, an important eminence commanding the junction of the roads three hundred yards beyond, and only a mile and a quarter from the outer intrenchments of the enemy. The project was Sherman’s. General Hurlbut sent forward two regiments and a battery under General Denver and General M. L. Smith. The attack was successful; and the position, which was one of great natural strength, was immediately fortified and occupied by a large force.
Gradually the National lines began to draw nearer the Confederate outworks, Halleck cautiously fortifying his position as he advanced. On the May 21st of May the National army was fairly in line three miles from Corinth, with detached works in front, corresponding with the general direction of those of the enemy. On the 28th, still drawing closer and closer, it was within thirteen hundred yards of the enemy's outer line. Heavy siege guns were now in position; and reconnoisances in great force were being made on both flank and centre. On the May 29th Pope drove them from their advance batteries, and Sherman planted heavy guns within a thousand yards of Beauregard's left. It was not possible now that the end could be long delayed. Beauregard's position was such that his delay in making a vigorous attack was simply inexplicable. He had allowed the National troops, comparatively unmolested, to get within easy fighting distance of his lines, and to establish themselves behind fortifications quite as strong as his own. He had allowed himself to be completely isolated from all possible sources of assistance. His railroad communications had been cut north, south, east, and west. It was General Halleck's confident belief on the night of the 29th that Beauregard would offer battle in the morning. The battle might be sanguinary, but he was confident of success; for he knew he had a superior force, and that retreat would be impossible, as all the railroad communications had been cut. He did not know that retreat had already been accomplished. In the early morning the skirmishers sought the foe in vain. Suddenly the earth was shaken as if by an earthquake; and dense clouds of smoke rolled up over Corinth. The enemy was gone. Beauregard had fled. For days ahead he had been sending on his sick and his most valuable stores towards Mobile. Some twenty-four hours before, a part of his effective force and nearly all his ordnance had been moved off in the same direction. The rear-guard had left for the south and west the night before. Some wretched creatures had willingly or unwillingly been left behind to fire the town. So ended the siege of Corinth. After all his labor and patience, Halleck reaped a bloodless but comparatively barren victory. Beauregard was compelled to retire; but he had the proud satisfaction of having saved his army and all his munitions of war. His retreat was in some respects equal to a victory.

No time was lost in following up the retreating foe. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 30th, Pope's advance drove the small rear-guard of the Confederate cavalry through the town; while the brave Gordon Granger, setting out with a brigade and a battery on the Boonesville road from Farmington at noon, pushed the flying foe through the former place, and keeping up the pursuit, crossed Twenty-mile Creek the following day, the main army being close upon his heels. On June the 10th of June the pursuit ended, the National advance having reached Baldwin and Gumtown, and still on the
railroad. Beauregard had established himself at Tupelo, a few miles below, where the railroad is crossed by Old Tom Creek, an affluent of the Tombigbee. Halleck, thinking that he had risked enough, and fearing for the safety of his communications, ordered a halt; and so the brief campaign of Corinth was brought to an end.

The National army returned to Corinth, where it remained making busy preparations for a new movement. The waters of the Tennessee were already low; and as for months to come they would become lower and lower, and therefore useless as a means of communication, the railroad was repaired and put in good condition as far as Columbus. General Buell, with the army of the Ohio, was sent on the 10th of June to Chattanooga, while General Grant, with the army of the Tennessee, held possession of the new strategic line of railroad between Memphis and Iuka. Halleck had already accomplished much; and at Washington, as we shall soon have occasion to see, he was regarded as the rising man. Much as he had done, he might have done more. We have already expressed the opinion that a little more dash and daring, and a little less caution, when he took command in person after the battle of Shiloh, might have resulted in the complete defeat if not capture of Beauregard's army, before that general was able to surround himself with fortifications at Corinth. As it was, the fate of the great States of Kentucky and Tennessee had to all appearance been decided; and the entire northwest of the Confederacy, a vast space of many thousand square miles, had been wrenched away. The plan, the execution of which commenced with the attack on Fort Henry, had worked admirably; and although some hard fighting had yet to be done before the enemy was completely driven out of the valley of the Mississippi, and before the Father of Waters was open through to the sea, the North had reason so far to be well satisfied with Halleck's services and success.

Beauregard had much less reason to feel satisfied with the position in which he found himself. He had no doubt done his best. If he had not made at Corinth so bold and vigorous a stand as was expected by friend and foe alike, it was because he correctly measured his strength, and took in the true value of his position. If he had been better supported by the authorities at Richmond, the results might have been different. Most unquestionably he showed greater wisdom in retreating as he did, than he would have done by risking a battle in the later days of the siege. His forces had not been sufficiently increased; and Corinth had been rendered not only worthless but dangerous by the destruction of the railroads. For some time he had been ill; and at Tupelo he took the liberty of retiring to Bladdon Springs, about twelve miles distant, for the purpose of recuperating, leaving General Bragg in command, with instructions to put the army in condition to take the field on his return. On hearing this, Davis became wild with rage, telegraphed Bragg to assume
permanent command, and declared that nothing could ever induce him again to entrust the army to Beauregard. It was not long until Davis had sufficient reason to alter his determination. While saying this much for Beauregard, we cannot at all hold him excusable for the grossly exaggerated and sometimes false reports which he was in the habit of sending to his government. He claimed a "great and glorious victory" when he had been defeated and driven from Shiloh. He declared Corinth to be the "strategic point of that campaign," and assured his government that he was able to hold it; and yet from Tupelo, whither he had found it necessary to retreat, he could write that he had "accomplished his purposes and ends." Human nature often reveals such inconsistencies; and this weakness, on the part of the Confederate commander, stands out in striking contrast with other and unmistakably great qualities which the man possessed. This particular weakness is and must ever remain a source of regret to all who, from any cause, learned to admire the better part of one of the greatest generals produced on either side during the civil conflict.

It would not be easy to overestimate the importance of Shiloh and Corinth on the general character of the struggle. Taken together, they constituted a turning point in the progress of events. In retiring from Corinth, the enemy abandoned his second line of defense. As he must now fall back upon his third line, it was manifest to all that the next great struggle would be around Vicksburg. In consequence of events which will be detailed in a future chapter, this was now the one remaining stronghold of the Confederates on the line of the Mississippi. Vicksburg captured, the great river would again be open to the sea. The capture of Vicksburg—this was the purpose which now filled the minds of Halleck and Grant, and to this end all their energies were henceforth directed. Extensive preparations must be made, and some hard work must be done, before the next great struggle; but Vicksburg became the objective point of all the efforts of the army of the Tennessee.

At the close of this chapter, it can hardly be deemed out of place to notice the influence of Shiloh and Corinth on the fortunes of some of the principal actors. Among the Confederates, Beauregard was the man principally affected. He had the greatest opportunity. He sustained the greatest loss. The effect of Shiloh and Corinth was undoubtedly injurious; but it was not lasting. Beauregard suffered the less that neither at Shiloh nor at Corinth did any rival of equal capacity come to the front. On the National side three men shared largely of the favors of fortune—Halleck, Grant, and Sherman. Halleck reaped a glory which was scarcely all his own. Grant, in spite of a treatment which must be pronounced unjust, not only preserved his reputation, but secured the opportunity of making himself what he soon afterwards was recognized to be, the leading representative on the field of the Northern cause. Sherman, in the one battle and in the
CHAPTER IX.

The Third Great Expedition.—Burnside and Goldsborough.—Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Roads.—Terrific Storm.—Disaster to the Fleet.—Hatteras Island.—Roanoke Island.—Fort Barton.—The Bombardment.—The Confederate Flotilla.—Landing of the National Troops.—The Battle of Roanoke.—National Victory.—The Confederates Discouraged.—Albemarle Sound.—Elizabeth City Captured.—Edenton.—The Dismal Swamp Canal.—Winton.—Plymouth.—Burnside and Goldsborough's Joint Address to the People of North Carolina.—Governor Clark's Counter-Proclamation.—New Berne.—Expedition against.—Landing Troops at Slocum's Creek.—Disposition of the Forces.—The Battle of New Berne.—Severe Fighting.—The Confederate Right Driven in.—A Panic.—The Retreat of the Confederates.—Capture of New Berne.—Burnside's Order.—His Report.—Compliment to McClellan.—Expedition against Fort Macon.—Preparations for Bombardment.—Arrival of Burnside.—Call for Surrender.—The Bombardment.—Splendid Work.—Description of the Fight.—The Fort Surrenders.—Beaufort.—Reno at South Mills.—Burnside's Good Fortune.—He is Summoned to Washington.—The Savannah Blockade.—Dawson's Island.—Jones' Island.—Big Tybee.—Fort Pulaski.—Preparations for the Bombardment.—Commander Dupont.—General Quincy A. Gillmore.—The Erection of Batteries on Venus Point and on Long Island.—The Siege Batteries on Big Tybee.—Colonel Olmstead called upon to Surrender.—General Hunter Supersedes Sherman.—The Opening of the Fire on the Fort.—The Walls of the Fort Honeycombed.—The White Flag.—The Surrender.—The Blockade of Savannah Complete.—Along the Florida Coast.—Commander Dupont and General Wright.—Fort Clinch.—Fernandina.—Brunswick.—Jacksonville.—Fort Marion and St. Augustine.—Pensacola.—Forts Macon and Barrancas.—On the Gulf and along the Atlantic Seaboard, the National Power Supreme.—New Orleans Expedition.

In a previous chapter of this work we have described the character and traced the progress of two great naval and military expeditions, both of them fitted out in Hampton Roads, and both of them sent forth for the purpose of rendering more effective the blockade of the southern ports. One of these was under the command of General Butler and Commodore Stringham, and was successful in driving the Confederates from Harrison's Inlet, and in retaining possession of the inlet and of the island of the same name. The other, which was fitted out somewhat later and on a larger scale, was entrusted to the care of General T. W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont. We have seen how, after a severe storm, that expedition succeeded in reaching Port Royal, capturing Forts Walker and Beauregard and taking possession of Warsaw Sound to the south and Big Tybee to the north, thus driving the Confederates from every stronghold on the southern shores of South Carolina, and on the northern shores of Georgia, with the exceptions of Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah, and Fort Jackson, further up the river.

In the beginning of 1862 another expedition was fitted out on a grand scale,
and was intended not only to operate on the southern coast, but to advance into the interior and act in conjunction with the Federal armies. This expedition was put in charge of General Ambrose Everett Burnside and Flag-officer Louis M. Goldsborough. The military force, like that of Butler, had been gathered at Annapolis. It was composed of fifteen regiments and a battalion of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a large number of gunners capable of serving either on land or sea. The whole force was divided into three brigades, which were commanded respectively by Generals John G. Foster, Jesse L. Reno, and John G. Parke. The fleet comprised over one hundred steam and sailing vessels, consisting of gunboats, transports, and tugs. It was divided into two columns for active service, intrusted respectively to the care of Commanders S. G. Hazard and Stephen H. Rowan. The troops to be conveyed in these vessels numbered in all about sixteen thousand.

The commanders were well chosen; and there could be no reason to doubt that, so far as their ability and fidelity were concerned, the expedition would not fail of success. General Burnside was born at Liberty, Union County, Indiana, on the 23d of May, 1824. In 1842, at the age of nineteen, he entered the Military Academy at West Point, and graduated in 1847, when he became a second-lieutenant in the United States Artillery. He served under General Patterson in Mexico, where he remained till the end of the war. In August, 1849, he distinguished himself in a skir-
mish with the Apaches at Los Vegas; and for his gallantry on that occasion he was promoted to a first-lieutenancy. He was one of the commissioners appointed to settle the boundary line between Mexico and the United States; and in 1851 he performed, as the bearer of despatches from Colonel Graham to President Fillmore, the marvellous feat of riding on horseback, in seventeen days, over a space of one thousand two hundred miles, through a country beset with hostile Indians. Burnside, like many others of the military men of that day, grew tired of a life of inactivity; and in 1853 he resigned his commission in the army. For some years he was engaged in railroad management. He was a trained child of the republic; and when the war broke out, he was naturally expected to give his country the benefit of his training and experience. Appointed by Governor Sprague to the command of the First Rhode Island Volunteers, he responded to the call of duty, and marched with his regiment to Washington. His conduct at Bull Run won for him the highest praise both from the government and from the people. No fitter man could have been found for the leadership of such an expedition. Flag-officer Goldsborough was a man of equal worth and of even greater experience. He had been in the navy since 1812. He had been at sea for eighteen years; had been on duty on shore for twelve years; and for some eighteen years he had been without active employment, when he was appointed to the command of the frigate Congress. From the Congress
he was transferred to the Minnesota, taking command of one-half of the Atlantic blockading squadron. Goldsborough had been for some time stationed in Hampton Roads, when he was instructed to take charge of the fleet in the third joint military and naval expedition. It is thus seen that the command of the expedition was placed in thoroughly competent hands.

On the 11th of January, after two months' preparation, with the troops all on board the transports, the magnificent fleet sailed out of Hampton Roads, and proceeded to sea. It was Sunday; and the scene witnessed in the neighborhood of Fortress Monroe was much the same as that which had been witnessed in October of the previous year, on the occasion of the departure of the expedition under Sherman and Dupont. As in the former case, the destination of the fleet was kept a profound secret. The instructions, which had been given to General Burnside on the 7th of January, were that he should unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet at Fortress Monroe, and proceed to capture New Berne, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort Macon. It was not, however, deemed advisable that these instructions should have the effect of putting the Confederates on their guard; and hence care was taken that the objective point of the expedition should be known only to the government and to the two commanders. The secret was well kept; but the government at Richmond was not ignorant of the necessities of the situation or of the general policy in favor with the authorities at Washington. With characteristic shrewdness the Confederates divined the direction of the intended blow, and were not wholly unprepared for it when it fell. The public had not had time to forget the terrific storm which scattered Dupont's fleet in the first days of November; and, considering the season of the year, there were many fears and some forebodings of evil. The fears, as the result proved, were not groundless. The forebodings were too literally realized. No great difficulty was experienced until the vessels were off the stormy Hatteras. The advance had reached the stiller waters of the inlet, when, on Monday night, a dreadful storm broke out, striking the vessels in the rear with terrific fury. Four transports, a gunboat, and a floating battery were wrecked. Among these the fine steamer City of New York, with four hundred barrels of gunpowder, one thousand five hundred rifles, eight hundred shells, and other stores and supplies, valued in all at about a quarter of a million dollars, went down in sight of the shore. Some of the vessels, which had been purchased in New York, were evidently unfit for such service; and the opinion was very generally entertained that the ship merchants of that city had taken advantage of the necessities of the government to dispose of worthless stock. Happily, in the first instance at least, no human lives were lost. On the 14th, however, a party went ashore from one of the transports, yet outside; the boat, on returning, was capsized, and three of
the party were drowned. These were Colonel J. W. Allen of Burlington, New Jersey, commander of the Ninth Regiment from that State; Surgeon F. S. Waller; and the mate of the transport. Great difficulty was experienced in getting the vessels through the inlet, as the weather continued boisterous, and the vessels crowded each other and obstructed progress. It was the end of January before all the vessels were through the inlet; and it was not until Feb. 7 that the reorganized expedition, having moved forward over the still waters of Pamlico, had reached the entrance to Croatan Sound.

It can readily be imagined of what advantage the storm proved to the Confederates. It did seem once more as if the winds of heaven were enlisted on their side and fighting their battles. Information leaked out through the newspapers; and what with their own knowledge of the coast and the general purpose of the government at Washington, they had no great difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that Roanoke Island, which lay behind Bodies' Island and between Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and about thirty miles from Hatteras Inlet, was to be the first point of attack. The island, which was well fortified and garrisoned, completely protected the entire northeastern coast of North Carolina from invasion by sea; and it effectually guarded the rear approaches to Norfolk and Portsmouth in Virginia. It was scarcely second in importance to Fortress Monroe. The island and its vicinity were now under the command of Brigadier-General H. A. Wise. In consequence of the illness of Wise, Colonel H. M. Shaw, of the Eighth North Carolina Regiment, was performing the duties of commander-in-chief on the island. He had under him his own regiment; the Thirty-First North Carolina Volunteers, Colonel J. V. Jordan; three companies of the Seventeenth North Carolina, Major G. H. Hill; and four hundred and fifty men, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson. On all the prominent points of the shores of Roanoke, batteries had been erected commanding Croatan Sound on the one side and Pamlico Sound on the other. On the narrowest part of the island, between Shallowbag Bay and Croatan Sound, there was an intrenched camp with a strong redoubt, extending across the road which traversed the middle of the island. All these fortifications were well mounted and well manned. In addition to those on the island, there were powerful batteries on the mainland, commanding the channels of Croatan Sound. This, however, was not all. The principal channel of Croatan Sound was blocked with sunken vessels; and the entire waters at Pork Point, from the island to the mainland, were filled with stakes and other obstructions. Above these, and towards Albemarle Sound, was a flotilla of small gunboats, eight in number and carrying eleven guns, under the command of Lieutenant W. F. Lynch, now charged with the defense of the coast of North Carolina.

As early as the 5th of February Commodore Goldsborough had made a reconnaissance with thirty of his
gunboats towards Croatan Sound; and Feb. on the 7th he began to move on 7. the forts on either side. The morning of that day was dull and unpromising; but later the sun burst forth in splendor; and Goldsborough, at about ten o’clock, hoisted the signal, “This day our country expects every man to do his duty.” The gunboats advanced in three columns. The first was led by the Stars and Stripes, Lieutenant Worden; the second by the Louisiana, Commander Alexander Murray; and the third by the Hetzel, Lieutenant H. R. Davenport. Goldsborough was on board the Southfield, which he made his flag-ship, and was accompanied by the gunboat Underwriter. At eleven o’clock, a bombardment was opened on Fort Barton, on Pork Point; and within thirty minutes afterwards the battle had become general. The Confederate gunboats took part in the fight; but they were soon driven beyond the range of the National guns; and the Curlew, their largest steamer, was so badly damaged that she began to sink, and was saved by being beached under the guns of Fort Forrest on the mainland. The fleet thus put out of the way, Goldsborough concentrated his fire on Fort Barton, at a range of about three-quarters of a mile, as close as the depth of water would permit him to advance. Soon the flagstaff of the fort was shot away; the barracks were set on fire; and the entire works began to fall to pieces, under the weight of the shot and the terrific explosions of the shells.

The transports were now brought forward; and preparations were made for landing the troops at Ashby’s Harbor, on Roanoke Island, about two miles below Fort Barton. The Confederates had anticipated this movement; and a force of two thousand men, with a battery of three pieces, lay concealed in the woods in front of the landing. In the meantime the Confederate flotilla returned to the attack. A shower of shot and shell from the National gunboats quickly cleared the woods; and, after an hour’s vigorous firing on both sides, the Confederate flotilla again retired. About midnight the troops were got on shore. The landing, however, had been accomplished in circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty. The night was extremely cold; there was a heavy rain-storm; and to add to the discomforts of the situation, such was the shallowness of the water that the boats could not effect a landing, and the men were compelled to wade waist-deep, for a quarter of a mile. Early on the morning of the 8th the troops, about eleven thousand in number, who had spent the dark hours as best they could without any shelter, were moved forward to attack the enemy’s intrenchments in the interior of the island. The advancing column was under the command of General Foster, the next in rank to General Burnside, who remained at the landing. The main body followed, and was led by Generals Reno and Parke. About eight o’clock Foster reached the enemy’s position. Their ground was well chosen. On either side was a morass. A narrow causeway was the only approach to their works;
and this they had protected by an earthwork mounting three guns. Inside the intrenchments there were some three thousand troops, under command of Colonel Shaw. Foster had brought from the naval launches some six or eight boat-howitzers. These were under the immediate command of Midshipman B. F. Porter. Foster continued to press forward; but the ground being swampy and bordered with woods, the march was conducted slowly and with great caution. With musketry and cannon the battle was begun on both sides. The Twenty-Fifth Massachusetts, Colonel Upton, supported by the Twenty-Third Massachusetts, Colonel Kurtz, were the first engaged. These were soon joined by the Twenty-Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, and the Tenth Connecticut, Colonel Russell. The battle now raged fiercely, the Confederates firmly holding their ground and making a most gallant defense. Reno, with the Twenty-First Massachusetts, Colonel Maggi, the Fifty-First New York, Colonel Ferrero, the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Colonel Hartranft, and the Ninth New Jersey, now came up to the aid of Foster. Pushing through the tangled swamps, he took a position on Foster's right. While Reno thus advanced to the right, Parke, with the Fourth Rhode Island, Colonel Rodman, the first battalion Fifth Rhode Island, the Eighth Connecticut, and Ninth New York, the last under Colonel Hawkins, pressed towards the left. At this moment the fighting was terrific, both sides performing deeds of great valor; while among the Nationals, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, each emulous of all the others, strove for the prize of the day. Notwithstanding the immensely superior numbers by which they were attacked, the Confederates stubbornly held their ground. The Nationals, who had suffered severely from the Confederate fire, now began to experience a scarcity of ammunition. It was evident to General Foster that a bold stroke must be made vigorously and at once. The main battery which commanded the causeway must be silenced. A bayonet charge was resolved upon. Major E. A. Kimball of Hawkins’ Ninth New York (Zouaves) volunteered to lead the attack. “You are the man,” said Foster; “the Ninth is the regiment; and this is the moment. Zouaves, storm the battery! Forward!” With a leap and a yell, they went bounding across the causeway. “Make way for the redcaps!” resounded on every side; while the cry of “Zou! Zou!” rent the air. It was the work of a moment. The Zouaves rushed into the battery, followed closely by the Tenth Connecticut, the Fifty-First New York, and the Twenty-First Massachusetts. The colors of the Fifty-First and the State flag of Massachusetts, planted on the captured battery, revealed the rapidity of the attack and the completeness of the victory. The Confederates, after the first shot, abandoned their guns and fled to the northern part of the island. Reno, with the Twenty-First Massachusetts and Ninth New York, started off in vigorous pursuit. Foster, having
re-formed his men, quickly followed. Hawkins, with his Zouaves, hurried toward Shallowbag Bay, where, it was understood, the Confederates had a two-gun battery. After a chase of some five or six miles, Foster was met by a flag of truce in the hands of Colonel Pool, of the Eighth North Carolina, who bore a message from Colonel Shaw, the commandant of the island, asking on what terms capitulation would be granted. There was but one answer possible. "Unconditional and immediate surrender," was Foster's prompt reply. Two thousand men laid down their arms and became prisoners of war. Among them was Colonel Shaw. Meanwhile Reno, who had turned toward Weir's Point, forced the surrender of some eight hundred, who, with Colonel Jordan at their head, were vainly attempting to escape from the island; while Hawkins found easy possession of the battery at Shallowbag Bay, and captured some two hundred who were seeking a chance to escape to Nag's Head on the mainland.

While success was thus attending the land forces, Goldsborough was making good use of his gunboats. He had renewed his fire on Fort Barton, at Pork Point. Towards the close of the day, and in order to complete the conquest of the island, Foster sent a detachment to capture the fort. The guns were already silenced; it was found that the garrison had retired; and shortly after four o'clock, Goldsborough, on seeing the National colors floating over the stronghold, signalled to his fleet, "The fort is ours." About the same time the Confederate steamer Curlew, which had been beached under the guns at Redstone Point, was blown up; and the barracks at that place were set on fire. The Confederate flotilla retired into the waters of Albemarle Sound; and what is known as the battle of Roanoke was ended.

From Fort Barton, where he took up his headquarters, General Burnside sent a report of the day's proceedings to Washington. He had captured six forts, forty guns, most of them of large calibre, three of them being 100-pounders, and about three thousand prisoners. With a magnanimity which is characteristic of true greatness, he gave all the credit of the victory to Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke. In fitting terms he lamented the deaths of Colonel Charles S. Russell and Lieutenant-Colonel Vigeur de Monteuil, both of whom fell when gallantly leading the attack in the centre of the island. His entire loss was fifty killed and two hundred and twenty-two wounded. The Confederate loss was much less, as they fought for the most part under breast-works. According to Pollard, there were twenty-three killed, fifty-eight wounded, and sixty-two missing.

The capture of Roanoke was justly regarded by the South as a damaging blow to their cause. Pamlico Sound was now completely wrenched from their grasp; Albemarle Sound must soon share a similar fate; and then nearly the entire seaboard of Virginia and the better part of that of North Carolina would be in the hands of the Nationals. This, however, was not all. Roanoke Island was indissolubly associated with
the early history of America. North Carolina was proud to own it. It was
the scene of Sir Walter Raleigh's colonizing experiment in 1585; and it was
here that the first attempt was made to establish a titled and privileged aristocracy in the New World. After two unsuccessful attempts at coloniza-
tion, Manteo, a native chief, was, by command of Raleigh, and with the approval of Queen Elizabeth, made Lord of Roanoke. The loss of the island implied
the dismemberment of one of the oldest and proudest of the Southern States. The people of the South very properly complained that Roanoke was not better fortified, and that the island should have been allowed to fall so easily a prey to the enemy. General Huger, who had charge of that department, with his headquarters at Norfolk, and Secretary of War Benjamin, were both greatly blamed. Although the battle of Roanoke was won by the Nationals with comparative ease, and although there was no great loss of life on either side, few of the battles of the war were conducted, on the one side or the other, with more ability or with greater determination. The Nationals were vastly superior in numbers; and for this reason the issue, from the commencement of the contest, was not doubtful.

The Confederate flotilla had crossed Feb. 9. Albemarle Sound, and had sailed
up the Pasquotank River as far as Elizabeth City, in the neighborhood of the Great Dismal Swamp. Elizabeth City is the capital of Pasquotank County, North Carolina. It is situated on the right bank of the Pasquotank River,
about thirty miles from its mouth. It is a post town, and contains a court-house, jail, and several churches. Vessels drawing seven feet of water can come up close to the city with the greatest ease. It has a water communication with Norfolk by means of the Pasquotank River and the Dismal Swamp Canal. Into these waters the Nationals resolved to follow; and Goldsborough, the day after the capture of Roanoke, detailed some fourteen vessels, under Commander Rowan, for that purpose. Rowan had some difficulty in getting his fleet past the sunken vessels, piles, and other obstructions in Croatan Sound; but on the morning of the Feb. 10th he had so far accomplished his purpose as to have his entire fleet in the harbor of Elizabeth City. There he found the Confederate fleet, consisting of seven steamers and a schooner armed with two 32-pounders. A four-gun battery had been planted on shore. There was also one heavy gun in the town, in front. The entire arrangement was in charge of Commander Lynch. Rowan lost no time in getting his vessels in order; and about nine o'clock he opened fire upon the enemy's fleet and also upon the batteries. The fight was of short duration. The Confederate vessels were run aground. The one gun was silenced; so also were the batteries. The vessels were set on fire and abandoned. The fight had lasted only forty minutes. Lynch fled, and was not again heard of during the war, until he reappeared at Smithfield, on the occasion of the capture of Fort Fisher, in 1865. In his report of the engagement,
Rowan said that he had destroyed or captured the entire naval force of the enemy, that he had silenced and destroyed his batteries, and that the only vessel saved was the Ellis, whose captain, J. M. Cook, was wounded and a prisoner. His own loss was "two or three killed and some wounded." Elizabeth City was promptly taken possession of, but not before a most barbarous attempt had been made by the retreating Confederates to destroy it by fire. Happily the flames were got under; and the lives of many helpless women and children were saved.

Burnside did not allow himself to rest upon his laurels. The advantages gained, to be made secure, required that the Confederates be rendered powerless for evil all along the coast of North Carolina. The capture of Elizabeth City was followed by similar movements into the harbors and bays which branch off Albemarle Sound. The first movement was towards Edenton, a flourishing little place at the head of the bay of the same name, near the western end of the sound. It is a post town, a port of entry, and the capital of Chowan County. Edenton wassettled as far back as 1716. On the day after the capture of Elizabeth, Lieutenant A. Maury, with part of Rowan's fleet, took possession of Edenton, the Confederates offering no resistance. A body of flying artillery, as soon as they saw the gunboats, made a precipitate retreat, without firing a shot. Maury found a schooner on the stocks, and some cannon, which he destroyed, and passed on, capturing other vessels in the sound. Next day (February 13), Lieutenant Jeffers, with a portion of the fleet, proceeded to the mouth of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal—the canal which traverses the Great Dismal Swamp, connecting the Pasquotank with the Elizabeth River. It was the intention of the Nationals to destroy the canal; but when Jeffers arrived, he found that this work had already been accomplished by the Confederates themselves. He saw two small steamers and three schooners about a mile and a quarter up the canal. Some pickets stationed near the entrance fired their muskets as a signal; and what seemed a large body of men got under cover close by the vessels. At about a hundred yards from the mouth of the canal the National gunboats grounded. The Whitehead was ordered to open fire with her nine-inch guns. After three shells had been flung at them, the Confederate troops fled precipitately, and the vessels moved further up the canal. On landing, Jeffers found that a schooner had been sunk about fifty yards from the canal's mouth, and that, to prevent it changing its position, it was well supported by piles, logs, and other material. A large dredging machine had been left behind. This, after destroying its machinery, the Nationals sank diagonally across the canal, thus effectually blocking the way for even the smallest vessel. Still another movement of a similar kind was made before Burnside girt himself for the heavier work which had to be accomplished further to the south. On the 19th the combined fleet set out
from Edenton on a reconnoissance. One portion of the fleet sailed up the Chowan River as far as Winton, while another portion proceeded up the Roanoke to Plymouth. At neither place was any attempt made to land; but as in both cases they were fired upon from the land, the gunboats responded with shells; and Winton was partially and Plymouth almost completely destroyed.

In a joint address to the people of North Carolina, Burnside and Goldsborough stated the object of their mission, and repelled the unfounded charges made against them by the Confederate leaders. After assuring them that they were Christians like themselves, and that they realized the obligations which that sacred name implied, they thus concluded, "We invite you, in the name of the constitution, and in that of virtuous loyalty and civilization, to separate yourselves at once from these malign influences, to return to your allegiance, and not compel us to resort further to the force under our control. The government asks only that its authority may be recognized; and we repeat, in no manner or way does it desire to interfere with your laws, constitutionally established, your institutions of any kind whatever, your property of any sort, or your usages in any respect."

This document was signed by both commanders, and bore date February 18, 1862. Such a proclamation naturally enough alarmed and irritated the Confederate leaders; and on the 22d a violent counter-proclamation was issued by Henry T. Clark, the governor of North Carolina.

The tone of Governor Clark's proclamation was as bellicose as that of Burnside and Goldsborough was peaceful. It denounced the expedition as an attempt to deprive the inhabitants of their most sacred rights. It proclaimed the war as waged by the North to be one of subjugation—"a war forced upon us in wrong, and prosecuted without right and in a spirit of vengeful wickedness, without a parallel in the history of warfare among civilized nations." It was a war of "avarice and ambition." "I call," said the governor, "upon the brave and patriotic men of our State to volunteer from the mountains to the sea." Such were the sentiments which, at this stage of the war, prevailed respectively in the North and in the South. It was useless to cry "Peace"; for there was none, and there was to be none for three weary and sadly eventful years.

New Berne was the next place singled out for attack. For that purpose all necessary preparations were made. Roanoke Island was now the basis of operations. There the troops concentrated; and there the scattered vessels of the fleet congregated. As Goldsborough had been ordered back to Hampton Roads, the naval portion of the new expedition was entrusted to the care of Commodore Rowan. On the 11th Mar. of March, after taking on board some fifteen thousand troops, Rowan, with Burnside on board, rendezvoused at Hatteras Inlet. Early the following morning the entire fleet, including the transports, sailed from the inlet, making for Slocum’s Creek, about twelve miles above which, on the Neuse River,
where it is joined by the Trent, stands the town of New Berne.

New Berne is a small township, the capital of Craven County. It contained at that time about six thousand inhabitants. It had a good harbor, leading to the Atlantic Ocean, through Ocracoke Inlet; and as it was connected with the great commercial centres by railroad, it did a good business both by land and sea. It was very justly regarded by the North as a point of considerable strategic importance.

Early on the morning of the 13th, the entire force having arrived the night previous, the troops began to land off Slocum’s Creek, under cover of the gunboats. The landing was effected “with the greatest enthusiasm on the part of the troops,” wrote Burnside in his report. “Many, too impatient for the boats, leaped into the water and waded waist-deep to the shore, and then, after a toilsome march through the mud, the head of the column marched within a mile and a half of the enemy’s stronghold, at eight P. M., a distance of twelve miles from the point of landing, where we bivouacked for the night, the rear of the column coming up with the boat howitzers about three o’clock next morning, the detention being caused by the shocking condition of the roads, consequent upon the heavy rain that had fallen during that day and the whole of the night, the men often wading knee-deep in mud, and requiring a whole regiment to drag the eight pieces which had been landed from the navy and our own vessels.” The gunboats moved up the river abreast of the army, the flag-ship Delaware leading the way. The main body of the Confederates was under the command of General Branch, and consisted of eight regiments of infantry, five hundred cavalry, and three batteries of field artillery of six guns each. These were posted within a line of intrenchments, extending from near the river across the railroad and turnpike, of more than a mile in length. On their left they were protected by Fort Thompson, which was armed with thirteen heavy guns. This work commanded, also, the channel of the river. On the right there was a long succession of rifle-pits, curvettes and redans terminating in a two-gun redoubt. These works were a little over four miles from the town of New Berne. Burnside marched his army in three divisions. General Foster, with the first brigade, marched along the main county road, to attack Fort Thompson and the Confederate left. General Reno, with the second brigade, followed more upon the line of railroad, with the view of striking the Confederate right. General Parke, with the third brigade, followed in such a manner that he might be able to attack in front or support either or both brigades, as circumstances might require.

About seven o’clock, on the morning of the 14th, the skirmishers of the National army came into contact with the Confederate outposts. General Burnside rode to the front with his staff. Scarcely had he appeared in view of the enemy’s breastwork, when a shell fell within a few feet of himself and party, splashing them with mud, but,
as it did not explode, doing no further damage. The regiments were quickly in their respective positions. General Foster arranged his brigade in line of battle along the fringe of the woods, skirting the edge of the field before the breastwork. The Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts, Colonel Stevenson, was on the extreme right. The Twenty-Fifth Massachusetts, Colonel Upton, was next, with its left resting on the road. Next to this again was the Twenty-Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, with its right resting on the road. The Twenty-third Massachusetts was on the extreme left of the brigade, with the Tenth Connecticut in reserve. The National artillery had only partially arrived on the battle-ground; and consequently there were only a few pieces with which to oppose the numerous and powerful guns of the enemy. On the extreme right of Foster’s position was McCook’s battery of boat howitzers, manned by Lieutenants McCook, Hammond, Daniels, and Tillotson, with marines and a detachment of the Union Coast Guard. In the centre, and near the road, was a 12-pounder steel gun from the Cossack, manned by Captain Bennett and twenty of his ship’s crew. On the left was Captain Dayton’s battery, from the transport Highlander. The second brigade, under General Reno, and the third brigade, under General Parke, maintained the positions assigned to them in the line of march, as above described.

It was about eight o’clock when the battle was fairly begun. Foster’s brigade was the first to feel the effect of the enemy’s fire. After the first shot the Confederates ran their flag defiantly up over the ramparts; and from the many mouths of their powerful guns they poured forth a perfect storm of round-shot, grape, canister, and shell. Their infantry, which were stationed in front of the works, and extended the entire length between the river and the railroad, kept up a brisk and steady fire of musketry. The fight from the commencement was severe. It was not long until several of the regiments lost some of their principal officers. At the place where the Confederate intrenchments crossed the railroad, the struggle, for a time, was terrific. For nearly four hours the brigade of Foster bore the brunt of the battle, the regiments one and all covering themselves with glory. General Parke, with his third brigade, following out the instructions of Burnside, had been supporting Foster. It was now evident that the latter could hold his ground against the enemy; and Parke, still carrying out the original arrangement, withdrew his troops and moved to the support of Reno, who, with his brigade, was successfully carrying out his flank movement against the Confederate right. It deserves to be noted here that General Reno experienced unexpected difficulty in carrying out his part of the plan of attack. It was not known that the line of intrenchments extended beyond the railroad, at least to any distance. When, therefore, the National troops attempted to get to the rear of the enemy, they discovered not merely all but impassable swamps, but redoubts and rifle-pits.
which temporarily checked their progress. Happily, an attack on the right had not been suspected by the Confederates, their whole strength being centred on the left wing. As soon, however, as they discovered what was going on on the right, they hurried forward a sufficient number of men to reinforce the redoubts and to defend the rifle-pits. After he had been joined by Parke, Reno resolved to make a bold advance on the enemy's works. The Twenty-First Massachusetts, Colonel Clarke, was ordered to charge. With the speed of lightning they rushed forward, and were soon inside the intrenchments. They had taken possession of the guns and were actually attempting to turn them against the enemy, when, the Confederates being reinforced, they were driven back, with the loss of some of their men, who were made prisoners. The repulse, however, was but momentary. Re-forming, and being joined by the New York Fifty-First, the Fourth Rhode Island, and the Ninth New Jersey, with the Fifth Rhode Island in reserve, they returned to the assault; and after a terrible hand-to-hand fight, in which victory trembled in the balance, the works remained in the hands of the Nationals, the Confederates being completely routed and chased at the point of the bayonet back out of sight. In the fierce struggle over the ramparts, the Twenty-First Massachusetts especially distinguished themselves; and in making the victory complete, gallant service was rendered by the Fifth Rhode Island and the Eighth and Eleventh Connecticut. While this struggle was going on, Reno was greatly annoyed by another battery which was doing most destructive work. Calling up his reserve regiment, the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Colonel Hart ran aft, he ordered it to charge. The orders were promptly obeyed, and the work was gallantly done. Meanwhile the cheering on the National left had attracted the attention of Foster on the right. It was impossible for him any longer to restrain his men. Coming out from their position along the edge of the woods, they dashed across the fields and assailed the enemy at the very muzzles of their guns. It was a perilous movement. It might have resulted in terrible slaughter. But the retreat on their right flank had created a panic in the Confederate ranks. There was no more fight in them. Leaving their guns unspiked, their caissons and their unexpended ammunition, with a number of horses, they fled ingloriously towards the Trent. Foster pursued; but when he reached the verge of the river, the enemy had crossed and burned both the railroad and turnpike bridges in their rear. Such was what is known as the battle of New Berne. The capture of the town of that name followed as a matter of course.

The National squadron had taken an active part in the contest, and contributed not a little towards securing the victory. It lent effective aid in driving the Confederates out of Fort Thompson and the other batteries on the shore. These being evacuated, and the National flag left floating over them, the gunboats passed the obstructions in the river and moved up toward the town.
On their arrival they found that it had been fired in no fewer than seven places by the fleeing Confederates, and that it was almost completely deserted. On the day of the battle the terror-stricken inhabitants had fled by the thousand. General Foster’s brigade was taken over to the city wharves by some of Rowan’s gunboats. General Burnside established his headquarters at the fine old mansion of the Stanley family, in the suburbs of the town. On the following day he issued an order appointing General Foster military governor of the place, and ordered that the churches be opened on Sunday, the 16th, in order that the chaplains of the different regiments might hold divine service therein. The bells were to ring as usual. On the same day he issued an order congratulating his troops on their “brilliant and hard-won victory,” and directing every regiment to place the name of New Berne on its banner. In his report he gave General McClellan the credit of planning the expedition. “I have endeavored,” he said, “to carry out the very minute instructions given me by him before leaving Annapolis, and thus far events have been singularly coincident with his anticipations.” In a work in which McClellan’s conduct is fairly and candidly criticised, it gives us pleasure to be able to record this tribute to his genius.

By this victory the Nationals not only captured New Berne, and secured all the advantages which the possession of such a place implied, but eight batteries, mounting forty-six heavy guns, three batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores of all kinds. Burnside’s loss was ninety-one killed and four hundred and sixty-six wounded. The Confederate loss, according to their own statement, was ninety-four killed, one hundred and one wounded, and four hundred and thirteen missing. Its moral effect on both sides was great. It cheered the hearts of the Northern people. It greatly discouraged the South.

Burnside’s next movement was against Fort Macon. This was an old fortress of the United States. It had been seized by the authorities of North Carolina at the commencement of the war. It stands on a long ridge of sand, called Bogue Island, and is separated from the mainland by Bogue Sound, which is navigable for vessels of light tonnage. On the side of Beaufort harbor, at the terminus of the railway from New Berne, is Morehead City. On the opposite or northern side of the harbor is Beaufort, the capital of Carteret County, an old and pleasant town, and, as already described, a favorite summer retreat for the aristocracy of North Carolina. Fort Macon commanded the harbor of Beaufort; and as the Confederates had been making free use of the harbor in introducing contraband goods by means of foreign vessels, it was deemed necessary, in order to the efficiency of the blockade, that that stronghold should be reduced.

Immediately after the capture of New Berne, Burnside made all necessary arrangements for the reduction of the fort. He placed the expedition in charge of General Parke, General Reno
having been sent to make some further demonstrations in the rear of Norfolk.

**Mar. 24.** Nine days after the fall of New Berne, Parke having been conveyed, with his troops, by water to Slocum's Creek, and having marched thence across the country, proceeded to invest Morehead City. On the 25th of March, a detachment composed of the Fourth Rhode Island and the Eighth Connecticut entered Beaufort without opposition. A flag was sent to Fort Macon, demanding its surrender. The place was in charge of Colonel Moses T. White, a nephew of Jefferson Davis. White declared that he would not yield until he had eaten his last biscuit and slain his last horse. Parke made immediate and vigorous preparations to take the fort by storm. A reconnoissance was made in force on April 11th; and suitable points were selected for planting siege guns. The garrison was closely watched, as it was feared that in their desperation they might make a fierce sortie. Ordnance and ordnance stores were brought over on rafts from Carolina City; and batteries were constructed behind sand hills on Bogue Spit. Gunboats had been provided; and it was arranged that they should co-operate with the batteries on the island. There were three batteries. The first was under Lieutenant Flagler of the New York Third Artillery. It was fourteen hundred yards from the fort, was well covered by a large sand hill, and mounted four ten-inch mortars. The second was under Captain Lewis J. Morris of the First Regular Artillery. It was about two hundred yards in advance of the first, and mounted three long thirty-pound Parrott guns. The third was in charge of Lieutenant Prouty of the Third New York Artillery. It was one hundred yards nearer the fort than the second, and mounted four eight-inch mortars. Communications between the batteries were established by cutting trenches in the sand and skirting the hilllocks. To guard against any sortie which the garrison might be tempted to make, sharpshooters were posted in rifle-pits on both flanks and in front. The gunboats which were to take part in the attack were the Daylight (flag-ship), Commander Lockwood; the State of Georgia, Commander Armstrong; the Chippewa, Lieutenant Bryson; and the barque Gemsbok, Lieutenant Cavendish.

When the arrangements were completed, Burnside came down from New Berne. On the 24th, under a flag of truce, he had an interview with Colonel White, and summoned him to surrender. White peremptorily refused, declaring that he had been placed in command of the fort, and that he would defend it to the extent of his ability. On the morning of the 25th, at six o'clock, Burnside ordered the gunboats within range of the fort. Orders were then given for both gunboats and batteries to open fire. For half an hour no response came from the fort. Suddenly, however, there were a series of flashes, a succession of loud reports, and the deadly missiles fell thick and fast among the gunboats and close by the batteries. From that time till four o'clock in the afternoon the firing con-
continued on both sides without intermission. For a time it was wild and ineffective; but gradually the range on either side was attained with increasing accuracy; and the shot and shell began to strike more frequently in the near neighborhood of the hostile positions. By midday the effect of the fire from the batteries was distinctly visible on the fort. The gunboats, after the first hour and a half, were withdrawn, a southwest wind disturbing the waters and making it difficult for them to manoeuvre with ease and accuracy. During the course of the day there was some splendid work done by the National gunners, Lieutenant Prouty, with his eight-inch mortar battery, particularly distinguishing himself by the accuracy of his aim. An eye-witness tells us that the scene was grandest about two o'clock. "A flash and a puff of smoke betokened a discharge; an interval elapsed, which terminated with the report of the piece; then came the sonorous hum of the shell as it flew through the air; another puff of smoke, soon followed by a second report, and the deadly missile had exploded." Shortly after four o'clock a white flag was displayed on the fort; and the firing ceased. Before ten o'clock next morning Fort Macon was in the possession of the National forces, and General Burnside had the double gratification of seeing the old banner of the republic and the new colors of his own Fifth Rhode Islanders, just presented them by the women of Providence, unfurled over its battered walls.

Burnside had, indeed, much to be proud of. For the present, at least, he seemed to be a favorite child of fortune. Since the day he left Annapolis everything had gone well with him. He had restored the supremacy of the Union in Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and in their adjoining creeks and bays; he had captured New Berne, and, by the reduction of Fort Macon, he had destroyed the Confederate power in the harbor of Beaufort. Good luck seemed to attend his generals as well as himself; for while Parke was nailing victory to the National standard at Bogue Island, Reno, equally successful, had won a splendid victory over the Confederates at South Mills, near Camden Court House. The occupation of the different places from Beaufort and New Berne in the south to Winton and Plymouth and Washington, at the head of the Pamlico River; in the north, greatly scattered Burnside's troops, and made it impossible for him, unless reinforced, to make any further aggressive efforts. In the present condition of things at Washington, reinforcement for such a purpose was out of the question. McClellan, who had been compelled to fall back from before Richmond, was lying at Harrison's Landing; and such men as Burnside were needed nearer headquarters. He was summoned to Fortress Monroe, with all the forces he could collect, on July 17th. General Foster was left in command of the department.

In a previous chapter we have given an account of the expedition under General T. W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont. At first this expedition was
attended with great success. With the exception of two forts—Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah River, and Fort Jackson, up the river and near the town of Savannah—the entire coast from Warsaw Sound below the Savannah River to the North Edisto, well up towards Charleston, was, at the close of 1861, under the control of the National forces. At the same time, this expedition did not fulfill its high promise. In place of moving against the enemy in the interior, and making a bold effort to capture Savannah and Charleston, Sherman remained in his encampments in the neighborhood of Port Royal, busying himself with the construction of intrenchments, as if defense had been the main object of the expedition. It is but just, however, to say in vindication of General Sherman that he had not been instructed to press his advantages, and that, with the forces at his command, he was not in a position to attack, with any great hope of success, either Savannah or Charleston. Still, the panic which followed the fall of Port Royal and the victory at Port Royal Ferry was such that more daring measures might have been crowned with greater victories.

Dupont had made several unsuccessful attempts to reach Savannah by way of Warsaw Sound, and by means of the creeks which abound in that region. He had at last succeeded in getting possession of Dawfuskie Island, which, in its southeastern extremity, commands the entrance to the Savannah River. Here he had stationed some gunboats, with a detachment of troops. It was felt, however, that the one thing to be done was the reduction of Fort Pulaski. How was this to be accomplished? It was, as we have had occasion to remark, in a previous chapter, one of the strongest works on the Atlantic seaboard. Its peculiar position made bombardment extremely difficult. It was the opinion of General Quincy A. Gillmore, General Sherman's chief engineer, that the place could be successfully attacked by batteries of rifled guns and mortars placed on Big Tybee Island, which lies to the southeast of Cockspur, on which the fort stood, and on the opposite side of the narrow channel. It was also his opinion that very effective aid might be given from a battery on Venus Point, on Jones' Island, two miles from Cockspur in the opposite direction. Big Tybee Island, as we have already seen, was occupied by the Nationals towards the close of 1861. The question now was, how to get to Venus Point, on Jones' Island, the entire entrance being so completely commanded by the guns of the fort. Information was given by some negroes to the effect that there was a channel which connected Calibogue Sound with the Savannah River. The information was found to be correct, the two being connected by an artificial channel, some two hundred yards in length, called Wall's Cut. This channel had been obstructed by three rows of piles and by a sunken brig. At high tide, however, the water rose above these obstructions some ten feet. The reconnoitering party had, therefore, no difficulty in getting over. Arrangements were imme
Confederate gunboats also found it convenient to remain at a distance. As early as the 22d of February, when these works were all completed, Fort Pulaski was in a condition of absolute blockade.

The next thing to be done was the erection of siege batteries on the northwest face of Big Tybee Island, opposite the fort. Tybee Island, like all the ground in the neighborhood, is a huge marsh. Its soil, where not actually under water, is a species of mud jelly. All the difficulties experienced on Jones Island were experienced here in an aggravated form. The guns, which were all heavy—eight and ten-inch columbiads, ten and thirteen-inch mortars, and rifled of large calibre—had to be dragged two miles over such ground. Difficulties, however, did not hinder the progress of the work. On the 9th April General Gillmore, who was in command, had completed his preparations. Eleven batteries, mounting in all some thirty-six guns, were in readiness to open fire on the fort; and on that day the commanding general gave minute instructions as to the working of the guns, and notified his troops that, if the garrison did not in the meantime surrender, he should open fire at daybreak the following day.

General Hunter had succeeded General Sherman in command of the department. On the evening of the 8th he arrived at Tybee. On the morning of the 10th, at sunrise, Lieutenant April J. H. Wilson was sent to the fort with a message from the general-in-chief to the commander of the garrison.
Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, calling upon him to surrender. The answer was as prompt as it was brief. "I am here," said the colonel, "to defend this fort, not to surrender it." At a quarter past eight o'clock the batteries opened fire. Fort Pulaski, as we have already said, had the reputation of being one of the strongest forts on the Atlantic coast. It was well mounted; and its walls were seven and a half feet thick. The National batteries were planted at different distances—the nearest being about a mile from the fort, the most distant about two miles. Three minutes after the first shot was fired by the Nationals, the Confederates replied from a ten-inch barbette gun. The firing then became general; and for the remainder of the day it was maintained with great spirit on both sides. The day was not far advanced when it became manifest that the masonry of the fort could not long resist the terrible pounding of the batteries. Long before night came on, the rifles had honey-combed the walls, the shot at sixteen hundred and fifty yards, the distance of the nearest rifle-battery, penetrating the walls to a depth of from twenty to twenty-six inches; and the ten-inch solid shot, which struck with less velocity, fell, as an eye-witness puts it, like a trip-hammer, battering to pieces the damaged masonry. It was Gillmore's opinion, after he had seen the effect of his guns, that, if he had known, he might have completed his preparations in one week instead of two, and contented himself with placing his nearest battery at twenty-five hundred yards. When darkness fell, five of the guns of the fortress were silenced, and the firing generally had become feeble. All night long four of Gillmore's guns fired at intervals of fifteen or twenty minutes. On the morning of the 11th, April at sunrise, the firing from the batteries was commenced afresh, and continued with great vigor. A yawning breach began to be visible in the southeast angle of the fort; yet the garrison gallantly maintained the fight until two o'clock. A practicable breach had been made; and Olmstead perceived that "it was impossible to hold out any longer, as the rifle-shots were fast working their way into the magazines, and as many of his guns were disabled." He accordingly raised the white flag, and placed himself and garrison unconditionally at the mercy of the conqueror. Forty-seven guns, a large supply of fixed ammunition, forty thousand pounds of powder, large quantities of commissary stores, and three hundred and ninety prisoners, constituted the spoils of victory. The Nationals had one man killed. The Confederates had three wounded. At Fort Pulaski a striking illustration was given of the power and efficiency of modern artillery. It had always been supposed that such walls could not be successfully breached at distances greater than eight hundred yards. The nearest battery, as we have seen, was distant from the fort at least sixteen hundred and fifty yards.

It was the general expectation at Savannah that Fort Jackson would be immediately attacked, and that the fort and Savannah itself would both be sur
rendered. Nothing of the kind was intended. It would have been a useless waste of the National forces to employ them in garrisoning Fort Jackson and in occupying Savannah. With Fort Pulaski in their possession, the Nationals commanded the entrance to the river—the blockade of Savannah was complete; and this was all that was immediately contemplated.

While these events were progressing at the mouth of the Savannah, Commodore Dupont and General Wright were making rapid and easy conquests along the coast of Florida. Dupont had left Port Royal on the 28th of February, with twenty armed vessels and six transports, filled with troops; and on the 1st of March he arrived in St. Andrew's Sound, north of Cumberland and St. Andrew's Islands. As but little if any resistance was offered, it is unnecessary in a work of this kind to do more than note the results of this expedition. Fort Clinch and the adjoining village were found deserted; and Dupont was able to write to the secretary of the navy, "We captured Port Royal, but Fernandina and Fort Clinch have been given to us." Brunswick, the terminus of the Brunswick and Pensacola Railroad, were taken possession of with equal ease. Jacksonville followed, but not until a wicked attempt had been made by the Confederates to destroy it by fire. Fort Marion and the ancient city of St. Augustine, a little further down the coast, were surrendered to Commander C. R. P. Rodgers, on the 11th of March. Pensacola was soon after aban-

doned by the Confederate General T. N. Jones, who burnt whatever he could at the navy yard, at the hospital, and in Forts McRae and Barrancas, before he retreated into the interior. On the 27th of March Dupont returned to Port Royal, when he found that Skidaway and Green Islands had been abandoned by the Confederates, thus leaving Savannah and Ossabaw Sounds and the Vernon and Wilmington Rivers open to the National forces. Edisto Island had been captured as early as the 11th of February. Thus it was that on the first anniversary of the attack on Fort Sumter, the entire Atlantic and Gulf coast, from Cape Hatteras to Perdido Bay, excepting only the harbor of Charleston and its immediate surroundings, had been abandoned by the Confederates, and that along that whole line the National power was supreme.

In a previous chapter we have mentioned the fact that after the capture of Hatteras Island, General Butler hurried to Washington for the purpose of inducing the government not to abandon the conquest which he had made, but to leave a certain number of troops on the island. General Butler's advice was taken, as we have seen; and he himself was commissioned by the secretary of war to go to New England and "raise, arm and uniform a volunteer force for the war," to be composed of six regiments. In this the general was completely successful. As early as the 13th of January, 1862, he had a conference with Secretary Stanton, then newly installed as war secretary in
On the 20th of March, after a stormy and perilous voyage, he reached Mar.
Ship Island, and commenced those preparations which resulted, through the united efforts of himself and Commodore Farragut, in the capture of the Queen City of the South. The story of the capture of New Orleans, however, must be reserved for another chapter.

CHAPTER X.

Memphis and New Orleans.—Island No. 10.—Confederate Grief.—Fort Pillow.—General Villepigue.—Jeff. Thompson.—Foote and His Flotilla.—General Pope.—Hollins.—Pope Recalled to Corinth.—Foote Left Alone at Fort Pillow.—Foote's Wound making Retirement Necessary.—C. H. Davis takes Command of the Flotilla.—Activity of Hollins.—The Fight Commenced.—The Boiler of the McRae Penetrated.—The White Flag.—The Losses on Both Sides.—Ellet and His "Ram" Squadron.—Flight of the Confederates.—The Effect of the Fall of Corinth.—The Fort Occupied by the Nationals.—Occupation of Fort Randolph.—Memphis Unprotected on the North.—The Gunboats at the Levee.—The Memorable Sixth of June.—The National Fleet in Motion.—The Opening of the Fight.—The Queen of the West.—The Monarch.—The Queen and the Price.—The Fighting General.—The Queen badly Injured.—The Lovell Shattered to Pieces and Sunk.—One Half-Hour's Work.—A Grand and Impressive Scene.—The Last Hope of Memphis Perished.—Surrender of Memphis.—Memphis Occupied by the Union Troops.—Fitch Appointed Provost-Marshal.—Another Obstruction.—New Orleans.—The Key-Position of the Great Valley.—Naval Expedition.—David G. Farragut.—Stanton's Energy.—Farragut at Ship Island.—His Instructions.—Butler and the Land Force.—Porter and His Gunboats.—All things Ready for a Combined Movement.—The Difficulties.—Fort St. Philip and Jackson.—The River Chain.—The Louisiana.—The Manassas.—Twiggs and Lovell.—Higgins.—The Confidence of the South.—All things in Readiness for an Assault.—The Plan.—Porter's Device.—The Bombardment Commenced.—Fort Jackson Fires the First Shot.—Terrible Fighting.—Farragut's Resolve.—The Chain Across the River Cut.—One Thousand Shells.—The Fleet Passes the Obstructions.—Farragut on the Fore-Rigging of the Hartford.—Passing the Forts.—The Ram Manassas.—The Fire-Rafts.—Bailey and Bogg.—The Varuna.—The Battle Ended.—Brief, but Desperate and Destructive.—The Evacuation of the Forts.—The Louisiana Set on Fire by her Commander.—The Intention.—The River in Flames.—New Orleans Hemmed In.—A Thunder-Storm.—Call for Surrender.—The Mayor's Reply.—Landing of the Marines.—The National Flag Waving over New Orleans.—Butler in Charge of the City.—Honor to the Brave.

Rightly to appreciate the actual state of things in the valley of the Mississippi, and intelligently to follow the events which will be recorded in the immediately succeeding chapters, the reader must now give his attention to certain naval operations which, in the interest of the National cause, had been successfully conducted on two separate portions of the lower section of the great western river. Memphis, as we have already had occasion to remark,
had fallen; and General Wallace had May there established his headquarters.

1. On the 1st of May, two days after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops, New Orleans had yielded to the strategy and daring of Farragut; and the old flag was floating over the largest and in some respects most important city of the Confederacy. After the capture of New Orleans and the fall of Memphis, Vicksburg was the one remaining stronghold of any importance which obstructed the free navigation of the Mississippi from St. Louis to the sea. Let us see how it came to pass that both Memphis and New Orleans were wrenched from the hands of the Confederates.

In a previous chapter we have given a somewhat detailed account of the operations, by land and water, which resulted in the capture and occupation of Island No. 10. The fall of that island was felt by the Confederates to be one of the deadliest blows which they had yet received. It was one of the strongest places on the river, richly supplied with all the material of war; and everything fell into the victors' hands. It was openly confessed by the Confederates themselves, amid much grief and lamentation, that no single battle had yet afforded the North such visible fruits of victory as had been gathered at Island No. 10. It was not, however, solely on account of the number of men who had been made prisoners, or because of the vast quantity of arms and ammunition which had become the spoil of the victorious Nationals, that the Confederates were filled with grief. They had another cause for sorrow. Memphis, the most important city on the Mississippi between St. Louis and New Orleans, was virtually left undefended. Fort Pillow, it is true, remained; but Fort Pillow, strong as it was, could scarcely be expected long to resist the captors of Forts Henry and Donelson and Columbus, now flushed with success from their fresh triumph at Island No. 10.

The Confederates, however, were neither without the means nor without the spirit to offer the invaders a stubborn resistance. Fort Pillow, whose works occupied a line of seven miles in circumference, was very strong, and was under the excellent superintendence of General Villepigue, a New Orleans creole, a West-Pointer, and, as an engineer, regarded second only to Beauregard himself. It had forty heavy guns in position. There were nine gun-boats under Hollins; and Jeff. Thompson was there with about six thousand troops.

After the fall of Island No. 10, Commodore Foote lost no time in pushing his way down the Mississippi. General Pope followed, in transports, with his army, numbering some twenty thousand men. Pope arrived on the 13th April; and preparations were immediately made for an attack. Foote opened fire and moved against the gun-boats on the following day, and with such vigor that Hollins found it necessary to seek the shelter of the fort. Pope had landed his troops on the Arkansas shore, but so greatly was the land overflowed with water that he could render no assistance. On the
17th he was recalled with his entire force, to join Halleck, who was then advancing on Corinth. Foote was thus left to prosecute the work alone; and soon afterwards, in consequence of the painfulness of the wound which he had received in his ankle at Fort Donelson, he was compelled to retire from active duty, leaving the command in the hands of Captain C. H. Davis.

Hollins, meanwhile, had not been idle; and on the 10th of May, having re-formed his flotilla, he came out from under the guns of the fort, sweeping around Point Craighead, on the Arkansas shore, with armored steamers. Some of the steamers were fitted with strong bows, plated with iron. Davis was ready to receive him. The fight was commenced by Hollins’ largest gunboat, the McRae, which, armed with a strong iron prow, rushed at the mortar boat No. 16. The commander of the mortar boat, Acting-Master Gregory, made a gallant fight, firing his single mortar no fewer than eleven times. The gunboats Cincinnati and Mound City came to Gregory’s assistance, when the fighting became general. The fight had lasted the better part of an hour, when a shell from the Boston penetrated the boiler of the McRae. This was the end. Clouds of steam enveloped the ill-fated vessel, and torrents of boiling water were doing more effective work among the men on board than the shells from the National gunboats. The flag was raised in token of surrender. The National gunboats were in no condition to pursue and capture. Some of them were much injured, the Cincinnati particularly, which soon went to the bottom of the river. As their steam power was too weak to enable them to resist the powerful current of the river, it was wisely concluded not to grapple the disabled vessels of the enemy, lest by so doing they might be dragged under the guns of the fort. The National loss was four men wounded. The Confederate loss must have been considerably greater. The damage sustained by the McRae alone, through the bursting of her boiler, must have exceeded that sustained by the entire National fleet. In some respects it was a barren victory; but it afterwards proved more fruitful than at first it seemed.

Three weeks were allowed to pass without any attempt being made, on either side, to renew the conflict. About the beginning of June, Davis was reinforced by Colonel Charles Ellet, jr., with his famous “ram”-squadron—a fleet of boats of a peculiar model, of which he was the inventor. Thus strengthened, Davis concluded to repeat the trial of strength. It was too late. The enemy had fled. Fort Pillow was deserted. Hearing of the disaster which had befallen Beauregard, and of his flight from Corinth, the garrison, officers and men, were filled with alarm; and having first blown up their magazines and fired their barracks and stores, they went down the river in transports, accompanied by the Confederate fleet. The evacuation and retreat took place under cover of the night of the June 4th. On the following day the National flag floated over Fort Pillow.
and over Fort Randolph, a place of some strength but of less importance, further down the river. Believing in the strength of the forts on the river above and below, the authorities had not thought it necessary to fortify the town itself. On the northern side, Memphis was now entirely unprotected. The only defense that now remained was the flotilla of gunboats, now lying close to the levee.

The situation of Memphis on the June 6th of June was peculiar in the extreme. The inhabitants had before them a great sensation, and the almost certain expectation of a great sorrow. In their immediate presence, in the broad sea-like waters which rolled past their city, a great naval engagement was about to take place; and the result, which could hardly bring to them any permanent advantage, might in a few hours or minutes place themselves, their property, and their institutions entirely at the mercy of the enemy. At the early dawn the National fleet, with the Cairo in advance, was moving in battle order toward the levee. The Confederate fleet, which, as we have seen, lay there, consisted of eight vessels. The National fleet, it will be remembered, had been strengthened by four ram boats under Ellet. While the National boats were moving forward, and only as yet within long range, the Confederate Little Rebel hurled a rifled shot at the Cairo. The Cairo replied with a broadside. Thus the conflict began. For a time the battle was confined to the gunboats. Suddenly, how-

ever, two of the Confederate rams (Beauregard and Price) pushed forward and joined in the fray. Ellet observed the movement; and watching for his opportunity, he brought the two rams Queen of the West (his flag-ship) and Monarch right in front of the gunboats. He made a dash at the Confederate rams, the Queen being brought down toward the Beauregard with tremendous force, but missing her. Rushing at the Price, the Queen struck the wheel-house of that vessel with her iron prow, and so damaged her that, to avoid sinking, she was compelled to seek the opposite shore. The Beauregard now turned upon the Queen; and, both vessels, rushing together at full speed, the latter received a crushing blow, which disabled her. The Monarch, hastening to the aid of the Queen, struck the Beauregard fair in the bow, causing her to sink almost immediately. A white flag was raised on the Beauregard; and the ram fight having ceased, the Monarch towed the badly wounded Queen of the West to a place of safety. Meanwhile the struggle was going on between the gunboats. The Confederates, being hard pressed by the Nationals, were steadily falling back. The fighting was conducted with great spirit, and the destruction was terrific. The Confederates, however, were the only sufferers. The boilers on some of their boats were burst and the crews scalded. A fifty-pound ball, hurled from the Benton by a rifled Parrott gun, hit the Lovell with such force that she was shattered almost to pieces, and sunk in a few minutes, in seventy-five feet of water,
carrying with her the greater portion of her officers and crew. Such had been the destructive work done in the brief space of half an hour that only four Confederate vessels remained afloat—the Thompson, the Bragg, the Sumter, and the VanDorn; but these were all badly injured and made for the shore. They were all abandoned except the VanDorn, which made good its escape down the river. Not a man had been killed on board the National gunboats. When the brief conflict was at its height the scene was grand and impressive in a high degree. The battle had been witnessed by many thousands of the inhabitants of Memphis. The firing of the first gun had roused them from their slumbers; and anxious multitudes soon lined the shores and crowded the roofs of the houses. The dense smoke, which gathered cloud-like around the ships, concealed from view much of the actual fighting; but the wild war of jarring sounds—the booming of cannon, the rattling of musketry, the bursting of shells, the explosion of boilers, the crashing of timbers as the rams rushed together in fierce embrace—all attested the severity of the conflict which was raging behind. When the cloud of smoke arose and the wreck was revealed, the last hope of Memphis had perished.

There was no further resistance. To the request of Commodore Davis that he surrender the city, the mayor politely replied that he had no means of defense, and that the city was in his hands. Jeff. Thompson, who had command of the city, and who had witnessed the fight, when he found that the fleet was defeated, beat an immediate retreat. The old Union flag was hoisted on the public buildings; and Memphis was taken possession of by the National troops, Colonel Fitch, of the Forty-Ninth Indiana, being appointed provost-marshal. The reader now knows how it came to pass that Memphis had been wrenched from the Confederates, and how it was that General Lewis Wallace, of Grant's army, entered and occupied that city without encountering any resistance. The fall of Memphis left the Mississippi comparatively unobstructed as far down as Vicksburg.

Let us now give our attention to what had happened on the same waters to the south of Vicksburg and nearer to the sea. Very early in the history of the war the attention of the National government had been directed to New Orleans; and it was felt that so long as the city remained in the possession of the Confederates there could be no free navigation of the Mississippi. It was the key-position; and whoever was strong enough to hold that position was master of the great valley. In the autumn of 1861 it was resolved not to wait until the military combinations had forced a passage down the river, but to send a naval expedition, which, fitted out in the Atlantic ports, should move up from the gulf. The command of this expedition was assigned to Captain David G. Farragut, a Tennessean by birth, and an officer who had seen service and done good work both in the Mexican campaign and in the naval operations of 1812. It was not, how-
ever, until early in 1862 that this expedition showed any signs of vitality. By that time Stanton had succeeded Cameron as head of the War Department; and the energy of the new chief was making itself everywhere felt.

On the 2d of February Farragut sailed from Hampton Roads in the armed steamer Hartford. Having been detained by sickness at Key West, he did not reach Ship Island, his point of destination, until the 20th of the same month. Farragut's instructions were of the most positive kind. He was to proceed with all possible despatch to the Gulf of Mexico, and assume command of the western gulf squadron, relieving Flag-officer McKean. The gulf squadron, which was employed in enforcing the blockade, was to be considerably strengthened; and in addition, there was to be attached to the squadron a powerful bomb flotilla, under Commander David Porter. With these mortar vessels, as soon as they were ready, and with such others as might be spared from the blockade, he was to reduce the defenses which guarded the approaches to New Orleans, take possession of that city, under the guns of the squadron, and hold it until troops should be sent to his aid. If the expedition from Cairo should not yet have got down the river so far, he was to push a strong force up the stream past the city, and destroy the defenses in the rear. Thus instructed, and having been provided with plans of the principal works on the lower Mississippi, Farragut set about the accomplishment of his task.

Arrangements had been made to back up the efforts of the fleet by a powerful land force. An army of eighteen thousand men was furnished and placed under the command of Major-General Butler. Farragut, we have seen, arrived at Ship Island on the 20th of February. On the 25th of the same month, General Butler, his troops on board five transports, sailed from Hampton Roads. Porter's fleet of mortar boats, which were to rendezvous at Key West, arrived in due time. It was a formidable fleet. Fitted up in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, it had for months been the subject of not a little speculation; and it was generally expected that with such instruments Porter and Farragut would be able to do some effective work. There were in all twenty-one vessels, of from two hundred to three hundred tons each, of great strength, and constructed so as to draw as little water as possible. They were armed with mortars eight and a half tons in weight, and capable of throwing a 15-inch shell. Each vessel carried also a 32-pounder rifled cannon. Before the middle of April the fleet was in perfect order; Butler, too, had arrived; and all necessary preparations had been made for a combined movement against the enemy.

Strong as the National forces now undoubtedly were, Farragut had a task on hand fitted to unnerve the strongest arm and to appal the stoutest heart. New Orleans was well fortified; and the numerous narrow and, in some places, shallow outlets by which the Mississippi seeks the sea, make its approaches
exceedingly perilous to ships of heavy tonnage. These outlets are five in number, and are named respectively Pass a l'Outre, Northeast Pass, Southeast Pass, South Pass, and Southwest Pass. At a bend about thirty miles up the river there were two powerful forts—one on the right or south bank, Fort Jackson, and the other on the left or north bank, Fort St. Philip. These barred the approach to the city from the gulf; and the Confederates had armed them with one hundred and twenty-six guns of long range and large calibre. At this point a large chain, sustained upon eight hulks, was stretched across the river. Close to Fort Jackson there was a formidable water-battery; and under the guns of the forts there was a fleet of thirteen gunboats, a powerful ironclad floating battery, called the Louisiana, carrying sixteen guns, and the steam-ram Manassas. In addition to all these tremendous war appliances, there were numerous rafts and fire-ships. Further up the river and to the southwest of the town, on the bayous and lakes, there were elaborate and powerful works, which Beauregard had greatly strengthened. In and around the city of New Orleans there was a force of at least ten thousand men. General Twiggs, of somewhat questionable reputation as a soldier, had been entrusted by the Confederates with the defense of the city. His position, by this time, however, had been assumed by Mansfield Lovell, formerly a politician and office-holder in New York. Lovell had for his assistant General Ruggles, a man of ability and energy. The general command

of the river defenses was entrusted to General J. K. Duncan, another New York office-holder, Forts Jackson and St. Philip being under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins. Lovell had made application to the governor of the State for ten thousand men; but such had been the drain upon the army by the necessities of the Border States that not more than three thousand could be spared him as a reinforcement. As it was, however, it was not wholly without reason that the Confederate strength around New Orleans was believed by some to be sufficient to “beat off any navy in the world.” “Our only fear,” said one of the New Orleans journals, “is that the Northern invaders may not appear. We have made such extensive preparations to receive them that it were vexatious if their invincible armada escapes the fate we have in store for it.”

On the 8th of April the National fleet, consisting of four sloops-of-war, seventeen gunboats, twenty-one mortar schooners, and two sailing vessels, but having no ironclads, had been, with great labor, carried over the bar. The Brooklyn had been dragged through the mud of the Southwest Pass. At the shallowest part, the water was barely fifteen feet deep, the mud having greatly increased in the channel since the commencement of the blockade. By the 17th all things were in readiness for an attack. Not only were the two fleets now fully in the river: Butler, with his troops, was at the Southwest Pass, immediately below.
ready to take what action might be necessary. A fire-raft, which came sailing down the river, gave the Nationals an idea of the species of tactics the enemy was disposed to adopt. On the 18th following day the movement began in earnest. According to the plan agreed upon at Washington, and which formed part of the instructions given to Farragut, Porter was to attempt to reduce the forts by his mortars, and if he failed, Farragut was to run past them with his heavy vessels. In the event of the latter course being attended with success, Butler was to land his troops in the rear of St. Philip and carry it by assault.

The south bank of the river for several miles below Fort Jackson was thickly wooded. At some distance below the bend, and in order to enable the guns of the fort to sweep the river and prevent the vessels from ascending, a large opening was cut through the wood. It was impossible, however, to rob the Nationals of all the advantages which the trees afforded. Under cover of the woods, fourteen of the mortar boats, their masts and rigging being clothed with leafy boughs, to make them indistinguishable from trees, moved up the river and were moored at desirable points without being discovered. The remainder of Porter's boats were on the other side of the river; but as it was found that they were within the range of the guns of the forts, they too were brought, on the morning of the second day, under cover of the woods. Early on the morning of the 18th the bombardment commenced. The first shot was fired from Fort Jackson. Porter was ready to reply; the mortar vessels opened fire immediately; and the effect was terrific. From a position on board the Harriet Lane, Porter watched the effect of the shells, and directed their range accordingly. In Fort Jackson the barracks were set on fire soon after the bombardment opened. The guns were frequently silenced, the men being terror-stricken by the shells which were exploding all around them. It was observed that the shells were bursting in the air, in consequence of the badness of the fuses. The fuses were, therefore, put in full length, to delay the explosion. The change had the desired effect. The shells, penetrating the earth eighteen or twenty feet, and then exploding, tearing up the ground and scattering it all around, had the effect of a constantly repeating earthquake. The firing from the forts, in spite of all this, was kept up with great energy, shot and shell coming crashing through the woods and tearing up the trees by the roots. During the first twenty-four hours fifteen hundred bombs must have been flung by Porter's mortars, the enemy replying with equal spirit; and for six weary days and nights this terrible work went on. No such continued and heavy fighting had been witnessed since the days of Nelson. At the distance of thirty miles from the scene of action, window panes were broken by the concussion; and fish, stunned by the dreadful explosions, were floating about on the surface of the water.

On the third day of the bombard-
ment, Farragut, seeing that no decisive results were likely to be attained unless bolder measures were adopted, called a council and announced his determination to cut the barricade, run the gauntlet of the forts, and pass up to the city of New Orleans in spite of their guns. Butler was at hand, with at least ten thousand troops, ready to land and assist in the capture of the forts, all his transports, with the exception of the Great Republic, having entered the Mississippi on the 18th. If this movement was to be carried out, the first thing to be done was to remove the obstructions from the river. On the April night of the 20th, therefore, under cover of the darkness, a fierce north wind blowing at the time, Commander Bell, with the Pinola and Itaska, supported by the Iroquois, Kennebec, and Winona, ran up to the boom. The Pinola attempted, but unsuccessfully, to blow up one of the hulks, by means of a petard. The Itaska was lashed to the hulk adjoining. A rocket thrown up from Fort Jackson revealed her presence, and a heavy fire was immediately opened upon her from the fortress. Nothing daunted, the men kept at their work; and by means of cold-chisels, hammers, sledges, and saws, the chain was cut. The river being in full flood, the powerful current swung around both hulk and gunboat, the latter being grounded in the mud in shallow water. The Pinola came promptly to the rescue, and, after some difficulty, succeeded in carrying her consort back in safety to the fleet. Some two hours afterwards a fire-raft came blazing down the stream. It was caught, however, in time, and rendered harmless. Mean-time the firing never ceases, either on board the mortar boats or in the forts; and night after night those blazing fire rafts are let loose on their errands of destruction. There were no signs as yet that the forts would surrender. One thousand shells at least had burst within Fort Jackson; twenty-five thousand had been hurled against it; yet General Duncan could say: "God is certainly protecting us. We are still cheerful, and have an abiding faith in our ultimate success."

The arrangements for the onward movement up the river were now completed. The chain was broken; and Farragut was ready. On the April night of the 23d the Itaska, which had run up to the boom, signalled that all was right—that the channel was clear, with the exception of the hulks, which, with care, might be easily passed. The fleet had been arranged in three divisions, under Farragut, Captain Bell, and Captain Theodorus Bailey. Six gunboats were to engage the water-battery below Fort Jackson, but were not to proceed further. Farragut had charge of the first division, which consisted of the three large ships, the Hartford (flag-ship), the Richmond, and the Brooklyn. This division was to keep to the right bank of the river and fight Fort Jackson. The second division was under Bailey, and was composed of the Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, Katahdin, Kineo, Wissahickon, and Portsmouth. This division was to keep to the left bank and fight Fort St. Phil
The third division, which comprised the Scioto, Winona, Iroquois, Pinola, Itaska, and Kennebec, and was under Bell, who was ordered to press on neglectful of the forts, and attack the Confederate fleet above. At one o'clock on April 24, the morning of the 24th all hands were called, hammocks stowed, and everything put in readiness to weigh anchor at two o'clock. The night was dark, and a heavy fog rested upon the river.

At two o'clock precisely, two red lights were hung out. They were the signal for going into action. In less than an hour, the whole fleet was under way. There was an ominous silence at the forts, as if they were fully aware of what was going on, and were preparing to give the fleet a warm reception. Meanwhile Porter's boats had opened a terrific fire, literally filling the air with shells, and making night hideous with their noise. As if redoubling their efforts, the men kept up the firing with unceasing vigor until Farragut's vessels were all fairly in the heat of the conflict. The waning crescent of the moon revealed itself just as Farragut, struggling with the fierce current, safely passed the broken chain, its pale light blending strangely with the fierce glare of the hissing shells. As the vessels under his care slowly but steadily approached Fort Jackson, Farragut, from the fore-rigging of the Hartford, eagerly watched, with the help of his night-glass, the movements of Bailey and Bell. When within a little over a mile of Fort Jackson, the guns of both forts opened upon him with great force and with singular precision of aim. Farragut was in no haste to reply, although the Hartford was hit several times. Drawing closer and closer, and waiting fully fifteen minutes after the first volley had been aimed at him, he began with two heavy guns which he had mounted on the forecastle; and then, when within half a mile of Fort Jackson, and having that work fairly within range, he sheered around and poured forth such broadsides of grape and canister that no living thing could stand before them. The men were driven from the barbette guns, and the wildest confusion prevailed. The firing from the casemates continued; and the conflict raged with tremendous fury. The Richmond, which had successfully passed the barricade, soon came up and took part in the fight. The Brooklyn had been less fortunate. In passing through the opening made by the breaking of the chain, she became entangled with one of the hulks; and while in this position she was exposed at once to the fire of the forts and to attacks from the Confederate ironclads. Scarcely was the Brooklyn extricated from this peril when the iron ram Manassas came down upon her with great fury, firing from the trap-door a heavy bolt at the Brooklyn's steam drum. Happily the shot lodged in some sandbags and did no harm. The next moment the ram butted into the ship's starboard; but the impetus was insufficient to make any impression on the Brooklyn, whose sides were bound round and round with chain armor. As the Manassas glided away and was
lost in the darkness, and while still under the fire of Fort Jackson, the Brooklyn encountered another steamer. The struggle with this one was short and sharp. One hearty broadside, at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, and the strange vessel was no more. The Brooklyn was then abreast of Fort St. Philip, and her guns were within easy range. "I had the satisfaction," said Captain Craven, in his report, "of completely silencing that work before I left it, my men in the tops witnessing, in the flashes of the bursting shrapnel, the enemy running like sheep for more comfortable quarters."

Farragut, meanwhile, was having enough to do on board the Hartford. While engaged with the forts, a huge fire-raft was pushed against him by the Manassas. In attempting to avoid the blazing raft, the Hartford ran aground; and in a moment, the incendiary having come crashing alongside of her, the ship was in flames on the port side and halfway up to the main and mizzen-tops. While the flames raged, the Hartford did not discontinue her cannonading. "All the time," says Farragut, "we were pouring shells into the forts, and they into us, and now and then a rebel steamer would get under our fire and receive our salutation of a broadside." The flames were soon extinguished; and the Hartford, being released, sailed up the stream. Half an hour more and Farragut had successfully passed through the fiery storm, having done his work effectually as he moved along.

Bailey, with his second division, had had, if possible, even a harder experience; but his success was scarcely less marked. In crossing the river obstructions he encountered the fire of both forts; and scarcely had he passed through, when, owing to the great speed of the Cayuga, he found himself ahead of his friends and alone in the midst of the Confederate fleet. His situation was one of extreme peril. The Manassas, the floating battery Louisiana, and at least sixteen other armed vessels, all turned upon him; and his vessel seemed doomed. The swiftness of the ship came to his aid; and he handled her with exquisite skill. While completely successful in so keeping out of the way of the Confederate ironclads that they could neither butt nor board him, he so used his guns that he compelled three of them to surrender before any aid came to him. Meanwhile the Varuna, Captain Boggs, and the Oneida, Captain Lee, came up and engaged the enemy. The Cayuga had been hit forty-two times, and was so damaged that Bailey deemed it prudent to retire. The Varuna was the next object of attack. Boggs found himself, all at once, after passing the forts, as he said in his report, "amid a nest of rebel steamers." The brave captain did not hesitate as to what he should do. Rushing at once into the midst of them, he "worked both his sides, loaded with grape," producing terrible havoc among the Confederate ships, which were strangely overcrowded. "An explosion, terrific yells, a careen, and that fellow is done for." Such is the language of an eyewitness. And so the fearful work goes on, until the Varuna has sunk, one after
another, six of the enemy's vessels. Meanwhile she was badly hurt herself. The heavy shot of the ironclads had told on her rigging and on her timbers. One raking discharge from one of them had killed four and wounded nine of her men. Four times she had been butted by the powerful rams of her antagonists. The last time she was struck, her side was crushed in; but before the ram could get out of her way, she put through her unarmored stern five 8-inch shells "that settled her, and she went ashore in flames." In fifteen minutes after she was struck the Varuna went to the bottom; but in the interval she had settled her antagonist. It was noble fighting, conducted in the true spirit of the sea kings of ancient times.

The Moore was the last vessel which the Varuna had to encounter. Badly disabled as the Varuna was, Boggs kept up the fight, with his vessel aground and her bow tied to the trees. It was not until the water was up over the gun-trucks that the captain gave his attention to the saving of his men. Happily all the survivors, including the wounded, were got out and saved before the vessel went down. At the last moment the Oneida, Captain Lee, came up to the aid of the sinking Varuna. Boggs "waved him on" after the Moore, which was in flames but trying to get away. In a little while the Moore was surrendered to the Oneida by the second officer, the captain having fled, after setting the vessel on fire. But for her timely capture, fifty of her men, maimed and wounded, must have perished in the flames.

Bell had been less fortunate than either Farragut or Bailey in bringing his ships into action and accomplishing the task assigned him. The Scioto, Iroquois, and Pinola passed the forts; but the Itaska, being disabled, drifted down the river. The Winona recoiled from the terrible fire which had proved fatal to her companion. The Kennebec got entangled in attempting to pass the obstructions, and finally, having lost her way in the darkness, returned to her moorings.

The fight was now ended. It had been as brief as it had been desperate. It was little more than an hour and a half since the fleet had left its moorings; and in that brief space of time all that it was intended to do had been successfully accomplished. The forts had been passed and the Confederate navy was destroyed. The ironclad Manassas, from which such great things were expected, shared the fate of the smaller vessels. Commander Porter's description of the last moments of this naval monster are well deserving of reproduction. We have seen that he kept up a continuous fire from the mortar boats while Farragut was pressing on his way. "It was reported to me," he says, "that the celebrated ram Manassas was coming out to attack us, and sure enough, there she was, apparently steaming along shore, ready to pounce upon the defenseless mortar vessels; but I soon discovered that she could harm no one again. She was beginning to emit smoke from her ports or holes; she was on fire and sinking. Her pipes were twisted and riddled with shot;
her hull was cut up. She had evidently been used up by the squadron as she passed along. I tried to save her as a curiosity by getting a hawser around her and securing her to the bank; but just after doing so, she faintly exploded. Her only gun went off, and, emitting flames from her bow-port, like some huge animal she gave a plunge and disappeared under the water.” The description of the closing scenes of the contest, from the same pen, is equally graphic. After the Manassas had gone down, there “came a steamer on fire; after her, two others, burning and floating down the stream. Fires seemed to be raging all along the ‘up river,’ and we supposed that our squadron was burning and destroying the vessels as they passed along. The sight of this night attack was awfully grand. The river was lit up by rafts filled with pine knots; and the ships seemed to be literally fighting among flames and smoke.”

The Cayuga, Captain Bailey's flagship, had, as we have seen, when relieved by the Varuna and the Oneida, and after having been struck at least forty-two times, and consequently been considerably damaged, sailed up the river. It was the advance boat. It had not sailed far when Bailey discovered the camp of the famous Chalmette regiment. On the approach of the Cayuga, the regiment attempted to effect its escape. Bailey opened fire; a volley of canister was sufficient to compel a halt, which was soon followed by an unconditional surrender. By this time Bailey was joined by Farragut; and the national fleet, consisting of thirteen vessels, was ready to steam up to New Orleans. On reaching the quarantine ground, Farragut concluded to halt for the night, and to move on the city on the following morning.

Let us see what was taking place in the rear of the National fleet. Farragut had passed the forts, but he had not silenced them. Where was Porter, with his mortar boats; and what was General Butler doing with his soldiers? We shall see. Butler, with his staff, had witnessed from the deck of the Saxon the contest between the fleet and the forts. Half an hour after he had reached the quarantine, Farragut sent Captain Boggs in a smallboat, through the bayous, with despatches for Butler and Porter. Butler had already joined his transports. With the least delay possible they were moved to Sable Island, whence the troops were, with very considerable difficulty, conveyed in smallboats and landed successfully a short distance above Fort St. Philip, and under cover of the guns of the Mississippi and Kineo. A portion of them were sent across the river, to be ready to take possession of Fort Jackson. Meanwhile Porter, who had remained behind the fleet, had not been idle. On Fort Jackson particularly he had kept up an incessant fire; the shells from his mortars giving terrible annoyance to the enemy, although not producing any visible impression on the works. On the 26th he sent a flag of truce, demanding its surrender, stating that he had information of the capture of New Orleans. Colonel Higgins, who
had command of the forts, refused to surrender, stating that he had no information of the fall of New Orleans, and that until he had such information, from what he should consider a reliable source, the thought of surrender was not for a moment to be entertained. Meantime it began to be known to the soldiers that Butler was in the rear of Fort St. Philip; and in spite of the encouraging words of General Duncan, the commander of the coast defenses, then in Fort Jackson, that they were as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as they were before the bombardment, the garrison began to mutiny. Spiking their guns, some of them sallied out and surrendered to Butler's pickets, stating that they had been impressed and compelled to fight against their will. It was now evident to the Confederate officers that it was useless to prolong the struggle; and Colonel Higgins, feeling that he had done his best, accepted Porter's not ungenerous terms. While the treaty was being signed on board the Harriet Lane, the huge battery, the Louisiana, was set on fire by its commander, and let loose in the strong current of the river, with all its guns shotted. It was the evident intention of its officers to destroy by this means Porter's fleet of mortar boats. Their calculation proved a failure. The monster blew up when abreast of Fort St. Philip, a flying fragment killing one of its garrison. It was a barbarous proceeding; and it was with great propriety that Mitchell and his subordinates were sent close prisoners to the North. The treaty of surrender being completed, the forts were turned over by Porter to General Phelps. It was found that the works were comparatively uninjured. The actual number of the Confederate killed and wounded has never been correctly given. The whole number of prisoners surrendered, including those of the Chalmette regiment and the men from the gunboats, amounted to nearly one thousand.

On the morning of the 25th, Farragut proceeded up the river with nine vessels. Owing to the slowness of some of the boats, and to a want of knowledge of the river, it was 10.30 A.M. before the fleet had reached what is called the English Turn. "All the morning," says Farragut in his official report, "I had seen abundant evidence of the panic which had seized the people in New Orleans. Cotton-loaded ships on fire came floating down, and working instruments of every kind, such as are used in shipyards. The destruction of property was awful. The levee in New Orleans was one scene of desolation. Ships, steamers, cotton, coal were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity was much taxed to avoid the floating conflagration." On his way up, and when about three miles from the city, fire was opened upon him by the Chalmette batteries, one being on each side of the river; but the vessels were now well together, and a few vigorous and well directed broadsides soon silenced the guns and scattered the men in all directions. New Orleans was now utterly defenseless; and the water in the river was so high that a gunboat could easily be taken up as far as Renner's
plantedation, ten miles above the city, and thus, by commanding the narrow neck of land across which the railroad passes, and which connects the river and the swamp, completely enclose the city, shutting off all means of egress and every source of supply. In the circumstances, and seeing that he had no hope of saving the city, Lovell, with the sanction of the municipal authorities, who were anxious to avoid the horrors of a bombardment, sent off his munitions and a large portion of his troops, and, having disbanded the rest, turned the city over to the mayor.

At one o'clock, on the afternoon of the 25th, and in the midst of a fierce thunder-storm, Farragut anchored his squadron off New Orleans. The excitement was tremendous. The inhabitants, who believed that the defenses of the city were invulnerable, gave way to the most frantic rage, invoked vengeance on Higgins and Lovell, and demanded that the city be given to the flames rather than surrendered. On board the National ships the sailors were wild with delight. They had seen the end of their mission; they had nobly and successfully done their work; and cheer after cheer went sounding from the ships to the shore. Farragut sent Bailey to the city authorities, with a flag, demanding the immediate surrender of the city, and informing them that no flag but that of the United States would be allowed to float in presence of the fleet. The mayor, John T. Monroe, in a foolish letter, refused to surrender or take down the Confederate flag, declaring that the city was defenseless, that he was no military man, and knew neither how to command an army nor to surrender an unprotected place; that there was not a man in the city whose heart would not be palsied by the mere thought of hoisting any flag but the flag of their adoption; and that he would seek in vain for "so wretched and desperate a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspirations." In the meantime a party had landed from the Pensacola and hoisted the National flag over the government mint; but it was quickly torn down and dragged in derision through the streets. A gambler named Mumford, who was chiefly responsible for this rash act, afterwards paid the penalty with his life. Farragut, patient as he was, and merciful as he wished to be, was not to be hindered in the discharge of his duty by the querulous protestations of the mayor. He notified the mayor to remove the women and children from the city within forty-eight hours, as he had no desire that the innocent and the helpless should suffer, in the event of a bombardment. Another letter, more ridiculous than the former, came back from the mayor. "Do your worst, but don't speak about humanity. If the Confederate flag must be taken down, and the National flag raised, the work must be done by other hands than ours." Such was the burden of the mayor's reply. Farragut, having learned of the surrender of the forts below, and knowing that General Butler would soon be on hand and ready to take possession, felt that, not
withstanding the irritating conduct of Mayor Monroe, he could afford to act with caution and patience. Next day, on April 26, Captain Bell landed with a hundred marines; and the National flag was raised over the mint and the custom-house. To these no violence was offered. The people had become aware of the fact that Butler was coming up the river with his transports.

April 30. On the 30th, Farragut informed the city authorities that he should hold no more intercourse with them, and that as soon as General Butler arrived he should turn over the charge of the city to him. On the 1st of May, General Butler, with his transports, bearing two thousand armed men, appeared off the levee in front of New Orleans. On the afternoon of the same day the debarkation took place, and New Orleans was formally occupied by United States troops. Before the middle of the month, Baton Rouge and Natchez had also been occupied; and the Mississippi was free both above and below Vicksburg. The capture of New Orleans, which was accomplished at the small sacrifice of 40 killed and 177 wounded, was justly regarded as one of the greatest victories yet achieved by the North. The people were jubilant; and President Lincoln, in a cheerful proclamation, and as if to give the world assurance of the completeness of the National victories, declared the termination, on June 1st, of the blockade of the ports of Beaufort, of Port Royal, and of New Orleans. It was justly felt to be a heavy loss to the South. "It annihilated us in Louisiana," says Pollard, "diminished our resources and supplies by the loss of one of the greatest grain and cattle countries within the limits of the Confederacy; gave to the enemy the Mississippi River, with all its means of navigation, for a base of operations, and finally led by plain and irresistible conclusion to our virtual abandonment of the great and fruitful valley of the Mississippi."

We have thus answered the questions which we put to ourselves at the commencement of this chapter. We have told the story of the occupation of Memphis and the story of the capture of New Orleans, and have explained why it was that at the date of the Confederate retreat from Corinth and its occupation by General Halleck and the National forces, Vicksburg alone remained to obstruct the free navigation of the waters of the Mississippi. We leave General Butler in possession of New Orleans; but the consideration of his administration of the affairs of that city forms no essential part of the plan of this work. The naval operations which resulted in the occupation of Memphis on the one hand and the capture of New Orleans on the other, were in the highest degree creditable to the officers of the North. Farragut covered himself with glory; so did Bailey; so did Boggs; but where all did so well, it is invidious to single out and bestow special praise.
CHAPTER XI.

The Army of the West.—The Army Inactive.—Halleck made Commander-in-Chief.—Buell Sent to Chattanooga.—The Army of the West Weakened.—Grant in Command.—Pope Sent to Virginia.—Rosecrans takes Pope’s place under Grant.—The Position of the Army of the West.—Price and VanDorn.—The Confederate Army Preparing to Strike.—Grant’s Caution.—The Object of the Confederates.—Iuka.—Armstrong’s Raids.—Colonel Murphy in Command at Iuka.—Price at Iuka.—Grant Watchful and Ready.—Time Precious.—Generals Ord and Ross.—Rosecrans’s Army in Motion.—The Confederates Well Posted.—The Battle-Ground at Iuka.—The Battle Begun.—The Battery of the Eleventh Ohio.—Fearful Fighting.—Colonel Eddy Killed.—The Battery Captured.—Ord Deceived.—Too Late on the Field.—A Great Misfortune.—Defeat and Retreat of the Confederates.—Corinth.—Preparations for another Fight.—The Old Battle-Ground.—The Place Greatly Strengthened.—Major Prine.—Chewalla Road.—Beginning of the Fight.—Terrific Onslaught of the Confederates.—The First Day a Victory for the Confederates.—The Confederates Reinforced.—Resolved to Capture Corinth.—The Confederates Open Fire.—A Deceptive Movement.—The Movement Defeated.—The Confederates Come Up in Force.—Great Bravery and Great Slaughter.—A Temporary Panic among the Nationals.—Fort Powell Captured.—At Rosecrans’s Headquarters.—Are they to Win?—Victory turned into Defeat.—The Confederate Right Driven Back to the Woods.—The Confederate Left.—Their Advance on the National Works.—A Terrible Reception.—“Gorgeous Pyrotechnics.”—A Murderous Fire.—The Confederates Fall Back.—Another Attack.—The Battle Ended.—A National Triumph.—The Pursuit.—The Battle of the Hatchie.—The Confederates Defeated.—Halleck and Ord.—Ord Wounded.—Pursuit Discontinued.—Promotion of Rosecrans.—His Order of the Twenty-Fourth of October.—The First Praise Due to Grant.—Grant’s Command Enlarged.

Before proceeding to call the reader’s attention to the important events which were already taking place on the Atlantic coast, we have deemed it advisable, for the sake of unity, to remain a little longer with the army of the West, and to describe somewhat in detail the operations of that army, and the work generally which had to be done after the capture of Corinth and before General Grant was in a fit condition to march upon Vicksburg.

Corinth was evacuated on the 30th of May, and on the same day was occupied by the National troops. From a variety of causes, the conquerors of Shiloh remained comparatively inactive from June to September. Halleck remained in command until the 11th of August, when he was summoned to Washington, and by general orders from the War Department assigned to the command of "the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief." During that time he employed himself in strengthening the fortifications of Corinth and repairing the railroads between that place and Columbus. General Buell was detached on the 10th of June, and sent to Chattanooga to oppose Bragg; for the Confederates, encouraged by the success which had attended their arms in the East, were making superhuman efforts, not only with the view of marching upon Washington, but for the purpose, also, of recovering what they had lost in Tennessee and Kentucky. Should Bragg succeed in moving
along the west flank of the Cumberland Mountains and in capturing Louisville, he would undo all that Halleck had done in his southward march along the Tennessee. In order to strengthen Buell, and so enable him to countercheck Bragg, the Shiloh army was robbed of some of its ablest and most experienced soldiers. On the departure of Halleck for Washington, General Grant succeeded to the chief command of his old army; but, from the causes above mentioned, its ranks were considerably thinned.

When Grant assumed the command, General Pope had been ordered to Virginia, and General Rosecranz had taken charge of that leader’s forces under Grant. Rosecranz’s division was known as the army of the Mississippi, and was charged with the occupation of Northern Mississippi and Alabama, in the vicinity of Corinth and eastward to Tuscumbia. The entire army under Grant was stationed from Memphis to Bridgeport, Tennessee, along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. His headquarters were at Jackson, Tennessee, where the Central Mississippi Railroad unites with the Mobile and Ohio. In consequence of the low water of the Tennessee, it was necessary for him to hold the railroads from Corinth and Bolivar north to Columbus.

In Grant’s immediate front lay the Confederates, in considerable force, under Price and VanDorn. Becoming aware of the fact that Grant’s army had been greatly weakened by the transfer of troops to Buell, these officers moved their armies toward the Tennessee River at the beginning of September. Of this forward movement General Grant was fully aware; but with a caution which was fully justified by the result, he refrained from any precipitate action, his attention being mainly devoted to ascertain the plans of his opponents. It was evidently the object of the Confederate generals to get possession of Corinth, the key to the military possession of Tennessee. This in their hands, they could render effective aid to Bragg; they might even resume possession of their lost territory, and bring Kentucky and Tennessee once more within the limits of the Confederacy. There can be little doubt that Bragg expected Price and VanDorn to follow him; and there is every reason to believe that these two officers felt confident of their ability to measure swords with Grant and Rosecranz. They hoped, however, that Grant would be tempted to abandon Corinth; in this showing that they shared the feeling which was commonly entertained at Richmond, that Bragg’s march on Louisville would compel the National commander to release his hold on the Mississippi. They did not know their man. Grant’s character, in fact, was not yet fully understood.

Of the approach of the enemy, and of two unsuccessful raids made by a cavalry force under General Armstrong, Grant duly informed Rosecranz, who was at the time at Tuscumbia. Rosecranz hastened to Iuka, a sweet village on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, in Tishamingo County, Mississippi, noted for its mineral springs and
the beauty of its surroundings. At Iuka there was collected a large amount of stores. Leaving the place in charge of Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the Eighth Wisconsin, with orders to remove the property to Corinth or destroy it, Rosecranz hurried westward, with Stanley's division, to Clear Creek, some seven miles east of Corinth, and there en-

**Sep. 1.** camped. On the 1st of September, Price, with twelve thousand men, reached Jacinto, when the small National force stationed there retired and fled to Corinth. Tuscumbia and Iuka were in like manner abandoned; and Price, unresisted, established his headquarters at the latter place, taking possession of the National property which Murphy had failed to destroy.

The time had now come for Grant to act. He had watched the movements of the enemy with great earnestness. He had now divined their meaning. He had also found his opportunity. What the Confederate leaders intended was now clear. Price wished so to engage the attention of Grant as to tempt him to draw his forces out of Corinth. VanDorn, meanwhile, was to be ready to spring upon the abandoned or poorly garrisoned stronghold, and secure it for the Confederacy. From his scouts Grant had learned that VanDorn could not reach Corinth for at least four days. Price, as we have seen, had established his headquarters at Iuka; and VanDorn was at Holly Springs. There was time, therefore, to punish Price, and to be back at Corinth ready to give VanDorn a warm reception. But the time was precious. Not an hour was to be lost. Every second delayed was a positive gain to the enemy. The instructions were promptly given. General Ord was directed to move on the left of the railroad, through Burnsville, to Iuka, taking care, of course, to leave garrisons at Corinth and other points that required protection. General Ross was ordered by telegraph to come at full speed from Bolivar on the same route, and, leaving a small rearguard at Burnsville, to join Ord with three thousand four hundred men. This force, six thousand five hundred in all, was to attack Price from the north. Rosecranz was ordered to send one division of Stanley's, with Mizner's cavalry, by way of Jacinto, to strike the enemy's flank, while Hamilton should move round by the Fulton road, to cut off his southward retreat or turn it into a rout. The force under Rosecranz amounted to nine thousand. This, with the three thousand under Ord and the three thousand four hundred under Ross, made the army of Grant in the field larger, by three thousand, than that of Price. The choice of position made by the Confederates more than compensated for the difference in actual strength. The combined movement of the National troops began at four o'clock in the morning of the 18th of September. That night, after having marched through a terrible rain-storm, the troops of Rosecranz bivouacked at Jacinto, about twenty miles south of Iuka.

On the following morning they pushed on in light marching order toward Iuka, with Mizner's cavalry.
At Barnett's Corners they encountered some Confederate outposts, driving them in, after a sharp skirmish. Early in the afternoon, when about two miles from Iuka, Hamilton's division, while moving cautiously and expecting every moment to hear the guns of Ord, came suddenly upon the enemy, in strong force and well posted on the side of a hill which flanked a deep ravine. Hamilton immediately formed line of battle. The ground was so broken, so tangled with thickets, so interlaced with creeks and ravines, that it was impossible to bring the troops into action in large bodies. The men formed themselves wherever the ground would permit them. The line was thus broken at frequent intervals; and the fighting seemed to be done by a number of small armies. The fighting, however, was severe. After much exertion, and in spite of a most destructive fire of grape, canister and shell from the enemy's guns, the Eleventh Ohio battery was put in position on the crest of the hill. This battery was supported by the Fifth Iowa, Colonel Matthias, and the Twenty-Sixth Missouri, Colonel Boomer; and commanding the road in front, it did excellent and effective work. Colonel Eddy, with the Forty-Eighth Indiana, was holding ground a little in front of the battery, where the fighting was most fierce, and where the Confederates were led by General Price in person; and although assistance was given him by the Fourth Minnesota, Captain LeGro, and by the Sixteenth Iowa, Colonel Chambers, he was driven again and again back upon the battery.

Around the battery of the Eleventh Ohio, the battle raged most fiercely. Three or four times the guns of this battery were taken and retaken. The commander of the battery, Lieutenant Sears, did noble work. At length Colonel Eddy fell mortally wounded; and his regiment being hurled back in disorder, the guns—every horse having been killed, seventy-two of the men and nearly all the officers either killed or wounded—were seized and carried off by the Confederates. While this struggle lasted, Stanley's division came up; but such was the nature of the ground that only the Eleventh Missouri could be pushed to the front. This regiment rendered most effective assistance, and helped to drive the Confederates back into the ravine. The fight lasted until nightfall; and, the Confederates having been compelled to take shelter in the hollow toward the village, darkness fell upon the combatants and made an end of the carnage.

The reader will observe that Ord was not present to take any part in the contest. Why was this? He had, it seems, spent the greater part of the day watching the movements of a Confederate force which appeared to be advancing in the direction of Corinth. This proving to be only a feint, he hastened to Burnsville, where he found Ross waiting with his three thousand men. Grant ordered him forward, with five thousand men, with directions to halt within four miles of Iuka until he should hear Rosecranz's guns. A high north wind, which blew all the afternoon, prevented him from hearing the sound of the cannon. It
was not until next morning that he heard the expected signal; but it was too late. When he reached Iuka, the enemy had disappeared. As illustrative of the difficulties of the situation, it deserves to be noted that, at half-past ten o'clock on the night of the 19th, Rosecranz sent a dispatch to General Grant, stating that he had been engaged for several hours, and had lost three pieces of artillery, and requesting the assistance and co-operation of the troops under Ord. This dispatch should have been in Grant's hands within two hours. It did not reach him until thirty-five minutes past eight the next morning. Mortified by the delay, and dreading the possible result, Grant wrote to Ord in the most urgent language. "Rosecranz," he said, "may find his hands full. Hurry up your troops—all possible." Happily, the character of Ord was well known, and there was no reason to suspect his bravery or his willingness to take part in the fight.

The Fulton road had not been covered, as Grant had ordered, and Price was able during the night to make good his escape. As soon as his flight was known, a pursuit was made; but Price had too much the start to be overtaken. Although Grant had reason to sympathize with Rosecranz, in consequence of the nonappearance of Ord, he was ill satisfied with the result of the fight. He had counted on the destruction or capture of Price's army. As it was, Iuka was a victory, and his plan had been amply justified. Price lost one of his best generals, Little, who was killed. At least a thousand of his men were made prisoners; the number of his killed and wounded was large; and he was unable to carry with him the captured guns. The National loss was about seven hundred and thirty men killed and wounded. On the 22d Grant withdrew his forces and returned to Corinth to prepare for the reception of VanDorn.

Corinth again comes prominently into the foreground. In May it was the theatre of great and stirring events which commanded the attention of both continents; and now, in October, it is to be the theatre of events even more momentous and greatly more enduring in their results. Price joined VanDorn at Ripley; and, little daunted at the failure of their plan to get hold of Corinth by stratagem, they made up their minds to take it by force. It was known that VanDorn was already approaching from the west; but it was not known what point he might first attack. It might be Jackson; it might be Bolivar; it might be Corinth—the latter most likely. Grant took all needful precaution to make his different points of strength secure, knowing that it would not be difficult to concentrate, once the enemy was encountered and his purpose fully understood. Rosecranz was marched back through Jacinto to Corinth, which he reached on the 26th. Ord was stationed at Bolivar; and Grant returned to his headquarters at Jackson. General Hurlbut was thrown out with his division towards Pocahontas. The United Confederate forces moved northward to Pocahontas, striking the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad about halfway between Corinth and Grand Junction. There they met the troops of Mansfield Lovell, whose acquaintance, the reader will remember, we made in the last chapter, when describing the capture of New Orleans. Thus strengthened, the Confederate army numbered about twenty-two thousand men, and was under the immediate command of General VanDorn, who ranked both Price and Lovell. On the night of the 2d of October, the united forces bivouacked at Chewalla, ten miles from Corinth. Early on the morning of the 3d, the Confederates came up in force; and Rosecranz had no longer any reason to doubt that the objective point aimed at by VanDorn was Corinth. Rosecranz disposed of his troops accordingly. Hamilton he placed on the right, Davis in the centre, and McKean on the left; while Colonel Oliver, with three regiments and a section of artillery, was stationed on the Chewalla road, beyond the old works of Beauregard. Mizner's cavalry was disposed in every direction around the town, watching the roads at Burnsville, Boneyard, Kossuth, and also in the front. On the Confederate side, the left, under Price, was on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, to the north of Corinth. VanDorn had charge of the centre, a little more to the west, on the Chewalla road; and the right was held by Lovell. It was evident that the attack was to be made upon the northwest side of Corinth—the point which VanDorn had been led to understand was the most vulnerable. He did not know that this defect in the original fortifications of Beauregard had been completely obviated, Grant having caused to be constructed here four powerful redoubts. Corinth, in truth, was a very different place in these first days of October to what it was when Beauregard abandoned it in May.

When the National forces, after the retreat of Beauregard, entered Corinth, the defenses, which had been constructed by the Confederate chief, were found to extend fifteen miles. To defend so extended a line would have required an enormous army. To obviate this difficulty, and in order to make the place defensible by a much smaller force, General Halleck had constructed an inner line of defenses. Grant, however, was not satisfied with these. Major F. E. Prime, the chief engineer of General Grant, under his direction, threw up a line of batteries on the north front, far inside of Halleck's line, and close to the town of Corinth, having an ensnailing fire upon the Bolivar and Chewalla roads, and a sweeping cross-fire upon all assailable parts of the entire front. On the extreme right were the old works of Beauregard; and from that point the chain of forts reached to the extreme left. On succeeding to the command of all the forces in the District of West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, Grant examined the defenses of Corinth, which were then being constructed under the superintendence of General Cullum, and expressed the opinion to General Halleck that they would be appropriate if there was an army of one hundred thousand men.
to defend them, but that they were of too great extent for the force at his disposal. Immediately upon General Halleck's departure for Washington, Prime's works were pushed forward with energy, and by the 25th of September, when Rosecranz took command, they were nearly completed. To Major Prime, under General Grant's orders, belongs the credit of laying out and constructing the fortifications against which the enemy was now about to hurl his masses with impetuous but unavailing valor.

The first pressure of the Confederates was felt by Colonel Oliver, who, as we have seen, was somewhat in advance on the Chewalla road. It was the vanguard of the Confederate army, under Mansfield Lovell. Lovell pushes his men forward with such energy that Oliver finds his position one of considerable difficulty. Hard pressed, he is joined by General McArthur, who in turn finds himself overmatched and in danger of being outflanked. McArthur is strengthened by four regiments from McKean's division. In spite of this assistance, McArthur is pushed back, as Oliver had been before him. The battle now becomes general. Davis is hard pressed; and, an interval appearing between him and McArthur, the Confederates make a desperate rush to fill up the gap. The onslaught was tremendous. Davis, to save his flank, was compelled to retire a thousand yards, and in so doing lost two guns. It was evident that the Confederates were in earnest, and that they meant to capture Corinth. New dispositions were therefore made of the National troops, bringing them nearer the town. These were being carried out when the darkness ended the conflict. The struggle had been severe; and not a few brave men on the National side had fallen. General Oglesby was severely wounded; and General Hackelman was killed. It was not without reason that VanDorn was jubilant. He had pressed the National army back with comparative ease. When night fell, he had enveloped Rosecranz's front. If he telegraphed to Richmond, announcing a victory, he was only stating what was a fact. Perhaps he was too jubilant, and too confident that Corinth would be his before the rising of the sun on the following morning; but this was because he was ignorant of the strength of the works behind which the National forces were able to entrench themselves.

By the break of day on the morning of the 4th of October, the battle was resumed. The Confederate line was closed up within a thousand yards of the outer works which guarded the town. The night had not been spent by them in slumber; for it was observed that they had thrown up several batteries in front of the National line. Besides VanDorn, Price, and Lovell, there were present on the Confederate side Generals Villepigue, Rust, Maury and L. Hebert; and the troops were of the best possible material. The Nationals had been equally on the alert. All the batteries around the town were well manned; and a new one, called Fort Richardson, and mounting five guns, had been constructed by the sappers and miners during the dark hours.
of the night. The ground which lay between the combatants was of a varied, irregular character. Hill and swampy land alternated; and the whole was covered by forest trees and brushwood. On the north and west there were fields interspersing the woods; in front of the right centre, a swamp; and in front of the left centre, impracticable hills. The National left, held by Stanley's division, was protected by Battery Robinett on the left and Battery Williams on the right. The centre was on a slight ridge, just north of the houses of Corinth, and consisted of Davies' division, slightly retired, with sharp-shooters in front, and having Battery Powell on the right. Hamilton's division was on the right, with Dillon's battery, advanced beyond Davies, and having two regiments in rear of his left.

The first shot was fired from one of the newly erected Confederate batteries, the one most in advance, and distant only from Battery Robinett some two hundred yards. This was the opening of the fight. The shells fell in the streets of Corinth, producing the wildest consternation among the inhabitants. For a time this battery was unanswered. It was not until daylight when Captain Williams, of Battery Williams, opened his 20-pounder Parrott guns upon it, silencing it in three minutes. Clearly it was the intention of the Confederate commander to attract the attention of the Nationals by this cannonading; and, by keeping them employed in this direction, to give Lovell an opportunity to storm the works on their left. The silencing of this advanced battery necessitated a change of plan. There was, however, no delay. Shortly after nine o'clock, Price came down on Rosecranz's centre with tremendous force. Moving in heavy masses, and marching rapidly along the Bolivar road, the Confederates came up in wedge-like form, and fell fiercely upon Davies and Fort Powell. Never was advancing column more warmly received. The road was swept by a direct, cross and enfilading fire. As the column advanced, it was literally torn through and through. At each successive volley, huge gaps appeared in the ranks. The men were mowed down like grass. There had been no such destruction of human life since the commencement of the war. It put into the shade the massacre at Ball's Bluff and the Valley of the Shadow of Death at Pittsburg Landing. Undismayed by this storm of grape and canister, which covered the ground with the bodies of their comrades, the Confederates pressed gallantly on. An eye-witness of this attack has told us that they "came up bending their necks downward, and with their faces averted, like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail." Are they to win the day? Davies' division yields; and there is a temporary panic. Onward push the brave Confederates. They capture Fort Powell; and, in spite of the guns of Fort Richardson, they penetrate to the public square and make themselves masters of the headquarters of Rosecranz. In a better cause, such bravery ought to have been rewarded with victory. As it was, the triumph was short-lived. Rosecranz, see-
ing the panic which had seized Davies' men, rushed into the midst of the wa- 
pering battalions; and, what with en- 
treaty and threats and the flat of his sabre, he succeeded in restoring order. 
"The ragged head of the column" which had forced its way into the town, was assailed by a section of Immel's battery, supported by the Tenth Ohio and the Fifth Minnesota, and driven to- 
ward the forest. Fort Powell was re- 
taken by a splendid charge of the Fifty- 
Sixth Illinois. Meanwhile, the guns of 
Hamilton, who had fallen back with 
Davies, being in full command of the 
avenues of advance and retreat, were 
spreading death and destruction in the 
Confederate ranks. What for a mo- 
moment seemed a victory was now con- 
verted into a rout. Price's men were 
driven back at all points. In the wild- 
est confusion, they fled to the shelter of 
the woods, the victorious Nationals 
closely pursuing. Price's attack thus 
proved a complete failure.

The attack on the left was conducted 
by VanDorn in person. It was intended 
that the attack on the right and that on 
the left should be made at the same 
moment. VanDorn, however, was de- 
layed by the difficulties of the ground; 
and Price had been engaged some twen- 
ty minutes before he was able to bring 
his men into action. Arranging his 
regiments in four columns, and placing 
his heavy artillery in the rear, VanDorn 
marched forward under the fire of the 
guns of the two forts, Robinett and 
Williams. From the moment they came 
in sight, they were mowed and torn and 
shattered by grape and shell and canis- 
ter. On, however, they moved, with 
an audacity which compelled the ad- 
miration of the National troops. Now 
were witnessed those "gorgeous pyro- 
technics," of which Rosecranz speaks in 
his official despatch, and the description 
of which he leaves "to pens dipped in 
poetic ink." Never in the history of 
warlike movements was there exhibited 
cooler determination or greater bravery 
on the part of the rank and file. On 
they move, in spite of the tempest of 
iron. It seems as if nothing will hinder 
them. They are now within fifty yards 
of Fort Robinett. Suddenly the Ohio 
brigade, which has been lying flat, rises 
at a signal and pours so murderous a 
fire upon the advancing columns that 
they stagger, break, and fall back into 
the woods. The battle, however, is not 
yet ended. The Confederates re-form; 
and again, as if convinced that a more 
daring effort will give them the victory, 
they come up gallantly to the charge, 
led by Colonel Rogers, of the Second 
Texas. This time they succeed in reach- 
ing the ditch. Rogers, revolver in hand, 
has leaped the ditch and scaled the par- 
apet. At this moment the Ohio bri- 
gade, again springing up, pours its mur- 
derous volleys upon the assailants. The 
effect was terrific. Rogers, with five 
equally brave companions, falls inside 
the fort. The word "charge" is given 
by the National brigade commander: 
Taken up and repeated by the men, 
it rings loud above the din of battle; 
and the Eleventh Missouri and the 
Twenty-Seventh Ohio rush bounding 
over the parapet, and, after a severe 
hand to hand fight with the assailants,
BATTLE OF THE HATCHIE.

chase "their broken fragments back to the woods." By noon the battle was ended. It was, beyond all question, one of the bloodiest contests since the commencement of the war. On both sides the greatest bravery was exhibited; and although the Nationals were victorious, they had little cause to disesteem the prowess of their opponents.

On the morning of the 5th, the men having been allowed to rest for the night, the pursuit of the Confederate army was begun. It was continued for forty miles by the infantry, and for sixty miles by the cavalry. During the course of that day, a severe engagement took place between a body of the Nationals and a detachment of Confederates who had been sent to guard the crossing of the Hatchie. In this engagement, which is known as the battle of the Hatchie, the Confederates had a largely superior force; but they were broken in spirit, battle-worn and weary, and made, in consequence, but a poor resistance. Driven back across the river toward Corinth, they were compelled to make a wide circuit, and recross the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, six miles above. In their retreat they left behind them two guns; and three hundred of their men were made prisoners. The glory of this victory must be divided between Hurlbut and Ord, who in succession held the chief command. In the course of the struggle Ord was severely wounded, and Hurlbut resumed the command, which he had relinquished in the early part of the day, on the arrival of his superior. At Ripley, whither the great body of the National army had pursued the retreating Confederates, the pursuit was discontinued, Grant deeming it advisable not to advance further for the present. Rosecranz was justly proud of the victory which he had won; and it was only a just reward for the services which he had rendered at Iuka and Corinth, when, a few days after his return, he was promoted to the chief command of the army of the Ohio, now called the army of the Cumberland, thus superseding Buell. In an order issued to his troops on the 24th of October, Rosecranz said: "The enemy numbered, according to their own authorities, nearly 40,000 men—almost double your own numbers. You fought them in the position we desired on the 3d, punishing them terribly; and on the 4th, in three hours after the infantry entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried one thousand four hundred and twenty-four officers and men. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed five thousand. You took two thousand two hundred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom were one hundred and thirty-seven field officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thirteen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured three thousand three hundred and fifty stand of small arms, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force.
with infantry, and sixty miles with cavalry.”

The entire National loss, including, of course, Iuka and Corinth, was 315 killed, 1812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing.

General Grant, although he had some reason to complain that the army of VanDorn had not been completely destroyed, had just cause to be gratified with these fresh successes. His plans had worked admirably. His calculations had been perfect. It was a piece of great daring, and, in other hands, would have implied tremendous risks, to march first on Iuka to whip Price, and then to find time to return to Corinth to demolish VanDorn. His success must have strengthened his faith in his own judgment. It certainly convinced the authorities at Washington and the people at large that in Grant the National cause had found a defender whose ability was equal to his daring, and whose judgment was thoroughly to be trusted. His abilities did not find full scope, nor did he get credit for what he actually accomplished, so long as Halleck held the chief command. Now that he was free to act on his own responsibility, the true character of the man revealed itself; and it began to be seen that it was to General Grant, more than to any other man, that the nation was indebted for that series of brilliant victories which, begun at Forts Henry and Donelson, had swept the Confederates out of Kentucky and Tennessee. Too much praise can hardly be bestowed on General Rosecranz; nor can it be denied that Ord did well according to his limited opportunity. Price and VanDorn revealed all the qualities of brave and dashing generalship; but there was a visible absence from the management of the Confederate troops of that cool and calculating head which directed the movements of the Nationals.

By a general order of the 16th of October, the department of which General Grant had command was largely extended and named the Department of the Tennessee, with the headquarters at Jackson. The Confederates having been again repulsed, and the course so far cleared, Grant began to make vigorous preparations for the carrying out of the original intention of the campaign inaugurated at Donelson, but brought into temporary abeyance by the abstraction of so many of his troops. Vicksburg remained the chief obstacle to the free navigation of the Mississippi; and to the reduction of Vicksburg all the energies of Grant were now directed.
CHAPTER XII.

The Army of the Ohio.—Buell Sent to Chattanooga.—Vicksburg.—Delay in Marching on.—The Reason.—Confederate Boldness.—The Invasion of Maryland and Kentucky.—General Bragg.—Kirby Smith.—Cumberland Gap.—Smith's Raid through Kentucky.—Excitement in Ohio.—The Importance of Chattanooga.—The Race for Chattanooga.—Bragg Wins.—Bragg's Army.—Buell Follows Bragg.—Intercepted Despatches.—Buell First at Louisville.—Reinforcements from Grant.—Buell's Blunder.—Believed of His Command.—The Order Recalled.—Bragg's Proclamation.—The Confederate Committee on Foreign Affairs.—A Bribe to the Northwest.—Attempt to Inaugurate a Confederate Government in Kentucky.—A Political Failure but a Successful Raid.—Bragg's Retreat with His Booty.—Buell Pursues.—Concentration at Perryville.—Scarcity of Water.—Preparing for Battle.—Bragg Preparing to Retreat.—He Resolves to give Battle.—The Battle of Perryville Commenced.—Severe Fighting.—Colonel McCook Sorely Pressed.—Reinforced.—The Confederates Pressed Back into the Woods.—Major-General McCook Comes Up.—He Takes Position.—Advance of Rousseau.—Chaplin's Creek.—A Commanding Position.—General McCook Surprised.—A Terrific Blow Deal by the Confederates.—Death of Jackson.—The Nationals Driven Back.—Terrill Mortally Wounded.—Rousseau also Falls Back.—Mitchell and Sheridan.—Sheridan's Opportunity.—Terrific Slaughter.—Reinforcements Wanted.—Crittenden Ordered Forward.—The Battle of Perryville Ended.—Retreat of Bragg.—Bragg and Buell both Blamed.—Buell Removed.—Rosecranz takes His Place.—His Promptitude.—Preparations for another Struggle.—Murfreesboro'.—Rejoicings at Bragg's Headquarters.—Bragg Over-Confident.—Trying to Annoy Grant.—Rosecranz Moves Southward.—The Battle-Ground.—Stone River.—The Two Armies in Position.—Bragg's Army the Stronger.—Rosecranz's Plan of Attack.—Bragg's Plan.—The Battle Began.—A Terrific Onslaught.—A Temporary Defeat.—Plan of Battle Changed.—Critical Position of Sheridan.—Terrible Loss of Life.—Sheridan Exhausted.—Negley and Thomas.—The Battle all but Lost.—Hazen and His Brigade.—Rosecranz's new Arrangements Completed.—A Tempest of "Double-Shotted Iron Fire."—The Tide of Battle Turned.—Stubbornness of the Confederates.—Rosecranz in the Front.—"Forward Now!"—Darkness.—A Drawn Battle.—Burying the Dead.—The Battle Resumed on the Third of January.—The Confederates Driven Back.—Terrible Havoc.—Rosecranz in Murfreesboro'.—A Great National Victory.—Rosecranz Complimented.

On the 10th of June, as we have seen in a previous chapter, General Buell, at the head of his old army—the army of the Ohio—was ordered by General Halleck to move towards Chattanooga. This was almost immediately after the retirement of Beauregard from Corinth and the occupation of the same by the National troops.

What was it that rendered necessary this breaking up of the army of the West at this particular juncture? In a space of time which hardly justified the result, that army had marched from Henry to Donelson, from Donelson to Shiloh, from Shiloh to Corinth, had opened the Mississippi as far south as Memphis, and had swept the Confederates out of Kentucky and Tennessee. Farragut had already pushed his way beyond New Orleans; and that city had been restored to the Union. At the time that the victorious army was divided, and Buell with his forces was sent towards Chattanooga, it seemed to be the plain duty of Halleck to move southward and capture Vicksburg, the one remaining barrier of any consequence to the free and unrestricted navigation of the great river from St. Louis to the sea. Moreover, the capture of Vicksburg formed part of that grand
plan which was inaugurated at Forts Henry and Donelson. There must have been good and substantial reasons why this plan was not followed out—why what seemed a plain duty was not performed. What were those reasons?

To answer this question, it will be necessary for us to take a brief retrospect of the situation. It deserves here to be noted that the successes of Hal-leck, Grant and Buell in the West had been more than counterbalanced by the victories of the Confederates in the East. The government at Richmond had made tremendous efforts to strengthen their armies; and conscription had successfully accomplished their purpose. McClellan, as we shall see more fully in the next chapter, had been driven back from Richmond; and his peninsula campaign had totally failed. Nothing daunted by the succession of defeats sustained in the West, it was resolved by the Confederate authorities to give effect to the clamor of the South, "to carry war into the enemy's country, and relieve us from its intolerable burdens." With this end in view, Lee was directed to move into Maryland; and Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard in command, was ordered into Kentucky. It was believed that these slave-holding States would be easily reclaimed, and that from them it would be easy to invade the North, and wring peace from it in one or other of the great cities. Of Lee and his movements we shall have occasion to treat in a subsequent chapter. Our attention for the present must be given to Bragg, and to the events which were taking place.

or were about to take place, in Kentucky.

The southward movement of the National forces, and their concentration for a time at Shiloh and Corinth, had left Kentucky and Tennessee to a large extent unprotected. Taking advantage of this, Morgan, Forrest, and other guerilla chiefs, had overrun those States, producing terror and dismay among the inhabitants and working terrible destruction. The successful raids by those bands greatly encouraged the Confederates in their determination to make bold and aggressive efforts in the North; and General Kirby Smith, an officer who, the reader will remember, played an important part at the first battle of Bull Run, contrived to unite those irregular bands, and make use of their experience in furthering the plans of the Confederate government. At the head of these men, as the advanced guard of Bragg's army, this general marched through Rogers' and Big Creek Gaps of the Cumberland Mountains into Kentucky. At Richmond, in this State, he encountered a body of Unionists under the command of Major-General Nelson, and defeated them, two thousand of the Union troops being captured and two hundred killed and wounded. Among the latter was General Nelson himself. After their success at Richmond, they found little opposition at Lexington, at Frankfort, at Shelbyville, at Paris, and at Cynthiana. It was not long until they were on the banks of the Ohio. The people of that State became wild with excitement; and the citizens of Cincinnati made vigorous efforts to be in readiness
for the daring invader. When within one day's march of the city, Kirby Smith, Sep. 12, on the 12th of September, fell back on Frankfort and Lexington. Later, having been reinforced by troops from Southwestern Virginia, under Humphrey Marshall, he manœuvred so as to accomplish his original purpose, which was to effect a junction with Bragg.

Chattanooga, the citadel of the mountain fastness of Tennessee, and the point d'appui for operations towards Atlanta, was justly regarded by Halleck as a strategic point of the first importance. Chattanooga held by a strong National force, it would be impossible for the Confederates to make any very effective inroad into Kentucky. But the importance of Chattanooga for certain purposes was as well known to Bragg as it was to Buell. It was the object of the Nationals to possess themselves of Chattanooga, and so prevent such invasion. It was the object of the Confederates to enter Kentucky in force before Chattanooga was in the hands of their enemies. Hence Chattanooga was so far the objective point of both commanders. The National commander desired to take advantage of the concentration of the Confederate forces on the Mississippi line by seizing Chattanooga; the Confederate commander desired to take advantage of the concentration of National forces on the same line by an advance towards the Ohio. On June 11, the 11th of June Buell commenced his march from Corinth. Following the route prescribed by Halleck, which was the direct route through North Alabama, by way of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the divisions moved forward in close succession by marches of fourteen miles a day. The distance from Corinth to Chattanooga, by this railroad is two hundred miles. When joined by Mitchell, whom he had left behind him to guard Middle Tennessee, and General Morgan, who had seized Cumberland Gap, Buell had under him some forty thousand men. Cautionly and carefully providing for all contingencies by the way, he had by the end of July thrown forward two divisions, under McCook and Crittenden, to Battle Creek, some twenty-five miles from Chattanooga; and all preparations for an advance on the latter place were complete.

Bragg, however, had reached Chattanooga in person on the 28th of July July; his troops were already well in hand; and, what with the so-called army of East Tennessee, numbering thirteen thousand men, and which, under the command of Kirby Smith, covered his right at Knoxville, he could count on an effective force, for immediate use, of fifty thousand men. Bragg's army was organized in three corps—one under Kirby Smith, as we have seen, at Knoxville, and the two others, under Hardee and Polk, at Chattanooga. With the two latter, Bragg moved northward, directing his march towards the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Forestalled in the occupation of Chattanooga, Buell was dependent upon Louisville for supplies, and hence had to guard nearly three hundred miles of railroad. As Bragg marched north-
ward, he had no choice but execute a parallel march and fall back upon Nashville. Bragg, who had struck the rail-
road at Mumfordsville, moved thence to Frankfort, where he was joined by Smith. Buell had by this time dis-
covered, through some intercepted despatches, that their true object was Louisville, and not Nashville, as their movements seemed to indicate. Leaving a garrison at the latter place, he hurried on to Louisville, which he reached on the 25th of September. Bragg's movements had been slow. It had taken him six weeks to march from Chattanooga to Frankfort. Slow, however, as his march had been, he would certainly have been first at Louisville, had it not been for a burnt bridge near Bardstown, which obstructed his progress and caused considerable retention. As it was, Louisville was secure. The arrival of Buell was an immense relief to the panic-stricken citizens, who had become aware of the near approach of the Confederates.

At Louisville Buell received large reinforcements. Some of these were in the shape of new levies; but not a few of them were veterans, sent up the Mississippi and the Ohio from the army of Grant. His entire force, after he had been joined by General Nelson, was estimated at about one hundred thousand men. The National force thus greatly outnumbered the Confederate force, which, including that of Kirby Smith, did not exceed sixty-five thousand men. Buell had conducted the retrograde movement from the Tennessee to the Ohio with marked ability; he was entitled to no little praise for anticipating Bragg at Louisville; but he had made a grand mistake in not being first at Chattanooga. He had allowed the enemy to invade Kentucky by not being forward in time at that strategic point; and considering the ir-
ritable mood in which the Northern mind was at the moment, it is not won-
derful that the cry of incapacity was loudly raised, and a demand made for his recall. This feeling being yielded to, Buell, just as he had got his army in order and was about to march from Louisville against the Confederates, received from Washington an order relieving him of his command, and appointing General G. H. Thomas to act in his stead. Thomas, who had the highest respect for the military talent of Buell, refused to supersede him. At Thomas's urgent request, the order was revoked and Buell remained in command.

Bragg, meanwhile, had commenced to carry out his instructions in regard to the organization of Kentucky on Confederate principles. On the 18th of September he issued a proclamation from Glasgow, declaring that the Confederate army had come as the liberators of Kentuckians "from the tyranny of a despotic ruler, and not as conquerors or despoilers." "Your gallant Buckner," he said, "leads; Marshall is on the right; while Breckinridge, dear to us as you, is advancing with Kentucky's radiant sons to receive the honor and applause due to their heroism." He told them that he must have supplies for his army, but that they would be fairly paid for. "Kentuck
ians," he concluded, "we have come with joyful hopes. Let us not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer Federal rule, show it by your frowns, and we shall retire whence we came. If you choose rather to come within the folds of our brotherhood, then cheer us by the smiles of your women, and lend your willing hands to secure yourselves in your heritage of liberty. Women of Kentucky! your persecutions and heroic bearing have reached our ears. Banish henceforth forever from your minds the fear of loathsome prisons or insulting visitations. Let your enthusiasm have free rein. Buckle on the armor of your kindred, your husbands, sons and brothers, and scoff to shame him who would prove recreant in his duty to you, his country, and his God." Bragg was giving expression to sentiments then common at Richmond. It was evidently his opinion that the dominant feeling was in favor of the South, and that the Kentuckians would gladly welcome his appearance as that of a friend and liberator. It would be absurd to deny that there were among these people many who sympathized warmly with the Southern cause. But they were not the majority, nor were they as a rule the better class of citizens. Kentucky had fairly and squarely cast in her lot with the North, and she was not to be shaken in her purpose or tempted from the path of duty. At this juncture the Confederates, elated with their successes in the East, began to indulge in the wildest day dreams. It was not Kentucky or Tennessee alone that would gladly join and make common cause with the South. Why should not the Northwestern States do the same? Duty and interest alike pointed them in that direction. On the same day that Bragg issued his proclamation, the Committee on Foreign Affairs made a report to the Confederate Congress with respect to the propriety of a proclamation with a view to influence the States of the Northwest. In the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, the Northwest and the South had a common interest. As a reward for the alliance of these Northwestern States, the Richmond authorities were willing to cede the free navigation of the Mississippi and to open to them the markets of the South. The Northwest, however, equally with Kentucky and Tennessee, had decided upon their course of duty, and had such a proclamation been issued, the sturdy men of the West might have been justified in reminding their generous friends that the ownership of the Mississippi and its tributaries was no longer an open question. Still further, in carrying out the instructions he had received, Bragg, while with Kirby Smith, at Frankfort, inaugurated on the 4th of October, a provisional governor of the State of Kentucky.

The Confederate commander, however, had made good use of his time and opportunities for other purposes as well. His guerrillas and foraging parties had scoured the country round and round, and had carried off thousands of hogs and cattle, with bacon and bread.
stuffs of every kind. In every town the shops and stores were forced open, and whatever was wanted was taken and paid for in worthless Confederate money. A little later than this, when the Confederates were driven out of the State, the boast was made by the Richmond newspapers that “the wagon train of supplies brought out of Kentucky by Kirby Smith was forty miles long. It brought a million yards of jeans, with a large amount of clothing, boots and shoes, and two hundred wagon-loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of pork, fifteen hundred mules and horses, eight thousand beeves, and a large lot of swine.” It ought to be added here that his tender feelings towards the unfortunate Kentuckians did not prevent him from enforcing the Confederate conscription act wherever his influence extended, and thus largely increasing the effective strength of his army.

Anticipated in the occupation of Louisville, and feeling convinced that he was already defeated in the main purpose of his campaign, Bragg prepared to retreat and to protect the large booty which he had collected. It was certainly the next most important thing for him to do in the premises. He moved backward with great deliberation, his object being to cover his supply trains until they got a good start toward Tennessee.

Oct. 1. On the 1st of October, Buell, his army reinforced and reorganized, moved out of Louisville in pursuit of his antagonist. His army was arranged in three corps, commanded respectively by Generals Gilbert, Crittenden, and McCook. General George H. Thomas, who was Buell’s second in command, had charge of the right wing. It was known that Bragg was at Bardstown. Towards Bardstown, therefore, Buell directed his divisions. Crittenden, who was in immediate command of the right, marched by way of Shepherdsville. The left moved in a line nearer to Frankfort. The other columns, marching by different routes, fell respectively into the roads leading from Mt. Washington, Fairfield and Bloomfield to Bardstown. Arrived at Bardstown, it was found that Bragg had retired some eight hours before, and that he had moved in a direction which suggested that he would probably concentrate at Harrodsburg. After leaving Bardstown, Buell learned that the force of Kirby Smith had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky River, and that the enemy was moving to concentrate either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. The centre, under Gilbert, was accordingly ordered to march on Perryville, where it arrived late on the afternoon of the 7th, finding the Confederates apparently assembled in strength. Buell and his staff moved with this corps. “The advanced guard,” General Buell tells us in his report, “under Captain Gay, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported towards evening by two regiments of infantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy’s rearguard to within two miles of the town, against a somewhat stubborn opposition.” The National army had suffered greatly, for the three previous days, from the scarcity of water. In the bed of Doctor’s Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, about two and a
half miles from Perryville, some pools of water were found; and the thirty-sixth brigade, from General Sheridan's division, under Colonel D. McCook, was ordered to seize and hold a commanding position which covered these pools. The order was promptly executed; and a supply of bad water, although the best that could be had, was obtained for the wants of the army. Determined to offer battle early on the following morning, Buell sent orders to General McCook and General Crittenden to march at three o'clock in the morning, so as to close up on his right and left, and, if possible, surround the foe.

McCook did not receive his orders until half-past two o'clock, and he marched at five. Crittenden, failing to find water, had gone off his path some six or seven miles; and he was late, in consequence, several hours. Bragg had already seen the peril of his position, and had commenced to retreat. Perceiving, however, that the centre under Gilbert and McCook had out-marched Crittenden, he resolved to give battle at once. It was, at least, worth making the effort. If he could defeat Gilbert and McCook before the arrival of Crittenden, he might be able either to make good his retreat in the interval, or failing that, he could fall upon him in turn. Bragg's army was arranged in five divisions—two under Hardee, and one each under Anderson, Cheatham, and Buckner—the whole being under the immediate command of Major-General Polk. Smith had already retreated further to the west, carrying with him the "provisional government," in the person of Governor Hawes.

Early in the morning of the 8th, the fight, which had been interrupted by the darkness of the night preceding, was resumed. Colonel McCook, as we have seen, had taken a position on a height which commanded Doctor's Creek; and this secured a supply of water, such as it was, for the National army. At the break of day an attempt was made to draw Colonel McCook from his position. For a time he had to bear the whole weight of the Confederate attack alone. When being somewhat pressed, the Second Missouri, a regiment which did memorable service at Pea Ridge, with the Fifteenth Missouri as a support, came to his aid, and the Confederates were compelled to retire into the woods. While retiring, they were heavily smitten on the flank by the Second Minnesota battery.

Buell, who, as we have seen, was with the central corps, under the immediate charge of General Gilbert, dreaded an attack on that body, all the more so that neither McCook nor Crittenden had yet arrived. The engagement with Colonel McCook's brigade at Doctor's Creek had, to all appearance, sufficiently engaged the attention of the Confederate chief; and between ten and eleven o'clock, when Colonel McCook had repelled the enemy and firmly established himself, the first corps, under Major-General McCook, came up on the Maxville road. After the arrival of this corps, no formidable attack was apprehended. McCook was ordered to get promptly into position on the left of
the centre corps, and to make a reconnoissance to his front and left. The reconnoissance was still being continued by Captain Gay toward his front and right, and sharp firing with artillery was going on.

The head of McCook's column reached the point designated shortly after ten o'clock. It was about three and a half miles from Perryville, his line being abreast of Gilbert's corps. Only two of McCook's three divisions—those, namely, of Rousseau and Jackson—were present, that of Sill having been sent toward Frankfort. Rousseau advanced with his cavalry, and secured his ground, and the batteries of Loomis and Simonson were placed in commanding positions. General Jackson's two brigades were stationed on high ground to the right of the Maxville and Perryville road, and his instructions were to hold them there in column so that they might be easily moved in whatever direction the occasion might require. McCook was under orders to report to General Buell in person. Having made these dispositions, he rode off to Buell's head-quarters. He was not long absent; but when he returned he found that the Confederates had put in position three batteries, and that an ineffectual artillery duel was going on between them and the batteries of Loomis and Simonson. Seeing no infantry near, he gave instructions to the commanders of these last mentioned batteries to discontinue firing and to husband their ammunition. Water was extremely scarce, and his men were suffering terribly in consequence. Following out instructions received from Buell, McCook proceeded to make a reconnoissance toward Chaplin's Creek. Here he found high commanding ground, altogether a better position, and not far from the river. Having sent for Generals Jackson and Terrill, he showed them the water, marked their line of battle, and ordered a battery to be posted on this line, with strong supports. Terrill at the same time received instructions to advance a body of skirmishers cautiously down the slope of the hill to the water, as soon as his line was formed. Not apprehending any immediate danger at this point, General McCook now moved toward the right of his line. At this very moment the Confederate force was moving stealthily upon him. Cheatham's division had stolen up to Jackson's left, which was under the immediate command of General Terrill, and which consisted chiefly of raw troops. McCook had scarcely completed his general arrangements, when the enemy fell upon him like a thunderbolt. The Confederate general had made himself familiar with the position of his antagonist. McCook's right rested firmly on Gilbert's left; but his left was comparatively weak and altogether unprotected. It was on the left, therefore, that the Confederates fell with the greatest fury. Their charge was terrific; and their horrid yells filled the air. At the first volley Jackson was killed, a bullet or a fragment of a shell having hit him in the breast. Terrill, who showed great bravery, did everything that man could do to steady his troops; but, demoralized by the fall of Jackson, and
being vastly outnumbered, they broke and fled in the wildest confusion. Terrill himself fell mortally wounded. He died the same evening. McCook's left was thus driven back, and the Confederates fell with equal fury on Rousseau's division. Starkweather's brigade, aided by the batteries of Bush and Stone, made a gallant resistance, and held the enemy at bay for nearly three hours. It was found impossible, however, to repel the fierce and determined attack. Bush's battery had lost thirty-five horses; the ammunition of both infantry and artillery was all but exhausted; and Rousseau's left was compelled to fall back. On the Confederates pressed, Rousseau's centre and right, commanded respectively by Colonels L. A. Harris and W. H. Lytle, yielding in succession. In the struggle, Lytle was seriously wounded, and, believing his wound to be mortal, refused to allow himself to be carried from the field. Gilbert's left flank was now exposed, and Bragg was leading the attack in person. The situation had become critical in the extreme. The position here was held by R. P. Mitchell and Philip H. Sheridan. Sheridan had now a chance to show the metal of which he was made. He held the key of the National position, and he knew it. If he must relinquish the position, it will not be without a struggle. He had been more or less engaged all the forenoon, and had just repelled an assault on his front. Turning his guns upon the victorious Confederates, who had just thrown back Rousseau's right, he opened upon them a most terrific fire, which checked their advance; and while fighting valiantly and holding the enemy back, he was joined by Carlin's brigade, which Mitchell pushed forward to the support of his right. This force, charging at the double quick, broke the line of the Confederates and drove them back through Perryville, capturing two caissons, fifteen wagons of ammunition, with the guard, which consisted of three officers and one hundred and thirty-eight men. Meanwhile Colonel Gooding, who had been sent to the aid of McCook, had for over two hours been fighting with great persistence against a superior force. He lost one third of his men; and his horse having been shot under him, he was made prisoner. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon before General Buell became aware that a severe battle had been raging for hours. The fact was made known to him by General McCook's aide-de-camp, who came to him with a request for reinforcements. These were promptly sent. Orders were also sent to General Crittenden to hurry forward, and with all expedition possible, to send one division to strengthen the centre, and "to move with the rest of his corps energetically against the enemy's left flank." Such, however, was the distance from one flank of the army to the other—six miles—that before the orders could be delivered, and action taken, night came on and terminated the battle. Such was the battle of Perryville, or, as it is sometimes called, Chaplin's Hills.

All the necessary arrangements were made for resuming the contest early on the following morning. It was Buell's
expectation that the Confederate general would endeavor to hold his position. Orders, in consequence, were given to the commanders of corps to be prepared to attack at daylight. Gilbert and Crittenden were to move forward at six o'clock and attack the Confederates on their front and also on their left flank. In obedience to orders these commanders moved early in the morning; but Bragg, with his entire army, had fled. They retired first to Harrodsburg, where they were joined by Kirby Smith and General Withers; thence they hurried to Camp Dick Robinson; and from Camp Dick Robinson they hastened back to Chattanooga through Cumberland Gap. The retreat was conducted by General Polk, covered by the cavalry of Wheeler. At Harrodsburg they left behind them about twelve hundred sick and wounded. Buell pursued as far as London, and then returned. During the pursuit the Confederates were compelled to abandon at various points as much as twenty-five thousand barrels of pork. The Confederate loss in this engagement must have amounted to 2500. Buell's loss was 916 killed, 2943 wounded, 489 missing, and 10 guns. Eight of the captured guns were left behind.

The Confederates had been driven out of Kentucky; but they had retreated with scarcely any loss, and they had carried off immense booty. The main body of the National army, under General Thomas, was moved towards Nashville. Buell went to Louisville. He had shown but little generalship in this campaign. His movements had been singularly and inexplicably slow. If he had been afraid or unwilling to fight, he could hardly have acted otherwise. He blundered, first of all, when he allowed Bragg to reach Chattanooga before him. He blundered again when, having reached Louisville before his antagonist, and been reinforced, he did not strike the Confederates at once, and before Kirby Smith had time to retire with his booty. He blundered in his arrangements at Perryville, where he ought to have cut Bragg's army to pieces. He blundered worst of all when, after Perryville, he allowed the enemy to escape. It is not wonderful that his conduct gave great dissatisfaction at Washington, and that he was supplanted by General Rosecranz, who had covered himself with so much glory at Iuka and Corinth. Rosecranz took command on the 30th of October; and the army of the Ohio became, from that date, the army of the Cumberland.

The Confederate government was as little satisfied with Bragg, as the government at Washington was with Buell. His expedition had been a failure. He had, in reality, accomplished nothing. He had collected some valuable booty, it is true; but that was a small result from a campaign from which such great things were so confidently expected. He had gained no brilliant victory. He had failed to make any impression on the Northwest; and but few Kentuckians had voluntarily joined his army. On the contrary, his seizure of their property had done more to alienate the people of Kentucky from the Confederate
rate cause than anything which had hitherto happened. Bragg was not removed from his command, but he was ordered, almost as soon as he reached Chattanooga, to return and move again to the north.

On assuming the command of the army of the Cumberland, known also as the fourteenth army corps, Rosecranz found that the task he had undertaken, while it involved serious responsibilities, was beset with difficulties of no ordinary kind. The army was in a dilapidated condition. Its ranks had been thinned. The men had to be clothed and supplied with all the necessities for another campaign. This, however, was not all. The railroad between Louisville and Nashville was badly injured, and could not be used for transport; and, as was the case on the occasion of Bragg's former march northward, the country was overrun by Confederate raiders, who, well mounted, spread everywhere terror among the inhabitants, and otherwise worked infinite inconvenience. Rosecranz knew well the temper of the government and the people. Both were impatient to see his army in motion. Nothing could justify delay. Out of the war levy of six hundred thousand men called out by the government, he received reinforcements; and the work of reorganization went rapidly on. It was on Oct. 30, the 30th of October he assumed the command; and on the 7th of Nov. 1862, the advance corps of his army was at Nashville, one hundred and eighty-three miles distant. Nashville, which had been held by General Negley, and which for a time had been in great peril, had been relieved; and here Rosecranz established his headquarters. The work on the railroad was carried on with great energy; and by the 26th of November the connection was complete and the cars were running. From this date on to the 26th of December, Rosecranz tells us, "every effort was bent to complete the clothing of the army, to provide it with ammunition, and replenish the depot at Nashville with needful supplies, to insure us against want from the longest possible detention likely to occur by the breaking of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad; and to insure this work, the road was guarded by a heavy force posted at Gallatin." All this looked like business. It revealed a man of energy and activity, and presented Rosecranz in striking contrast with Buell.

Bragg evidently expected that Rosecranz would take up his winter quarters at Nashville; and so he prepared his own winter quarters at Murfreesboro. Possibly he hoped, as Rosecranz suggests, to make them at Nashville before the winter was ended. It was about the season of Christmas; and there was evidently a feeling of security in the ranks of the Confederates. The Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, was on a visit to Bragg at his private residence in the fine mansion of Major Manning. The occasion was celebrated with much festivity and rejoicing. There was a famous wedding. Morgan, the guerrilla chief, was married to the daughter of Mr. Charles Ready.
who had been a member of Congress in 1853. Davis was at the wedding. Most of the principal army officers were present. The ceremony was performed by General Polk, who put on the cassock for the occasion; and the merry party found a means of increasing their pleasure by dancing upon a floor carpeted with American flags.

During the time that Rosecranz was completing his arrangements, there occurred certain minor engagements, such as that at Lavergne and that at Hartsville, but on these we cannot afford to dwell. They were but preliminaries to the great struggle which was now impending. Bragg, over-confident, had sent a large cavalry force into West Tennessee to annoy Grant, and another large force into Kentucky to break up the railroad. Evidently he had not formed a proper judgment on the man who was eagerly watching his every movement. In the absence of these forces, and now that he had abundant supplies in Nashville, the National commander deemed the moment opportune to make a dash on his antagonist. Early in the morning of the 26th of December, and amid a heavy, chilling rain, the National army began its southward march. The Confederate outposts yielded as it advanced. It was not possible for them, so vigorous was the pressure of the National advance, to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesboro' turnpikes.

On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be attacked, had concentrated his army some two miles in front of Murfreesboro'. Stone River, which rises in the high lands south of Murfreesboro', flows towards the northwest, and passes that town about a mile to the west. A few miles above Nashville, it empties itself into the Cumberland. Bragg's army, some sixty-two thousand strong, was arranged in the following order. Four divisions — those of Withers, Cheatham, Cleburne, and McCown — were on the west side of the river, the line running slightly in a southwesterly direction. One division — that of Breckinridge — was on the east side of the river, and there held the approaches to the town. The National army, forty-three thousand strong, was arranged in a line as nearly as possible parallel to that of Bragg, the entire force being on the west side of the river. The line extended between three and four miles. Crittenden was on the left, with three divisions — those of Wood, VanCleve, and Palmer. Thomas was in the centre, with two divisions — those of Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve. McCook was on the right, with three divisions — those of Sheridan, Davis, and Johnson. The left wing touched the river; the right stretched a little beyond the Franklin road. Such was the disposition of the rival forces on the morning of the last day of the year 1862.

It was the intention of Rosecranz to attack with his left; and consequently he had concentrated two-thirds of his force on that wing. His plan was to throw his left and centre hurriedly on Breckinridge at daybreak, to drive him from his position, to wheel rapidly round and strike the Confederates in
THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK.

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decisive and natural. The plan was bold and daring, and well fitted to inspire sanguine hopes. On the east side of the river are commanding heights. These taken possession of and covered with artillery, the Nationals would be able to strike in reverse the works fronting the centre of their line; and it was expected that the artillery fire would so shake the Confederates that the rest of the plan would be easy of execution. While Thomas and Palmer were to open with skirmishing, and so engage the attention of the Confederate centre and left towards the river, VanCleve and Wood, of Crittenden's division, were to cross the river further to the north, fall upon Breckinridge, and carry out the plan as proposed. The necessity to cross the river was the one disadvantage which Rosecranz had to contend with. Meanwhile McCook, whose divisions, as we have seen, were on the right, was to maintain his position and hold the hostile left in check.

Singularly enough, Bragg had also resolved to take the offensive; and he, too, meant to deal the first effective blow with his strong left arm. There was thus on both sides a similar intention and a not dissimilar disposition of force. Both were strongest on the left wing; and, as a natural consequence, each was weakest at the point of attack. It was Bragg's plan to rest on Polk's right, as on a pivot, and, by a constant wheeling of his whole line towards the right, to force the National right and centre back upon Stone River, and so make himself master of the turnpike and the railroad to Nashville, their lines of communication in the rear. The plan was not less daring—not less striking—than that of Rosecranz. It was evident that two capable generals were confronting each other, that each had found in the other a foeman worthy of his steel, and that each was making the best of his position and of the means at his command. On the night of the 30th both armies lay on their arms.

On the following morning, before sunrise—a mild and pleasant morning for the season of the year—Dec. 31, the National movement began. VanCleve's division took the lead, as directed. Two of his brigades had made the passage in safety and without any interruption. Wood, with his division, was ready to follow. While thus crossing the stream with haste and high hopes, and while the movement was making satisfactory progress, suddenly there burst forth the roar of battle on the far-off right, and so violent was the shock that it was felt by the moving column on the extreme left. Emerging from a thick fog which had settled over the ground, his troops massed in overwhelming force, Bragg had fallen furiously upon Johnson's division, which was on the extreme National right; and so unexpected was the attack that two of its batteries were captured before a gun could be fired. It was a decisive blow. It came down like the crash of a thunderbolt. Johnson's division was instantly swept away. One of his bri-
gade commanders, Kirk, was severely wounded; another, Willick, had his horse killed under him, and was made prisoner; and a large number of his men were surrounded and made prisoners. Davis, whose division stood next, was assaulted in front and on his uncovered flank. The shock was irresistible. Spite of his bravery, he, too, was compelled to give way, with the loss of many guns. Sheridan’s division was next to that of Davis, and still to the right. On this the victorious Confederates fell with accumulated power, and with an energy and purpose increased and intensified with success. And now came the opportunity for a man who had in him the true military instinct. All was lost, if Sheridan could not prolong the resistance. But Sheridan again, as he had done before at Perryville, proved himself equal to the emergency and rose to the grandeur of the occasion.

Rosecranz had been slow to abandon his plan or stop his aggressive movement. It was not until he had received a second message from McCook that he comprehended the gravity of the situation. To the first call for help by that general, he returned for answer that he was to dispose his troops to the best advantage and hold his ground obstinately. “Tell him,” said Rosecranz, “to contest every inch of the ground. If he holds them, we will swing into Murfreesboro’ with our left and cut them off.” The second message, which informed him that the right wing was being driven, “a fact which was becoming apparent by the rapid movement of the noise of battle toward the north,” opened the eyes of the commander-in-chief; and while General Thomas was ordered to despatch Rousseau into the cedar brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan, and General Crittenden was ordered to suspend the movement across the river by VanCleve and Wood, Rosecranz began to feel and confess that his forward movement on the foe was already paralyzed, and that a change of plan was necessary. If he would save his right and defend his communications, he must withdraw his left—he must, in fact, establish a new line. Whether he could do this, depended much on Sheridan.

Sheridan’s position had become critical in the extreme. So, in truth, had that of the whole National army; for, if Sheridan had given way easily, the Confederates would have pressed upon both flank and rear, driven it toward the river and cut it off from its lines of communication. In consequence of the defeat and overthrow of Johnson and Davis, Sheridan’s division was completely uncovered on his right flank, and absolutely unprotected in front. On his front, therefore, he was attacked by the Confederate division of Withers, and on his right the victorious bands of McCown and Cleburne, flushed with success, rushed with tremendous fury. The first onslaught was made by Withers. The approach was made over an open cotton field. Sheridan had three batteries advantageously posted along his line; and as the Confederates came forward in column closed in mass several regiments deep, they were received
with a destructive fire. Severe as was this fire, it was powerless to check the forward march of the foe. On, steadily on, came the mighty mass, until within fifty yards of the edge of the timber in which lay Sheridan’s troops. Springing to their feet, the infantry poured such a shower of bullets in the faces of the Confederates that they were compelled to halt. Volley succeeded volley in ever-increasing power and destructiveness. It was a very tempest of iron. The Confederates wavered, broke, and fled. Sheridan’s men charged and drove them across the open field and behind their intrenchments. The tide of battle had now turned. It was not, however, without great loss that this partial victory was won. The young and chivalrous Sill, one of the most promising officers in the National army, was killed while leading the charge. By this time the divisions of McCown and Cleburne were on Sheridan’s right; and outflanking him, exposed him to attack in the rear. Sheridan was entitled to retire, on the ground that his flank was unprotected. But he did better. Retiring his right and reserve brigades, and charging with the left into the woods, he caused the Confederates to recoil, and thus found time to swing around so as to bring his line perpendicular to its former direction. He now faced south instead of east, and his line ran parallel to the Wilkinson turnpike. He was now in a better position to withstand his opponents. But he was opposed by mighty odds; and the divisions which had driven Johnson and Davis from the field overlapped his right by nearly their whole length. It was not possible for Sheridan to repel them; but he could hold them in check. To reach the Nashville road, they must put Sheridan out of the way; but to do this implied hard fighting and time; and time was salvation. Doubling in towards their right, the Confederates rushed upon him with all their might. But it was all to little purpose. His troops and his batteries gathered around him; there he stood like a rock in mid-ocean against which the tempestuous billows surge and foam and spend their fury in vain. An hour had now been saved. The Confederates crowded around him in increasing numbers. A change of front was again necessary. Pivoting, so to speak, on the right flank of Negley’s division, he wheeled round his line so as to face the west, and planted his batteries on the salient of his front. In his new position he covered Negley’s rear, and with that commander he was now forming a wedge-shaped mass. Here again he was savagely assailed. The full weight of the four divisions of Hardee and Polk was hurled against him and Negley. Thrice they came forward with impetuous fury, and thrice were they received with a fire so biting and so merciless that they staggered and fell back. Another hour had been gained—another precious hour for Rosecranz. But Sheridan had done his utmost. His ammunition was spent; and there were no means of obtaining a fresh supply, as, in the discomfiture of the right, the ammunition train had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Nor was this all. Sill, Roberts,
Shaeffer, his three brigade commanders, had been killed. Even he now must fall back. But he must do so in a manner worthy of the glorious resistance he has been able to make; and, if he has not powder, he has steel. Covered, therefore, with the bayonets of his reserve, he retired unconquered out of the cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. It was eleven o'clock when he went out of the fight. He had lost 1630 men; but with their heroic lives he had won three hours for Rosecrans, and turned the fortunes of the day. "Here's all that is left," he said sadly as he joined his chief.

After the retirement of Sheridan, the brunt of the battle fell upon Thomas. His command was chiefly in and near the cedar brakes. He had done his best, as we have seen, through Negley's division, to sustain Sheridan. Negley was now exposed to the attacks of the Confederates both in flank and rear. Rousseau, at the head of Thomas' other division, was sent to the front to the assistance of Negley. The Confederates, however, continued to press further to the National rear; and by and by, having reached a commanding position, they poured a concentrating cross-fire on those two divisions. It was impossible longer to resist the fury and concentrated strength of the enemy. Thomas, therefore, withdrew his troops from the cedar woods and formed his line between them and the Nashville turnpike. It was a perilous operation, and was attended with great loss of life, one brigade alone—that of Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd—losing twenty-two officers and five hundred and two men in killed and wounded. In his new position Thomas held his ground firmly. It seemed, however, as if the battle was lost. The right wing of the National army was gone. The centre had been dreadfully cut up and driven from the field. All now depended on the left.

While these events were taking place on his right and centre, Rosecrans was not idle. The stubborn resistance offered by Sheridan and the two divisions of Thomas had given him time to make good use of his left wing, and to reform his line of battle. We have seen that the National right had not only been turned, but driven off the field. We have seen that a similar fate had befallen the National centre. In their victorious march, therefore, describing, so to speak, a circle drawn to the right, the Confederates were moving steadily on to what would have been the rear of the National left, if the dispositions of the early morning had remained unchanged. It was the possibility of such a calamity that lent such importance to the heroic endurance of Sheridan and Negley and Rousseau and the men under their commands. It was this possibility which gave such value to those precious three hours which, so to speak, had been arrested in their course. When the victorious Confederates had borne down all opposition, and reached the National left, Rosecrans had all but completed his new formation. On a commanding knoll which overlooks the plain west of the Murfreesboro' road, he had massed his batteries, somewhat
HAZEN'S BRIGADE.

...the fashion of Napoleon at Austerlitz. With this as a point d'appui, he was forming his new line, which was to face no longer to the west, as in the original disposition of the troops, but to the southwest, with the Nashville turnpike in its rear. His object, of course, was to bring his army into such a position that he should be able to present his front to the enemy. It requires but little knowledge of the military art to understand how difficult, how perilous even, it is for an army in such circumstances to pass from one formation to another. While the change is being made, it is necessarily disjointed and helpless. At the last moment it seemed as if the experiment of forming a new line might fail. Palmer's division held the right of the National left wing. After Sheridan had been compelled to retire, and when Thomas's two divisions under Negley and Rousseau had been driven through the cedar woods, the Confederates fell upon Palmer like an avalanche. His two right brigades were swept away at once. If his left brigade could not prolong the resistance, Rosecranz would be struck before his new line was completed; and the day would in all probability be lost. But this brave brigade, with the gallant Colonel W. B. Hazen at its head, was equal to the emergency. The rôle of Sheridan was repeated. Once and again and yet again the foe came down upon this brigade with all its force, every time doing tremendous damage, but every time repulsed with terrible loss. Some twelve hundred men thus kept thousands at bay until Rosecranz, having adjusted his new front, was ready for the Confederate charge. It is no disparagement to any of the other division or brigade commanders, or to the men whom they led, to say that to Hazen and his brigade must be freely accorded the honor of having saved the day. It was not, however, without a great sacrifice; for nearly one half of the brigade had perished.

The struggle, however, was not yet ended. Bragg's entire army, with the exception of a portion of the division of Breckinridge, which was on the other side of the river, having issued from the cedar thickets which they had won, was advancing over the plain in one magnificent column. Victory seemed to be in their shout, and triumph in their firm and steady footsteps. It was a glorious sight, but it lasted only for a moment. Rosecranz was fully prepared. There was the loud roar of artillery and the sharp rattling sound of musketry all along the National line. It was a tempest of "double-shotted iron fire." It was "a sirocco of lead." Deep lanes were cut in the Confederate ranks. The slaughter was terrible. Again and again the attempt was made to face the desolating storm of bullets; but in vain. Blinded by the sulphurous smoke which, like a cloud-wall, rose up between them and Rosecranz's line, and exposed to a fire which was increasing in rapidity and becoming more deadly in its aim, the troops of Bragg, so recently so triumphant, staggered, broke and fell back in confusion to the shelter of the woods.

Compelled to abandon all further
The battle of the 31st of December was, however, only a drawn battle. The National troops still held the original ground on their left; and their new position was strong. From all the other points, however, they had been driven back. Neither general had been able to carry out his original plan. Nothing was decided. Everything must depend on a subsequent effort. On New Year's day, the two armies stood looking at each other, and but little was done in the way of fighting. Both, however, were busy making preparations for a fresh test of strength. Some slight fighting took place in the afternoon; but it led to no result.

There is good reason for believing that
Bragg thought the National army would retreat; but in this he was mistaken. Retreat was not as yet any part of Rosecranz’s plan. On the morning of the 2d, Friday, the Confederates opened four batteries on the National centre; but these were soon silenced. A similar demonstration was made a little more to the National right, with a like result. About three o’clock in the afternoon a spirited attack was made by Breckinridge. The position was held by VanCleve’s division, which showed a want of steadiness, and yielded to the force of the enemy. Crittenden came to his rescue, and posted his batteries in an advantageous position on the west side of the river, while two brigades of Negley’s division were ordered up. “The firing was terrific, and the havoc fearful. The enemy retreated more rapidly than he had advanced. In forty minutes they had lost two thousand men.” There was a retreat and a pursuit. But it was now after dark, and rain was falling heavily. The pursuit, therefore, was discontinued. As it was, the Confederates had been foiled in all their efforts, and the Nationals had gained some points of advantage. On the morning of the 3d it was still raining heavily, and nothing was attempted on either side. During the course of the day there was some skirmishing and picket-firing all along the lines; but there was no serious effort, and but little change made in the relative positions of the two armies. On the morning of the 4th, Sunday, it was found that Bragg had retreated with his entire army during the previous night. He had left behind him about two thousand of his sick and wounded, with attendant surgeons, in his hospitals. Nothing was done on that day; but on Monday morning Thomas entered Murfreesboro’ and drove the Confederate cavalry some seven miles towards Manchester. On the same day Rosecranz established his headquarters in the village. Such was the end of the famous battle in the cedar brakes at Stone River—a battle in which were put hors de combat nearly thirty thousand men. The Confederates had lost over 14,000 and the Nationals over 15,000 men. More than one-third of the National artillery and a large portion of its train had been captured. Undecisive as had been the terrible struggle—one of the greatest in the war—it had at least determined this—that the Confederates could not break through the line of investment between the Cumberland Mountains and the Free States. Two desperate attempts had been made; but both had failed.

The result of the battle of Murfreesboro’ filled the National heart with joy. It was natural that it should be so. On the first day Rosecranz was all but defeated, when he turned the tide of victory, saved his army, and compelled his antagonist to leave the field. If he had not completely accomplished his purpose—if the possession of Middle Tennessee would still have to be contested—the presumption now was that in the next struggle that important question would be settled in favor of
the North. This, however, was not all. The victory, partial as it was, was singularly opportune. The summer campaign had been, all over, the reverse of favorable to the National arms. The Confederates, both in the east and west, had been daringly aggressive; and the successes which had attended and rewarded their efforts pained and discouraged the people of the North. Grant, after Iuka and Corinth, had sustained a series of checks in his onward movement towards Vicksburg; and the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg, which was fought on the 13th of December, had produced a shock from which neither the government nor the people had wholly recovered. Light seemed to break in upon the darkness when the tidings of Murfreesboro' were flashed across the land. There was a general who knew how to handle his troops. There were men who knew how to follow and obey. By their joint efforts they had snatched victory out of defeat. It was the grateful and delighted sentiments of an entire people which President Lincoln telegraphed to Rosecranz, "God bless you and all of you; please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the nation's gratitude for your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless courage." The words of the general-in-chief were equally expressive of the feeling of the Northern people. "The victory," he said in greeting Rosecranz, "was well-earned, and one of the most brilliant of the war. You and your brave men have won the gratitude of the army and the admiration of the world."

A new element of strength was now added to the army of the Cumberland in the person of Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, who was appointed to succeed Colonel Garesché as chief of staff to General Rosecranz. General Garfield had seen hard service in other departments, and to his natural abilities added the experience of a tried veteran. He proved of great service to General Rosecranz, especially in softening the bitterness of the quarrel between his chief and the War Department, accomplishing more by his calm good sense than the fiery energy of the hero of Murfreesboro' could secure.

During the time that the Confederates under Bragg were engaging the whole attention and all the available forces of Rosecranz, the superior cavalry of the South were scouring Tennessee and Kentucky, plundering the inhabitants and destroying the railroads. Of these marauding bands, the principal were under the lead of Forrest and Morgan. By and by they were compelled to desist; and attention began to centre again on Chattanooga, near which, it was evident, another trial of arms must take place. Of this, however, we shall have occasion to treat in a subsequent chapter. Our attention, meanwhile, must be directed to certain important events which had already happened on the Atlantic border.
CHAPTER XIII.


For reasons already given, we have lingered a whole year with the armies of the West. We have followed Grant and his victorious legions from Cairo to Corinth, and seen them driving the Confederates before them, until Kentucky and Tennessee were secured to the Union, and until Vicksburg and Port Hudson alone barred the free navigation of the Mississippi. We have seen a National flotilla under Foote and Davis driving the enemy from stronghold after stronghold on the great river until the National flag was again floating over the city of Memphis. We have followed Farragut and his fleet from the gulf to New Orleans, and seen that most important of southern cities wrenched from the grasp of the rebellious Confederacy. We have followed Buell from Corinth to Chattanooga, and from Chattanooga to Louisville. We have returned with him on his backward march, and seen him successfully resist and even force the retreat of the Confederates at Perryville. We have followed the same army under its new leader, Rosecranz, and witnessed the bloody and well-contested, though indecisive, battle of Murfreesboro’ — a battle in which, although neither side could justly claim the victory, the Nationals not only held their ground, but again compelled their antagonists to retire before them.

During that time, important operations had been going on in the East. It becomes a necessity, therefore, for us now to leave the valley of the Mississippi and return to the Atlantic border. The object of the western campaign, which was the opening of the Mississippi River, was in a fair way of being accomplished. The object of the eastern or peninsular campaign was the capture of Richmond. It will be our business, in the chapters which immediately follow, to ascertain how this
campaign had been conducted, and with what success.

There are certain vexed questions regarding the management of the Eastern forces—questions the discussion of which has led to a large amount of ill-feeling without producing any satisfactory result. Into these questions we will not enter further than is necessary for the elucidation of our subject. It is quite possible that General McClellan attached too much importance to the capture of Richmond. There can be no doubt, we think, that the strength of the Confederacy lay rather in the strength of its armies than in the possession of any particular locality, city, or stronghold. The capture of Washington by the Confederates in the early stages of the war might have proved fatal to the Union cause. But it would be absurd to say that Richmond was to the South all that Washington was to the North and to the National cause generally. The capture of Washington, the seat of the National government, and where were treasured all the National archives, would certainly have been followed by the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign governments, which might have been very disastrous to the National cause. It might have had another result equally bad, perhaps worse. The holders of the capital might have been regarded as the rightful rulers of the republic; and been enabled to impose their own terms on the nation, and so not only resist, but throw back the revolution for an indefinite period. Even in a sectional point of view no such importance could attach to Rich-

mond. It was the most influential town in the Confederacy; that was all. The Confederate government could have been carried on in any other town; and the strength of the Confederacy would still have consisted in the strength of the army. The correctness of this principle was abundantly proved in the later stages of the war. Charleston fell by the march of Sherman; Richmond yielded to the persistent operations of Grant; but neither the one general nor the other cared to enter the city which he had conquered. In the estimation of each the extermination of the army was more important than the occupation of the city.

It had, however, been decided, or rather it was taken for granted, that the capture of Richmond was a matter of primary importance. The question, therefore, was how it could be most easily and effectively accomplished. One thing, it was obvious from the outset, must not be overlooked in any plan which might be adopted. Washington must not, in any case, be left unprotected. This condition complied with and a plan agreed upon, it was absolutely necessary that action be taken at once. General McClellan, as we have seen, was appointed to the command of the army of the Potomac in July, 1861. On the 1st of November, on the resignation of General Scott, he was promoted to the chief command of the armies of the United States. No general, for the time being, so completely commanded the confidence of the government and the people. He was by far the most popular and most
trusted man in the army. Although commander-in-chief, he still remained at the head of the army of the Potomac. At the date of his elevation, that army had an effective strength of one hundred and thirty-four thousand two hundred and eighty-five men, with some three hundred guns. On the 1st of February the aggregate strength of the army had risen to two hundred and twenty-two thousand one hundred and ninety-six, there being present for duty over one hundred and ninety thousand men. The Confederate force in front of him at Manassas, where they had remained since the battle of Bull Run, did not exceed fifty-five thousand. In regard to drill and equipment, no finer army than that under McClellan was ever held in readiness for battle. Absolutely trusted by the government, and permitted to mature his plans in secret, it was confidently expected that with such an army he would make such a dash upon his antagonist as would force the war to a hurried conclusion.

For reasons best known to himself, McClellan was in no haste to put his army in motion. There was no end of parades—no end of magnificent manœuvreing—which for a time delighted and astonished the people of Washington. Autumn was allowed to pass by, and the winter of 1861; and yet nothing was done. An excuse for delay was always at hand. It was too hot, or it was too cold. The foliage on the trees was as yet too thick, or the roads were too heavy for rapid and successful military operations. The people began to manifest impatience. News of the success of the army of the West began to arrive; and the conduct of Halleck and Grant was contrasted with the persistent inaction of McClellan. The daily exhibitions of the army of the Potomac no longer pleased—they disgusted the populace. "On to Richmond," became the popular and imperious cry. Through the press, from the platform and from the pulpit, the words rang out over the length and breadth of the North, finding a response in every loyal heart. There were many who did not hesitate to affirm that McClellan was at heart in sympathy with the rebellion. The government caught the contagion, and all the more readily that the president had for some time been dissatisfied with McClellan. He saw that the heart of the nation was sinking. Expenses had been frightful, and there had been no result. The treasury was all but exhausted; and there was the danger of the loss of public credit. He could obtain no satisfactory explanation from the commander-in-chief. There were signs of disaffection in the ranks; and the subordinate officers were impatient and sick of their life of inaction. They were there to protect their country and to repel the foe; but they had been compelled to spend precious months in daily repetition of a meaningless show.

In these circumstances the president summoned Generals McDowell and Franklin to a conference with himself and his cabinet. To them he frankly revealed his distress. "If something is not soon done," he said, "the bottom will be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan does not want to use
the army, I would like to borrow it, provided I can see how it could be made to do something." He had been to the house of the commander-in-chief; but he had not been admitted to his presence. It was necessary that he should talk to somebody; and therefore he had sent for them, to learn, if possible, whether there was any probability of an early movement of the army. McDowell was in favor of immediate action. He would advance with a heavy force on the front and flanks of the Confederates at Manassas. He believed that their numbers were greatly exaggerated, and that it would not be difficult to make an end of the disgraceful blockade, and drive the besieging army back upon Richmond. Franklin, who was somewhat in the confidence of McClellan, and knew at least part of his plan, was in favor of something being done at once; but he approved of a movement upon Richmond by way of the lower Chesapeake and the Virginia peninsula. There were further conferences, McDowell and Franklin meanwhile consulting with other prominent army officials. The result was that these two generals agreed as to the necessity of moving directly on Manassas; and they recommended such a movement. At this stage, however, the cabinet was somewhat divided; and it was agreed to hold another conference, and to ask General McClellan to be present and give his own views on the question. The meeting was held accordingly; General McClellan appeared, but took no part in the discussion. He showed signs of being offended. To McDowell, who apologized for the position in which himself and Franklin were placed, he said haughtily that they could have any opinion they pleased. When asked by the president "what and when anything could be done," his answer was "that the case was so plain that a blind man could see it." To the question of the secretary of the treasury as to where and how he proposed to use the army, he gave for answer only that "the movements in Kentucky were to precede any from Washington." At the same time he expressed his willingness to develop his plans, if he was ordered to do so, although he said it was his conviction that always, in military matters, the fewer who knew the plans to be carried out the better.

A few days afterwards his plan, which was to abandon his present base and proceed towards Richmond by way of the lower Chesapeake, was laid before the president. The president liked it not. It implied further delay. It would, besides, be a tedious operation; and, so far as he could see, it promised little. Determined to be done with this do-nothing policy, the president, on the 27th of January, issued his famous War Order No. 1, in which he directed the 22d of February following "to be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces." Four days afterwards a special order was issued to McClellan, directing him to form all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing for the safety of Washington, into an expedition for
the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point on the railroad southeast of Manassas Junction, the details of the movement to be left to the discretion of the commander-in-chief. This dispatch on the part of the president has generally been attributed to the energy and firmness of Edwin M. Stanton, who had, a few weeks before, succeeded Cameron as secretary of war. Against this order McClellan remonstrated. This led to a correspondence between him and the president, each advocating his own plan in preference to that of the other. The result was that the whole question was submitted to a council of twelve officers, McClellan's plan being approved of by eight out of the twelve. The president, of course, acquiesced; and on the same day orders were issued from the War Department for the procuring of transports for the troops and the other necessaries of war.

Mar. 8. On the 8th of March the president issued a general order, directing the army of the Potomac to be divided into four corps, to be commanded respectively by Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. A fifth corps, formed from his own and General Shields' division, was under the command of General Banks. The command of the National troops in the valley of the Mississippi and westward of the longitude of Knoxville in Tennessee, was assigned to General Halleck; and a Mountain Department, covering the region between McClellan and Halleck, was created and placed under the command of General Fremont. The commanders of departments were instructed to report directly to the secretary of war, and not, as formerly, through the commander-in-chief. This order gave great offense to McClellan. Later on the same day, another order directed that no change should be made in the base of operations without leaving a competent force for the protection of Washington; that not more than fifty thousand troops should be moved toward the scene of intended operations until the navigation of the Potomac should be "freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions"; that the new movement on Chesapeake Bay should begin as early as the 18th of March, and that the general-in-chief should "be responsible that it moves so early as that day"; and that "the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac, between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay." On learning that McClellan was about to move, Johnston (March 9th) evacuated Manassas, and hastened towards Richmond, carrying everything with him. It was a timely and masterly retreat, and evinced that ability for which Johnston has obtained credit alike from friend and foe, and which stamped him as one of the greatest commanders developed on either side during the progress of the war.

Mar. 10. On the ensuing morning McClellan made a "promenade," as it has been called, to the deserted position, when his soldiers were mortified to witness the miserable earthworks and Quaker guns—logs of wood shaped like cannon—by which an army little more
than one-fourth their own, had kept them so long at bay. Undoubtedly this discovery irritated the president greatly, and went far to shake his faith in the ability or honesty of the general-in-chief. It is not wonderful, therefore, that on the day on which McClellan returned from the “promenade,” he should have been relieved, by a special order from the president, of all the military departments except that of the Potomac. The reason assigned for this change was that the campaign on which the army of the Potomac was about to enter would require all the resources and all the attention of its commander. It is impossible, however, not to perceive in each of these successive orders a manifestation of distrust—an increasing want of confidence in the commander-in-chief.

The movement which had been agreed upon was carried out with all promptitude. There was no unnecessary delay. There were chartered one hundred and thirteen steamers, one hundred and eighty-eight schooners, eighty-eight barges; and by means of these there were transported, in thirty-seven days, to Fortress Monroe, one hundred and twenty-one thousand troops, fourteen thousand five hundred and ninety-two cattle, eleven hundred and fifty wagons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four ambulances, as well as a vast quantity of equipage. McClellan left Washington on the 1st of April. On the same day he sent to the adjutant-general a detailed statement of the number and disposition of the forces which he had left behind. The number of men left for the avowed purpose of protecting the capital was about seventy-three thousand. These, however, were so disposed that not more than twenty thousand; and they but imperfectly organized, were all that were left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction. The president was indignant; and General McDowell’s corps was detached from McClellan’s command and detained at the capital. McClellan complained and delayed action. In a letter written by him at the time to McClellan, Lincoln explained and fully justified the course which he had been forced to adopt. In the same letter, Lincoln forcibly reminded him that inaction was no longer to be tolerated. “It is indispensable to you,” he wrote, “that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this.” * * “The country will not fail to note,” he added, “is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched camp is but the story of Manassas repeated.” He wrote him, he assured him, in the utmost kindness; but his last words were “You must act.”

McClellan did not pay much attention to the injunction. He seemed to feel that he was distrusted; and his hesitation to strike a blow that might be ineffectual, almost implied distrust in himself. When McClellan’s army fairly landed on the peninsula, there ought to have been no hesitation. A bold and vigorous blow promptly dealt could scarcely have failed to drive the enemy before him; it would certainly have redeemed his reputation for bravery. The Confederates under Gen-
eral Magruder did not exceed in number eleven thousand men. At the time of his landing, this was the only force opposed to him on the peninsula; and he was aware of the possibility of Magruder being reinforced by Johnston. This force was so divided by the necessity of placing fixed garrisons at Yorktown, on Gloucester Point, and on Mulberry Island, on the James River, that the line in front of McClellan’s great army, and stretching thirteen miles from Yorktown across the peninsula, did not consist of more than five or six thousand men. On this point authorities differ, but the largest estimate does not give Magruder for this line more than eight thousand. Magruder’s own claim was that, exclusive of the garrisons above named, he had only five thousand men. The National army April 3d began to move forward from Fortress Monroe on the 3d of April. McClellan’s avowed object was to drive or capture Magruder’s army before it could be reinforced by Johnston. The Nationals moved steadily but slowly in two columns, the one column by the old Yorktown road, the other along the Warwick road. These columns were commanded respectively by Generals Heintzelman and Keyes, Heintzelman being on the right and Keyes on the left. On the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of each column was compelled to halt by Magruder’s fortified lines—the right near Yorktown on the York River, and the left near Winn’s Mill on the Warwick River. What did McClellan now do? Did he remember and seek to repair the blun-
der he made at Manassas? Did he remember the kindly but withal sting

ing words of the president, “It is indispensa
ble to you that you strike a blow.” “You must act”? Not at all. The same
demon of delay had taken hold of him. The folly of Manassas was repeated, if possible, in more aggravated form. In place of acting at once, he commenced the tedious operations of a regular siege, casting up intrenchments and otherwise acting like a field officer of the middle ages, rather than a skilled and practical general of modern times. Meantime he wrote complaining letters to Washington, declaring it to be his conviction that he would have to fight all the available troops of the Confederates not far from his present position. “Do not force me to do so,” he said, “with diminished numbers; but, whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success.” At McClellan’s urgent request, Franklin’s division of McDowell’s corps was sent to his aid. Towards the end of April the National forces in front of Yorktown amounted to close upon one hundred and forty thousand men; and of these, one hundred and twelve thousand were ready for duty. In addition to these, McClellan could count on the co-operation and aid of Wool’s force, which was at Fortress Monroe.

It was surely of all things the most natural that the government and people should expect that some prompt and effective work would be done with an army so large and so splendidly equipped. McClellan left Fortress Monroe, as we have seen, on the 3d of April. In-
stead of hastening forward and making a dash on the Confederate position, he occupied his time in throwing up earthworks and advantageously placing his guns. It was the 16th before any serious encounter took place. There had been cannonading on both sides, and some skirmishing; but as yet no regular encounter. On the day just mentioned, McClellan discovered that the Confederates were strengthening their works at Lee’s Mills, on a streamlet of the Warwick River. On these he ordered fire to be opened. Captain Mott, with the New York battery; took a position on the left of the enemy’s works; Captain Bartlett, with the Rhode Island Battery B, placed himself on the right; the Third Vermont regiment, acting as skirmishers, were thrown out in front, while a force of some strength was posted in the rear as a reserve. About eight o’clock in the morning the first section of Mott’s battery, consisting of two ten-pounder Parrott guns, moved forward to within a thousand yards of the Confederate work, and took post under cover of a wood on the Warwick road. Fire was immediately opened. The Confederates made a brisk response; and such was the accuracy of their aim that three of Mott’s men were killed and four wounded. Mott brought up the remainder of his guns; and the cannonading which ensued was kept up on both sides for two hours, when the Confederates were driven back. At this stage General Smith, who had charge of the Vermont brigade, attempted to throw a force across the stream, with a view to take the defenses by assault. It was now about three in the afternoon. Colonel Hyde took charge of the storming party, which consisted of four companies, D, E, F, and K, of the Third Vermont regiment. These companies were fresh, not having taken any part in the engagement of the morning; and to cover them as they advanced, four batteries of light artillery, commanded respectively by Ayres, Mott, Kennedy, and Wheeler were placed on advantageous ground. As the batteries opened a concerted fire on the fort, throwing shot, shell and spherical case into it, in rapid succession, the four companies dashed forward, plunged into the water, which in some places reached to their arm-pits, and made for the work. While these men were still in the water, a terrific fire was opened upon them by a body of Confederates who had hitherto lain low and concealed themselves. On pushed the brave little band; and in spite of their soaked condition, and what was still worse, their wet cartridge-boxes, they reached the fort and drove their antagonists out of the rifle-pit. Here they held their position for nearly half an hour. Strange to say, while thousands of men were close at hand, reinforcements failed to reach them in time. Observing the advance of two or three fresh Confederate regiments, the brave little battalion had no choice but fall back and recross the river. In crossing and recrossing, they sustained very considerable loss.

As soon as the remnant of these companies had returned within their own lines, the National batteries, which for
a time had been silent, again opened fire. Orders were given to the Sixth Vermont regiment to resume the attack, and storm the work by the left flank. Colonel Lord, at the head of his brave soldiers, dashed into the stream. Seven companies followed. The advance had reached within three rods of the breastwork, when, being in three feet of water, they were fired upon by a long line of rifles which were popped above the parapets. A running fire from at least one thousand small arms kept pouring upon the Nationals as they pressed on to the fort. While the breastwork was lit up by a continuous sheet of flame, the National batteries kept up a steady fire, the shot and shell falling thick and fast inside the work. The Nationals were fighting at a great disadvantage; but they kept their ground and used their rifles with great effect, taking off their men as they raised their heads from time to time above the parapet. For a time the battle raged with great fury; and the scene was grand and imposing in the extreme. The Confederates continued to increase in strength at the point of attack; and as it was impossible, in the circumstances, to make any effective use of the bayonet, Lord ordered a retreat, carrying his wounded with him. In this struggle the National loss was 35 killed, 120 wounded, and 9 missing. Captain Mott, on whose battery the Confederates had concentrated their fire, had three men killed and seven wounded. Of his horses, seven were disabled. The Confederate loss was also considerable, Colonel McKinney, of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, which bore the chief part in the fray, having been killed.

After this ineffectual assault on the Confederate battery, ten days were allowed to elapse before any event of consequence occurred. General McClellan meanwhile busied himself in the perfecting of his siege arrangements. The Merrimac, of which we shall have something to say in our next chapter, gave him some uneasiness, and compelled him to be fearful for his gunboats. On the 26th of April, the monotony of the siege was varied by a spirited attack which was made on a Confederate redoubt. This work stood in front of a wood near the Yorktown road, and was somewhat in advance of the main defenses. Surrounded by a ditch six feet deep, with a strong parapet, it was manned by two companies of infantry, but with no artillery. It was resolved to take this redoubt, and ascertain the nature of the works behind. Five Massachusetts companies were detailed for the purpose. Three of these companies were from the First regiment, and were under Lieutenant-Colonel Wells. Two were from the Eleventh regiment, and were under Major Tripp. The attack was well planned. One company was sent out to skirmish on the left, in the cornfield, with instructions to prevent a flank movement of the enemy; another company was held in reserve toward the right, near a ravine; while a third company, under Captain Carroll, made the assault. The assaulting party rushed across the cornfield at double-quick,
making straight for the Confederate re-
doubt. A warm reception awaited
them. As soon as they came in view,
the Confederate infantry opened fire,
and used their rifles to some purpose.
Nothing daunted, the Massachusetts
men pushed forward. Not one of them
fired a shot until they were within a
few yards of the ditch. Then halting,
they let fly a full volley into the faces
of their antagonists. On again they
rushed, clearing the ditch and mounting
the parapet. The Confederates fled be-
fore them, and the redoubt was cap-
tured. A working party came up with
spades and shovels, and the work was
soon demolished. Thirteen Confede-
rates were made prisoners. On the side
of the Nationals there were three men
killed and thirteen wounded.

There was another pause. Nothing
further was done in the way of direct
hostilities until the 30th. That
April day, General McClellan having ad-
vanced his parallels, got one of his
large batteries in position and opened
fire on the Confederate works, at the
distance of two miles. The first shot was
fired from battery No. 1, at the mouth
of Wormsley's Creek. It was aimed at
the Confederate shipping, and it suc-
cceeded in scattering the vessels. The
guns were now directed against the
works at Yorktown and Gloucester.
The Confederates replied with their
large pivot gun, a rifled sixty-eight
pounder, which was mounted on the
heights of Yorktown. For some hours,
the firing on both sides was maintained
with great spirit. No result, however,
was visible. During the night the Con-
federates continued to fling shot and
shell on McClellan's advanced parallels,
where the men were at work. Next
morning they tried their columbiad,
which was well posted on the heights,
firing it with great rapidity; but after
the twenty-third discharge, "it went
into a thousand pieces, tearing up the
parapet, and making havoc with the
crowd who were collected around it
at the time." This was the only gun
which seemed capable of competing
with McClellan's heavy siege batteries.
The National batteries maintained a
continuous fire. Saturday arrived, May
3. At the close of that day everything was in
readiness for opening the bombard-
ment—the huge siege batteries being
all in position. Still McClellan is in
no haste. To-morrow (Sunday) is to
be given to sacred rest; and on Mon-
day the guns are to be opened all along
the line. The general is confident of
success, and believes in a triumphant
victory. On that same Saturday night,
the Confederates evacuated Yorktown
and Gloucester, carrying with them
their sick, their hospital stores, their
ammunition, and their camp equipage,
and moved toward Williamsburg. So
quietly and so skilfully was the retreat
accomplished, that it was not until
next morning the fact was known to
the Nationals. McClellan on the May
morning of the 4th telegraphed to the Secretary of War that he was in
possession of the abandoned fortress, and
added, with an air of mightiness which
ill became him in the circumstances,
"No time shall be lost. I shall push
the enemy to the wall.” Such was the end of the siege of Yorktown—an end almost as disgraceful, all things considered, as would have been a defeat.

When the National troops entered the abandoned fortifications, they found fifty-two guns spiked, and some stores; but surely was a poor trophy for so great an army, and especially after such magnificent and costly preparations for a successful siege. It was McClellan over again—all show and no work. The National army left Fortress Monroe, as we have seen, on the 3d of April. On the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of both columns halted in front of Magruder’s fortifications. For nearly one month, therefore, McClellan with more than one hundred thousand men, and well supplied with all the necessities of war, lay before Yorktown. Doing what? Preparing for a great siege—when there was to be no siege. Constructing extensive and costly lines of defense—which were never needed. General Magruder’s account of McClellan’s conduct reads like a caricature; but we know nothing of those four weeks before Yorktown, which does not justify us in saying that Magruder’s account is the simple truth. “To my utter surprise,” says that general, “he (McClellan) permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay became apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and in the open fields, earthworks began to appear.” Had McClellan moved on Yorktown and Gloucester at once, in place of halting for a whole four weeks, these places most undoubtedly would have yielded to the first attack, and the waste of time, of labor, of money, of human life even, in that inhospitable region, would have been avoided. “With five thousand men,” adds Magruder, “inclusive of the garrisons, we had stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the enemy.” Difference of opinion has existed as to the actual strength of the Confederates in and around Yorktown. The presumption is that when McClellan arrived and felt Magruder’s outer lines in front of Yorktown, the Confederate force did not exceed five thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons. It is now known that both Lee and Johnston were opposed to holding the peninsula, their reasons being that in the event of the York and James rivers falling into the possession of the Nationals, as seemed probable, the Confederate army, on both flanks, would be exposed to the National gunboats. They had no doubt that McClellan would capture Yorktown. Johnston visited and inspected the works at Yorktown soon after McClellan’s arrival; and what he saw confirmed him in this opinion. His desire was to concentrate all his forces near Richmond and offer there a decisive battle. These counsels, however, were overruled; and it was decided to hold the peninsula, if possible, until the fortifications at Norfolk should be dismantled and the naval establishment at that place destroyed. In these circumstances, and when it was known that McClellan, instead of pressing forward, was intrenching himself, rein
forces were sent down from Richmond; and, later, Johnston went to Yorktown and took command in person. Hence we find Magruder, in the same report from which we have already quoted, saying: "Reinforcements began to pour in, and each hour the army of the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us." The conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable—that McClellan lost his golden opportunity when he failed to make an attack on Magruder immediately on his arrival at Yorktown, and that in place of the barren victory which he reaped after a month's waiting, toil and terrible sacrifice, he might have won a fruitful victory by striking a blow at once with energy and determination.

A feeling began again to prevail all over the North, as soon as the details of the siege were made public, that nothing was to be expected from McClellan. Of course his friends still clung to him tenaciously; but the earnest people of the North, who were bent on putting down the rebellion and preserving the Union intact, began to feel that, if the great task was to be accomplished, it must be by other hands than those of the brilliant but hesitating chief of the army of the Potomac. McClellan was not ignorant that the siege of Yorktown was a blunder, and that it was generally so regarded. He had, of course, something to say in his own defence. It was impossible, he said, to ascertain the exact strength of the enemy; and there were many indications that they were behind the works in great force. It was his business to find out the facts, just as it was his misfortune to be outgeneralled. Some of his excuses were very lame. Franklin's division had been promptly sent him when asked for. Yet in his report he said that the non-arrival of that division was the cause of his failure to attack Yorktown, and that the same cause "made rapid and brilliant operations impossible."

The simple truth is that when Franklin's division arrived, McClellan declared that he was not ready; and, waiting for orders, these troops were detained on the river, in transports, for a whole fortnight. It was his intention, he said in his report, to turn Yorktown by an attack on Gloucester; and this attack was not made because Franklin's division was not forward. What McClellan's intention really was, it is difficult to know. It does seem as if he was undecided, feeling afraid to attack in front and not daring to attack in flank. It certainly redounds to the credit of the Confederates that they were better posted regarding his movements than he was regarding theirs. The siege of Yorktown was no improvement on McClellan's past record. It was the first tardy step in a series of tardy movements which distinguished his peninsular campaign. Before the end of that disastrous campaign was reached, the storm of battle had done much to thin the ranks of his army; but delay led to disease; and disease proved more destructive than the bullets of the enemy. The view taken by President Lincoln, in his letter to McClellan dated
April 9th, 1862, was sustained in every particular. In that letter the president says: "You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty—that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is now noting—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated." Read now, in the light of what took place, these words were really prophetic.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Importance of War Vessels on the Rivers and Gulfs.—The Merrimac.—Her original build.—Reconstructed.—A Powerful Instrument of Destruction.—Confederate Cunning.—The Merrimac in her New Form said to be a Failure.—A Strange Sight.—The Merrimac at Hampton Roads.—The National Fleet Attacked.—The Cumberland and Congress.—The Merrimac Shot-Proof.—The Cumberland Laid Open.—Terrific Firing.—The Cumberland Goes Down.—One Hundred Sick and Wounded.—The Patrick Henry.—The Congress Attacked.—Heavy Loss of Life.—The Congress on Fire.—Newport News.—The Flag of the Congress Hauled Down.—Red Hot Shot.—Her Magazine Catches Fire.—Two Hours' Work.—The Roanoke and the Minnesota.—Hurrying to the Scene of Action.—The Minnesota Grounded.—The Merrimac unable to Approach.—The Guns of the Minnesota Skilfully Handled.—A Cheerless Prospect.—The Danger to New York.—Fortress Monroe.—What General Wool said.—Relief at Hand.—The Monitor.—Ericsson.—Description of the Monitor.—The great Purpose for which it was Built.—A Novelty.—The Success of the Experiment Doubtless.—Prophets of Evil.—The Launch.—The Trial Trip.—A Fearful Storm.—Terrific Experience of the Crew.—Lieutenant John L. Worden in Command.—What Spies had Done.—What Might Have Been.—Rejoicing at Norfolk.—The Nationals Downcast.—A Night to be Remembered.—The Congress Explodes.—Sunday Morning.—Wreck and Ruin all around.—Reappearance of the Merrimac.—Worden Ready.—The Object of the Confederate Commander.—The Monitor alongside of the Merrimac.—A Contrast.—David and Goliath.—"Pebbles thrown by a Child."—A Battle of Mailed Giants.—The Merrimac Aground.—The Monitor Moving and Hitting like a Skilled Pugilist.—The Merrimac shows Signs of Punishment.—Turns off and Renews the Attack on the Minnesota.—A Warm Reception.—A Tremendous Shot.—The Monitor again Comes to the Relief.—The Merrimac a Second Time Grounded.—The Merrimac Retreats.—The Monitor Pursues.—A Fierce Encounter.—Canister Shot Comparatively Harmless.—The Merrimac Badly Punished.—Sagging at the Stern.—The Last and Most Effective Shot of the Merrimac.—Worden Wounded and Felled to the Ground.—The Merrimac Sheers Off.—The Battle Ended.—Worden's Life Despaired of.—"Did We Save the Minnesota?"—Saved.—A Great Victory.—Rejoicings in the North.—The "Little Wonder."—Pilgrimage to Hampton Roads.—Profound Interest Abroad.—Lessons Read to the Nations.—Superiority of Turrets.—Honors to the Brave.—Ericsson Congratulated.—The Importance of the Victory.—Reflections.

In tracing the history of the great western campaign, we have seen how important was the part which was played by gunboats on the Tennessee and Ohio rivers. It was naturally to be expected that war vessels, suitably constructed, would play an equally important part in the bays and rivers more to the east, and which connect themselves with the waters of the Atlantic.

One of the great events of the early part of 1862 was the appearance in Hampton Roads of the powerful ironclad man-of-war Merrimac, which had
been reconstructed by the Confederate government and named Virginia. When the Norfolk Navy Yard was abandoned by the Nationals, this vessel was scuttled and sunk. In her original form she was a powerful steam frigate of forty guns; and she had cost the government, for building and furnishing her, a sum not less than a million and a quarter dollars. The Confederates found little difficulty in raising her; and the hull being in perfect condition, a substantial basis existed for the construction of a gigantic and dangerous vessel. A plan was furnished by Lieutenant John M. Brooke, formerly of the National navy; and, reconstructed after the fashion of the shot-proof raft which had been used in Charleston harbor, she became one of the strongest and most destructive engines of war which had ever been seen floating on any waters. When properly cut down, she was covered with an iron roof projecting into the water. At or below the water line the mail extended the opposite way, so that a shot striking above the water mark would glance upward, and below the water mark would glance downward. She was simply a broadside ironclad with sloping armor. Her great bulk enabled her to carry a formidable battery. She was armed with a powerful steel beak, and carried eleven guns, with a one hundred-pound rifled Armstrong at each end. Such a monster might well be a terror as well as a surprise. It was known that the vessel was undergoing reconstruction, and that it was intended to make her a terrible engine of war; but strange rumors were circulated to her disadvantage by the Confederate authorities; and it is probable that, until she was seen at Hampton Roads, she was somewhat despised by the officers of the National navy. The Southern newspapers artfully circulated that "the Merrimac was a failure"; and, the wish being father to the thought, the statement was too readily believed.

About noon, on Saturday, the 8th of March, observers at Fortress Monroe saw a strange object, "looking like a submerged house, with the roof only above water," moving down the Elizabeth River toward Hampton Roads. It was the dreadful Merrimac; and she was under the command of Franklin Buchanan, an officer who had abandoned the National navy. Two smaller armed steamboats accompanied her. Almost immediately after their appearance, two other Confederate gunboats came down from Richmond and took positions in the James River, a little above Newport News. Signal guns were at once fired from the Union batteries and by the ships Cumberland and Congress, lying off and blockading the James River, to give warning to the rest of the National fleet. Accompanied by the two smaller vessels the Merrimack moved steadily on towards the Cumberland and Congress. The Congress, a sailing frigate, was commanded by Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith. The sloop of war, Cumberland, 24 guns and 376 men, was commanded temporarily by Lieutenant George Morris. Pursuing the Congress, and giving and receiving a broadside, the Merrimac made straight for the Cumberland. This vessel had
been placed across the channel so as to bring her broadside to bear on her antagonist; and as the Merrimac approached she opened upon the monster and poured forth a rapid fire. It was no use. The heavy shot from the nine and ten inch guns of the Cumberland glanced from her rival’s shield of iron, “like so many peas.” The Merrimac seemed stunned for an instant by the weight of the shot; but she quickly recovered; and having increased her speed, she rushed against the Cumberland, striking her with her steel prow about amidships, and “literally laying her open.” Before striking the Cumberland, the Merrimac had received some seven or eight broadsides; but they produced no impression on her invulnerable coat of mail. As she struck, she opened her ports and poured in on the unfortunate Cumberland, now rapidly filling with water, a most destructive fire. The Cumberland fought well; but the combat was unequal. Buchanan gradually drew off the Merrimac; and again opening his ports, he rushed against his disabled antagonist, this time completely crushing in her side. It was now all over with the Cumberland. Giving a parting fire to the monster which was retiring from the ruin it had wrought, with apparent indifference, Morris ordered his men to jump overboard and save themselves. This was quickly done; and in a few minutes afterwards, the vessel went down in fifty-four feet of water, carrying with her about one hundred of dead, sick and wounded, who could not be moved. The topmast of the Cumberland remained partially above the water, with her flag flying from its peak.

It was now nearly four o’clock in the afternoon. Having finished the Cumberland, the Merrimac now turned her attention to the sailing frigate Congress. We have seen that just as the Merrimac appeared by the way of the Elizabeth River, two other vessels came down the James, as if by a preconcerted arrangement. These vessels were the Yorktown and the Jamestown, or, as the latter was now called, Patrick Henry. While the Merrimac was engaged with the Cumberland, the Yorktown and the Jamestown, which had successfully passed the National batteries at Newport News, had tackled the Congress. Until the Cumberland went down, the Congress made a gallant and successful resistance. With the help of the Zouave, she then managed to run aground under cover of the strong batteries just named. There she was beyond reach of the Merrimac’s prow, but she was not beyond the range of her guns. As soon, therefore, as that vessel came up, she opened fire upon the unfortunate Congress, which could not reply with her stern guns, one of which was soon dismounted by the Merrimac’s shot, and the other had the muzzle knocked off. Lieutenant Smith, Acting-Master Moore, and Pilot William Rhodes, with nearly half the crew, were killed or wounded. The Merrimac moved backward and forward slowly, firing at a range of less than a hundred yards. The Congress now took fire in several places. Further resistance would have been worse than
foolishness; and so Lieutenant Prender- 
gast hauled down the flag. A tug 
came alongside to haul her off; but the 
batteries on shore drove off the tug; 
and the Merrimac, despite the white 
flag which was flying over her in token 
of surrender, again opened fire upon 
the battered and helpless vessel. Later 
in the day, the Merrimac returned and 
set the Congress on fire by red-hot shot. 
About midnight the fire caught her 
magazine; and she exploded with a 
tremendous noise. Those of her crew 
which survived the first attack had 
meanwhile made good their escape. 
About one half of the whole, 218 out 
of 434, responded to the call of their 
names next morning at Newport News. 
In little more than two hours the Mer-
rimac had destroyed two of the best ships 
in the National service; and Buchanan, 
her commander, had the satisfaction— 
if satisfaction it was—of killing or 
drowning more than three hundred of 
his old comrades.

When the Merrimac first made her 
appearance in the early part of the day, 
the flag-ship of the National squadron, 
the Roanoke, Captain John Marston, 
and the steam frigate Minnesota, Cap-
tain VanBrunt, were lying at Fortress 
Monroe, several miles distant. These 
were at once signalled to hurry forward 
to the assistance of the Cumberland, 
the Congress, and the other vessels now 
so sorely menaced. It was not possible 
for them to be forward in time to 
render any effective aid. Flag-officer 
Marston had responded to the signal as 
quickly as possible. His own ship was 
disabled in its machinery; but, with 
the help of two tugs, he set out for the 
scene of action. The Minnesota was 
ordered to hasten in the same direction. 
When passing Sewall's Point, the Min-
nesota came within range of a Confede-
rate battery there, and had her main-
mast crippled. This, however, was not 
the only misfortune which she was des-
tined to experience; she drew twenty-
three feet of water; and although it 
was known that the water was danger-
ously shallow, it was thought that, the 
bottom being soft, it would be possible 
to push her through. It was a mis-
take. When within about a mile and 
a half of Newport News, the vessel 
grounded and stuck fast. While in 
this helpless condition, the Merrimac 
having destroyed the Cumberland, and 
having retired after her first attack 
on the Congress, came down upon her. 
Fortunately it was not possible for 
the Merrimac to get within a mile of 
her intended victim, her own heavy 
draught preventing a nearer approach. 
At this distance an ineffective fire was 
opened by both vessels. Some of the 
smaller armed steamboats ventured 
nearer, and with their rifled guns killed 
and wounded several men on board the 
Minnesota. Some of these, however, 
paid dearly for their rashness; for, 
grounded as she was, her guns were 
ably handled, and with great rapidity. 
It was now seven o'clock; and count-
ing, no doubt, on an easy victory on 
the morrow, the Merrimac, with her 
companion ships, retired behind Sew-
all's Point. The Minnesota still lay 
fast in the mud; and although during 
the night several attempts were made
to get her off, it was found impossible to move her. The Roanoke and the St. Lawrence, on their way to the scene of conflict, had both got aground; but with the rising tide they were relieved, and moved down the Roads. It was Saturday night (March 8), and, when the sun went down, the prospect for the following morning was the reverse of cheering to the National commanders. There could be no doubt that the Merrimac would renew the battle in the morning. In such a case, the result, unless some unexpected aid arrived, would be disastrous in the extreme. The Minnesota would be the first victim; and, helpless as she was, her destruction was certain. If any of the other vessels were spared, they would surely endeavor to make their escape. The harbor of Hampton Roads would be lost. The Merrimac would be free to prosecute her work of destruction. Fortress Monroe would be in danger; and who could say that the harbor of New York was safe, while such a monster was afloat? General Wool, commander of Fortress Monroe, telegraphed to Washington that the capture of the Minnesota was all but certain, and that "it was thought the Merrimac, Jamestown, and Yorktown would pass the fort to-night." It was the opinion of that officer that if the Merrimac, instead of passing on, attacked the fortress, it would not be possible to hold the place for more than a few days.

Happily relief was at hand. At nine o'clock that night, the Monitor, Ericsson’s new iron-clad turret ship, arrived at Fortress Monroe from New York. This vessel, which was a dwarf beside the Merrimac, and which was of novel form and appearance, had been built at Green Point, Long Island, New York, under the direction of its inventor, Captain John Ericsson—a Swede by birth, but who had been a resident of the United States for twenty years. Ericsson had already won distinction as a practical scientist in Sweden and in England; and in 1842, having come to the United States, he built for the government, the U. S. Steamer Princeton, the first screw-propeller in the world. The Monitor was one of three vessels—the other two were the Galena and the New Ironsides—which were constructed to meet the emergency, and by special requirement of the government. Ericsson’s plan was to secure the greatest possible power, both for attack and resistance, with the least possible exposure of surface. The hull of the Monitor admirably met all those requirements. It was buoyant, yet it was almost entirely under water. It presented to the enemy a target which was wonderfully small, but which because of the concentration of iron and timber was absolutely impregnable—proof against the heaviest artillery of the day. Concentration was Ericsson’s object in the construction of the hull, so far as defence or resistance was concerned. He followed the same plan in regard to the offensive part of the ship. In the centre of his raft-like vessel, he fixed a revolving cylinder of wrought-iron, of sufficient diameter to allow of two heavy guns, and just high enough to give the gunners stand-
ing room. When finished, the total length of the Monitor was 172 feet. This covered the armor and what is called the "overhang." The length of the hull proper was 124 feet. Her total beam over armor and backing was 41\1/2 feet—the beam of the hull proper being 34 feet. Her depth was 11 feet; her draught 10 feet. The diameter of the turret inside was 20 feet; the height was 9 feet; the thickness, 8 inches, there being 5 inches of wrought-iron and 3 feet of oak. The total weight, with everything on board, was nine hundred tons. As an engine of war, the Monitor was in the strictest sense of the word a novelty. Nothing of the kind had ever before existed. Not unnaturally, therefore, very different opinions prevailed as to the fitness of the vessel for the purposes contemplated. Had the Monitor gone to the bottom as she slid from the stocks at Greenpoint, she would only have fulfilled the predictions and justified the expectations of many prominent scientific men who were present when she was launched. The strange-looking little ship, as we shall presently see, was to have a different and more glorious future.

According to the terms of the contract the Monitor was not to be accepted by the government until her sea-going powers were tested and until she had made trial of her strength with the heaviest guns of the enemy. This, therefore, was her trial trip; and never, perhaps, in the history of any ship of war was a trial trip more severely tested or more completely successful. Lieutenant John L. Worden was in command. On her way from New York the weather was extremely rough. For three days the Monitor battled with the storm; but more than once victory was doubtful. The sea rolled over her decks, the turret alone being above the water. At one time the tiller-ropo was thrown off the wheel, and the situation was really critical. The draft pipe was choked by the pouring down of the water; and but for the ventilation obtained through the turret, the men would have been suffocated. More than once during the voyage the fires were extinguished. After such a voyage the crew, as was to be expected, were completely exhausted. We have seen that the Monitor reached Fortress Monroe at 9 o'clock, on the evening of Saturday, the 8th of March. But for this storm the Monitor might have been up in time to prevent the disaster of the previous day; for it is now known that the Confederates, informed by spies of the forwardness of the Monitor, had made almost superhuman efforts to have the work on the Merrimac finished, so as to give her an opportunity of destroying the National fleet at Hampton Roads before her great rival could appear on the scene. As it was, Lieutenant Worden lost no time after his arrival at Fortress Monroe. Within a few minutes he had reported to the flag officer in the Roads, received orders and sailed to join the disabled fleet. Soon after mid-\textbf{Mar.} 9, night, on the morning of the 9th, he anchored his little vessel alongside the Minnesota.

Never did relief arrive more oppor-
tunely. It was a night to be remembered—that of the 8th of March, 1862, at Hampton Roads. The Confederates were flushed with success. The Nationals were downcast, as well they might be, but by no means desperate. Norfolk was illuminated; and the Confederate officers and sailors were rejoicing and carousing with her grateful citizens. On the one side, there was the certain conviction that to-morrow would bring with it an easy victory. On the other side there was a sullen determination to resist to the last, and a dim, ill-defined hope that some effective aid was to be expected from the strange little vessel which had just arrived. As the night wore on, the waters and the adjacent coast were brilliantly lit up by the flames of the burning Congress; and ever and anon, at irregular intervals, a shotted gun would boom over the dull waters and startle the quiet air, as the spreading flames ignited its charge. The ship had been burning for ten hours, when, about one o’clock, the fire having reached the magazine, she blew up with a terrific noise, filling the air and strewing the waters far and wide with masses of burning timber.

Sunday morning broke beautiful and clear. The Congress had disappeared; but the masts and yards of the Cumberland projected above the water, and her ensign was flying in its accustomed place. As sad evidences of the suddenness of her destruction, the dead bodies of her brave defenders floated in large numbers around the ship. Before the sun had fully revealed himself, and paled by his brighter light the lurid flames of the burning fragments of the Congress, the Merrimac was seen coming down from Sewall’s Point. Evidently she was bent on completing the work of the previous day. The drums of the Merrimac beat to quarters. Worden was ready. Taking his position at the peep-hole of the pilot-house of the Monitor, he gave orders for an immediate attack. The Merrimac made direct for the Minnesota; and from the course she took it was apparently the intention of her commander to capture that vessel, if possible, and carry her back as a prize to Norfolk, where hundreds of people lined the shores, awaiting his triumphant return. As she approached, the stern guns of the Minnesota opened upon her, but to little purpose; for the stacks and sloping sides of the huge monster had been smeared with tallow, and the shot, heavy as it was, glanced harmlessly off. Meanwhile, the little Monitor, to the astonishment of all who were privileged to witness the sight, ran out from under the Minnesota’s quarter and placed herself alongside of the Merrimac, completely covering the Minnesota “as far as was possible with her diminutive dimensions.” The contrast was striking. It was more—it was almost ridiculous. David and Goliath! It seemed as if the Merrimac had but to move upon the insignificant, almost invisible thing, touch it with her iron prow, and make an end of it forever. But it was not so. This other giant had found more than a match in this other stripling. The Merrimac let fly a broadside; and
the turret of the Monitor began to revolve. Both vessels, as we have shown already, were heavily armed. The Merrimac had on each side two 7¼-inch rifles and four 9-inch Dahlgrens. The Monitor had in her turret two 11-inch guns, each capable of flinging a shot of 168 pounds. The turret kept revolving; but the ponderous shot of the Monitor rattled in vain against the mail-clad sides of the Merrimac. Broadside followed broadside in rapid succession; but the heavy metal discharged by the guns of the Merrimac made no impression on the wrought-iron citadel of the Monitor. Unlike as were the two ships, it was really a battle of giants. "Gun after gun," says Captain Van Brunt of the Minnesota, "was fired by the Monitor, which was returned with whole broadsides from the rebels, with no more effect apparently than so many pebble-stones thrown by a child * * * clearly establishing the fact that wooden vessels cannot contend with iron-clad ones; for never before was anything like it dreamed of by the greatest enthusiasts in maritime warfare." After the first vigorous onset there was some manoeuvring for positions, the Monitor seeking the port holes of the Merrimac, the latter all the while pouring her heavy shot on the invulnerable turret of her plucky little antagonist. One bolt from a rifle-gun struck the turret squarely, and penetrated the iron. "It then broke short off and left its head sticking in." Five times the Merrimac attempted to run the Monitor down; but, on each occasion, she received, at the distance of a few feet, the heavy shot of the 11-inch guns. In one of these encounters, the Merrimac got aground, and the Monitor, being light of draught, steamed easily around, moving and hitting like a skilled pugilist, her lightning-like fire striking her antagonist at every vulnerable point. The Merrimac began to show signs of punishment. Her armor plate was bending and starting under the heavy blows.

As if desiring of accomplishing anything definite or satisfactory with the Monitor, the Merrimac turned away from her agile and rather dangerous antagonist and renewed her attack on the Minnesota. Van Brunt, as he himself tells us, was on his guard, and gave the monster a warm reception. He opened upon her all his broadside guns, with a ten-inch pivot gun besides. So terrific was the broadside that "it was enough," to quote Van Brunt's language, "to blow out of the water any timber built ship in the world." It produced, however, but very little effect. The Merrimac gave a hearty response. From her rifled bow gun she flung one of her terrible shells, which went crashing through the side of the Minnesota, exploding on its way two charges of powder, and finally bursting in the boatswain's apartments, tearing four rooms into one and setting the ship on fire. Another shell burst the boiler of the tugboat Dragon, which lay alongside the Minnesota. During the encounter, which was brief, the guns of the Minnesota had hit the Merrimac at least fifty times, producing little or no impression.
A second time the Monitor comes to the aid of the Minnesota. The Merrimac finds it necessary to change her position, and in doing so, again gets grounded. The Minnesota again finds her opportunity; and her heavy guns are opened on her stranded foe. The broadsides are now telling on the thick armor-plates of the Merrimac. Catesby Jones, who was in command, Buchanan having been wounded the previous day, evidently regarded his situation as critical; and, accordingly, as soon as he got the Merrimac afloat, he turned her prow toward Norfolk. The Monitor gave chase. Irritated by the pertinacity of the little ship, the Merrimac turned round on her pursuer and rushed upon her at full speed, as if resolved to run her down. It was a vain attempt, although, judging from the appearance of things, it was by no means either unnatural or unwise. The huge beak of the Merrimac grated on the deck of the Monitor and was wrenched. Such a blow had sent the Cumberland down on the Saturday. Such a blow, had it been possible to deal it, would doubtless have proved equally fatal to the Minnesota, or indeed to any wooden ship afloat. It left the Monitor uninjured. The little vessel glided nimbly out from under her antagonist; and in doing so, the two ships being almost in actual contact, she opened upon her with one of her heavy turret guns, striking her with a force which seemed to crush in her armor. Quick as lightning the concentrated shot of the Merrimac rattled against the turret and pilot-house of the Monitor. The encounter was terrific; but the armor of both vessels was shot-proof, and for the first time in naval warfare, heavy and well-directed cannon were found to be comparatively worthless. At this stage the Monitor hauled off for the purpose of hoisting more shot into her turret. Catesby Jones, imagining that he had silenced his small but formidable antagonist, made another move toward the Minnesota. Before he had time to open fire, the Monitor was steaming up towards him. He changed his course at once; and it was now noticeable that the Merrimac was sagging at her stern. A well directed shot from the Monitor had hit the Merrimac at the junction of the casemate with the ship's side, and caused a leak. Another shot about the same moment had penetrated the boiler of one of the Merrimac's tenders, enveloping her in steam, and scalding a large number of her crew. Latterly the Monitor had been firing low, and every shot told with greater or less effect. The Monitor, however, was not to be allowed to escape uninjured. The last shot fired by the Merrimac was the most effective. It struck the pilot-house of the Monitor opposite the peep-hole through which Worden at that moment was looking. It cut the iron plank in two, inflicted a severe wound on Worden, and knocked him senseless to the floor, Lieutenant Green, who commanded the guns, and Chief-Engineer Steiners, who worked the turret, being at the same moment stunned and stupefied, but not severely injured. Green and Steiners recovered quickly enough to keep the gunners at work;
THE MERRIMAC AND THE MONITOR.

but Worden did not for some time recover consciousness. When he did so, his first question was, "Did we save the Minnesota?"

The battle was now ended. The Merrimac steered at once for Norfolk. The Monitor soon afterwards steered for Fortress Monroe, the severe mishap which had befallen her commander preventing her from following up her victory, and forcing the battle to a surrender. Worden was really badly injured. His face was much disfigured, and he was completely blind. Removed to the city of Washington, his life for a time was despaired of; but he revived; and, as we shall see hereafter, he rendered his country further good service before the war was ended. As soon as the Merrimac retired, the Minnesota was got afloat by throwing some of her heavy guns overboard. She was saved. The battle which began as early as eight o'clock in the morning was waged with great ferocity until after midday. The little Monitor did noble work and won a most decided victory.

During the two days the Minnesota had fired 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and more than ten tons of powder. While struggling with the Merrimac, the Monitor fired 41 shots, and was struck 22 times. The only serious injury done to the Monitor was the shattering of her pilot-house. The Merrimac suffered considerably. On board two men were killed and some nineteen wounded. She had lost her iron prow, her starboard anchor and all her boats. Her armor was badly damaged; her steam-pipe and smoke-stack were riddled; the muzzles of two of her guns were shot away; the wood work at one of her ports was so exposed that it took fire at every discharge; and the water was rushing in upon her through one of the openings made by the shot of the Monitor.

No battle by land or sea, during the whole war, created more excitement or evoked more enthusiasm than the battle at Hampton Roads. At the close of the first day, victory was clearly on the side of the South. In proportion to the joy that prevailed throughout the Confederate States—and the joy was great—there was depression of feeling in the North. At the close of the second day the situation was reversed. There was depression of feeling in the South—all the greater because of the previous joy. The hearts of the Confederates, in truth, sank within them. But there were great rejoicings in the North. Cheers and congratulations rose up on all sides. The glad intelligence of the success of the Monitor was flashed from State to State and from city to city; and from the Cabinet, from Congress, from State Legislatures, from Town Councils, from Chambers of Commerce, from Boards of Trade, from public bodies of all kinds, as well as from special meetings of the people, thanks and praise were poured out upon the Monitor, upon her inventor, upon her brave commander, and upon all the officers and men who took part in the heroic struggle and helped to bring about the glorious result. The rejoicing was universal; and the praise was as unstinted as the gratitude was genuine and profound. Hampton Roads became
immortal; and the little Monitor acquired a reputation such as was never before enjoyed by any ship of war. Pilgrimages were organized and undertaken to visit the scene of the conflict and the victory; and all ranks and classes of the people, from the President downward, rushed to see the "little wonder"—the strange vessel which had done such effective work. The excitement was not confined to this country alone. The success of the Monitor created a profound interest throughout the civilized world, and nowhere more than in the British Isles. It was felt and confessed not only that sea-girt nations must in future depend for protection on other than wooden walls, but that a new and terrible engine of war had been constructed. The battle at Hampton Roads had read the world a lesson. It proclaimed the superiority of such a vessel as the Merrimac with her sloping sides and inclined armor to the ordinary iron-clad. It also proclaimed the fact that inclined armor was inferior to a turret. The nations then busy with the reconstruction of their ships for war purposes, and spending millions upon millions upon new models, felt it necessary to pause, to read the lesson which came from Hampton Roads, and to reflect.

It would not be easy to overestimate the importance of these two days' fighting on the general conduct of the war. The result was a heavy blow to the Confederates: it was a clear gain to the National cause. There was, no doubt, just cause for regret that the Merrimac was allowed to escape, and that she was not hotly pursued and compelled to surrender. There can be no doubt now that the Monitor was quite equal to such a task. It was developed in an investigation after the battle that the Monitor had on board wrought-iron shot, each weighing 184 pounds; but this shot was not used as the capacity and strength of the 11-inch Dahlgren guns were as yet imperfectly known. In answer to a question put by the War Committee, as to why the battle was not more promptly decided against the Merrimac, Mr. Newton, the Chief Engineer of the Monitor, said: "It was due to the fact that the power and endurance of the 11-inch Dahlgren guns, with which the Monitor was armed, were not known at the time of the battle; hence the commander would scarcely have been justified in increasing the charge of powder above that authorized in the Ordnance Manual. Subsequent experience developed the important fact that these guns could be fired with thirty pounds of common powder, with solid shot. If this had been known at the time of the action, I am clearly of opinion that from the close quarters at which Lieutenant Worden fought his vessel, the enemy would have been forced to surrender."

According to the same witness, if a 15-inch gun could possibly have been mounted in the turret, the action would have been short and decisive. Mr. Newton did not doubt that but for the injury received by Lieutenant Worden that officer would have pursued and "badgered" the Merrimac to surrender. These reasons, it must be admitted, are sufficiently satisfactory. If they do not
remove all cause of regret that the Merrimac made her escape, they at least completely exonerate the National commanders. Worden was irresponsible; and his subordinates, judging from the experience they had had that Sunday forenoon, thought it best to content themselves with what they had actually accomplished. If they missed a prize, posterity will not judge them harshly.

As it was, the Nationals had won a great victory, and had just reason to be well pleased. Had the Merrimac been permitted to proceed unchecked in her work of destruction, the result could not but have been most disastrous to all the best interests of the North. It might have seriously affected the entire future of the war, and led to results very different to what were desired and to what were ultimately achieved. But for the timely arrival of the Monitor, the Minnesota would have shared the fate of the Cumberland and the Congress; the entire Union fleet would have been destroyed or captured; the splendid harbor of Hampton Roads would have been left in the undisputed possession of the Confederates; Fortress Monroe would have been imperilled, and its fall would have been only a question of days. Such a loss, in itself considered, would have been great. But it would have been greater still in the consequences which must necessarily have resulted. The possession of Hampton Roads, implying of course the possession of Fortress Monroe, would have given the Confederates absolute control of the James and York rivers, and by consequence would have upset all McClellan’s plans, and brought his projected campaign against Richmond to premature and inglorious defeat. This, however, would not have been all. The possession of these waters by the Confederates would have made secure, as it would have given them the command of, the Peninsula, and made impossible any attack by way of the James River. Worse even than this was possible. What would have hindered the Merrimac from running up Chesapeake Bay and steaming up the Potomac, to the terror of the National Capitol? Or supposing she had put to sea, what was there to prevent her making her way to the harbor of New York, dealing destruction among the shipping, and laying under contribution the chief commercial city of the Union? There were other possibilities equally if not even more alarming. One other we deem it proper to mention. The expulsion of the National fleet from Hampton Roads, coupled as it would have been with the fall of Fortress Monroe, would have encouraged foreign governments in what they would have been pleased to call the interests of peace, to grant recognition and even support to the Confederacy. In the spring of 1862 the Confederates were not without bright, and, as they thought, cheering prospects; if they were not absolutely commanding confidence abroad, they were at least inspiring hope; and such success as that which we have indicated, would have been quite sufficient to make ill-concealed foreign sympathy resume an active form.
It was a matter of some importance to the Union that all these evils were averted. It was something of greater importance still, that the Nationals had for the time being, at least, established their superiority in naval warfare, had effectually secured possession of one of the largest and most valuable land-locked bays on the Continent, with all the connected rivers of the Peninsula, and had rendered necessary the abandonment of Norfolk. Now that the enemy had been driven from all the neighboring waters, McClellan had a fair opportunity to carry out his projected plans on the Peninsula, with a view to the capture of Richmond. This happy state of things had been brought about mainly by the Monitor. It was not without good reason that Chief-Engineer Steiner, on the day the battle had been fought, wrote to Ericsson in the following terms: "I congratulate you upon your great success. Thousands have this day blessed you. I have heard whole crowds cheer you. Every man feels that you have saved this place to the nation, by furnishing us with the means to whip an iron-clad frigate, that was, until our arrival, having it all her own way with our most powerful vessels."

The Merrimac was blown up by the Confederates May 11th, and, towards the close of the year, the Monitor foundered in a storm off Cape Hatteras.

**CHAPTER XV.**

**Following up the Foe.—The Confederate Works at Williamsburg.—Fort Magruder.—Winne's Mill Road.—Hooker and Kearney.—Couch and Casey.—Sumner in Command.—General Stoneman.—The 4th of May.—A Fearful Night.—Hooker Engages the Foe.—The Confederates Well Prepared.—Severe Fighting.—Fort Magruder Silenced.—Arrival of Longstreet.—A Cruel Piece of Deception.—Blaisdell's Men.—Private Doherty.—The Seventeenth New York.—Bravery of Hooker.—The Pluck and Endurance of His Men.—An Unequal Struggle.—Kearney Comes Up.—General Hancock.—General Birney.—A Gallant Charge.—Hancock's Advance.—Hancock Driven Back.—Falls Back in Good Order.—A Halt.—"Gentlemen, Charge!"—Retreat of the Confederates.—The Key of the Position.—The Heroes of Williamsburg.—An Unsatisfactory Fight.—The Great Bravery of the Troops.—Bad Generalship.—It Ought to Have Been Different.—Want of Unity.—McClellan's Mistake.—Sumner not the Right Man in the Right Place.—Why was McClellan Absent?—Franklin's Expedition.—The Prince de Joinville.—McClellan on the Field.—His Appearance.—Enthusiasm of the Troops.—"That Little Matter."—"Bivouac in Front of Williamsburg."—Other Battles to Fight.—More Delay.—What a Bold Stroke Might Have Accomplished.—Promises Fair but Fruitless.—Lincoln's Prophetic Words.—The Story of Manassas Repeated.—Would not Strike a Blow.

After the evacuation of Yorktown, 1862, McClellan gave orders that the enemy should be followed up. The Confederates moved towards Williamsburg, where, some months before, they had constructed a line of strong works, some thirteen in number, on the rolling but elevated ground on which that city stands. These works were two miles in front of Williamsburg, at
the narrowest part of the Peninsula. The line stretched from a deep ravine, near the James River on the right, to Queen's Creek, near the York River on the left. The principal work was Fort Magruder, close to the junction of the Yorktown and Winn's Mill Road. This was an earth-work, with bastioned front. Its crest measured nearly half a mile. It was heavily armed and surrounded by a ditch. The others were redoubts not unlike those which were thrown up around Washington City. These works the Confederates placed under a strong guard for the purpose of holding the pursuers in check, while the main body pressed on so as to place the Chickahominy between them and the Nationals.

The pursuing army was headed by General Stoneman, with his cavalry and horse artillery. Stoneman was followed along the Yorktown Road by the divisions of Generals Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, and along the Winn's Mill Road by the divisions of Generals W. F. Smith, Darius N. Couch and Silas Casey, of Keyes' corps. The commands of Richardson, of Sedgwick, and of Fitz John Porter were left at Yorktown, with instructions to hold themselves in readiness to advance as a supporting force, if required, or, if deemed more important, to follow and co-operate with Franklin's division, which was to move up the York River to West Point, and take possession of the terminus of the Richmond and York River Railroad. General Edwin V. Sumner, McClellan's second in command, was intrusted with the immediate direction of the pursuit. McClellan himself remained at Yorktown for the purpose of completing the arrangements necessary for the departure of Franklin up the York River.

General Stoneman, who moved some miles ahead of the rest of the army, touched the Confederate lines in the neighborhood of Fort Magruder. Exposed to the guns of the fort, and fiercely attacked by the Confederate cavalry, he was compelled to fall back. Meanwhile, Hooker and Smith's divisions, the latter ahead, were pressing forward with all haste on the Yorktown Road. On being informed of Stoneman's repulse, Hooker, feeling the necessity of despatch, obtained leave from General Heintzelman to throw his division on the Hampton or Warwick roads. Having Smith no longer in front, he was able to move with greater ease and rapidity. Sumner, having hurried forward with Smith's division, reached the place where Stoneman was halting about five o'clock in the afternoon. By midnight, Hooker, who had made the best possible use of his time, had his men in position on Smith's left. Here the troops rested on their arms until the morning.

The 4th of May, 1862, is one of the memorable Sundays of the war. It had rained all day, and the roads were almost impassable. At night the rain continued. "That was a fearful night," wrote one who was present with the army; "and that was a strange, eventful bivouac. The roads being in a dreadfully muddy condition, the troops had had a difficult march; and then, at night, without shelter from the rain, which was
falling fast, without food or nourishment, they all, officers and soldiers, reposed that Sabbath night, as best they could, on the wet ground and among the forest trees.” The position of the army, as, in these circumstances, it sought rest for the night, was as follows: General Hooker’s division lay in front of the centre of the Confederate works; Smith’s division and Stoneman’s cavalry and artillery lay to the right. The divisions of Kearney and Couch had halted in the rear.

At break of day on the 5th, Hooker was up and in motion. Before the May 5th church clocks had struck six, he was in full view of the works which the Confederates had thrown up for defense; and the towers and spires of Williamsburg were clearly revealed across the open level plains. For well nigh a mile in front, the ground was obstructed by trees which had been felled for the purpose; and wherever the ground was open it was dotted with rifle-pits. Hooker lost no time in moving upon the foe. He knew that there were thirty thousand men within supporting distance, and that the bulk of the army of the Potomac was within four hours’ march. At half-past seven o’clock, he directed General Grover, with his brigade, to make the attack. The First Massachusetts, the Second New Hampshire, the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-Sixth Pennsylvania regiments were deployed in front, to the left of the Hampton Road, as skirmishers, with orders to pick off the Confederate sharpshooters and artillerists, while Captain Weber, with his battery, was pushed into the open field, until they were within seven hundred yards of Fort Magruder. The Confederates were not found unprepared. Before the disposition of the National troops was completed, the guns of the fort and of one of the adjoining redoubts opened a heavy fire, killing two of Weber’s officers and several of his men, and forcing the battery to fall back. The battery, however, was quickly re-manned by some volunteers from Osborn’s; and the guns were soon in position and responding to the fire of the enemy. Bramhall’s New York battery came up opportunely and took a position to the right of Weber’s. The two batteries were supported by the Fifth New Jersey regiment; and while the batteries poured forth their shot and shell with terrible rapidity and with deadly aim, the rifle bullets of the infantry did scarcely less effective work. Within an hour and a half the Confederate troops which had appeared on the plain were dispersed, and the guns of their works apparently silenced.

The battle, however, was as yet only beginning. The Confederates, at the very moment victory seemed secured by the Nationals, began to appear in great force. We have already seen that the main body of the Confederate army had left Williamsburg, and was on its way towards Richmond before Hooker came up. It was only, therefore, with the rearguard of the retreating army, and with the troops which had been left behind to man the fort and the redoubts, that the Nationals had as yet been engaged. After Hooker had sent out his skirmi
ishers, and the National batteries had opened fire, Johnston began to perceive that the pressure of the pursuers was much greater than he had been led to suspect from the ordinarily dilatory movements of McClellan. Longstreet's division had already passed through Williamsburg. It was ordered back by Johnston to give its support to the rear-guard. It was this division which now appeared on the scene of conflict, and gave new life to the struggle. Longstreet's men were fresh and full of vigor; and when they fell in force upon Patterson's New Jersey brigade, which had been engaged all the morning, it was felt that the contest was unequal. Hooker, therefore, sent to Patterson's assistance Brigadier-General Grover, with the First Massachusetts and two regiments of the Excelsior brigade, the Twentieth and Seventy-Second New York. At the same time the Eleventh Pennsylvania and Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts came up to the Yorktown Road; and Colonel Blaisdell, who commanded them, was ordered to clear the road and form a connection with Heintzelman's corps.

Blaisdell promptly put the order in execution. His men marched steadily forward until they were within fifty yards of the enemy; and here occurred one of those cruel pieces of deception to which the Confederates on more than one occasion resorted. "Don't fire on your friends," shouted a Confederate officer, displaying a white flag. Blaisdell ordered his men to cease firing; and Private Doherty advanced to take the flag. "Now, give it them," ex-
and Gholson, and Pryor and others, having hurried back from the direction of the Chickahominy; and the increasing strength of Johnston's army was steadily concentrating on Hooker's left. The situation was becoming critical. The Confederates had three times charged the National centre; they had made a bold dash from Fort Magruder, and captured five of Weber's guns; they had worn out some of the best National regiments, and thinned several of the National brigades; but Hooker, still unaided against the superior and rapidly increasing strength of his antagonist, tenaciously held his ground.

As early as half-past eleven o'clock, Hooker sent a despatch to the assistant-adjutant-general of General Heintzelman, to whose corps his division belonged. In that despatch he said: "I have had a hard contest all the morning, but do not despair of success. My men are all at work, but a great deal exhausted. It is reported to me that my communication with you by the Yorktown Road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry and infantry can take part by the side of mine and whip the enemy." Later in the day, and again and again, he addressed appeals for help to Sumner, but in vain. One o'clock, two o'clock, three o'clock struck, and still no help came, with the exception of Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, which arrived early in the afternoon, and was posted on his right, where it helped to repel several Confederate attacks. Later in the day two more of Couch's brigades came up; but as Hooker's men were completely exhausted, and their ammu-

nition failing, it was too late to enable him to make any vigorous aggressive effort. Between four and five in the afternoon, General Philip Kearney, with his division, appeared on the scene of action, and, with characteristic energy, pressed to the front. Hooker, with his thinned ranks and worn-out men, withdrew from the fight and rested as a reserve. He had lost in the battle one thousand seven hundred men. We do not much wonder that Hooker was indignant that his morning efforts were not more effectively backed by the strength of the other divisions of the army, and that he was allowed, after victory had become impossible to him and his brave soldiers, to fight so long unaided against such fearful odds. "History," he afterwards wrote, "will not be believed, when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades, with arms in their hands; nevertheless, it is true." Of this, however, more anon.

Kearney, as we have just said, pressed to the front. General Berry, whose brigade of Kearney's division, followed by Thomson's batteries, was the first to arrive on the ground, was immediately put into action. The brigade consisted of the Fifth Michigan, the Thirty-Seventh New York, and the Second Michigan. The Fifth Michigan was filed off into the woods to the left of the Hampton Road, and was supported by the Thirty-Seventh New York. A charge was ordered on the left; and the
regiments just named “advanced in splendid style, driving the enemy before them, away from the fallen timber, and out of the rifle-pits beyond.” In this charge the Fifth Michigan suffered severely, Colonel Terry and nearly all his subordinate officers being wounded; but they stoutly held the ground which they had so gallantly won. The Confederates were now making vigorous and determined efforts on the National centre. They had captured some of Bramhall’s guns; and they seemed resolved to silence and capture the whole battery. To check these efforts, a battery in charge of Captain Smith was planted, en echelon, on a rising knoll, to the right of the road. At the same time, two companies of the Second Michigan were ordered to charge on the enemy’s skirmishers who were thronging about the coveted guns. The charge was gallantly made; and what with the effective fire from Smith’s battery, the Confederates were driven back. General Birney, who, with two regiments of his brigade—the Thirty-Eighth New York and the Fortieth New York—had been deployed on the right to relieve Hancock’s weary men, now came forward. The Confederates had resumed firing from their forts; and they were again pressing forward with their troops. Colonel Ward, with two companies of the Thirty-Eighth New York, made a brilliant dash down the road, taking the rifle-pits by the flank. The charge was completely successful; and the Confederates were driven from their position. Encouraged by Colonel Ward’s success, Kearney ordered a portion of the Fortieth New York to sustain him in another charge to the Confederate rear. This detachment was led by Captain Mindel, Birney’s chief of staff. The charge was gallantly made, and was even more effective than the preceding. The Confederates fell back; and there was no more firing either from the rifle-pits or by the artillery. The rear-brigade of Kearney’s division, under General Jameson, now reached this portion of the field; a second line was at once formed; and arrangements were made for further vigorous efforts. But darkness fell upon the scene; and the wearied soldiers, seeking repose, stretched themselves on the rain-soaked and blood-stained battle field.

While these events were taking place on the National left, events of equal importance were occurring on the extreme right. At an early hour in the day, fears were entertained that the Confederates might make a dangerous movement in that direction; and in obedience to orders from Sumner, the general in command, General Smith sent Hancock, with about twenty-five hundred men, to hold the enemy in check, and, if possible, to make a flank movement upon the works. Hancock’s command consisted partly of his own and partly of Davidson’s brigade. For the special duty assigned him, Hancock selected from his own brigade the Fifth Wisconsin, the Forty-Ninth Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Maine, and, from Davidson’s brigade, the Seventh Maine and Thirty-Ninth New York volunteers. These were accompanied by the batteries of Crowen and Wheeler. One of the
redoubts which had been thrown up by Magruder, and which was near to the extreme Confederate left, was discovered to be unoccupied. Its existence, it appears, had been unknown to Johnston and his officers. The redoubt occupied a conspicuous and important position. It stood upon a high bank, looking down upon a ravine, and commanded a dam on what is called Cut Dam Creek, a small tributary of Queen's Creek, and was about a mile and a half eastward of the Yorktown Road. Having crossed this creek, Hancock experienced no difficulty in taking possession of the redoubt. Another redoubt, about twelve hundred yards in advance, was found to be unoccupied. This, also, was taken possession of. Between the redoubts now occupied by Hancock's men and Fort Magruder there were other two redoubts; but these were manned by Confederate forces, more or less strong. A few shells were flung at these redoubts, and a brisk fire was opened upon them at the same time by some sharpshooters; and they, too, were soon deserted. General Hancock had accomplished, without the least difficulty, more, perhaps, than he had expected to accomplish by severe and protracted fighting. But the evil genius of that ill-starred day would not allow him to reap the full rewards of victory. He had not around him a sufficient number of men to warrant his occupation of the two deserted redoubts. There was no lack of men in the immediate neighborhood; but they were neither at hand nor in hand. It was Hooker's experience over again. He could make no further aggressive efforts without reinforcements. Meantime, Johnston discovered the blunder he had made in not making himself familiar with the ground. He ought to have known of the existence of these redoubts. They were all-important; for they were in the flank and rear of his line of defense. Unless speedily reclaimed, his line would be not only menaced in its integrity, but practically broken. By all means, the Nationals must be driven from this position. Such was the necessity which Johnston felt laid upon him. With this end in view, he gave instructions to General Hill to send a force of sufficient strength to expel Hancock from the redoubts and drive him back upon his own lines. The task was assigned to General Jubal Early, with a force of Virginia and North Carolina troops. Hancock, meanwhile, had been earnestly calling for reinforcements. It was all in vain. Sumner had been unable to send assistance to Hooker because of the number of men he had placed under Hancock; and now he professes himself unable to succor and strengthen Hancock from a fear that he might thereby weaken his centre, and so place his whole army in peril. In place of receiving reinforcements, Hancock was ordered to abandon the redoubts and fall back upon his original position. It was a painful order to execute; but he had no choice. With the small number of men at his command, it was impossible for him to retain the position he had taken in face of the overwhelmingly superior numbers of the enemy. If, however, he must fall back, he will fall back in
good order, contesting every inch of ground and saving his command. About five o'clock in the afternoon, he saw the two redoubts nearest Fort Magruder reoccupied by the Confederates. Their forward movement was fairly begun. In the most perfect order, and keeping his ranks in line, Hancock drew back his brigade. Retiring regiment by regiment, and carrying his artillery back piece by piece, maintaining, meanwhile, a vigorous fire upon the advancing foe, he reached the crest of a ridge not far from the dam above mentioned. There he halted, and forming his men in line of battle, he calmly awaited Early's approach. On came the Confederates in great force, firing as they advanced, shouting and yelling "Bull Run," "Ball's Bluff," and other offensive expressions. They had reached within thirty paces of his line, when Hancock, with as much politeness as bravery, exclaimed, "Gentlemen, charge!" With enthusiastic cheers, his gallant soldiers dashed down the slope. The attack was irresistible. The Confederates broke and fled at the first touch of the bayonet. The Nationals, halting, fired some ten or a dozen volleys into the broken ranks. When the smoke cleared off, some five hundred of Early's men were found dead or wounded on the field. The remainder were in full retreat towards the Confederate lines. The battle of Williamsburg was now practically ended. Hancock had won no great victory; he had not dared to follow the retreating foe; but he had secured the key of the position. Here he remained, waiting for reinforcements; but when these were forwarded to him by special orders from McClellan himself, who had now arrived on the field, they were no longer necessary. The battle had ceased all along the line.

There were other struggles during the day, one particularly late in the afternoon, a little to the right of the Confederate works, on the Yorktown Road. Here, in the open space, Peck's brigade encountered the Confederates in force; and after severe fighting they were compelled to fall back, Generals Kleim and Devens, with their respective brigades, of Casey's division, coming to their relief. The two great features of the day's contest were the heroic resistance of Hooker on the left and the splendid charge made by Hancock on the extreme right. Hooker and Hancock, and after them Kearney—these were the men who won the laurels at Williamsburg.*

*Joseph Hooker was born in 1819, in Hadley, Massachusetts. He was appointed a cadet at West Point in 1833. He took part in the Mexican war, serving in the same regiment with "Stonewall" Jackson, and becoming aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Hamer. In 1848, having passed through the various grades, he was promoted to a full colonelcy, and entered the Adjutant-General's Department at Washington. In 1858 he resigned, went to California, and combined the duties of farmer with those of railroad constructor. He superintended the building of the National road. When the war broke out in 1861, he returned and was present as a spectator at the battle of Bull Run. Soon afterwards we find him appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of a new regiment of regulars. Later he was made Brigadier-General of volunteers. His first active duties were in Maryland and Eastern Virginia. He made himself useful in helping to clear the Potomac of the Confederate blockading batteries. When McClellan moved to the Peninsula, Hooker's brigade was added to the command, and he himself placed at the head of a division. At Williamsburg, as we have seen, he established his reputation as one of the first soldiers of the republic. His name will frequently again appear in these annals.
According to the official reports, the National loss on Monday, May 5th, was 456 killed, 1411 wounded, and about 500 missing. The loss sustained by the Confederates was not quite so great; but, including killed, wounded and missing, it could scarcely have been under one thousand men. Hooker's division suffered most severely of all, the loss being in the proportion of one to six—a proportion of loss equal to that of the allied armies at Alma, one of the bloodiest battles of which history has preserved any record.

On the night after the battle, the soldiers of the National army rested on their arms on the ground where they fought during the day, some of them in front of the Confederate works, and not a few of them in close proximity to the bodies of their dead or wounded companions in arms. It was uncertain as yet what would be required of them on the following day. The Confederates still held their position; and there was no good reason for believing that they would not renew the fight in the morning. Shortly after midnight it was rumored that the works were being evacuated, and that according to appearances a retreat would be effected during the night. When morning dawned, what was report was found to be a fact. The defenses were abandoned; and in their march to new ground beyond the Chickahominy, the Confederates were leaving behind them the town of Williamsburg. Fort Magruder and the redoubts were speedily occupied by the Nationals; and the Confederate rear-guard had not yet left the city on the one side when General Jameson entered it on the other. Williamsburg was found to be deserted.

Of all the battles fought during the continuance of the war, none was more unsatisfactory, so far as the North was concerned, than the battle of Williamsburg. It was not that there was any lack of bravery on the part of the men. It was not that there was a want of pluck or skill on the part of those by whom they were immediately led. On the contrary, never was more heroism displayed than that exhibited by Hooker and the men of his division.
as, during the weary hours of that day, they resisted, unaided, the vastly superior forces of the Confederates; and certainly there never was a more gallant charge than that made by Hancock and his little band down the ridge by the dam at Queen's Creek. Nor is it possible to speak in terms of too high commendation of the conduct of Kearney and his men when, after coming to the relief of Hooker, they charged the Confederates in front and flank and rear, driving them from their defenses, out of the redoubts, out of the rifle-pits, and out of the open ground, away into the woods beyond. From the actual work done by those commanders, and by the men who followed their lead, it is clear that the secret of the bungling inefficiency of that day on the outskirts of Williamsburg lay not with the army, properly so called, nor with the division leaders, but with those who were in supreme control. How Hooker could be left so long unaided, while whole divisions, not yet engaged or even menaced, were within easy distance, we confess we seek in vain for a satisfactory explanation. And why Hancock, after he had successfully captured the redoubts on the extreme right, should have been ordered to fall back, is to us beset with the same difficulties.

The success which attended Kearney in his repeated aggressive efforts, and the comparative ease with which Hancock forced a retreat, show that the foe was much less redoubtable than was imagined; and there can be no doubt that, if timely and sufficient aid had been sent to the one and the other, the battle would have been less enduring, and the victory more complete. The retreat of the Confederates from Williamsburg this second time ought to have been impossible. Their works, including Fort Magruder, ought to have been cleared, and the Confederate rear-guard captured or destroyed, before Longstreet could have had time to return to the aid of his comrades. In that case, the battle of Williamsburg would have been unnecessary. A little more energy on the part of the Nationals, with greater unity of action and community of purpose, and Johnston would have found it impossible to do what he actually accomplished even after the battle of Williamsburg—to place the Chickahominy and its fever-breeding borders between himself and his opponents. A common purpose and unity of action were sadly and visibly wanting throughout the whole contest. How differently things were managed at Shiloh, and, later, at Iuka and Corinth! How different at Perryville and Murfreesboro!

We have said that the secret of the mismanagement was to be sought not among the men, not among the subordinate officers or generals of divisions, but in higher places. McClellan, it must be admitted, made a mistake in placing Sumner in chief command of the pursuing army. General Sumner was undoubtedly a brave and capable commander, as he showed subsequently at Antietam and at Fredericksburg; but it has been known in all time that men capable of great effort and great
enterprise, when acting in a secondary capacity, are not necessarily possessed of those qualities which enable them to force success, when acting on their own responsibility. Many first-rate corps commanders and generals of divisions have proved but sorry commanders-in-chief. Our own Civil War, on the one side and the other, revealed many such; and it is no serious charge to make against General Sumner to say that, in the battle before Williamsburg, he did not prove himself to be possessed of those higher qualities—that eagle eye for the situation, that promptitude in sending assistance to the weak and menaced points, that power of holding the army in hand and utilizing all its strength towards the desired result—which are absolutely essential in a general-in-chief on the field of battle. It appears that McClellan had some hesitation about the appointment. His first intention, we understand, was to appoint Heintzelman. Heintzelman might have been a better appointment; but he might not; and what we do know for certain is that Sumner was a failure. This, however, brings us to the real source of trouble—the principal cause of complaint.

Why was not McClellan present in person? Why was it necessary for him to delegate, on such an occasion, powers and responsibilities so important? He had wasted a month before Yorktown laboriously constructing extensive and costly siege works. In spite of his vast preparations and costly care, the enemy had escaped from his grasp before his works were finished, or, at least, before they were turned to any practical account. It would surely not have been unnatural for him, yielding to feelings of mortification and disappointment, which most men would have felt in the circumstances, to seize the opportunity so unexpectedly offered to follow the retreating hosts of the enemy, and to smite them hip and thigh before they had time to cross the Chickahominy. But McClellan did not so feel—did not so judge—did not so act. What did he do? He sent five divisions of his army, under Sumner, to pursue the Confederates. Retaining three divisions with him, he remained at Yorktown, ostensibly for the purpose of superintending the arrangements necessary for the transport of Franklin's division up the York River. It would not do to belittle Franklin's expedition. It was, no doubt, all-important that West Point and the Richmond and York River Railway Terminus should be in the hands of the Nationals. That, however, is not the question. The question rather is, whether the general-in-chief was more needed at Yorktown or at the head of the army of pursuers. The mere statement of the actual facts of the case is the best answer which can be given to the question. While McClellan, with three divisions of his army, besides that of Franklin, was idling at Yorktown, Hooker was maintaining an unequal struggle, his men being cut to pieces in the very "presence of thirty thousand of their comrades," and Hancock,
after having won a substantial victory, was compelled to relinquish his prize and fall back, for the want of support which existed on the very skirts of the battle field in the shape of whole divisions. Such was the wretched management of the forces sent in pursuit that, when the battle was ended, the divisions of Smith and Couch and Casey had scarcely been called upon to act.

It was near the close of the battle before McClellan appeared on the field. It was too late for him to contribute in any appreciable way to the result of the struggle. He gave orders to Smith, when made aware of Hancock's position, to forward reinforcements at once; but Hancock had accomplished his task before the reinforcements arrived. The circumstances which brought McClellan to the field redound but little to his credit. General Sprague and the Prince de Joinville, during the confusion which prevailed in front in consequence of the absence of a skilful directing hand, rode in haste to Yorktown, and urged the general to hasten at once to the scene of action. The answer was as cold as it was curt. "I suppose those in front can attend to that little matter." Ultimately, however, he was induced to mount his horse and hasten forward. It was about two o'clock when he started from Yorktown. It was five o'clock when he approached the field of action; Kearney on the left and Hancock on the right were just about to deal those final blows which determined the issue of the contest; and the sounds of battle, as well as the evidences of hard work which were visible as he drew near the front, convinced him that the day's struggle had been something far other than a "skirmish with the rebel rear-guard." His appearance on the field was the occasion of the wildest demonstration of applause. Regiment after regiment, as he was recognized, tendered him a welcome, than which none more hearty was ever given to the great Napoleon himself. Mounted on a splendid charger, which he gracefully rode, and dressed in a plain blue coat and glaze-covered cap, himself and horse literally covered with mud, his whole appearance was admirably suited to the situation. It was, no doubt, the opinion of many of those brave men, who were willing to be led against the enemy, that if the general had been present, the day's struggle would have had a different and more noble ending. The enthusiasm with which he was greeted ought to have been felt by him as a severe rebuke for his absence; for it testified to the existence on the part of his troops of a warm and deep-rooted affection, which he had but poorly rewarded.

When the battle was ended, McClellan countermanded the order which he gave to Sedgwick and Richardson on leaving Yorktown; and instead of advancing, with their divisions, to the front, they were directed to accompany Franklin to West Point. From "Bivouac, in front of Williamsburg," he telegraphed to the War Department that the Confederates were before him in great force, that they were probably
in point of numbers stronger than himself, and in all likelihood well-entrenched. In the same message, he said he would "run the risk of holding them in check there." On the following day he telegraphed to the secretary of war the particulars of the previous day's struggle. He estimated his loss at two thousand two hundred and twenty-eight, of whom four hundred and fifty-six were killed and fourteen hundred wounded. He indicated no desire for a rapid forward movement. The last words of the despatch were, "We have other battles to fight before reaching Richmond." It was not until the 8th that the march was resumed; and when it was resumed, it was conducted in a manner so dilatory that it may justly be characterized as suicidal. Eleven days were consumed in accomplishing what might have been done in three. It is not wonderful that the people became impatient because of the slow execution of their desire and will, and weary of promises always fair but always fruitless. The words of President Lincoln were now seen to be more and more prophetic. After Williamsburg, as before Yorktown, it was "the story of Manassas repeated." McClellan would not "strike a blow."
Chapter XVI.

West Point.—York River.—Franklin’s Command.—The Gunboats.—West Point Occupied.—Norfolk.—General Wool.—Lincoln, Stanton and Chase at Fortress Monroe.—Sewall’s Point.—Colonel T. J. Cram.—Ocean View.—Surrender of Norfolk.—General Huger.—The Gunboats on the James River.—Ward’s Bluff.—The James and York Rivers Both Open.—McClellan’s Position Advantageous.—William and Mary College.—The National Advance after Williamsburg.—Bad Roads.—The Pamunkey River.—Tunstall’s Station.—The Chickahominy.—Bottom Bridge.—The Railroad Bridge.—Gaines’ Mills.—New Bridge.—Hanover Court House.—Mechanicsville.—Peake’s Station.—Cool Arbor.—Ashland.—Vigorous Encounter Near Hanover Court House.—A National Victory.—The 30th of May.—The Williamsburg Road.—The Battle Ground.—Fair Oaks and Seven Pines.—McClellan’s Headquarters.—New Bridge.—General Casey.—General Keyes.—White Oak Swamp.—The Position of the Two Armies.—The Army of the Potomac.—Time Lost.—A Critical Position.—A Heavy Rain Storm.—Johnston’s Opportunities.—The Confederates March to the Attack.—The Attack. The National Advance Driven In.—The Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines Begun.—Casey’s Division Fights Bravely, but Hard Pressed.—Compelled to Fall Back.—A Furious Charge.—The Battle Raging.—The Rail Fence.—General Rains.—The Nationals Fall Back upon the Second Line.—General Couch.—Couch Not Unprepared.—Heintzelman Comes Up and Takes Command.—Berry and Jameson.—Birney.—Heintzelman Sorely Pressed.—Couch’s Command Severed.—The Entire Left Wing of the National Army in Peril.—Couch Forms a Double Line of Battle.—Heintzelman’s Promptitude.—McClellan and Sumner Warned.—The Chickahominy Flooded.—The Grapevine Bridge.—Sumner Moves to the Assistance of the Right Wing.—A Critical Moment.—Sumner on the Scene.—A Timely Arrival.—A Tremendous Volley.—Morgan, of Sedgwick’s Division.—Abercrombie in Difficulty.—Johnston Wounded.—Still the Battle Rages.—An Attempt to Outflank Sumner’s Right.—Night and Rest.—The Second Day.—The Order of Battle.—The Battle Resumed.—Hooker.—Richardson.—Stoneman.—French.—Howard.—Meagher.—Roger A. Pryor.—Mahone Comes to the Aid of Pryor.—Meagher Ordered Up.—Barriers of Bristling Steel.—General Howard Wounded.—The Confederates Fall Back.—The Firing Ceases.—McClellan’s Purpose.—Fatal Delay.—Hooker Looking into Richmond.—Hooker Rebuffed and Recalled.—Heavy Losses on Both Sides.—No Glory to McClellan.

On the evening of the day which witnessed the battle of Williamsburg, McClellan countermanded the orders which he had given to Franklin, Sedgwick and Richardson. It was no longer necessary that they should advance towards the front. Franklin received instructions to proceed to West Point, at the head of the York River; and Sedgwick, Richardson and Fitz John Porter were to bear him company. During the night the transports reached their destination; and early on the morning of May 6th, Newton’s brigade landed and took position on an open plain, on the right bank of the Pamunkey, one of the principal affluents of the York River. Within twenty-four hours Franklin’s whole division had encamped, the gunboats had taken possession of West Point, and the National flag was floating over the little village. The other divisions were also promptly on hand.

During the night of the 7th, the Confederate pickets ventured to draw near the National encampment, and a guard belonging to the latter was shot. Franklin was thus
admonished that the enemy was not far off; and preparations were made for a possible engagement on the following morning. At early dawn, skirmishers were thrown out towards the edge of the woods; and the whole force was drawn up on the plains, ready to welcome the foe, should he make his appearance. As the Confederates seemed in no haste to show themselves, the National troops were recalled to breakfast; the Thirty-Second New York, and the Ninety-Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Pennsylvania regiments being left as an advanced guard near the skirts of the woods which, with the exception of the side towards the river, completely surrounded the plain. It was not long until the Confederates began to show themselves more openly and in greater strength. On the west side of the river, there appeared a considerable force; but a vigorous fire having been opened upon them by the gunboats, they were compelled to retire. No time was now lost in landing the troops from the transports; and by nine o'clock in the morning General Dana had got his brigade ashore. The Confederate scouts were now becoming troublesome; and the Sixteenth, Thirty-First and Thirty-Second New York, and the Ninety-Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Pennsylvania were ordered to enter and clear the woods. The scouts retired at their approach; but the Nationals soon found themselves opposed by large bodies of the retreating army; and, as these were advantageously posted, and well supplied with artillery, it was feared that the above-named regiments might be overwhelmed. They were therefore withdrawn. Meanwhile, the Second United States battery, under Captain Arnold, and the First Massachusetts battery were ordered into position, the former on the right and the latter on the left; and so vigorous was the fire of shell, that the Confederates were driven from their shelter in the woods and forced toward the river, where they came full under the fire of the gunboats. They had now no choice but to retire. In this encounter, the Nationals lost one hundred and ninety-four men—the Thirty-First and Thirty-Second New York having suffered most severely. The Confederate loss was not so great. The Nationals, however, had made themselves masters of the position; and secured the head of the York River as a base of supplies for the army of the Potomac.

While Franklin was establishing himself at West Point, and while McClellan was slowly pressing forward with a view of establishing a communication between the main body of the army and the divisions at the head of the York River, events of the utmost importance were taking place at Norfolk, far to the rear of the National army. From the time McClellan had decided to march to Richmond by way of the Peninsula, General Wool, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, saw the great advantages which would result from the possession of the James River. As a highway for the supplies of the army, it would be in-
valuable. It would be all the more so if the York River was also wrenched from Confederate control. Influenced by these views, he had urged the government to allow him to attempt the capture of Norfolk, and so break up the blockade of the James. It was not until the evacuation of Yorktown, and until he had renewed his request, that his suggestions were regarded with any degree of favor. The views of General Wool so impressed the government, that a visit was made to Fortress Monroe by President Lincoln, and Secretaries Chase and Stanton. The shore was carefully reconnoitred; and Lincoln, though he saw some difficulties in the way of effecting a landing, in consequence of the shallowness of the water, warmly encouraged the plan—overcoming objections by vigorous and practical suggestions, which showed that on the battle-field, as in the council chamber, he was capable of winning distinction. The order was given on the 8th of May for an immediate attempt to be made on Sewall’s Point and a march on Norfolk. Arrangements were made with Commodore Goldsborough; and a large number of troops were embarked on transports then lying in Hampton Roads. Goldsborough moved towards Sewall’s Point, and opened fire upon the batteries; but the batteries on the Point replied with such spirit, and the Merrimac having come to their aid, the National vessels withdrew, and the troops were disembarked.

On the following day, General Wool, with Colonel T. J. Cram and Secretary Chase, made a reconnaissance along the shore, when it was decided to land five thousand troops at a place called Ocean View. A successful landing made at this point would enable the Nationals to strike Sewall’s Point in the rear, and would open up a direct road to Norfolk. The troops were again embarked; and while a bombardment was kept up on the Point from the Rip Raps, with the intention of convincing the Confederates that the purpose still was to move direct on Sewall’s Point, a landing was successfully made at Ocean View. Before dawn on May 10, Captain Davis’ company, of Richardson’s light artillery, followed by the Twentieth New York regiment, was safe on shore. General Weber pushed on with the advance; but no opposition was offered, the Confederates having already abandoned the position. About 8 o’clock in the morning, General Wool, accompanied by the president and by the two secretaries above named, together with Generals Mansfield and Viele, arrived on the scene, and took command in person. The infantry were now pushed on towards Turner’s Creek; but the bridge had been set on fire by the Confederates; and a circuitous route to reach Norfolk was rendered necessary. There was now a general advance ordered; and at five o’clock in the afternoon, the lines of the Confederate intrenched camp were reached. Twenty-nine cannon were found in position, but there were no troops. On marched the Nationals; and just as they were about to enter the city, the mayor, preceded
by a flag of truce, and accompanied by several members of the Common Council, came out to meet them with a proposal of surrender. Huger, it appears, who had charge of the city, had orders not to attempt to hold the city against any serious demonstration of National troops; and when he was informed of the landing of General Wool at Ocean View, he turned over the city of Norfolk to Mayor Lamb, and fled, with his troops, towards Richmond. Having received the surrender, General Wool issued an order from the City Hall, informing the inhabitants of what had taken place, appointing General Egbert Viele military governor; and directing that all peaceful citizens should be protected in the free use and exercise of their lawful rights and privileges. About midnight General Wool, who rode back to Ocean View, had crossed to Fortress Monroe with the pleasing intelligence that Norfolk had fallen. The president and Secretary Stanton were there to receive him.

The Confederate commander, Huger, had evidently resolved to leave as little behind him as possible. The Navy Yard and works at Portsmouth were found to be on fire; and although every effort was made to save the place, the fire gained the mastery, and ships, gunboats, workshops and machinery of various kinds were all destroyed. On the morning of the morning of the May 11th, the Merrimac, which, on the retirement of the Confederates, had had a slow match applied to the magazine, exploded with a tremendous noise, the huge monster being blown into a thousand fragments. All the defenses in and about the city, and all the formidable works on the Elizabeth River and on the borders of Chesapeake Bay, including Sewall’s Point and Craney Island, were abandoned; and about two hundred cannon, with a large quantity of ammunition, were left as spoil for the victors. The destruction of the Merrimac, judged from a Confederate standpoint, seems to have been a great blunder; and it was so judged at the time. It was natural and proper enough for them, in the circumstances, to destroy the Navy Yard, and to put out of the way everything which should add to the strength of their enemy; but the Merrimac was practically invulnerable; and she might have been retained and used by the Confederates much to the inconvenience of the Nationals. As it was, the James River was free for the passage of the gunboats; and without delay, and experiencing but little difficulty, they were pushed forward, day by day, until they were brought to a halt at Ward’s Bluff. At this point, the river was too narrow and the Confederate works too strong for the gunboats to pass. A bold and vigorous attempt was made on the 15th, May 15, on which day they had worked their way so far up the windings of the stream; but it was adjudged to be "impossible to reduce such works except with the aid of a land force," and the vessels were withdrawn. Up to this point the river was open; and McClellan, in his advance up the
Peninsula and towards Richmond, had now the full advantage of both the James and the York.

We have followed Franklin, with his own division and those of Sedgwick, Richardson and Fitz John Porter, up from Yorktown, along the York, to West Point. We have recounted the details of the encounter which they had with the Confederates shortly after their landing at what was called Brick House Point. We have also described the surrender of Norfolk, the explosion of the Merrimac, the abandonment of the forts on the Elizabeth and on the borders of the Chesapeake, and the other events which left the James River, like the York, in the possession of the Nationals. These two episodes form a natural, as they are a necessary, introduction to the battle of "Fair Oaks," or "Seven Pines," as it is sometimes called. McClellan now found himself in a really advantageous position. Had events resulted in perfect conformity with his own desires and interests, they could hardly have been other than they were. Free from all danger of attack in the rear, and having complete command of both great waterways, he had only to think of the foe in his front. Let us now return to the main army, which we left under the personal command of McClellan.

Having made provision for his sick and wounded in the halls of the venerable college of William and Mary, he began to move forward on the 8th of May, the third day after the battle of Williamsburg. Stoneman was sent in advance to open a communication with Franklin and the other divisions which had accompanied or followed him up the York River. The roads were in a wretched condition; and the march was conducted in circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty. It was one of the most beautiful and fertile portions of Virginia; but the retreating army had spared no pains to injure the roads and to multiply obstructions. On the 15th, McClellan had advanced to the neighborhood of White House, at the head of the navigation of the Pamunkey, and some eighteen miles from Richmond. On the 18th, he had reached Tunstall's Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad; and on the 22d, he established his headquarters at Cool Arbor, not far from the Chickahominy, and between eight and nine miles from Richmond. His advanced light troops had already reached Bottom Bridge, on the Chickahominy, at the crossing of the New Kent Road. In their retreat, the Confederates had turned the bridge, but had left the point uncovered. Casey's division, of Keyes' corps, was soon across the river; and the heights on the Richmond side were occupied. He was followed close by Heintzelman. Pressed by Stoneman, the Confederates had retreated across the railroad bridge which passes over the Chickahominy, a little to the north of Bottom Bridge—destroying it as they crossed. Stoneman halted and took a position at Gaines' Mills, whence active and suc-
cessful reconnaissances were made, a number of the Confederate scouts and advance troops, after some skirmishing, being driven from their posts at New Bridge.

While thus feeling his way, and getting his army into position, McClellan detached Fitz John Porter from the main body, which was still on the left of the Chickahominy, on an expedition to Hanover Court House. His object was to disperse the forces of the Confederates concentrated at that point, and to cut off their railroad communications between Richmond and Fredericksburg. It was hoped, also, that he might facilitate the advance of McDowell's corps, whose approach McClellan anxiously awaited; but operations in the Shenandoah Valley, hereafter to be described, made McDowell's advance in this direction impossible. This detachment moved, by way of Mechanicsville, early on May 27. General Emory led the advance, with the Fifth and Sixth Regular Cavalry and Benson's horse battery, supported by Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield and McQuade, with Berdan's sharpshooters and three batteries under Captain Griffin. Warren, with his provisional brigade, moved towards the same point by another road. The rain had fallen heavily during the early hours of the morning; and the roads, in consequence, were in a fearful condition. The troops, however, bore bravely up. When about six miles from Hanover Court House, the mounted pickets of the Confederates came into view, but they speedily disappeared. The Nationals kept moving on until they were within about two miles of the Court House, when they were brought to halt by a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. The Twenty-Fifth New York suffered severely; two of their companies were cut off and captured; and they were compelled to fall back. Meanwhile, the batteries were hurried forward; and the main body of the Nationals rushed to the aid of the advance. After holding the ground obstinately for two hours, the Confederates were forced to retire, one of their guns being captured by the Seventeenth New York. They were vigorously pursued for some distance by the brigades of Butterfield and McQuade. Martindale's brigade was pushed forward to Peake's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, while Porter himself, with the rest of his force, advanced towards Hanover Court House. On his way to the railroad, Martindale encountered a Confederate force, and drove it towards Ashland. In the encounter, one of his mounted men was shot by a concealed foe; but this was the only casualty. Having destroyed a portion of the railroad, burned the bridge, and cut the telegraph wires, Martindale was on his way back to join the main body, when the Confederates, who had been reinforced by fresh troops from Richmond, and had contrived secretly to regain the cover of the woods, fell upon him with tremendous fury. His men fought like true heroes, boldly maintaining
Chickahominy, which Virginia these Bottom disappeared. angle, general shell. musketry the National 29th, the This He satisfied. his fifty line had be Here, The little General John Inside A had it renewal an hour, Cool Confederates this the close face and the wood. Meanwhile, this Confederates also, the Chickahominy and Williamsburg Road. The Chickahominy forms a line which runs from Bottom Bridge towards the southwest. The Williamsburg Road forms a line which, from the same point, runs almost due west. A little to the north of Bottom Bridge, the York River Railroad crosses the Chickahominy and runs towards Richmond in a line very nearly parallel with the Williamsburg Road. Inside of this angle, but towards Richmond, and with full command of the country in the rear, lay the Confederate army. All the bridges in the neighborhood, it will be remembered, were destroyed by the Confederates before the Nationals came up. Outside of the angle, and along the left or northeast bank of the Chickahominy, was ranged the great bulk of the National army. Here, at Cool Arbor, near New Bridge, were the headquarters of General McClellan. Here, too, a little further down the stream, were Franklin, Fitz John Porter and others. And here, too,
was General Sumner, further on still, towards the point of the angle, at Bottom Bridge. Bottom Bridge having been repaired, Keyes' corps, as we have seen, crossed the river on or about the morning of the 24th. He was followed by Heintzelman, who took up ground in his rear. Casey's division of the corps advanced as far as Fair Oaks Station, on the York River Railroad, where he took position, his line stretching from a point a little to the north of the railroad, southward as far as the Williamsburg Road. The ground was bounded on the left and front by dense woods. The edges of these woods were cut down to form abatis, in order to obstruct the enemy. A line of earthworks was also thrown up, consisting of a redoubt and some rifle-pits. Behind these Casey posted his troops—his first brigade on the right, his second in the centre, his third on the left, his picket-guards being pushed forward into the woods in front. About half a mile to the rear of Casey, at a place called Seven Pines, Couch was similarly posted, his line lying across the Williamsburg turnpike, and stretching from a point slightly to the south of that road, northward towards the York River Railroad. His right was thus slightly in the rear of Fair Oaks Station. In front of him the Williamsburg Road is intersected by a circuitous highway, called the "Nine Mile Road." Kearney's division, of Heintzelman's corps, was further in the rear, on the York River Railroad, and in the neighborhood of Savage's Station.

Hooker, with his division, also of Heintzelman's corps, was guarding the approaches to White Oak Swamp, which lay to the south of the Williamsburg Road, and stretched eastward as far as the Chickahominy.

Such was the position of the National army on the eve of the famous battle of Fair Oaks. We have already said that the position was one beset with considerable peril. One of the wings of that army, as we have shown, was on the right and the other was on the left side of the river. The right wing, which consisted of five divisions and the reserves, lay on the outside of the angle, on the side formed by the Chickahominy. The left wing, consisting of four divisions, lay, en echelon, along the line of the York River Railroad. From the extreme point of one wing to that of the other, by way of Bottom Bridge, which was the only available connection, was a distance of more than twelve miles, although by an air line the two wings were not at any point very far apart. It is manifest at a glance that McClellan, by allowing himself to drift into the position, gave the Confederates an immense advantage. Until he should succeed in throwing up new bridges across the Chickahominy—and there was no evidence that such work was going on—it naturally enough seemed to the Confederates a possibility to strike the National left, drive it into the river or swamp, or both, and perhaps annihilate it before any assistance could be rendered by the right. This was the plan of action decided upon
by the Confederate leader; and the delay of McClellan gave Johnston his opportunity. On the 24th, at the head of the advance, Keyes had crossed Bottom Bridge. It was now the 30th. Six days of comparative inaction had thus been allowed to elapse; and the National general-in-chief seemed as yet in no haste to adopt the initiative. He had told his troops, when giving instructions in regard to the crossing of the river on May 25, the 25th, to “go prepared for battle at a moment’s notice.” He had, a day or two later, appealed to the pride of his soldiers, and reminded them “that the army of the Potomac had never yet been checked.” Still, he seemed unwilling to strike the first blow, and so force the fight. This delay was all the more reprehensible, that the waters of the Chickahominy were already somewhat swollen, and the marshy ground around considerably flooded. A heavy rain storm, which might fall at any moment, would so flood the ground as to increase the peril which would attend the retreat of the National left, and would so swell the river as to make communication between the two wings impossible.

On this occasion, at least, the Fates seemed to be on the side of the Confederates. On the night of the 30th of May, there was a terrific rain storm in and around Richmond. It is described as resembling a tropical deluge. All the lower lands were flooded; and the Chickahominy overflowed its banks and washed away many of the bridges by which it was spanned. Johnston’s opportunity had come. He was not slow to see it. Everything was in readiness, and action was taken at once. Longstreet was ordered to go out by the Williamsburg Road, with his own and D. H. Hill’s division—Hill, with his division, to attack the Nationals in front; General Huger was ordered to move down the Charles City Road, and strike them on the left; while General G. W. Smith was directed to follow the New Bridge Road towards the “Old Tavern,” and then, by the Nine Mile Road, move towards their right at Fair Oaks. It was intended that all these troops should move simultaneously at dawn on the morning of the 31st; but so heavy were the roads, in consequence of the extraordinary rainfall, that it was ten o’clock before Hill’s division began to move. General Casey was not ignorant of the responsible and perilous position which he occupied. He knew that an attack was meditated; and he had every reason to believe that the first blow would fall upon his division. He had been busy all the morning making his ground secure. About eleven o’clock he was made aware that the Confederates were advancing in great force. He ordered his men to take to their arms. Almost as he gave orders, two shells came hissing along, too unmistakably announcing that the Confederates were close at hand. The spades and the axes with which the men had been working were speedily exchanged for the weapons of war. It was not too soon. Shortly before one
o'clock, the strength of the enemy and the violence of the attack were soon revealed by the appearance of the panic-stricken pickets of the National advance, who had been driven in. The One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania was sent forward to aid in resisting the attack. It was of no avail. At the first volley, two hundred men of this regiment were struck down. The remainder turned back and fled in a panic, exclaiming that they had been "cut to pieces." Casey's entire division was now got into line. Colonel Bailey, Casey's chief of artillery, soon had his batteries in action. Spratt's battery was posted in a field to the right of the road, near the edge of a wood, through which the Confederates were advancing. Regan's battery was stationed to the left of Spratt's. The batteries were supported by a powerful body of infantry, under General Naglee, consisting of the One Hundredth New York, the Eleventh Maine, the One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania and the Ninety-Third New York. Bates' battery, under Lieutenant Hart, was in the unfinished redoubt. Wessel's brigade was in the rifle-pits. Palmer's was held behind as a reserve. The batteries opened a vigorous fire and were well served. The infantry fought bravely, firing with great spirit, and contesting every inch of ground; but they were compelled to fall back towards the rifle-pits. The batteries, however, continued their fire, and succeeded for a time in holding the enemy at bay. Casey now began to perceive that the Confederates were gaining on his flanks. His artillery was in peril. With a view to prevent so great a disaster, he ordered a bayonet charge. This was gallantly performed by the regiments above named, in immediate charge of General Naglee. With a tremendous yell, the National troops sprang forward, and drove the enemy back to the adjacent woods. Here, however, they were assailed by a most murderous musket fire; and the Confederates rushed upon them, from the cover of the woods, in overwhelming numbers. The battle was now raging furiously. Spratt's battery, which had long resisted the Confederate advance at a rail-fence, and had driven them back again and again, was under the necessity of falling back for the want of ammunition. Regan's battery held out for a little while longer. It was now about three o'clock; and the conflict had been fierce since before one. About this time, General Rains forced his way to the rear of the redoubt; and multitudes of Confederates appeared at the rifle-pits. Casey, unable any longer to offer anything like effective resistance, ordered his troops to fall back upon the second line, in possession of Couch. The retreat was well conducted. The Confederates halted not, but pressed vigorously forward. Two of Spratt's guns fell into their hands, but happily they had been spiked; the cannon in the redoubt were seized by General Rhodes and turned upon the fugitives; yet, in spite of the odds which were arrayed against them, and the terrific fire to which, in their
retreat, they were exposed, Casey’s men carried off with them, and brought safe to the second line, three fourths of their guns.

Couch was not unprepared for the stern duties which now devolved upon him. Several of his regiments had been ordered forward to Casey’s relief by his corps commander, General Keyes. Four of these regiments—the Fifty-Fifth New York, the Twenty-Third, Sixty-First and Ninety-Third Pennsylvania—had been in the thick of the fight, when it raged most violently, and had been severely punished. These regiments, with the Seventh Massachusetts and Sixty-Second New York, which had been sent after them, were all pressed back again towards the right of the second line, which, it will be remembered, rested on the York River Railroad, not far in the rear of Fair Oaks Station. Couch’s division, which, as we have already seen, lay across the Williamsburg Road, and reached northward to the York River Railroad, had its right considerably advanced, and presented to the approaching enemy an oblique front, nearly parallel to the Nine Mile Road. Rifle-pits were well arranged all along the line; and the batteries of Flood and Brady and Miller, with battery C, of the First Pennsylvania artillery, were skilfully and advantageously posted.

Heintzelman, whose corps lay considerably in the rear, had been notified by Keyes of the perilous position in which Casey’s division was placed, and urged to send forward reinforcements, was hurrying forward with all possible speed. Shortly after four o’clock, Heintzelman appeared on the field; and, as he outranked Keyes, he assumed the command. About the same time, Kearney, of Heintzelman’s corps, came up with two of his brigades—those of Berry and Jameson. His other brigade, that of Birney, was also on its way. There was a pause in the fight, after the Confederates occupied the ground from which they had driven Casey’s division. It was brief, however; for before it was yet half-past four o’clock, they bore down with tremendous energy upon Couch’s line; and from its oblique character, having its right advanced, they came first in collision with the Twenty-Third Pennsylvania. The attack was gallantly met by that regiment. Reserving their fire until the Confederates were close upon them, they opened with deadly effect; and while their opponents reeled and staggered, they charged them with the bayonet, and drove them back. The Twenty-Third paid dearly for their temerity. Advancing too far, they exposed themselves to the fire of the enemy’s artillery, and were driven back, in their turn, in disorder, and with great loss. Colonel Niele, having retained his colors, rallied some one hundred of his men, fell back on the First Long Island, and re-formed. The struggle now became general on the right. Effort after effort was made to but little purpose. The First Long Island soon shared the fate of the Twenty-Third Pennsylvania. The Fifty-Seventh and Sixty-Third
Pennsylvania were also compelled, in their turn, to yield to the pressure of the foe. The Tenth Massachusetts, after having been surrounded and broken, re-formed and moved to the right; but it was to little purpose. Heintzelman was not proving himself a match for Johnston, who was present with his army, and directing its every movement. All along the line on the right, in the centre and on the left, the Confederates were victorious. Couch’s command was severed; the general himself, with a portion of his forces, was compelled to cross the railroad to the north, while the body of his division was driven back in the direction of the Williamsburg Road; and Kearney was pressed towards the borders of the flooded White Oak Swamp. The day was advancing; and as night drew on, the prospect was the reverse of cheering for Heintzelman and Keyes. Destruction seemed to rest on the entire left wing of the National army.

In his extremity, and not knowing which way retreat was possible, Couch formed two lines of battle—one toward the railroad, with a section of Brady’s battery, supported by the Seventh Massachusetts; another toward the wood to the west, with the other section of the battery, supported by the Anderson Zouaves, with the Thirty-First Pennsylvania and the First Chasseurs. This latter line was formed on the edge of the wood, under cover of a rail-fence.

The situation had become perilous in the extreme. Happily, at this critical moment, and when most needed, relief came. Heintzelman, when made aware of Casey’s perilous position, lost no time in conveying the information to Generals McClellan and Sumner. McClellan was at New Bridge, at the extreme point of the National right wing. Sumner was nearer the extremity of the angle, in the neighborhood of the railroad bridge. Both were, as the reader has already been given to understand, on the further side of the now flooded Chickahominy. Sumner, fortunately, had been seeing dangers ahead; and without any special instructions from his chief, he had, May 25, as early as the 25th, commenced to construct a bridge across the stream, in front of his position. The bridge was completed on the evening of May 30. It was known afterwards as the Grape Vine Bridge. It was slender; but it saved the army of the Potomac. As soon as the news reached McClellan of the danger which threatened his left wing, he ordered Sumner to be ready to move at a moment’s warning. Sumner was ready, when, at two o’clock the order reached him to cross the stream at once. The passage was difficult; but by caution and care it was successfully accomplished. Sedgwick, with his division, crossed first, dragging with them a battery of twenty-four Napoleon guns. Richardson followed—Sumner last. At the moment when Couch and Heintzelman were separated, Sumner appeared on the field and assumed the command. No change was made in Sumner’s dispositions. Sedgwick formed in line of battle at the edge of the wood, near
Fair Oaks, with the First Minnesota on his right flank. The Confederates began to press on as if they meant to rush victoriously to Bottom Bridge. The Napoleon guns opened fire; and a storm of canister mowed down their ranks and made them recoil. The Confederates made one more attempt to advance; and as they came to the edge of the wood, they delivered a most effective volley at the Anderson Zouaves. Colonel Riker was killed, and the Zouaves broke and ran. Speedily rallied, they resumed their position. Just as the fatal volley was delivered by the Confederates, three regiments—the Thirty-First Pennsylvania, the First Chasseurs and the First Minnesota—which were lying on their faces in front of the battery, sprang up, and poured their deadly fire into the very faces of the enemy. In front of that line the Confederates lay in heaps. Brigadier-General A. Davis was among the killed; and Brigadier-General Pettigrew, who was wounded and had his horse killed under him, was taken prisoner.

Morgan, of Sedgwick's division, had meanwhile been sent to the relief of Abercrombie, who had been maintaining a protracted and unequal struggle on the extreme right. Morgan, in his turn, needed help; and the gallant General Burns, with the Sixty-Ninth and Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, was sent to his support, while Sedgwick himself advanced for the same purpose, taking with him two other Pennsylvania regiments—the Seventy-First and the One Hundred and Sixth. At this time the fighting was severe. It required all the nerve of Sedgwick and of Burns to keep the men at their work. The Confederates, resolved to win, seemed fearless of punishment. Again and again they attempted to advance, and as often were fearful lanes made in their compact ranks by the murderous fire of canister which was poured from the National battery. It was now sunset; and about this time General Johnston was wounded. The command devolved upon General Smith, who assumed its duties. The loss of their chief did not damp the purpose of the Confederates or lessen their energy. As darkness came on, a determined attempt was made to outflank Sumner's right. Sumner ordered a bayonet charge by five regiments. The charge was gallantly made, and was completely successful. The Confederate line was broken and thrown into confusion. It was now eight o'clock; darkness was falling upon the scene; and the weary combatants on both sides, resting on their arms, fell asleep on the ground where so many of their comrades lay in the cold embrace of death. Such was the famous battle at Fair Oaks, May 31st, 1862.

On the following morning (Sunday, June 1st), both armies were ready to resume the contest. The National army had been largely reinforced during the night by troops from the other side of the Chickahominy. McClellan was himself on the field and made the disposition for the day; but with that habitual regard which he had for the Sabbath, he seemed un-
willing to provoke battle. Sickles' New York brigade was posted on the left, and stretched across the Williamsburg turnpike, with Patterson and his New Jersey brigade on his right. Both were of Hooker's division and of Heintzelman's corps. To the right of Patterson, and slightly in advance, was Richardson's division, of Stoneman's corps. Sedgwick's division, also of Stoneman's corps, and also slightly in advance, was on Richardson's right. The two last were so placed along the line of railroad that they lay almost at right angles to the brigades of Sickles and Patterson. Couch held the position which he had reclaimed the day before, and was supported by Sedgwick. Birney was also on the railroad, but more to the rear. The National line, it will thus be seen, formed a sort of triangle. Inside of the triangle were the Confederates, who occupied substantially the ground which they had wrenched from the Nationals on the previous day. The main body of the Confederates faced the main body of the Nationals along the line of railroad. The Nationals were on the north of this line; the Confederates were on the south.

McClellan, as we have said, was slow to provoke battle; but his dispositions were made, and he was ready for the attack which he had reason to expect the Confederates would make. He had not long to wait. With the first streak of early dawn, the Confederates were in motion. It was evident that they were nothing daunted by the experience of the previous day, and that they meant to complete what they doubtless regarded as their unfinished task. The Nationals were up and ready, when the Confederates fell upon Richardson's division with tremendous fury. It was a cavalry attack; and it was as warmly received as it was vigorously given. The cavalry were driven back upon their lines by a well-directed fire of artillery. It was, however, only for a moment; for they returned in greater force, well sustained by companies of infantry. The battle soon extended along the whole line. French's, Howard's and Meagher's brigades were the first to engage the foe who was so resolute on battle. To protect an open field on his right front, Richardson had advantageously posted a battery of 10-pounder rifle Parrott guns, under Captain Hazard; and directly in front of his line he had placed the brigade of General French and a regiment of the brigade of General O. O. Howard. The remaining regiments of Howard's brigade formed a second line; and the Irish brigade of Thomas F. Meagher, with eighteen pieces of artillery, formed the third. It was evidently the intention of the Confederates, in attacking Richardson, to cut the National line in two; and, by forcing their way between, to destroy the army in detail. If such was their purpose, they had sadly miscalculated the strength and spirit of the National troops. General Roger A. Pryor, whose acquaintance, the reader will remember, we first made in Charleston Harbor, came up with a part of Huger's division, which had
taken no part in Saturday’s battle, and fell heavily upon French. Howard rushed forward to the support of French. The fighting was severe; and under the vigorous assaults and well-directed fire of the Confederates, the National troops more than once wavered, but were quickly rallied by their officers. General Howard made himself conspicuous at the head of his men, and did much to cheer and sustain them, both by word and deed. Mahone now came up to the aid of Pryor; and Meagher, who had been impatient to join the fray, was ordered to the front. He fell upon the enemy with great vigor. For three hours the battle raged with great fierceness. The Confederates began to yield to the bold and impetuous attacks of the Nationals on the right. They had no better fortune on the left; for in that direction they became engaged with two brigades of Hooker’s division—Patterson’s New Jersey and Sickles’ New York; and, after sustaining a severe fire from those brigades, they were driven back at the point of the bayonet. All along the line, wherever they attempted to penetrate, they found barriers of bristling steel and hearts of iron. It was in vain to make any further attempt to drive the Nationals back into the swollen waters of the Chickahominy and the adjoining swamps, or to force a way to Bottom Bridge. It was now nine o’clock; and at this early hour, the Confederates, as if convinced of the fruitlessness of further efforts, fell back, and the firing ceased. The battle was not renewed. Towards the close of the struggle, General Howard received those wounds which cost him his right arm. He did not, however, leave the field. Binding his shattered limb in his handkerchief, he remained at his post till the battle was ended.

Although they had failed in their second day’s efforts, the Confederates did not abandon the ground which they had taken from Casey on Saturday. On this ground they remained during the whole of Monday, and some of them over Monday night. It was General McClellan’s purpose to pursue them on the third day and regain what had been lost. With this end in view, he had made all necessary arrangements to offer them battle. His line was drawn up, skirmishers were sent in advance, the artillery was posted, and the army began to move forward. It was all unnecessary work. Delay had given the Confederates sufficient time to move back their camp equipages and munitions of war to their lines at Richmond. This being successfully accomplished, they themselves followed. When McClellan advanced there was no enemy to encounter. Fair Oaks and Seven Pines were reoccupied by the National troops; and the two armies resumed substantially their former positions. Hooker, having been ordered forward by Heintzelman, with a reconnoitering party toward Richmond, advanced within four miles of the Confederate capital. On hearing of his temerity, McClellan ordered him back.

These are the words McClellan used: “General Hooker will return from his
brilliant reconnaissance; we cannot afford to lose his division." Hooker returned to Casey's camp, where, at the house of one George Turner, McClellan had established his headquarters. While McClellan busied himself again at his favorite work of throwing up entrenchments and constructing fortifications, Hooker, yielding to the gentler impulses of a soldier's nature, occupied his hours of enforced inactivity in the establishment of an hospital near Fair Oaks Station.

In the two days' fighting at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, both armies sustained heavy losses. It has been estimated that the loss on either side must have amounted to near seven thousand men—a heavy loss, when it is considered that in neither the one army nor the other were there more than fifteen thousand engaged. Attempts have been made to give the actual figures; but they cannot be regarded as reliable.

The battle of Fair Oaks does not redound to the credit of General McClellan. It cannot be said that he was successful in his choice of battle ground or in the original disposition of his troops. He was neglectful in the matter of bridges. His long delay before the battle gave the enemy an opportunity; he ought to have placed more men at Sumner's disposal, and most certainly he ought not to have been absent from the first day's fight. His delay, after the battle, in pressing on toward Richmond has been severely condemned by competent military authorities.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Old Policy of Delay.—McClellan's Army Still Inactive.—The Shenandoah Valley.—Jackson and Lander.—Blooming Gap.—Death of Lander.—General Banks at Harper's Ferry.—General Shields.—Battle of Kernstown.—Shields Wounded.—Conducting the Battle from his Bed.—Tyler's Splendid Charge.—The "Stone-wall Brigade."—Jackson's Defeat.—General Banks in Pursuit.—Shields the Hero of the Fight at Kernstown.—Sketch of Shields.—Jackson Joining Ewell.—Shields Detached from Banks and Sent to Join McDowell.—Banks Greatly Weakened Thereby.—Jackson Strikes Fremont.—Banks' Retreat.—Jackson and Ewell in Pursuit.—Attack on Front Royal.—Kenly Overpowered.—Banks Continues his Retreat from Strasburg.—Overtaken by Ewell at Winchester.—Battle of Winchester.—Banks Compelled to Fall Back.—He Reaches the Potomac Opposite Williamsport.—An Almost Unparalleled March.—Safe Across the River.—Jackson's Mistake.—Consternation at Washington.—McDowell's Recall.—Fremont and Shields.—Jackson's Retreat from Harper's Ferry.—Ewell's Demonstrations.—His Retreat.—The Race up the Shenandoah.—Jackson Eludes his Pursuers.—Burns the Bridges in his Rear.—Reaches Harrisonburg.—Followed Close by Fremont.—A Vigorous Encounter.—General Ashby Killed.—Capture of Colonel Wyndham.—Battle of Cross Keys.—Ewell Holds his Ground.—Port Republic.—Jackson Across the Bridge.—Arrival of Shields' Advance.—Ewell Joins Jackson.—The Nationals Driven Back.—The Burning of the Bridge.—Jackson's Success.—What He Had Done.—Sketch of Jackson.—Reflections.—The Mistake of the Government.

The battle of Fair Oaks was fought on the last day of May and the first day of June. For three weeks the army of the Potomac lay quietly along the line of the Chickahominy.—McClellan, pursuing his old
policy of delay, and occupying the thoughts of his men by throwing up fortifications and otherwise strengthening his position. The three weeks' delay proved fatal, as we shall soon see, to the Peninsular campaign—a campaign begun in splendor and promise, but, having signally failed of its purpose, destined to end in gloom and disaster.

In order, however, to an intelligent appreciation of what may be called the second period of the Peninsular campaign, it is necessary for the reader to carry with him a knowledge of the events which, at this date, were in progress in the Shenandoah Valley and the adjacent regions on both sides of the Blue Ridge. While, therefore, McClellan waits for propitious weather, and for the advent of McDowell on the line of the Chickahominy and on the malarious borders of White Oak Swamp, let us follow the movements of the National armies a little further to the north and west, and witness their vain endeavors to check the triumphal progress of the Confederate general, "Stonewall" Jackson. In a previous chapter it has been shown that, when it was finally agreed that McClellan was to proceed to Richmond by way of the Peninsula, every precaution was taken for the protection of Washington. Early in January, General Lander, of General Banks' corps, was placed in command of a force whose primary duty it was to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Floyd and Wise and Lee had each of them been compelled to retire from that neighbor-

hood; and "Stonewall" Jackson, in whom Lander found a skilful and energetic opponent, was endeavoring to recover the ground which they had lost, and make himself master, if possible, of the Shenandoah Valley. With a comparatively small force, not exceeding four thousand men, Lander executed a series of brilliant movements in presence of the enemy; and, on the night of February 14th, he made a dash, at the head of some four hundred horsemen, and, surprising Jackson at Blooming Gap, captured seventeen of his commissioned officers and about sixty of his rank and file, and compelled him to retire. Lander died soon after, from the effects of a wound which he had received in October of the previous year, a few days after the battle of Ball's Bluff, in a skirmish at Edward's Ferry. In Lander, the country lost a brave soldier, a capable general, and a truly loyal citizen. The troops commanded by Lander were placed under General Shields, another able officer, who had already earned for himself a name by his services in Mexico.

Early in February, General Banks, to whom had been assigned the duty of covering the line of the Potomac and Washington City, sent Colonel Geary forward with a force to occupy Harper's Ferry. This task was easily accomplished; and towards the end of the month, General Banks arrived and took command in person, occupying, with his troops, all the higher ground near the ferry, as well as Charleston and Leesburg. Jackson, after his en-
counter with Lander, had retired to Winchester, where he was lying, with his division of some eight thousand men, when, early in March, Johnston evacuated Manassas. On the 11th of March, two days later, Jackson also retired, moving further up the Shenandoah Valley, and keeping himself in easy communication with Johnston. He halted at Mount Jackson, some forty miles above Winchester. Thither Shields pursued him; but finding Jackson well posted, and believing him to be too strong to warrant an attack, he fell back on Winchester for the double purpose of securing a place of safety, and of decoying Jackson from his position. After a march of thirty miles, which was accomplished in one day, Shields posted his division in a secluded place, about two miles from Winchester, on the Martinsburg Road, and about half a mile north of the village of Kernstown. While the division under Shields was so occupied, General Banks, following out the arrangements agreed upon at Fairfax Court House, put the rest of his corps in motion towards Centreville, from which the Confederates had retired on March 11th. In his backward march towards Winchester, Shields was followed closely by Ashby's cavalry.

On the 22d, about five o'clock in the afternoon, Ashby's horsemen attacked and drove in Shields' pickets. Shields was well posted, and had under him a force of about 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 guns. By order of General Banks, who was on the ground, Shields pushed forward one brigade and two batteries of artillery; but the movement was so conducted that the enemy could only see a small portion of that force. While directing one of the batteries to its position, Shields was hit by the fragment of a shell, which fractured his arm above the elbow, bruised his shoulder and injured his side. Badly injured as he was, he was yet able to attend to his duty, so far as to make dispositions for the ensuing days. Under cover of the night, he pushed forward Kimball's brigade, nearly three miles on the Strasburg Road. To support this brigade, if attacked, Daum's artillery was placed in a strong position. In the rear of Kimball's, and within supporting distance of it, covering all the approaches to the town, was placed Sullivan's brigade, which, with Broadhead's cavalry, was held in reserve. In that order the troops rested for the night. Early on the following morning a reconnoissance was made. There was no evidence of the presence in front of any Confederate force, except Ashby's cavalry. In the belief that such was the fact, and taking it for granted that Jackson would not be daring enough to attack Shields, Banks, in obedience to a summons from headquarters, left at ten A. M. for Washington.

Shields was soon undeceived; and General Banks had only reached Harper's Ferry, on his way to Washington, when he heard the sounds of battle, and promptly retraced his steps. At
the time the reconnoissance was made, and when the National scouts could see nothing but Ashby's cavalry, Jackson's whole army was posted in battle order, with artillery on each flank, about half a mile south of Kernstown, and completely under cover of the woods. Shortly after eleven o'clock, the Confederate cannon opened fire upon Kimball. Sullivan's brigade was ordered forward to his support; and the fire of artillery on both sides became heavy, although as yet ineffective, because of the distance. Jackson seemed resolved to force the fighting. Pushing forward more guns to his right, and advancing to their support a considerable force of infantry and cavalry, he made a vigorous effort, as if he wished to enfilade and turn the National left. At this moment, an active body of skirmishers, under Colonel Carrol, consisting of his own regiment—the Eighth Ohio—and three companies of the Sixty-Seventh Ohio, were thrown forward on both sides of the valley road, to check the enemy's advance. These skirmishers were admirably supported by four pieces of artillery, under Captain Jenks, and also by Sullivan's gallant brigade. At every point the Confederates were repulsed; and Jackson, as if despairing of any success against the National left, massed his forces, and flung himself with great energy on the right. The movement was skillfully made, and very narrowly missed success. So fierce was the onslaught that Daum's batteries, although worked with skill and energy, were powerless to offer any effective resistance. On rushed the Confederates, as if nothing could check them; and for a time it seemed as if they were about to snatch the prize of victory. Shields, who was unable to be present on the field, was actually conducting the battle from his bed. Having been informed by a messenger from Kimball of the state of affairs, he saw at once that his army was in danger, and that not a moment was to be lost. He gave orders that all the disposable infantry should be immediately thrown forward on the right, and that thus massed, they should fall with all their might on Jackson's batteries, capture them, then turn his left flank and hurl it back on his centre. Kimball entrusted this movement to Colonel Tyler. It was admirably executed, the gallant Tyler and his splendid brigade marching forward with "alacrity and enthusiastic joy to the performance of the most perilous duty of the day." The Confederate skirmishers yielded to the attack, and fell back to the main body, strongly posted on high ground, and behind a high and solid stone fence. Here the struggle became desperate, and, for a time, doubtful. Tyler's brigade was soon joined by the Fifth and Sixty-Second Ohio and Thirteenth Indiana, of Sullivan's brigade, and the Fourteenth Indiana, Eighty-Fourth Pennsylvania, and several companies of the Eighth and Sixty-Seventh Ohio, of Kimball's brigade. This united force, with cheers and yells, which rose high above the roar of battle, rushed upon the Confederates; and in spite of a
most heroic resistance, which was too well attested by the heaps of slain on the field, Jackson's men were driven back through the woods. Resting upon the reserve, an attempt was again made, chiefly by the famous "Stonewall brigade," to retrieve the fortunes of the day; but it was of no avail. Nothing could resist the onward rush of the now triumphant Nationals, as they rent the air with their cheers, and poured forth their murderous volleys. This last attempt at resistance was but of brief duration. The Confederates again broke; and this time they fled in disorder from the field, leaving, in addition to the multitude of killed and wounded, three hundred prisoners, two guns, four caissons, and a thousand stand of small arms. "Night alone," said the gallant Shields, in his graphic and honest report, "saved them from total destruction." The Nationals rested on the battle field.

On the following morning, in obedience to orders from General Shields, the pursuit was commenced, the National artillery opening fire upon the rear-guard of the retiring foe. General Banks, when he halted at Harper's Ferry, ordered back Williams, with his whole division. The general himself lost no time in returning to Winchester; and having made a hasty visit to General Shields, he assumed command of the forces in pursuit of the enemy. The pursuit was continued as far as Mount Jackson. It was there abandoned, in consequence of the utter exhaustion of the troops.

This victory at Kernstown was due largely, no doubt, to the bravery of the rank and file of the National army and to the skill and intrepidity of its officers. It is doubtful, however, whether even such an army, in presence of such a foe, could have nailed victory to its standard, without the clear head, the firm, decisive will and the prompt action of General Shields. No more skilful generalship than that displayed by General Shields on this occasion was exhibited during the entire progress of the war.*

Although Jackson had been defeated and held for a time in check, it was no part of the plan of the Confederates to abandon the Shenandoah Valley. They knew that so long as they were able to threaten Washington by maintaining a large force in the valley, they would embarrass the movements of McClellan in the Peninsula. It was not possible for Jackson to make any aggressive efforts, or even to maintain his position, if he was not considerably

* General James Shields, the hero of Kernstown, was born in 1810, in the county of Tyrone, Ireland. In 1826, when at the age of sixteen, he emigrated to the United States. In 1832, he settled in Illinois, where he devoted himself to the profession of law. After having filled several offices, he became a judge of the Supreme Court. In 1845, he was appointed by President Polk, commissioner of the General Land Office, and removed to Washington. After serving in the Mexican War with distinction, he was elected United States Senator from Illinois. He was living in Minnesota when that Territory was admitted a State of the Union, and was chosen United States Senator. When the war broke out, he had been for some years in California, living in comparative retirement. Congress made him a brigadier-general, with a commission bearing date August 19, 1861. General Shields has always been a pronounced Democrat; but his politics have never tempted him to entertain views injurious to the unity and integrity of the National government.
reinforced. Accordingly, while he was lying at a point between the South Fork of the Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap, after his retreat from Winchester, he was joined by the division of General R. S. Ewell, and also two brigades under Edward J. Johnston. The entire force under Jackson was thus increased to about 15,000 men. They were surely all needed; for he was confronting three National armies—that of Fremont on his left; that of Banks in front, and that of McDowell on his right. Fremont, it will be remembered, had charge of what was called the Mountain department; Banks had charge of the Shenandoah department; and McDowell had charge of the newly-created department of the Rappahannock. Towards the end of April, when Jackson was about to commence offensive operations, Fremont, in obedience to orders given by the president, had come down to Franklin, in Pendleton County, near the mountains west of Harrisonburg, and had taken a position there with 15,000 men; General Banks was at Strasburg, in the valley, with about 16,000 men; and General McDowell was at Fredericksburg with 30,000 men. About the time Jackson began to move, Shields' division was detached from Banks' command and given to McDowell, who, as Washington was no longer menaced by Johnston, was on his march to McClellan, now at the head of some 41,000 men, with 100 guns. Such was the disposition and such the strength of the National forces in Virginia in the first weeks of May. Banks, it will be observed, after Shields' division had been transferred to McDowell, had not under him more than 6000 men.

Jackson's great object was to prevent either McDowell or Fremont from forming a junction with Banks. Learning that Fremont was pressing on to join Banks at Harrisonburg, Jackson left Ewell to watch Banks, and advanced to meet Fremont. Coming up with his advance at McDowell, some thirty-six miles west of Staunton, a vigorous encounter took place. Both armies suffered severely, but the Nationals were compelled to retire: Jackson followed them up as far as Franklin, when, hearing from Ewell that Banks was evidently preparing to make his escape from Harrisonburg, he hastened back to McDowell, recrossed the Shenandoah Mountains, rested for a little at Lebanon Sulphur Springs, and then pressed forward, with the view of falling upon Banks. Meanwhile, Banks had fled to Strasburg, pursued by Ewell. Jackson posted on to New Market, where he joined Ewell. The united forces moved up the Luray Valley, between the Massanutten Mountains and the Blue Ridge, towards Front Royal, their object being to cut off Banks' retreat in that direction, and thus to prevent him joining McDowell by way of Manassas Gap. By this movement, Jackson accomplished a double object; he created a panic in Washington and, indeed, throughout the whole North; and he fell with overwhelming force
on Colonel Kenly and the little garrison at Front Royal. Kenly made a spirited resistance; but he was completely overpowered, and, after being wounded, he himself and 700 of his men, with a section of rifled 10-pounders and his entire supply train, fell into the hands of the victorious Confederates. This affair happened May 23 on the 23d of May. Banks was still at Strasburg, when, on the evening of that day, he heard of the disaster at Front Royal. Alarm followed vexation when he learned that Jackson, at the head of 20,000 men, was moving rapidly toward Winchester. With his reduced force, it was vain to think of offering resistance to an army so greatly superior in numbers. As he could not hope to win, his plain duty was to try to save his men and his war material. Early in May the morning of the 24th, Banks, resolved to lose no time in putting distance between himself and his pursuers, hastened down the valley. By a forced march, he gained Winchester by midnight. The retreat was conducted in a masterly manner, and in circumstances of very great difficulty. Banks, however, had little time to rest his weary troops. Ewell was already at his heels; and Jackson was pressing forward in overwhelming strength, not far in the rear of Ewell. The Confederate advance bivouacked within a mile and a half of Winchester. It was evidently their expectation that the next day would witness the capture or destruction of their opponents. Banks, as we have seen, had only about 6000 men, with ten Parrott guns and a battery of six-pounder smooth bore cannon, with which to resist the pursuer and protect the valley. The Confederate force had been considerably strengthened, and must have numbered, all told, over 20,000 men. It was not possible to continue the retreat without showing front to the pursuers.

By daylight on the 25th both armies were in battle order; May 25 and the fight opened furiously in front of Winchester. Banks' left was commanded by Colonel Donnelly, and his right by Colonel Gordon, while the troops in the centre were well protected by stone fences. Ewell made a bold endeavor to turn the National right, and to shut Banks off from Harper's Ferry. The National soldiers, realizing their danger, fought with great bravery, and for some five hours held the Confederates in check. Jackson's whole force was now seen to be moving forward. Banks, wisely concluding that further resistance might prove his ruin, issued orders for a retreat. He had already, in anticipation of such an emergency, sent his trains on to the Potomac. Under a most destructive fire, the troops formed into three parallel columns, and moved in the direction of Martinsburg, each column being protected by an efficient rear-guard. In passing through Winchester, they were subjected to insults and violence, the women pouring upon them hot water from the windows and flinging other missiles. In the course of the after-
noon Banks reached Martinsburg, having accomplished a march of twenty-two miles. There he rested his footsore and battle-worn troops for two and a half hours. At the end of that time the march was resumed; the other twelve miles of the journey were accomplished; and by sundown of the same day Banks, with his worn-out but not yet disorganized men, stood on the banks of the Potomac, directly opposite Williamsport. Forty-eight hours had just clapped since the news had reached them of the disaster of Front Royal. It was a march of fifty-three miles, thirty-five of which were performed in one day. "The scene at the river," says General Banks, in his graphic report of that retreat, "when the rear-guard arrived, was of the most animating and exciting description. A thousand camp fires were burning on the hill-side, a thousand carriages of every description were crowded upon the banks, and the broad river rolled between the exhausted troops and their coveted rest."

Some difficulty was experienced in getting across the river. The ferry was occupied by the ammunition trains—the ford by the wagons. The cavalry was secure in its own power of crossing. But the infantry had to content themselves with some boats which belonged to the pontoon train, and which had been brought along from Strasburg. With an ingenuousness which does no discredit to his well-tried soldierly qualities, General Banks tells us that "there never were more grateful hearts in the same num-

ber of men than when, at midday on the 26th, we stood on the opposite shore." In killed and wounded, Banks' loss was about 200. Two guns, more than 9000 small arms, and some 3000 prisoners constituted Jackson's prize.

It would be unfair to refuse to General Banks the highest praise for the orderly and successful manner in which he conducted this retreat from Strasburg to the Potomac. At the same time it is undeniable that, if Jackson had pursued with the same vigor with which Banks conducted his retreat, the result might have been very different. Jackson halted his infantry not far from Winchester; and George H. Stewart, who was sent after the fugitives, discontinued the pursuit at Martinsburg. In the latter part of his retreat, therefore, Banks' danger was more in seeming than in reality; for Jackson, by giving up the pursuit, had flung away his opportunity. Superior numbers gave Jackson the victory; but fortune smiled upon Banks, and enabled him to save his army. The National government had reason to honor Banks for saving his men and his ammunition trains. The Confederate government had reason to blame Jackson for not completing his victory by the annihilation of his antagonist.

The reappearance of Jackson in the valley of the Shenandoah, followed as that was by the attack on Front Royal and the retreat and pursuit from Strasburg, naturally enough produced not a little consternation in Washington. We have seen that General Shield-
formerlly of Banks' corps, had been ordered to join the army of McDowell, taking with him his 11,000 men. We have also seen that thus reinforced, and with an army 41,000 strong, McDowell was under instructions to move toward Richmond on the 26th, for the purpose of co-operating with McClellan. Before McDowell began to move toward Richmond, tidings of what had happened in the Shenandoah Valley had, of course, reached Washington. The government was alarmed; the National capital was considered to be in peril; and McDowell, in place of being allowed to carry out the orders received earlier on the same day, and proceed to aid McClellan before Richmond, was instructed to push 20,000 men into the valley by way of Manassas Gap, the object being to intercept Jackson, if he should attempt to retreat. At the same time instructions were sent to Fremont by telegraph, commanding him to hasten, with his army, over the Shenandoah Mountain to Harrisonburg, the object being the same. It was hoped that both armies might effect a junction at Strasburg, and that they might do so in sufficient time to head off Jackson. Fremont lost no time in complying with the instructions which he had received; but, having taken a more northerly road across the mountain to Strasburg, he did not reach that place till the evening of the 1st of June. Jackson had passed through the town a few hours before. McDowell was equally prompt, although, in letters addressed both to the president and to the secretary of war, he expressed his regret, in a dignified and soldierly manner, that it should have been necessary to countermand his orders and compel him to fall back. Shields' division was pushed forward in advance. On the morning of the 2d of June, Shields' cavalry, under General Bayard, reached Strasburg—too late also to accomplish their intended purpose.

In the meantime, the excitement and anxiety of the government were finding other channels of expression. Alarming despatches were sent to the governors of the different States. They were informed that the enemy in great force was marching on Washington; and they were exhorted to organize and forward immediately, all the militia and volunteer force in their respective States. On the same day on which these despatches were forwarded, the president took military possession of all the railroads in the United States, ordering their officers and servants to hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of troops and munitions of war to the exclusion of all other business. It was evident that the government was really alarmed; but it was plain also that it knew its duty, and that it meant to perform it.

Jackson had advanced, after the retirement of Banks, as far as Harper's Ferry. There he became aware of the orders which had been given to McDowell and Fremont. He felt that he was in danger. If these generals should succeed in forming a junction at Strasburg before he reaches that
place, it will be necessary for him to offer battle to their combined forces; and the result, as he fears, will not be favorable. He deemed it wise to beat a hasty retreat. Leaving Ewell as a rear-guard, he moved back from Harper's Ferry on the night of the 29th of May. On the following night, May 30, false impression, Ewell kept up a heavy cannonading, and otherwise acted as if a severe contest was going on. The night was favorable for his purpose. It was “intensely dark; the hills around were alive with signal lights; the rain descended in torrents; vivid flashes of lightning illuminated, at intervals, the green and magnificent scenery, while the crash of the thunder, echoing among the mountains, threw into comparative insignificance the roar of the artillery.” When the sun rose May 31, on the morning of the 31st, there were no traces of any Confederates in the neighborhood of Harper’s Ferry. Ewell was already far advanced on his way to rejoin Jackson. It was a race, as if for sweet life, both with Jackson and with Ewell. In order to overtake Jackson, whom he rejoined at Middletown, Ewell marched in one day thirty-four miles. The race up the Shenandoah Valley was now fairly begun; and the retreat of Jackson in the one direction was quite as hasty as that of Banks had been in the other. Jackson, in fact, had exhibited even more celerity in retreat than he had done in pursuit.

We have already mentioned that when Fremont reached Strasburg on the 1st of June, Jackson had passed through the town some hours before, and that the van-guard of Shields’ division, which had been detached by McDowell, did not arrive at Strasburg until a day later. A vigorous effort was now made by both of those officers to intercept Jackson further to the south. Shields moved vigorously along the South Fork of the Shenandoah, between the Massanutten and Blue Ridge Mountains, while Fremont, somewhat in his rear, and leaning on the North Fork, marched along the great turnpike to Harrisonburg. The mountain streams which flow into the Shenandoah were all swollen with the heavy rains—so swollen as to make it perilous in most places to attempt to ford them. Jackson, who was also on the South Fork, took the precaution of destroying the bridges as he passed, and, by means of his cavalry, of breaking down or burning all those in the openings of the Massanutten range. By so doing, he greatly retarded the advance of his pursuers. On the 5th of June, June 5, and after making the most vigorous efforts all along his line of march, he reached Harrisonburg. Jackson now saw that his one hope of safety was to cross the swollen Shenandoah at Port Republic, where there was a strong bridge. He would thus put the river between himself and Fremont. He would do more. It was all-important that Shields, who was near at hand, on the east side of the river, should not be allowed to cross and
form a junction with the other National army. He would make this junction impossible. With these ends in view, and after allowing his wearied soldiers a brief period of repose, Jackson began to move from Harrisonburg—his line of march being towards the river, in a southeasterly direction, by way of Staunton. Fremont's advance entered Harrisonburg shortly after Jackson left it. They were not allowed to halt. Pushing on after the retreating army, a body of cavalry, under Colonel Percy Wyndham, came upon its rear-guard about two miles from Harrisonburg. The Confederate rear was covered by General Turner Ashby’s cavalry. With the speed of lightning, Ashby turned upon the Nationals and smote them with great severity. Wyndham was captured, together with some sixty-three of his men. At this critical moment, Bayard and Cluseret hurried forward cavalry and infantry. Among those engaged were Kane's Bucktail Rifles. Ashby, feeling himself hard pressed, called for an infantry support. General Stewart rushed to his aid. Severe fighting ensued. Kane's riflemen, after performing deeds of great valor, were driven back with a loss of fifty-five men. Kane himself was wounded and made prisoner. During the brief encounter, in which both sides sustained heavy losses, General Ashby was killed. His horse had been shot under him; and he was dismounted when the fatal bullet entered his body. General Ashby was one of the most brilliant generals developed on either side during the war. His death at this crisis was a great loss to the Confederate cause.*

Jackson continued his march toward the Shenoandoah with the view of attempting a passage at Port Republic. In the meantime he had left Ewell, with the three brigades of Elzy, Trimble and Stewart, well posted at a place called Cross Keys, near Union Church, about seven miles from Harrisonburg, and about five miles from the river. Ewell’s force was about 5000 strong, and occupied a ridge which crossed the road near the church. There were on either side dense woods which protected his flanks. Trimble was a little in advance, in the centre; Stewart was on the right; and Elzy on the left. On Sunday morning, the 8th of June, as early as six o'clock, Fremont marched out of Harrisonburg; and by nine o'clock he had his army arranged in order of battle. Schenck was on the right; Milroy in the centre; and Stahl on the left. Between Milroy and Schenck was Cluseret's brigade, composed of the Sixtieth Ohio and the Eighth Virginia, supported by the Garibaldi guard, of Blenker's division. Bohlen's brigade supported Stahl; and the remainder of Blenker's division was held as a re-

* Brigadier-General Turner Ashby was a middle-sized man, handsomely built, and very active. He was a dark-complexioned man—had dark eyes and fine features, and was distinguished by rather a benevolent countenance. He was a man of much piety. Although not a soldier by profession, he soon gave proof that he was possessed of all those qualities which secure distinction and success on the field of battle. He was a splendid horseman; and he had done good service to the cause which he had represented in many a hard-fought battle. He had been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general only three weeks before his death.
serve. The Nationals moved to the attack up the rising ground under a tremendous fire. By eleven o'clock the battle had become general. The fighting was particularly severe in the centre, where, in spite of the terrific fire of the Confederates, Milroy and Schenck were gaining ground. For hours the battle raged with great fury, Milroy and Stahl suffering most severely. The Eighth New York alone had sixty-five killed. On the Confederate side, Trimble, who was the most exposed, had suffered the heaviest loss. For a time victory seemed doubtful. After having been driven back, the Nationals again pressed forward; and Milroy had already penetrated Ewell's centre, and forced his way up almost to his guns. It was now four o'clock; and Stahl's troops, at the supreme moment when Fremont seemed on the point of grasping victory, giving way, the order was given to fall back along the whole line.

Thus ended the battle of Cross Keys—one of the best-contested, and, considering the numbers engaged, severest struggles since the war commenced. It was fought with great bravery on both sides; and if victory remained with the Confederates, it was because of the excellency of the position which they occupied, rather than because of the greater endurance of their troops, or the superior skill of their commanders. On both sides the loss was heavy. It was particularly severe among the National officers. General Stahl had five killed and seventeen wounded. The Pennsylvania Bucktails lost all their officers—commissioned and non-commissioned.

Both armies slept on the ground which they occupied in the morning before the battle commenced. Ewell was prepared to resume the conflict on the morning of the 9th; but being called to aid Jackson at Port Republic, he began to move, as soon as day broke, towards the Shenandoah—Fremont following in battle order. Shields' advance, under Colonel Carroll, reached Port Republic on the 8th of June. There he found some of Jackson's cavalry guard; and falling upon them with great force, he drove them out of the town and took possession of the bridge. His true policy at that moment would have been to burn the bridge; for by that means he might have ruined Jackson, by making it impossible for Ewell to come to his aid. This, however, he neglected to do, believing, perhaps, that he could hold it, and that it might still be useful in enabling the two National armies to form a junction. While waiting for the arrival of his infantry, he was joined by General E. B. Tyler, who took command. After assuming command, Tyler was unwilling to act until he had received instructions from Shields. Ewell, meanwhile, had managed to escape from Fremont, had brought his troops across the river, and had so strengthened Jackson that the Confederate had no reason any longer to fear his enemy. Discovering that an attempt was being made by the Confederates in great strength to outflank his left, Tyler made a vigorous show
of resistance. Counteracting the flank-
ing movement by employing his whole
force, Tyler drove back into the woods
about 8000 Confederates. The battle
raged for some time with great sever-
ity. It was impossible, however, for
Tyler to maintain the struggle against
the fearful odds which were now ar-
rayed against him. Fremont, when he
heard the sounds of battle and saw
the clouds of smoke, had hastened
towards Port Republic. When he
reached the bridge he found it in
flames, the water too deep to be
forded, and the enemy safe beyond his
reach. Tyler had no choice but to order
a retreat, which, covered by Carroll and
his cavalry, was conducted in good order.
The Confederates pursued the retreating
forces some five miles, the "boys
preserving their places in the ranks,
and fighting every inch of the way."

Port Republic added another laurel
to the victorious wreath which en-
circled the brow of General Jackson.
His campaign in the Shenandoah Val-
ley had been conducted with won-
derful skill and with great success. He
had not won, it is true, any great vic-
tory, but he certainly enjoyed its fruits.
He had, by the pursuit of Banks, al-
most threatened the National capital.
By his rapidity and dexterity of move-
ment he had baffled all the skill of
three major-generals. At the last mo-
ment, when he seemed to be shut in
between two forces, he paralyzed Fre-
mont with one blow and Shields with
another, and finally, by the destruction
of the bridge, made their junction im-
possible. This, however, was not all.

He had diverted large reinforcements
from McClellan, and, while he had
given that general a cause for indulg-
ing in his "masterly inactivity," he
had otherwise neutralized the influence
of 60,000 men. He had taught the
National government that it would
never again be safe, while the war
lasted, to leave Washington unpro-
tected. That lesson, taught at that
time, was equal to the adding of many
thousands of men to the Confederate
armies.

This chapter would be incomplete
without a brief sketch of the man who
is really its hero.*

* The National government was un-
doubtedly primarily to blame for the

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* Thomas Jefferson Jackson was born in Western
Virginia, in January, 1824. His family was respect-
able; but in his boyhood he received only a limited edu-
cation. At the age of nineteen, he entered, as student,
the military academy of West Point, where, in spite of
his homely dress and uncouth manners, he distanced
many of his competitors, taking a prominent place in
several of his classes. He served in the Mexican War
as an artillery officer under Magruder, and acquired the
reputation of being a good gunner. Toward the close
of that war he was brevetted a major. He afterwards
held for ten years the chair of chemistry at the military
academy of Virginia, at Lexington. On the death of
his first wife he visited Europe; and during his stay in
England, he took great delight in visiting the cathe-
drals, York Minster being his special favorite. When
the Civil War broke out, he had married a lady of a
Northern family; and it is said he was for some short
time in doubt as to what course he should follow. He
had, in 1852, resigned his rank in the army. Ultimate-
ly he offered his sword to his native State, and received
a commission. It was he who turned the tide of affairs
at Bull Run, and secured the victory for the Confede-
rates. His exploits in the Shenandoah Valley speak for
themselves. Jackson's life was destined to be brief;
but, as we shall see while this history progresses, he
filled it with noble deeds, and left behind him a name
which the world will not willingly let die. "Stonewall"
Jackson will ever be the symbol of a chivalry equal to
that of a Bayard, and of a piety equal to that of a saint.
In his life, he commanded the love and confidence of
his men. In his death, he was mourned by the world.
humiliation brought upon the Northern armies by Jackson's raid. The action at Winchester showed what could be done, even against such a man, with a force of reasonable strength. It was the weakening of Shields, by the removal of so many troops to Centreville, which provoked the battle of Winchester. In the presence of so watchful an antagonist as Jackson, the lesson ought not to have been lost. When, therefore, the government detached Shields from Banks, and sent him, with his division, to swell the army of McDowell, leaving Banks with only some 6000 men, a grave blunder was committed. It was not possible for Jackson to resist the temptation which was thus offered. But for that temptation, Jackson certainly would not at that time have ventured to attack Banks; and probably the famous race through the Shenandoah Valley would never have taken place. This, however, was not all. The blunder committed by the government had another result. It hindered the very purpose for which Shields had been detached from Banks—it prevented McDowell from joining McClellan before Richmond. It is not wonderful that McDowell, when commanded to fall back and take part with Banks and Fremont in the interception of Jackson, should have done so reluctantly, exclaiming, with a heavy heart, as he repeated the order: "It is a crushing blow to us all." It was unfortunate that Shields and Fremont did not meet at Strasburg; and the latter general, though assuming a responsibility which success would have justified, undoubtedly made a mistake in not taking the route across the mountains which he was ordered to take. If he had taken the appointed route, he might have intercepted Jackson; but he might not, for the mountain roads were in a wretched condition, in consequence of the heavy rains, which had soaked the soil and swollen the streams. As it was, Jackson had passed through Strasburg only a few hours before he arrived. Supposing Fremont had been up in time to meet the retreating army, it is by no means certain that he could have hindered Jackson's onward march. Shields did not arrive at Strasburg till the following day; and it is by no means improbable, judging from what actually did happen, that Jackson, in the interval, could have found time to punish Fremont and proceed on his journey. Fremont and Shields no doubt did their best; and if they were outrun, and finally defeated, they had the satisfaction of knowing that the task had been accomplished by a general who was without a superior, either in the armies of the South or in the armies of the North.
ON THE CHICKAHOMINY.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The Army of the Potomac.—A Critical Period.—McClellan Still on the Chickahominy.—Masterly Inactivity. —Quiet Siege of Richmond.—Stuart's Raid.—A Confederate Council of War.—McClellan's Difficulty.—Fight or Retreat.—He Might Have Fought and Won.—Retreat to the James River Resolved Upon.—The Confederates Move on Mechanicsville.—The Nationals Well Posted at Beaver Dam Creek.—The Confederate Attack at Mechanicsville.—Night Closes the Struggle.—The Result a National Victory.—McClellan Hastens his Retreat.—The Second Day.—The Nationals Still Well Posted.—The Brave Confederates.—"Thundering Hurrahs."—Repeated, but Vain Attempts.—Porter Calls for Help.—Slocum Sent to his Aid.—Porter Again Calls for Help.—Butterfield Sorely Pressed.—St. George Cooke.—A Pause.—The Nationals Falling Back to the River.—Arrival of Meagher and French.—The Day Saved.—White Oak Swamp.—The Confederates Deceived.—White House Evacuated.—The Pursuit.—McClellan's Despatch.—Savage's Station.—Fair Oaks Abandoned.—Battle of Savage's Station.—McClellan at Malvern Hills.—The Battle at White Oak Swamp Bridge.—The Confederates in High Hopes.—Grand Massing of Troops.—Jackson at White Oak Swamp Bridge.—Frazier's Farm.—Willis's Road.—Battle of Glendale.—Determined Fighting on Both Sides.—Arrival of Hooker and Kearney.—A Drawn Battle.—Meade Wounded and McCall Captured.—Incidents of the Two Battles.—White Oak Swamp and Glendale.—The Retreat Continued.—Malvern Hills.—A Strong Position.—The Hills Covered with Artillery and Infantry.—Lee's Plan.—Hill's Opinion.—A Bold Attack and a Fearful Cannonade.—The Confederates Repulsed.—A Lull in the Fight.—The Attack Renewed.—The Quivering Hills.—Terrible Slaughter.—Hand-to-Hand Fighting.—The Nationals Hold Their Position.—A Fearful Night.—The Retreat Continued.—Vexation of the National Officers.—Fitz John Porter.—Philip Kearney.—The Circumstances Depressing.—McClellan's Address to his Soldiers.—Address of Jefferson Davis to the Army of Virginia.—Committee of Congress.—Heavy Loss of Men.—Poor Results.—McClellan and Lincoln.—McClellan and Halleck.—Correspondence.—Reluctance of McClellan to Leave Harrison's Landing.—His Demand for More Troops.—End of the Peninsular Expedition.—Reflections.

We have now arrived at the most critical, if not the most perilous, period in the entire history of the war. Since the disastrous battle of Bull Run, the National armies had experienced no very serious reverse. On the contrary, in many a hard-contested fight, and on many a blood-stained battle field, victory had rewarded the bravery and crowned the efforts of the Union troops. In the West they had marched in triumph from Cairo to the neighborhood of Vicksburg; and such names as Henry and Donelson, and Shiloh and Corinth, and Perryville and Murfreesboro had become separate sources of National pride. Along the coast and on the inland waters, they had been even more successful than they had been on land; and it was with feelings of equal pride they could reflect that the entire seaboard, both of the Atlantic and of the Gulf, had been restored to Federal authority. It was only in the Peninsula and over the army of the Potomac that the cloud of darkness hovered. Here alone fortune seemed to be chary of her favors.

The siege of Yorktown, the battle of Williamsburg and the battle of Fair Oaks had shed but little lustre on the Federal arms. The army of the Potomac—so imposing in its strength, so
splendid in its equipment, so perfect in its training, the pride of its chief, the hope of the nation—had not yet given any earnest of the fulfillment of its high promise. We have followed it from Manassas to Yorktown, from Yorktown to Williamsburg, from Williamsburg to the swamps of the Chickahominy; and, although we have no reason to blame either officers or men for lack of bravery, we have seen precious time wasted, blunder after blunder committed, and opportunity after opportunity flung to the winds of heaven. A month had elapsed since the battle of Fair Oaks, and McClellan was still lying inactive along the line of the Chickahominy. While he waited for reinforcements, and occupied himself and his men in the construction of bridges and batteries, the enemy was multiplying his own forces, and mightily increasing the difficulties of the National commander. Had McClellan moved on Richmond immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks, the presumption is that he would have won an easy victory. As it was, he gave General Jackson abundant time, after his brilliant campaign in the valley, to come up and, with his army of 35,000 men, to join General Lee, who had succeeded General Joseph E. Johnston in the supreme command. This, however, was not all. Time was given the government at Richmond to reap the full benefit of the new Conscription Act, and to hurry forward, at the same time, detachments from the West. McClellan's army had no doubt suffered since it first landed on the Peninsula. The ranks of the regiments had been thinned. Some had died in battle; and not a few had perished from the malarious fevers of the swamps. Detachments, too, had been left respectively at Yorktown and at Williamsburg. But he had been joined by five regiments from Baltimore; General Wool's disposable force at Fortress Monroe was at his call; McCall's division, of McDowell's corps, had already arrived from Fredericksburg; and if McDowell himself, with the remainder of his army, had been prevented from coming to his aid, McClellan had the less reason to complain that his own dilatory conduct had given Stonewall Jackson the opportunity of teaching the Federal authorities the propriety of securely guarding the National capital. A vail of mystery hangs over some of the doings of this period; and it may be that there are some things which will yet find a fuller explanation; but in the meantime, with all the light we now enjoy, the evidence seems conclusive that McClellan sacrificed his chances by his habitual caution, or rather by his incorrigible habit of delay.

The National army was strongly fortified on the Chickahominy. The left wing was on the south of that stream, between White Oak Swamp and New Bridge. The roads towards Richmond were commanded by heavy guns. The right wing was north of the Chickahominy, and extended beyond Mechanicsville. Several solid bridges had been thrown over the stream, thereby bringing the two
wings into easier communication. The one fault of McClellan's arrangement was that his line was too long, and, consequently, greatly attenuated. The Confederates were not slow to discover this weakness of their adversary.

June 13. On the 13th of June, General J. E. B. Stuart, with some 1500 cavalry and four pieces of horse artillery, made a bold dash on the National right, and, after some severe fighting at Hanover Court House, swept around the entire army, working terrible destruction, and capturing 165 prisoners and 260 mules and horses. After resting three hours at Talleysville, he returned next morning to Richmond, unopposed. This audacious movement of Stuart actually created great commotion in the army of the Potomac. For some days more all was quiet on the Chickahominy. On June 25th of June the army, then numbering 115,000 men present for duty, heard with delight that they were to be led out of the pestilential swamps. On that day a forward movement was made by Heintzelman's corps, with a part of Keyes' and Sumner's, on the Williamsburg Road. At a place called Oak Grove the enemy was encountered in considerable strength, when a severe fight ensued, the Nationals losing some 516 men in killed and wounded. The coveted point was gained, but it was not to be turned to much account. On that very night the unwelcome tidings arrived that Stonewall Jackson was at Hanover Court House. On the following morning the advance was recalled; and for the army of the Potomac there was something else to do than to march in triumph to the Confederate capital.

On the same day on which the above-mentioned encounter took place, June 25, a Confederate council of war was held, and it was resolved that, as the Confederate lines around the city were now completed, the greater portion of the army might now be spared for a forward movement on the National line. Jackson was to cross to the north of the Chickahominy, and move on the right flank of the National army; and in the event of McDowell remaining inactive at Fredericksburg, a general and simultaneous attack was to be made along McClellan's whole line. The National army was now in a perilous position. It was evident that the object was to cut McClellan off from his communications with the York River. He must either retreat or give battle out of his intrenchments. McClellan had now to resolve what he would do. There was no time for delay. His decision was quickly taken. The bridge which he had thrown across the Chickahominy gave him the opportunity of throwing over either wing to the assistance of the other. He might concentrate on the north side or the south side, as he thought fit. But if he concentrated on the north bank, it implied an abandonment of the idea of capturing Richmond, and exposed him to the risk of an unsupported retreat to Yorktown. If he concentrated on the south bank, he lost his communications with White House, and he would
have to execute the perilous operation of changing his base by a flank movement. It was seventeen miles from Fair Oaks to James River, and there was only one road—a road which was exposed to many others radiating from Richmond. The southern movement had this one advantage: that since the destruction of the Merrimac, the James River was open, and some transports had already found their way to City Point. The movement to James River was determined upon; and arrangements for a retreat were made at once. Happily, the only bridges in possession of the Confederates were about ten miles above, at Mechanicsville. As the Confederates must needs go round by that way, time would be gained by the Nationals to make good their retreat to Harrison's Landing, where they would come under the shelter of the gunboats. Military writers have expressed the opinion that a more daring general might, by a judicious concentration of his troops on the south side of the Chickahominy, have marched in triumph to Richmond. It is true that the Confederate capital was left comparatively unprotected; and it is undeniable that the bravery of the troops and the skill of the officers, from the commander-in-chief downward, as displayed in the retreat, encourage the belief that if the attempt had been made, it might have resulted in complete success. Such a course, however, necessarily implied a great risk. Defeat was not impossible; and defeat in such circumstances would have been ruinous to the National army. True to his instincts, faithful to the character which he had already established, McClellan chose, as might have been predicted, the less hazardous course.

On the afternoon of the 26th began that series of engagements which culminated in retreat—a retreat which, whether regard be had to the protracted character of the struggle, the severity of the fighting, or the skill with which it was conducted, must be considered one of the most memorable in history. Shortly after two o'clock on that day, the Confederate general, A. P. Hill, crossed to the north side of the Chickahominy and moved on Mechanicsville. The right wing of McClellan's army which, as we have seen, stretched beyond Mechanicsville, was under the command of General Fitz John Porter, and consisted of the divisions of Morell, Sykes and McCall. McClellan had long before seen and recognized the strategic importance of Beaver Dam Creek, near Mechanicsville. The place was naturally strong; and its strength had been increased by some rifle-pits and abatis. Here were posted McCall's Pennsylvania reserves, 8500 strong, with five batteries. The batteries were so disposed as to command the stream and the open fields beyond, through which the Confederates must approach. In the face of a heavy fire from the batteries and from the infantry, Hill's brigades, followed by those of Longstreet, advanced to the attack. They fell with tremendous force upon McCall's division. Making but little im-
pression at first, they massed and fell successively on his right and on his left, doing terrible damage; but it was all of no avail. The Nationals stood firm. McCall, receiving some effective aid from Martindale and Griffin, of the division of Morell, and his orders being admirably carried out by Generals Reynolds and Seymour, repelled the enemy at every point. From their superior position, the National guns did terrible execution. The battle lasted until nine o'clock, when the Confederates were driven back with a loss of 1500 men. The National loss was trifling; and, at the close of the fight, McClellan’s men were in full possession of every point of the battle field. The fight of the 26th is known as the battle of Mechanicsville.

McClellan had won the battle of Mechanicsville; but he felt, even more than before, the necessity of making a hurried retreat to the James River. Jackson had at last come up. He had already crossed Beaver Dam Creek; and he was moving down towards the National right. McClellan could no longer doubt that it was Lee’s intention to cut him off from his communications at the White House. Retreat, in his judgment, must be commenced at once; and, in his own words, “to that end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent.” Quarter-master Ingalls was ordered to forward the stores and munitions of war to Savage’s Station, to burn what he could not remove, and to do his utmost to have supplies sent up the James. Having sent his wounded also to Savage’s Station, he prepared to cross the Chickahominy with his right wing, for the flight. During the night most of the heavy guns and wagons were thrown across the river, and shortly before dawn the troops were skillfully withdrawn to a strong position near Gaines’ Mills, between Cool Arbor and the Chickahominy. There, in the form of an arc of a circle, the left resting on the Chickahominy, the right towards Cool Arbor, and covering the two bridges—Woodbury’s and Alexander’s—the Fifth corps on the morning of the 27th awaited the attack. Some of the siege guns were yet in position there; and those which had been taken over the stream were planted so as to cover the approaches to the bridges. Morell’s division was on the left; and Sykes’ division of Regulars and Duryea’s Zouaves were on the right, extending towards Cool Arbor. The extreme point of the right wing, which rested on a swamp on the Cool Arbor Road, was held by Battery I, Fifth United States artillery, Captain J. H. Weed. Meanwhile, Stoneman had been sent to the White House with a column of cavalry, to evacuate the depot and to destroy there what could not be used.

About noon the Confederates were discovered approaching in force, under A. P. Hill; and soon the artillery opened a heavy fire. Sykes was the first to feel the severity of the enemy’s attack; but he rose upon them in his might and hurled them back in confusion, and with heavy loss. Long-street now came forward to the relief
of Hill. His first intention was to make a feint on Porter’s left; but the situation was too serious; and he was compelled to make a real attack, or do nothing at all. He resolved, therefore, to carry the heights on which the Nationals were posted; and while he was preparing to do so, Jackson and D. H. Hill arrived and took positions. The order was now given for the whole Confederate line to advance, except the right wing under Magruder, which was confronting McClellan on the right bank of the Chickahominy. The brave masses rushed, with “thundering hurrahs,” upon the musketry of Porter’s troops; and whole ranks went down under the terrible fire. After a tremendous struggle, in which the Confederates vainly attempted to get possession of the rising ground on which the Nationals were posted, the former began to give way. They were already falling back in disorder. At this critical juncture, General Cobb appeared on the field with his legion, together with the Fourteenth Virginia and the Nineteenth North Carolina, and vainly attempted to renew the fight. His legion was sent rolling back in broken fragments from the charge; and the Nineteenth North Carolina lost eight standard bearers, with most of their officers killed or wounded.

At two o’clock, Porter, feeling the pressure which was brought to bear upon him, sent to McClellan for reinforcements. McClellan, dreading the army under Magruder in his immediate front, could only spare Slocum’s division, of Franklin’s corps. He did not know that Magruder had not more than 25,000 to oppose to his 60,000 all of whom were well entrenched. Slocum arrived about half-past three, when the battle was raging most fiercely. Porter’s force now amounted to 35,000 men. For hours afterwards the fighting was desperate, and the issue doubtful. The Confederates continued to hurl brigade after brigade against the National line; but they came up, one after another, only to be broken like the angry waves on the rock-bound shore. Later in the day Porter again sent for reinforcements; and the brigades of French and Meagher, of Richardson’s division, were sent to his aid. They arrived just in time. Jackson, with the divisions of Longstreet and Whiting, had fallen with terrific energy on the National left. With fierce yells they crossed the intervening swamp, and rushed up to the very muzzles of Porter’s guns. Cut down like grass before the scythe, the survivors nevertheless still pressed forward over the dead bodies of their comrades. It seemed as if nothing could check their advance. Butterfield’s gallant brigade, which had been repelling the heaviest attacks of the Confederates for more than an hour without any assistance, was no longer able to resist those furious onsets. Sorely pressed, it yielded, and fell back to the woods. By this movement, the batteries of Allen, Weedon, Hart and Edwards were left exposed. In spite of a most heroic resistance, they, too, were forced to fall back, with the loss of several guns. At five o’clock, Porter reported his
position as critical. His opponents had now double his strength. At this supreme moment an untoward circumstance aggravated the difficulties of his position. Porter was calling up all his reserved artillery—about eighty guns in all—and was effectually covering the retreat of his infantry, when General St. George Cooke, acting without orders, attacked the Confederates on their flank with his cavalry, repulsing them in great disorder. His horses, terrified by the roar of two hundred guns and the shrill, sharp sounds of thousands of muskets, rushed back through the Union batteries, giving the impression that it was an attack of Confederate cavalry, and producing all the effects of a panic. But for this unhappy circumstance, Porter might have been able to hold the field and get all his guns across the river. As it was, his entire force was pressing towards the bridges, the Confederates, in great force, close upon their heels. It had almost become a rout. At this extreme moment, when all seemed lost, the brigades of French and Meagher, who had crossed from the other side, came rushing up from the bridges and dashed to the front. Wild hurrahs rent the air as they appeared on the field. The retreating Nationals halted and re-formed. The Confederates, seeing fresh troops, and ignorant of their number, paused, and rested on the field they had won. It was now after sunset; and darkness soon fell upon the scene of carnage. Such was the battle of Gaines' Mill. Prodigies of valor were performed by both armies.

Weed's battery, above referred to, was under fire for eight and a half hours; and it was only when some of the guns were disabled, and when pressed by the overwhelming masses of the enemy, that the position was abandoned. On both sides the losses were heavy. The Confederate loss must have been great; for in Jackson's corps alone there were 589 killed and 2671 wounded. McClellan's loss was 9000 men and twenty-two guns.

Although he had suffered severely, and been driven from his position, Porter had yet won a substantial victory. He had accomplished the great purpose for which he fought. He was still master of the position in front of the bridges. During the night, he carried his thinned and exhausted regiments across the Chickahominy, and destroyed the bridges in his rear. It was found impossible to care for the dead and the seriously wounded; and a few guns and some prisoners were left behind. McClellan applied his whole energies more and more towards the successful accomplishment of his retreat. Flight, not fight, was now his fixed purpose. General Keyes was ordered forward to take possession of the road across the White Oak Swamp, and of all communicatory approaches. By noon of the 28th Keyes was in the position prescribed. During the day Porter and McCall, with their shattered bands, took positions on the roads leading from Richmond to White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. Sumner and Heintzelman, with Smith's division, of Franklin's corps, formed
McClellan's Singularly things the carried and material his situation. flames. Arrange-
a and the interior that this demonstration wounded. unnaturally, its certain. situation. success. reserve his

It was not until the afternoon of the 28th that the Confederates fully understood the situation. They had supposed, from the manner in which the ground had been vacated, that McClellan had been cut off from his line of retreat; and the capture or destruction of the entire National army was regarded as certain. The Confederates were wild with delight. The day was spent in burying the dead and caring for the wounded. A demonstration was made towards White House, where it was expected immense stores of all kinds would be found. But Stoneman and Emory had already done their work, and proceeded by way of Yorktown to rejoin the army on the James River. In place, therefore, of finding rich and abundant supplies at White House, the Confederates found nothing but blackened ruins. What the Nationals had not been able to carry off, they had committed to the flames. When the state of things at White House was reported to General Lee, he at once comprehended the situation. McClellan, he knew, was on his way to the James River, to form a junction with the fleet. Singularly enough, it does not appear that the plan of retreat conceived and carried out by McClellan had, up to that moment, entered the minds of the Confederate leaders. When it became known to them, they did not dream of the possibility of its success. It was their decided conviction that, as he had been driven from all his strongholds on the north side of the Chickahominy, and been cut off from all communications with White House, his base of supplies, the Chickahominy in his rear and the divisions of Magruder, Longstreet and Huger in his front, it would be impossible for the National commander to save his army. Arrangements were made at once for a vigorous pursuit.

McClellan, not unnaturally, was greatly elated by the success which had so far attended the retreat. His despatch to the secretary of war, bearing date June 28th, was boastful and extravagant. He truly declared that no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. It was a little absurd, however, for him to say, considering the many opportunities he had flung away, that with 10,000 additional men he could take Richmond to-morrow; and surely his better sense had deserted him when he allowed himself to write to the secretary of war: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

McClellan had spent the whole of the 28th at Savage's Station, superintending the retreat, and so disposing his troops as effectually to block the way of his pursuers. Early on the
June 29, 1862

morning of the 29th, he caused
of the approach of Magruder, Sumner
the 29th, he caused
not to be carried away from the camps.
be destroyed all that could
not be carried away from the camps.
A complete railroad train, locomotive,
tender and cars, which had been left
on the track, the cars filled with sup-
plies and shells, was turned loose, and
went rolling headlong over the broken
bridge into the Chickahominy. The
train had been set on fire at starting;
and, as car after car went crashing
over the broken bridge, the shells
bursting in rapid succession, added
grandeur to the work of destruction.
This done, the general-in-chief moved
across the White Oak Swamp towards
the front of his retreating columns.
About the same hour that McClellan
left Savage’s Station, Lee commenced
his pursuit. In the race, McClellan
had the advantage of twenty-four hours.
Magruder and Huger, who, as we have
seen, were posted south of the Chick-
ahominy and in front of the works at
Fair Oaks, were ordered to push along
the Williamsburg and Charles City
Roads; Longstreet and Hill were to
cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge;
and Jackson was to cross at the Grape
Vine Bridge, and sweep down the
right bank of the river. Provision was
thus made to intercept the retreating
army if possible; and, in any case, to
fall with great force on both flanks,
and on the rear. Magruder, as he
moved along the Williamsburg Turn-
pike, found that the works at Fair Oaks
had been abandoned. Sumner and
Heintzelman, with Smith’s division, of
Franklin’s corps, had fallen back to-
ward Savage’s Station. Made aware
of the approach of Magruder, Sumner
prepared to offer resistance. The di-
visions of Richardson and Sedgwick
were formed on the right of the rail-
road—Sedgwick’s right touching Heint-
zelman’s left. Magruder fell with
great fury on Sedgwick as early as
nine o’clock, but he was compelled to
fall back. Unfortunately at this stage
Heintzelman, giving way to some mis-
apprehension of the orders given him,
moved towards White Oak Swamp,
and crossed the bridge, thus leaving a
gap of some three-quarters of a mile
between Sumner and Smith. Magru-
der saw his opportunity; and, after
some manoeuvring, rushed upon the
Nationals with tremendous violence.
The brigades of Generals Burns, Brooke
and Hancock were soon engaged. The
New York Sixty-Ninth came to their
aid; while splendid service was ren-
dered by the batteries of Pettit, Osborn
and Bramhall, who promptly took
part in the action. Magruder was thus
kept at bay, the National troops hold-
ing their ground until darkness fell
upon the scene and made an end of the
battle. Magruder had counted with
confidence on being joined by Jackson,
but that officer had been too long de-
layed in rebuilding Grape Vine Bridge.
During the night Sumner, leaving be-
hind him in the hospitals some 2500
sick and wounded, moved towards
White Oak Swamp; and before sun-
rise on the following morning, the Na-
tional troops had passed over White
Oak Bridge, and the bridge had been
destroyed. Over this one bridge had
passed almost the entire army of the
Potomac, with all its trains and herds of cattle. By its destruction, a fresh obstacle was placed in the way of the pursuing army. The fight of the 29th is known as the battle of Savage's Station. The one sad feature of the day was the leaving behind so many sick and wounded. It was one of those terrible necessities which bring out into striking relief the horrors of war.

On Monday morning, the 30th of June, McClellan had reached Malvern Hills. This is "an elevated plateau, cleared of timber, about a mile and a half long by three-fourths of a mile wide, with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, the ground sloping gradually toward the north and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for the artillery in those directions. Towards the northwest, the plateau falls off more abruptly to a ravine which extends to James River. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack were from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike the National army on its left wing." This place McClellan regarded as the key to his contemplated new position. Here, therefore, in the mansion house of the estate, he established his headquarters; and here he resolved to mass his troops and collect his artillery. He lost no time in establishing communication between the army and the gunboats, which were in charge of Commodore Rodgers. Meanwhile a large part of the army, having emerged from White Oak Swamp, were beginning to appear on the high, open ground of Malvern Hills, the van reaching as far forward as Turkey Bend. It was not, however, without a severe struggle that this position had been gained. The morning of the 30th was exceedingly hot; but there was to be no rest for the weary and foot-sore men on either side. The retreating army must continue its retreat: the pursuing army must continue its pursuit. Generals Sumner and Franklin were left to act as a rear-guard, and to hold the passage of White Oak Swamp Bridge. General Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker, Kearney, Sedgwick and McCall, took a position at the point of intersection of the roads which lead from Richmond, called Charles City Cross Roads. The Confederates resumed the advance the following morning. Generals D. H. Hill, Whitney and Ewell, with their divisions, under command of Jackson, had crossed the Chickahominy by the Grape Vine Bridge, and followed the retreating Nationals by the Williamsburg Road and Savage's Station. Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill had crossed at New Bridge, and, having moved around the head of the swamp, made a rapid march down the Central Road, in the hope of being able to strike McClellan's flank. Meanwhile, Magruder and Huger had been marching on a parallel line with Longstreet along the New Market Road. The Confederates were in high hopes that they would be able to penetrate McClellan's line; and to make matters absolutely certain, a bri-
gade had been ordered to come across the James River from Fort Darling. It was expected that at least 80,000 Confederates would be brought into action; and Jefferson Davis had come on from Richmond to witness the capture or destruction of the army of the Potomac. About noon Jackson came up to White Oak Swamp and found the bridge destroyed. Sumner and Franklin were there in force. A fierce artillery fight commenced at once. It lasted during the entire day, the Confederates massing their forces and putting forth almost superhuman efforts to force a passage. It was found to be impossible, however, to make any headway against the batteries of Ayres and Hazard. During the struggle Hazard was mortally wounded, and his force was so cut up that his battery had to be withdrawn. Ayres continued the fire without intermission until night closed upon the scene. The Confederates failed in their purpose to force a passage across the swamp. During the night the Nationals retired, leaving on the ground some 350 sick and wounded, and several disabled guns.

While the contest was raging at the broken bridge, and the Confederates were prevented from crossing or making any attempt at reconstruction, another and even more fearful battle was raging in another direction, although at no great distance. Later on the same day, about four o'clock in the afternoon, Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who had been waiting for Magruder and Huger, fell upon Heintzelman and his forces at the point where the Long Bridge Road intersects the Quaker or Willis Road, not far from Willis Church. There were two farms in the immediate neighborhood, one called Frazier's and the other called Nelson's, both of which have given names to the battle. The Nationals were strongly posted, their heavy guns particularly being in good position. Longstreet having been called away, the Confederate command devolved upon A. P. Hill. It seemed to be Hill's intention to drive the Nationals before him by the first onslaught. Massing his forces, therefore, on he came, as if with the speed of the whirlwind and the force of the avalanche. He had not properly reckoned regarding his foe. A terrific shower of artillery and musketry decimated his ranks and threw his troops into disorder. The crushing blow dealt by the Confederates fell most heavily upon McCall. His division—the Pennsylvania Reserves—originally 10,000 strong, had been reduced since he reached the Pamunkey to 6000. But the men were in excellent trim, and full of spirit. Colonel Simmons, with the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Reserves, rushed upon the Confederates, when reeling and broken under the terrific fire, driving them back to the woods and making 200 of them prisoners. Lee hurried forward reinforcements; and the victorious Nationals were driven back to their original ground with terrible slaughter, Simmons himself being mortally wounded. For two hours more the battle raged, victory yielding now to the one side
and now to the other. It seemed to be the determined purpose of the Confederates to break the National line and to capture its batteries. At one time Cooper's battery in the centre was captured. By a dashing effort it was retaken, together with the standard of an Alabama regiment. At a critical moment Meagher rushed forward with his Irish brigade; and such was the fury of the onset that the Confederates were driven back again to the woods. One of the most brilliant charges of the day was made by the Fifty-Fifth and Sixtieth Virginia. They captured Randall's battery, and drove back in confusion the supporting regiments. Determined to recapture it, McCall and Meade rallied their infantry. A terrific and protracted hand-to-hand fight ensued; and, although the reserves were repulsed, they carried back with them the recaptured guns. The darkness was setting in. During the fierce struggle, the officers had recklessly exposed themselves. Meade was severely wounded, and a little later McCall was captured. Seymour assumed command, and the battle continued. The sounds of battle had attracted the attention of Hooker and Kearney; and as night was closing upon the scene, their divisions arrived upon the field. They were soon joined by the First New Jersey brigade. Some of the lost ground was immediately reclaimed. Joyful shouts arose from the National ranks. The Confederates, worn out and perplexed by this fresh accession of strength on the part of the Nationals, retired to the shelter of the woods. It was not another victory to either side; but it was another great battle; and to the Nationals it was equal to a victory, for it was a successful resistance. On this day, as the reader now knows, there were two separate fights. The one is best known as the battle of White Oak Swamp; the other as the battle of Glendale. The latter is known also as the battle of Frazier's Farm.

In no previous battle of the war, perhaps, was the martial spirit so keenly and so bitterly developed as on this day, and particularly at the battle of Glendale. The wounding of Meade and the capture of McCall give evidence of the feeling on the National side. On the 30th of June, the real sentiment of the rank and file of the Nationals was several times revealed by the loud and universal cry, "On to Richmond." On the Confederate side there was equal determination and more bitterness. It was no uncommon thing on that day for cavalry officers to leap from their saddles and lead to the charge infantry regiments who had lost their commanders. At one time General Hill, when the Confederates were in full retreat, seized the standard of the Fourth North Carolina, a regiment which he had formerly commanded, and shouted to the retreating soldiers: "If you will not follow, I will perish alone." "Lead on, Hill: head your old North Carolina boys!" rang over the field, while fifty officers dashed to his side. The result was that the Confederates halted and turned, and the
pursuit was checked. Major Peyton had a son who had both his legs shattered. He called to his father for help. "When we have beaten the enemy, then I will help you. I have other sons to lead to glory. Forward." Such was the answer. In a few seconds more the father was dead. Such incidents might easily be multiplied on both sides; but these are sufficient to show the intensity of feeling which influenced both armies at this particular juncture. Of McCall's division, nearly one-fourth had been killed or wounded; and General Pryor tells us that he crossed the Chickahominy with 1400 men, and that in the fights that followed he suffered a loss of 859 killed and wounded, and eleven missing.

It was the confident expectation of the Confederates that the battle would be resumed next day. In this, however, they were doomed to disappointment. During the darkness the retreat was July 1st; and on the morning of the 1st of July, the army of the Potomac was again a unit, and strongly posted—infantry, cavalry and artillery—on the high grounds of Malvern Hills, the James River in view, and its communication with that river secured. The character of that ground has been already described. The position was naturally strong, and McClellan had arrayed his forces with admirable skill. Both flanks of the army rested on James River, under protection of the gunboats. The arrangement of the troops from left to right was thus: Porter, Heintzelman, Sumner, Franklin, Keyes. The approaches to the position were commanded by about seventy guns, several of them heavy siege cannon. "There were crouching cannon waiting for the enemy, and ready to defend all the approaches. Sheltered by fences, ditches, ravines, were swarms of infantry. There were horsemen picture-esquely careering over the noon-tide and sun-scarred field. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible upon the slope which rose in the form of an amphitheatre. With a fan-shaped sheet of fire, they could sweep the incline—a sort of natural glacis—up which the assailants must advance. A crown of cannon was on the brow of the hill. The first line of batteries could only be reached by traversing an open space of from three to four hundred yards, exposed to grape and canister from the artillery, and musketry from the infantry. If that were carried, another and still another more difficult remained in the rear." Such was the position, and such were the forces against which Lee was now to direct all his strength. It was not without reason that, when the attack was about to be made, Hill expressed to Lee his strong disapproval. Lee, however, had made up his mind to take the position by storm; and he gave his orders accordingly.

The Confederate chief had massed his troops on the right; and he so posted his artillery as to be able to bring upon the National batteries a concentrated fire. It was his belief that by this means he would silence
the guns of McClellan; and he had given orders that, whenever the expected result was produced, Armistead’s brigade, of Huger’s division, should advance with a shout and capture the battery immediately before it. This shout was to be the signal for a general advance with fixed bayonets to “drive the invaders into the James.”

Lee found more difficulty in carrying out his plan than he had anticipated. The day was far advanced before the first gun was fired. Between three and four o’clock a heavy artillery fire was opened upon Couch, of Keyes’ division, and Kearney, of Heintzelman’s. A little later D. H. Hill, believing that he heard the preconcerted signal for a general advance, made a vigorous rush towards Couch’s front. Instead of being supported by one hundred guns, as he had expected, only a single battery was ordered up—that of Moorman; and it was knocked to pieces in a few minutes. One or two others shared the same fate—that of being beat in detail. Hill was driven back in confusion to the woods near the Quaker Road. On his retreating, the National right advanced several hundred yards and took a stronger position. Magruder, meanwhile, had made a furious attack on Porter, who commanded on the National left. Two brigades of McLaws’ division, charging through a dense wood, rushed up to the very muzzles of Porter’s guns. Attacks equally furious were made a little further to the right, and also on the centre. It was to no purpose. The attacking columns, one and all, shared the same fate. They were driven back in confusion, and with heavy loss. Nothing could withstand the terrific fire of the National batteries. Malvern Hills literally blazed, as if one sheet of solid flame; and the guns, which crowned every rising knoll, from their many mouths belched forth shot and shell which fell in showers on the bewildered masses who from time to time pressed forward, only to be torn to pieces, or to be driven back in wildest confusion. There was a lull in the battle. The fighting ceased for a time, the Confederates having all fallen back and taken shelter in the pine forest. Lee, however, was not to be driven from his purpose. He had made up his mind that Malvern Hills must be taken by storm; and no matter what the cost, no matter how great the sacrifice, the attempt must be repeated. He spent the interval in re-forming his battalions; and at about six o’clock he opened a general artillery fire on the right and left of the National position, his infantry rushing from their covering at the double-quick, sweeping over the undulating fields and boldly up the hill in the direction of the batteries. As they advanced, their ranks were torn and ploughed by musketry as well as by the heavy guns. Brigade after brigade was cut up and driven back; but their places were speedily filled, with a like result. As the evening advanced, the fighting became at once more general and more severe. The batteries on the hill redoubled their fire, the Confederates replying with equal boldness. The gunboats on the
river now began to fling shot and shell, which fell with deadly effect on the Confederate masses. For two hours the hills absolutely shook under the fierce cannonade. It was not until nine o'clock that the attempt to capture the National position was abandoned, and that the firing ceased. In his report of the engagement at Malvern Hills, General McClellan gives a graphic picture of the struggle when it was most fierce. "Brigade after brigade," he says, "formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking columns—which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery—had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley, and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field." Such was the battle of Malvern Hills. It was, although not in any sense decisive, one of the bloodiest and most fiercely contested battles of the war.

The night that followed was dark and stormy. The rain fell in absolute torrents. During such a night the sufferings of the wounded must have been fearful. The wearied Confederates sought a brief repose on the rain-soaked and blood-stained soil, some of them lying within one hundred yards of the National batteries.

When the morning of the 2d of July dawned, and the half-slept Confederates began to open their eyes, they discovered with some amazement that the Nationals were gone, and that Malvern Hills, the scene the evening before of so much tempestuous life—their heights crowned with frowning cannon, brilliant with gay uniforms, and refulgent with thousands of bayonets, which caught on their glittering points the rays of the setting sun—were deserted and silent as the grave. In the Confederate camp all was dire confusion. The following picture is by one of their own generals: "The next morning, by dawn," he says, "I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder. Thousands of straggling men were asking every passer-by for their regiments; ambulances, wagons and artillery obstructing every road, and all together in a drenching rain presenting a scene of the most woful and heart-rending confusion." It is not wonderful, when these things are known to us, that many competent critics have questioned the propriety of McClellan's conduct in continuing the retreat. The words, "On to Richmond," if uttered by him, would have been gladly obeyed by most of his officers, and by thousands of his men. This perpetual fighting, with no result but further retreat, was breaking the spirits of his soldiers. Such an order on the morning of the 2d would have filled them with newness of life; and even at the
last, worn and weary as they were, they might have marched in triumph to the Confederate capital. McClellan thought otherwise; and he otherwise ordered.

It is hardly possible to conceive of circumstances more depressing, than those in which McClellan's army was placed on the night of the 1st of July, 1862. For six days they had been struggling with a powerful foe, each successive fight being followed by a fresh retreat. During three days it had been continuous fighting and marching. The men had had no rest. Foot-sore and battle-worn, they were not to be allowed even on this night even an hour's repose. The roar of the conflict had not ceased more than two hours, when orders were given to resume the retreat. The night, as we have said, was dark, and the storm raged fiercely. We cannot wonder that the order gave general dissatisfaction. Some of them openly and loudly protested. Fitz John Porter was indignant; and his faith in his chief was at least temporarily shaken. Phil. Kearney was more plain-spoken than most of his brother-officers. "I, Philip Kearney," he said, "an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this order for a retreat. We ought, instead of retreatting, to follow up the enemy, and take Richmond; and in full view of all the responsibilities of such a declaration, I say to you all, such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason." The order, however, was obeyed; and by midnight the utterly exhausted soldiers were groping their way along a road which is described as desperate. There was only a narrow pass along which the army could retreat. The mud was ankle deep all over the ground. It was only seven miles to Harrison's Landing; and yet such was the nature of the road and the condition of the ground, that it was not till the middle of the next day that the landing was reached. It was the evening of the 3d before the wagons were all forward and in their places. The Confederates, after a fourth attempt at pursuit, turned their backs on the National army and on they moved to Richmond.

On the 4th of July General McClellan issued the following address to his army:

"SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—Your achievements of the past ten days have illustrated the valor and endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by superior forces, and without hopes of reinforcements, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of military operations. You have saved all your guns, except a few lost in battle. Upon your march you have been assailed, day after day; with desperate fury, by men of the same race and nation, skilfully massed and led. Under every disadvantage of number, and necessarily of position also, you have in every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaughter. Your conduct ranks you among the celebrated armies of history. None will now question what each of you may always, with
NATIONAL DISAPPOINTMENT.

pride, say: 'I belonged to the army of the Potomac.' You have reached this new base complete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. The enemy may at any time attack you—we are prepared to meet them. I have personally established your lines. Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a final defeat.

"Your government is strengthening you with the resources of a great people. On this, our nation's birthday, we declare to our foes, who are rebels against the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter the capital of the so-called Confederacy; that our National constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can alone insure internal peace and external security to each State, must and shall be preserved, cost what it may in time, treasure and blood.

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
"Major-General Commanding."

On the 5th, President Davis issued the following address to the army in Eastern Virginia:

"SOLDIERS—I congratulate you on the series of brilliant victories which, under the favor of Divine Providence, you have lately won, and, as the president of the Confederate States, do heartily tender to you the thanks of the country, whose just cause you have so skilfully and heroically served. Ten days ago an invading army, vastly superior to you in numbers and the material of war, closely beleaguered your capital and vauntingly proclaimed its speedy conquest; you marched to attack the enemy in his intrenchments; with well-directed movements and death-defying valor, you charged upon him in his strong positions, drove him from field to field over a distance of more than thirty-five miles, and, despite his reinforcements, compelled him to seek safety under the cover of his gun-boats, where he now lies cowering before the army so lately derided and threatened with entire subjugation. The fortitude with which you have borne toil and privation, the gallantry with which you have entered into each successive battle, must have been witnessed to be fully appreciated; but a grateful people will not fail to recognize you, and to bear you in loved remembrance. Well may it be said of you that you have 'done enough for glory'; but duty to a suffering country and to the cause of constitutional liberty, claims from you yet further effort. Let it be your pride to relax in nothing which can promote your future efficiency; your one great object being to drive the invader from your soil, and, carrying your standards beyond the outer boundaries of the Confederacy, to wring from an unscrupulous foe the recognition of your birthright, community and independence.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

Cheery and hopeful as were General McClellan's words, the complete failure of the Peninsular expedition filled the nation with sorrow. There was general gloom; and but for the successes which had attended the armies in the West, the situation would have been desperate enough. The Confederates, of course, were jubilant; and there were many who thought that they had
good reason for their joy. In his report, General Lee said: "The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign which had been prosecuted after months of preparations, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than ten thousand prisoners, including officers of rank, fifty-two pieces of artillery and upwards of thirty-five thousand stand of small arms, were captured. The stores and supplies, of every description, which fell into our hands were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field, which his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled." Boastful and offensive as this report was felt to be at the time, it was nevertheless admitted to be a not distant approximation to the truth. The committee of Congress on the conduct of the war gave in a report which was not altogether favorable to McClellan. "The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrison's Bar," it declared, "was very precipitate. The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army from destruction." There had been sent to the Peninsula from first to last about 160,000 men. On the 3d of July, when this army had reached Harrison's Landing and was under the protection of the gunboats, McClellan telegraphed to the president that he had not "over 50,000 left with their colors." The actual number, however, was about 86,000, as was found on close inspection, when President Lincoln, on July the 7th, made a visit to McClellan's headquarters. These figures speak volumes. So large a sacrifice of human life ought to have produced greater and more beneficial results.

This chapter would be incomplete without a reference to the correspondence which took place between General McClellan and the government, in regard to his future movements and the use to be made of his army. On the morning of the day on which was fought the battle of Malvern Hills, McClellan telegraphed to Washington for fresh troops, adding that it might be necessary for him to fall back to the river. The president promptly replied that he had no men to send, but that if he had a million at his disposal, it would be impossible to forward them in time to meet the emergency, urging him at the same time to save his army, even if he should be compelled to fall back to Fortress Monroe. The president added: "We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out."
DEMAND FOR MORE TROOPS.

asked for 50,000 troops, when he had for reply that the demand could not be complied with, as 15,000 more men were needed to defend the National capital. If he was not strong enough to take Richmond, the president did not ask him to attempt an impossibility. Strange to say, in spite of all this, McClellan made a demand on the 3d for 100,000 men—a demand which he repeated on the 4th, that he might, as he said, "take Richmond and the rebellion." It was at this time, too, that he wrote that foolish letter which is destined to be remembered against him, offering the president political advice, particularly in the matter of slavery.

McClellan could not bear the idea of being overruled in his plans—if Richmond was to be captured, he must have the glory; nor could he for one moment find a place for the thought that he should cease to be the chief of the army of the Potomac. On the 23d of July, General Halleck, having resigned his command of the army of the West, assumed the duties of general-in-chief of the entire army of the United States. The first thing to which his attention was called, was the condition of the army of the Potomac. Halleck, without delay, visited Harrison's Landing. Lincoln had been there on the 7th. McClellan was thus receiving sufficient attention. Halleck found McClellan bent on moving to Richmond, but imperious in his demands for more troops. To accomplish his purpose, he would require at least 50,000 additional troops. So large a number, Halleck assured him, was altogether out of the question. He was not authorized to promise more than 20,000, and to let him have even that number implied the weakening of other places. McClellan took the night to consider the matter. In the morning he had come to the conclusion that he would make an attempt on Richmond with the additional 20,000. With this understanding Halleck left for Washington. Almost immediately after his arrival there, he received from McClellan a telegram, stating that he could not undertake a movement upon Richmond with any hope of success, unless he was reinforced to the extent of 35,000 men. So large a body of men was not at the moment disposable. It was resolved, therefore, to withdraw the army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of General Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. On the 30th of July, McClellan received instructions to send away his sick as quickly as possible, and to prepare for a movement of his troops. On the 3d of August he was ordered by telegraph to withdraw his entire army to Acquia Creek. This he most reluctantly proceeded to do. On the 4th he wrote to Halleck, protesting against the withdrawal of his army. The telegram of the commander-in-chief had given him great pain. The withdrawal of the army to Acquia Creek could not but prove disastrous. It was
removing the army further from Rich-
mond, and from a base of operations
which had all the advantage of the co-
operation of the gunboats on the river.
It would prove demoralizing to the
army—both men and officers; it would
have a depressing effect upon the peo-
ple; and it would have a powerful
influence in inducing foreign govern-
ments to recognize the independent
sovereignty of the Southern Confede-
racr. By implication he denied that
the government was unable to send
him reinforcements. "I point you," he
said, "to General Burnside's force,
to that of General Pope—not necessary
to maintain a strict defense in front of
Washington and Harper's Ferry; to
those portions of the army of the West—
not required for a strict defense there.
Here, directly in front of the army, is
the heart of the rebellion. It is here
that all our resources should be col-
lected to strike the blow which will
determine the fate of this nation. All
points of secondary importance else-
where should be abandoned, and every
available man brought here. A decided
victory here, and the military strength
of the rebellion is crushed. It matters
not what reverses we may meet with
elsewhere—here is the true defense of
Washington; it is here, on the bank of
the James River, that the fate of the
Union should be decided." There
were both truth and eloquence in Mc-
Clellan's words; but coming from him
at this particular juncture, they were
powerless and without effect. They
failed to convince Halleck. They
equally failed to make any change in
the purpose of the government. Hal-
leck's reply was vigorous. It left un-
heeded none of the points which Mc-
Clellan had raised. He differed from
McClellan entirely as to the value of
his position, at least in the circum-
stances in which the National army, as
a whole, found itself. He made a
strong point of the fact that he found,
on his arrival at Washington, the orig-
inal army of the Potomac split into
two parts, with the entire force of the
enemy directly between them. It was
desirable—it was necessary—that they
be again united; and, as this union
could not be effected on the banks of
the James, it must be attempted in the
neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The
question of demoralization was easily
disposed of. "Your change of front,"
said Halleck, "from your extreme right
at Hanover Court House to your pres-
ent position was over thirty miles, but
I have not heard that it demoralized
your troops, notwithstanding the severe
losses they sustained in effecting it."
He referred with effect to McClellan's
fickleness of purpose, now demanding
50,000 men, now 20,000, and then dis-
covering that nothing could be done
without an addition of at least 35,000.
He reminded him also of the dangerous
character of the climate on the James
River—a climate fatal to whites in the
months of August and September. He
finally assured him that no change
could be made in the orders issued,
and that the wishes of the govern-
ment must be carried out. Hal-
leck's letter was written on the
6th of August. It was not until the
Aug. 14. 14th that the evacuation of Harrison’s Landing commenced. McClellan left himself on the 23d, and arrived at Acquia Creek on the day following.

Thus ended the ill-starred Peninsular expedition. From first to last it had been unfortunate. Whatever the cause, that magnificent army which had been organized with so much pomp and pageantry at Washington, and from which so great things were expected, had virtually exhausted itself and accomplished nothing. No finer soldiers ever went to give battle to an enemy. But they were allowed to sicken in the trenches at Yorktown, and to perish by thousands in the woods and swamps of the blood-stained Chickahominy. Once only during the campaign was the government, in our judgment, to blame. It might have given an entirely new feature to the campaign if, on the eve of the battle of Mechanicsville, McDowell had been ordered to make a demonstration along the Richmond Road. Such a demonstration, as we have already had occasion to observe, was dreaded by Lee,* as it would have rendered entirely impracticable the flank movement of General Jackson. In the circumstances, however, and after the experience it had had, the government was not without abundant reason for the justification of its conduct. It trembled for the safety of Washington, and it called McDowell to its protection. McClellan, however, was to blame throughout. We have no desire to repeat what we said when treating of Yorktown and of Williamsburg and of Fair Oaks, and what we said over again at the commencement of this chapter. The army of the Potomac, as one has well put it, was without a presiding genius—a controlling mind. The delays, which proved ruinous, were absolutely inexcusable. It would be ungenerous to say that McClellan was wanting in bravery, or that he lacked the higher qualities essential in a great commander. But it is notorious that he lingered at Yorktown when he had no enemy to oppose his advance, that he was not present till the battle of Williamsburg was fought and won, that he was not present at all at the battle of Fair Oaks, that when the great battle was fought at Gaines’ Mill he was on the south side of the Chickahominy, that he was not present at White Oak Swamp or at Glendale, and that when Malvern Hills were shaking as if to their foundations with the thunder of cannon, he was safe on board the gunboats on James River.

* General Robert Edmund Lee, to whom belongs the chief glory of this campaign, and who had already proved himself one of the greatest commanders developed by the war on either side, was son of General Henry Lee, and was born in Washington, in 1808. Graduating at West Point, he entered the army in 1829; rising to the rank of captain in 1838; major in 1846; and lieutenant-colonel in 1847. He was promoted to the post of superintendent of the West Point Military Academy in 1852. In 1854, he accompanied General George B. McClellan on the commission sent by the United States Government to the seat of war in the Crimea. On the 23d of April, 1861, he resigned his commission in the United States army, and offered his sword to his native State of Virginia. During that summer, he conducted the military operations in the mountain regions of Virginia. Returning to Richmond, he was occupied till June, 1862, with the general disposition and equipment of the Confederate forces. When Johnston was wounded at Fair Oaks, Lee assumed command of the army, and pressed McClellan from point to point, until he took his final stand at Malvern Hills and Harrison’s Landing.
CHAPTER XIX.

The Army of Virginia.—Pope in Command.—Fremont Resigns.—Burnside Ordered to Alexandria.—Pope’s Instructions.—Pope Opposed to McClellan’s Retreat.—Pope’s Address to his Soldiers.—He Asks to be Relieved of his Command.—McClellan at Aquia Creek.—The Plans of the Confederates.—Pope’s Orders.—Measures of Retaliation by the Confederates.—A Call for Militia.—The Unpopular Orders Modified.—The Confederates at the Rappahannock.—Pope’s Army Begins to Move.—Position of the Nationals.—Pope at Culpepper Court House.—Banks at Cedar Mountain.—The Confederates Approaching.—Battle of Cedar Mountain.—Banks Begins the Attack.—Pope on the Ground.—A Severe Encounter.—Banks Driven Back.—American Obstinance.—The Losses on Both Sides.—The Confederates Fall Back.—Intercepted Letters.—Lee’s Plan.—Pope Reinforced.—A Retreat Ordered.—The Retreat Successfully Conducted.—No Rest for the Woreted Army.—The Confederates at the Heels of the Nationals.—Across the Rappahannock.—Fighting at the Bridges and the Fords.—Stuart’s Raid.—The Nationals Humiliated.—Character of the Retreat.—The Object of the Confederates.—Pope’s Danger.—McClellan’s Delay.—Warrenton Evacuated.—Pope’s Disposition of his Troops.—Jackson Across the Rappahannock.—Jackson Through Thoroughfare Gap.—At Bristow Station.—Capture of Manassas Junction.—Pope’s Communication Intercepted.—Activity of Jackson.—Both Armies in Critical Circumstances.—Pope Prepares to Strike Jackson Before the Arrival of Longstreet.—Movement Toward Gainesville.—An Encounter at Bristow Station.—Hooker Successful.—Retreat of Ewell.—Jackson Evacuates Manassas.—Delays Again.—Porter at Bristow Station.—His Troops Need Rest.—Merritt at Warrenton Junction.—McClellan’s Officers Lukewarm.—Pope at Manassas.—Jackson’s Retreat by Way of Centreville.—The Pursuit.—Kearney at Centreville.—Bull Run.—The Old Battle-Ground.—Jackson Pressing Toward Thoroughfare Gap.—King’s Division.—Gallantry of Gibbons and Doubleday.—A Severe Encounter.—Ewell Loses a Leg.—King Holds his Ground.—Kearney’s Division at Thoroughfare Gap.—Arrival of Longstreet.—Kearney’s Division Driven Back.—King Falls Back.—The Situation Changed.—A New Disposition of the Nationals.—Battle of Groveton or Gainesville.—The Confederates Well Posted.—Arrival of Pope.—Severe Fighting In the Morning.—Pause in the Battle.—Pope Waits for Reinforcements.—Battle Resumed.—Terrific Fighting.—The Confederate Left Doubled Back on the Centre.—The Nationals Hold the Ground.—Remarks on the Battle.—Porter Blamed.—The National Army Exhausted.—Ammunition Scare.—Pope Calls for Supplies.—McClellan’s Reply.—Pope Resumes the Attack.—Porter Arrives.—A Tempest of Shot and Shell.—Porter Driven Back.—A Severe Attack on the National Left.—The Nationals Forced Back.—Pope Retires Across Bull Run.— Destruction of the Stone Bridge.—The Nationals at Centreville.—Reports of Lee and Pope.—Preparations for Another Engagement.—Excitement in Washington.—Lee’s Purpose.—The First of September.—Battle of Chantilly.—A Severe Thunder Storm.—Bravery of Stevins and Kearney.—Death of Stevins.—Death of Kearney.—The Gallant Seventy-Ninth.—The Brave Birney.—Kearney’s Body Sent to Pope’s Headquarters.—The Losses During the Campaign.—Difficult Creek.—The National Army Ordered Inside the Fortifications at Washington.—Resignation of Pope.—Disappearance of the Army of Virginia.—Restoration of the Army of the Potomac.—Reappointment of McClellan.—Vindication of Pope.

At the time McClellan was continuing his disastrous retreat towards 1862. Harrison’s Landing, important events were taking place in the nearer neighborhood of the National capital; and public interest and expectation were both excited by the active and vigorous measures of General Pope, who had been called from the West and placed in command of the army of Virginia. As early as the 27th June of June, 1862, the following order had been issued by the president:

"I. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks and McDowell, including the troops now under Brigadier
General Sturgis, at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the army of Virginia.

"II. The command of the army of Virginia is specially assigned to Major-General John Pope, as commanding general.

"The troops of the Mountain Department, heretofore under command of General Fremont, shall constitute the First army corps, under the command of General Fremont.

"The troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under General Banks, shall constitute the Second army corps, and be commanded by him.

"The troops under the command of General McDowell, except those within the fortifications and the city of Washington, shall form the Third army corps, and be under his command."

Major-General Pope, who now comes prominently to the front, had, as the reader already knows, won some distinction in the West. He was a native of Illinois, having been born at Kaskaskia, in that State, in March, 1823. His father was Judge Pope, of Illinois. Having received a liberal education, the younger Pope entered West Point in 1838. He graduated with Rosecranz in 1842, and in August, 1846, joined the army, under General Taylor, in Mexico. From the close of the Mexican War up until 1861, he was engaged chiefly in surveying expeditions. When the Civil War broke out, he held only the rank of captain. He was soon, however, appointed brigadier-general of volunteers. In December of 1861, he was despatched by General Halleck into central and western Missouri, then being harassed by Confederate raiders. In this mission Pope was completely successful. Subsequently, in March, 1862, he was appointed major-general of volunteers, and soon afterwards captured New Madrid and Island No. 10. He took part, also, in the siege of Corinth, and followed up the retreating Confederates.

The consolidation of these various forces into one command was favorably regarded by the public. It was believed that the combination would conduct alike to strength and usefulness. The new arrangement did not prove agreeable to General Fremont, as Pope had been his junior in Missouri. It was Fremont's opinion that the effect of the appointment of Pope to the supreme command, while he himself remained in a subordinate position, would be greatly to reduce his rank and consideration in the service; and consequently he asked to be relieved from command. He was relieved accordingly; and his corps was given first to General King, and then to General Sigel. In addition to these three corps, a small and unorganized force, under Brigadier-General Sturgis, was posted in the neighborhood of Alexandria; and thither, also, Burnside, who had arrived at Newport News from Roanoke, was ordered to proceed with his troops. The disposable movable forces consisted of the three corps first named—that of Sigel; that of Banks; and that of McDowell;—about 40,000 in all. The cavalry numbered about 5000;
but the horses were in wretched condition, and the men were poorly provided with arms. These forces were scattered over a wide surface, and along a line which extended from Fredericksburg to Winchester and Harper's Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley; and General Pope was charged with the three-fold duty of covering the National capital, of guarding the valley entrance to Maryland, in the rear of Washington, and of menacing Richmond from the North, as a diversion in favor of McClellan.

Pope assumed command on the 28th June of June, Colonel George D. Ruggles being his chief of staff. Having disposed of his troops as he best could, for the purpose of carrying out the wishes of the government, he was prepared to move toward Richmond with the view of aiding McClellan when began that series of battles which preceded and attended the retreat of the army of the Potomac from the Chickahominy to Harrison’s Landing. It was Pope’s intention to advance by way of Charlottesville upon the James River, above Richmond, compelling Lee to detach a part of his army from the front of Richmond, and thus enabling McClellan to complete his movement successfully. McClellan’s retreat changed the entire plan of the campaign. A cabinet council was called; and Pope was summoned before it. Pope was seriously opposed to McClellan’s retreat; and strongly urged its impolicy upon the president and the secretary of war. He offered to march from Fredericksburg upon Richmond direct with his whole force, insisting only on one condition—that peremptory orders should be sent to McClellan, and such measures taken in advance, that it would not be possible for him to evade, on any pretext, making a vigorous attack upon the enemy with his whole army the moment he heard that Pope was engaged. This proposal of Pope was the more honorable that it implied a very considerable risk: it would have placed Lee between the two National armies, and given him the opportunity of striking each in turn, with the possibility of destroying both. After McClellan arrived at Harrison’s Landing, Pope clung to his conviction that it would be impolitic for him to abandon the Peninsula, and wrote to him a personal note, offering every assistance in his power, and inviting a free exchange of opinions. To this letter McClellan returned a chilling reply. On July the 14th of July, when about to commence active operations, Pope issued to his soldiers an address which revealed something like vanity, with not a little irritation of feeling—an address which could not have been otherwise conceived and expressed if the object had been to embitter sentiment already known to exist, and to divide the discordant sympathies of the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia. “By special assignment of the president,” said Pope, “I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition and your wants, in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and
to the purpose. These labors are nearly completed, and I am about to join you in the field. Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies—from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack, and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving; that opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. In the meantime I desire you to dismiss certain phrases I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and holding them—of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance—disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding; and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever." Such language was certainly not fitted to encourage good feeling and unity of purpose. It is painful to have to allude to these personal differences; but it is useless to make any attempt to conceal the fact that these same differences had much to do with the disasters which had befallen, and which were soon again to befall, the National arms—disasters which for a time threatened the ruin of the Union cause. These difficulties showed the government the necessity for a commander-in-chief of all the forces of the Union; and on the 23d of July General Halleck, having resigned his command of the army of the West, assumed, in obedience to an order from the president, the duties of this high and responsible position. Pope, foreseeing the inconveniencies, not to say injuries to the Union cause, which must inevitably result from the inharmonious action already manifest on the part of the different generals, asked to be relieved from his command in Virginia and returned to the Western country. His request, however, was not complied with. In such circumstances began Pope's campaign in northeastern Virginia—ground made memorable by the first battle of Bull Run, and, more recently, by the successful raid of General Jackson and by the comparatively unsuccessful efforts of Banks, Fremont and Shields.

We have seen in a previous chapter that the withdrawal of McClellan's army was definitely decided upon at Washington. It had become a necessity. On the 14th of August, therefore, that army began to move towards Acquia Creek, with a
view to reinforce General Pope, and to act under his command. It was Pope's object, therefore, so to act that, while he would cover Washington and assure the safety of the Shenandoah Valley, he would also facilitate the Aug. 25. movements of McClellan. On the 23d McClellan himself left the landing; and on the following day he reached Acquia Creek.

It is not much to be wondered at that the Confederate government had found great encouragement from the failure of the Peninsular campaign, and had, in consequence, resolved to abandon the merely defensive attitude with which hitherto they had for the most part contented themselves, and to push forward upon the foe, striking him boldly in his own territory. The conscription had proved singularly successful; their armies had been largely increased; and victory had wonderfully improved the spirits of their men. Conscious of strength and full of high hopes, the Richmond authorities made up their minds that the time had come for the adoption of vigorous, aggressive, measures. It was resolved that Bragg should push his way through Kentucky, and capture Louisville and Cincinnati, while Lee should make a rush through the Shenandoah Valley, cross Maryland, and make himself master of Philadelphia in the hope that, by two simultaneous movements, both of them proving eminently successful, they would be able to compel the government at Washington to come to terms. In a previous chapter, when treating of some of the important operations in the West, we have shown what success attended the sortie of General Bragg. We have now to consider the success which attended that of General Lee. As soon as it became known at Richmond that an attempt was about to be made to unite the forces of McClellan to the command of Pope, it was determined to act at once, and to make a bold attempt to force a way to Washington before the junction of the two armies could be effected. The exploit of Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley was to be repeated on a grander scale. There was much high-sounding talk at the time. All that was predicted was not destined to be fulfilled; but for a time matters looked black enough for the Nationals; and the Confederates were not wholly without reason for the hopes which they indulged and for the language which they used. There were at least 150,000 fighting men centred at and around Richmond. With the exception of a strong corps of observation, all these were at once to be precipitated upon Maryland.

At this stage of our narrative, and while the armies of Lee and the armies of Pope are preparing to rush into deadly collision—the first resolute for attack, the second resolute for resistance—it is necessary to pause and direct the attention of the reader to certain measures which had been adopted for the more successful prosecution of the war—measures which at this very moment were largely occupying the public mind. We refer to the orders of General Pope, dated July 18th, 1862,
bearing date August 4th, August 8th and August 11th. On the 18th of July Pope issued the following orders:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA,\{\{\}
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862.\}\}
"General Orders, No. 5.
"Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases, supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers.
"Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.
"By command of
"Major-General Pope.
"Geo. D. Ruggles,
"Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff."

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA,\{\{\}
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862.\}\}
"General Orders, No. 6.
"Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used, unless so stated especially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men; and all villages and neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General Orders, No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses.
"Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext.
"Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of the army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching, and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty, will be specifically designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed without the gravest and most conclusive reasons.
"Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt compliance with every provision of this order:
"By command of
"Major-General Pope.
"Geo. D. Ruggles,
"Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff."

On the same day was issued another order, declaring that the inhabitants along the lines of railroads and telegraphs and the routes of travel would be held responsible for any injury done to track, line or road, or for any attacks on trains or stragglers by bands of guerrillas in their neighborhood. In cases of damage to roads, the citizens within five miles would be turned out in mass to repair the damage. If a soldier or legitimate follower of the army was fired upon from any house, the same should be razed to the ground.
By another order, all disloyal citizens within the lines of the army or within the reach of its respective officers, were to be arrested at once. Those taking the oath of allegiance, and giving sufficient security for its observance, were to be allowed to remain; all others were to be conducted to the South, beyond the extreme pickets, and if again found anywhere within the lines, were to be treated as spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. These orders of General Pope were followed by the pillaging of private property, and by insults to females, to a degree unknown heretofore during the war.

The Confederate government, by way of retaliation, issued an order declaring that General Pope and the commissioned officers serving under him were "not entitled to be considered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war. Ordered, further, that in the event of the capture of Major-General Pope, or any commissioned officers serving under him, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force and unrepealed by the competent military authority of the United States; and that in the event of the murder of an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this Confederacy, by virtue or under pretense of the order hereinbefore recited, it shall be the duty of the commanding general of the forces of this Confederacy to cause immediately to be hung, out of commissioned officers, prisoners as aforesaid, a number equal to that of our own citizens thus murdered by the enemy." It was manifest from the orders of General Pope that he meant to conduct the war on very different principles from those which had guided General McClellan. The action taken by the Confederate government showed, on the other hand, that through them Pope had added bitterness to the contest. Pope's orders were afterwards considerably modified.

After the failure of the Peninsular campaign became fully apparent, and McClellan had commenced his retreat, the government at Washington naturally enough felt the danger to which the country was in consequence exposed, and proceeded to do their utmost to provide against the emergency. A call had just been made for 300,000 volunteers. It was now deemed necessary to call upon the several States to furnish an equal number of militia, to serve for nine months. It was found extremely difficult to raise by voluntary enlistment as many as 600,000 men. Great efforts were therefore made to arouse the enthusiasm of the people. Burning words went forth from pulpit and platform; and the press lent the weight of its mighty influence to the advancement of the common cause. Liberal bounties were offered by the government; and large sums of money were contributed from private sources for the purpose of promoting enlistment. All these efforts, however, were found to be insufficient; and the president at last found himself under the necessity of having recourse to a draft. The following orders were, therefore, issued:
"War Department, \\
Washington, August 4, 1862."

"Ordered, First—That a draft of 300,000 militia be immediately called into the service of the United States, to serve for nine months, unless sooner discharged. The secretary of war will assign the quotas to the States, and establish regulations for the draft.

"Second—That if any State shall not, by the 15th of August, furnish the quota of the additional 300,000 volunteers authorized by law, the deficiency of volunteers in that State will also be made up by a special draft from the militia. The secretary of war will establish regulations for this purpose.

"Third—Regulations will be prepared by the War Department, and presented to the president, with the object of securing the promotion of officers of the army and volunteers for meritorious and distinguished services, and of preventing the nomination and appointment in the military service of incompetent or unworthy officers. The regulations will also provide for ridding the service of such incompetent persons as now hold commissions.

"By order of the president.

"Edwin M. Stanton,

"Secretary of War."

These orders were submitted to with a reasonably good grace, considering the natural repugnance of the American citizen to compulsory military service. Subsequent orders, however, Aug. 8, seriously interfering with the principles involved in the writ of habeas corpus—orders, for example, authorizing the arrest and imprisonment of any person or persons who should by act, speech or writing discourage volunteer enlistments, or who should aid and comfort the enemy, or who should be discovered in any other disloyal practice; authorizing, also, the arrest and imprisonment of any person or persons who should attempt to leave the United States, and thus seek to avoid military duty—these raised a perfect tempest of excitement. They placed the foreigner resident on these shores under great inconveniences; and they forbade the American citizen, who was liable to be drafted, to go out of the country or even to absent himself from his State or county. It was found to be impossible to carry out these orders according to the strict letter; and, consequently, another order from the War Department, dated the Aug. 11th of August—some days after the fighting between Pope and Lee had fairly commenced—took the edge off their offensiveness, by advising the exercise of great caution and sound judgment in carrying them into execution. The difficulty was thus got over; and the manifestations of patriotism on the part of the people were such as to teach the government that such measures were as unnecessary as they were unwise.

The reader is now in a position in which he can comprehend the state of things North and South at this critical moment in the history of the war. With a knowledge of these details, he will be able the more easily to enter into the feelings of the rival armies
which now confronted each other and were ready to rush into deadly strife, as well as to appreciate the special advantages which belonged to each. It is important, also, for the reader to remember that, at this particular juncture, McClellan had not yet left Harrison's Landing.

Early in the month of August the divisions of Ewell, Hill and Jackson were hurried forward to the Rapidan River, which is the south fork of the Rappahannock. General Pope made immediate preparations to meet the enemy, and to hinder his advance. Hitherto he had been giving his instructions from Washington, the capital of Rappahannock County. General Rufus King had been ordered to send forward detachments of cavalry, and break up, if possible, the Virginia Central Railroad. In this mission King had been successful; and the road was broken up in several places. General Banks had been instructed to move forward and take post where the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpepper crosses Hazel River. Previous to this, Banks had been instructed to send General Hatch, with some 2000 of his best mounted men, to proceed from Madison Court House around the west side of the Blue Ridge, and make a descent upon Gordonsville and destroy the railroad leading to Richmond, and then to push forward to Charlottesville and break up the railroad between that place and Lynchburg. Hatch was despatched accordingly. But both movements failed. Hatch was disgraced; and the cavalry of General Banks was placed in charge of General John Buford. McDowell had been ordered from Waterloo Bridge to Culpepper Court House; and General Sigel was already encamped at Sperryville, some twenty miles from Culpepper. On the 7th of August, Pope himself tells us, all the infantry and artillery forces of the original army of Virginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpepper, and numbered about 28,000 men. The cavalry were well arranged, both for observation and defense. Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison Court House, with his pickets stretching along the line of the Rapidan from Barnett's Ford to the Blue Ridge. Sigel, according to instructions, had posted a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the road from Madison Court House to Sperryville crosses the Robertson River. These were intended as a support for Buford. Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan Station, at the point where the Orange and Alexandria Road crosses the Rapidan, his pickets extending as far east as Racoon Ford, and connecting with Buford at Barnett's Ford. There was a signal station on the summit of Thoroughfare Mountain, commanding a view of the entire country as far south as Orange Court House. Having command of this station, Pope could count with confidence on being informed of the first appearance of the enemy, as well as of the direction of his movements. Burnside and his troops, of
which no account is here taken, were left in charge of Fredericksburg. The two main points of Pope's line of defense were thus Fredericksburg and Culpepper Court House. Culpepper is about seventy miles from Washington. The route crosses the Long Bridge at Washington, thence through Alexandria, Fairfax, Manassas and Warrenton. It is equally distant from Richmond. Fredericksburg is connected with Washington by steamboat navigation on the Potomac to Acquia Creek, thence, by railroad, fifteen miles to Fredericksburg, which is sixty miles by railroad from Richmond.

On the morning of the 8th of August, after having inspected the 8th different corps, and seen and given orders to the different generals, Pope arrived in person at Culpepper. Here he found that his orders had been attended to, and that all things were in a satisfactory condition. Crawford's brigade, of General Banks' corps, had already arrived. So, too, had Ricketts' division, of General McDowell's corps. At an early hour he had learned from General Bayard, who was slowly falling back towards Culpepper, that the enemy was approaching. The same information came from General Buford, who was stationed more to the west. It was impossible during the whole of the 8th to decide whether the intended movement of the enemy was in the direction of Culpepper or Madison Court House. As he had been specially instructed to preserve his communication with the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, he regulated his movements with that end in view.

Early in the day he pushed forward Crawford's brigade in the direction of Cedar or Slaughter Mountain, to the support of Bayard, who was falling back in that direction. Meanwhile he concentrated his forces, bringing them closer together in the neighborhood of Culpepper. Banks was summoned to that place from Hazel River. Sigel was ordered to hurry forward from Sperryville. Banks arrived in good time; but Sigel, from some cause, blundered as to the road he should take, and was by that means prevented from coming up until late in the afternoon of the following day. On the morning of the 9th, Pope ordered Aug. General Banks, with the remainder of his corps, to advance towards Cedar Mountain—a sugar-loaf eminence about seven miles south of Culpepper, and about two miles west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Banks was to join Crawford, who was stationed in the rear of Bayard, and to take command of all the forces present. He had special instructions to check the advance of the enemy and to ascertain his strength, as well as, if possible, to discover his immediate purpose.

The Confederates had, meanwhile, been pressing forward in very considerable strength; and before Banks arrived, Jackson had taken possession of Cedar Mountain, and, from that commanding eminence, had taken in the entire view and made himself acquainted with the position and strength of the National army. Ewell was thrown forward with his division; and care
was taken to conceal the troops as much as possible under the cover of the woods. Early's brigade, of Ewell's division, was posted on the road leading from Culpepper. The other divisions took position on the western slope of the mountain, and planted batteries on every available spot. Some of the batteries were as high as a hundred feet above the common level of the ground. Four guns were advanced to the front; and these, with some of the more elevated batteries, opened fire upon Crawford's batteries. Simultaneously with the opening of this fire on Crawford, General Winder, with a portion of Jackson's corps, moved out towards the left, carefully keeping under cover. A little later in the day, Hill came up with his division; and when about five o'clock they began to throw out skirmishers, the Confederates, strongly posted, numbered about 20,000 veterans.

It was about five o'clock in the afternoon when General Banks advanced to the attack. Up to that hour he did not believe that the enemy were in sufficient force to make any vigorous demonstration; and he so reported to General Pope. The battle at once became general; it began to rage more fiercely after six o'clock; and from that time till darkness came on the fighting was furious and incessant. About seven o'clock Pope himself came on the field, bringing with him Ricketts' division. On his arrival on the ground, Pope saw at once that Banks' right wing was too much extended. Directing Banks to draw in his right wing and mass it upon his centre, he pushed forward Ricketts' division to occupy the ground thus vacated. As Banks retired his men with great caution, the Confederates pressed close upon them and began to emerge from the woods. The batteries of Ricketts' division opened upon them a tremendous fire, and compelled them to fall back under cover. Night now fell upon the scene; and the close, and, in some cases, hand-to-hand fighting ceased; but the artillery firing was kept up until near midnight. General Sigel did not arrive in time to take any active part in the fight; but his appearance helped to give courage against the possibilities of the coming day. General Banks held the ground he took early in the morning. His mistake, if he made any, was that he advanced against a foe whose strength he had no means of knowing. He had been driven back one mile from the spot where the fighting commenced. Such was the battle of Cedar Mountain, or, as it is named by the Confederates, Cedar Run. Not on so large a scale, or so protracted as some of the battles which we have described, it was yet one of the bloodiest and most keenly contested. "I have witnessed," writes one who was present, "many battles during the war; but I have seen none where the tenacious obstinacy of the American character was so fully displayed." It was a fight of one against two. The Nationals were in the minority; but it can hardly be said that they were robbed of the honors of the day. The loss on both sides was very heavy. General Banks' corps was so
cut up as to be reduced at least one-half. Brigadier-Generals Geary, Augur and Carroll were badly wounded, and Brigadier-General Prince was captured. Pope estimated his entire loss at 1800 men. The confederate loss was heavy, and included some of the best officers.

The 10th was Sunday. At daybreak the Confederates fell back about two miles. The National pickets advanced and occupied the ground. During the remainder of the Aug. 10 day the army rested. The day following was spent in burying the dead; and on the same night the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead unburied, and his wounded to the mercy of the Nationals.

On the 16th a party of Confederate Aug. 16 cavalry were surprised and captured at Louisa Court House. On their persons were found some important letters, one of them being an autograph letter from Lee, intimating that he was moving the main body of his army, by forced marches, to attack General Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the army of the Potomac. This information having been sent to Washington, Pope received instructions from the commander-in-chief not to cross the Rapidan, but to fall back and take post behind the north fork of the Rappahannock, where reinforcements could be more easily sent him. This movement was commenced on the Aug. 18 18th. On the following day Lee, with a large force, crossed the Rapidan. Meanwhile Pope had been considerably reinforced. He had been joined by 8000 of Burnside’s soldiers, under General Reno; by ten regiments, under General Stevens, which had just returned from Port Royal; and by General King, with some regiments from McDowell’s corps. He was also authorized to call the main portion of General Cox’s forces from Western Virginia. With the greater portion of these forces already on hand—about forty regiments in all—the retreat began. General Sigel led the advance; General Reno had charge of the left; and General McDowell, supported by General Banks, occupied the centre. In this order the retreat was commenced on the night of the 18th of August. The night was dark and cold for the season of the year. The usual camp fires were extinguished, and all unnecessary noise was avoided. Considering the immense train of wagons in advance of the troops, the progress made during the night was marvellous. On the morning of Tuesday the 19th a large portion of the army had passed through Culpepper. The sight presented by the moving masses of infantry, cavalry and artillery, together with the multitudes of white-covered wagons winding slowly up the distant hills, was imposing in the extreme, and one which it rarely falls to the lot of even military men to witness. It was unfortunate for the country, however, that two such spectacles should have been witnessed by the same men within so limited a period. By noon on the 19th the advance had reached the one bridge—the railroad bridge at the Rappahannock Station—over which the
entire army must pass. All day long, and all night through, this great army, with all its encumbrances, continued to pass over the bridge; and by one o'clock on the 20th, the mighty moving mass was, if not absolutely safe, at least on the other side of the North Fork. They were not a moment too soon across; for the Confederates were already in great force at their heels. Bayard, who had charge of the rear, had been skirmishing with their advance since he had passed Cedar Mountain. At the last moment the Confederate cavalry made a vigorous charge on the National rear; a few men were killed; but the complete success of the retreat was not hindered. It was with good reason that Pope was proud of the manner in which the retreat had been conducted.

After an effort so exhaustive, it might be expected that the army would need rest. But there was to be no rest: the toil must be severe and continuous for days and weeks to come. Pope posted his army along the line of the Rappahannock, so as to guard the railroad bridge and all the fords. On the morning of the 21st, the Confederates were forward in full force; and a series of attempts at different places were made to cross the river. There were, in consequence, a number of fierce artillery duels. But the bridge and all the fords were well guarded; and every attempt at forcing a passage completely failed. These attempts were repeated, and heavy artillery firing was maintained at the different fords on the 23d and 24th,

but with no special results. On Aug. 23, the 23d Ricketts destroyed by fire the bridge at the Rappahannock. Lee now resolved on a flank movement; and, with this end in view, he advanced about twelve miles further up the river, and made a bold attempt to cross at Waterloo Bridge. This attempt was also resisted; but it was only partially defeated. Meanwhile, General Stuart, at the head of a body of Confederate cavalry, had succeeded in crossing the river, and, having made a bold dash on Catlett's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, some thirty-five miles from Washington and some thirteen miles in the rear of the Rappahannock Station, where he ransacked Pope's army trains, seized his baggage, with the property of his staff officers, captured more than two hundred horses, and destroyed much that he could not carry away, then found his way back again to the Confederate lines with all his booty, encountering during the entire raid almost no opposition. This raid of Stuart was extremely discouraging to the people of the North, and to the government at Washington. It was not less discouraging to the National army, and to Pope himself. It revealed to the world what Pope and many of his officers well knew—that but little was accomplished when, after his retreat from Cedar Mountain, he had put the Rappahannock between his own army and that of General Lee. It showed that Washington, unless some manifestation of strength was quickly made, was again at the mercy of the Confederacy,
and that General Lee was not ignorant of the way by which he might pass through Maryland and dictate terms of peace in the city of Brotherly Love.

The retreat across the Rappahannock was, in fact, partly a temporary expedient and partly a military necessity. It was a military necessity because Pope, with the forces at his command, could not continue the struggle so far from his base of supplies, and against such fearful odds. It was a temporary expedient because it was believed that, by putting the Rappahannock between the two opposing armies, Lee would be so hindered in his operations that he would be unable to strike with his superior numbers before the proposed junction had been effected between the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia. Pope was not ignorant of the danger to which he was exposed from an attack on his right flank, unless he were speedily reinforced—a danger greatly aggravated by the fact that he was bound by strict orders to preserve intact his communication with Fredericksburg.

Pope had now become fully alive to the danger of his position. Convinced that the main body of Lee's army was being moved further up the river, where there was little difficulty in crossing, and that the object was to turn his right, get in his rear, and cut off his supplies from Washington, he telegraphed again and again that, if not reinforced, he would be compelled to retreat; that, with the enemy moving in force to his right, it was impossible for him to offer effective resistance without abandoning Fredericksburg. He was assured that if he could only hold on two days longer, he would be so reinforced that he would be able to resume the offensive. Day after day from the 21st of August were these assurances repeated. On the 25th, Aug. of the 30,000 or 40,000 men promised him, only 7000 had yet got forward so far as Warrenton Junction. It was out of the question to think of waiting any longer. The situation was pregnant with peril. Delay one day more might be attended with the most disastrous consequences. Arrangements were, in consequence, made for immediate retreat. Breaking up his camp at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, Pope began to march rapidly back in three columns. General Heintzelman, from McClellan's army, had arrived; but he was without wagons, without artillery, without even horses for the general and field officers, without provisions, and with only forty rounds of ammunition to the man. Porter, too, had arrived at Bealston with a portion of his division. His men were fresh, but poorly provided either with provisions or with ammunition. Sturgis and Cox were hourly expected at Warrenton Junction—the former with 10,000, the latter with 7000 men. Franklin, too, was on his way with 10,000 more. Before the arrival of Heintzelman, Pope estimated his entire force at about 40,000. The Confederate force amounted to at least 80,000. On evacuating Warrenton, Pope resolved to offer the enemy battle in the neighborhood of Gainesville, the
first station to the west of Manassas Junction, on what is called the Gap Railroad. With this end in view, he disposed his forces, sending McDowell, with his own corps and that of Sigel, by the turnpike toward Gainesville, Reno toward Sudley Springs, and Heintzelman toward Greenwich, assigning at the same time suitable positions to the expected reinforcements as they should come up. Porter was to push forward and join Reno; Franklin was to push forward with all possible speed to Gainesville; and Haupt, who commanded at Manassas Junction, was authorized to retain one of the strongest divisions that should arrive, for the protection of the works, and to push forward its cavalry to Thoroughfare Gap. General Sturgis, also, received instructions to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett’s Station, and to superintend them in person. Pope’s command, including all these expected reinforcements, now amounted to 60,000 men.

While Pope’s forces are moving steadily to the positions assigned them, the Confederates are not idle. Jackson has crossed the Rappahannock at Hixson’s Mill, four miles above Waterloo Bridge, has rested his men for the night at Salem; and before to-morrow at noon he will have crossed the Bull Run Ridge, at Thoroughfare Gap, and forced his way to Gainesville. In point of fact he reached Gainesville when the day was yet young, and was joined by Stuart, with two cavalry brigades; and before midnight, while he was destroying Bristow Station, where he had arrived a little after sundown, Stuart, in obedience to his instructions, had surprised the post at Manassas Junction, captured 300 men, eight guns, stores in large quantity, and much public property. Intelligence of what had happened at the Junction reached Colonel Scammon, at Union Mills, on Bull Run, who was stationed there with the Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio, of General Cox’s division. Scammon hasted to the Junction; a severe skirmish ensued at dawn on the 27th; but he was driven back and compelled to retreat toward Alexandria. Brigadier-General Taylor, with the Second, Third and Fourth New Jersey Infantry, hurried from Alexandria by railroad to the assistance of Scammon; but these, too, were soon routed; and in the brief conflict Taylor lost a leg. It is quite manifest that Pope had not counted on the appearance of the enemy on the eastern side of Thoroughfare Gap so early, and in so great numbers. Jackson had, in reality, effected a surprise. It is true that Pope’s report says: “The movement of General Jackson in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, while the main body of the enemy confronted me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, was well known to me, but I had relied confidently on the forces which I had been assured would be sent from Alexandria, and one strong division of which I had ordered to take post on the works at Manassas Junction. I was entirely under the belief that these would be there, and it was not until I found my communication intercepted that I was undeceived. I
knew that this movement was no raid, and that it was made by not less than 25,000 men.” It is also true, however, that when Jackson was reposing at Salem, between Thoroughfare and Manassas Gaps, Pope sent word to McDowell at Warrenton that he believed “the whole force of the enemy had marched for the Shenandoah Valley by way of Luray and Front Royal.” Banks, it would seem, was of the same opinion. So thoroughly ignorant were the Nationals of the whereabouts of Jackson that, when he was already at Bristow Station, a train of cars came up and, of course, was captured—a train on which a short time before Hooker and his division had passed for Warrenton.

On the 27th of August, the army of Pope and the army of Lee were both in critical circumstances. Pope was cut off from his supplies and reinforcements. This was serious enough in the presence of such a general as Jackson, and in view of the speedy arrival of Longstreet and Lee. On the other hand, however, Pope had a splendid opportunity—an opportunity which, if it could be seized and acted upon in time, might prove the ruin not only of Jackson, but of the whole Confederate army. If he could block Thoroughfare Gap, and thus prevent the passage of Longstreet, he might fall with overwhelming force upon Jackson. Pope saw his opportunity, and began to turn it to account. The instructions already given in regard to Gainesville were repeated and emphasized. He ordered McDowell, with Sigel and Reynolds, to hasten to Gainesville that night, and there intercept Longstreet at the head of Lee’s main column. Reno was to hurry forward to Greenwich with his corps and with Kearney’s division, of Heintzelman, to report to and assist McDowell, if necessary. Porter was to remain at Warrenton Station until the arrival of Banks, who was marching to that place from Fayetteville. So soon as he was relieved, he was to push forward to Gainesville. Pope himself, with Hooker’s division, of Heintzelman’s corps—a division which had now become famous, and which could always be relied upon—proceeded along the railroad to Manassas Junction. McDowell reached his destination without the necessity of fighting. Hooker had been less fortunate. On approaching Bristow Station, somewhat late in the afternoon, he came into contact with Ewell. It was the advance of the same force, a portion of which had attacked Scammon and Taylor in the forenoon. A vigorous action ensued, with a loss to each of about 800 men. Ewell was driven from the field with the loss of all his camp equipage; but he succeeded in destroying the bridge and railroad track, and thus hindered pursuit. He hastened to join Jackson at Manassas. When this action commenced, Hooker had only forty rounds of ammunition to each man. When it ended, the forty had been reduced to four. Pope was put in high spirits by the success of Hooker. He believed that, by a vigorous effort on the morning of the 28th, he might “bag the whole crowd” at Manassas Junction. Jackson was already, after the defeat of Ewell, in a
tight place. There were but two routes by which he could retreat—the one through Gainesville and the other through Centreville. Retreat by Gainesville was impossible; for McDowell was there with a force equal, if not superior, to his own. He must, therefore, retreat through Centreville, or mass his forces and attack Pope, with the view of turning the National right at Bristow Station. Jackson chose the former course, and proceeded to retire through Centreville. Meanwhile, in consequence of the exhausted condition of Hooker’s troops, and knowing that they were without ammunition, Pope had sent special orders to Porter on the evening of the 27th, instructing him to move forward at one o’clock in the morning, and to report at Bristow by daylight. In the event of Banks not having yet arrived, he was to leave him some instructions in detail. This order was not obeyed. If Jackson had not retired—if, on the contrary, he had massed his men and offered fight—the consequences might have been disastrous. At three o’clock on the morning of the 28th Jackson, believing himself to be in danger, evacuated Manassas, and sought to effect a junction with Lee by way of Centreville. As it was, Pope resolved to pursue the retreating foe with all the forces at his command.

McDowell had been ordered on the evening of the 27th to push forward, at the very earliest dawn, from Gainesville toward Manassas Junction. He was to rest his right on Manassas Gap Railroad, and throw his left to the west. Reno had orders to march at the same hour from Greenwich, also upon Manassas; and Kearney was to march upon Bristow. Kearney was promptly on hand, and, with Hooker following, was pushed forward to Manassas in pursuit of Ewell. Sigel, with McDowell’s advance, was not forward until three hours after the time appointed. Porter did not arrive at Bristow Station until after ten o’clock, when, instead of being willing and anxious to push forward, he asked permission to halt and rest his men. Sykes’ division, of Porter’s corps, had spent the whole day of the 27th, from ten o’clock in the morning until daylight of the 28th, in camp at Warrenton Junction. Merritt’s division, of the same corps, arrived at Warrenton Junction later on the day of the 27th, and also remained there during the whole of the night. It was Pope’s opinion that Porter’s troops were the freshest in the whole army. It is, it must be confessed, exceedingly difficult for the impartial mind to take in all the facts, even at this early stage of the campaign, and yet resist the conviction that, in the service of Pope, some of McClellan’s officers were not only wanting in enthusiasm, but half-hearted, lukewarm, indifferent. Either that, or the demon of delay, which held their former master in bondage, had extended its baleful influence to them. Pope arrived at Manassas Junction about noon of the 28th, shortly after Jackson in person had left. He immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearney and Reno upon Centreville. McDowell,
also, was ordered to recall that portion of his force which had moved in the direction of Manassas Junction, and to march with his whole strength towards Centreville. McDowell had, unfortunately, sent Ricketts’ division toward Thoroughfare Gap. For this new movement it was not, therefore, available. Instructions were sent to Porter to take post at Manassas Junction.

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, Kearney came up with the rear-guard of Jackson’s retreating columns, and drove them out of Centreville, one portion of the Confederates falling back by the Sudley Springs Road, the other portion by the Warrenton Turnpike, toward Gainesville. Kearney remained in occupation of Centreville. The Confederates destroyed the bridges over the streams as they passed. The ground which the pursued and the pursuers were now treading was that made famous by the first great battle of the war. They were passing over Bull Run. In spite of the eager anxiety of the moment and the all-absorbing interest of the situation, stirring memories must have been awakened in the minds of the rank and file, as well as of the officers, of both armies. After more than a year’s incessant fighting, the two great representative armies of the divided nation were again in bloody conflict on the same battle field, about to attempt to settle the question whether freedom should or should not be the inalienable birthright of all the children of the Republic. The Confederates had their faces turned toward Thoroughfare Gap, where they knew Longstreet was coming to their aid. Suddenly Jackson’s advance came into contact, on the Warrenton Turnpike, with King’s division, of McDowell’s corps, which was pressing vigorously forward to intercept the retreat. It was about six o’clock in the evening. The struggle which ensued was severe and sanguinary, and was terminated only by the darkness. In this action noble work was done by the brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday, both of the gallant commanders covering themselves with glory. The Confederate general, Taliaferro, was badly wounded; and Ewell, who was in the thick of the fight, lost a leg.

Made aware of this engagement that evening about ten o’clock, Pope concluded that he had caught Jackson in a trap, and that if King, McDowell with his other divisions sustaining him, could hold out till the morning, he would be able so to concentrate his forces as to crush and destroy the Confederate army before Longstreet could arrive with the expected relief. McDowell and King were accordingly urged to hold on, at all hazards, and by no means to allow Jackson to pass to the west through Thoroughfare Gap, Pope assuring them that by daylight the entire National forces would be forward both from Centreville and Manassas, and that the enemy must be crushed between them. Kearney was ordered to move cautiously, after midnight, from Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, to keep close to the enemy’s lines, resting his left on the Warrenton Turnpike, and throwing his
right well to the north, and, at daylight, to assault him vigorously with his right advance. Reno and Hooker, he was told, would join him shortly after dawn. Pope’s instructions to Kearney were even more than usually particular, because he dreaded lest Jackson should make an attempt to retreat to the north in the direction of Leesburg. Porter, who was supposed to be at Manassas Junction, was ordered to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn. On the night of the 28th, therefore, McDowell, Sigel and Reynolds, whose united strength was 25,000 men, were immediately west of Jackson, and between him and Thoroughfare Gap. On the following morning, as soon as it was light, Porter’s corps and Heintzelman, with Kearney, Hooker and Reno, were simultaneously to fall upon him from the east. Such was the disposition Pope had made of his forces; and it was his conviction that Longstreet was, as yet, so far off that he would be able to defeat Jackson before the former could come to his aid.

Longstreet, however, was fully aware of the perilous situation of his companion in arms; and, by forced marches, made with almost incredible activity, he had, on the evening of the 28th, reached Thoroughfare Gap. There he encountered Ricketts’ division, of McDowell’s corps; and, after some sharp fighting, drove it back in the direction of Manassas Junction. The gap was, therefore, left undefended, and Longstreet was able to pass through without further hindrance. Prior to this, on discovering that Thoroughfare Gap was well guarded, he had sent a portion of his troops up to Hopeville Gap, a little further to the north, about three miles above White Plains. Through both these gaps, therefore, Lee’s men were rushing to the assistance of Jackson. This, however, was not the only calamity which, at this critical moment, occurred to thwart Pope’s designs. Aug. 29.

Early on the morning of the 29th, before daybreak, the National commander, greatly to his mortification, learned that King, unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon him by Jackson, had fallen back in the same direction with Ricketts. A new disposition of his forces was, therefore, necessary. Pope lost no time in endeavoring to meet the emergency. Sigel, supported by Reynolds, was ordered to advance from Groveton and attack Jackson in the wooded heights close by, while the remainder of the forces were being got well in hand. Quickly thereafter Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, was pushed forward from Centreville toward Gainesville. Reno was to follow. Their instructions were to strike promptly, and with all their weight. Porter, with his own corps and the division of King, was ordered to move from Manassas toward the same place. Porter’s instructions were to strike Jackson’s flank at the point where the Warrenton Turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville, to turn it, and then fall heavily upon his rear.

Pope’s instructions, with one exception, were well carried out. Sigel, with
the division of Carl Schurz on his right, that of Schenck on his left, and
the division of Milroy in the centre, about five o'clock on the morning of
the 29th, fell heavily on the Confederates, a mile or two east of Groveton.
They were soon joined by Hooker and Kearney. The battle became furious
all at once. Jackson, feeling the weight of the onset, fell back some distance;
but he was so closely pressed, that he was compelled to halt and
make the best defense possible. Accordingly he took up a position with
his left on Sudley Springs, his right a little to the south of the Warrenton
Turnpike, his line being covered by an old railroad grade which leads from
Gainesville in the direction of Leesburg. His batteries were numerous;
and some of them were of heavy calibre. They were for the most part
behind ridges in the open ground on both sides of the turnpike. His troops,
too, were well sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad embankment. It
was about noon when Pope appeared on the field. He had hurried forward
from Centreville with all possible despatch. He found both armies much
cut up by the sharp action in which they had been engaged since daylight.
Heintzelman was on the right of the line, in front of Sudley Springs Road.
Sigel was on Heintzelman's left, with his line extended a short distance south
of the Warrenton Turnpike, Schenck's division occupying the high ground to
the left of that road. Reynolds was on the extreme left. Reno's corps had
reached the field, and some of his regi-
ments had already been pushed into action. Four regiments of this corps,
however, were held in reserve in the rear of the centre. Heintzelman in-
formed Pope that his line was weak, and that two of his divisions—those of
Schurz and Steinwehr—were so cut up that they ought to be drawn back from
the front. To this Pope could not consent, but he cheered him with the in-
formation that McDowell and Porter were both on the road to Gainesville,
and would soon be in position to fall upon Jackson's right flank, and prob-
ably also on his rear. Riding along
the whole front of his line, he cheered the different commanders by the same
comforting assurance. From twelve
until four o'clock, the skirmishing was frequent and severe, but the fighting
was neither general nor continuous.
About two o'clock, firing was heard
in the direction of Jackson's right;
and Pope naturally supposed that Mc-
Dowell and Porter had reached their
position. The firing, however, was not
long continued. Soon afterwards, he
learned that McDowell was advancing
by the Sudley Springs Road, and that
he would probably be up in two hours.
As yet there was no information regard-
ing Porter. At half-past four o'clock
Pope, utterly impatient, sent him per-
emptory orders to push forward at once
into action on the enemy's right, and, if possible, turn his rear. He at the
same time stated to him generally the
condition of things on the field. After
allowing what he thought a sufficient
time for the execution of these orders
by Porter, and knowing that McDowell
was close at hand, the order was given to Heintzelman and Reno to make the attack in front. It was half-past five o'clock. The order was promptly obeyed, and with a will. Never was onslaught more vigorous or more gallantly made. They fell upon the enemy with the swiftness of lightning and with the force of an avalanche. Jackson's men could not resist the fury of the onset. Fighting bravely, and contesting every inch of ground, they were yet steadily pressed back into the woods. On both sides the fighting was desperate and gallant. Regiment vied with regiment, and soldier with soldier. Nor did the officers spare themselves. Everywhere they were seen in the front, in the thickest of the fight, urging the contest by voice and gesture. Hooker and Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, justified the confidence reposed in them, and established on a firmer basis their well-won fame. One of the most brilliant efforts of the day was made by Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division. In the fury of the first onset this brigade penetrated, by a bayonet charge, first one, then another of Jackson's lines, and was well up to the third line before it could be checked. After a severe hand-to-hand struggle, it got possession of the railway embankment on the Confederate left, but not until it had sacrificed thirty per cent. of its strength. Hooker's other brigades gallantly joined in the struggle. Meanwhile, Kearney had struck Jackson's left at the point occupied by A. P. Hill; and, by the joint efforts of the two divisions, Jackson's left was doubled back upon his centre, and the railway entrenchment was secured. While Heintzelman was thus pressing back the enemy's extreme left, Reno was firmly holding his position more to the centre; and after an hour and a half from the first onset, this portion of the Confederate army was driven off the original battle ground—the dead and wounded being left in the hands of the Nationals.

It was now sunset. McDowell had arrived on the field. His corps was pushed to the front along the Warrenton Turnpike, his instructions being to fall upon the enemy who was retreating towards the turnpike from Sudley Springs. With this end in view, King's division, of McDowell's corps, advanced beyond the general line of the Nationals. The advance of the main body of the enemy, under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field. With these King came into contact about three quarters of a mile in front of the line of battle. Some severe fighting ensued, but neither gained upon the other. With this advance of Longstreet, Kearney, who had pressed back the Confederate left toward the Warrenton Turnpike, also came into collision. Kearney was compelled to fall back with the loss of a gun, four flags, and 100 men made prisoners. Porter now came up, and made a disposition for attack; but it was too late. Darkness fell upon the scene; and the battle of Groveton, or, as it is more generally called, the battle of Gainesville, was ended. On the whole, it was a victory for Pope; for he had driven the enemy back from his
original position; and almost the entire battle field was occupied by the National troops. The loss on either side was about 7000 men. Both armies slept that night on their arms, near the old battle ground of Bull Run.

Judged from a National standpoint, the battle of the 29th of August, at Gainesville, must be pronounced in the last degree unsatisfactory. There was no lack of bravery on the part of the men. In the conflict, both bravery and ability were displayed by the officers, higher and lower. But somehow there was a want of harmony on the part of the higher officials. Either there was a defect in the orders, or time was badly kept. The result certainly might have been different if McDowell and Porter had come up at an earlier hour. Those precious hours—from noon to half-past five—during which Pope waited to hear from those two generals, saved Jackson’s army, and ruined the National prospect. They allowed Longstreet to come up and unite with Jackson, thus making the Confederate army greatly superior to that of Pope. The battle, it is true, was not lost; but it was indecisive. It settled nothing. It was already manifest that Pope must retreat, and that Lee would be able to carry out his purpose of driving the Nationals inside of the fortifications at Washington, of passing across through Maryland, and of entering Pennsylvania. In his report, Pope greatly blamed Porter. “I do not hesitate to say,” he says, “that if he had discharged his duty, as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to eight o’clock that night, we should have utterly crushed and captured the larger portion of Jackson’s force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently reinforced to have made an effective resistance.” Porter says he did not receive the order until it was dusk, and that he had not time to come up. The evidence is, no doubt, conflicting. In our judgment, the balance of the evidence is against Porter; and we do not see how, when subsequently he was tried on the charges preferred against him by Pope, found guilty, and dismissed the service, the verdict or the punishment could have been other than they were. His dilatory conduct, as we have seen, had become painfully conspicuous, even before the battle of Gainesville. His particular defense—that it was dusk on the evening of the 29th, when he received the order—is weak in view of all the facts of the case. On the afternoon of the 28th, he was ordered to move from Manassas to Centreville at the earliest dawn, Pope assuring him that a battle would undoubtedly be fought on the following morning. Early on the morning of the 29th, on hearing of the withdrawal of Ricketts and King, and the consequent opening of Thoroughfare Gap, and before Porter had time to leave Manassas Junction, he was ordered to move forward from that place by the direct road to Gainesville. The order was repeated in the most urgent manner at half-past four o’clock, on the
afternoon of the 29th. His explanation, even if it covers the last order, does not certainly touch the other two. His apologists have endeavored to vindicate him, by saying that nearly the whole of Longstreet's corps had been directly in front of him for several hours when Pope's last order reached him. This, we think, creates difficulties, rather than removes them. It is not claimed that Porter was engaged with any portion of Longstreet's corps—only that this corps was lying in front of him. If Longstreet was so early on the ground, it is natural to conclude that he would have heard the sounds of battle in the forenoon, and, instead of moving so far to the south, would have moved in the direction whence these sounds came. It is notorious, too, that although after twelve o'clock there was a lengthened pause in the fight, there were between that hour and four in the afternoon frequent skirmishes—skirmishes no doubt noisy and demonstrative enough to indicate to Longstreet where he was most needed. And is it conceivable that Longstreet could have been for several hours so far on the eastern side of Thoroughfare Gap, and Jackson not have known it? How, in fact, on the supposition that Longstreet was already in force on the field, are we to account for the practical suspension of hostilities which existed from twelve noon until half-past five o'clock, when Heintzelman and Reno resumed the attack?

After the battle of the 29th, Pope's army was in no fit condition to resume the struggle with fresh and vastly superior forces. For the last fortnight his men had been continually marching or fighting. There had been positively no rest. The cavalry and artillery had been ten days in harness; and the entire army had been two days without food. On the 28th, Pope had telegraphed to the commander-in-chief to have rations and forage sent forward from Alexandria with all despatch. Halleck communicated with McClellan, who was then at Alexandria, ordering him to send the needed supplies at once. On the morning of the Aug. 30th, the day after the first battle, about daylight, Pope received from McClellan a letter, dated at eight o'clock, P. M., on the 29th, stating that "rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons" as soon as he would send a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. It is not wonderful that Pope should thus express himself in his report: "I do not see," he says, "what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged." On the 30th, Pope made a request for more ammunition—a request which, strange to say, had to go the same round; and the answer which was given by McClellan was, "I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery." There is one other story, which strikingly illustrates the want of harmony among some of the leading National commanders at this critical juncture. On the afternoon of the 29th, at the time Pope was
heroically engaged with Jackson, and dreading the arrival of Longstreet, McClellan, in a communication to the government, suggested that one of the best things to do in the circumstances would be "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." Anything more heartless than this suggestion could hardly be conceived. It is said that when President Lincoln had read the despatch which contained it, he fell back horror-stricken in his chair. It is not wonderful that Pope's campaign proved a failure. The wonder rather is that the National cause, whose representatives on the field were so divided in sympathy, did not utterly perish.

In these circumstances, on the morning of the 30th, Pope found himself in presence of the enemy. Lee's forces had been coming up in great numbers during the night and early morning from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. By noon the Confederates greatly outnumbered the Nationals. To confront the mighty and rapidly increasing forces of Lee, Pope had not more than 40,000 men; and many of them were comparatively useless from fatigue and want of food. It seemed to him, however, that he had no choice but fight. He could hardly hope to win; but he "determined to give battle to the enemy, and at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance toward the capital." Pope felt the necessity of immediate and vigorous action; for every moment of delay was increasing the odds against him. It was his intention to attack the Confederate left; and he had made his disposition accordingly. It soon became apparent, however, that the Confederate general was massing his troops on his right, as fast as they arrived on the field, and that his purpose was to fall back, and, if possible, turn the National left. It would appear as if, for a moment, Pope had been deceived by the movement of the Confederates towards their own right. In the moment of exultation, he telegraphed to Washington that the Confederates were "retreating to the mountains." He quickly, however, discovered his mistake, and arranged his troops as he best could to meet the requirements of the situation. McDowell was ordered forward with three corps, Porter's in advance, along the Warrenton Turnpike; and Ricketts' division, which had been sent to the right, was brought back and posted on the left of the National line. As Porter moved forward, his advance was received by a perfect tempest of shot, shell and bullet, which came from the wooded eminence near Groveton, where the Confederates were swarming in thousands. Porter's men, unable to face this terrific storm, reeled, staggered, and fell back. At the same moment almost, the Confederates fell with tremendous force on the National left. Recognizing the fact that the main attack was to be made in this direction, McDowell ordered Reynolds from Porter's left to the assistance of Schenck and Milroy, on whose divisions
the blow was about to fall. This movement was attended with considerable peril, as it exposed Porter’s key-point; but, with singular presence of mind, and with great promptitude of action, Colonel G. K. Warren, seeing the danger, pushed forward his little brigade of a thousand men and occupied the vacant place. Had he waited for orders, the National line might have been cut in two. The battle was already raging furiously on the National left, Schenck, Milroy and Reynolds, in spite of superior numbers, offering a gallant and stubborn resistance. Porter’s men were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the rear; and as soon as order was restored among them, they were pushed forward to the support of the left, where they rendered splendid service. Warren’s little band of Volunteers and Buchanan’s brigade of Regulars particularly distinguishing themselves. Ricketts’ division had also gone to the assistance of Schenck, Milroy and Reynolds, and had greatly strengthened them, both on their left and in their rear. Towers, of Ricketts’ division, who went to the support of Reynolds, and led his brigade in person, made himself conspicuous alike by his skill and by his daring. Such was the conduct of this brigade that it drew forth enthusiastic and repeated cheers. “Its example,” says Pope, “was of great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed their intrepid conduct.” For a time it seemed as if the Nationals might carry the day. In spite of all his strength and the pertinia-

city of his attack, Jackson’s advanced line was being steadily pushed back. It was not until five o’clock that the tide began to turn. About that hour the battle commenced to rage more furiously than before. Longstreet had found a commanding position on Jackson’s right; and with four batteries he poured a most destructive fire upon the National troops. Line after line was cut down by the raking fire, like grass by the scythe of the mower. The slaughter on both sides was terrific. Late in the afternoon, Reno’s corps was withdrawn from its position on the right centre and thrown into the action on the left. This corps, coming up as the tide of battle began to turn, behaved with great gallantry. For hours this mutual slaughter continued, the Confederates showing their superior strength by falling heavily on the National right as well as upon the left, the latter presenting a bold and determined front, gallantly contesting every inch of ground, but gradually yielding to the fierce onsets and tremendous pressure of the foe. The contest ended only when darkness fell upon the scene. The losses on both sides had been very severe. The National left had been pushed back well nigh three quarters of a mile; but its ranks were unbroken, and it still held the Warrenton Turnpike. The National right, on which the pressure had been less heavy, still held its ground. Pope had now no choice but fall back upon Washington. Happily he had been able to hold command of the turnpike in his rear. At about six
o'clock in the evening, he had accidentally learned that Franklin was approaching Centreville, about four miles to the east of that place, and that Sumner was about four miles in the rear of Franklin. To Centreville he resolved to fall back. At eight o'clock, he accordingly issued an order to the effect that the whole army should withdraw during the night across Bull Run, and take position on the heights of Centreville. The retreat was conducted for the most part by way of the Stone Bridge. When the passage was completed, the bridge was destroyed. The night was excessively dark; and Lee did not pursue. When daylight broke on the morning of Aug. 31, Bull Run once more divided the two great armies. The engagement of the 30th is sometimes spoken of as the second battle of Bull Run.*

On the morning of the 31st, the entire Union army, under General Pope, was at or near Centreville, with the exception of two brigades, about 4000 strong, which had been sent on to Fairfax Station to guard the train and the depot. Generals Franklin and Sumner had arrived; and General Banks, after destroying a large amount of property which he could not bring with him, was pressing forward from Bristow Station. On the following day Burnside evacuated Fredericksburg; and Falmouth Station, with all the bridges, was destroyed by fire. Aquia Creek was soon also deserted. The Nationals from all points were pressed back towards Washington. The strength of the army, as reported by the different corps commanders, was as follows: McDowell’s corps, 10,000; Sigel’s corps, about 7000; Heintzelman’s, 6000; Reno’s, 6000; Banks’, 5000; Sumner’s, 11,000; Franklin’s, 8000. Large numbers had straggled from the ranks; and many had been left on the battle field. The retreat of Pope behind Bull Run created the wildest excitement throughout the North. It was matter of universal regret and humiliation that so many of the wounded brave should be left on the battle field to the tender mercy of the Confederates, and so near the National

* In his report of the second day's fighting in the neighborhood of Gainesville and Groveton, General Lee says: "The enemy, being reinforced, renewed the attack on the afternoon of the 30th, when a general advance of both wings of the army was ordered, and after a fierce combat, which raged until after nine o'clock, he was completely defeated, and driven beyond Bull Run. The darkness of the night, his destruction of the Stone Bridge after crossing, and the uncertainty of the fords, stopped the pursuit."

The following is Pope's account of the doings of the 30th: "The enemy's heavy reinforcements," he says, "having reached him on Friday afternoon and night, he began to mass on his right for the purpose of crushing our left, and occupying the road to Centreville in our rear. His heaviest assault was made about five o'clock in the forenoon, when, after overwhelming Fitz

John Porter, and driving his forces back in the centre and left, mass after mass of his forces was pushed against our left. A terrible contest, with great slaughter, was carried on for several hours, our men behaving with firmness and gallantry, under the immediate command of General McDowell. When night closed, our left had been forced back about half a mile, but still remained firm and unshaken, while our right held its ground. General Franklin, with his corps, arrived after dark at Centreville, six miles in our rear, while Sumner was four miles behind Franklin. I could have brought up three corps in the morning in time to renew the action, but starvation stared both men and horses in the face; and, broken and exhausted as they were, they were in no condition to bear hunger also. I accordingly retired to Centreville that night in perfect order."
capital. An invitation was issued by the War Department, calling on citizens to go out to the battle field and assist in taking care of the wounded. On the afternoon of the 30th, the streets of Washington were crowded with people and conveyances loaded with blankets and baskets and rolls of lint, all pressing forward to the scene of distress. In some respects the movement was ill-advised; for very few of those who went out were allowed to get near the wounded, and some were made prisoners by the Confederates. On the following morning the invitation was recalled. At the same time, the movement thus begun at Washington, although not immediately of any practical value, produced good and wholesome fruit. The example set by the capital was imitated by Boston, by Philadelphia, by New York, and by all the cities of the North; and from that day until the close of the war, the wounded soldier became more and more the object of the nation's care. It is only just to remark that, while General Lee would not consent to a truce or a suspension of military operations, he interposed no obstacles to the removal of the wounded.

The 31st was Sunday. On that day the Confederate army began to move forward. It was evident to Pope, from the direction in which the enemy was moving, that it was Lee's intention to fall with force on his right flank. At an early hour in the morning Jackson, taking with him his own and Ewell's divisions, crossed Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and pushed towards the Little River Turnpike. His object clearly was to cut the rear of Pope in the direction of Fairfax Court House. Pope, not unprepared for some such movement, disposed his forces so as to meet the requirements of the situation. Changing his entire front, and flinging his right wing back to the heights of Germantown, he occupied, on the morning of the 1st of September, when the Confederates came up, an entirely new position. Pope had no intention to strike the enemy until the morning of the 2d; but Lee's purpose became so developed by the afternoon of the 1st, that he resolved to hazard a battle between the Little River Turnpike and the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court House. Hooker was ordered forward to the latter place, to assemble the troops there and to move towards Germantown. McDowell was directed to take a position on the Warrenton Turnpike, about two miles west of Fairfax. He was to connect with Hooker by his right. Reno was pushed forward to the north of the turnpike, in the direction of Chantilly, about two and a half miles east of Centreville. Heintzelman was posted in the rear of Reno; Franklin was on McDowell's left and rear; Sumner was on the left of Heintzelman; while Sigel and Porter had orders to unite with Sumner's right. Banks, who had charge of the wagon trains, was to come by the old Braddock Road into the Alexandria Turnpike, in rear of Fairfax Court House. Just before sunset, Hooker and Reno came simultaneously in contact with the enemy's
CHANTILLY.

advance—the one on the Little River Turnpike, close by Germantown, the other a little more to the west, near Chantilly. The day was in the last degree unfavorable for warlike operations. The wind was cold, and a drenching rain was falling. But neither wind nor rain could now deter the combatants. The battle became furious all at once. After it had raged for nearly an hour, the Confederates concentrated on Reno’s left, and fell heavily on his second division, which was commanded by General Isaac I. Stevens, of Port Royal Ferry fame. Hooker, McDowell and Kearney, of Heintzelmans’, rushed to Reno’s assistance. At this point the battle was raging with tremendous fury, when General Stevens, who had ordered a charge, and was leading it in person, was shot dead. When their general fell, this division fell back in disorder. The remainder of Reno’s force were showing signs of confusion, when Kearney, descrying the danger, advanced with his division, and, sending Birney’s brigade to the front, boldly renewed the action. A thunderstorm, which had for some time been raging, had now reached its height. It was dangerous to expose the ammunition; but Kearney, personally regardless of consequences, brought forward a battery and put it in position himself. It was the last heroic act of a brave life. Darkness was now setting in. As if anxious to know the character of the ground, he pushed forward to reconnoitre; and having inadvertently passed beyond the line of his own pickets, and approached too close to those of the enemy, a Confederate bullet laid him low. As soon as he was missed, the gallant Birney assumed command of the division; and by means of a bayonet charge of his own brigade, composed of the First, Thirty-Eighth and Fortieth New York, and led by Colonel Egan, he drove the Confederates back for a considerable distance, and held the field for the night. The dark hours were spent in burying the dead. Such was the battle of Chantilly—the last battle of Pope’s unfortunate campaign. It was a battle by no means inglorious to the National arms; but, like all the other battles of the campaign, it was fruitless of good. It was the last of a series of disasters.

In the battle of Chantilly many precious lives were lost. Kearney and Stevens left behind them vacant places which could not be easily filled. In the charge in which he fell, shot through the head, Stevens led the attack in person at the head of the brave Seventy-Ninth (Highlanders) New York, bearing with him the colors of that regiment, which had fallen from the hands of a wounded sergeant. The army had no braver officer. Kearney had already won great distinction and become a popular favorite. He was one of the few men on whom the hopes of the North were centred. He had often been tried; he had never been found wanting. “Words,” said Pope, “cannot express my sense of the zeal, the gallantry, and the sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier, Major-General Kearney. He died as
he would have wished to die, and as became his heroic character." Kearney was well known to General Lee; and next morning the Confederate commander sent the body of the unfortunate general, with a flag of truce, to the headquarters of Pope. Kearney's body was conveyed to New York, where it was deposited in the family vault in the quiet church-yard of old Trinity. The same terrific encounter in which Kearney and Stevens lost their lives, proved fatal, also, to Major Tilden, of the Thirty-Eighth New York—a brave soldier and a gallant and skilful officer.

Pope's losses, since the commencement of the campaign, were about 30,000 men, 30 guns, 20,000 small arms, and vast quantities of supplies and war material. Lee must have lost at least 15,000 men. On the morning of the 2d of September, Pope's army was massed behind Difficult Creek, between Germantown, Flint Hill and Fairfax. It was a strong position; but, exhausted with continuous marching and fighting for three weary weeks, broken and demoralized, it would have been cruel, as well as impolitic, to prolong the contest. About noon of that day, therefore, orders were given by General-in-Chief Halleck for the army of Virginia to fall back within the defenses of Washington. McClellan had the proud satisfaction of seeing the fortifications on which he had spent so much time, labor and care—works of which he was personally so proud, but which had been made the subject of so much ridicule—at last protecting the National capital, and shielding a National army. At his own request, Pope was relieved from the command, and allowed to return to the West. The army of Virginia disappeared as a separate and distinct organization, and was merged in the army of the Potomac; and, in compliance with the wishes of a large body of the people, as well as with the wishes of his surviving officers and men, by whom he was greatly beloved, General McClellan was placed in command of all the troops entrusted with the defense of Washington.

It would not be difficult for the military critic to point out professional mistakes in Pope's campaign. It is possible that he might have done better with the forces at his command. It is ungenerous, however, to judge him harshly, in view of the disappointments he was from first to last called upon to endure. He was certainly most unfortunate; but his misfortunes were not always of his own creating. It was natural, after the high expectations which had been formed, first of the army of the Potomac, and then of the army of Virginia, and after the disastrous failure of both, that popular indignation should have been aroused, and that Pope should come in for a share of that abuse at the beginning of September, which was heaped upon McClellan at the beginning of August. To this day Pope has not received justice. We have already called the reader's attention to the feelings of jealousy and dislike which McClellan entertained towards Pope, to the want of sympathy between McClellan's officers and the commander.
Pope's complaint.

in the field, to McClellan's "Leave Pope to get out of his scrape," and his "I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery," to the failure of the army of the Potomac to join Pope in time, to the dilatory conduct of most of McClellan's officers, and to the positive refusal of some of them to obey orders; and having done so once, it is unnecessary again to enter into details. The charges made by Pope have not yet been refuted. Where they have been brought to the test, they have been sustained, rather than disproved. "The small fraction of 20,500 men," says Pope, "was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing who ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in this campaign. Some of the corps," he goes on to say, "moved with becoming activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor excusable." Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousands straggled away from their commands; and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to be paroled prisoners of war. These are serious charges; and until they are disproved the presumption must remain that the judgment of history will coincide with that which Pope himself has pronounced—that "the complete overthrow of Lee's army, or, at least, the entire frustration of his movement towards the Potomac, was defeated by the failure of the army of the Potomac to effect a junction in time with the army of Virginia on the line of the Rappahannock, or even so far back as the line of Bull Run."

The battle of Chantilly will be remembered in connection with the loss of Generals Kearny and Stevens.

Philip Kearny was born in New York, June 24, 1815. In 1837 he was commissioned second lieutenant in the First Dragoons. Shortly afterwards he was sent to Europe by the government to study and report upon French military tactics. For a time he pursued his studies in the military school at Saumur. He went thence to Algeria, joined the First Chasseurs d'Afrique, and, for his services, received the Cross of the Legion of Honor. He returned to his home in 1840. During the Mexican War he was brevetted major for gallant conduct at Contreras and Churubusco; and, in a charge at the San Antonio Gate, he lost his left arm. In 1841, having resigned his position in the army, he went again to Europe, with the view of resuming his military studies. When the Italian War broke out, in 1859, Kearny took a position on the staff of General Maurier, and was present at the battles of Magenta and Solferino, receiving for his services, a second time, the Cross of the Legion of Honor. On the outbreak of the Civil War, he hurried home, and offered his sword to his country. His subsequent career was rendered famous by his actions in the engagements at Williamsburg, at Fair Oaks, at Frazier's Farm, and at Chantilly, where he met his untimely death.

Isaac Ingalls Stevens was born in Andover, Mass., in 1817, and graduated at West Point in 1839. As an engineer, he had few equals in the service. When the Mexican War broke out, he was employed in the fortifications of the New England Coast. During the Mexican War he served on the staff of General Scott, who pronounced him "the most promising officer of his age." In the organization of Washington Territory he took an active part, first in the capacity of governor, and later as delegate to Congress. A sincere friend of President Buchanan, he was yet opposed to the policy he pursued towards the South; and, when the war broke out, he hurried from the Territory, and offered his sword to his country. Appointed colonel of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders after the death of Cameron, he was soon afterwards commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers. He accompanied Gen. Thos. W. Sherman to Port Royal in the fall of 1861. Having been transferred to North Carolina, we soon find him in Virginia, in the corps of General Reno; and, as major-general, he figured prominently in Pope's famous but unfortunate campaign. At Centreville, where he was shot through the head by a Minie ball, he was leading a charge, and bearing aloft the colors of his favorite Seventy-ninth.
CHAPTER XX.

State of Feeling in the North.—The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia.—Lee’s Opportunity.—His Plan.—Invasion of Maryland.—His Address to the People of Maryland.—Disappointment.—Excitement in Pennsylvania and in Maryland.—High Hopes of the South.—McClellan’s Army in Motion.—Lee’s Order.—Important Discovery.—Lee’s Blunder.—McClellan Hurries Forward.—Catostin Range.—The Catostin Valley.—Turner’s Gap.—Crampton Gap.—Harper’s Ferry.—McClellan’s Advice Regarding it.—D. S. Miles.—Thomas H. Ford.—Jackson at Harper’s Ferry.—McLaws and Walker.—Ford Falls Back.—Maryland Heights Captured.—Miles’ Difficulty.—McClellan’s Advice.—The White Flag.—Death of Miles.—The Capture.—A Disgraceful Affair.—The Committee of Investigation.—The Two Armies Come into Collision.—D. H. Hill Retires up the Mountain.—Turner’s Gap.—The Battle of South Mountain Begun.—Hooker on the Right.—Reno on the Left.—Longstreet Arrives and Takes Command of the Confederates.—National Victory.—Death of Reno.—Franklin at Crampton’s Gap.—Howell Cobb.—A Three Hours’ Fight.—The Nationals Victorious.—Lee’s Purpose Accomplished.—A Great Risk.—Lee Falls Back.—Antietam Creek.—Sharpsburg.—The Heights.—The Battle Ground.—The Potomac.—The Shepherdstown Ford.—Lee’s Position.—His Reasons for Offering Battle.—McClellan Advances.—His Line of Battle.—Time Lost.—Lee Reinforced.—Arrival of “Stonewall” Jackson.—The Confederate Line.—The Three Stone Bridges.—McClellan’s Plan of Attack.—Lee Strongly Posted.—The Dunker Church.—The Woods.—The Open Ground.—The Battle Area.—Hooker Advances by Bridge No. 1.—The Battle of Antietam Begun.—The Darkness.—The Battle Resumed.—The Confederates Driven Back.—A Fearful Struggle.—Hartsuff Wounded.—Terrible Slaughter.—Mansfield Comes Up.—A Pandemonium.—Mansfield Killed.—Hooker Sorely Pressed, but Hopeful.—The Key of the Position.—Hooker’s Reckless Daring.—The Air Alive with Bullets.—Hooker Shot in the Foot.—Summer Arrives and Takes Command.—General Sedgwick Advances.—French and Richardson.—Sedgwick Wounded.—Struggle at the Dunker Church.—The Nationals Again Driven Back.—Arrival of Franklin.—Irwin’s Brigade, of Smith’s Division.—Gallant Efforts.—The Maine and Vermont Regiments.—Havoc.—A Ghastly Spectacle.—Summer’s Bravery.—Fighting on Summer’s Left.—Gallant Movement of Meagher.—Colonel Cross.—The “Fighting” Fifth New Hampshire.—The Confederates Driven Back.—Death of Richardson.—Meagher Wounded.—The National Right at Last Victorious.—Porter and Burnside.—Burnside Ordered to Attack.—His Delay.—The Attack Successfully Made.—Burnside’s Blunder.—Arrival of A. P. Hill.—Burnside Driven Back to the Bridge.—Darkness.—The Battle Ended.—Heavy Losses on Both Sides.—A National Victory.—Lee’s Plan had Failed.—The Battle Ought to Have Been More Decisive.—The Comte de Paris.—McClellan’s Mistakes.—The Morale of his Men.—Burnside to Blame.—McClellan Vindicated.—Reinforcements.—The 18th of September.—The Battle Field.—A Sad Picture.—The 19th.—Preparations for an Advance.—Lee’s Retreat.—Porter in Pursuit.—The Pursuit Feeble and Ineffective. Lincoln Visits the Army.—McClellan’s Inactivity.—The Government Impatient.—Stuart’s Raid.—The People Indignant.—The 1st of October.—The Army in Motion.—McClellan Removed from Command.—The Proclamation of Emancipation.—The President’s Purpose.—Secretary Seward.

In the first week of September, 1862, the state of affairs at Washington was not encouraging. A shadow of gloom seemed to rest on the National cause. There were many men loyal and true to the Union—men who, for its preservation, had given their best, their means, their strength, the fruit of their bodies, everything which they held most dear—who had come to the conclusion that the war which had now extended over the better part of two years, and, to outward appearance, accomplished nothing, should be abandoned. If the South could not be subdued, it was useless, they thought, to prolong the contest. If they could not live together in the same household, surely there was
no reason why North and South should not get along as neighbors.

These sentiments prevailed extensively throughout the North; and it is not wonderful that they should have prevailed. Within a few weeks the hopes of the people had twice been raised to the highest point, only to be rewarded with the bitterest disappointment. The army of the Potomac, in many respects one of the finest armies the world had ever witnessed, had not only failed of its purpose, but had practically ceased to exist as a separate organization. The army of Virginia had similarly inspired hope, and similarly failed. After well-nigh two years of costly and bloody warfare, the enemy was literally knocking at the gates of the capital. Two months before, the army of the Potomac was lying in strength before Richmond; one month before, the army of Virginia promised to do what the army of the Potomac had failed to accomplish; but now, after having been driven, inch by inch, from the soil of Virginia, all that remained of those two magnificent armies was sheltered behind the fortifications at Washington.

Widely as these sentiments prevailed, they were not by any means universal; nor did they represent the pith and backbone of the North. There were still men who were willing to fight; there were still sources of revenue which had been left untouched; and while money could be had, and men could be found, the Union cause was not to be regarded as desperate.

The withdrawal of the army of Pope left the field clear for the Confederates. Lee had a choice of two courses. He might assault the fortifications of Washington, or cross the Potomac and enter into Maryland. The first course was not to be thought of. It would consume too much time, and, besides, there was but small hope of success. The invasion of Maryland promised richer results. It was known that in that State there were many who, at heart, were deeply in sympathy with the Southern cause. It was believed by many in the South that Maryland was held in the Union by sheer force, and that the appearance of Confederate troops on her soil would be the signal for a general uprising of the people. “Maryland! my Maryland!” was the burden of one of the most beautiful lyrics of the time; it was supposed to express the sentiments of the entire South—Maryland included; and nowhere was that song more rapturously sung than at the firesides of Virginia. Lee confidently expected that he would be warmly received by the people of Maryland, and that once firmly established in that State, he would be able to attack Washington in the rear, and possibly invade Pennsylvania. In any case, such a movement could not fail to be productive of good fruit. It would demonstrate to the governments of Europe the inherent strength of the Confederacy; and, if it did not compel recognition, it would, at least, command sympathy and encouragement.

On the 2d of September, D. H. Hill came up with his fresh divisions Sept. from Richmond. He was imme-
diately sent forward as a vanguard to Leesburg. Between the 4th and the sept. 5th, the entire Confederate army had crossed the Potomac by the fords, in the neighborhood of what is called Point of Rocks, and encamped near the city of Frederick, on the Monocacy River. The Confederate general lost no time in bringing to a test the sentiments of the Marylanders. On the 8th of September he issued the following address:

"Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,}
Near Frederick, September 8, 1862.}

"To the People of Maryland:

"It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.

"The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political and commercial ties, and reduced to the condition of a conquered province.

"Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned, upon no charge, and contrary to all the forms of law.

"A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom, in his better days, no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt.

"The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed; words have been declared offenses by an arbitrary decree of the Federal executive; and citizens ordered to be tried by military commissions for what they may dare to speak.

"Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the independence and sovereignty of your State.

"In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled.

"This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. No restraint upon your free-will is intended, no intimidation will be allowed, within the limits of this army at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of you in every opinion.

"It is for you to decide your destiny, freely and without restraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will
THE ATTACK ON FORT SUMTER BY THE MONITOR FLEET.
CHARLESTON HARBOR AND ITS APPROACHES, SHOWING FORTS SUMTER AND WAGNER, JAMES ISLAND, Etc., Etc.
GENERAL GRANT LEADING THE OHIO REGIMENT AT SHILOH.

PIKETS ON DUTY.
GENERAL GRANT AND SHERMAN AT THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS OR BULL RUN.
MAP SHOWING VICKSBURG AND ITS APPROACHES.
GENERAL GRANT AND HIS STAFF ENTERING JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI.
THE ABOVE DIAGRAM SHOWS THE POSITIONS DURING THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT.

DIAGRAM SHOWING POSITIONS DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD DAYS
MAP ILLUSTRATING THE CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGNS.
DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
only welcome you when you come of your own free will.

"R. E. Lee,

"General Commanding."

Lee had counted too confidently on Maryland sympathy. His expectations were not realized. His address, which was well conceived and carefully expressed, fell flat on the people. A few Southern sympathizers joined his ranks; but he soon discovered that his recruits were few in comparison with the numbers who took advantage of the circumstances in which they found themselves, to reclaim that liberty of which, by the conscription, they had been deprived. Maryland, in fact, was lukewarm; and Lee was too sharp not to see that the invasion of Pennsylvania would not be free from peril, with a doubtful or hostile State in his rear. His appearance in Maryland, however, naturally enough created the wildest excitement in Pennsylvania. In York and Adams counties, and in the valleys of the Susquehanna and the Cumberland, the people were seized with a panic; but it was not the panic which comes of fear or cowardice. The farmers and villagers realized their difficulty, and prepared to meet it. Sending away their wives and children, and removing their cattle to regions where they would be less at the mercy of the enemy, they themselves hastened to take up arms. In many of the townships of the State the stores were closed, bells were rung, guns were fired, public meetings were held, and citizens assembled in large masses to drill. Governor Curtin issued an order, calling upon all the able-bodied men of Pennsylvania to organize immediately for the defense of the State, and to be ready for marching orders upon an hour's notice. On the Sept. 11th, he issued a call for 50,000 of the freemen of the State to enter immediate service, in order to repel the imminent danger of invasion. On the same day he transmitted the following despatch to the mayor of Philadelphia: "We have," he said, "reliable information this evening that the rebel generals have moved their entire army from Frederick to Cumberland Valley, and their destination is now Harrisburg and Philadelphia. We need every available man immediately. Stir up your population to-night. Form them into companies, and send us 20,000 to-morrow. No time can be lost in massing a force on the Susquehanna to defend the State and your city. Arouse every man possible, and send him here." The governor of Maryland followed a similar course. To these appeals the people made hearty response. Pennsylvania acted nobly. The excitement produced by the governor's words knew no bounds. Seventy-five thousand men were soon converging from all parts of the State to Harrisburg. Volunteers came pouring in from the adjacent States; and in a brief space both Harrisburg and Washington were overflowing with troops. The Confederates were still in high spirits; and some of them openly expressed their belief that in a few days they would be able to dictate terms of peace in the city of Philadelphia. The same old hall which had witnessed the signing of the Declaration of Inde-
dependence of the United States was to witness the signing of a treaty acknowledging the independence of the South. General Lee had already arrived at a different conclusion; but these sentiments were largely shared by the rank and file of the Confederate army.

We have already seen McClellan placed at the head of the reconstructed army of the Potomac, or rather, as it was now called, the army of Northern Virginia. McClellan had always been a great favorite with the men, from the officers down to the common soldier. His reappearance among them was hailed with enthusiasm. The army was in a wretched condition. It was not slow, however, to assume something like order. The absentees, in great numbers, rallied to their standards; discipline recovered its sway; and the shapeless, disorganized mass became once again the army of the Potomac.

As soon as it became known that General Lee had crossed into Maryland, McClellan was ordered to follow him with all the troops not needed for the defense of Washington. On the following day, he set his troops in motion; and on the 7th, leaving General Banks in command at the National capital, he hastened to the field, and made his headquarters that night with the Sixth corps at Rockville. His army, comprising his own old forces and those of Pope and Burnside, numbered over 87,000 effective men. On the morning of the 10th, McClellan was at Damascus; and on the 12th, his army having marched by five parallel roads, he had reached Frederick. The first movements of McClellan were conducted with a view to command all the lower fords of the Potomac, thus giving Lee the choice of meeting him in battle, or of retiring before him and crossing the river further up, with the view of retreating through the Shenandoah Valley. Great caution was necessary, as the real intentions of Lee were not known. Happily, however, a copy of his order of march, issued on the 9th, was found at Frederick on the 13th. The following is the order:

"Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, Sept. 9, 1862.

"Special Order, No. 119.

"III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown Road. General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and, after passing Middleton with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday morning, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry.

"IV. General Longstreet’s command will pursue the main road as far as Boonsboro’, where it will halt with reserve, supply and baggage trains of the army.

"V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middleton, will take the
route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

"VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Check's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, keep the ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.

"VII. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains will precede General Hill.

"VIII. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

"IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown.

"X. Each regiment on the march, will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons for use of the men at their encampments to procure wood, &c.

"By command of

"General R. E. Lee.

"R. H. Chilton, A.-A.-General,

"For Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, Comd'g, Division."

The secret which this document revealed was of priceless value to McClellan. It was evident that Lee had no intention to leave Maryland until necessity compelled him. His object, as he himself afterwards put it, was "to move the army into Western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond through the valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and draw him back from his base. Now, it had been supposed that the advance upon Frederick would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the valley. But this not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from these positions, before concentrating the army west of the mountains. To accomplish this with the least delay, General Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg, and, after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the south side of the Potomac upon Harper's Ferry. General McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's divisions, was ordered to besiege Maryland Heights, on the north side of the Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, and Brigadier-General Walker to take possession of Loudon Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it unites with the Potomac.
These several commands were directed, after reducing Harper's Ferry and clearing the valley of the enemy, to join the rest of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown."

Lee's plan was undoubtedly bold. It cannot, however, be called wise. He was far away from his supplies; and yet he was cutting his army into two parts, and placing between those parts a river which was liable to be made impassable in a few hours by a heavy rain. In addition to all this, he was closely pursued by an enemy who was considerably superior in numbers. It is difficult to acquit Lee of the charge of having, at this particular crisis, committed a grave blunder. He has himself tried to explain what seemed a gross violation of the fundamental principles of military tactics. "The advance of the Federal army," he says, "was so slow, at the time we left Frederick, as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry would be accomplished, and our troops concentrated before they would be called to meet it. In that event, it was not intended to oppose its passage through the South Mountain, as it was desired to engage it as far from its base as possible." Lee was evidently judging McClellan by his experience in the Peninsula. On this occasion, however, the National commander had made good use of his time. The discovery of Lee's purpose had led Sept. 14. to both vigor and promptitude of action; and on the 14th, the Confederates were startled to perceive the Nationals, in great force, coming streaming down the western sides of the Catoctin Hills. Such an apparition was all the more alarming that the operations at Harper's Ferry had not yet been crowned with success; and that, if the National forces should penetrate the South Mountain, they would find themselves in Pleasant Valley, directly in the rear of McLaws, who, from the side of the Maryland Heights, was co-operating with Jackson in the reduction of Harper's Ferry. This was not a state of things which Lee could have any special desire to see brought about. It could hardly fail to prove destructive of his whole plan of campaign.

The Catoctin range is a continuation of the Blue Ridge. On the south, it terminates in Maryland at the Point of Rocks. On the north, it unites at the Pennsylvania State line with the South Mountain range which, trending to the southwest, slopes down to the Potomac at Knoxville, about four miles to the east of Harper's Ferry. Between these two ranges nestles the most beautiful valley in Maryland—the valley of Catoctin. In the centre of the valley, and about ten miles from Frederick, is the village of Middletown. Few villages in the whole world are more highly favored for situation than the village of Middletown. At this season of the year Nature, clad in her rich, autumnal robes, presents in this region unusual attractions. To prevent any possibility of disaster resulting from the unfortunate division of his army, Lee made such disposition of his forces as would cover the siege of Harper's Ferry. He had fallen back upon South Mountain, which running north, as it does from...
the ferry, forms a sort of natural curtain and furnishes an excellent line of defense. This line can only be penetrated by Turner’s Gap, in front of Middletown, and by Crampton’s Gap, some five miles further to the south. Master of these natural passes, Lee could hold back the Union army with one hand, while with the other he was securing the rich prize of Harper’s Ferry. Here, therefore, he posted his troops. Meanwhile, the Nationals, whom we have just seen streaming down the western slopes of the Catoctins, were moving in two columns across the valley—the right and centre—towards Turner’s Gap, Burnside leading the way; and the left, composed of Franklin’s corps, towards Crampton’s Gap, more to the south.

While the forces of North and South are thus nearing each other at South Mountain, and while a great battle is hourly becoming more imminent, let us see what is taking place in the immediate neighborhood of Harper’s Ferry. This place is highly favored by nature, the entire hollow being commanded by the three mountains, named, respectively, Bolivar, Maryland and Loudon Heights. A large amount of artillery and stores had been collected at Harper’s Ferry by the Federal government. In the event of its being found necessary to evacuate the ferry, it would be necessary to destroy all the stores and other property, or leave them to the enemy. It was McClellan’s opinion, when he started to follow Lee into Maryland, that Harper’s Ferry could not be held. He therefore advised its evacuation, and the employment of its garrison in co-operation with his army. Four days later he repeated the same advice to Halleck. But Halleck was unwilling to make so great a sacrifice. He resolved, therefore, to hold the position until McClellan should be able to relieve it, or until communication would be open, so that it could be evacuated in safety. The place had been, since the 15th of August, in charge of D. S. Miles, who had been sent thither by General Wool, with special instructions to fortify Maryland Heights—the key of the position. Miles had been singularly remiss in the discharge of his duty. He had done nothing to strengthen the position. On the 5th of September, Colonel Thomas H. Ford was placed by Miles in command of the heights. Ford saw the danger to which the Nationals were exposed from the unprotected nature of the position. He therefore called for reinforcements, and for intrenching tools. The reinforcements came, but not the tools. With a few borrowed axes and other implements, Ford went to work, and was successful in constructing a slight breastwork of trees near the crest of the hill. This was finished the very day that Jackson appeared with his advance. Miles had fortified Bolivar Heights behind the town; but these are commanded by both Loudon and Maryland Heights. The garrison at Harper’s Ferry had been increased to about 13,000 men by the arrival of General Julius White with the garrison from Martinsburg. At noon of the 13th, Jackson was in full force in the rear of
Harper's Ferry, and at once put himself in communication with Walker and McLaws. Walker was already in possession of Loudon Heights; and McLaws was exerting himself to the utmost to get hold of the Maryland Heights on the other side of the Potomac. The summits of these different mountains are within cannon shot of each other. Ford had been attacked on the 12th, but had managed to hold his ground. On the 13th again, early in the day, he had repelled a fierce assault; but later on the same day, the attack was resumed by Kershaw, and the Nationals were driven back in some confusion. At two o'clock next morning Ford, hopeless of aid from Miles, spiked his guns, and, under cover of the darkness, retired to Harper's Ferry. All now depended upon Miles. Could he hold out till McClellan should be able to send him aid? It was a difficult and dangerous task. But with the forces at his command, and considering the advantages of the position, it was not by any means impossible of accomplishment. Early on the 14th, Harper's Ferry was completely invested, the Confederates being in command of both Loudon and Maryland Heights. At the foot of the latter, General Wright was well posted with artillery; and McLaws, who had pushed forward to the Potomac, at Sandy Hook, was barring all way of escape down the river. In the afternoon an artillery fire was opened. On the same day a message came from McClellan to Miles, saying, "Hold on to the last extremity, and, if possible, reoccupy Maryland Heights with your whole force. The Catoctin Valley is in our possession, and you can safely cross the river at Berlin." This Miles could not or would not do. At nine o'clock that night he allowed his cavalry, 2000 strong, under Colonel Davis, to depart. When morning dawned, it was found that Bolivar Heights were also in the hands of the Confederates. With the early light, no fewer than nine batteries opened fire upon the now comparatively helpless garrison. Miles could not prolong the resistance. He soon hoisted a white flag; but as it was not perceived by the Confederates, the firing continued for some thirty or forty minutes afterwards. During this time Miles was mortally wounded by the fragment of a shell. The duty of surrendering devolved upon General White. Eleven thousand five hundred and eighty-three men were made prisoners of war; and 73 guns, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and large quantities of supplies fell into the hands of the Confederates. The officers were allowed to go on parole with their side arms and private property. The private soldiers were permitted to take everything with them except their equipments and guns. The surrender of Harper's Ferry was felt to be a disgrace to the National arms. Later in the year it was made the subject of examination by a Court of Inquiry at Washington. The evidence produced was of the most damning kind. Ford and other officers were dismissed from the army of the United States; and a lasting stigma was affixed to the name and memory of Miles, who
was declared to have exhibited "an incapacity amounting almost to imbecility."

Let us now see what was taking place a little further to the northeast. We left the National army under McClellan marching across the beautiful valley through which, as seen from the neighboring heights, runs, like a silver thread, the little river Catoctin. They were moving towards the two passes which lead through the South Mountain—Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap—both of which the Confederates had carefully guarded, and each of which they were resolved to defend to the very uttermost. McClellan knew that the garrison at Harper's Ferry was reduced to great straits; and being eager to afford relief, he pressed forward with unwonted speed. On the morning of Sunday, the 14th of September, the two rival armies came into collision at a bridge which traverses the Catoctin about half a mile west of Middletown, and where the Confederates had posted some artillery. Finding it impossible to resist the heavy and resolute pressure of the Nationals, D. H. Hill, who was in command, fell back, retiring further up the mountain, and posting his men on the three roads which lead through Turner's Gap. In addition to the main road, there are two country roads—one to the right and one to the left. All these approaches were well guarded by artillery. Cox's Kanawha division, of Reno's corps of Burnside's column, moved along the road to the left or south of the gap. They soon discovered that the Confederates occu-
pied the crest in their front in great force. Reno immediately ordered an advance, promising the support of his whole corps. Cox was promptly supported by Wilcox, Rodman and Sturgis. At this point, the battle now began to rage with great fierceness, the Nationals not only holding their own, but gradually pressing the enemy backward, and gaining a foothold on the crest. Between two and three o'clock, Hooker's corps, of Burnside's column, moved along the road to the right, his object being to crush the Confederate left at the higher crest. Meade pressed toward the eminence on the one side of this road; and Patrick, supported by Doubleday and Phelps, was pressing toward the eminence on the other side. Duryee advanced to the assistance of Meade with his fine brigade, of Ricketts' division, arriving just in time to witness the close of the contest. About four o'clock, when the battle had reached a climax, Longstreet came up from Hagerstown with reinforcements; and, as he outranked Hill, he assumed the command. While victory was crowning the efforts of Reno on the left, and those of Hooker on the right, Burnside, somewhat late in the afternoon, pushed Gibbon's brigade forward on the main road which leads along through the gap. This brigade, coming into contact with the Confederate centre, encountered a stubborn resistance; but they pressed on, fighting bravely, and steadily gaining ground. At nine o'clock, when they had all but reached the summit of the pass, their ammunition failed them; but the vic
tory was secure; and they were soon afterwards relieved. When the contest closed, the Nationals had carried the mountain sides on the right and left of the gap; and the main road or turnpike was also in their hands. Such was the battle of South Mountain. It was a decided victory for the National arms. It was not won, however, without very considerable loss—a loss in killed and wounded amounting to 2325 men. Among the killed was General Reno—one of the bravest of the brave—a soldier who had done much during the dark hours of adversity to sustain the sinking spirit of the North.

Simultaneously with this struggle at Turner’s Gap, the Nationals, under Franklin, were making a bold effort to secure possession of Crampton’s Gap, some six miles further to the south. The position was held by Howell Cobb, who, the reader will remember, was secretary of the treasury under Buchanan. Cobb had under him three of McLaws’ brigades. Franklin, following out McClellan’s instructions, appeared at Barkittsville, in front of the pass, at noon on the 14th, with a fine body of men from New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. He found the Confederates well posted behind stone-wall defenses. Forming his line of battle with Slocum’s division on the right of the road running through the gap, and with Smith’s on the left, he advanced upon Cobb, steadily driving him back from his defenses up the slope; and after an action which lasted some three hours, he gained the crest of the hill. The Confederates fled down the western side of the mountain, leaving 400 prisoners, three regimental colors, two pieces of artillery and 3000 stand of arms. Franklin was now only six miles from Harper’s Ferry. He was in a position to go to the assistance of Miles. But, as the reader has already learned, it was too late. In this engagement, Franklin lost 115 killed and 418 wounded and missing. In the two engagements, the Nationals had actually come off victorious; but Lee had accomplished his purpose—he had secured time for Jackson to complete the enterprise at Harper’s Ferry.

Maryland Heights and Harper’s Ferry, with its stores, were in the hands of the Confederates. In one sense it was a great prize which Lee had won. It was a prize, however, more in seeming than reality. To gain it he had divided his army into two parts, in presence of united and powerful forces, and had thereby exposed himself to the terrible risk of being cut up in detail. This danger was imminent on the 14th, when Harper’s Ferry was still engaging Jackson’s attention, and employing all his strength. It was still imminent on the morning of the 15th, when Franklin, having forced his way through Crampton’s Gap, appeared, like a spectre, in Pleasant Valley. Jackson had hurried off that morning from Harper’s Ferry, leaving A. P. Hill to carry out the arrangements rendered necessary by the surrender; but some time must elapse before Lee could count on Jackson’s presence with any number of his troops. The Confederate commander lost no
time in making the necessary disposition of his forces. Withdrawing from South Mountain, he crossed Pleasant Valley, and took position on the sloping ground to the west of Antietam Creek, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg.

**Sept. 16.** On the 16th, the larger portion of the Confederate forces left Harper's Ferry in great haste, crossed the pontoon bridge into Maryland, and, by forced marches, succeeded in joining Lee at Antietam in time for the great battle of the 17th. Jackson, who, as has been mentioned, left on the 15th, rejoined Lee on the 16th. McLaws had abandoned the Maryland Heights when he became aware of the near presence of Franklin. Walker at the same time abandoned Loudon Heights. These last reached Lee by way of Shepherdstown, about nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th. On the night of the 16th, the Confederates were well posted on the heights near Sharpsburg.

A few words here, descriptive of the ground on which two great armies were about to come into deadly collision, will enable the reader to understand more clearly the battle picture which follows. As the traveler, after reaching the summit of South Mountain, begins to descend the western slope, there bursts upon his view one of the loveliest landscapes in the United States—a scene quite as attractive as the valley of the Catoctin which he has just left behind. In the distance, some eight or twelve miles in front of him, rolls lazily along on its tortuous bed the dark current of the Potomac. On this side of the Potomac, and from six to eight miles from the mountain passes runs the drowsy stream called Antietam Creek. This creek, which, flowing almost due south and falling into the Potomac some eight miles above Harper's Ferry, forms with that river a sort of irregular acute angle. Between these two streams there is an enclosed space which, of course, widens considerably towards the north, but which, at this point now particularly claiming attention is from two to three miles broad, and about seven or eight miles long. From the western margin of the Antietam the ground rises until it becomes a bold crest, the entire slope being covered by woods and cultivated fields; it then falls back to the Potomac in rugged and broken outlines of rock. Almost in the centre of this space, and just behind the ridge to the west, nestles the town of Sharpsburg; and behind Sharpsburg, a little to the south, is the Shepherdstown Ford across the Potomac.

Such was the position which the Confederate general had chosen, and on which he proposed to await the attack of McClellan. The creek was in his front; the Potomac was in his rear; and behind and near the middle of his line was the little town of Sharpsburg, about a mile from the creek. The position unquestionably offered several advantages; but it is always dangerous to hazard—what in the circumstances this could not but be—a great and possibly decisive battle, with a river in the rear. The truth is, Lee's original plan had failed. He was no longer offensive, but defensive. His great object, from
the failure at South Mountain, had been to gain time for the concentration of his troops. This, however, he could have accomplished with equal ease on the other side of the Potomac. Why, then, did he remain on the Maryland side? The answer is simple. He could not have recrossed the Potomac without covering himself with odium—without making his expedition to a certain extent ridiculous. He had marched North with a great flourish of trumpets; his plans and purposes had become known; it was absolutely necessary, in short, that in a fair fight he should test the skill and strength of his antagonist; and judging from the past, he was not without reason to hope that victory might crown his effort. If defeated, he might still be able to make good his retreat across the Potomac. If successful, he might yet march in triumph to Baltimore and Washington.

On the morning of the 15th, the National army had defiled from the South Mountain, and moved in long, shining columns athwart the valley. By the evening of that day, the advance had arrived at Antietam Creek; and the enemy was discovered well posted behind the crest of the opposite slope. There was some slight skirmishing with cavalry; but neither of the commanders was quite willing to open the fight. Lee, while actually waiting for the arrival of reinforcements from Harper’s Ferry, made such a show of strength as imposed upon McClellan. The National forces were not well forward, when darkness set in. There had been on the part of some of the commands unnecessary delay—a delay but for which McClellan might have been able to attack Lee with success on the afternoon of the 15th. During the morning of the 16th, the whole of the National army arrived, with the exception of Franklin’s command, which was still in Pleasant Valley. By that time, however, Lee was equally prepared for battle; for Jackson had already arrived, and with him almost the entire Confederate strength from Harper’s Ferry.

On the morning of the 16th, there was some artillery firing; but it did not seem to indicate that either side was yet fully ready for the fight. Both armies, however, were busy making preparations for the attack which could not now be long delayed. The Confederates were so arranged that Longstreet was on the right, with his right flank resting on a curve of the Antietam, D. H. Hill being on his left, and one of Longstreet’s divisions, commanded by Hood, being on the left of Hill. In a general manner their line stood north and south; but Hood’s division made an angle with the rest, and, facing northward, stood across the Hagerstown Road. The object of this arrangement was to oppose any flank movement which might be made in that direction. Close to that point, and in the rear of Hood, Jackson’s exhausted troops, which had just arrived from Harper’s Ferry, were posted in reserve, his line stretching from the Hagerstown Road toward the Potomac, and protected by Stuart, with cavalry and artillery. Walker was posted on Long-
street's right with two brigades, near what was called Shaveley's Farm. Lee had his headquarters in a tent on the hill where the National cemetery now is. McClellan's forces, on the morning of that day, were posted along the eastern bank of the Antietam. Hooker's corps was placed on the extreme right. Next to him was Sumner, with his corps. Porter was placed in the centre, and Burnside on the left. Mansfield was stationed in the rear of Hooker. Franklin had not yet come up from Pleasant Valley. General McClellan's headquarters were at the fine brick mansion of Philip Pry, on the east side of the Antietam, and about two miles northeast of Sharpsburg. From this point he had a commanding view of the entire line of battle. In front of the National line were three stone bridges. These bridges have been described as Nos. 1, 2 and 3. No. 1 was in front of the National right, near which were stationed Hooker, Sumner and Mansfield. No. 2 was in front of Porter, who commanded the National centre. No. 3 was opposite Burnside, who had charge of the National left. Near bridge 1 was a ford, which was turned to good account during the progress of the fight. McClellan's plan was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's; and, as soon as matters looked favorable in that direction, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried that position, to press along the crest toward his left. Whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, he proposed to advance the centre with all the forces then disposable.

We have already referred to the careful disposition which Lee had made of his troops on his own left, on and around the Hagerstown Road. On the west side of that road, about a mile from Sharpsburg, and about half a mile from the rear of the Confederate left, there was a small meeting-house, known as the Dunker Church. This church was enveloped in woods. In the immediate neighborhood of the church there was an open, cultivated area, extending from the north, for the most part skirted with woods, but part of which was traversed by the Hagerstown Road. In the woods near the church were numerous ledges of limestone, which afforded an excellent cover for troops. It was here, among these limestone ledges, where Jackson had posted his men. The middle part of this open ground was a cornfield. A portion of it toward the east had been recently ploughed. It was in the woods, near the church, and in that open ground, that the battle of Antietam most fiercely raged and was principally fought. This was the focus of the fight.

On the afternoon of the 16th, about two P.M., General McClellan began to put his plans into operation. General Hooker, ever ready and always equal to the situation, with his corps, consisting of Ricketts', Meade's and Doubleday's divisions, in prompt obedience to orders, crossed the Antietam at bridge
No. 1, and by the adjoining ford. General Mansfield was to follow Hooker during the night, and to be in a position to render him assistance by daybreak. Sumner was to follow in the same direction in the morning. Hooker, encountering no opposition in crossing the river, advanced in a southward direction, and came to the eastern edge of what we have described as the battle area. As he approached the house of a Mr. D. Miller, his advance—Meade's Pennsylvania Reserves—came into contact with a portion of the enemy's left. The contest thus began was sharp and severe, and lasted until dark, when the Confederates fell back. Hooker's men rested that night on their arms on the ground they had won. Mansfield's corps, consisting of the divisions of Williams and Green, were also successful in crossing the Antietam; and upon the farm of Poffenberger, about a mile in Hooker's rear, they bivouacked till dawn.

Hooker, impatient to resume the attack, was ready and in action by the first streak of early day. The Pennsylvania Reserves were again the first to be engaged. Soon, however, the whole of his corps were in deadly conflict with the enemy, Jackson being in command. Hooker advanced, with Doubleday on his right, Meade on his left, and Ricketts in the centre. Such was the vigor of the onslaught, and so effective was the assistance rendered by the batteries on the east side of the Antietam, that Jackson's brigades, terribly cut up, were driven across the cornfield, in the open ground, over the Hagerstown Road, and into the woods beyond the Dunker Church, where were their reserves. Eager to accomplish his purpose, and to obtain possession of the woods beyond, Hooker now pushed forward his left and centre. At this point, where the ground rises to something of an elevation, they were met by a murderous fire. The broken battalions were re-formed; and Jackson brought forth his reserves. A fearful struggle ensued. At short range, and in the open ground, and with the ardor of desperation, they plied their deadly work. It was a fight in which there was no desire for quarter—no wish to save or be saved. Two great commanders were pitted against each other; and the men were animated by the spirit of their chiefs. In his extremity, Hooker called on Doubleday for aid; and a brigade under Hartsuff was forwarded at the double-quick. This brigade was terribly punished in pushing its way across the cornfield. It offered a gallant resistance; but it could not turn the tide of battle. In the brief struggle of half an hour Hartsuff fell, severely wounded. The opposing forces were literally torn to shreds. In his official report of this fierce encounter, General Jackson says: "The carnage on both sides was terrific. At an early hour, General Starke, commanding the Stonewall division, was killed; Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, was also killed. General Lawton, commanding division, and Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, were severely wounded. More than half the brigades of Lawton and Hay..."
THE AIR ALIVE WITH BULLETS.

were either killed or wounded, and more than a third of Trimble's. All the regimental commanders in those brigades, except two, were either killed or wounded. Thinned in their ranks, and their ammunition exhausted," it was necessary to withdraw the shattered regiments to the rear, when "Hood's division, of Longstreet's command, took their place." Hooker's corps had similarly suffered. Indeed, General Sumner, who arrived on the field a little later, testified that when he came up he "saw nothing of Hooker's corps at all."

It was now half-past seven o'clock. Mansfield had just come up to the support of Hooker. He had pushed his way to the Hagerstown Road. At that moment the battle din was fearful. What with the yells of the Confederates, the ringing cheers of the Nationals, the sharp, penetrating fire of musketry, the loud booming of cannon, and the ghastly procession of the wounded as they came out from the thick of the fight, it seemed a very pandemonium. But it was no time for idle moralizing. While attempting to deploy his corps—the divisions of Williams and Green—Mansfield was fiercely set upon by the division of D. H. Hill, which had just come out of the woods at the Dunker Church. In the struggle which ensued, and in which his corps were driven back to the woods, brave old Mansfield was killed. His command devolved on General Williams, who left his division to the care of General Crawford, one of his brigade commanders. Hooker, nothing daunted by his terrible losses, was still hopeful of success. Ricketts was unable to advance; but he assured the general that he could hold his ground. Doubleday had succeeded in silencing a battery which for half an hour had been pouring enfilading fire on Hooker's central line. Near the Dunker Church was a wood-crowned elevation, which was really the key of the position. This Hooker determined to take. With this end in view, he ordered forward two of the Mansfield brigades—Crawford and Gordon—Hooker himself advancing to the front, and recklessly exposing himself to the enemy's bullets, which fell in showers around him. For a time he moved about on foot, examining the ground in his front, and seeking a favorable site for a battery. As he remounted on a piece of rising ground, the air was literally alive with bullets. He was scarcely in the saddle when three men were shot by his side, and when he himself was shot in the foot. Suffering dreadfully from the wound, and sitting unsteadily in his saddle, he turned and fixed his eyes on the coveted position. "There is a regiment to the right," said he; "order it forward. Crawford and Gordon are coming up; tell them to carry these works, and hold them, and it is our fight." On examination, it was found that the bullet had completely passed through his foot. Soon afterwards he was carried off the field to McClellan's headquarters at Pry's, but not until he felt satisfied that he had won the field, so far as it was the duty or in the power of the National right to win it. In carrying
out the orders given them, Crawford and Gordon were fairly successful. They had reached the woods, and were holding them against heavy odds.

It was only nine o'clock. It seemed as if the battle had been raging for the greater part of a day. Just as Hooker was leaving the field, Sumner arrived and assumed command. Discovering at once the dangerous position held by the two Mansfield brigades, Sumner ordered Sedgwick, whose division was in advance, to move forward to their support. It was a hazardous operation. It was necessary to cross the cornfield; and if the enemy's line was complete, he was in immediate danger of being flanked. Simultaneously, with the advance of Sedgwick, French and Richardson, who had also arrived on the field, moved down upon the foe a little more to the left. Sedgwick suffered terribly; but the Nationals, having again pressed across the open and now blood-stained area, were holding the ground around the Dunker Church. It seemed for a moment as if victory had pronounced in their favor. But no. The backward and forward struggle must be repeated. The blood-stained field must be crossed and recrossed. McLaws and Walker, who had arrived with their troops from Harper's Ferry, were moved at once to Jackson's support, with Early on their left. Posted behind the rocky bulwarks, they awaited the approach of the Nationals; and, as they drew near, they leaped from their hiding-places and fell upon them with tremendous fury, forcing them from the Dunker Woods, and driving them across the cornfield, and into the woods beyond. At this moment, affairs looked sufficiently gloomy for the National right. Sumner's headquarters were now in the narrow field where Hooker in the morning had begun the fight. Sedgwick, who had been three times wounded, was at last obliged to leave the field. Dana, Crawford and other officers had been wounded. What remained of Hooker's troops were terribly exhausted; and their general was off the field. Mansfield was gone; and what remained of his troops were in little better condition than those of Hooker. It was Sumner's conviction that further aggressive effort without reinforcements was impossible. He might hold his own; but he could do no more. The Confederates at this stage did not seem to be in any better plight than their antagonists. They had suffered terribly from the National artillery; and as they were exposed in their advanced position to the batteries of Doubleday, who held his place on the right with inflexible tenacity, they fell back to their original ground near the Dunker Church. Some of them, however, were still engaged; nor was there any evidence that they were unwilling to continue the fight.

It was now shortly after midday. Franklin, who had left Crampton's Pass in the morning about six o'clock, had just arrived on the field. It was McClellan's intention to retain that corps on the east side of the Antietam, to be ready to operate on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances might re-
ARRIVAL OF FRANKLIN.

quire. The terrible condition of the National right, however, left the general-in-chief no choice. McClellan had been an anxious spectator of the fight all the morning and forenoon. He knew how critical was the situation in which Sumner found himself. Franklin was, therefore, ordered at once to his assistance. He made no delay. Hastening forward, he reached the point of danger not a moment too soon. An attack was being made on battery A, Fourth United States Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas. Smith’s division led the column, followed by Slocum’s. Smith received general instructions to retake the ground on which the battle had all day long raged so fiercely. Slocum was ordered to move more to the centre. The orders were promptly executed. Smith’s men were soon in the thick of the fight. Battery A was immediately relieved by Hancock’s brigade; and, as he observed that the enemy was still disposed to advance, Smith ordered up his third brigade, commanded by Colonel Irwin. Passing through Thomas’s battery, this brigade rushed upon the foe with intrepid energy, and with a violence which was irresistible; and by a series of gallant charges, made in the face of a most destructive fire, which ploughed through their ranks, the men cheering as they advanced on the run, they drove the Confederates across the open field, and beyond the Hagerstown Road, compelling them to seek shelter in the woods to the west of the Dunker Church. On this day of brilliant effort and heroic self-sacrifice, nothing was more brilliant, more heroic or more full of self-sacrifice than this last and crowning effort of Smith’s division, of Franklin’s corps. The grandest work was done by the Maine and Vermont regiments. They literally covered themselves with glory. It was only fifteen minutes from the time the order was given, when the field was reclaimed, and the work was done. “The field and its ghastly harvest,” says an eyewitness, “which the reaper had gathered in those fatal hours, remained finally with the Nationals. Four times it had been lost and won. The dead are strewn so thickly that, as you ride over it, you cannot guide your horse’s steps too carefully. Pale and bloody faces are everywhere upturned. They are sad and terrible; but there is nothing which makes one’s heart beat so quickly as the imploring looks of some sorely-wounded men, who beckon wearily for help which you cannot stay to give.”

The arrival of Franklin on the field was singularly opportune. A few minutes later, the Confederates might have penetrated the National line between the division of Sedgwick and that of French. Such a result would have been disastrous in the extreme. His efforts had been attended with so much success, that he felt emboldened to assault the woods near the Dunker Church, where the Confederate left had again sought shelter—a position which had been vainly assaulted by both Hooker and Sumner. Franklin had given the order; but Sumner having come up, it was countermanded.
was Slocum’s brigade that was to make the intended assault. Franklin, confident of success, was anxious that it should be made; but Sumner, “the old bull of the woods,” as they called him at Fair Oaks, who was as stubborn as he was brave, and as cautious as he was daring, could not be persuaded to give his consent. Franklin’s was the only remaining corps available for attack. In the meditated assault on the enemy, strongly posted on ground which hitherto had proved impregnable, a repulse was at least possible; and a repulse, in Sumner’s judgment, would peril the safety of the whole army. Sumner’s caution at this crisis of the fight was the more entitled to respect that that day he proved himself to be the bravest of the brave. He was ever at the post of danger, and where the battle raged most fiercely. Mounted on his spirited charger, and careering through the woods, his head bare, his white hair streaming in the wind, the fire of battle in his eye, he seemed the very impersonation of the god of war. Few that saw him that day in the thick of the fight believed he could leave the field alive. But the bullets fell mercifully around the brave old warrior.

While these events were taking place on Sumner’s right, severe fighting was going on also on his left. French and Richardson had not been idle. The former, with the brigades of Weber, Kimball and Morris, pushed on where the Confederate general, D. H. Hill, was posted in considerable strength. Weber led the advance, while hotly engaged with the enemy. French received orders to press on with the utmost vigor, and make a diversion in favor of the right. The Confederates were pressed back towards a hollow or sunken road in much disorder. At this point, Richardson came up, with the brigades of Meagher, Caldwell and Brooks, and took position on the left of French. Meagher fought his way to the crest of a hill which overlooked the Confederate position. The battle now raged furiously. A vigorous effort was made by the Confederates, who at this time were reinforced by about 4000 men under R. H. Anderson, to obtain possession of a piece of rising ground on the left of the National right wing, with the view of turning that flank. The ground, however, after what might be called a fighting race, was seized and held by Colonel Cross and his famous “fighting” Fifth New Hampshire.

Cross was speedily joined by the Eighty-First Pennsylvania; and the Confederates were driven back, leaving behind them the colors of the Fourth North Carolina. An effort was made at the same time to push towards and flank the National right. It was made with great energy and stubbornness. Resisted, however, by French and by Richardson, the Confederates were brought to a standstill, and finally driven back to Dr. Piper’s house, near the Sharpsburg Road. There they came to a halt, and made an obstinate attack. Richardson now brought up his artillery. It was at this moment, and while directing one of the batteries, that this brave officer was felled to the
earth by a cannon ball. General Hancock immediately took command; and, by a desperate charge, he drove the Confederates from Dr. Piper's house, and pressed them so closely that it was only by the merest chance that Lee's line was not completely severed. A vigorous and more general effort at this moment might have given a new aspect to the entire struggle, and even crowned the day with a decisive victory. As it was, the Nationals held the ground on the right and toward the centre when darkness fell. In this closing struggle, General Meagher, who performed deeds of valor, was wounded and carried from the field.

Thus far our attention has been directed exclusively to the operations on the National right. This has been unavoidable. It was by his right wing McClellan intended to fight the battle of Antietam; and it was by that wing the battle was really fought. It was not the general's intention, however, that either the centre or the left, or both, should be mere armed spectators of the scene. The reader will remember that General Fitz John Porter, who had command of the National centre, occupied a position on the east of Antietam, commanding bridge No. 2. The left wing, it will also be remembered, was under General Burnside, and held a position also on the east side of the creek, commanding bridge No. 3. While this murderous work was going on to the right of the National line, what was being done by the centre and left? Let us see.

McClellan deemed the position held by Porter of the utmost importance; and, consequently, it was not until the afternoon was somewhat advanced that he could be induced to take any steps which should have the effect of weakening his centre. Hooker had been taken from the field wounded; his corps had been cut to pieces. Mansfield had fallen in battle; and there remained but tattered fragments of his once splendid regiments. Sumner was still giving directions in the field; but his own corps had shared the fate of those of Hooker and Mansfield. It was "towards the middle of the afternoon," McClellan tells us, that, discovering the desperate state of things on his right, he detached two of Porter's brigades, and sent them to Sumner's assistance. About the same time he caused six battalions, of Sykes' regulars, to be thrown across bridge No. 2, in order to attack and drive away the Confederate sharpshooters, who were giving great annoyance to Pleasonton's horse batteries, which were stationed a little in advance of the bridge. At the same time, also, he detached Warren's brigade from the same corps, and sent them to hold a position on the right and rear of Burnside. In consequence of these repeated withdrawals of troops Porter's corps was, at one time during the day, reduced to fewer than 4000 men.

And what was taking place on the left? It was McClellan's design, as has been indicated, to support his right by making an attack on the enemy with his left. With this end in view, Burnside's corps, on the evening of the 16th,
was moved into position near the bridge. On that day McClellan visited Burnside, and, after pointing out the proper disposition to be made of his troops, informed him that he would probably be required to make an attack on the enemy’s right on the following morning. He was instructed, also, to make careful reconnaissances. Burnside’s corps consisted of the divisions of Generals Cox, Wilcox, Rodman and Sturgis. Colonel Brooks’ brigade, of Cox’s division, was on the right; Sturgis’ division was immediately in the rear; while Rodman’s division, with Scammon’s brigade, of Cox’s division, in support, was stationed on the left. The division of Wilcox was held in reserve. On the night of the 16th the corps bivouacked in position. At eight o’clock on the morning of the 17th, McClellan sent instructions to Burnside to force the lower stone bridge, to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. The position was held by Toombs’ brigade, supported by sharpshooters and batteries, under the command of D. R. Jones. Burnside was singularly tardy in carrying out the instructions given him. It is to be admitted that the task imposed upon him was one of more than ordinary difficulty. The approaches to the bridge partook of the character of a defile, which was completely commanded by the Confederate batteries. Burnside made repeated attempts; but they were feeble, and without effect. He was evidently impressed with the idea that, however important it might be to capture the bridge and the heights beyond, the risk to be run was too great. Again and again imperative orders were sent to him to push forward his troops without delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet. It was not until about one o’clock, when Colonel Sackett had been sent to Burnside with instructions to remain and see the order executed, that a really vigorous effort was made. The Fifty-First New York and the Fifty-First Pennsylvania charged with tremendous energy, driving the Confederates from the bridge, and back to the heights in their rear. Other troops followed, and the position was secured. Unhappily, however, Burnside did not pursue the advantage thus gained. In getting his troops and batteries across the bridge, and putting them in order, he wasted two precious hours—the most precious hours of the day; for, as we now know, Longstreet had so exhausted his strength by sending reinforcements to the Confederate left, that he had only some two thousand men with whom to oppose Burnside’s advance. It is impossible not to admire the skill with which, on this and other occasions, the Confederate generals contrived to make an imposing and deceptive show of their forces, when they were really weak and in distress. At three o’clock, Burnside was in the same position. McClellan, becoming impatient, sent Colonel Key to him, with the most urgent entreaties to push on without a moment’s delay. The movement, he assured him, was vital to success. It was no time to halt or hesitate
because of the value of life. With a considerateness which seems strange to those accustomed to the stern military orders of older nations, McClellan again sends Key to Burnside, telling him that if, on experiment, he finds that he cannot flank or storm the battery, and carry the heights, he is to inform him, so that he may be able to recall the troops. The advance is now resumed; the attack is gallantly made; the guns are abandoned by the fleeing Confederates; the heights are carried; and the victorious Nationals, in considerable force, are already at the outskirts of Sharpsburg. At this supreme moment, when victory seems at last about to crown the labors and sacrifices of the day, the Nationals are brought to a standstill. A new army appears to have arisen out of the ground. It is A. P. Hill, who, with his division, has just come up from Harper's Ferry. Getting his men into order on the brow of a ridge to the left, he falls heavily on Burnside's troops, as they press eagerly forward, apparently with victory in their grasp. The blow is all the more stunning that it is unexpected. Under cover of a tremendous fire of artillery, the Confederates charge upon Burnside's left flank. The National troops offer a stubborn resistance. But they cannot hold their ground. Step by step they are forced back to the bridge over the Antietam, where they are protected by the batteries on the other side of the creek. Here Burnside had instructions to make a determined stand. It was unnecessary, as the Confederates did not venture to pursue. In this last struggle there was a heavy loss of life. The Confederate general, Branch, was killed; and General Rodman was mortally wounded. The last shot was fired as night spread her mantle of gloom over that field of blood and agony. The battle of Antietam was ended. It was not the most decisive, but it was the bloodiest battle since the commencement of the Civil War. On that narrow piece of ground lay dead, or bleeding to death, twenty thousand men, their comrades so completely outworn by continuous marching and fighting, without sleep and without food, that they could not give burial to the one or succor to the other.

The National loss in this battle was 2010 killed, 9416 wounded, and 1043 missing; a total of 12,469. Lee's losses were correspondingly heavy. About 2700 were buried by McClellan. His wounded numbered about 7000, not including those which had fallen into the hands of the Nationals. In that single day his army must have been reduced by at least 10,000 men. Lee himself acknowledged that, in the different engagements at Crampton's Gap, Turner's Gap, Harper's Ferry and Antietam, he sustained a loss of 1567 killed, and 8724 wounded. Most undoubtedly Lee, from some cause or other, underestimated his loss. It does not appear possible to get at the exact figures; but it is not an overestimate to say that Lee's loss, during his brief campaign in Maryland, was from 25,000 to 30,000 men. Although Antietam could not be called a National victory, it was unquestionably a gain to the National
cause; and McClellan was hardly to be blamed if he felt some self-satisfaction in being able to say that "thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 15,000 stand of small arms, and more than 6000 prisoners are the trophies which attest the success of our arms in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap and Antietam," and that "not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles." Lee could, no doubt, boast that he had not been defeated, although he had fought with inferior numbers, and that McClellan did not venture to resume the battle on the following day; but he had lost ground along the whole line, and his army was so broken down that a retreat to Virginia was now an absolute necessity. His whole plan of campaign had failed. It is fair, here, to ask the reader to bear in mind that Lee, although repeatedly reinforced, was not able to bring into the field on that day more than 40,000 or 45,000 men; whereas, McClellan's effective strength was over 87,000.

It would not be difficult to show that greater results ought to have been achieved by the noble army of the Potomac. The discipline was defective. The generalship was not good. The commanding mind which gives unity of purpose and unity of movement to a great army was wanting. McClellan repeated his characteristic blunder. In place of combining his forces, and attacking with an overwhelming mass, he used them too much in driblets, and worked too much in detail. In his history of the Civil War, the Comte de Paris very clearly puts the merits and demerits of the fight. "The error," he says, "which Lee expiated by this great defeat is evident. This error was in dividing his army for the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry in the presence of McClellan, and in counting too much upon the tardiness of his adversary. If he had not made such a division of his forces, he would have had the choice either to fight a decisive battle under much more favorable circumstances, upon the steep acclivities of South Mountain, or of continuing the campaign on the upper Potomac with all his troops. The mistakes of his enemies repaired to some extent those committed by himself. Through the disgraceful capitulation of Miles, the slow movements of Franklin on the 14th and 15th, and the delays which prevented McClellan from attacking him on the 16th, he was enabled on the 17th to mass all his troops on the field of battle. The issue of the contest, however, would probably have been different if A. P. Hill, instead of arriving at three o'clock in the afternoon, had been able to take part in the struggle early in the morning, and add his efforts to those which kept the Federal right so long in check. There were, however, many other causes which prevented McClellan from achieving a more complete victory, and taking advantage of the opportunity to strike an irreparable blow at Lee. The first is to be found in the moral condition of his troops. The army which had been entrusted to him was partly composed of the vanquished soldiers of Manassas,
and the remainder consisted of soldiers who had been only one or two weeks in the service, who had never marched, never been under fire, and knew neither their commanders nor their comrades. They fought with great bravery; but they could not be expected to perform what Lee easily obtained from his men. Their ranks had not that cohesion which enables a commander to follow up a first success without interruption. The Union generals may be censured for having divided their efforts on the right in successive attacks, and thereby impaired their effectiveness. The corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner—in all from 40,000 to 44,000 men—instead of being brought into action one after the other for the space of four hours, might have been united so as together to strike the Confederate left, which they would, no doubt, have crushed. McClellan and several of his lieutenants, as we have said, had also overrated the number of their adversaries—an error which had the effect of keeping back Franklin and Porter, whose cooperation at the close of the battle would have been decisive. Finally Burnside, by his long inaction, upset all McClellan’s plans, enabled Lee to mass all his forces on his left, and thus deprived the Federals of the principal advantages which a more energetic action on his part would certainly have secured.” These are sensible words; and they justify the tone which pervades this narrative.

McClellan himself tells us that the night of the 17th brought with it grave responsibilities. The question was seriously revolved in his own mind, and discussed with his generals, “whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy’s retirement.” Some of the generals, Franklin among the rest, urged immediate action. Others again, Sumner included, opposed such a course. McClellan concluded to wait a day, to give his army rest, and to prepare for the renewal of the battle on the 19th. For this McClellan has been greatly blamed by many. We cannot join with them. Discretion is, sometimes at least, the better part of valor. McClellan, we think, showed a wise discretion. It may be true that, if he had resumed the attack on the morning of the 18th, he could easily have captured or ruined Lee’s army. It ought not to be forgotten, however, that we judge the situation now with a fuller knowledge than McClellan then possessed. There were certainly grave reasons why he should act with caution. As he himself has said: “At that moment—Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded—the National cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and all would have been lost.” During the course of the 18th, he was joined by 14,000 fresh troops, under Couch and Humphrey. Thus strengthened, he felt that he could strike the enemy on the following morning with assured hope of victory. Meanwhile, the 18th was spent in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, removing the wounded, burying the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the battle.
The 18th of September, 1862, will not soon be forgotten by any who spent that day on the battle field of Antietam. Sad duties had to be performed; and sad sights had to be witnessed. In battle histories, it is too much the habit to confine the reader's attention to the stirring scenes of actual conflict—too little the habit to linger with him in the battle's rear, and witness the scenes of woe. Yet it is on the blood-soaked field, when the din of battle has ceased, among the dead and the wounded, that the true lesson is to be learned. Happily, a picture of the field of Antietam after the battle has been preserved to us by a competent eye-witness. "My route," says Captain Noyes, "carried me over the late battle field, and I spent much of the afternoon, in company with a friend, in visiting some of the most severely-contested points, to be awe-struck, sickened, almost benumbed with its sights of horror. Within this space of little more than a mile square—this spot once beautiful with handsome residences and well-cultivated farms, isolated, hedged in with verdure, sacred to quiet, calm content—the hottest fury of man's hottest wrath had expended itself, burning residences and well-filled barns, ploughing fields of ripened grain with artillery, scattering everywhere through cornfield, wood and valley the most awful illustrations of war. Not a building about us which was not deserted by its occupants, and rent and torn by shot and shell; not a field which had not witnessed the fierce and bloody encounter of armed and desperate men.

Passing through the cornfield, with the dead lying all through its aisles, out into an uncultivated field, I saw bodies, attired mainly in gray, lying in ranks so regular that Death, the Reaper, must have mowed them down in swaths. Our burying parties were already busily engaged, and had put away to rest many of our own men; still here, as everywhere, I saw them scattered over the field. The ground was strewn with muskets, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes and articles of clothing; the carcasses of horses, and thousands of shot and shell. And so it was on the other side of the turnpike—nay, in the turnpike itself. Ride where we may, through cornfield wood or ravine, and our ride will be among the dead, until the heart grows sick and faint with horror. Just in front of these hay-stacks, where our general and his staff paused for a while during the heat of the battle, was the only pleasing picture on this battle field—a fine horse struck with death. At the instant when cut down by his wound, he was attempting to rise from the ground. His head was half lifted; his neck proudly arched; every muscle seemed replete with animal life. The wound which killed him was wholly concealed from view, so that I had to ride close up before I could believe him dead. He was the admired of every passer-by. Two weeks afterward, I found myself pausing to gaze upon him, and always with the wish that some sculptor would immortalize in stone this magnificent animal, in the exact pose of his death-hour. One would like to see something from a
battle field not wholly terrible. One more scene in this battle picture, and our ride may end. It is a narrow country lane, hollowed out somewhat between the fields, partially shaded, and now literally crowded with the Confederate dead. Here they stood in line of battle, and here, in the length of five hundred feet, I counted more than two hundred of their dead in every attitude conceivable—some piled in groups of four or six; some grasping their muskets, as if in the act of discharging them; some, evidently officers, killed while encouraging their men; some lying in the position of calm repose, all black and swollen, and ghastly with wounds. This battalion of the dead filled the lane with horror. As we rode beside it—we could not ride in it—I saw the field all about me black with corpses; and I was told that the cornfield beyond was equally crowded. It was a place to see once, to glance at, and then to ride hurriedly away; for strong-hearted as was then my mood, I had gazed upon as much horror as I was able to bear." Such is war, when stripped of the pomp and the splendor and the show, and seen in its naked reality.

On the morning of the 19th, according to instructions given the day before, preparations were made for an advance. The cavalry were sent forward to reconnoitre the ground. What has happened? Mounted messengers return at full speed to McClellan’s headquarters. There is no longer any enemy in front. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, Lee had taken his entire army across the Potomac by the Shepherdstown Ford, and escaped, unmolested, into Virginia. He had left eight batteries, under Pendleton, on the river bluffs, for the purpose of checking the pursuit. This, then, was the end of all that blood and sacrifice. Justified, as McClellan was, in resting on the 18th, it must be regarded, from a National point of view, as a great misfortune that Lee should have been able, without let or hindrance, to cross the Potomac, carrying with him his entire army, with all the supplies, material and impediments of war generally. It is no matter of wonder if many a soldier’s heart sank within him, when he learned that the enemy had escaped. Good generalship was again on the side of the Confederates. An attempt at pursuit was made by a portion of Porter’s corps; but it was a feeble attempt, and tended to reveal the indecision and want of purpose on the part of the National commander. Porter’s men, under General Griffin, captured four of the enemy’s guns; but on the morning of the 20th, when making a reconnoissance in force, and when about a mile from the ford, they were surprised by A. P. Hill, who lay in ambush, and driven back into and across the river in great disorder, with the loss of 200 men made prisoners. The Confederates held the river for the remainder of that day. On the 21st, Lee moved leisurely toward Martinsburg, destroying, as he moved along, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Stuart lingered behind to make a show of numbers
and strength; and on the same day that Lee marched to Martinsburg, he was daring enough to recross the river at Williamsport. He was met by Couch, who compelled him to make a precipitate retreat. Two days later, Maryland Heights were retaken by the Nationals; Harper's Ferry was reoccupied, and in charge of General Sumner; and pontoon bridges were thrown across both the Potomac and the Shenandoah Rivers. The Maryland campaign was ended. The great battle of Antietam had been fought; blood and treasure had been liberally spent on both sides; yet both armies had substantially resumed the positions which they occupied some three weeks before.*

McClellan's besetting sin again became a source of disquietude to the country and the government. There was an earnest and general desire that he should pursue Lee, and force matters to a crisis before the winter should set in. Lincoln visited the army on the 1st of October, and remained with it several days. His entreaties were urgent that McClellan should advance. The general was full of promises; but his wants were many. He needed reinforcements, horses, clothing, shoes, supplies of all kinds. Lee had moved to Winchester. His army was in a wretched condition. McClellan's army had increased to 150,000 strong. Yet day follows day, and nothing is done. On the 6th of October, Hall Telegraphed to the general: "The president directs that you cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." On the 10th, General J. E. B. Stuart made a raid into Pennsylvania, forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government. His idea," said the president, "was that it would be considered our last shriek on the retreat. 'Now,' continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war.'" Mr. Lincoln continued: "The wisdom of the view of the secretary of state struck me with great force. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, waiting for a victory. Well, the next news we had was of Pope's disaster at Bull Run. Things looked darker than ever. Finally came the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers' Home. Here I finished writing; the second draft of the proclamation; came up on, Saturday; called the cabinet together to hear it; and it was published the following Monday. I made a solemn vow before God that, if General Lee was driven back from Maryland, I would crown the result by the declaration of freedom to the slaves."—Carpenter's Six Months in the White House.

* The battle of Antietam, it is but just to notice, had a most important effect in determining the promulgation of the war policy which the National government had at this time under consideration. President Lincoln himself tells the story. "It had got to be," said he, "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we were pursuing: that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game. I now determined upon the emancipation policy; and without consulting with, or the knowledge of, the cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a cabinet meeting on the subject. This was the last of July or the first part of the month of August, 1862. This cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. ** Nothing was offered that I had not already fully anticipated and settled in my mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance: 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government—a cry for help; the government stretching
Capturing Chambersburg in that State, he destroyed a large quantity of supplies, burning machine shops, trains of cars, and other property; and then, having made a complete circuit around McClellan's army, he re-entered Virginia by crossing the Potomac below him. This raid of Stuart roused public indignation to its highest pitch. It was regarded as an open insult to the National army; and it was felt that the Confederates had made good their boast, by carrying war into the free States. Still McClellan remained inactive. There was no forward movement. Again, on the 21st, Halleck telegraphed: "The president does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity." McClellan could not move before the 1st of November. Then he did move; but it was too late. On the 7th of that month there was a heavy snow-storm. It was a sure sign that winter was at hand. Lincoln's patience was at last exhausted—his forbearance had given way; he had already taken action; and on the night of that day, while at Rectortown, on his southward march towards Gordonsville, McClellan received instructions to turn over the command of the army to General Burnside.
CHAPTER XXI.

and the National Government.—Bad Blood.—Blame on Both Sides.—McClellan's Love for the Army of the Potomac.—The Army Again on the March.—McClellan's Plan.—A Storm.—McClellan's Removal.—Burnside in Command.—Reconstruction of the Army.—Burnside's Order.—His Plan.—McClellan's Plan Abandoned.—On to Fredericksburg.—Halleck and Meigs.—The Pontoon Difficulty.—Who Were to Blame?—Falmouth.—Fredericksburg.—Stafford Heights.—Marye's Heights.—Description of the Country.—Topography of the Position.—Aquia Creek.—Sumner at Falmouth.—The River Impassable.—No Pontoons.—An Unfortunate Delay.—Lee's Activity.—Position of the Confederate Army.—Marye's Heights Impregnable.—Arrival of the Pontoons.—Precious Time Lost.—Five Bridges.—The Morning of the 11th.—The Confederate Sharpshooters and the Pontoniers.—Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Construct the Bridges.—A Cannonade.—The Sharpshooters Dislodged.—The Bridges Completed.—The National Army Across the Rappahannock.—Preparations for Battle.—Both Armies in Line.—A Glance at Lee's Position.—The Disposition of his Troops.—Burnside's Position.—His Plan of Attack.—The Night of the 12th.—Burnside Changes his Mind.—His Delay in Giving Orders.—His Order to Franklin.—Franklin Perplexed, but Obedient.—The Attack on the Left.—The Gallantry of Meade and his Pennsylvanians.—Gibbon and Doubleday.—An Artillery Duel.—Meade Penetrates the First Confederate Line.—His Difficulty.—A Terrific Struggle.—Fearful Slaughter.—Meade Driven Back.—Arrival of Birney.—The Confederate Line Closed.—Miracles of Valor.—Bad Management.—The Attack on the Right.—General Sumner Advances.—French and Hancock.—Marye's Hill.—The Plank Road.—The Stone Wall.—Bravery of the National Troops.—Terrific Slaughter.—The Jaws of Death.—French's and Hancock's Divisions Cut to Pieces.—The Confederate Position Impregnable.—Burnside Orders Hooker to Advance.—Hooker Remonstrates.—Burnside Obstinate.—"That Crest Must be Taken To-Night."—Useless Slaughter.—Hooker's Own Account.—The Darkness.—The Battle of Fredericksburg Ended.—A Confederate Victory.—Burnside's Blunders.—He Alone Responsible.—Retreats Across the River.—Preparations for Another Attack.—Disaffection and Distrust.—The Proposed Attack Countermanded.—Burnside Offers to Resign.—The Resignation Not Accepted.—Change of Plan.—Another Attack About to be Made.—A Fearful Storm.—The Elements.—The "Mud March."—The Enterprise Abandoned.—The Army Back in the Old Camps.—Public Indignation.—Burnside Dissatisfied with his Subordinates.—Relieved of Command.—Franklin Removed.—Sumner Relieved.—Hooker in Command.

The battle of Antietam was fought on the 17th of September. It was not until the beautiful month of October was all but passed that any active, forward movement was made by the army of the Potomac. It is not necessary to dwell at any length on the causes of this extraordinary and, as the result proved, unfortunate delay. It is probable that the exact truth concerning this matter will never be known. It is certain that much precious time was wasted in useless correspondence between the National commander and the authorities at Washington. Bad blood most unquestionably existed; and the ill-concealed jealousies and enmities of individuals contributed not a little to increase that burden of sorrow and suffering under which the people were already groaning. We are not disposed to entirely acquit McClellan. But we are as little disposed to acquit the National government. The former was, no doubt, too exacting in his demands for supplies and rein
forcement. Poorly equipped as his army was at this period, it was not for a moment to be put in comparison in this respect with the army of Lee, whose men were shoeless and half-naked. Nor was there any good reason for insisting that the reinforcements and supplies should be forwarded at once, and before the onward movement commenced; for surely they could be sent after him. On the other hand there was, on the part of the Washington officials, a too manifest disposition to dictate, to disregard the demands and to ignore the wishes of the commander in the field. There was, in fact, a mutual distrust, which had grown into dislike. There was blame on both sides. McClellan was self-willed; and the authorities were officious. It might have been better for McClellan's fame to-day if, when at this stage, he found that he could not get on amicably with the War Department, he had resigned his position. It was known that he was deeply attached to the army of the Potomac, and that he was proud to be its chief. It had grown up under his own eye; it had reached maturity and attained perfection under his own watchful care. His Gallic legions were not more dear to Caesar; the grand army of the empire was not more dear to Napoleon, than was the army of the Potomac to McClellan. His resignation would have fallen like a thunderclap on the army and on the people. It would have disarmed suspicion wherever suspicion existed; and it would have proclaimed to all the world that his motives were pure and noble, and his actions disinterested. As it was, patriotism or ambition impelled him in a different course.

On the 6th of October, instructions were received from Washington to move at once. He was to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South. "Your army must now move, while the roads are good." It was the 26th, when the first movement was made in obedience to this order; and it was not until the 2d of November that McClellan was able to announce that his whole army was once more in Virginia, prepared to move southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge, instead of pursuing Lee up the Shenandoah Valley, on the western side of those mountains. By the 4th the National army, reinforced by the divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles from Washington, were in possession of the entire region east of the Blue Ridge, with several of the passes through the mountains, from Harper's Ferry to Paris. On the 6th, McClellan's headquarters were at Rectortown, near Front Royal. The Confederates, meanwhile, were steadily falling back. The spectacle, at this time presented, was that of two great armies moving in parallel lines, the mountain chain of the Blue Ridge between them, the objective point in both cases being the same. It was a race for Richmond. Everything depended on despatch. The race was eagerly watched. Would not McClellan, with his superior force and ample supplies, outrun his opponent, and, by gaining
his front, strike him there and also on the flank, through the gaps in the hills? Such was the question put by many. As usual, Lee was too quick for his opponent. Anticipating some such movement, he had hurried Longstreet forward; and on the very day that McClellan’s army crossed the Potomac, that general, having pushed his way over the Blue Ridge, was at Culpepper Court House, and ready to resist the advance of the Nationals on the Confederate capital. There was still an opportunity for McClellan. By a rapid and vigorous movement, he might cut Lee’s army in two, and destroy it in detail. But there was distrust of McClellan at Washington; and at this critical moment it was determined to displace him. On the 5th of November, an order was issued from the War Department, relieving him of the command of the army of the Potomac, and appointing General Burnside in his place—McClellan being required to report himself at Trenton, New Jersey. This order was placed in the hands of General Buckingham. On the night of the 7th, during a heavy snow-storm, when General Burnside happened to be in McClellan’s tent at Rectortown, Buckingham arrived, and placed the despatch in McClellan’s hands. After reading it, and without betraying any emotion, he handed it to Burnside, simply remarking, “Burnside, you command the army.” The news was as unwelcome to Burnside as it was to McClellan. The position had been offered him twice before; but Burnside, having, as we have seen in a previous chapter, a high opinion of McClellan’s ability, being a warm, personal friend, and being, besides, distrustful of himself, had, in both instances, modestly declined the proffered honor. He had not changed his mind. It was not until the 10th, after having received peremptory orders from Washington, and being warmly encouraged by his friends, that he consented to assume the responsibilities of general-in-chief of the army of the Potomac. “I’ll try,” he said, evidently intimating that he had a secret distrust of his own fitness for so responsible a position. In view of the actual situation, and without having any regard to the disasters which so speedily followed, the removal of General McClellan, at this particular juncture, must be pronounced unfortunate and ill-timed. He ought to have been removed at an earlier date, or not until he had had another opportunity of measuring his strength with his antagonist.

McClellan made immediate preparations for departure. He took leave of his troops in the following words:


OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC:

An order of the president devolves upon Major-General Burnside the command of this army. In parting from you, I cannot express the love and gratitude I bear to you. As an army, you have grown up in my care. In you I have never found doubt or coldness. The battles you have fought under my command will probably live in our nation’s history. The glory you have
achieved over mutual perils and fatigues; the graves of our comrades fallen in battle and by disease; the broken forms of those whom wounds and sickness have disabled—the strongest associations which can exist among men unite us by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades in supporting the Constitution of our country and the nationality of its people.

"Geo. B. McClellan,
"Major-General U. S. A."

On Monday, the 9th, General McClellan visited the different camps, reviewed the troops, and took a final leave of officers and men. The leave-taking showed that, whatever his defects of character, or whatever were the blunders he committed, he had not lost the respect and confidence of his men. As the general, "mounted upon a fine horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military men, riding rapidly through the ranks, gracefully recognized and bade a farewell to the army, the cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond bounds—wild, impassioned, and unrestrained. Disregarding all military forms, they rushed from their ranks and thronged around him, with the bitterest complaints against those who had removed from command their beloved leader." On the next day he withdrew, taking the cars to Warrenton. On reaching the junction, a salute was fired. The troops assembled at that point actually broke their ranks, through their eagerness to see him and to obtain a few parting words. While on the platform, he said, "I wish you to stand by General Burnside, as you have stood by me, and all will be well. Good-bye." At Bristow Station and at Manassas Junction, the same scenes were repeated; and the cheering was loud and enthusiastic.

On assuming the duties of general-in-chief, Burnside issued the following order:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac,"

Nov. 10, 1862.

"In accordance with General Orders No. 182, issued by the president of the United States, I hereby assume command of the army of the Potomac. Patriotism, and the exercise of my every energy in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty co-operation of its officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success.

"Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery of the old army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume command.

"To the ninth army corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I need say nothing. Our histories are identical. With diffidence for myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination of the gallant army now entrusted to my care, I accept its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail.

"A. E. Burnside,
"Major-General Commanding."
Burnside did not make any attempt to carry out McClellan's plan of attack, which was, by a rapid march upon Gordonsville, to interpose between Lee's divided forces and beat them in detail. The truth is, the opportunity for doing this was already lost. With consent of Halleck, who made a visit to the army, he adopted a new plan of operations. The capture of Richmond, rather than the destruction of Lee's army, was now to be his objective. Some precious time was wasted in reorganizing the army. It was now 120,000 strong. In place of the old arrangement of corps with subordinate divisions, Burnside divided his entire force into three grand divisions, each consisting of two corps. The right was placed under the command of General Sumner, the left under General Franklin, and the centre under General Hooker, while a large body of reserve was commanded by General Sigel. Burnside had his headquarters at Warrenton. The National plan of attack, as stated by Burnside himself, was to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton, to make a movement across the Rappahanock as a feint, with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and leading him to believe that an attack was about to be made in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to move the whole army rapidly to Fredericksburg, on the southern side of the Rappahanock.

Such being the general plan, the mouth of Acquia Creek, where it empties into the Potomac, was established as the basis of supplies. Piers and roads were constructed; and immense quantities of stores were sent thither to meet the wants of so large a body of men. The bridges across the Rappahanock, in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg, had all been destroyed; and, in carrying out the proposed plan, it would be necessary to throw pontoon bridges across at various points. In connection with this matter, there was some sad bungling—bungling which, if it did not lead to the defeat of the National army, at least gave the Confederates time to discover Burnside's plan, and to prepare to meet him on his own chosen ground. This whole affair is so mixed up that it is difficult, if not impossible, to get at the exact truth. It does appear that when Commander-in-Chief Halleck and Quartermaster-General Meigs were at Warrenton, Burnside expressed to them the necessity for having the pontoon material sent on from Washington without delay. It was understood that Halleck and Meigs sent the necessary instructions to Washington regarding the pontoons. It is certain that General Burnside felt satisfied that this matter had been attended to, and that the instructions would be faithfully and promptly carried out. It is stated on reliable authority that General Woodbury, who commanded the engineer brigade which had charge of the pontoon equipage, received no instructions as to the time it was required to be at Acquia Creek, or the part it was to play in the campaign; that he called upon General Halleck on the 14th, telling him that, if the date of the arrival of the pontoons was to coin-
FATAL DELAY.

cede with the arrival of the army at Fredericksburg, the departure of the latter from Warrenton should be delayed for at least five days; and that Halleck, while not yet giving any positive instructions regarding the transport of the pontoon equipage, not only refused to grant the delay, but even neglected to communicate Woodbury’s remarks to Burnside. It was a badly managed business, and led to lamentable results, as the reader will soon perceive; and, while Burnside cannot be held wholly guiltless, the evidence lays the burden of blame on Halleck and Meigs.

On the 14th of November, orders were given for the march from Warrenton to Falmouth. Sumner, who was the first to start, set out on the morning of the 15th, and arrived at Falmouth on the 17th. This village is situated on the left or northern bank of the Rappahannock. At this point, the river meets a line of steep hills, and describing an angle, changes its course from east to southeast. The hills on the right bank, known by the name of Marye’s Heights, recede from the river a little above the angle, and then descend gradually towards a small plain, on which, and close to the river’s edge, stands the town of Fredericksburg, a little below Falmouth. The hills on the Falmouth side command the south bank and much of the distance—a mile and a half—toward the frowning hills beyond. But these heights equally command the intermediate plain, and are beyond the reach of guns planted on the north side of the river. When Sumner arrived at Falmouth, he discovered that on the opposite bank of the river there were only one battery and a few detachments of infantry and cavalry. He had but little difficulty in silencing the battery. Fredericksburg, in fact, was at his mercy and he might with ease have taken possession of Marye’s Heights—the key of the position. The pontoons had not yet arrived; but the water in the Rappahannock was low, and the fords, although not free from difficulty and danger, were not impassable. Sumner was willing and even anxious to make the attempt; but he was positively forbidden to cross the river until the arrival of the other troops. “I think,” said Sumner in his testimony, “that I could have taken that city, and heights on the other side of it, at any time within three days after my arrival here [Falmouth], if the pontoons had been here; for I do not think there was much force of the enemy here up to that time.” Sumner was thus compelled to remain inactive. Burnside, with Franklin’s grand division, reached Falmouth on the 19th. Hooker, on the same day, arrived at the village of Harwood; and, yielding to the same impulses which controlled Sumner, he expressed a desire to his chief to cross the river above Fredericksburg, and occupy Marye’s Heights. But the same reasons which hindered Sumner’s action, hindered that of Hooker. There were no pontoons; and by this time heavy rains had swollen the river, making the fords impassable.

While the National army was thus compelled to remain comparatively in-
active on the northern side, what was taking place at Fredericksburg and the heights beyond? The movement of Sumner on the 15th had been quickly reported to Lee. He had also been informed of the arrival of several transports at Acquia Creek. He was not slow to divine the meaning of the movements of his antagonist. The feeble demonstrations made at Culpepper could not deceive him. Fredericksburg, he saw at a glance, was the objective point. Towards Fredericksburg, therefore, he directed his attention. Longstreet’s corps had been at Culpepper since the 3d. Lee ordered them to strike their camp, and started with them for Fredericksburg. On his arrival, he found McLaws in quiet possession of the heights commanding the town; and while the Nationals were still barred by the impassable river, he proceeded with all haste to take full advantage of his splendid position. On Nov. 22, Burnside and his division commanders had the mortification to see the opposite heights—the object of their ambition, the vantage ground on which they had set their hearts—crowned with the enemy’s batteries, and bristling with the enemy’s steel. It was a humiliating sight. Jackson was summoned from Orange Court House on the 26th. It was not until the 28th or 29th that he rejoined Lee, Up until that date Burnside’s opportunity lasted. If he could have crossed the river, he might have whipped Lee, and taken possession of Marye’s Heights before the arrival of Jackson. But the opportunity could not be taken advantage of. The pontoon equipages were not forward until the 25th; and it was the 10th of December before all things were ready for throwing the bridges across the river. The hills behind Fredericksburg had by this time been rendered impregnable. It was a fatal delay—the most fatal since the commencement of the war.

Burnside had not, however, been wholly idle. The Confederates, as has been stated, had destroyed the railroad between Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. The bridges were all broken down or burned; and the track in many places was torn up. The National engineers had succeeded in restoring the bridges—one of these, built under the superintendence of Colonel Haupt over the Potomac Creek, being four hundred feet in length and one hundred feet above the water, commanding especial attention; and the line was put in good working order. Arrangements had been made to cross the river at Skinker’s Neck, twelve miles below Falmouth, with the view of turning the Confederate right; but the ever-vigilant Lee discovered the movement in time to show himself fully prepared. Burnside was checkmated, and the enterprise was abandoned. As early as the 21st of November, Sumner had made a call on the mayor of Fredericksburg to surrender that town; but the reply was promptly made that, while it would not be used for offensive purposes against the National army, any attempt to occupy it would be stubbornly resisted. The result of this correspondence was that the
Inhabitants, dreading a bombardment, for the most part left the city, Barksdale's sharpshooters distributing themselves behind the deserted buildings near the river. Meanwhile, Lee's army, some 80,000 strong, had been well brought forward; and at the end of November, it lay in a semicircle around Fredericksburg, each wing resting on the river—its right at Port Royal, below the city, and its left a short distance above it. His engineers had constructed in the rear of the city two lines of fortifications, one mile apart; and the range of hills to his left were also well fortified.

In the meantime the pontoons had arrived; and Burnside, on the evening of the 10th, made the necessary arrangements to have the bridges thrown across early on the following morning. About four o'clock on the cold, raw morning of the 11th of December, and amidst a dense fog, the work was commenced. Five bridges were to be constructed—three immediately in front of Fredericksburg, and the other two a couple of miles below. The two lower bridges were to be used by Franklin; those in front of the town by Sumner and Hooker. The topography of the river shores, as we have already indicated, offered facilities for carrying out the enterprise. Stafford Heights, on the Falmouth side, and on which the Nationals were encamped, were close to the margin of the river, which at this point is about three hundred yards wide. These heights were crowned with twenty-nine powerful batteries, numbering 147 guns.

Lee's batteries, on the other hand, were from three fourths of a mile to a mile and a half from the banks. But for the sharpshooters, who had found secure lodgment behind the stone walls of the river street of the town, there would have been but little difficulty experienced in throwing across the pontoons. The National army was posted along the north bank of the Rappahannock—Hooker and Sumner in front of Fredericksburg, Sumner more to the right; Franklin about two miles below. Burnside had his headquarters at the house of a Mr. Phillips, on the high ground, about a mile from the river; and from that commanding position, he had a full view of the whole field of operations. On the morning of the 11th, as we have seen, before day-break, the work was commenced. For a time it went quietly on, the workmen being covered by the Fifty-Seventh and Sixty-Sixth New York, of Zook's brigade, of Hancock's division. The bridges below Fredericksburg were constructed without much hindrance; but those in front of the town were now exposed to the Confederate sharpshooters. One of these latter bridges was well-nigh completed, when the Confederates discovered what was going on. Two signal guns were fired; and from behind the walls along the banks of the river, and from the windows of the houses, a galling fire of musketry was opened upon the pontoons, who were compelled to desist and fall back to the shelter of the hills. The work was resumed about six o'clock. The Confederate fire became
more severe, the bullets falling like hail among the brave pontoniers. It was impossible to continue the work. Again it was necessary to fall back to the shelter of the hills which ran parallel with the river. Burnside now became impatient. The sharpshooters must be silenced and driven from their hiding-places. Orders were given that the batteries on Stafford Heights should open fire on the town, and batter it down, if necessary. The response was prompt and terrific. More than a hundred guns opened their angry mouths at once. Fifty rounds were fired before the cannonade ceased. The shot told on the buildings, battering many of them down, and setting some of them on fire. Another attempt was now made, under cover of this fire, to finish the bridges; but the sharpshooters, strange to say, were still on the river’s bank, and concealed behind the stone walls. A third time were the pontoniers compelled to fall back. The sharpshooters must be dislodged. Volunteers were called for; when the Seventh Michigan, and Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, of Howard’s division, offered their services. They were quickly conveyed across the stream; and in a brief space of time the Mississippian sharpshooters were driven from their shelter, and nearly 100 of them made prisoners. The bridges were soon completed.

As soon as the bridges were in a fit state to be used, Sumner’s grand division, and a portion of Hooker’s, were over before dark at the upper bridges; Franklin’s grand division crossed at the lower. The movement was resumed on the morning of the 12th; and on the evening of that day, the greater portion of the National army was on the south side of the Rappahannock, and in full possession of Fredericksburg. During the afternoon, fire was opened on the town by the Confederate batteries on the heights nearest the town. The Nationals made a brisk response, and the firing was discontinued. It was Lee’s purpose to tempt the Nationals to attack him on the heights, where he knew he was all but impregnable. Had he given them more annoyance in the city, as he could easily have done, this purpose might have failed. A full revelation of his strength might have led to the recrossing of the river. Lee succeeded in his plan. Burnside made immediate arrangements for an assault on the Confederate position.

We have already endeavored to give the reader a general idea of the ground on which the struggle was about to take place. We have seen that the town of Fredericksburg lay on a stretch of level ground on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and that, at the distance of half a mile or a little more in rear of the town, the ground begins to rise in sharp slopes, until it forms a sort of table land, with two ridges, the more remote ridge being the higher of the two. These heights were generally known by the name of Marye’s Heights, although special names were given to particular prominences. The heights, which are from three quarters of a mile to a mile and a half in the rear of
Fredericksburg, and which completely command the town, had been rendered impregnable. A little to the south of Marye's Heights there is another, but more irregular, range of hills, running for some distance due south, then trending to the southeast, in the direction of the Massaponax, when they follow the line of that stream to the Rappahannock. On these hills there were some strong natural positions, particularly what was afterwards called Lee's Hill, at the northern extremity; Prospect Hill, at the extreme south; and Bernard's Cabin, not far from the centre. The ground in the rear of this irregular range was well wooded, thus affording good shelter for the troops which might be in possession. Along the front of this ridge ran the Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad. In consequence of the recession of the hills towards the middle of the range, the plain, which extends from Fredericksburg to the Massaponax, and from the base of the hills to the Rappahannock, acquires considerable dimensions. In addition to the railroad just mentioned, there runs through the entire length of this plain the old Richmond Road. Every available spot on this range of hills, as on Marye's Heights, although the batteries were not so crowded, was covered with cannon. Distributed along this line, and guarding every approach, was Lee's army of 80,000 men, with 300 pieces of artillery. Jackson was on the right; Longstreet on the left; Stuart, with cavalry and artillery, on the plain on the extreme right. In his rear Lee had cut a new road, by means of which he was able, without making a long detour through a bad country, to connect both wings of his army. The National army was lying on the southwest side of the Rappahannock, in the same position in which the divisions had crossed—Sumner and Hooker at the town of Fredericksburg, and Franklin about two miles below. Such were the relative positions of the two armies on the night of the 12th and the morning of the 13th. Burnside's army, which was over 120,000 strong, outnumbered that of Lee; but Lee had the advantage of position. His army, which was stretched out in a sort of semicircle, not only commanded the open space in front—it flanked it.

Everything was now ready for the attack. The Confederates, however, were not less prepared than the Nationals. Jackson had arrived on the field; and Longstreet had been enabled to close his lines on the left. On the afternoon of the 12th, A. P. Hill had relieved Hood, and taken position along the margin of the woods, on the Confederate right, from Hamilton's Crossing to Bernard's Cabin. Hood lay on the heights, between Deep Run and Hazel Run. Pickett was stationed at the foot of the hills, near the centre, between Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road. McLaws was on the heights, to the left of Pickett; and Anderson's division, which was further to the left, rested on the river. The important point was Marye's Hill, the southernmost prominence of Marye's Heights, which commanded the Plank Road. This position, which was strongly fortified and
well mounted with guns, was placed under the immediate care of General Ransom. At the foot of the hill, on a road which was protected on the town side by a gray stone wall, were stationed Cobb's brigade and the Twenty-Fourth North Carolina. The redoubts on the crest of Marye's Hill were held by the Washington (New Orleans) artillery, under Colonel Walton. On the evening of the 12th, Burnside convened his officers, and submitted to them his plan of attack for the next morning. His purpose was to push forward his entire force which had crossed the river, and, by sudden and simultaneous attacks made along the whole line, to penetrate the Confederate ranks, and seize the fortified heights. The work was to be done by Franklin on the left and Sumner on the right. Hooker's grand division was to be held in reserve, so as to be ready for any emergency. After consultation, it was agreed that the main attack should be made upon the enemy's right; and to enable Franklin to do his part of the work with effect, his command was strengthened by the addition of two of Hooker's best divisions, making his whole force about 55,000 men. It was understood that Franklin would make the attack at dawn; but he was to receive positive instructions from the commanding-general before midnight. Sumner's attack, which was to be made more to the right of the Confederate position, in the neighborhood of Marye's Hill, was to be conditioned somewhat on the success which might attend Franklin's, but it was to be made almost immediately after. Such was the general understanding on the night of the 12th. Franklin waited anxiously for his orders. Midnight came and went; but there was no message from Burnside.

It was not until near six o'clock next morning that Burnside issued his orders to his three grand division commanders; and it was nearly eight o'clock before Franklin knew what was expected of him. As Franklin was greatly, but very unjustly, blamed for his conduct at Fredericksburg, it is well that the reader should be put in a position to judge for himself. Burnside's order to Franklin read as follows: "General Hardie will carry this despatch to you, and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond Road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division, or more, to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank Road to its intersection of the Telegraph Road, where they will divide with a view to seizing the heights on both these roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the pos.
sibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain as supports. Copies of instructions to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be sent to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once, as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.'" The order was signed by J. G. Parke, Chief of Staff.

Such were the instructions brought to Franklin on the morning of the 15th. They were not the instructions expected, and for which preparations had already been made. The new plan differed entirely from that agreed upon the night before. Puzzled and perplexed as Franklin was by this change of mind on the part of his chief, he had no choice but obey. It deserves to be borne in mind that Hardie, who brought the instructions, remained with Franklin, and was in constant communication with Burnside during the day. The general-commanding was, therefore, kept well informed of all that was going on, on his left. For the orders given to Sumner to attack at a time when Franklin was not yet seriously engaged, for all the subsequent orders of that day, and for the general plan of the battle, Burnside was wholly responsible. It is evident from this order that Burnside had concluded, at the last moment, not to make a vigorous assault with his entire strength both on the left and right of the enemy's position, but, in the first instance at least, to make, simultaneously, two partial and tentative efforts—one on the right and one on the left. Franklin made immediate preparations to carry out the order. Believing that he was to hold his command in readiness for a rapid movement on the old Richmond Road, and that he was to send out only an armed reconnaissance, with a single division, he ordered Reynolds to take Meade's division, and attack the point indicated. Meade's division was accordingly thrown forward. The other two divisions of the same corps—those of Gibbon and of Doubleday—were ordered to support Meade, the one on his right, the other on his left, but somewhat in the rear. Meade had under him about 5000 men; Doubleday had about the same number; and Gibbon had nearly 6000. Reynolds' disposable force was therefore, about 16,000 men. A heavy fog lay over the valley. So dense was it that neither army could be seen by the other. The Confederates, however, could distinctly hear the words of command given by the National officers. As the ground was exceedingly broken and irregular, the advance was conducted under great difficulty. It was now nearly ten o'clock. The fog began to clear off; and the columns of Meade which were well advanced beyond the road, came full into view of the Confederates. At this moment, Meade was assailed by a terrible storm of bullets at near range. He had come close upon Stuart's horse artillery, which were posted along the road, on the open ground, to the Confederate right.
Meade was now compelled to halt. For half an hour the battle raged fiercely. At the end of that time Doubleday came up to his relief. Doubleday deployed his men in front of Stuart; and Meade continued his advance. At this moment Doubleday was facing towards the left, while Meade was pressing towards the railroad which, at this point, skirts the edge of the wooded heights. Meade’s progress was uninterrupted. All was quiet on the heights and in the woods beyond. Not a sign of the foe was visible. The National artillery poured shell into the woods occupied by the division of A. P. Hill; but there was no response. Jackson was evidently reserving his fire until his antagonist came fully under his guns. Everything now depended upon dash and daring. Meade urged forward his men. On rushed the brave Pennsylvanians—troops which had covered themselves with glory at Beaver Dam and on the blood-stained field of Glendale. They rapidly approached the position occupied by Walker’s artillery at Prospect Hill. Suddently these guns open fire; the twelve guns at the Confederate left centre open fire at the same moment; and Meade finds himself alone, in the open space, exposed to the fire of two concentric batteries, the projectiles actually crossing each other in his ranks. The situation is perilous. There is a halt; and an attempt is made to silence the enemy’s guns. Gibbon deploys to the right of Meade. Birney, with his division, of Stoneman’s corps, is hurried forward to the relief of both. After a fearful artillery duel, the Confederate fire from the batteries on Prospect Hill, and those more to their left centre in front of the railroad, is considerably slackened. A decided advantage has been gained by the Nationals.

Reynolds now gives Meade the signal for attack. Though the ground is covered with dead and wounded, there is no time to halt and consider. On rush the Pennsylvanians—on in the face of the most destructive fire of shell and canister. The Confederate general, Brockenborough, is compelled to fall back. A powerful battery is silenced, and hurried to the rear. Rushing bravely on, Meade soon finds himself across the railroad, over the crest of the hill, with his advance, under Sinclair, as far as the new military road, which Lee had constructed for the purpose of uniting the wings of his army. The first line of the Confederates had been pierced. On the military road, the victorious Nationals come into contact with Gregg and his South Carolina veterans. Unprepared for so vigorous an attack, and mistaking Meade’s men for Confederate soldiers, Gregg forbids his own men to fire. In a moment he is undeceived. There is a terrific discharge of musketry. Orr’s rifles, the most exposed regiment of the Confederate line, is almost annihilated; and Gregg himself has fallen, mortally wounded.

It is a critical moment. If Meade is well sustained, he may succeed in penetrating the second line of the enemy—thus cutting the Confederate army in two. In such a case, Burnside’s first object will have been accomplished;
and victory, it is not improbable, may crown his efforts. But Meade has been brave almost overmuch; he is far in advance of his supports; and his brave Pennsylvanians are utterly exhausted. No help is within reach. Doubleday is on the Richmond Road; Gibbon has allowed himself to be stopped at the left of Hill’s line, near the railroad; and Birney still lingers in the rear. Franklin’s headquarters are far distant from the scene of action; and being desirous to carry out the instructions he has received, he is fearful to engage the greater portion of his forces. Left thus to himself, Meade is unable to make good the advantage he has gained. The Confederates, having re-formed, fall upon his wearied troops in front with great weight, and with tremendous fury. It was already a most unequal combat. While thus attacked in front, and while his men were reeling and staggering under the vigorous onslaughts of the rapidly multiplying Confederates, Early came dashing up, with Ewell’s division, and struck Meade’s flank as if with a thunderbolt. Resistance was no longer possible. The Nationals were driven back over the railroad in confusion, and with great loss, the Confederates pursuing, with loud yells, and flinging themselves on the guns which covered the retreat. Birney came forward in time to save Meade from destruction. The Confederates were forced back into the woods, with the loss of 500 men in killed and wounded. Birney, however, could not reopen the breach in the Confederate line. Meade could render no assistance; Gibbon’s men had suffered terribly, and he himself had been wounded; while Smith, who had been advanced more to the right, was too far removed to render any efficient aid. At two o’clock Reynolds held the railroad; but he was not strong enough to make any attempt upon the woods. All that Meade had won was lost—hopelessly lost; and yet Franklin had under him some 30,000 men who had never been engaged. Never, during the world’s history, was there displayed more gallantry; but never was gallantry displayed to so little purpose. Meade performed miracles of valor; and the future hero of Gettysburg was already revealed. Franklin, overfaithful, and too rigidly obedient to rule, lost his opportunity—an opportunity which rarely falls to the lot of a division commander, and which was never to be his again. In strictly adhering to his orders, he did that which was right; but a little more willingness to incur risk, and to share responsibility, might have made him the hero of Fredericksburg; and the future captain of the Northern hosts.

Let us now see what was taking place on the right. While the thick fog was still resting heavily on the valley, Sumner’s forces were already moving towards the artillery-crowned heights in the rear of the city. Marye’s Heights we have already described. There were three prominences, all of which were well mounted with cannon—Marye’s Hill to the south, and commanding the Plank Road; Cemetery Hill towards the centre; and Stansbury Hill further
to the north. Burnside's plan, it will be remembered, was to throw upon the Plank Road and Telegraph Road a column of equal strength with that which was to make the attack on the left, his expectation being that he would thus make himself master of the entire range of hills, those on his right as well as those on his left. Of Sumner's grand division, Couch's corps (the Second) occupied the town of Fredericksburg; and Wilcox's (the Ninth) occupied the interval between Couch and Franklin. Couch was to have the honor of making the first attack. It was now nearing the noontide. The mist had just cleared off the valley. Burnside, who was still at the Phillips House, on the northern side of the river, and who had reserved to himself the direction of the battle on his right, gave the signal for attack; and French's division, of Couch's corps, composed of the brigades of Kimball, Anderson and Palmer, was seen to emerge from Fredericksburg into the open plain. The Confederate batteries on Marye's Hill had already opened fire upon the town. As French's columns advanced, the Confederate guns on the heights were lowered; and the shot and shell fell thick and fast into his serried ranks. French's division was followed at some little distance by that of Hancock; and Howard's division was held in reserve. An attempt was made by the National artillery on Stafford Heights to silence the batteries on Marye's Hill; but the distance was so great that the shot fell short, and threatened to do more damage to friend than foe. The firing on the part of the National artillery on the northern side of the river was, therefore, discontinued. So terrific was the fire from Marye's Hill that Couch's field-pieces could not be advanced. On, however, rushed the brave Nationals—French in front, Hancock following close behind. It was a rush into the jaws of death. Longstreet has told us that the gaps made by the artillery could be seen half a mile away. French's soldiers had approached within fifty paces of the stone wall at the base of Marye's Hill. As they rushed forward, they were received with a murderous volley. The first line was reduced to a handful of men. The two brigades which followed were brought to a standstill; and, after a single discharge, they retired, leaving nearly one half of their comrades on the ground. Hancock was now in the front; and, being joined by such portions of French's command as had not been broken and disorganized, he rushed towards the stone wall. It was a terrific struggle Bullet, ball and shell, like a tempest of iron, mowed down his ranks, while the triumphant Confederates, safe behind their strong bulwark, shouted and yelled in fierce delight. Again and again did Meagher dash his gallant Irishmen against the stone wall. As often, torn and bleeding and reduced in numbers, were they driven back. Fifteen minutes had elapsed since Hancock advanced to the front. His division, like that of French, had been cut to pieces. Of 5600 veterans whom he led into action, he had lost over 2000, of whom 156 were officers. The slaughter was terrible.
Hancock in turn was compelled to fall back; but the battle was not discontinued. Howard hurried forward to lend what aid he could on Hancock's right. Sturgis and Getty crossed Hazel Run, with two brigades, and endeavored to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack on the right of his position. It was all in vain. These attempts only increased the number of victims. They did not in any material way affect the enemy. It was now about half-past one. On the left, Meade had just been driven out of the Hamilton Wood, and back over the railroad. Burnside's plan had failed. The two independent attacks had been made; they had been sustained with great vigor, and with indomitable pluck; but they had only revealed the strength of the enemy's position. It was time to desist. To prolong the struggle was useless. It was worse than useless—it was murder.

Such, however, was not the opinion of Burnside. Orders were sent to Franklin to renew the assault, and this time with all his forces, the avowed object being so to engage the enemy's attention as to facilitate a new attack on the right. Hooker, at the same time, was ordered forward to repeat the attack where French and Hancock had vainly sacrificed their splendid divisions. The experience of that morning had irritated, not enlightened, the general in command. Burnside, in fact, was ignorant of the situation. He was still at the Phillips House. He saw the battle only from afar; and he had but a dim notion of the strength of the enemy's position, and of the terrible sacrifices which he himself had uselessly made. His eye was fixed on Marye's Hill—alternately girt with flame, and wreathed with smoke. He knew the importance of the position; but he forgot, for the time, the deadly havoc which that incessant and well-directed fire was producing among his troops. Striding up and down the terrace, proof against all advice, and as if lost to all reason, he kept repeating, mechanically, "That crest must be carried to-night."

No one has ever had the hardihood to accuse Hooker of cowardice. During the peninsular campaign at Williamsburg, and in all the subsequent battles before Richmond, in almost every one of which he performed a brilliant part, he had acquired the name of "Fighting Joe." Hooker did not hesitate to obey the orders he had received from his chief. Taking with him the divisions of Sykes and Humphreys, of Butterfield's corps, he advanced to the attack. As soon, however, as he saw the positions he was ordered to take, and heard from their own lips the experience of French and Hancock, he became convinced that the attempt was vain, and sent an aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief for a counter-order. Burnside, however, was inflexible. "That crest must be carried to-night." Hooker, unwilling to fling away the lives of his brave men, hurried across the river, and saw his chief in person. It was all in vain. Burnside would listen to no advice. The only answer which Hooker could get from him was, "That height must be carried this evening."
An hour and a half had thus been lost. On the National left, the fighting had not been resumed with any degree of vigor. Franklin’s forces were scattered over an extended line. It would be dangerous to leave any one point undefended. Even if it were safe to concentrate, it would be night before it could be accomplished; and to make any fresh attack with a portion of his forces would only be useless slaughter. About three o’clock, the Confederates made a vigorous attack on the left of Howe’s division, which was posted along the railroad. The attack was speedily repulsed, one of the Confederate regiments—the Fifty-Seventh North Carolina—being almost annihilated. With this exception, the fighting was virtually ended on the National left, when Birney came to the relief of Meade, and reclaimed the railroad. Musketry firing was kept up along the whole line; but there was no engagement.

It was now four o’clock. The brief December daylight would soon be succeeded by the dense December darkness. Hooker had returned to the field. Burnside’s orders were positive. The attack must be made at once. How the attack was made, and with what success, Hooker has told us himself. “I proceeded,” he says, “against the barrier as I would against a fortification, and endeavored to breach a hole sufficiently large for a ‘forlorn hope’ to enter. Before that, the attack along the line, it seemed to me, had been too general—not sufficiently concentrated. I had two batteries posted on the left of the road, within four hundred yards of the position upon which the attack was to be made, and I had other parts of batteries posted on the right of the road, at the distance of five hundred or six hundred yards. I had all these batteries playing with great vigor until sunset upon that point, but with no apparent effect upon the rebels or upon their works. During the last part of the cannonading, I had given directions to General Humphrey’s division to form under the shelter, which a small hill afforded, in column for assault. When the fire of the artillery ceased, I gave directions for the enemy’s works to be assaulted. General Humphrey’s men took off their knapsacks, overcoats and haversacks. They were ordered to make the assault with empty muskets, for there was no time then to load and fire. When the word was given, the men moved forward with great impetuosity. They ran and hurrahed, and I was encouraged by the great good feeling that pervaded them. The head of General Humphrey’s column advanced to perhaps within fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, which was the advanced position held by the rebels, and then they were thrown back as quickly as they had advanced. Probably the whole of the advance, and the retiring, did not occupy fifteen minutes. They left behind, as was reported to me, 1760 of their number, out of 4000.” It was now twilight. Hooker, to use his own words, having lost “about as many men as he was ordered to sacrifice,” gave the signal for retreat. Darkness came and prevented a further useless
sacrifice of life. A few hours more of daylight, and Jackson might have fallen upon Franklin with tremendous energy. It is hardly possible that he could have won; but the attack must have resulted in a heavy loss of life. The battle of Fredericksburg was ended. To the National cause, it was one of the most disastrous battles of the war. To the Confederate cause, it was a great triumph; but the triumph was more in seeming than in reality, for Lee, either from inability or from fear, failed to turn it to account.

According to the reports of the division commanders, the National loss was over 13,000. Franklin had lost 4679. Sumner had lost 5494, and Hooker's loss was 3548. The killed numbered 1152; the wounded 9101; and there were 3234 missing. The Confederate loss did not exceed one half of these enormous figures.

The battle of Fredericksburg must ever be regarded as one huge blunder, so far as Burnside is concerned. For the battle ground chosen he, and he alone, was responsible. The plan he followed was not McClellan's plan; it was not the plan approved and recommended by the authorities at Washington; it was his own. He might have done better by pursuing Lee towards the Rapidan, than by occupying the heights of Falmouth. He gave the enemy his opportunity; and circumstances enabled the enemy to seize it. The pontoon mismanagement was the second grand blunder. It was the opinion of Burnside himself, and all his subordinates, that if the pontoons had arrived in time to allow him to transfer his army to the south side of the Rappahannock, before Lee had time to concentrate his forces and fortify the heights, the battle of Fredericksburg might never have been fought, or, if fought, the result would have been entirely different. For the pontoon mismanagement Burnside was not wholly responsible; but it was his business more than that of any other. On the prompt arrival of the pontoons everything depended; yet he treated this as a secondary matter, and left it entirely for some days in the hands of Halleck and Meigs, who regarded themselves as irresponsible. The non-arrival of the pontoons in time gave the Confederates the full advantage of a splendid position, and brought about the necessity that if a battle were to be fought at all on the chosen ground, it must be fought by the Nationals at a terrible disadvantage. It would have been better far, however humiliating for the moment it might have seemed, if Burnside, after he knew that the heights on the opposite side of the river were all but, if not absolutely, impregnable, had entirely abandoned his plan, and sought to meet the foe by a different course. Having decided to make the attack, he ought to have done it differently. His plan on the evening of the 12th was better than that on the morning of the 13th. He had changed his mind in the interval; but he had changed it for the worse. A general attack was hazardous. A partial attack was folly. The temporary success of Meade showed what might have been done if he had massed his troops
on his left, and encouraged Franklin to put forth his entire strength in one bold, dashing effort. He blundered again when he ordered Sumner to advance before he knew what success had attended Franklin on the left. He sinned against reason and common-sense when he forced Hooker to make the final attack. History will say that the army of the Potomac—one of the finest armies the world has ever known—was literally slaughtered through the incompetency of its chief.

The 14th was Sunday. It had been Dec. Burnside's intention to renew the attack in the morning. He found it impossible, however, to overcome the opposition of his chief officers, who regarded the enemy's lines as impregnable; and the order which had already been given was countermanded. During that day, and the next, the National army lay on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock; but on neither side was any evidence given of a disposition to attack.

During the night of the 15th, Burnside Dec. quietly withdrew his entire army, 15. with his guns, to the Falmouth side of the river; the pontoon bridges were also taken up; and Lee was permitted to enter and occupy Fredericksburg. It was not to be wondered at that Lee took advantage of the circumstance, to boast of a great victory. On the 16th, Dec. Burnside wrote to Halleck, the commander-in-chief, that the army was withdrawn to the Falmouth side of the river, because he felt that the position in front could not be carried, and because it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse, he said, would have been disastrous. The army was withdrawn at night without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men.

Burnside was still hopeful that he might be able to redeem the disaster which had befallen the National army. He had another plan ready. He proposed to make an immediate advance on Richmond. His plan was to make a feint above Fredericksburg, and to cross with the main body of the army about six miles below. Twenty-five thousand cavalry, with four guns, were to cross at Kelley's Ford, push towards the Rapidan, destroy the railroad tracks and bridges in the rear of Lee's army, destroy, also, the locks on the James River Canal, traverse Virginia, raiding as they advanced, and finally join the National garrison, then under Peck at Suffolk. Such was Burnside's plan. Unhappily for him and his plan, however, there was dissatisfaction among his subordinate officers. The bad management at Fredericksburg had produced a feeling of general distrust; and this distrust found free and full expression at Washington. Representations had been made to the president by Franklin and Smith, showing the utter folly and uselessness of any further attempts to cross the Rappahannock. They could only, they said, result in disaster. At the same time, two other generals—Newton and Cochrane—who happened to be in Washington, fully convinced the president of the bad temper which prevailed in the army of the
Potomac—a temper which did not justify any further movement for the present.

A fortnight had now elapsed since the battle of Fredericksburg. On the Dec. 30th of December, Burnside had completed his preparations for the onward movement; his cavalry were already at Kelley’s Ford, and his infantry were ready to start. The whole movement was suddenly stopped by an order from the president. Burnside hastened to Washington to demand an explanation. From the commander-in-chief and the secretary of war he could learn nothing. Ignorant of the cause themselves, they could not explain. The president, however, did not conceal his reasons for acting as he had done. Complaints against the general had been made by several prominent officers in the army. The complaints of these men were such that the president could not afford to ignore them. It was notorious that bad feeling existed among the officers and men; and while such was the state of things, he did not feel justified in sanctioning a forward movement. Burnside tendered his resignation; but this the president, having perfect faith in his loyalty and patriotism, refused to accept. The president desired him to remain in command of the army, but he was not to renew the campaign without his knowledge and consent. All these things led to delay. Much precious time was wasted; and what was even more to be lamented, the secret of Burnside’s plans had leaked out, and Lee was no longer ignorant of the intentions of his antagonist.

Burnside changed his plan. He now proposed to cross the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, at Banks’ and United States Fords, hoping to flank the enemy, and to force a battle. Permission was given him by the president to renew the campaign. It was now the 20th of January, 1863. Franklin and Hooker were at Banks’ Ford. At that point the river is not passable in winter time. The pontoons, however, had been brought up; and preparations were being made for throwing bridges across the swollen waters. It seemed, for the moment, as if fortune were smiling on Burnside. Some demonstrations made at a point a little further down had been attended with complete success. The weather, too, was good; and the roads were in excellent condition. On the night of the 20th, all these hopes were dissipated. A fearful storm of wind, snow, sleet and rain came on, such as is seldom seen in that region; it continued all night; and when morning dawned, the entire country was converted into a huge quagmire. The troops were for some hours hopelessly mired. They could neither retreat nor advance. Lee had already become aware of Burnside’s intention to cross the river, and was at the point of danger, ready to meet him. Burnside was not unwilling even yet to cross the river, and offer the enemy battle. It was found impossible, however, to construct the bridges. The greater the effort made by men and horses to push forward the vehicles containing the boats, the more hopelessly did they
sink in the soft, paste-like mud, with which the roads were covered. The rain continued during the whole of the 21st. It was still raining on the morning of the 22d. The three days' rations, with which the men had been supplied, were all but exhausted. The game was already lost; and the Confederates could again make the boast that the elements fought in their favor.

Jan. On the 23d, the army of the Potomac was in its former encampments, and in winter quarters. What was known at the time as the "Mud March" was ended.

At this crisis, the public mind was filled with indignation and sorrow. Not a little blame was attached to the president and his cabinet. The commander-in-chief was not held guiltless. The revelations made through the court of inquiry in the case of General McDowell, and the court martial on General Porter, had convinced the public that the government had intermeddled too much with the plans of the military leaders. Burnside had done much to save the president and his cabinet by publishing a letter, in which he assumed the entire responsibility of the plan, and the conduct of the attack on Fredericksburg. Some of the old feeling, however, still remained. At this time, Burnside became ill-satisfied with his generals; and, irritated and discouraged by this latest failure, and by the adverse criticisms which were freely made both by men and officers, he resolved to rid the army of the fomenters of dis-

cord. Among the officers aimed at were Generals Hooker, Brooks, Newton and Cochrane, whom he wished to be dismissed from the service of the United States; and Generals Franklin, Smith, Sturgis and Ferrers, with Colonel Taylor, whom he wished to be deprived of their respective commands. Hurrying to Washington, he asked the president to sign the order which he had already prepared. Of course the president refused. To have signed such an order would have ruined the army. It would have deprived it of some of its trusted and most competent leaders. Burnside then tendered his resignation of the command of the army of the Potomac, and also of his rank of major-general. He was relieved of command at his own request, but he retained his rank in the army. The same order which relieved Burnside, also relieved Franklin and Sumner. Franklin, somewhat unjustly, we think, had come under suspicion; and Sumner, who was broken down by age and infirmity, was relieved at his own request. Hooker was now the senior general of the army of the Potomac. He had shared its fortunes from the first. By his courage, skill and promptitude, he had won not a little renown. To him, therefore, was now assigned the dangerous honor of being its chief. The appointment was generally approved; and Hooker was well received by both officers and men. How the army fared under his command will form the subject of another chapter.
CHAPTER XXII.

Guerrilla Movements in the West.—General Curtis at Batesville.—Moving Eastward.—At Jacksonport.—National Gunboats.—White River.—St. Charles.—Clarendon.—Encounter with General Rust.—Condition of the National Army.—Sad Disappointment.—What was to be Done?—The March to Helena.—At Helena.—Arkansas and Missouri Unprotected.—General J. M. Schofield in Command in Missouri.—Attacks of the Guerrillas.—Political Feuds in Missouri.—Lincoln Complains.—Guerrilla Leaders.—Porter, Poindexter and Cobb.—General McNeil.—McNeil Attacked by Porter and Cobb.—Colonel Merrill.—Newark Captured.—Battle of Kirksville.—Poindexter Caught in a Trap.—Defeat of Cobb.—National Supremacy Restored North of the Missouri.—Capture of the Garrison at Independence.—Battle of Cross Roads.—Defeat of Foster.—Coffee's Retreat.—The Guerrillas in Arkansas.—Rains, Parsons, Cooper and McBride.—Hindman in Command of the Guerrillas.—The Ozark Mountains.—Schofield Takes the Field in Person.—The "Army of the Frontier."—Sarcoxie.—Blunt and Totten.—Fort Wayne.—The Confederates Attacked.—Fayetteville.—Boston Mountains.—Hindman Preparing to Attack the Nationals.—Cane Hill.—Illness of Schofield.—Blunt in Command.—Blunt About to be Attacked.—Herron Sent For.—Prairie Grove.—Battle of Prairie Grove.—Terrible Fighting.—Herron in Peril.—Arrival of Blunt.—The Confederates Defeated.—Hindman's Mistakes.—Blunt's Ride to Van Buren.—The Guerrillas in Texas.—The Loyalty of the Texans.—The Texan Martyrs.—Among the Indians.—Ta-ke-Quah.—Foris Davis and Gibson.—The Indian Encampments.—Colonel Phillips.—Phillips Attacked by Taylor.—Bayou Barnard.—Taylor Killed.—Attack by the Indians on New Ulm and the Agencies.—Horrible Butchery.—Swift Punishment.—Peace Established on the Frontier of Minnesota.

Towards the close of 1862, there were some engagements, in the western country, beyond the Mississippi, and east of the Rocky Mountains—engagements which, although not of first-class importance, or directly connected with any of the great, leading military movements, cannot, in a work of this kind, be passed over in silence. After the battle of Pea Ridge, described in a previous chapter, the Confederate general, Van Dorn, who, as we have seen, made a skilful and successful retreat, moved with the greater portion of his army down the Arkansas River as far as Little Rock, marched in an eastward direction, crossed the Mississippi at Helena, and joined the army of Beauregard almost in time to take part in the battle of Shiloh. General Curtis made no haste to pursue. On the field of victory he rested his men; and then, finding no foe in that part of Arkansas, he descended from the highlands into the vast plains below, and, moving in a southeasterly direction, reached, on the 6th of May, Batesville, a large village on the White River. Here he expected to find gunboats and supplies in charge of Colonel Fitch. But the siege of Corinth had not yet ended; and, in consequence, the White River and its tributaries were not yet open to the Federal flotilla. Curtis, not a little disappointed, remained at Batesville until the 24th of June, depending for his supplies by wagon trains from Rolla, far up in Missouri, and thus very much at the mercy of the guerrilla bands which infested the country. After the evacuation of Corinth, and the capture of Memphis, the Arkansas waters were
open to navigation; and several Federal gunboats proceeded up the White River.

**June 25.** On the 25th of June, Curtis, learning that the gunboats were coming up the river, started for Jacksonport. Here he was joined by General C. C. Washburne, with the Third Wisconsin cavalry, which had come down from Springfield, Missouri, without encountering any opposition. The gunboats, however, had not yet made their appearance. They had been detained further down the river, by an encounter with some Confederate batteries near St. Charles; and, although these works had been carried, the gunboats had been so damaged that they were unable to proceed further up. To add to their difficulties, the water in the river had become very low. Still hopeful that, if he could reach the gunboats, he might be able to turn them to some account in a joint movement against Little Rock, Curtis, with his whole army, pressed on towards Clarendon. He was the more anxious to reach the gunboats, that he knew they were accompanied by a brigade of infantry from Indiana. It was a wretched country through which they had to pass—a low, swampy region, intersected by canals or bayous, covered with canebrakes, and inhabited by a white population, who were entirely in sympathy with the Southern cause. On the 7th of July, while still in this inhospitable region, the advance (Thirty-Third Illinois) under Colonel A. P. Hovey, was attacked by some 1500 Texan cavalry, under General Albert Rust. Hovey was soon joined by Wood, who came up with the First Indiana cavalry and two howitzers, when a vigorous charge was made, and Rust was compelled to beat a hasty retreat, leaving 110 of his men dead on the field. The National loss was 8 killed and 45 wounded. The march was continued to Clarendon; but, on reaching that place, it was found that the gunboats had departed some twenty-four hours before.

It was a sad disappointment. Curtis' condition was a thousand times worse than it had been before. It would have been better far for him to have remained at Pea Ridge or at Batesville. He had not only made a long and fatiguing march: he had lost all the advantages of these positions, without obtaining any compensation. What was now to be done? Retrace his steps? That was not to be thought of. Remain where he was? That would be suicidal; for the region was unhealthful, and he was without food, without ammunition, without supplies of any kind, and without the means of communicating with any base of operations. There was but one course open to him, and that was to reach the waters of the Mississippi as quickly as possible. It was an ungrateful task, considering the exhausted condition of his men. But there was no choice. No delay was permitted. It was sixty-five miles to Helena, the nearest point of any importance. Washburne, with all the cavalry, numbering some 2500 horses, and with five howitzers, set out at once. Although he had to make the roads as he advanced, bridging the bay-
ous, and cutting his way through the tangled and almost impenetrable copse, Helena was reached in twenty-four hours. Curtis followed, with the infantry, taking with him a few Arkansas volunteers and a large number of negroes, and, proceeding by long marches, arrived at the same place on the 13th, 12th and 13th of July. At Helena, Curtis found his much-needed supplies; but for the remainder of the summer he was fastened to the Mississippi, having no other duty to perform than that of guarding its western banks, and thus covering the right of the National army, which was operating on the other side.

The retirement of Curtis to the Mississippi left Arkansas very much uncared for. The result was that large guerrilla bands were organized in that State and the neighboring State of Missouri. They gradually united and assumed the proportions of a formidable army. In April, 1862, Missouri was in charge of General J. M. Schofield, an officer of decided ability, who had served on the staff of the lamented Lyon. All the militia of the State, numbering some 14,000 men, and largely composed of cavalry, were assigned to his command. To this was attached a volunteer force of considerable strength, and drawn from almost all sections of the State. In June, at the request of Curtis, Missouri was created into a separate military district; and Schofield was placed in command. About this time the guerrilla bands began to be a terrible source of annoyance. Every device was resorted to by the Confederates to organize armed opposition in the State. Whole Missouri regiments, including officers and men, were furloughed; they returned to their homes in citizens' clothes, carrying with them secret instructions to recruit and organize bands in all directions, and then, at a given signal, to meet in the heart of the State, and destroy the militia enrolled under the Federal flag. Schofield, however, was vigilant, active and energetic, and spared no efforts to overcome these cunning devices of the foe. Fresh appeals were made to the militia and to the volunteers; and, on the 22d of June, he issued an order holding all rebels and rebel sympathizers responsible in their property, and, if need be, in their persons, for damages thereafter committed by guerrillas or marauding parties. His appeals to the militia and the volunteers were only partially successful; and his order did not produce the effect which he probably expected. At the close of July he had on his roll 50,000 men, of whom 20,000 were ready for effective service; but the failure of the campaign against Richmond greatly encouraged the rebel spirit, and rendered his position one of extreme difficulty. The people of Missouri were greatly divided in sentiment as to the political issues before the country. Emancipation found favor with one party: it was bitterly opposed by another. Such were the wranglings and contentions that Lincoln, on one occasion, wrote to them in bitter complaint. "It is painful to me," he said, "that you in Missouri
cannot or will not settle your factional quarrels among yourselves. I have been tormented with them beyond endurance for months, by both sides. Neither side pays the least respect to my appeals to your reason."

Schofield’s army of militia and volunteers was distributed over the State in six divisions, under competent officers. Towards the end of July, the guerrillas began to reveal their strength and their purpose. The northeastern division of the State, above the Missouri River, and bordering on the Mississippi, was under the command of Colonel McNeil. This was the principal theatre of operations. Here the guerrilla bands were strong, and under the leadership of such men as Porter, Poindexter and Cobb.

**July**

On the 28th of July, Porter and Cobb came into contact with a portion of McNeil’s command, under Colonel Merrill. In this encounter, Merrill revealed those rare qualities which mark a first-class cavalry officer. Porter and Cobb were compelled to retreat. Three days afterwards, Porter captured Newark and two companies of National troops. Merrill renewed the pursuit, which lasted for twelve days, ultimately coming up with the Confederates on the 6th of August, at Kirksville, in Adair County. Here a desperate fight ensued. McNeil’s entire force at this point did not exceed 1000 men, all mounted, with six guns. Porter had under him at least 2500 men of all arms. Porter, however, was defeated, with a loss of 180 killed, about 500 wounded, and several wagon loads of arms. McNeil’s loss was 28 killed and 60 wounded. Porter’s power was completely broken. Poindexter’s gang, meanwhile, had increased to at least 1200 men. Early in August, Colonel Guitar, with 600 men, and two pieces of artillery, went in pursuit of the guerrilla captain, and fell upon him while crossing the Chariton River, on the night of the 10th. Poindexter was caught in a trap. A large number of his men fell a prey to the bullets and sabres of the Nationals; not a few were driven into the river and drowned. A considerable quantity of his supplies was captured. With what remained of his band, Poindexter hastened north to effect a junction with Porter; but, coming into contact with Ben Loan, he was forced back again upon Guitar. He was thus caught between two fires. His men fled for their lives, and he himself was made prisoner. Cobb soon afterwards shared the fate of his brother bandits; and to the north of the Missouri River, the National supremacy was restored. In his report, Schofield tells us that, from the 1st of April to the 20th of September, there were more than one hundred engagements. The National loss was 3000. The loss on the other side was not less than 10,000 men. Some terrible stories are told, illustrative of the vengeful spirit with which, on both sides, this guerrilla warfare was conducted. It is quite possible that the stories are exaggerated reports of the facts in the case; but there can be no doubt that the cold-blooded murder of Colonel McCullough, the day after Kirksville, and what
were called the Palmyra massacres, threw a dark cloud over the name of McNeil, and damaged the reputation of a loyal and patriotic soldier.

The guerrilla bands to the south of the Missouri River were scarcely less aggressive than their brethren further north. These bands, having been organized under a chief of the name of Hughes, when they heard of the outbreak in the north, resolved to take the initiative, and, if possible, open communication with their friends across the river. On the 11th of August, Hughes, with about 1000 combatants, surprised the garrison at Independence. He encountered some severe opposition from them inside the garrison; but he had no great difficulty in making himself master of the place.

About the same time the Confederate general, Coffee, who had moved from the interior of Arkansas with 1500 horse, was pushing on rapidly for the purpose of forming a junction with Hughes. A combination of National troops was formed to prevent this junction. Coffee, as he moved north, was being pressed by 1200 cavalry sent by Brown. General Blunt, commanding on the west of Kansas, detached some troops for the same purpose. General Totten was ordered by Schofield to attack Hughes at once, before he could be joined by Coffee. Unhappily, Totten's forces were divided; 800 horse and two guns, commanded by Major Foster, being at Lexington, on the Missouri, east of Independence, and 1500 men, under Colonel Warren, being at Clinton, more to the southeast. Both had started for Independence. Foster, who had the shorter journey to make, encountered the enemy at the Cross Roads, called Lone Jack, on the 15th of August. Coffee and Hughes had formed a junction; and their united forces amounted to 4000 or 5000 men. Foster's band was defeated, and driven back to Lexington. In the struggle, Foster himself was wounded. At this moment Coffee, who was free in his movements, would not have shown bad generalship, if he had crossed the river and joined his friends, who were waiting for him on the other side; but he was so pressed in his rear, that he deemed it best to make a detour and find his way, as quickly as possible, back into Arkansas. Blunt was already upon his heels; but Coffee, who knew the country thoroughly, and whose men were well trained in that kind of warfare, contrived to make his escape.

Robbed of their strength, if not completely driven out of Missouri, the guerrillas were still powerful in Arkansas; nor was it any part of their plan that their adversaries should remain masters in Missouri. At the beginning of September, the united Confederate forces in Arkansas amounted to nearly 50,000 men. They were under the command of General T. C. Hindman, who was assisted by Generals Rains, Parsons, Cooper, McBride and others. Hindman had been a member of Congress; but he had warmly espoused the Confederate cause, and gone into the war with all the bitterness of a partisan. Under the plea of
tary necessity, he had arrogated to himself excessive powers in the State, exercising an arbitrary authority, and allowing his soldiers a license in the last degree offensive to all peaceful citizens. Living on the country wherever he happened to be, and rigidly enforcing the conscription law, he was enabled to gather together and to maintain a large body of men. Hindman was completely master of Arkansas. Indeed, there were no Federal soldiers in that State to dispute his authority. Nestling in the recesses of the Ozark Mountains, among which the battle of Pea Ridge had been fought, he could sweep the vast and fertile plains which lay around him on every side, and carry off whatever he thought his army needed. In one thing only was that army found wanting. It was well provisioned, but poorly supplied with arms. This was the less an inconvenience that there was no foe against which the arms could be used. So much was this the case that General J. Johnston, who had just been placed in command of the armies of the West, added his solicitations to those of General Randolph, that the forces under Hindman should be turned to some account, by being sent across the Mississippi to strengthen the forces under Pemberton. Davis, however, would not give his consent. Randolph, in consequence, retired from the Confederate cabinet, and Hindman determined to make a fresh invasion of the State of Missouri. His forces were divided as follows: Rains, with 6000 infantry, occupied the heights in the neighborhood of Pea Ridge; Cooper, with 7000 horse and some artillery, had advanced into the valley of Neosho, as far as Newtonia, thus menacing the National troops, who were stationed at Springfield; while another body of 4000 men, massed on the White River, seemed to be making ready for a march on Rolla, the most important of the National depots in the Western country.

Schofield now resolved to take the field in person, and, if possible, strike the enemy before he was in a fit condition to take the offensive. He had shortly before, on the 26th of September, been appointed to the command of what was called the "army of the frontier," General Curtis having superseded him by taking command of the department. Steele was put in command of the forces which remained stationary at Helena. The army under Schofield has been variously estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000 men, of whom about 8000 were available for active operations. There were about 5000 cavalry and some sixteen pieces of artillery, with a complement of men and horses. The largest portion of this army was at Springfield; two brigades, all mounted, were at Sarcoxie; and General Blunt was known to be coming up from Kansas. Schofield took up his line of march for Sarcoxie with 6000 men, leaving some 5000 to guard Springfield and his long line of communication with St. Louis. On the 30th, a reconnoissance was made in the direction of Newtonia by some of the troops which were already at Sarcoxie. Coming into contact with Cooper's cavalry,
they were, after a lively engagement, driven back to their encampments. On the 1st or 2d of October, the troops, which had left Springfield, arrived in the neighborhood of Sarcoxie, and, forming a division under General Totten, were joined by those commanded by Blunt. On the following day, the entire National army set out for Newtonia. Blunt and Totten approached at different points. The Confederates evidently were taken by surprise; and Rains and Cooper, who had not been able to form a junction, both took to flight, the one towards Huntsville, the other towards Maysville. Schofield marched steadily onward; and, on the 17th of October, he was on the old battle ground of Pea Ridge. The Confederates, as we have seen, were divided. Cooper evidently intended to take possession of Maysville, and cut off communication with Fort Scott. Rains, with the main body of the troops, covered by about 3000 cavalry, was still moving in the direction of Huntsville. Blunt, with two brigades, went off in pursuit of Cooper; while Schofield, with the main army, pushed over the White River Mountains, in the track of Rains.

Blunt, who did not allow his men to halt by the way, reached the outskirts of Maysville before daylight on the morning of the 22d of October. He felt satisfied that the enemy could not be far off. Disguising himself, and entering into conversation with some of the villagers, he soon discovered that Cooper was encamped on prairie ground in the vicinity of an old military post, called Fort Wayne. As soon as day broke, Blunt, although his men were not all forward, resolved to make the attack. It was important to strike a blow before his presence was discovered by the enemy. His vanguard, therefore, dismounted and commenced firing. The Confederates were quite unprepared for the attack; and, before they thoroughly understood their position, the main body of Blunt's troops came up at a gallop from Maysville, and deployed on the prairie. A few shells were flung into the encampment, and then the whole line advanced. The Confederates, making but little resistance, fled precipitately towards Fort Gibson in the Indian Territory, leaving their four guns behind them. There was but little loss of life on the part of the Confederates; and the Nationals had only three men disabled.

Schofield had been not less successful in his pursuit of Rains. The enemy had escaped from Huntsville, and sought shelter once more in the neighborhood of the Ozark Mountains. It was evidently Hindman's intention to avoid battle until his troops were collected in greater force. Returning to a position not far from Pea Ridge, Schofield learned that some 3000 or 4000 cavalry were encamped on White River, about eight miles from Fayetteville. Totten was ordered to advance and attack them in front, while Francis J. Herron was instructed to proceed immediately with about 1000 cavalry, and strike them in the rear. Herron was the first to reach the enemy. On the morning of the 28th of October, after
a rapid night march, he found himself close upon the encampment. Without waiting for the arrival of the infantry, he fell upon the foe with the rapidity of lightning. The surprise was complete; and such was the vigor of the onslaught that the Confederates fled to the mountains, leaving everything behind them.

Comparative quiet reigned in those regions for nearly a month. On the 26th of November, however, it became known to Schofield that Hindman had made up his mind to resume the offensive. The Confederate general, Marmaduke, had arrived at Cane Hill with 7000 or 8000 men; and it was natural to conclude that Hindman was about to follow. Schofield, who had for some time previous to this been in poor health, deemed it necessary to resign his command. General Blunt immediately accepted the responsibilities of the situation. He set out at once in quest of the enemy. So rapid were his movements that, on the morning of Nov. 28, he found himself in the presence of his antagonist. Blunt had advanced with 5000 men and thirty pieces of artillery. He had taken with him provisions for four days. In one day he had marched twenty-seven miles. Only some 200 men were forward when he encountered resistance. The main body, however, soon came up, when Marmaduke fell back upon his reserves on the Boston Mountains, and took a good position on the heights. Blunt now assailed him with his entire strength; and a vigorous charge having been made by the Second Kansas Cavalry, the Third Cherokee Indians, and the Eleventh Kansas Infantry, the Confederates were driven back, but not in disorder, in the direction of, Van Buren. Blunt returned and took up a position at Cane Hill. In this engagement, which is known as the battle of Boston Mountains, the Nationals had four killed, and 36 wounded. The Confederate loss was 75 killed. The number of wounded was not reported.

Hindman was not disposed to give the Nationals any rest. He seemed resolved to recover his State. In order to do this, it was necessary to give a crushing blow to Blunt. Hindman, no doubt, was encouraged in this determination by the knowledge that Schofield, who had been his great terror, was no longer in command. He might also have been emboldened in his purpose by the fact that the National army was divided into two parts, at that time far from each other. Blunt, with the first division, composed of three brigades, numbering about 6000 or 7000 men, was at Cane Hill and the village called Rhea's Mills, on the Fayetteville Road. Herron, with the remainder of the army, comprising 6000 infantry, 8000 horse, and 20 guns, was at Wilson's Creek, many miles away. On the 1st of December, Hindman, who had been hastening to Marma- duke's relief, crossed the Arkansas River at Van Buren with 9000 infantry and 3000 cavalry; and the two forces were united at a point some fifteen miles further up. Made aware of this fact, Blunt sent to Herron, requesting him
to hurry to his assistance. That excellent officer lost no time in coming to the relief of his chief. His cavalry he hurried forward under Colonel Wicker-sham, while he himself advanced with the main army. Fayetteville was reached on the morning of the 7th. He had marched all night. Resting his men for an hour, he pushed on in the direction of Cane Hill. He had advanced to within ten or eleven miles of that place, when he met a portion of his own cavalry, despatched by him in advance, fleeing from the enemy. They had been attacked and broken by Marmaduke’s horsemen. Herron was in a position of very considerable danger. The Confederate general had been apprised of the approach of Herron; and his purpose was, if possible, to interpose between him and Blunt. He had left a few troops, with a field battery, in a strong position on the Cane Hill Road, at the culminating point of the pass of the Boston Mountains, his object being to mask his movement and detain Blunt. With the rest of his army, he had moved along the Fayetteville Road. This was the condition of things when, about eight o’clock, Herron’s advance, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, was met and driven back by Marmaduke. The retreating cavalry were brought to a halt by the second division, which was under General Totten, the Confederate attack being not only resisted but repelled. Herron, at this moment, had a good position; and he might have been able, if he had known the actual state of things, to make a bold, defensive stand. But he was ignorant of his real danger, and intent only on the relief of Blunt. He, therefore, pressed forward, driving the Confederates back over Illinois Creek, on the heights beyond which the Confederate army was posted.

The ground on which Herron now found himself was known by the name of Prairie Grove. It was an extensive, natural clearing in the midst of woods and thickets, with which the surrounding hills were covered. The ground was irregular; there were also some clumps of trees; and, here and there, cultivated patches had taken the place of the tall grasses, with which the prairie generally was covered. On its eastern extremity, this open ground was watered by the creek above mentioned. It was traversed, also, by two roads—one leading from Fayetteville to Cane Hill, and passing at Rhea’s Mills; another leading from Van Buren, and crossing a ford at Illinois Creek, near the church of Prairie Grove. Beyond this stream, and about three-quarters of a mile to the east, the Van Buren Road ascends a hill which is well covered with woods. On these heights, so soon as he became aware of the approach of Herron, Hindman had taken position with all his army.

Hindman’s troops were well concealed in the woods. Herron did not know, and he had no means of discovering, the actual strength of the enemy in his front. On these heights, hidden by the trees, but admirably posted for defense, was an army of some 20,000 men, well supplied with cavalry and artillery. Herron had found it necessary to leave
certain detachments behind him. His entire available force, therefore, did not exceed 5000 men; and these were not yet all on the ground. It was, so far as numbers were concerned, destined to be a most unequal contest. Had Herron been aware of the facts, he might well have hesitated, before venturing upon an attack. In this case, however, as not unfrequently happens, pluck and daring, guided by a clear head and steady nerve, fully compensated for lack of numbers. Herron had not heard from Blunt since the 2d, when he received instructions to come to his aid. Blunt was aware of the difficulties which lay in Herron's way; but such was the activity of Marmaduke's skirmishers, that he found it impossible to open communications with his lieutenant, or send to him any words of warning. Blunt, in fact, had for some days been misled by the tactics of his antagonist. He was under the impression that he had been skirmishing with the advance of Hindman's main army, when, in truth, Hindman, having turned his left, was making for his trains, and actually interposing between him and Herron. It was not until the arrival of Wickersham, with his four cavalry regiments, that Blunt became fully alive to the true character of the situation.

As soon as his third division came up, Herron resolved to assume the offensive. It was yet early morning. An attempt was made to force the passage of the ford near the church, a light battery having been sent forward to feel the foe. The attempt was unsuccessful, the battery being driven back another mile and a half further down the creek. Murphy's battery was successfully transported to the other side of the creek; and, as soon as it was got into position, it opened fire upon the flank of the enemy. The attack from this quarter had all the effect of a surprise. It not only engaged the attention of the Confederate officers—it created the impression that the National troops were more numerous than they actually were. Herron did not lose his opportunity. Three batteries, accompanied by three full regiments, were pushed across the ford in his front; and about ten o'clock the whole of the National artillery were pouring grape-shot and canister on the Confederate positions. The result was soon visible. Within sixty minutes most of the Confederate guns were silenced. The Nationals continued to advance, the artillery belching forth destruction until they were within a hundred yards of the ridge. It was now evident that Hindman, whose force had already suffered severely, was massing his men on the right with a view to crush the National left. This movement was supported by a powerful battery in front. This battery must be captured. The perilous task was assigned to the Nineteenth Iowa and the Twentieth Wisconsin. The task was speedily accomplished. It was the work of only a few minutes. The summit of the hill was reached; the enemy was driven back; and the guns were seized. It was impossible, however, for those gallant regiments to
hold the position which they had so nobly won. The Confederates rallied and returned to the charge. Largely outnumbered, the two National regiments were compelled to fall back, and the battery was again in possession of the enemy. The Confederates contrived to press forward; and, gathering courage as they advanced, they made a bold dash towards the National guns. It was a vain effort. Their ranks were ploughed by grape-shot; they were torn in pieces by canister. It was a rush to destruction. They soon fell back, leaving the ground covered with the dead and wounded. At this critical moment, and seeing the determination with which Hindman was menacing his left, Herron summoned up two fresh regiments—the Twenty-Sixth Indiana and the Thirty-Seventh Illinois—and hurled them against the enemy's right. This fresh attack was, in the first instance, completely successful. Colonel Houston, who was in charge, led his men forward right gallantly. The Confederate battery was again captured; but, as in the former case, so in this, the National regiments were outnumbered, and compelled to fall back.

It was now half-past two. The battle had raged fiercely since eleven. Herron's men had all been put under fire. Further aggressive effort, on his part, was out of the question. It was doubtful whether he could much longer hold the ground he occupied; for the Confederates had evidently begun to feel their strength, and to realize the value of superior numbers. Fortunately, just at this time, the noise of heavy guns was heard on the extreme right; and some stray shot fell in the midst of the National skirmishers. It was Blunt. He had arrived on the field just in time. The news quickly spread along the lines, reviving the sinking spirits of the Union soldiers. Hindman was in the act of massing his forces, for the purpose of flanking Herron's right wing. While thus engaged, he came into contact with the heads of Blunt's advancing columns. The battle was thus renewed with tremendous energy. Blunt pushed forward three batteries, which soon drove the Confederates back into the woods. While the cavalry was crossing his right, he pushed forward Colonel Weir, with a heavy force, to the woods, where the Confederates were forming for the attack. Weir accomplished his task with skill and energy. The Confederates were driven from their shelter, and their onward movement was completely arrested. During the struggle, an attempt was made by the Confederates to capture the batteries of Robb and Hopkins. The assailants, however, were severely punished for their temerity. Another attack, in which the Confederate general, Stein, of Missouri, fell, was successfully repelled by Lieutenant Tenney and his six ten-pounder Parrots. After the arrival of Blunt, his own lines and those of Herron were speedily joined; and a daring attempt made by the Confederates, to penetrate between Herron's second and third division, was completely frustrated by the stubborn resistance of Dye's brigade. Musketry-fire and cannonading
continued until dark; but the Confederates did not renew the attack, nor did the Nationals retire from the position they had won. Night ended the conflict. The National troops slept on their arms, in the expectation that the battle would be resumed in the morning. When morning dawned, the Confederates were in full flight along the Van Buren Road. The Nationals, however, were in no condition to pursue. Such was the famous and bloody battle of Prairie Grove. The estimated National loss in this day's fighting was 1148 men, of whom 167 were killed, 798 wounded, and 183 made prisoners—but of the total, 953 belonged to Herron's force.

If Hindman had been more daring, the battle at Prairie Grove might have resulted very differently. He had two good opportunities, both of which he recklessly flung away. He might have crushed Blunt on the 4th or 5th, on both of which days he had him alone in his front; and a more dashing effort might have led to the discomfiture of Herron, when he met him alone on the borders of Illinois Creek.

After the battle of Prairie Grove, the "army of the frontier" remained quiet in the Ozark Mountains. As late as the 28th of December Blunt, having been informed that Hindman was collecting troops and preparing for another attack, made a rapid march with some light cavalry and artillery, as far as the borders of the Arkansas, taking possession of Van Buren without any opposition, burning several steamers, destroying the Confederate depots, and then returning to the main army, which had gone into winter quarters. At the close of 1862, quiet reigned both in Missouri and Arkansas. Missouri had been completely relieved, and at least one half of Arkansas had been occupied.

These guerrilla bands were not confined to Missouri and Arkansas alone, nor indeed to Kentucky and Tennessee, where we have already found them. They were scattered in large numbers over Texas—the extreme southwestern State of the Republic. In the western part of that State there were but few slaveholders. There was, therefore, but little sympathy with the Southern cause. The people, who were truly loyal and devoted to the Union, were at once feared and hated by the guerrilla bands which infested the country, and whose acts were characterized by great wastefulness and horrible brutality. As they were far removed from the National armies, and but little liable to be called to account, they seemed to deem it their privilege to indulge in all kinds of excess, and to riot in the destruction of life and property. Early in the summer of 1862, after the Confederates had been defeated and driven out of Tennessee, Texas was placed by the Richmond government under martial law, and a rigid and merciless conscription was enforced. The State was overrun by guerrilla bands, whose lawlessness knew no bounds. They robbed and murdered at will; and other crimes of the most heinous and shocking character have been laid to their charge. Some of the loyalists at-
tempted to escape into Mexico. Of these, many were captured and murdered; and the boast was proudly made by the San Antonio Herald, that their bones were bleaching on the soil of every county, from Red River to the Rio Grande; and in the counties of Wise and Denton, their bodies were suspended by scores from the “black jacks.” On the night of the 9th of August, 1862, a company of young Germans, about sixty in all, and belonging to the best families in Western Texas, who were on their way to New Orleans, by way of Mexico, in order to join the Union army, had reached the Nueces River, about forty miles from the Rio Grande. They lay encamped on the edge of a cedar brake; their movements had been conducted with great secrecy; and they were hopeful that they might escape the vigilance of the guerrillas. By treachery or otherwise, their character and their whereabouts became known to the freebooters; and Duff, the guerrilla chief in those parts, sent one hundred men to surprise and destroy them. Early on the morning of the 8th, one of the party, who happened to be up and about, was captured. As he refused to lead the gang to the exact spot where his companions were still sleeping, he was immediately hanged. The guerrillas found out the encampment, and at night fell upon the young men in their sleep. A terrible hand-to-hand fight ensued. Not less than two-thirds of the brave young Unionists perished, some of them having been cruelly put to death after they were wounded and helpless. Only a few of them escaped to tell the horrid tale. One of the butchers afterwards boasted that he killed several of the wounded with his own hands. In the performance of this brutal work he emptied two revolvers. Such was his own confession. His name will be infamous forever. It was Lieutenant Lily. Three years afterwards, a monument was erected over all that could be collected of the remains of the Texan martyrs.

The Western territory, during the year 1862, experienced not a little disturbance from the peculiar combinations and conflicts of the Indian tribes. The withdrawal of the volunteers raised in Northern Missouri, and in the young States of Iowa and Minnesota, had left some portions of the country on the western slope of the Rocky Mountains very much at the mercy of the indigenous race. The Indians had wrongs to right, revenges to gratify, both as regarded their white conquerors and the rival native tribes; and, in the absence of the troops of the regular army, they believed they had found their opportunity. In the circumstances, it was natural that they should make some efforts to multiply the scalps with which they delighted to adorn their wigwams. Some of those tribes, moreover, had been induced to take sides in the great struggle. On both sides, considerable armies had been raised. They were generally commanded by whites, and were, for the most part, employed in guarding the frontier. The frontier was designated by several posts which, before the war, had served as provision
depots. All those to the south of Kansas had been abandoned by the Nationals. These posts, separated from each other by vast intervals, and placed *en echelon* through the vast region then known as Indian Territory, were divided among several tribes, the most powerful of which were the Creeks and the Cherokees. The latter tribe had experienced somewhat of the benefits of civilization. Scattered over the rich prairie, which extends from Pea Ridge to the borders of the Neosho, were to be seen not a few Cherokee villages, surrounded and adorned by patches of cultivated land. The principal chief of this tribe was John Ross, who resided in a beautiful villa at Park Hill, on the Fayetteville Road. The chief town or capital of this tribe was called Tah-le-Quah, a place which though not yet old, was giving some evidence of premature decay. The Cherokees were no great favorites with their more war-like neighbors, who were located a little more to the south and west. As a rule, the semi-civilized Indian is despised by his rougher and ruder brethren, who adhere to their primitive modes of life. Such was the feeling entertained towards the Cherokees by the other Indian tribes all along the borders of the Arkansas. The war-like ardor of these latter was stimulated by Southern emissaries; and in the neighborhood of Fort Davis—a new fort built by the Confederates—and also at Fort Gibson—an old fort near the village of the same name—quite a little army of redskins had assembled. Officered by white men, they undertook to conquer the whole Indian Territory, and even threatened the invasion of Arkansas and Missouri. In the absence of the regular army, this whole region depended for protection on three regiments of Indians, all mounted, and officered by white men of the National army. It was not long before these National officers became aware of the hostile intentions of the rival tribes enlisted in the interest of the South. It was resolved to make an immediate attack—to surprise and disperse them, before they could have time to carry out their meditated purpose. With this end in view, Colonel Phillipps, with 1200 mounted men and two field pieces, was detached, and sent forward in the direction of the enemy. We have already seen that the hostile Indians were congregated in strength in and about the village of Gibson. They, too, consisted of three mounted regiments, and were under the command of Colonel Taylor. Phillipps divided his forces into two columns of equal strength. The one column, under Major Forman, was to cross the Neosho, and descend the right bank of the river: the other column, under Phillipps himself, was to march towards Gibson, through Park Hill and Tah-le-Quah. It was Phillipps' intention to advance and surprise the enemy on the morning of July, the 24th. Taylor, however, was not to be so easily caught. He had been apprised of the intended movement, and had made preparations accordingly. Sending forward some 300 men to meet and delay the advance of Forman, he advanced himself with about 800 men to meet Phillipps.
July 28. On the 28th, about two o'clock in the afternoon, Taylor came into contact with the National advance, between Gibson and Tah-le-Quah; and falling upon them with tremendous fury, he drove them back in confusion. Their retreat, however, was soon arrested by the main body, which had found time to deploy, dismount, and occupy a strong position along the edge of a wood. As Taylor's Indians were rushing forward in the full triumph of victory, they were received by a murderous fire, the Nationals, with fierce yells, rushing out upon them, and driving them back in disorder. On a ridge which commanded the little valley of Bayou Barnard, they rallied and renewed the attack. It was, however, only for an instant. After the first fire, they fell back again and dispersed. In this last encounter, Colonel Taylor was killed. His body and the body of two Choctaw captains were found on the field. Phillipps crossed the Neosho and joined Forman; but the detachment of Indians which Taylor had sent against the latter, contrived to escape, and succeeded in making its way to the south of the Arkansas.

On the 19th of August, a savage attack was made by the Sioux on two Indian agencies and on the village of New Ulm, not far from Fort Ridgely, on the Minnesota River. At the agencies, all the employés were massacred; and at the village, over 100 women and children were ruthlessly put to death. After their bloody work, the Indians retired to their camp, near Yellow Medicine Creek. It was absolutely necessary, for the safety of the settlers, that so horrible an outrage should be promptly and adequately avenged. Colonel Sibley was entrusted with this duty. On the 19th of September, taking with him about 1000 men in all, composed of detachments from the Third, Sixth and Seventh regiments of Minnesota, with some militia, Sibley proceeded from Fort Ridgely towards the Indian encampment. As soon as it became known that he was approaching, Little Crow, the chief of the tribe, called a council of war, and advised that an attack should be made on the National camps at night. His counsel was not approved of by the Sioux warriors; and it was agreed that, to give proof of their courage, they should fight the white men openly in the broad light of day. On the 23d of September, they approached the National encampment from two different points; and rushing forward in their usual manner, uttering savage yells, they made a vigorous attack. The Nationals promptly put themselves in line to receive them. For two hours the battle raged, the Indians trying to break their ranks in front, to turn their right, and to strike them in the rear. It was all in vain. The Nationals were more numerous, and their artillery enabled them to keep the Indians at a distance. Peace was thus established on the frontier of Minnesota. Before the close of 1862, all those guerrilla bands, both whites and redskins, were broken and dispersed; and between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, the National power was supreme.
CHAPTER XXIII.

After the battle of Corinth, which was fought on the 4th of October, 1862, the army, under General Grant, fell back to the position which it formerly occupied, and remained in comparative inactivity until the beginning of November. It was stationed from Memphis to Bridgeport, Tennessee, along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Its strong points were Memphis, Grand Junction and Corinth. The army was arranged in four divisions. General Sherman, with the first division, was at Memphis; General Hurlbut, with the second, was at Jackson; General C. S. Hamilton, with the third, was at Corinth; and General T. A. Davies, with the fourth, was at Columbus. Grant's headquarters were at Jackson, Tennessee, a point in the West where the Central Mississippi Railroad unites with the Mobile and Ohio. That
general had not abandoned the plan which was inaugurated at Henry and Donelson. His whole soul was bent on the capture of Vicksburg. A variety of circumstances, however, had necessi-
tated delay. The removal of Halleck to Washington had devolved upon him the entire care of the Department of the Tennessee—a department which included, in addition to Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, the whole of Northern Mississippi, and those por-
tions of Tennessee and Kentucky west of the Tennessee River. This, how-
ever, was not the only or even the most important reason. The army which had fought and won at Shiloh, at Corinth and at Iuka, had been greatly weakened, a large proportion of its strength having been sent to Kentucky to resist the invasion of Bragg. It was necessary, therefore, for Grant, while perfecting his plans and rearranging his troops, to wait for reinforcements. As soon as the reinforcements arrived, he was ready to move.

The reader has already been made familiar with the general plan to be pursued in the opening of the Missis-
sippi; and he has learned that a considera-
ble portion of that plan had been successfully carried out. The National gunboats had swept the Mississippi, from Cairo to Memphis; and, between those two points, every Confederate stronghold had been deserted or de-
stroyed. Farragut, with a portion of his fleet, had pushed his way up to Vicks-
buch, after the capture of New Orleans. He was accompanied by General F. Williams, with an infantry force of four regiments. While Farragut bom-
baraded the city, Williams was cutting a canal, with the view of diverting the waters of the Mississippi from their proper channel, thus leaving Vicksburg high and dry on all sides. The siege lasted some seventy days. It was all to no purpose. Farragut, who failed to make any serious impression on the Confederate works, began to fear for his own safety. The canal, also, proved a complete failure. The fleet and the land force both found it necessary to retire; and Vicksburg remained to obstruct the navigation of the great river.

On the 4th of November, Grant began to move. He transferred his headquarters from Jackson to La Grange, some few miles to the west of Grand Junction. He soon discovered that the Confederates, under General John C. Pemberton, a Pennsylvanian, who had superseded Van Dorn, were in considerable strength immediately in his front. Pemberton, in fact, had taken a strong position behind two lines of defenses, the outer being the Yalla-
busha, and the inner being the Talla-
hatchie—two streams which, after their junction, form the Yazoo River. Both of these streams cross the Mississippi Central Railroad, between Grand Junction and Grenada. The banks of the Tallahatchie were strongly fortified. Grant's first intention was to offer Pemberton battle, defeat him, and force his way to Vicksburg.

On the 8th, he sent out McPherson with 10,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, with instructions to drive from Lamar a body of Confederates.
who were holding the railroad. McPherson accomplished his task in the most effectual manner, the Confederates having been driven back as far as Holly Springs.

About the 17th of November, Grant summoned Sherman to meet him at Columbus; and at the interview which there took place, the views of the two generals were freely exchanged, Grant explaining to Sherman his plan, and giving him his orders. It was at Sherman's suggestion that a portion of Curtis' army, which, as we have seen in a previous chapter, was stationed at Helena, should be brought over to Delta, with a view to co-operate with Grant in his general movement towards Vicksburg. These troops which, in the absence of General Curtis, who was at St. Paul, being under the temporary command of General Frederick Steele, were promptly at the place appointed, on the eastern banks of the Mississippi. They numbered some 7000 men, and were under the joint command of Generals A. P. Hovey and C. C. Washburne. Ordered to scour the country to the south and east, in the rear of the Confederate army, to destroy the railroads and bridges, so as to cut off supplies, and generally to prepare the way for Grant's advance, they accomplished their task in the most effectual manner, and then returned to the Mississippi. Pemberton, on discovering that the railroads were badly damaged, and that the rolling-stock was destroyed, Grant meanwhile pressing on his front, deemed it prudent to fall back on Grenada.

On the 1st of December, Grant was at Holly Springs. On the 5th, he was at Oxford, where he established his headquarters. It now became a serious question with General Grant, how far he was wise in allowing himself to be tempted to advance into the enemy's country. The State of Mississippi was but sparsely peopled; and he had no means of knowing whether its resources were equal to the wants of a large army, possibly cut off from its base of supplies. Had he known what he knew afterwards, the caution would have been unnecessary; and he would doubtless have continued his onward march.

On the 5th of December, Sherman on his way to join Grant, and Dec. 5 bringing with him from Memphis some 16,000 men, arrived at College Hill, about ten miles from Oxford, whence he reported to his chief. On the 8th, he received from Grant a letter, requesting his immediate presence at Oxford, and enclosing a message from Halleck to Grant, authorizing the latter to prosecute the new plan he had just submitted to him, to move his troops as he thought best, to retain till further orders all Curtis' troops now in his department, to telegraph to General Allen, in St. Louis, for all the steamboats he might need, and to ask Porter to co-operate with his gunboats. On his arrival at Oxford, Sherman found Grant surrounded by his staff. The new plan was discussed and approved. It will be seen that Grant had made up his mind that, for the safety of his men as well as for the final success of the expedition, it was necessary to take
full advantage of the river communication with Vicksburg. It was agreed that a large force on transports should proceed down the Mississippi, under convoy of Porter's gunboats, that on reaching the mouth of the Yazoo, they should open up that water line, and, by a joint attack of the land and naval forces, attempt to capture Vicksburg in the rear. Grant, meanwhile, was to press forward towards Jackson, which is only some forty-six miles to the west of Vicksburg, offering Pemberton battle, and following him up close in the event of his retreat, in the hope of finding Sherman on the Yazoo with supplies, or in possession of Vicksburg.

Happily, Grant had been left complete control of the whole movement, Halleck having offered no special advice, and imposed no conditions. He could move at will, and he could place in prominent command the men of his own choice. Sherman, who commanded the right wing of Grant's army, was appointed to the command of the river expedition, and received his instructions. Grant had the greater pleasure in appointing Sherman to this command that McClernand, who had great influence with the president, was known to be intriguing for an independent command on the Mississippi. Sherman was, therefore, ordered to take command of the forces at Memphis, and those also at Helena and Delta, under General Steele, to descend the river by transports, with the gunboat fleet as a convoy, commanded by Admiral Porter, and to attack Vicksburg by the 29th of November. McClernand was to take the forces at Cairo, and to proceed to Vicksburg, so as to be in time to lend Sherman effective aid as soon as he made the attack. Grant himself, as we have said, was to move rapidly on the Confederates to the north and east of Vicksburg, to follow them if they should retreat towards the city, and to take part with Sherman, if necessary, in the reduction of the place. It was a well-conceived plan. Its success, however, depended on the prompt and faithful execution of all its parts. Grant knew that it was unsafe to trust for supplies solely to the enemy's country. He had therefore, repaired the Central Mississippi Railroad as far as Oxford, where, for the present, he had established his headquarters; and Holly Springs, which was entrusted to the care of Colonel R. C. Murphy, was retained as a grand depot and hospital.

Let us see how this plan was carried out. Grant had taken great care that no misfortune should befall him in his rear. He had left small but adequate garrisons at Columbus, at Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, Holly Springs, Coldwater, Davis' Mills and Middlebury. He had taken particular care of Holly Springs; for he knew that the treasures at that place presented a powerful temptation to Van Dorn. On the night of the 19th, he warned Murphy of his danger, and informed him that he had sent 4000 men to enable him to repel any attack which might be made upon him. Murphy, it would seem, paid little heed to the instructions given him. He made no extra preparations to resist the enemy.
On the morning of the 20th, at daybreak, Van Dorn, executing a brilliant cavalry operation, rushed upon the place with tremendous fury. Murphy offered no resistance. The Second Illinois, however, refused to surrender, and gallantly fought their way out, with a loss of only seven men. Murphy, with the rest of his men, accepted a parole. Van Dorn seized all the property, valued at over $1,500,000, taking with him what he could carry, and destroying the remainder. He set fire to the buildings, not even sparing the hospital, which was filled with sick and wounded soldiers. This was the second time that Murphy had been guilty of such conduct. He did the same thing at Iuka. General Grant was wild with rage. It was his opinion that with “all the cotton, public stores and substantial buildings about the depot,” Murphy ought to have been able to keep the assailants at bay until relief arrived. It was only four hours after the catastrophe, when the 4000 men sent to his aid arrived on the spot.

Grant was particularly incensed at Murphy for accepting a parole for himself and his men. A cartel had been agreed to by the rival commanders; and it had been stipulated that each party should take care of his own prisoners. If Murphy had refused parole for himself and men, Van Dorn would have been “compelled to release them unconditionally, or to have abandoned all further aggressive movements for the time being.” In a severe order, on the 9th of January, General Grant dismissed Murphy from the army, the order to take effect “from December 20th, the date of his cowardly and disgraceful conduct.”

The disaster at Holly Springs was ruinous to Grant’s plan. It robbed him of supplies, which, it was intended, should sustain the army for several weeks. To replace them, it would be necessary to put in operation all the capacity and force of the Columbus Railroad; but this railroad had been destroyed, and weeks would be exhausted before it could be put in working order. Ignorant of the resources of the country, and not knowing whether, in the event of his pressing forward, he should find Sherman in the vicinity of Vicksburg, he deemed it his duty to fall back. He immediately recrossed the Tallahatchie. Having no other means of subsisting his army, he made requisitions on the inhabitants as he moved along. On the 23d of December, he was at Holly Springs, now a scene of wreck and ruin; and a few days later, he re-entered La Grange and Grand Junction, where he was once more in communication with Corinth and Memphis. Pemberton made no attempt to pursue. On the contrary, taking advantage of the retreat of his antagonist, he withdrew the greater portion of his forces from Grenada, and concentrated towards Vicksburg.

On the same day that Van Dorn made his raid on Holly Springs, an attack was made by a Confederate force on Davis’ Mills, a little further to the north. In the neighborhood of Jackson, Tennessee, a vital point in Grant’s line of communications, an attack was
made by a body of cavalry under Forrest, on the 19th. The telegraph wires were cut, and the railroad was destroyed. On the following day Forrest presented himself before Humboldt and Trenton. These and other stations along the railroad, such as Dyer's, Rutherford and Kenton, fell an easy prey to the enemy. It seemed to be the purpose of the Confederates to destroy every railroad bridge from Columbus to Corinth, and thus to cut Grant off from all his communications and supplies. So far, they had carried out their purpose with determination, and with not a little success. Never was campaign opened under apparently happier auspices. The rich bud of promise, however, was cruelly blasted.

Grant's plan of the campaign had failed. Meanwhile, what of Sherman? On the 20th, the very day on which Van Dorn and Forrest struck the blow which compelled Grant to fall back and abandon his part of the joint undertaking, Sherman took his departure from Memphis. Taking with him over 20,000 troops in transports, he left, as a guard to the city, a strong force of infantry and cavalry, and the siege guns in position, with a complement of gunners. On the following day, at Friar's Point, he was joined by Admiral Porter, in his flag-ship Black Hawk, with the Marmora, Captain Getty, and the Conestoga, Captain Selfridge, which were to act as a convoy. The remainder of Porter's fleet were at the mouth of the Yazoo. On the same evening, the 21st, the troops at Helena embarked in transports, and came to Friar's Point. Sherman's force was now at least 30,000 strong. All the arrangements were completed; and the joint expedition was moving down the river the following morning.

Sherman got away just in time to secure for himself the glory or dishonor of the expedition. Had he lingered a day longer, he would have been superseded in his command by General McClernand. It is a strange story, and one which, for the sake of all the parties concerned, it would be well if the world could forget. We will not enter into details. It has already been stated that General McClernand was a warm personal friend of President Lincoln, and that he was ambitious of an independent command on the Mississippi. It is not necessary to say that Sherman was a man according to Grant's own heart. Since that great day at Shiloh, their fates had been linked together, and they had been to each other like David and Jonathan. Sherman was also a great favorite with Halleck, the commander-in-chief at Washington. But for the personal wishes of Grant and Halleck, both of whom knew well that Sherman was the man for the position, McClernand would have been appointed by Lincoln in the first instance to the command of the river expedition.

McClernand, however, was not to be put off; and Lincoln, who was always unwilling to disoblige a friend, was weak enough to yield to his entreaties. On the 18th of December, an order from the president reached Grant, directing him to divide all his forces into four
army corps, to assign one corps to McClellan, and to place him at the head of the troops destined for the attack upon Vicksburg. Grant could hardly fail to see in this order a blow aimed at himself. It was a most awkward circumstance, and reflected little credit on the wisdom and good sense of the president. Good and great as he was, Lincoln was not without his weaknesses. He was vain enough to imagine that he knew quite as much as his generals in the field; and he was disposed to deal with military officers, as he was in the habit of dealing with politicians. It is not much to be wondered at if Grant was staggered by this order, and if he was slow to put it in execution. It was not difficult for him to find an excuse. He was in the midst of his preparations for an onward march. The reconstruction of his army, according to the instructions received, occupied him the whole of the 19th. The disaster at Holly Springs, compelling a backward movement, occurred on the 20th; and the raids of Forrest on the same day deprived him of the use of the telegraph. As it was, Sherman had proceeded down the river before any counter-instructions reached Memphis. If Sherman had any reason to fear a counter-order, his haste to get ready and his prompt departure but revealed the soldierly spirit and true character of the man. As the result proved, it was well for Sherman, well for General Grant, and well for the nation at large, that Lincoln’s order did not take effect before the 20th of December.

On Christmas Day, the expedition under Sherman and Porter had reached Milliken’s Bend, when Sherman detached Burbridge’s brigade, of A. J. Smith’s division, to break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg to Shreveport, Louisiana. Leaving A. J. Smith’s division to await the arrival, the remaining divisions proceeded, on the 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo; and up that river to Johnson’s plantation, some thirteen miles, and there disembarked. The disembarkation was conducted without any opposition. Steele’s division landed furthest up the river; above what is called Chickasaw Bayou; Morgan’s division a little lower down, at the house of Johnson, which had been burned by the gunboats on a former occasion; Morgan L. Smith’s division below that of Morgan; and A. J. Smith’s, which arrived next night, below that of M. L. Smith. The ground on which Sherman now found himself presented obstacles of which formerly he had but a very imperfect conception.

Vicksburg is built on a range of bluffs, known as the Walnut Hills. These hills, which take their rise a little below the city, extend for the most part in a northeasterly direction, terminating in Haines’ Bluff, a distance of some thirteen or fourteen miles. The configuration of these hills has been compared to the ridge at Inkerman, to which, it is said, they bear, in some particulars, a striking resemblance. Their average height is about two hundred feet. Where the Mississippi touches their base at Vicksburg, and for some miles both above and below, they are
precipitous. Along their entire length, indeed, from Vicksburg to Haines' Bluff, their face is very abrupt, and cut up by numerous valleys and ravines. The only approach to the city by land, from up the river, is by climbing their almost perpendicular front. The ground beyond is high, broken, and somewhat rolling, gradually descending to the Big Black River. The Yazoo, which skirts the ridge at Haines' Bluff, about nine miles above Vicksburg by the road, along the foot of the bluffs, flows in a southwestern direction, and before discharging its waters into the Mississippi, crosses an old arm of the river, which now forms a semicircular lake.

The Yazoo evidently, in times gone by, clung to the foot of the hills; and traces of its former whereabouts are to be seen in the numerous bayous and channels by which the intervening ground is cut up. One of these bayous puts off from the Yazoo, about one third of the distance below Haines' Bluff, running at right angles with the river until it approaches the bluffs, when it turns and follows their base until it empties itself into the Mississippi. It is called Chickasaw Bayou. Between the bayou and the hills there was an irregular strip of land, on which the trees had been filled to form an abatis. It was dotted also with rifle-pits. Rifle-trenches abounded, too, along the front of the bluffs; and the heights above were crowned with batteries. About a mile to the northeast of the bayou, and parallel with it, there is a deep slough, which makes a sharp turn as it approaches the bluffs, and enters Chickasaw Bayou at the point where the latter is checked in its course, and turns to flow along the base of the hills. There was thus a fortified line some twelve or thirteen miles in length formed of abatis and rifle-pits, with an impassable ditch in front, and terminating in the powerful fixed batteries at Haines' Bluff, on the one hand, and in the heavy batteries and field works above Vicksburg, on the other. The land lying between the Yazoo and the Chickasaw was not only low and swampy; it was, except in one or two places, where there were plantations, densely wooded. The distance from Johnson's Landing to the Chickasaw was about six miles. Such was the ground over which Sherman proposed to march his men. Such were the obstacles to be overcome before he could enter Vicksburg. To the National commander, however, and to his officers, these obstacles were, as yet, but imperfectly known.

General Sherman's army was organized in four divisions. The first division, comprising three brigades, was under Brigadier-General George W. Morgan; second division, three brigades, under Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith; third division, three brigades, under Brigadier-General A. J. Smith; fourth division, four brigades, under Brigadier-General Frederick Steele. The brigade commanders of the fourth division were Generals Frank P. Blair, John M. Thayer, C. E. Hovey, and Colonel Hassendurbei. According to Sherman's plan of attack, General Steele was to hold the extreme left,
General Morgan the left centre, General M. L. Smith the right centre, and General A. J. Smith the extreme right. As the latter general had not yet arrived from Milliken’s Bend, where we left him waiting for Burbridge, General Frank P. Blair, with his brigade, was detached from Steele’s division, and placed on Morgan’s right. The object of this arrangement was to distract the enemy’s attention, leading him to expect an attack at a number of different points. Instructions, however, had been given to each of the commanders to converge toward the point of attack, at or near Barfield’s plantation. There it had been discovered the bayou could be crossed at two points—at a sand bar, and at a narrow levee.

On the 27th, the army began to move. General Steele, who had been ordered to take position on the further side of the slough above this bayou, experienced great difficulty in landing his troops. So soft and slushy was the ground, and so dense was the brushwood, that he found it necessary to construct roads for moving his wagons and artillery. When night came he had only advanced some two miles from the shore. During the greater portion of next day he pushed forward his command; but he was compelled to report to Sherman that he found it physically impossible to reach the bluffs from his position, and that to persist in the attempt, would inevitably lead to the ruin of his troops, and the loss of his field equipage. He was, therefore, ordered to leave some of his troops behind him as a show of force, to hasten to the west side of the Chickasaw Bayou, and take a position on Morgan’s left. On the 27th, Blair moved slowly towards the bluffs, his desire being to give Steele time to come into position on the left. He succeeded in silencing one of the enemy’s batteries at the point where he expected Steele would be able to join him, and held his ground.

On the 28th, the various divisions pressed forward; and the National troops were in full possession on the Yazoo side of the bayou, with one bridge thrown across, and with two bridges partially constructed. During the course of the day, while reconnoitering, General M. L. Smith was severely wounded in the hip, and compelled to retire to his steamboat. His command devolved on General Stuart; but Sherman, feeling convinced that A. J. Smith could accomplish nothing on the extreme right, because of the heavy fire of the forts immediately in his front, ordered him to leave Burbridge in position at that point, and to come up with a portion of his forces to the point selected for crossing the bayou, and entrusted him with the execution of the task. Such was the state of things on the night of the 28th. General Morgan was in position on the west or rather southwest side of the Chickasaw; General Blair was a little to his right, near the angle of the bayou; General M. L. Smith’s division, under General Stuart, was on the right centre; General A. J. Smith’s, which was further to the right, had taken position near the place where the bayou
was to be crossed; and General Steele was moving up on the left, to act as a reserve to Morgan.

On the morning of the 29th, all things were in readiness for the attack. It was Sherman’s object, as he himself has told us, to make a lodgment on the foot-hills and bluffs abreast of his position, while diversions were being made by the navy at Haines’ Bluff, and by the first division, directly towards Vicksburg. We have already mentioned that there were two crossings—one in front of Morgan, and another a little further to the southwest, in front of M. L. Smith. An attempt was made by A. J. Smith to throw a light-flying bridge over the bayou, more to the right. On the extreme left, a little above the angle of the Chickasaw, near the house of Mrs. Lake, Blair’s men had succeeded in constructing a bridge, but not without great difficulty, and with very considerable loss. Sherman expected great things from General Morgan, who, as we have seen, commanded the first division, and was to lead the attack in person. Sherman pointed out to him the place where he could pass the bayou, and received for answer: “General, in ten minutes after you give the signal, I’ll be on those hills.” His position was one of considerable difficulty. The crossing was narrow; and immediately opposite, at the base of the hills, there was a Confederate battery, supported by infantry, posted on the spurs of the hills in the rear. This was the real point of attack; but to distract the attention of the enemy, Sherman’s instructions were that the initial movements should be made at the flanks.

It was about noon before the signal was given for a general forward movement across the bayou and towards the enemy’s position. A heavy artillery fire was opened all along the National line. It recalled the memory of Iuka and Corinth. The Confederate batteries made a prompt reply, and were soon followed by the infantry, which opened a perfect tempest of lead on the advance ranks of Morgan and A. J. Smith. In the midst of this fierce storm of cannon-shot and musketry, De Courcy’s brigade, of Morgan’s division, succeeded in crossing the bayou; but so terrific was the fire that they took to cover behind the bank, and could not be moved forward. General Blair, meanwhile, had crossed the bayou by the bridge above the angle, and had reached the slough, the bottom of which was quicksand, and the banks of which were covered with felled trees. With great difficulty, and not until his ranks were thrown into some disorder, was the crossing of the slough accomplished. This done, it was necessary, before reaching the enemy’s works, to traverse a sloping plateau, raked by a direct and enfilading fire from heavy artillery, and swept by a storm of bullets from the rifle-pits. Nothing daunted, Blair and his brave brigade—his own and his officers’ horses having been left behind, some of them floundering in the mire and vainly seeking a foothold in the quicksand—went bounding across the plateau. Rushing upon the rifle-pits, they captured the first line and
then the second, and made a desperate effort to gain the crest of the hill on which the batteries were planted.

Colonel Thayer, of Steele's division, had followed Blair, with his brigade, over the same bridge. Entering the abatis at the same point, he turned somewhat to the right, and emerged upon the plateau almost simultaneously with Blair, and about two hundred yards to his right. Unfortunately, however, Thayer found that he was followed by only one regiment; his second regiment, after his movement had commenced, having been ordered to the support of Morgan, and the other two regiments having followed this one by mistake. It was a sad blunder, and one which contributed not a little to the disaster of the day. Thayer discovered the mistake before he had fairly brought his troops into action; but he was too brave a man to halt or hesitate in the circumstances. On he pushed to the right of Blair, and rendered effective aid in the capture of the second line of rifle-pits. Leaving his regiment to hold the position it had won, he hurried back, with Blair's consent, to obtain reinforcements. It was a trying interval. The moments seemed hours. "It was a struggle," as has been well said, "between three thousand in the open ground below and ten thousand behind entrenchments above." The hill sides bristled with bayonets and blazed with the fire of musketry, while, from the angry mouths of huge cannon, destruction was poured forth upon the shattered and rapidly thinning ranks of the assailants. Blair, impatient for the return of Thayer, rushed back himself to persuade the advance of more troops. It was all in vain. Both Thayer and himself failed in obtaining reinforcements. No help reached them; no diversion was made in their favor. They had no choice but to order a retreat. Blair and Thayer fell back, with a loss of at least one third of their men; and De Courcy, who had been attacked on the flank by the Seventeenth and Twenty-Sixth Louisiana, lost four flags, 332 men made prisoners, and about 500 small arms.

The attack was a complete failure. Somehow, the signal for attack was imperfectly understood. Either that, or it was not heard at all on the right. Two divisions had remained immovable, while a handful of men were being crushed in a desperate attempt on the left. A. J. Smith had done nothing. Stuart had managed to push across one regiment—the Sixth Missouri—which had orders to undermine the bluff. The position of those men was one which severely tried their faith and patience. They were exposed to the vertical fire of the Confederate sharpshooters who occupied the ridge; and a battalion of the Thirteenth Regulars, who were stationed opposite, and who attempted to protect them from the Confederate fire, proved equally dangerous with the enemy above. "Shoot higher!" shouted the Nationals below the bluff. "Shoot lower!" cried the Confederates. After dark, this regiment was brought back over the bayou. The remainder of Steele's division did not get up in time to be of any assistance to Blair. Mor-
gan failed to make good his promise. He did not even obey his orders. General Sherman was particularly severe on Morgan. To him, and to his conduct, he attributed the failure of the attack. "This attack failed," he has since told us in his memoirs, "and I have always felt that it was due to the failure of General G. W. Morgan to obey his orders, or to fulfil his promises made in person. Had he used with skill and boldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of Blair, he could have made a lodgment on the bluff, which would have opened the door for our whole force to follow."

Sherman was naturally mortified at the "lame and impotent conclusion" of a movement which, he had fondly and confidently believed, would result in a great and decisive victory. Baffled, and even humiliated, he was not dismayed. He resolved to make another attack; and arrangements were made to push forward General Hovey to the position from which Blair had been driven; Morgan's division, with the brigades of Blair and Thayer, to follow and support. For some reason it was not done; and next morning it was found to be impossible, because of the increased strength of the Confederates at the menaced point. Firing was continued on both sides during Tuesday; and on Wednesday, the 31st, a flag of truce was sent in; and the dead were buried, and the wounded cared for. An eye-witness has given us a sad picture of the battle field on that day of burial. "All across the plain, scattered among the abatis, and hid away in little entanglements of bogs, or tufts of bushes, they lay, Confederates and Federals side by side, showing how the battle had rolled and surged with the alternate charges of either party. But the saddest sight of all was that of the unfortunate wounded who had lain through all these weary hours, since the battle, uncared for, many of them, because the nature of their wounds prevented them from moving; others were held fast by a little knot of corpses which chance had thrown upon them; and still others, perhaps not wounded at all at first, but being caught beneath the horses they rode, as they fell, were pinned to the earth. The frantic appeals for water, for food, or other succor, of such of these miserable victims of war as could speak at all, were most heartrending."

Sherman was still dissatisfied, and resolved to make another attack. After consulting with Admiral Porter, it was agreed that a combined naval and land assault should be made on Haines' Bluff, the key of the Confederate position. Porter was to proceed up the Yazoo with his gunboats, and open fire on the bluffs, while General Steele was to land his division out of range of the enemy's guns, then to push forward and take the position by storm. The attack was to be made during the dark hours. By two o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 1st of January, 1863, the necessary arrangements were completed. A heavy fog, however, had enveloped the entire district; and so dense was it that Porter found it
impossible to steer the boats. It was utterly out of the question to make any further efforts. On the night of the 29th December, there had been a tremendous rain-storm; all the low ground was flooded; and the men who had been bivouacking for five successive days in those wretched swamps, without fire, were suffering cruelly from damp and cold. On the 2d of January, Sherman placed his troops on board the transports; and the fleet sailed down to the mouth of the Yazoo. Thus ended, somewhat ingloriously, the second campaign against Vicksburg. Sherman had accomplished nothing. He had, however, made great sacrifices; his loss in killed and wounded and prisoners amounting to nearly 2000 men. Such was the battle of Chickasaw Bayou, or, as it is sometimes but less correctly named, the battle of Haines' Bluff.

It was a sad disappointment to the people of the North; and Sherman, from whom great things were expected, came in for a large share of abuse. Several of the correspondents on the spot, ignorant of some of the causes of the failure, and not knowing as yet the fate which had befallen Grant, were unnecessarily severe in their condemnation of Sherman. That he meant well, that he was resolved to win, and that his plan was well-conceived, there can be no doubt. But somehow the execution was not equal to the conception. There was some mistake in giving the signal; and the real assault was made by only 3000 men. If Blair had been sustained in his attack, as he ought to have been sustained, the National army would most undoubtedly have effected a lodgment on the heights; and, although hard fighting must have followed with doubtful success, it is not at all impossible that Sherman might have reaped all the glory due to the capture of Vicksburg. Blair will be remembered as the hero of Chickasaw Bayou. He fought like a warrior of old, face to face and hand to hand with the foe. After Blair, praise is due to Thayer, who gallantly sustained his companion in arms. The battle ground, no doubt, had much to do with the defeat. To any one of less daring than Sherman, familiar with the district, and well-informed as to the strength of the enemy's position, the undertaking might have seemed impracticable from the outset; and it is questionable whether even he, had he possessed a fuller knowledge of the difficulties which beset him, would have imperilled his fame and risked the lives of his soldiers in a task so apparently hopeless. It was doubtless a mistake not to have more thoroughly and officially reconnoitered the ground before choosing it as the field of action. After all, however, it was an experiment which might have been successful; and it was not the only unsuccessful experiment which was made before Vicksburg was captured. As it was, everything might have been well, if Grant had been able to carry out his part of the plan. The retreat of the latter from Oxford, leaving, as it did, Pemberton free to concentrate his troops for the defense of Vicksburg,
largely diminished Sherman's chances of success.

The Confederates were jubilant after this first victory. It was undoubtedly a great triumph. General Pemberton, not without reason, felt proud that he had baffled Grant in person, compelling him to retreat, and that he had temporarily, at least, saved Vicksburg by the defeat of the greatest of Grant's lieutenants. These rejoicings in the South were not unmixed with sorrow. The more thoughtful of the Confederates knew that defeat only intensified the purpose of the North. Vicksburg had not yet fallen; but Vicksburg, they felt, was doomed.

We left the transports and the fleet on their way down the Yazoo. At the mouth of that river, General McClernand was waiting with orders from the War Department to take command of the entire expedition. That general, it will be remembered, was appointed to this command by the direct influence of President Lincoln. It was a severe blow to Sherman, who felt it keenly. It was some consolation, however, to him to know that the appointment—which had been made weeks ahead, and which had no connection with the recent disaster—was not intended as a disgrace. With a modesty which became a man of his high spirit, he accepted the situation, and explained to McClernand what had been done, accepting the entire responsibility of the failure. Referring to the trains of cars which could be heard coming in to Vicksburg almost every hour, and the fresh troops seen on the bluffs, he gave it as his opinion that Pemberton's army must have been pressed back, and that Grant must be at hand. He then learned, for the first time, what had befallen Grant; McClernand stating that Grant was not coming at all, that the depot at Holly Springs had been captured by Van Dorn, that Grant had fallen back from Coffeeville and Oxford to Holly Springs and La Grange, and that when he passed down, Quimby's division, of Grant's army, was actually at Memphis for stores. By common consent, all further attempts against Vicksburg, for the present, were abandoned; and the entire force left the Yazoo, and retired to Milliken's Bend on the Mississippi.

On the 4th of January, McClernand issued his General Order No. 1, assuming command of what was to be called the army of the Mississippi, and, following the plan which had been agreed upon at Washington, and which had been adopted in the armies of the East, dividing his forces into two corps. The first was to be commanded by General Morgan, and was to be composed of his own and A. J. Smith's divisions; and the second, to consist of Steele's and Stuart's divisions, was to be commanded by General Sherman. The rest of the army of the Tennessee was similarly divided, General Hurlbut being placed in command of one corps, and General McPherson in command of the other. The supreme command of these four corps was retained by General Grant. On the same day, General Sherman issued the following order:
"Headquarters Right Wing Army of Tennessee,
Steamer Forest Queen, Milliken's Bend,
January 4, 1863.

"Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps'; one to be commanded by General G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own corps, I desire to express to all commanders, to soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement—the capture of Vicksburg; but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement in which others were to assist. We were on time; unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others. We have destroyed the Shreveport Road, we have attacked the defenses of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify; and, having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the president of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubtedd right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough, too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must, in the end, emerge from the dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity. All officers of the general staff not attached to my person will hereafter report in person and by letter to Major-General McClernand, commanding the army of the Mississippi, on board the steamer Tigress at our rendezvous at Haines' Landing and at Montgomery Point.

"By order of

"Major-General W. T. Sherman.

"J. H. Hammond,
"Assistant-Adjutant General."

Before the arrival of McClernand, Sherman and Porter had agreed upon a plan for the reduction of Fort Hindman, or, as it was called, Arkansas Post. About forty or forty-five miles from the mouth of the Arkansas, there is a piece of elevated ground, the first high land on the banks of the river, after leaving the Mississippi. At this point, the river makes a sharp bend. Here the French had a trading post and a settlement as far back as 1685. The Confederates had taken advantage of the place to erect some fortifications, the principal work being named Fort Hindman, after the famous guerrilla chief. Behind these works, they kept several steamboats, which were wont to sweep down the river and intercept supplies. Sherman had experienced some inconvenience from the existence of this stronghold. He had left Memphis in such haste that he had not been able to
take with him a sufficient supply of ammunition for his guns. The Blue Wing, a small steamer carrying a mail, towing some coal barges, and having with her the necessary supplies, had been sent after him. This boat had been pounced upon at the mouth of the Arkansas, captured, and, with all her supplies, taken up to Fort Hindman. It was Sherman’s conviction, from the moment he learned of the fate of the Blue Wing, that before any operation could be successfully conducted against Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi, it would be necessary to reduce Fort Hindman, and make an end of the Arkansas pirates. Sherman communicated his purpose to McClernand, and asked permission to go up the Arkansas, and clear out the post. McClernand, who had not as yet, so far as appearances indicated, formed any plan of his own, went with Sherman on board the Black Hawk to consult with Porter. Porter, who had the highest esteem for Sherman, not only approved of the enterprise, but expressed a desire to go up the river himself, in place of trusting the expedition to any of his subordinates. It was Sherman’s expectation that he would be sent, with his own corps, alone on this business; but McClernand concluded to go himself, and to take with him his whole force.

The troops, which had not yet disembarked from the transports, were ordered to remain on board. Sherman’s corps was in two divisions. The first, which consisted of three brigades, commanded respectively by Blair, Hovey and Thayer, was under Brigadier-General Frederick Steele. The second, which consisted of two brigades, commanded by Colonels G. A. Smith and T. Kilby Smith, was under Brigadier-General Stuart. The transports with the troops on board, convoyed by the gun boats, of which three were iron-clads, proceeded up the Mississippi. The force under McClernand amounted to some 26,000 or 27,000 men, comprising 40 regiments of infantry, 10 batteries with several guns of heavy calibre, and about 1500 horse. On the 8th of January, the expedition was at the mouth of the White River. This river, which is one of the principal streams in Arkansas, rises a few miles east of Fayetteville, flows northeast into Missouri, then returns into Arkansas, and, pursuing a southeasterly course, enters the Mississippi about fifteen miles above the mouth of the Arkansas River. It is navigable by steamboats for about three hundred and fifty miles. About fifteen miles from its mouth, there is a channel or “cut-off,” through which it discharges a portion of its waters into the Arkansas. If, as sometimes happens, the Arkansas should be higher than the White River, the state of things is reversed, and the waters of the Arkansas seek the Mississippi through the channel of the White River. The “cut-off” at this season of the year is always well filled and easily navigable. On the morning of the 9th, the expedition having ascended the White River, had reached the mouth of the “cut-off.” There was no delay in making the
passage through to the Arkansas, a distance of about eight miles. Steaming up the Arkansas, the boats reached Notrib's Farm, about four miles below Fort Hindman, shortly after four o'clock in the afternoon. Here they halted; and during the night the artillery and wagons were got on shore, the troops disembarking in the morning. Arkansas Post is on the north side or left bank of the Arkansas, at a point where the river makes a sharp elbow, by flowing north, then east, then again abruptly to the south. The principal work, as we have said, was Fort Hindman. Its guns commanded the river, as it stretched to the east, and, after it bent toward the south. This fort was a regular square bastioned work, one hundred yards each exterior side, with a deep ditch about fifteen feet wide, and a parapet eighteen feet high. It was armed with twelve guns, two of which were eight-inch, and one nine-inch. The garrison, which numbered only 5000 men, was under the command of General T. J. Churchill, who was under the direction of General T. H. Holmes, then commanding at Little Rock. Churchill had received instructions to "hold on until help should arrive or all were dead."

The disparity of forces was great. It was 26,000 or 27,000 against 5000. The strong position held by the Confederates, however, did much to compensate for inferiority of numbers. The fort itself was strong; and its approaches were of the most difficult description. Fronting on the river, it was protected on the west by a bayou, on the east by a swamp which did not quite reach the edge of the water. Between the fort and the swamp, there was a ravine which stretched down to the river; and the front of this ravine was well fortified. The position had thus to be approached through the elevated ground which lay between the bayou and the swamp. The encampments of the Confederates were established in front of the fort, in the centre of the plateau dotted with clumps of trees. There was an outer line of entrenchments which stretched across the entire ground.

On the 10th, the army was kept busy endeavoring to get a position in rear of the fort, Sherman on the right and Morgan on the left. Some mistakes were made, in consequence of a want of knowledge of the ground. In the afternoon, and while the land forces were still seeking position, Porter was making good use of his flotilla. As he moved up the river, he shelled the rifle-pits along the levee, and drove the Confederates inside the fort. When about four hundred yards from Fort Hindman, he brought into action his three iron-clads—the Baron de Kalb, the Louisville and the Cincinnati; and for half an hour the firing was kept up, the guns of the fort replying vigorously.

On the morning of the 11th McClellan, who had his quarters still on board the Tigress, had come up and taken a position in the woods to the rear. Early in the forenoon, he sent a message to Sherman, asking him why the attack was not begun. It had
The gallant bullets. Surrender. This Thayer Sherman, hear necessary smoke field. The regiment firing ringing &ve field about the impossible the horses, volunteers, line. Morgan A Confederate was decimating the storming of 1200; that he was within five or six hundred yards of the enemy's works; that the next movement must be a direct assault along the whole line; and that he was waiting to hear from the gunboats. Half an hour or thereabout afterwards was heard the clear, ringing sound of the navy guns, the firing becoming louder and more rapid as they neared the fort. The National field pieces opened fire along the whole line. The thunder was terrific. The Confederates, most of whom were Texan volunteers, made a gallant resistance. A regiment of cavalry, abandoning their horses, fought on foot, and rendered, for a time, effective service in resisting the advance of the Nationals. It was impossible for them to resist the fierce onset made by overwhelming numbers. Sherman pressed forward on the right, Morgan on the left, each driving the Confederates back, and gradually obtaining possession of the wooded ground in front of the newly-erected parapet, but not without considerable loss. The Confederate firing was heavy; but the National soldiers took advantage of the clumps of trees, and felled logs to shield themselves from the storm of bullets. Gradually the edge of the woods was reached; the ground was clear; and there was nothing to protect them from the decimating fire of the enemy.

Meanwhile, the gunboats were pouring a murderous fire upon the fort, and sweeping the adjoining ground above and below with grape and shrapnells. Porter had brought into action not only the iron-clads, but the ram Monarch, Commander Ellet, and even the frailer vessels, as he tells us, that amid the clouds of smoke they might "do the best they could." It was not long until the effects of this terrific firing began to be visible. All the adjoining ground was cleared of the foe; nearly all the artillery horses in the fort were killed; and one by one the guns were being silenced. Shortly after three o'clock, the firing from the fort altogether ceased. The cannonading, however, was kept up by the gunboats. Porter, who had taken a regiment on board, was proceeding with the Black Hawk to attempt a landing, and to take possession, when a white flag was raised in token of surrender. He immediately ordered the firing to cease.

We left the troops in the clearing at the edge of the woods, fully exposed to the enemy's fire from the parapet outside the fort. This line had three sections of field guns; and they were handled, according to the testimony of Sherman himself, with great skill and energy. Hovey was wounded; Thayer had his horse shot under him; and so thick and fast was the round-shot falling about Sherman and his staff, that they felt it necessary to scatter, Sherman himself dismounting. Morgan, at this crisis, unfortunately found himself in front of the ravine, beyond which it was impossible to pass. Sherman was now well engaged on the right; and Morgan, finding himself thus hindered, sent a few regiments to his aid. The
burden of the fight, as at Chickasaw, had fallen on the brigades which now composed the division of General Steele. Blair and Thayer and Hovey performed prodigies of valor.

On the right, the Confederate batteries had been all but silenced. Morgan's men, on the left, had done splendid work before they were brought to a standstill at the ravine. A. J. Smith's brigades had pressed the Confederates back, step by step, until they were within two hundred yards of the fort. Burbridge expressly distinguished himself. But for the ravine, an attempt would have been made by the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio to scale, and carry by assault, the eastern side of the fort. Almost at this moment, however, Sherman, as his attention was arrested by the flags of the gunboats visible above the parapet of Fort Hindman, saw a man jump on the nearer parapet at the point where entered the road which divided the peninsula. "Cease firing!" he ordered; and the words were passed along the line with amazing rapidity. The firing soon ceased. In a few seconds the fort was invaded on every side by the National troops. Colonel Dayton was ordered forward to the place where was hung out the large white flag; and as soon as his horse was seen on the parapet, Sherman advanced with his staff. It appeared afterwards that the white flag was hung out without even the knowledge of Churchill. It made little difference. The battle had really been won on the land as well as on the river side of the fort. The surrender was subsequently made in due form—Colonel Dunnington, the commander of the fort, surrendering to Admiral Porter, and Colonel Churchill surrendering to the military authorities. The National loss in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 977 men. On the Confederate side there were only 60 killed and 80 wounded. Five thousand soldiers, with their officers, made prisoners, and all the property of the place, including some seventeen guns, constituted the prize of victory. General Burbridge was singled out for the honor of planting the National standard on Fort Hindman. Such was the battle of Arkansas Post.

General Sherman was dissatisfied with the arrangements made by General McClellan immediately after the surrender. The post of honor—the occupation of Fort Hindman—was given to A. J. Smith, of Morgan's division, Sherman being ordered to hold the lines outside, and go on securing the prisoners and stores. McClellan's reason for so doing was that he did not wish to interfere with the actual state of facts—the status quo at the time of surrender. It is undeniable that it was Sherman's plan throughout; that his corps bore the burden of the fight; that, after the surrender, his troops were in possession of two of the three brigades which constituted the opposing force; and that he was in possession of all the ground outside the "fort proper." McClellan was proud of his success, and manifested not a little vanity. His star, he said, was ever in the ascendant. In his memoirs, Sherman tells us that
McClernand was extremely jealous of the navy, and that, in his report, he ignored altogether the action of Porter's fleet. This was the less to be regretted that Porter told his own story in a very handsome and effective way. It is only simple truth to say that the battle was fought and won by the fleet before the land troops had any certainty of success. There was, in fact, a feeling of jealousy among the commanders—a feeling which was not wholly to disappear until the arrival of Grant, in whose presence, and under the influence of whose more commanding genius, jealousy and selfishness gave place to a spirit of honorable rivalry and dutiful obedience.

The day after the battle was devoted to burying the dead. The prisoners were all collected and sent to St. Louis. The victory at Arkansas Post opened the way for a successful expedition to Little Rock, the capital of the State of Arkansas. Sherman expressed a desire to be sent on this expedition. McClernand, however, did not deem it advisable. A combined expedition, was, therefore, sent up the White River, as far as St. Charles, Des Arc and Duval's Bluff, under General Gorman and Lieutenant-Commanding J. G. Walker. The expedition was completely successful. Meanwhile, the works at Fort Hindman were dismantled and blown up; and, on the 13th, the troops were re-embarked, and proceeded down the Arkansas to Napoleon. There, instructions were received from General Grant, who ordered McClernand to take the entire expedition down the river to Milliken's Bend, and await his arrival. This place was reached on the 21st of January.

In itself, the movement against Arkansas Post was a small affair; it was so regarded by General Grant; it ought to have been successfully accomplished by one corps, and by a portion of the fleet—instead of the combined strength of both—and that was Sherman's idea; but resulting, as it did, in victory, it served the double purpose of employing troops which would otherwise have been idle, and of cheering the hearts of a people who were somewhat despondent.
The Proclamation of Emancipation.—Divided Sentiments.—A Turning Point in History.—The Cry of the Slave.—Prayers Heard and Answered.—Colored Troops.—“Vicksburg Must Be Taken.”—Grant at Young’s Point.—The Walnut Hills.—The Yazoo.—Haines’ Bluff.—An Apparently Impregnable City.—How to Get to the East of the Mississippi.—Five Different Schemes.—The Williams Canal Experiment.—Almost a Success.—A Failure.—A Bold and Daring Experiment.—The Flood.—Roundabout Bayou.—Another Failure.—Lake Providence.—Moon Lake.—The Yallahusha.—The Tallahatchie.—Greenwood.—Fort Pemberton.—Another Failure.—Steele’s Bayou.—Admiral Porter.—Failure Again.—A Five-Fold Failure.—Grant Disappointed, but Not Discouraged.—Sherman’s Opinion.—Grant’s Resolve.—The New Movement Commenced.—New Carthage.—A Tedious and Difficult March.—The Fleet.—Passing the Batteries.—A Midnight Scene.—Grierson’s Raid.—The Importance of Cavalry.—A Brilliant Exploit.—Grand Gulf.—The Gunboats Open Fire.—The Place too Strong.—Rodney.— Bruinsburg.—A Landing Effected.—A Useful Diversion.—Sherman at Haines’ Bluff.—Safe on the East Side.—Grant’s Self-Reliance.—Port Gibson.—The Battle.—The Confederates Fall Back.—Hankinson’s Ferry.—“The City of an Hundred Hills.”—Bayou Pierre.—Big Black.—The Natural Barriers.—Reconnoitering Parties.—Raymond.—A Tremendous Rush for the Guns.—A National Victory.—Johnston at Jackson.—His Instructions to Pemberton.—Jackson Evacuated.—An Easy Victory.—Torrents of Rain.—The Three Generals, Grant, McPherson and Sherman.—Grant Now Marches Against Pemberton.—Edward’s Station the Point of Rendezvous.—Champion Hills.—A Strong Position.—Pemberton Prepares for Battle.—Arrival of the National Advance.—The Battle of Champion Hills Begun.—Hovey Sorely Pressed.—Reinforced.—Logan’s Success.—The Battle Won After a Terrible Struggle.—McClernand too Late.—McClernand and Osterhaus Ordered in Pursuit.—The Big Black River.—The Railway Bridge.—A Successful Retreat.—Preparations for Assault.—Lawler’s Discovery.—The Assault Made.—A Terrible Struggle.—Heavy Loss of Life.—The Burning of the Bridges.—The Bridges Reconstructed.—On to Vicksburg.—Porter on the Yazoo.—Sherman at Haines’ Bluff.—The Fall of Vicksburg Secured.—Preparing to Make the Assault.—Pemberton’s Situation.—The Assault of the 19th of May.—A Failure.—The Assault of the 22d.—Grant’s Reasons for Avoiding Further Delay.—Terrible Fighting.—The “Works too Strong, Naturally and Artificially, to be Taken by Assault.”—McClernand’s Mistake.—Sergeant Griffiths.—A Useless Slaughter.—The Troops Recalled.—The Troops Complimented.—The Bravery of the Defenders.—A Confederate Picture.—McClernand’s Congratulatory Order.—His Removal from the Command of the Thirteenth Corps.—The Appointment of Ord.—Grant Resolves to Take the Place by a Regular Siege.—Reinforcements.—The Investment Completed.—Siege Operations Commenced.—Pemberton’s Situation Becoming Desperate.—His Complaints.—The Want of Cavalry.—What Johnston Proposed.—Johnston Preparing to Attack the National Rear.—Pemberton’s Vaccination.—Distress of the Garrison.—The Mining Operations Well Advanced.—The 29th of June.—The First Mine Fired.—The Storming Columns.—The Assault on Fort Hill.—A Terrible Cannonade.—A Repulse.—The 1st of July.—The Destruction of the Redan.—An Intercepted Letter.—Promised Aid to Pemberton.—Grant’s Instructions to Sherman.—The 3d of July.—The White Flag.—General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery.—A Letter from Pemberton.—He Asks for an Armistice and the Appointment of Commissioners.—Grant Refuses.—“Unconditional Surrender.”—The Interview Between Grant and Pemberton.—An Imposing Scene.—Under the Old Oak, in View of Both Armies.—A Striking Contrast.—Can’t Agree.—Consideration on the Part of Grant.—Terms in Writing.—The Agreement.—The Surrender.—The Fourth of July.—Light at Last.—A Great Day for the National Cause.—A National Triumph.—A Great Triumph for Grant.—The First Soldier of the Republic.—The Results of the Campaign.—Pursuit of Johnston.—Evacuation of Jackson.—Johnston, the “Hero of Retreats.”—The End of a Great and Glorious Campaign.

The opening of the year 1863 was made memorable by the Proclamation of Emancipation. It was by slow degrees that Abraham Lincoln rose to the full dignity of his mission, and arrived at the conclusion that the
THE CRY OF THE OPPRESSED.

will of God, as well as the rights of man and the preservation of the Union, called for the immediate and unqualified abolition of slavery. What to do with the slaves of the South had, indeed, been a vexed question since the commencement of the war. It was a fruitful source of controversy in the cabinet; and it puzzled alike the legislators in Congress and the generals in the field. Among the last named, particularly from whom direct action was frequently demanded, the greatest diversity of sentiment prevailed. Butler looked upon the slaves as contraband. In his own department, Fremont gave them liberty. McClellan would put them down "with an iron hand." Patterson would repress all servile insurrections. Mansfield would allow them no harbor in his camps. Halleck would drive them out of his lines. Burnside would not interfere with slavery. Cameron would not surrender any that might chance to come within the army lines. Dix was unwilling to interfere between the slave and his master. Wool was willing to give them employment, and to regulate their pay and allowances. Hooker and Buell actually went so far as to authorize slave-owners to search the National camps for fugitives, and to carry them off. Lincoln complained of the conduct of Fremont; and he issued a counter-order when Hunter, at Hilton Head, proclaimed the slaves in his department free.

It is not necessary to trace the successive steps by which, ultimately, emancipation was reached. Reference has already been made, in these pages, to the history of the proclamation itself. It was the work of Lincoln's own hand; and, in its every sentence, it bears the impress of his genius. Evidently it took shape during the unfortunate campaign of General Pope in Virginia—a campaign, the disastrous results of which were all the more severely felt that it followed so close upon McClellan's retreat from the peninsula. But for the advice of Secretary Seward, the proclamation would have been published while the nation was yet smarting under defeat, while Pope and his shattered legions were sheltered behind the fortifications at Washington, and while Lee had marched in triumph into Maryland. It was wisely concluded to wait until the first returning sunshine of victory should rest on the National cause. The opportunity arrived after the battle of Antietam, and when Lee, on the night of the 19th of September, 1862, retired into Virginia. Three days after that date, on the 22d of September, Lincoln—remembering the vow he had made before God, that, if General Lee were driven back from Maryland, he would crown the result by a declaration of freedom to the slaves—issued that famous proclamation which marked a turning-point, not only in the history of the United States, but in the history of the world.

In one of the finest passages of his excellent history of the Civil War, Dr. Draper, when describing the condition of the negroes, and the hopes which the proclamation inspired in their breasts, says: "From the rivers of Virginia to the Mexican confines of the Republic
arose a mournful wail: ‘How long, O Lord, how long!’ It came from the weary laborer, leaning on his hoe in the cotton field under the noontide sun; it came through the moaning midnight forests, solemn and clear above their multitudinous inarticulate sounds; it came from children torn from their parents, from wives and husbands parted at the auction block, from mothers in despair, from strong men fainting under the lash, from the aged, whose heads were frosted by time. In their quaint prayers, the Africans talk to God as a man talks face to face with his friend. Slavery had made Him their friend. By the flickering fires of their cabins, they stealthily spelt out the Bible, to see what He had promised to them. It was their dreadful lot that had caused Jefferson, himself a slave-owner, to expostulate solemnly with his countrymen, and to deprecate the wrath of God. For who shall escape when, from the hand of Eternal Justice, her scales have dropped as useless; when from her brow the bandage has been raised, that her uncovered and angry eyes may gaze upon unutterable wrong; when her uplifted arm, quivering with indignation, is ready to strike a blow that shall make a whole continent tremble!”

On the evening of the last day of the year 1862, these poor, down-trodden ones, wherever they could gather together—in their humble meeting-houses, in their lowlier cabins, or in the lone woods—met in solemn assembly, and lifted their eyes and their hearts to heaven, calling upon Almighty God to strengthen the hands of Abraham Lincoln on the coming day. When that day arrived, the purpose which had been declared in September, was made good; and the stain of slavery was wiped out from the escutcheon of the Republic.

The emancipation proclamation did not give satisfaction to all. It greatly enraged, as a matter of course, the Southern leaders; and there were many in the North who, although they had no sympathy with the Southern Confederacy, regarded the abolition of slavery as an interference with the rights of property, and a violation of one of the fundamental principles of the constitution. Immediate and unqualified abolition may not have been an unmixed good; but it was a necessity—a necessity growing out of the war. It was a weapon which the North had a perfect right to use in putting down the rebellion; and not to have used it would have implied both weakness and folly. Slavery, besides, lay at the very root of the evil out of which, cancer-like, the war arose; and, if it was “the paramount object” of the North “to save the Union, and not to save or to destroy slavery,” it was to preserve the institution of slavery that the war was undertaken and continued by the South. It was not a rash act, done in hot haste, the offspring of revenge or despair. It was the result of much anxious and prayerful thought, the ripe fruit of calm, patient and protracted study. It was the noblest act of Lincoln’s brief and chequered but withal noble life.
One of the immediate results of this proclamation of emancipation was the organization of colored troops. Towards the close of 1863, there were some fifty thousand colored men in actual service; and this number was tripled before the close of 1864. It was not, however, for some time to come that their influence on the field began to be felt. During the year 1863, although colored troops, as we shall see, took part at the siege of Port Hudson, and in other engagements, their effect was comparatively unimportant. The introduction of colored men into the army was regarded by many in the light of a fresh revolution. It gave birth in some quarters to a perfect howl of dissatisfaction; several of the newspapers went beyond all bounds in their fierce denunciation of the government; and the swords of some prominent generals relaxed in their grasp. General Grant, not troubling himself with politics, but regarding himself simply as the servant of the Republic, heartily approved of the emancipation policy, and enforced the measures of the government. "It is expected," he said, "that all commanders will especially exert themselves in carrying out the policy of the administration, not only in organizing colored troops, and rendering them efficient, but also in removing prejudices against them."

The situation was now ripe for the vigorous prosecution of the siege of Vicksburg. Sherman's non-success at Chickasaw had not dismayed Grant, while the comparatively unimportant victory at Arkansas Post had greatly cheered the people. The popular cry was "On to Vicksburg!" and Grant's emphatic dictum was "Vicksburg must be taken." The army under General Grant had been greatly reinforced; and the general feeling was that if the "Queen City of the Bluff" was to be reduced, it was to be done by the hero of Donelson and Shiloh, of Iuka and Corinth.

As we stated at the close of the last chapter, Grant was to meet McClernand and Porter, with the fleet and transports, at Milliken's Bend. On the 18th of January, that meeting took place. There was a general consultation; and the views of the general-in-chief, and of all the leading officers, were freely exchanged. After consultation, Grant made arrangements for future movements, and gave some special instructions. McClernand and Sherman made immediate preparations to go down the Mississippi to Young's Point; and Grant, without delay, returned to Memphis, in order to hasten the transportation of his troops to the neighborhood of Vicksburg. McClernand, it will be remembered, assumed command of what was named the army of the Mississippi, after the battle of the Chickasaw, by virtue of a confidential order from the War Department. In this capacity, however, he was subject to orders from General Grant, who was at the head of the department of the Tennessee. At the time of which we write, all things were changed. By an order (No. 210) of December 18th, 1862, from the War Department, the Western armies had been
grouped into five corps, viz.: the Thirteenth, Major-General McClernand; the Fourteenth, Major-General George H. Thomas, in Middle Tennessee; the Fifteenth, Major-General W. T. Sherman; the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, at Memphis; and the Seventeenth, Major-General McPherson, back of Memphis. This entire force was placed under the control of General Grant.

In the 2d of February, the greater number of the troops intended to be used in the operations against Vicksburg having already reached their destination, Grant arrived at Young's Point, and took command.

Now that General Grant was on the spot, the question which he had to settle was—How could Vicksburg be most easily and effectually approached? The National army was lying on the west side of the Mississippi. Vicksburg stood on the Walnut Hills, high and impregnable ground on the opposite shore. The city must be approached by way of the river. To give any effect to the siege, troops must be landed either above or below the city. To land troops above the city, implied steaming up the Yazoo and passing the formidable batteries at Haines' Bluff, which completely commanded that river. This, as the latest attempt had proved, was in the last degree dangerous, if not absolutely impossible. It could only succeed by a sacrifice of life which would be but imperfectly rewarded by the result. To land troops below the city, implied steaming down the Mississippi and passing the Vicksburg defenses throughout their entire length. This seemed even a more perilous undertaking than the other. How were these obstacles to be overcome? That was the question which General Grant had now to answer. Five different solutions were suggested. There were, first, the Williams' Canal; second, the route from Milliken's Bend; third, the Lake Providence route; fourth, the Yazoo Pass; and fifth, the route by Steele's Bayou. Let us consider these in the order in which we have named them.

A glance at the map will show the reader what was meant by the canal, and how practicable at first it seemed. In front of Vicksburg the Mississippi makes a sharp bend, forming the peninsula on which stands the town of De Soto. A canal cut across this tongue of land, giving a more direct passage to the current of the river, would leave Vicksburg without any water defenses—the place would, for all military purposes, be neutralized. It will be remembered that, in the summer of 1862, General Williams, who came up the river with Farragut, undertook to cut such a canal, and, for that purpose, gathered some twelve hundred negroes from the plantations in the immediate neighborhood. It has already been narrated how, from an error committed in the location of its mouth, the canal proved a failure. The waters stubbornly refused to leave their ancient channel. This canal or "cut-off," which was one mile in length, was located across the peninsula, at right angles, about six miles below Vicksburg. Grant perceived that if it could effect-
ively be turned to account, it would not only isolate Vicksburg, but make a channel for the transportation of troops and supplies to the south of the city. To the completion of this work, he gave much of his personal attention, as soon as he returned from Memphis.

Meantime, the work had been prosecuted with great vigor by McClernand and Sherman. The men continued to work day and night; and, to secure their protection, good use was made of Porter’s fleet, strengthened now by the addition of several armed vessels, such as the Chillicothe, Indianola, Lafayette, Eastport and others. It was a bold and daring experiment to attempt to divert the course of a great river like the Mississippi—all the more so that the former attempt, undertaken in more favorable circumstances, had proved a complete failure. But it was not an impossible task; and, in the circumstances, nothing but the absolutely impossible was to be left untried. The work progressed favorably. The camps were on the west side of the canal; and the earth was thrown up on that side as a sort of levee. During February, the river continued to rise. By the end of the month, it had risen to a great height; and the work was carried on with very great difficulty, McClernand’s corps being removed to higher ground at Milliken’s Bend. Sherman remained at Young’s Point, and continued to direct operations at the canal. For days the waters, rolling past in their fury, and ever rising higher and higher, had been threatening instant and sweeping destruction to the entire

scheme. It was now the 8th of March. The barrier at the mouth of the “cut” could no longer resist the pressure of the great river. Suddenly, this barrier gave way; and the waters rushing through, swept all before them, filling the cut, submerging thousands of implements, and driving the soldiers to the levee. The canal experiment was a second time a failure. It was not to be tried again. General Grant was no doubt disappointed; but he was not discouraged.

There were a series of bayous connecting Milliken’s Bend with the Tensas River, which again connects with the Mississippi, at New Carthage, some distance below Vicksburg. The principal of these bayous was that of Roundabout or Roundaway, which at one of its extremities unites with the Tensas. In this case, canal-cutting was less necessary than dredging. It so happened that some dredge boats were on hand; and with these boats, Captain F. E. Prime and Colonel G. G. Pride, went earnestly to work. In a short time, a clear passage was effected; and some vessels of light tonnage were able to pass through. The Mississippi, however, began to fall in April; and as the roads between Milliken’s Bend and New Carthage became more serviceable, this water-way was of comparatively little value. It was, in fact, another useless experiment.

General Grant’s attention was not devoted exclusively to any one of those possible avenues by which Vicksburg might be approached. His object was to discover a route which should be at
once practicable and efficient. With this end in view, he was feeling his way all around and in every direction. To the north of Vicksburg about seventy-five miles, and about one mile from the Mississippi, on the Louisiana shore, there is a large body of water about six miles in length, formed evidently in an old bed of the river, and known as Lake Providence. This lake, by a couple of bayous, unites its waters with the Tensas and Washita Rivers, which form the Black River. Through the Black River, it connects with the Red River, and then with the Mississippi, some little distance north of Port Hudson. At the point where the Mississippi is reached, that river receives also the waters of the Atchafalaya. By following this latter river, which is also navigable, it would be possible to form a connection with General Banks, who was in command at New Orleans, and come up on the east side of the river. General Grant, having more troops on hand than could be advantageously employed at Young's Point, ordered a portion of them to cut a canal between Lake Providence and the Mississippi. The canal was successfully cut, and some light vessels passed into Lake Providence; but this route was finally abandoned, partly because of some uncertainty which existed regarding the channel of the Tensas, but mainly because greater success seemed to be promised in other directions.

Grant's resources were not yet exhausted. Some eight miles below Helena, but on the east side of the Mississippi, there is a sheet of water, known as Moon Lake. A narrow channel, of no great length, at that time connected Moon Lake with the Mississippi. Running in an eastern direction from the lake, there is what is called Yazoo Pass, about twelve miles long, which opens into the Coldwater—a narrow stream, which flows to the south and empties into the Tallahatchie; and this latter, after it receives the waters of the Yallabusha, becomes the Yazoo River—an easily navigable stream which, after a tedious course of some two hundred and fifty miles, falls into the Mississippi a little above Vicksburg. If the Yazoo River could be reached from above, it was Grant's expectation that he would then be able to obtain a firm foothold on the high ground to the north of Haines' Bluff, which, it will be remembered, blocked the Yazoo from below, and completely protected Vicksburg from attack in that direction.

It was known that Yazoo Pass had formerly been used by boats as a means of access into the interior of the country; it was believed that the interior streams were still navigable; and it was felt that, in order to make this route a complete success, it was only necessary to open a wider channel from the Mississippi to Moon Lake, and to cut through a levee which obstructed the mouth of the pass. The channel having been widened, and the obstructions having been removed, the water of the Mississippi, which was nine feet higher than the adjacent country, rushed in with tremendous force, sweeping everything before it, and tearing a
passage through the woods deep enough for steamboats to make their way. The expedition consisted of two heavy gunboats, one ram, six light-draught gunboats, and some eighteen transports. One division of McClernand’s corps, which had been stationed at Helena, with the Twelfth and Seventeenth regiments, Missouri infantry, as sharpshooters on the gunboats, formed the advance, under the command of Brigadier-General L. F. Ross. McPherson, with the Seventeenth corps, and two divisions, one from the Thirteenth and one from the Fifteenth, was, in obedience to instructions, in readiness to embark, when it was found that the transports were inadequate, and that not more than one division could be taken. It was not without great difficulty that the expedition found its way to the Coldwater. The country on each side of the pass was a dense forest. The woods abounded with ducks, cormorants, black squirrels, and game of various kinds; while, in the half-stagnant waters and the cane-covered marshes might be seen the turtle, the alligator and the copperhead snake. White smoke, floating here and there through the trees, revealed the presence of the negro, who, in detached clearances, cultivated not cotton but corn. Gigantic trees cast their huge branches across the passage, much to the detriment of the smoke-stacks and upper works of the steamboats. Three days were consumed in accomplishing a distance of twelve miles. All this time the occupants of the gunboats and the transports were exposed to the fire of the Confederate sharpshooters, who found convenient shelter behind the huge trees and in the dense brushwood.

After reaching the Coldwater, the channel of which was a little wider, less difficulty was experienced; and two mortar-boats having joined the expedition, the whole flotilla was soon steaming cautiously down the Tallahatchie. On the 11th, the advance had reached a point within ten miles of Greenwood, a village situated a little below the confluence of the Tallahatchie and the Yallabusha. At the point above-mentioned, and just before the two streams unite to form the Yazoo, the Tallahatchie makes a bend almost in the form of a horse-shoe. Here the Confederates, fully apprised of the approach of the expedition, had constructed extensive and powerful works, which stretched from stream to stream, completely commanding both, as well as the enclosed space between. This place was named Fort Pemberton. Thus it was that while the National forces were opening one end of the pass, “the enemy,” to quote the words of General Grant, “was diligently closing the other.” The ground in front of and all around the fort was low; and the water in the rivers being high, it was deeply flooded. It was impossible to land troops; and all attempts made by the gunboats to silence the enemy’s guns proved unavailing. Several days had been spent in vain endeavors, made by the gunboats, Chillicothe and DeKalb, to silence the fort or to force a passage down the river, when Ross, feeling convinced that the undertaking
was hopeless with the force at his command, retired by the way he came. On his way, he was met by General Quimby, of McPherson's corps, with some troops, when another attack was meditated; but on the 23d of March, the whole expedition was ordered to return to the Mississippi, General Grant having made up his mind to concentrate his army at Milliken's Bend.

This does not exhaust the experiments which were made in order to obtain a suitable route by which the National army could be moved so as to attack Vicksburg on the land side. While those other experiments were being made Admiral Porter had been unweariedly active. Before it was known what success might attend the expedition by way of Yazoo Pass and the Tallahatchie, Porter had reconnoitered another route, by which he hoped the Yazoo might be reached, and a descent made above the batteries on Haines' Bluff. Seven miles above the mouth of the Yazoo, what has been called Steele's Bayou empties into that river. Having discovered that about thirty miles up Steele's Bayou there was a passage through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, about six miles distant, and learning from some negroes that Deer Creek could be navigated to Rolling Fork, and thence down the Big Sunflower into the Yazoo, Porter notified Grant of the possibilities of this water-way. Grant saw at once that if such a route could be turned to practical account, it would place Greenwood between two bodies of his forces, and compel the abandonment of Fort Pemberton. This was not all. Some thirty of the enemy's steamboats, which had sought refuge in those inland waters, would fall into his hands.

The expedition was promptly approved of; and five gunboats, several transports, and one of Sherman's divisions, were ordered to attempt the new passage. This was the most intricate and difficult of all the routes yet attempted. Grant had accompanied Porter part of the way, and experienced some of the difficulties, before Sherman was ordered to take with him his pioneer corps or a regiment of first-class men, and, with the steamers Diligence and Silver Wave, proceed up the bayou to the assistance of Porter. In Black Bayou, and in Deer Creek, the most formidable obstacles were encountered. The passages were blocked by overhanging trees, which had to be cut down before the boats could pass. The darkness of the moonless night was rendered all the more intense by the deep gloom of the surrounding forests. Rain fell incessantly. In some cases heavy trees, which had been felled, lay across the streams. At last, before Porter had accomplished the passage of Deer Creek, the Confederates, who had evidently anticipated the movement, were encountered in great force; and it became perilous for the men to show themselves on the gunboats or on the transports. It was found impossible to advance.

This expedition, like all the others, had to be abandoned; and it was discovered to be no easy matter to effect a retreat. "The expedition," says General Grant, "failed, probably, more from
want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route, than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. The want of this knowledge led the expedition on, and difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to move forces to effectually checkmate further progress; and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo."

It seemed as if Vicksburg were destined to sit secure on her throne of hills, in proud defiance of all the skill, ingenuity and force of the National government. Farragut and Williams had done their best, but had failed. Sherman and Porter had put forth their noblest efforts, but to no purpose. And now a five-fold failure had been experienced by Grant himself. Disappointed he must have been; but he was not discouraged. Disappointment but gave force to his determination; his repeated failures but gave him a firmer grasp of the difficulties which he had to overcome; and out of the darkness, in which he saw but dimly, he was gradually working his way to a clearer light, and to a fuller comprehension of the situation. "At that very stage," as Swinton well puts it, "when an intellect of less determined fibre would have been resigning itself to a seemingly implacable fortune, Grant, overleaping fate and failure, rose to the height of that audacious conception, on which, at length, he vaulted into Vicksburg." A Napoleon might not have wasted time in so many fruitless experiments; but Napoleon himself could not more resolutely have resisted fate—could not more imperiously have resumed operations which were destined to chain victory to his standard.

It was now evident that all hope of diverting the Mississippi from its channel must be abandoned, and that practical access to the east bank of the Yazoo, in the rear of Vicksburg, was not to be obtained by any of the passes. What was now to be done? General Grant alone could answer that question. It was the opinion of some, General Sherman included, that the movement so auspiciously begun, but so prematurely brought to grief, at the close of the previous year, should be resumed. According to this plan, it would have been necessary for the main army to return up the Mississippi, and, after landing, to make an inland march towards Vicksburg, on the eastern side of that river; while the gunboats and a minor land force would have remained behind to threaten Vicksburg on its river front.

The position of Grant at this stage, so far as appearances went, was not better than it was when he commenced his retreat from Oxford, after the disaster at Holly Springs; and there can be no doubt that he already regretted that retreat. We know that he has since confessed that if the army had had, in December, 1862, the experience which it afterwards acquired, he would have marched on from Oxford, as at first contemplated, and trusted to the
country along his line of march and around Vicksburg for support. A backward march, however, at this time, if any other movement promising equal success were possible, would have been in the last degree injudicious. It would have given temporary encouragement, at least, to the Confederates. It would have lent emphasis to the howl of discontent, already loud all over the North. It would—it could not but—have been humiliating to General Grant. Happily, another movement was possible, although it was beset at the outset with grave and serious difficulties.

Grant, whose headquarters were at Milliken’s Bend, and whose army was well gathered around him, resolved to attack Vicksburg from the south; and, in order to give effect to this resolution, he proceeded to make all the necessary arrangements. It was a bold experiment—bolder than any yet attempted. It implied great risks. It implied the moving of the whole army across the Mississippi. But this could not be done at any point within range of the guns of the enemy’s works, or without the aid of the gunboats and transports which were lying above the city. The troops would, therefore, have to march at least thirty or forty miles, probably a greater distance, over the worst possible country, at the worst possible season of the year; and the gunboats and transports would have to run the gauntlet of the long line of batteries which completely commanded the river at Vicksburg. These difficulties overcome, it implied the transportation of the troops across the river, in the face of all the opposition of a powerful and vigilant enemy. Nor was this all. It implied the complete abandonment of his former base of communications, without having secured another in advance. Such was the movement which General Grant determined to make. Let us now see how it was put in execution.

On the 29th of March the movement was commenced. On that day, Mar. 29, General McClernand, with the Thirteenth army corps, moved from Milliken’s Bend across the peninsula which the river here makes towards New Carthage. McPherson was to follow with the Seventeenth army corps as soon as supplies of food, ammunition and other stores could be forwarded. Sherman, with the Fifteenth army corps, was to bring up the rear. The roads were execrable. The march was, in consequence, made with the utmost difficulty, and much time was consumed. Roads had to be made and repaired; boats and bridges had to be extemporized; and, as there was danger that the rising flood might burst its barriers and sweep all before it, some twenty miles of levee had to be carefully guarded both day and night. At last, McClernand’s advance reached Smith’s Plantation, about two miles from New Carthage, when it was found that the levee of the Bayou Vidal had given way in several places, and that the town and immediate neighborhood were surrounded by water. New Carthage, in fact, had become an island. Attempts were made to reach the town by boats. This, however, proved to be too tedious a process; and, a circuitous road being discovered, the march was
resumed around Bayou Vidal to a point some twelve miles further to the south. The distance travelled from Milliken’s Bend was about thirty-five miles. It was a most laborious and tedious march.

In the meantime, preparations were being pushed forward for running the transports and gunboats past the heavy batteries at Vicksburg. These batteries extended eight miles along the river. April 16. The attempt was made by seven iron-clads, one unarmed gunboat, and three transports, the vulnerable parts of which, above the water, were all well protected with hay and cotton. It was arranged that the gunboats should pass down in single file, with intervals between of a few hundred yards, and that when they opened their broadsides upon the batteries, the transports, under cover of the smoke, should endeavor to pass unseen. It was a starlit night; but there was a haze on the river which dimmed the lights on the Vicksburg heights. The Benton led the way. It seemed as if the city was wrapped in sleep, and as if the fleet would pass undetected. But no. “At just a quarter before eleven o’clock,” an eye-witness tells us, “two bright, sharp lines of flame flashed through the darkness, at the extreme right of the Vicksburg batteries; and in an instant the whole length of the line of the bluffs was ablaze with fire.” The gunboats, which had just rounded the point and lay squarely before the city, opened their broadsides at once. The firing was terrific. In an hour and a half the Vicksburg batteries were passed.

The batteries of Warrenton, a little further down the river, had still to be encountered. As these were approached, the fleet took the initiative, and so continuous and effective was the fire, that the enemy made but a feeble response. The work was now done, and done effectively. The gunboats were comparatively uninjured. Of the three transports, the Forest Queen, which was in the advance, received one shot in her hull and another in her steam-drum, and was instantly disabled. Taken in tow by a gunboat, she was carried down the river without further damage. The Henry Clay, which was next, having been hit by a shell, was soon a blazing mass, and beyond all hope of being saved. The Silver Wave had passed through the fiery ordeal unscathed. On board the gunboats, one man was killed and two men wounded. Not a man was injured on board the transports. The affair had been successful beyond all expectation. Emboldened by what had happened, Grant had other six transports prepared and sent down the river on the night of the 22d of April. One of them, the Louisiana, which was struck below water-mark, was sunk. The other five were all more or less injured, but they were soon repaired, and ready for use again.

Simultaneously with these movements, a magnificent cavalry exploit was being performed by Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson. Grant was anxious to ascertain the strength of the Confederacy, and to find out by a practical
test what resistance it could make to an invading force well organized and well equipped. He wished to do more: he wished to cut off the Confederate forces who were protecting Vicksburg from their base of supplies and their lines of communication. Colonel Grierson was a dashing but able and skilful cavalry officer; and to him was entrusted this somewhat hazardous task. On the morning of the 17th of April, while the National troops were still busy seeking a route by which to attack Vicksburg from above, Grierson, taking with him his own regiment, the Sixth Illinois, the Seventh Illinois, and the Second Iowa, some 1700 horsemen in all, and a battery of artillery, started from La Grange, Tennessee, and proceeded on his southward march, in the rear of the Confederate forces. These mounted men, now breaking up into detached parties, and diverging in different directions, and now reuniting, swept the country like a tornado, breaking up railroad tracks, cutting the telegraph wires, and burning bridges, depots, cars, manufactories, magazines and stores of every kind. The work was not performed without some hard experience. On the fifth day after their departure from La Grange, Grierson's men rode eight miles through a swamp in which the water was from three to four feet deep, losing twenty of their horses. Much of the country through which they passed was utterly destitute of forage and provisions; and it was rarely that they could obtain more than one meal a day. In less than sixteen days they had travelled over six hundred miles. During the last thirty hours they had accomplished at least eighty miles, fought the enemy four times, swum the Comite River and destroyed a Confederate camp.

At noon, on the 2d day of May, they entered Baton Rouge, amid the plaudits of Banks' men, horses and men half-famished, and some three fourths of the latter more than half-asleep in their saddles. During the expedition, they had killed and wounded one hundred of the enemy, captured and paroled five hundred prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed between fifty and sixty miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over three thousand stand of arms, and seized and carried with them over a thousand horses and mules. It was not without reason that General Grant pronounced this one of the most brilliant exploits of the war, and one which would be handed down in history as an example to be imitated. Grierson had demonstrated the rottenness of the Confederacy. It was a "shell," and nothing more.

We left General Grant, with the two army corps—McClernand's in advance, McPherson's following close behind—at a point some few miles below New Carthage. Under Grant's own superintendence, the necessary preparations were being hurried forward for the transportation of his troops from the west to the east side of the Mississippi. It was his intention to cross the river from this point, and to attempt a landing at Grand Gulf. It was found, however, that his means of transportation
BRUINSBURG.

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mendous enemy's to fire. The enemy's works, and, under cover of the fire, to land the troops, and carry the place by storm. At eight o'clock in the morning, Porter moved his fleet towards the enemy's works, and opened a tremendous fire. The response was quick and hearty. For five hours and a half the firing on both sides continued. At the end of that time the lower batteries were silenced; but the upper ones could not be reached.

From a tugboat on the river, General Grant contemplated the scene. "Many times," he tells us, "it seemed to me that the gunboats were within pistol shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were too elevated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known to be lined with rifle-pits. Besides, the field artillery could be moved to any position where it might be useful, in case of an attempt at landing." He wisely concluded, therefore, to discontinue the firing, and to abandon the attempt to effect a landing at Grand Gulf. Porter was ordered to run past the batteries, with the gunboats and transports, as he had done at Vicksburg and Warrenton, and move down to a point opposite Rodney, where the river might be crossed with less difficulty. At six o'clock that evening, accordingly, Porter renewed the attack; and, under cover of the fire, the transports passed without injury. In the double effort thus made, three of the gunboats sustained some damage; but they were soon repaired. Porter had 24 men killed and 56 wounded.

During the course of the night, information was obtained from a negro who had been selling home-made beer at Grand Gulf, that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, on the Bayou Pierre, in the rear of Grand Gulf. Bruinsburg lies between Grand Gulf and Rodney. At Bruinsburg, accordingly, General Grant resolved to effect a landing. At daylight, on Mar. 30. the morning of the 30th, the gunboats and transports were again in motion. The landing was effected without any great inconvenience. McClernand's corps (the Thirteenth) was ferried across first. McPherson's (the Fourteenth), which had arrived from Lake Providence, followed. Without delay, both corps, having been supplied
with rations for three days, were on their way to Port Gibson.

The east side of the Mississippi, below Vicksburg, had at last been reached with comparative ease. The crossing might have been attended with greater difficulty, but for the use which was made of Sherman and his corps. While waiting for orders to follow the other two corps, Sherman received from Grant a letter, couched in very friendly terms, requesting him, while McClernand and McPherson were attempting to cross the river below, "to make a demonstration on Haines' Bluff, and to make all the show possible." He did not like, he said, to order him to do it, because it might be reported at the North as another failure. Sherman answered that he would do as required, without any regard to public clamor at a distance; and he did it most effectually. On the 29th, at an early hour in the morning, he embarked ten regiments, of Blair's division, on ten steamers, and, preceded by several iron-clads and gunboats, he ascended the Yazoo, and lay for the night at the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. Towards evening, he caused the troops to disembark in full view of the enemy, although, as he has himself told us, he "knew full well that there was no road: across the submerged field that lay between the river and the bluff."

This movement had the desired effect. Pemberton had just sent off a large force to assist General Bowen to resist the threatened attack on the river below. Seeing this movement in his front, and dreading an immediate assault in great force, he recalled his men, and ordered them to take position at Haines' Bluff. The feint resulted advantageously in a double sense. It withdrew opposition from the point at which the troops were to be pushed across the river; and the marching and counter-marching so fatigued Pemberton's troops, that they were unfit for serious work when the real encounter took place. For two days, Sherman preserved this threatening attitude. As the other two corps had crossed the river seventy-five miles below, and gained a firm footing on the "high plateau in rear of Vicksburg," further demonstration in the direction of Haines' Bluff was unnecessary. Sherman was accordingly ordered to hasten forward and join the main army.

It had been General Grant's intention, up to the time of his crossing the Mississippi, to collect all his forces at Grand Gulf, to get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores, and, in the meantime, to detach an army corps to co-operate with General Banks against Port Hudson, in the hope that thereby he might be able to effect a junction of the two armies. A letter from General Banks informed him that it would be impossible for him to return to Baton Rouge before the 10th of May, but that by the reduction of Port Hudson, he would be able to join him with 12,000 men. About the same time, information reached him that troops were expected at Jackson from the Southern cities, with General Beauregard in command. Grant wisely concluded that delay un
der the circumstances was dangerous—
all the more so that on the 10th of May,
with the addition of 12,000 men, his
strength relatively would not be so
great as it now was. He resolved,
therefore, to act at once. This decisive
step was taken on his own responsi-
bility. He did not consult the authori-
ties at Washington; for he knew that
he would encounter opposition alike
from Lincoln and from Halleck, both
of whom were in favor of his effecting
a union with Banks.

As soon as the troops had been
landed on the other side of the river,
the onward movement was commenced.

May On the morning of the 1st of
1. May, about two o’clock, when
some eight miles from Bruinsburg, the
advance, under McClernand, came into
contact with the enemy. The Confede-
rates retired; and no attempt at pursuit
was made until daylight. Early in the
morning, General Grant rode forward,
with his staff, and found McClernand
engaged with a strong force of the
enemy, about four miles from Port
Gibson. At this point the road forked
off in two opposite directions, both
branches, however, leading to Port
Gibson. These roads which, for
the most part, ran along narrow ridges,
were flanked on either side by deep
and impenetrable ravines. The Con-
 federates had taken position on both
roads. It was a position which offered
peculiar advantages to the resisting
party, as in falling back, they necessa-
really divided the pursuing forces. It was
held by General Bowen, with not more
than 6000 men. McClernand’s troops
were divided so as to suit the require-
ments of the ground. The divisions of
Hovey, Carr and Smith were on the
right; the division of Osterhaus was
on the left. McClernand advanced
with the three divisions. The Confed-
erates offered a stubborn resistance,
contesting point after point with great
bravery. The National forces on the
right made steady advances on the
enemy, driving him from position to
position; but Osterhaus on the left
was making no impression on his stubborn
antagonist. On the arrival of Logan’s
division, of McPherson’s corps, Grant
sent one brigade to the assistance of
McClernand and another to the assist-
ance of Osterhaus. Effective resistance
was no longer possible. At both points
the Confederates gave way, but fell back
in good order towards Port Gibson.
Night closing in, the Nationals halted,
and rested on their arms in the expecta-
tion of renewing the conflict in the morn-
ing. When morning came, it was found
that the Confederates had abandoned
Port Gibson, had crossed both forks of
the Bayou Pierre, and burned the bridges
in their rear. In this engagement, the
Confederates sustained a heavy loss.
The Nationals captured three guns,
four flags and 580 prisoners. Their
loss was 130 killed and 780 wounded.
This encounter is generally spoken of
as the battle of Port Gibson.

No time was lost in the reconstruc-
tion of the bridges; and on the May
3d of May, the Confederates were
pursued as far as Hankinson’s Ferry.
On the same day, Grant having discov-
ered that Grand Gulf had been evacu-
uated, resolved to transfer his base of supplies from Bruinsburg to that place. At Hankinson’s Ferry, he halted his forces, and waited for wagons and supplies, as well as for the arrival of Sher-

May 7. On the 7th of May, that general succeeded in carrying across the river his entire command, with the exception of Blair’s division, which was left at Milliken’s Bend to protect the depots there, until relieved by troops from Memphis. On the same day, General Grant gave orders for a general forward movement of the whole army.

In a previous chapter, we endeavored to present a clear and intelligible view of Vicksburg, as looked at from the river side. Built on one side of a sharp bend in the river, on a high line of bluffs, which extend some fifteen miles from Haines’ Bluff, touching the Yazoo on the north to a point below Warren- ton on the south, the heights being fortified throughout their entire length, and the ground on the triangle in front of the Northern defenses being all but impassable, it is no abuse of language to say that on the river front Vicksburg was impregnable. We have already seen how all the attempts on that side had failed. We have now to look at Vicksburg from a different standpoint. Another and formidable effort was about to be made to reduce the “city of an hundred hills”; but this time the attack was to be made on the land side—not from the river. It is but truth to say that, at the time of Grant’s approach, the obstacles to be encountered and overcome on the land side were, in many respects, as great as those on the side of the river. There was first the Bayou Pierre, with its steep banks, forming an outer line. Then came the Big Black, with its tributaries, Big Sandy, Five Mile, Fourteen Mile and Baker’s Creeks. This, however, was not all. The roads were narrow, and not unfrequently, as we have just seen, flanked on both sides by deep ravines. The whole country was broken and irregular, presenting serious obstacles to an invading army. Nearer the city, the surrounding heights were crowned with fortifications—bastioned forts, redoubts, redans, detached batteries without number, and countless lines of connecting rifle-pits. It was not without reason that the South was proud of Vicksburg. After Richmond, it was the strongest place within the limits of the Confederate States. Such was the place which Grant had resolved to capture. Such were the obstacles which lay in the way of the accomplishment of his purpose.

It was General Grant’s design to secure his rear by a rapid march on Jackson, the capital of the State of Missis- sippi, to destroy the public property there, to break up the railroad which connects that capital with Vicksburg, and then to concentrate his forces around the doomed city. In order the more effectually to accomplish his purpose, he deemed it prudent to distract the attention of the enemy, and to conceal, as far as possible, his real intention. Reconnoitering parties to the west side of the Big Black felt their way, unmolested, to within six miles of
Warrenton. The main body of the army advanced by two parallel roads on the southeast bank of the same river—McPherson on the road to the left; McClernand on the ridge road, a little more to the right; Sherman, whose corps was divided, following on both roads. On the 11th, and while these movements were being carried out, Grant telegraphed to General Halleck that he would communicate no more with Grand Gulf, and that several weeks might elapse before he would again hear from him. That night McClernand’s corps was on and near the Baldwin’s Ferry Road; Sherman’s corps was at and beyond Auburn; and McPherson, with his corps, was eight miles to the right, a little in advance of Utica, in the direction of Raymond.

On the morning of the 12th, Sherman and McClernand crossed Fourteen Mile Creek, the former at Dillon’s Plantation, the latter a little further to the west. At both crossings the enemy was encountered, and there was severe skirmishing. Grant had been with Sherman from the time the latter arrived at Auburn. McPherson, who, as we have seen, was moving northward some seven or eight miles to the west, when within two or three miles of Raymond, encountered the Confederates in much greater force. Two brigades of the enemy, some six thousand strong, under Generals Gregg and Walker, the former being in command, were well posted near Farnden’s Creek. The troops were for the most part concealed in the thickly-wooded and irregular ground which bordered the stream.

Two powerful batteries, planted on an eminence, commanded the two roads by which the Nationals were approaching. Logan, who was in the advance, was the first to feel the weight of the enemy’s arm. His second brigade, which advanced to the edge of the woods, called forth a vigorous and well-directed volley. De Golyer’s artillery was ordered forward, when for the first time the Confederates opened their batteries. The firing was kept up with great vigor on both sides. Finding it impossible to silence the National artillery, the Confederates made a tremendous rush for the guns. The National gunners stuck to their posts. They were not to be intimidated. Waiting till the Confederates were fairly within range, they opened upon them a well-directed fire of shot and shell. The Confederates, their ranks torn in pieces by exploding shells, halted, broke, and retired in confusion beyond the creek. There, however, they rallied, and re-formed. McPherson followed them up, and ordered a fresh attack on their new position. This time the movement was led by the brigade of General Dennis. The struggle at this point was protracted and severe, the Twentieth Ohio, the Twentieth Illinois and the Twenty-Third Indiana being badly cut up. Offering a most stubborn resistance, the Confederates, although compelled to yield some of their ground, still maintained an unbroken front. Roused to the highest pitch of excitement, the Eighth Illinois, Colonel Sturgis, at the supreme moment of the fight, rushed with tremendous
fury, and with fixed bayonets, on this unbroken and apparently invincible phalanx. The attack was irresistible. The Confederate line broke in fragments, and, in disordered masses, fled from the creek. Such was the battle of Raymond. It lasted three hours. The Confederate loss in this engagement was 103 killed and 720 wounded. The National loss was 69 killed, 341 wounded and 32 missing. The battle of Raymond added to the already great reputation of McPherson, and to Logan's growing fame.

McClernand and Sherman had been ordered to move towards the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edward's Station, the latter to a point between Edward's Station and Bolton. This order was countermanded, and both were ordered to march towards Raymond. This change had been rendered necessary by the battle which had just been fought, the defeated Confederates having retreated in the direction of Jackson, where it was known General Joe Johnston was hourly expected, with large reinforcements. General Grant resolved to make sure of Raymond, so as to have no enemy in his rear. Determined to anticipate Johnston, and to prevent by all possible means a junction between him and Pemberton, Grant hurried forward his troops. On the 13th, May 13. McPherson pushed on towards Clinton, entering the town unopposed about two o'clock in the afternoon, and immediately destroyed a section of the railroad, thus cutting off supplies from Vicksburg. This was a victory in itself. Losing no time, McPherson hastened towards Jackson. Sherman was marching to the same point by the direct road from Raymond. McClernand, meanwhile, was taking a position near Raymond.

Johnston had arrived at Jackson on the 13th. There he found the brigades of Gregg and Walker which, on the preceding day had fallen back before McPherson from Raymond. He knew that Grant was approaching; and recognizing the military genius manifested in the conception of the campaign, as well as impressed by the terrible energy with which it was being executed, he felt convinced that he had to deal with a formidable antagonist. He, therefore, ordered Pemberton to move up to Clinton, in rear of the National force, which he imagined to be only a detachment. He was to move that night. "To beat such a detachment," he said, "would be of immense value. The troops could here co-operate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important." It was sound advice. It indicated a course which Pemberton ought to have followed at an earlier date. There was a bare probability, however, that if Johnston's advice had been taken, the movements of General Grant might have been seriously embarrassed. Pemberton, who held position at Edward's Station, might at least have been able to effect a junction with Johnston. What did he do? He called a council of war. It was the opinion of the majority of the officers
that Johnston's order should be obeyed. It was the opinion of not a few of them that, in place of following out Johnston's instructions, a movement should be made to cut off Grant's supplies from the Mississippi—a very unnecessary movement, as Grant had, five days before this time, notified the government that he "would communicate no more with Grand Gulf." "My own views," says Pemberton, "were expressed as unfavorable to any movement which would remove me from my base, which was and is Vicksburg. I did not, however, see fit to place my own judgment and opinions so far in opposition as to prevent the movement altogether; but believing the only possibility of success to be in the plan proposed, of cutting off the enemy's supplies, I directed all my disposable force—say seventeen thousand five hundred—toward Raymond." On the morning of the 14th, therefore, when Johnston was momentarily expecting the arrival of the Nationals, his expected reinforcements not having come up, he was depending entirely on the two brigades of Walker and Gregg. McPherson moved on Jackson by the Clinton Road. Sherman advanced by the road which leads from Raymond. Both encountered some slight opposition; and both entered the place at the same time. It was an easy victory. The Confederates made good their retreat, moving northward, in the direction of Canton. It was found that the State and city officials had fled, carrying with them the State papers and funds. Seventeen guns had been captured; but the commissary and quartermaster's stores were in flames. Grant entered the city with Sherman's head of column. His soldiers patrolled the streets, and brought the prisoners to the State House. In the hotel, in front of the State House, the three generals met, when arrangements were made for the immediate future of the campaign. During the night of the 13th and the morning of the 14th, up until noon, the rain fell in torrents; but the rank and file of the army of the West were inured to the hardships of a soldier's life; and, while excellent work was done and the most perfect order preserved, there was neither murmur nor complaint.

On the morning of the 14th, General Grant learned that Johnston had May 14 ordered Pemberton to move immediately out of Vicksburg, cross the Big Black, and fall upon the National rear. Grant saw at once what was meant, and he gave his corps commanders to understand that "time was all-important." All his and their energies must now be bent to prevent the junction of the Confederate forces. Action was taken at once. Pemberton must receive the lesson which had just been given to Johnston. Orders were given for a concentration of the entire National army in the direction of Edward's Station. McClernand was ordered to gather together his scattered divisions, and move towards Bolton. Blair, with his division, was detached from Sherman's corps, and ordered to move in the same direction. Similar instructions were given to McPherson. Sherman, with the bulk of his troops, was
ordered to remain for the present at Jackson, the special duty assigned him being the destruction of the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops, arsenals, and everything which might be of any value or service to the enemy. This duty was faithfully performed, and with a rapidity and completeness which characterized all the doings of that great soldier. Bolton was favorably situated for the conveyance of the troops. It was a convenient point from which to move on Edward's Station. May 15. On the morning of the 15th the movement began. Grant had been particularly careful that there should be no mistake; and, as McClernand was at some distance from his headquarters, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of his staff, to explain to him the situation, and to urge immediate action. Grant himself hastened to the front.

Meanwhile, what was Pemberton doing? He had received a despatch from Johnston on the 14th, "suggesting, not ordering;" as he afterwards said, a combined attack on McPherson at Clinton. It was not until the next morning that he began to move towards Raymond. He did not know that his chief had fled from Jackson, and that Grant, with the bulk of his army, was making forced marches westward. He had been delayed for some hours in passing a branch of Baker's Creek, which was greatly swollen by the heavy rains. He had, therefore, only reached Champion Hills, a strong place, some four or five miles from Baker's Creek, when he received a note from Johnston, directing him to move northward, so that they might be able to unite their forces. Pemberton halted, sent back his wagon trains to the Big Black, and was preparing to follow, when he learned that Grant was close at hand. It was too late to return. It was perilous to advance. He, therefore, took position, and remained to fight. The ground was well adapted for offering resistance. To the left of the road, as it approaches Vicksburg, there was a high, undulating hill, covered by a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right, the slope was gentle. Pemberton had posted his army right across the road, his left wing resting on a height where the road made a sharp turn to the left. General W. W. Loring commanded his right; General John Bowen his centre; and General Carter L. Stevenson his left.

It was the morning of the 16th of May. Grant was already at the front. There he found Hovey, of McClernand's corps, getting into line, and nearly ready for battle. Hovey, who had moved up the road, occupied the centre; McPherson, with two of his divisions, was stationed on the right; and Smith and Blair were to take position on the left. The enemy was not only well posted: he was strong in numbers. Grant, unwilling to run any unnecessary risks, forbade an attack until the arrival of McClernand, who was coming up with four divisions. Mes-
sages were sent to McClernand, urging him forward with all possible haste. In vain did Grant listen for the sound of McClernand’s guns. Every minute made it more difficult to postpone the conflict. The troops were already in close contact. Hovey’s advance was developing the enemy’s skirmishing line. The firing became more and more rapid; and by eleven o’clock the battle had fairly begun. Hovey’s division was soon fully engaged. This division, indeed, which was composed of Ohio, Indiana and Wisconsin troops, bore the brunt of the battle. General McGinnis gallantly led the attack. A vigorous charge was made upon two Confederate batteries, which were posted upon a ridge; and one of them was captured. The battle raged with great fury for an hour and a half. Pemberton, however, continued to mass his men in the centre and towards the National right; and Hovey’s troops, pressed by superior numbers, unable to hold their position or to retain possession of the captured guns, reluctantly fell back nearly half a mile. Hovey called for help. Help could not be given without weakening McPherson on the right; but help could not be refused, except at the risk of losing the fight.

Knowing that McClernand would soon be up, and having no fear of the result, Grant sent first one and then another brigade, of Croker’s division, of McPherson’s corps, to the aid of Hovey, who gallantly renewed the conflict. Meanwhile, Logan’s division was operating with great effect on the enemy’s left and rear. When Hovey called for more troops, Logan rode up to General Grant, and told him that if Hovey could make another dash at the enemy, he could come up where he then was, and capture the greater part of the opposing army. Grant rode forward, and cheered the troops who had been so gallantly engaged, urging them again to the attack, and explaining the position of Logan’s division. Logan continued to press heavily on Pemberton’s left, General C. L. Stevenson, Hovey holding his ground in the centre. About five o’clock in the afternoon, Stevenson’s line, which for some time had been yielding under Logan’s pressure, broke, and fell back in disorder. The battle was lost. Loring, who commanded on the Confederate right, had already left the field, leaving his cannon behind him. When his left gave out, Pemberton’s heart sank within him; and he ordered a retreat of his whole army. McClernand, with Carr’s division, followed by that of Osterhaus, arrived on the field only in time to pursue the retreating foe. The battle of Champion Hills was fought and won by Hovey’s division, of McClernand’s corps, and by Logan’s and Quimby’s, commanded by Croker, of McPherson’s corps. It was a bloody and most unequal strife, the Nationals from the outset being greatly outnumbered. The National loss amounted to nearly 2500, of whom some 430 were killed. The loss sustained by the Confederates must have been even more severe; for in addition to killed and wounded, 2000 were made prisoners.

After the battle was ended, it was
discovered that the Vicksburg Road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, turns almost to the west, across the valley in which Logan was operating. One of Logan's brigades had nearly reached this road. Consciously or unconsciously to himself, Logan's manoeuvre was thus threatening the Confederate rear and the capture of the greater portion of Pemberton's army. There is no evidence that the existence of this road was known to Grant, or any of his commanders, at the commencement of or during the contest. Its existence was, of course, known to the Confederates. This circumstance goes far to explain the panic which seized Loring on the right, and Stevenson on the left, and which at last demoralized the centre, making flight a necessity. The non-arrival of McClernand in time was unfortunate, and threatened to be dangerous; and, most undoubtedly, if the result had been different, he would have been called to account. General Grant evidently felt the delicacy of McClernand's position, and the necessity for some explanation of his conduct; and it redounds to his credit that, in his report, he takes some pains and goes somewhat out of his way to throw over his lieutenant the mantle of his protection. "The delay," he says, "in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers."

If any blame was attachable to Mc-

Clerand for his delay in coming up on the 16th, he nobly atoned for it by his conduct of the pursuit on the day following. The pursuit, as we have seen, was commenced on the afternoon of the 16th. It was continued until after dark, with great loss to the Confederates. A train of cars, loaded with a large quantity of commissary and ordnance stores, fell into the hands of the pursuers; and the Confederates themselves destroyed much valuable property, which they found it impossible to carry with them. McClernand bivouacked for the night on the hill which overlooks Edward's Station. It was Saturday night. On Sunday morning the pursuit was resumed; but it was not long continued. The Nationals were soon brought to a standstill by the strong works which the Confederates had constructed on both sides of the Big Black, in the neighborhood of the Railroad Bridge. On the west side, the bluffs extend to the water's edge. On the eastern side, there is an open, cultivated plain, nearly a mile in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty in width, reaching from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the line of this bayou, which served as a ditch in front, was a well-constructed line of rifle-pits. Behind the defenses on the eastern side of the river were the brigades of Green, Villepigue and Cockrell. A little above the Railroad Bridge, was a passage-way for troops, constructed of steamboat hulks. On the western side which, as we have said, was steep, the bluffs running
down to the water's edge, there were strong fortifications, mounted with heavy guns. Such was the new position which obstructed the triumphant Nationals in their onward march to Vicksburg. Of the pursuing party, Carr’s division occupied the extreme advance. Of this division, Lawler command the right brigade. After several hours ineffectual skirmishing, Lawler discovered that, by moving under cover of the river bank, he could gain a point from which a successful assault might be made. It was a hazardous operation, because of the level ground over which a portion of the troops would have to pass without cover, and because of the ditch in front of the works. Lawler gave the order; the charge was gallantly made; and in spite of the obstacles which lay in their way, and the tempest of bullets which decimated their ranks, the brave fellows, whose comrades were falling at every step by their side, nobly and successfully accomplished their task. Not a shot did they fire until they had crossed the ditch; then they poured forth one simultaneous and terrific volley, and, rushing forward without reloading, they carried the works at the point of the bayonet. Almost the entire garrison, and seventeen pieces of artillery, several thousand stand of arms, and a large quantity of commissary stores, were the trophies of this daring and brilliant exploit. Only a few of the garrison, some 1500 strong, had found their way across the river, when the Confederates on the western bank set fire to both bridges—the railroad bridge and the bridge of boats—thus shutting off their comrades from all means of escape, and checking the progress of the National troops. It was a cruel measure, and as the result proved, a useless piece of incendiaryism; but such things are not unlawful in war. Such was the battle of the Big Black. It brightened the fame of McClernand; but Lawler, and his brave brigade, carried off the honors of the day. In the engagement, Osterhaus was wounded.

With as little delay as possible, floating bridges were thrown across the river. On the afternoon of the 17th, McClernand came up; and all the necessary preparations were completed for continuing the pursuit. On the following morning his corps, and that of McPherson, which had also arrived, crossed to the western side of the Big Black. After the battle of Champion Hills, Sherman had been ordered to advance to Bridgeport, some miles to the north of the railroad bridge. By crossing the river at that point, it was expected he would be able effectually to fall on the enemy’s flank, in the event of his making a stand at the bridge on the western shore. On the 17th, Sherman had reached his destination, and been joined by Grant. Sherman had with him a pontoon train, the only one with the army. On the evening or that day, the bridge having been thrown across, the troops began the passage. After dark, the scene was lit up with fires of pitch-pine. Grant and Sherman having crossed, seated themselves on a log, and, by the light of the blazing pine fires, wi-
nessed the passage of the Fifteenth corps, Sherman's own. Having made known his purpose, and explained his plans for the morrow, Grant returned through the forest to his headquarters in the cane-brake. Next day Sherman, in his onward march to Vicksburg, and when about three and a half miles from the city, turned to the right, in the direction of the Yazoo and the northern extremity of the Walnut Hills. That night, Haines' Bluff was in his possession; and he had opened communication with Admiral Porter on the Yazoo. Porter, who left his iron-clads below Vicksburg, had entered the Yazoo on the 16th, to be ready to co-operate with the army. On the 18th he heard, in the rear of Vicksburg, the sound of cannon; and soon afterwards, by the use of his glass, he discovered Sherman's division on the left of Snyder's Bluff, and knew that the Confederates at that place had been cut off from joining the forces in the city. With the view of opening communication with the army, he despatched, up the Yazoo, the De Kalb, the Choctaw, the Romeo and the Forest Rose, under Lieutenant-Commander Breeze. The task was easily accomplished. Menaced by the land forces on the adjoining heights, the Confederates made a precipitate retreat, leaving everything behind them—stores of all kinds, guns, gun-carriages, ammunition, tents, and an admirably constructed camp. The Yazoo was now open. A base of supplies had thus been secured for the National army; and if Vicksburg could not be taken by assault, Grant could afford to wait, and force submission by the slower process of a siege.

It was a proud satisfaction to both Porter and Sherman, to find themselves masters of this important position at last. The works at Haines' Bluff had been abandoned on the 17th. They were found to have been very strong. "Such a network of forts," says Porter, "I never saw." Writing to M. L. Smith, some time afterwards, Sherman says, "As soon as we had fixed things in Jackson, I made good time in reaching the very point above Vicksburg that we had worked so hard and thanklessly for last January. It has fulfilled all my expectations, and we now have high and commanding ground, and haul all our stores from our old landing, at Chickasaw Bayou. The very roads made by the enemy, which enabled him to mass his troops so promptly before us, are now ours, and answer an admirable purpose. I ride often to the very hill from which all our movements were telegraphed, and enjoy an internal satisfaction that, after five months' patient labor and fighting, I can now reciprocate the compliment. We are close upon the enemy; our artillery reaches every part of the city, which, I am told, has become like a prairie-dog village, all burrowed in the earth." At this stage, Grant must have felt well-satisfied. He had now marched two hundred miles since he crossed the river at Bruinsburg, had fought four battles, had taken ninety guns, had captured six thousand prisoners had cut off Pemberton's retreat; and
he knew that Vicksburg was already in his grasp. On the 19th, the investment of Vicksburg was completed. Porter commanded the city from the river, cutting off all communications on that side. McPherson took position at the front, when Sherman turned off to the right. McClernand came up the Jackson Road to Mount Alban's, and then turned to the left to get to the Baldwin Road. Sherman was thus on the right; McPherson in the centre; and McClernand on the left.

The situation now looked gloomy enough for Pemberton. He had locked himself in a cage with his own hands. He had done it deliberately, and against the advice of his chief. Vicksburg had ceased to be of any value as a strategic point from the moment that the National troops crossed the river below the city. After the battle at Port Gibson, it was patent to all reflecting minds that the capture of Vicksburg was merely a question of time. The city was doomed. Pemberton refused to open his eyes to facts; and, in place of saving his army and making it his chief business to effect a junction with Johnston, he clung to Vicksburg with what seemed the tenacity of despair, rather than the tenacity of hope. He had received a letter from Johnston, written on the 17th. "If Haines' Bluff," said Johnston in that despatch, "be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value; it cannot be held. If you are invested in it, you must ultimately surrender. Instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies forthwith, and march north-east." It was too late. Pemberton had been blind to his duty in a higher sense than he understood it; he had lost his opportunity, whether he knew it or not; and he must now reap the fruit of his folly. As escape was now impossible, and as he was not yet in a mood to surrender, he must needs do as he best can with his shattered and dispirited forces. His position, as we have shown already, was one of great strength. His line of works was extensive, but it was protected by one hundred and two guns; and, as there were within the lines from twenty-five to thirty thousand men, the forts were well manned. In the arrangement of his troops, he placed Brigadier-General Stevenson in command on the right, Major-General Forney in the centre, and Major-General Martin L. Smith on the extreme left.

On the 19th, Grant, believing that the Confederate troops were demoralized by the repeated defeats sustained outside of Vicksburg, ordered a general assault to be made at two o'clock in the afternoon. This attack was made mainly by Sherman's corps on the right, Blair's division taking the lead, followed by Tuttle's as a support. There were two forts which guarded the entrance to the city by the old Jackson Road—Fort Hill to the right and Fort Beauregard to the left. The attack was directed against the former of those works. It was gallantly made, the Thirteenth regulars, the Eighty-Third Indiana, and the One Hundred and Twenty-Seventh Illinois, winning
special distinction. It was a perilous operation, rendered all the more so by the rugged character of the ground, intersected by deep chasms and covered by felled trees, which, with the remaining stumps, made a powerful abatis. The ground was really almost impassable. Sherman's men reached the parapet, but they could not cross over. At dark they were recalled. But little fighting was done by the other two army corps. The result of the attempt on the 19th was that the Nationals along the whole line drew nearer the Confederate works, and secured more advantageous positions. A Confederate writer gives the following account of that day's fighting:

"On Tuesday, the enemy made their first assault on the line of works held by Brigadier-General Shoup's brigade of Louisianians. They marched up in one solid column, our men withholding their fire until the enemy had approached within thirty yards of the lines, when they opened a terrific volley of musketry. The enemy wavered a moment, and then marched forward. They were again met by another volley, when they broke and fled under cover of the hills. This was the only attempt made on that day to force our lines, and the attempt was evidently made more with the intention of 'feeling' our lines than with any serious idea of storming them."

Two days were allowed to pass without any further attempt being made against the enemy's works. Grant, however, was not idle; nor was any idleness permitted in the National lines. Supplies were hurried forward from the Yazoo; rations were served to the men; roads were constructed; and cannon were planted on every available spot which offered any advantage. On the 21st, Grant was ready to make another assault. He has himself given us the reasons which induced him to make this second attempt without further delay. It was his belief that an assault made from the position which he had now gained would be attended with success. He knew that Johnston was at Canton, with the forces taken from Jackson, that he was continually receiving reinforcements, and that it was his intention to make an attack on his rear, with the view of relieving Pemberton. His own forces, not exceeding at the time 30,000 men, did not justify him in courting any such attack from a general of Johnston's skill and experience. Possessed of Vicksburg, he would be able to turn upon Johnston, drive him from the State, and make himself master of the entire territory west of the Tombigbee, before the season for campaigning was over. Nor was this all. A successful assault, by enabling him to secure all this country, would render it unnecessary for the government to send him reinforcements which were needed elsewhere. In addition to all this, the troops were impatient to be led to the attack, and detested trench-work, because they believed it to be unnecessary. Such were his reasons; and even in view of the failure of the attack and the terrible loss of life which it entailed, they must be admitted to be satisfactory.
On the 21st, Grant’s arrangements were completed; and orders were given for an assault along his whole line, at ten o’clock on the following morning. That there might be no blundering or irregularity in the movement, he ordered all his corps commanders to set their watches by his. On the morning of the 22d, promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps simultaneously advanced to the assault. Grant had taken a commanding position near the centre, from which he could see all McPherson’s corps, a part of Sherman’s and a portion also of McClernand’s. Meanwhile, Admiral Porter, according to instructions received from General Grant, had opened a heavy fire from his mortars and gunboats, on the water and hill batteries. On both the one side and the other, the enemy’s works were found to be invulnerable. “The works,” said Porter, “are stronger than any of us dreamed of.” Sherman, whose advance, as on the 19th, was led by Blair’s division, encountered a vigorous resistance from the brigades of Baldwin and Shoup, of the division of General Smith; Hurlbut’s brigade, of Forney’s division, met the attack in the centre; while on the National left, McClernand, putting forth his whole strength, made but little impression on the stubborn brigades of Moore and Lee, of the division of General Stevenson, who, as we have mentioned, commanded on the Confederate right. The assault was gallantly made by each of the three corps. It was not all at once that the Confederates revealed themselves. Concealed behind the parapets, they waited until their assailants were close to the works; and then springing, as if from the bosom of the earth, they poured their destructive fire on the advancing columns, literally mowing down the first line. In spite of this withering fire, a portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting the National flag on the outer slopes of the enemy’s bastions. For two hours the battle raged with great fierceness. No real advantage, however, was being gained by the assailants at any point. Under cover of their guns, the Nationals made repeated attempts to carry the works in their front. It was all in vain. No permanent lodgment could be secured. The experience of the three different corps, and along the entire line, was very much the same. In one instance, only, was an entrance effected into any of the Confederate works; but it was only a brief triumph, and proved to be barren of good results. In the first fierce onset made by the brigades of Lawler and Landrum, of McClernand’s corps, upon the fortifications to the southeast of the city, Sergeant Griffiths, a youth of eighteen years, with eleven privates of the Twenty-First Iowa Volunteers, rushed across the ditch, up the slope, over the bastion, and leaped into one of the redoubts. The privates were all prostrated inside the work. Griffiths, however, contrived to escape, being the only one of the number left alive. McClernand’s men succeeded in planting their colors on the bastion of this redoubt, and on the bastion of another strong earth-work in their
VICKSBURG.

front; but Griffiths’ was the only case of actual occupation.

It was now about twelve o’clock. Grant, but little satisfied with the success of the undertaking, and, having left his horse in a place of safety in the rear, came up on foot to Sherman’s headquarters. Sherman pointed out to him the Confederate works, and admitted that his assault had failed. Grant, whose position had given him a full view of the National centre and also of the right of the National left, admitted that it was about the same with both McPherson and McClernand. At this moment, a messenger arrived from McClernand, bearing a despatch to Grant, “stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of, and still held, two of the enemy’s forts, and that the American flag was waving over them,” requesting, at the same time, that Sherman and McPherson should be ordered to make a diversion in his favor. This was the second despatch which General Grant had received from McClernand to the same effect. He doubted its accuracy. He did not believe it to be a faithful presentation of the facts of the case. He had just left a commanding position where he had a full view of the works referred to, and he had witnessed no signs of successful attack or occupation. His first impulse was to disregard the message altogether. But he was reminded by Sherman that the note was official. With great reluctance, Grant consented to give orders for a renewal of the attack. He ordered Quimby’s division, of McPherson’s corps, to the aid of McClernand, and authorized that general to call for his assistance also the division of McArthur, of the same corps. At three o’clock, the general-in-chief having resumed his position, with McPherson in the centre, the attack was renewed with great vigor. This other assault was but a repetition of the former—determined, bloody, but unsuccessful. It resulted in the useless slaughter of 3000 men, including many veteran soldiers, who could ill be spared, and not a few first-class officers. General Grant bitterly regretted yielding to McClernand’s importunate calls for assistance. It was, in fact, a great blunder. McClernand was either greatly deceived as to the value of the position occupied by his troops, or his better reason was overpowered by an extreme desire to connect his name in some prominent way with the capture of Vicksburg. It was no doubt unfortunate that McArthur was so far distant when he received Grant’s orders, and that Quimby, who had been hurried to McClernand’s relief, did not arrive until twilight. It is doubtful, however, whether any assistance which might have been sent McClernand could have altered the situation. It does not appear that he had gained any real advantage. Subsequent revelations justified the doubts which General Grant expressed as to the correctness of McClernand’s statement; and General Sherman has told us that “instead of having taken any single point of the rebel main parapet, McClernand had only taken one or two small outlying lunettes, open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of the enemy,
behind the main parapet,” most of his men, in fact, being thus actually captured. As it was, the fighting continued until dark. During the whole day, Porter’s mortars kept up an incessant fire on the city, greatly adding to the horrors of the imprisoned inhabitants. It was, however, a useless struggle. The diversion requested by McClernand had been promptly and vigorously made; but while it had increased the mortality list of the National troops full fifty per cent., it had brought about no compensating advantages. About eight o’clock in the evening, therefore, the troops were recalled from the more advanced positions, pickets being left to hold the ground which had been won.

In his report, General Grant paid a well-merited compliment to his men. “The assault of this day,” he said, “proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, or other evidence of demoralization.” It is but just to say that the gallantry exhibited by the assailants was equalled by the bravery of the troops defending the works, and by the heroic self-endurance of the unfortunate people who were shut up inside the city. Every part of Vicksburg was within range of the Federal guns—of Porter’s mortars as of the attacking batteries. The scene presented is described by those who were inside the fortifications as having been sublime and terrific in the extreme, and requiring the “pen of the poet” to do it justice. The following report is from a Confederate source.

While doing substantial justice to the National troops, it gives us an inside view of the day’s fighting:

“On the morning of the 22d, the enemy opened a terrific fire with their Parrott guns, and continued it till about eleven o’clock, when the bombardment ceased, and heavy columns of the enemy could be seen forming in line of battle. Our forces were all ready for them, and eager for their advance. At about a quarter to twelve, the column of the Federal army advanced all along the lines in splendid order, and, with a loud cheer, dashed up to the works. They were gallantly responded to by our brave boys, and the first charge repulsed. On the extreme right of our lines, the nature of the ground prevented the enemy from making any heavy attack; but on the right of the centre, the centre and the left of the centre, the assault was desperately made and gallantly met. But once did our lines break, and that was in Lee’s brigade. The enemy gained a temporary footing on the rifle-pits, but Lee quickly rallied his men, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight, drove them out and reoccupied the lines. The engagement at this point, and at the right of the line, held by Brigadier-General L. Herbert, was of a terrible nature, the Federals having thrown their best troops on these works. Five times did they charge, and each time were repulsed. The last charge on the right of Brigadier-General Herbert’s lines was made by an Irish regiment (the Seventeenth Wisconsin), carrying the green flag of
Erin. They came at a double quick up the hill, each man in the front rank furnished with ladders to reach the works. Three times they essayed to plant their ladders, but were prevented by the obstinate resistance offered by the consolidated Twenty-First and Twenty-Third Louisiana regiments. At the third charge, they came within ten yards of the line; but two volleys of buckshot from the shot-guns of our forces compelled them to make a precipitate retreat from the front of our works. At about two o’clock they made their last charge, and were again repulsed, when they retired, and did not attempt any further demonstration that day.”

The Confederates not unnaturally exaggerated the National loss, by putting it down at from 8000 to 10,000 men. They admitted a loss of 1000 in killed and wounded.

The difficulty between McClernand and the general-in-chief was not to be easily removed. Grant naturally felt sore because of the useless waste of life which McClernand had brought about. This, however, might have been got over, had not McClernand, in a congratulatory order addressed to his troops, and first published in St. Louis, reflected on General Grant and the disposition which he made of his troops, and attributed his own failure to a want of support which, he asserted, could have been given him. On the 15th of June, Grant deemed it prudent, for the sake of preserving discipline in his army, to remove McClernand from the command of the Thirteenth corps. The command was given to Major-General Ord.

After the failure of the 22d of May, Grant, already convinced that the position of the enemy was too strong, “both naturally and artificially” to be taken by direct assault, determined upon a regular siege. The troops now at his command were not sufficient, absolutely to complete the investment—such was the extent of the enemy’s works. He sent, therefore, to West Tennessee for all the troops which could be spared. Reinforcements were ordered also from West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri. Lanman’s division, and four regiments from Memphis, with the divisions of Generals Smith and Kimball, of the Sixteenth corps, soon arrived, and were placed under the command of General C. C. Washburn. On the 11th of June, General Herron arrived, with his division, from the department of the Missouri; and on the 14th came General Parke, with two divisions of the Ninth army corps. The National force was thus increased to some 70,000 men, in sixteen divisions. The investment was now made absolute. Parke’s corps and the divisions of Smith and Kimball were sent to Haines’ Bluff. In front of the works which protected the city, Sherman was posted to the right; McPherson’s corps came next, and extended so as to guard the railroad; Ord’s corps lay to the left of McPherson’s; the investment in that direction being completed by the divisions of Herron and Lanman which, stretching across Stout’s Bayou, touched the bluffs on the river. The ground
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was, in a high degree, favorable to a besieging army. Springs of excellent water abounded in the ravines; and the sheltering woods protected the troops from the rays of the hot summer sun. On the river side, Porter had made ample preparations; and throughout the siege, as he had already done in the different assaults, he continued to render very effective assistance. In addition to gunboats, which were stationed both above and below the city, he had six 13-inch mortars, and two 200-pound Parrott guns mounted on rafts.

Siege operations were commenced at once, and were conducted with great vigor. Along the entire front, forts, batteries and rifle-pits were rapidly constructed; and the irregularities of the ground admitted of the construction of covered roads, by which the men could move from point to point without being exposed to the fire of the sharp-shooters behind the Confederate works. Up until the 25th of May, the firing on the city was made only during the day. After that date, it was continued both day and night. Porter opened fire on May 26th, and on his part there was no interruption until the surrender. It was estimated that as many as 6000 mortar-shells were flung into the city every twenty-four hours, and that, in the same space of time, not fewer than 4000 shells were flung from the land batteries in the rear.

It was not long until Pemberton was in a sufficiently sorrowful plight. His relations with Johnston were the reverse of agreeable; and he had been worried by delusive hopes held out by the authorities at Richmond. To the one and the other, however, he was bound to look for succor. There was no other source of relief. He complained bitterly of the want of cavalry. With a sufficient force of mounted men, he might have been able to protect his communications—he would certainly have been able to watch, if not to thwart, the movements of Grierson, who gave him so much annoyance. He might even have prevented Grant from reaching Jackson. As it was, he had to submit to great inconvenience, and not a little mortification. One of his greatest sorrows was that he had found it impossible—such was the rapidity of Grant's advance—to withdraw his heavy guns from Grand Gulf. This, however, was not all. He had, for some reasons, lost the confidence of his troops; and he was no longer a favorite with the people of Vicksburg. There were, in addition, troubles of a more pressing and immediate character. His ammunition which, since the commencement of the siege, he had been using with the utmost economy, was well-nigh exhausted. Provisions, also, were scarce. For the first five days of the siege, full rations were allowed to the troops; but, afterwards, the daily allowance was gradually reduced to four ounces of flour, four ounces of bacon, one and a half ounce of rice, two ounces of peas, and three ounces of sugar—fourteen and a half ounces of food in all. Add to all this the small number of men, and the conse-
quent heavy duties which, day and night, devolved upon them, and an idea may be formed of Pemberton's position.

Pemberton's hope of relief was now centred in Johnston. The latter was not without reason for being angry with his lieutenant; but it was his duty to do all that lay within the reach of his ability to extricate the beleaguered garrison. It was no longer possible to save the city; but something might be attempted to save Pemberton's soldiers. Pemberton had written to Johnston in despair. On the 14th, Johnston sent word to Pemberton that he would make an attempt to come to his relief, suggested that while he made an attack on Grant's line at a given point, an attack should be made simultaneously on the same point from within the lines, and requested that Pemberton should designate the point of attack somewhere north of the railroad. The desires of Pemberton and the purposes of Johnston were no secret to the National commander. Haines' Bluff was carefully guarded; so, also, was the entire peninsula on the river side of the city; Porter's boats were keeping watch above and below; and vigilant reconnaissances were being made in the neighborhood of Milliken's Bend. It was from the land side, however, that an attack was most to be dreaded. It was well known that Johnston was collecting troops on the line of the Big Black, that his army was rapidly increasing in numbers, that his deficiencies in artillery, in ammunition for all arms, and in means of transport, were gradually being supplied, and that his object was to attack the National army in the rear, with a view to the relief of Pemberton. Happily Grant, had now a sufficient number of troops to enable him to hold Pemberton with the one hand, and to strike, if necessary, Johnston with the other. Parke's corps, which was stationed at Haines' Bluff with one division of each of three corps d'armée investing Vicksburg, was placed under the command of General Sherman, who was ordered to watch Johnston, and counteract any movement he might make in the direction of Vicksburg. It was General Grant's intention, as he wrote to General Parke on the 27th of June, "to whip Johnston fifteen miles off." Sherman faced about, his line extending from Haines' Bluff eastward to the railroad crossing of the Big Black, where Osterhaus held a strong position. It was Sherman's conviction that if Johnston should cross the Big Black, it would not be difficult, from the nature of the country, to hold him in check, until a concentration could be effected. Johnston did not venture to make any attempt to penetrate Sherman's line, nor did he cross the Big Black.

It was now towards the end of June Pemberton's situation was well-nigh desperate. In his agony, his mind vacillated from one resolution to another. The one day he writes to Johnston, suggesting that if he could divert the attention of the assailants by attacking them to the north of the city, he might succeed in making his escape by break-
ing the investing lines to the south, and by forcing his way across the Big Black, at Hankinson's Ferry. The next day, as if despairing of the success of his plan, he thinks it might be better to abandon Vicksburg, and to propose to Grant that he allow all the troops to pass out "with their arms and equipage." Success would have been as little likely to result from the one course as from the other. Meanwhile, famine was doing its terrible work. After the thirty-fifth day of the siege, mule meat had become the common fare of all alike; and even dog's meat was in request for the table. Bean-meal was made into bread, and corn-meal into coffee. "In these straits," says a Confederate officer, "the garrison dragged on the weary length of one day after another, under a scorching sun, the stench from the unburied corpses all around alone causing the strongest-minded, firmest-nerved to grow impatient for the day of deliverance."

In the last week of June, the mining operations which were being carried on in front of McPherson's line, and under his immediate direction, were well advanced. On the 25th, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, the first mine was fired. The explosion was fearful. The air was filled to the height of one hundred feet with earth, broken timber, and the shattered fragments of gabions, stockades and gun-carriages. A great breach was made, a part of the face of Fort Hill having been thrown down. Two columns of storming parties, consisting of 100 picked men, taken respectively from the Forty-Fifth Illinois and from the Twenty-Third Indiana, were held in readiness to make the assault. As soon as the breach was made, in rushed the brave fellows, in their shirtsleeves, and carrying nothing with them save their muskets and their cartridge-boxes. A fearful struggle ensued, the Confederates offering a most stubborn resistance. Supports were pressed forward; and ultimately, amid wild cheers, heard amid the roaring din of battle, the flag of the Forty-Fifth was planted on the summit of Fort Hill. As soon as the storming columns entered the breach, the batteries opened fire along the whole line, Porter following the example with his gunboats and mortars on the river front. It was one of the most terrific cannonades heard during the whole war. While shot and shell were falling thick and fast upon the Confederate works and upon the doomed city, "the classic thunders of the Roman poet were being realized across the whole heavens, and from pole to pole." Nobly as was this assault on Fort Hill, and proud as was the temporary triumph, it ended in a repulse. On the 28th, there was another mine explosion, which did further damage to Fort Hill. On the 1st of July, a mine was sprung to the right of the Jackson Road. The result was the complete demolition of the redan situated at that point, the living burial of nine men who were counter-mining, and the killing and wounding of a large number who were manning the works.
On the 1st of July, Johnston had taken position between Brownsville and the Big Black, having with him from 30,000 to 40,000 men, with all the necessary munition of war. With as little delay as possible, he sent a note to Pemberton, informing him that a diversion would be made on or about the 7th, to enable him to cut his way out. This message, which was intercepted by General Ewing, fell into the hands of General Grant. The latter had already made up his mind as to what he should do. He had determined to make an assault on Vicksburg on the morning of the 6th, and, if the assault should prove successful, to move Sherman with all possible haste, and with all the forces that could be spared, against Johnston. All needful preparations for the final assault were completed. Further delay might prove as dangerous as it was unnecessary. Sherman was notified of his intention, and ordered to hold himself in readiness. Grant was confirmed in his purpose by intercepted documents, which informed him of the wretched condition to which the city and garrison had been reduced. The assault, however, was not to be necessary. In addition to all the other misfortunes of the situation, 6000 sick and wounded crowded the hospitals of Vicksburg; and the number was daily increasing. Convinced that Grant was about to make a final and fatal assault, despairing of any aid from Johnston, and knowing how helpless he was to offer either a vigorous or protracted resistance, Pemberton’s heart sunk within him, and he determined to surrender.

On the 3d of July, about eight o’clock in the morning, a white flag was seen displayed on the parapet in front of the division of General A. J. Smith, of Ord’s (late McClernand’s) corps. An officer having been sent forward to learn its meaning, it was found that General Bowen, commander of one of the Confederate divisions, and Colonel Montgomery, of Pemberton’s staff, were the bearers of a message to General Grant. Having been blind-folded, these officers were led to the headquarters of General Smith, to await the reply of the National commander. It must have been a proud moment in the life of General Grant, when the sealed message was put into his hands. After more than seven months of planning, hard fighting and weary waiting, his great task was on the point of accomplishment. But the bystander looked on those firm features in vain for any sign of unusual emotion. At that moment, when weaker men would have given way, the conqueror gave proof that, if he knew how to subdue great armies, he knew also how to restrain himself. The message proved to be a proposal from the Confederate commander for an armistice, during a time not specified, and for the appointment, on each side, of three commissioners, whose duty it should be to arrange terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. “I make this proposition,” said Pemberton, “to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position a yet indefinite period.” Grant’s reply
was characteristic. "The effusion of blood, which you propose stopping by this course, can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage, as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and, I can assure you, will be treated with all the respect due to them as prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no other terms than those indicated above." Declining to see General Bowen, General Grant expressed a willingness, if it were so desired, to meet General Pemberton, any time that afternoon, between the lines, in McPherson's front. Three o'clock was appointed. At that hour the meeting was held. Grant was accompanied by Generals McPherson, Ord, Logan and A. J. Smith. Pemberton was attended by General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery. After shaking hands, and introducing the officers, the two chiefs retired, and sat down on the grass beneath the shade of an old oak tree. The position was on the southern slope of Fort Hill, and in full view of thousands of the opposing armies. The oak tree has disappeared; but a handsome monument now commemorates the event. Pemberton renewed his proposition for the appointment of commissioners. This was the course followed at Vera Cruz, at the surrender of which, he said, he was present. Grant was not to be moved from his purpose. He had no terms to offer but "unconditional surrender," and he would consent to no other. Pemberton thought the terms unreasonable. He would never submit to them—never, while he had a man left—he would fight, rather. Unable to restrain himself, he was showing signs of great irritation. "Then, sir," said Grant, coolly puffing his cigar, "you can continue the defense. My army has never been in a better condition for the prosecution of the siege." Pemberton had much to say in regard to details. Finding it impossible to come to an agreement, Grant, with an evident desire not to wound unnecessarily the feelings of his baffled and defeated opponent, brought the interview to a close by promising to send his ultimatum in writing. It was finally agreed that the entire garrison—officers and men—should be paroled not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by proper authority; that the officers should be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each; that the rank and file be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; that they should take rations from their own stores sufficient to last them until beyond the National lines; that they should be allowed to take with them the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and that they should have thirty wagons for the transport of such articles as could not well be carried. The same conditions were to be granted to all sick and wounded officers and privates as soon as they should be able to travel.
The next day was the Fourth of July—a day sacred to American liberty. On the morning of that day, white flags were displayed along the whole length of the Confederate works, in token of surrender. In the afternoon, General Grant, accompanied by General McPherson, with their staffs, entered the city in triumph. Pemberton was greatly blamed for surrendering the city on the 4th. It was a lame excuse to say that, knowing the vanity of his enemies, he hoped to obtain better terms by giving them an opportunity to triumph on that day. The Fourth of July, 1863, was indeed a proud day for the friends of the Union. On that same day, victory, which smiled so propitiously at Vicksburg, crowned the National arms at Gettysburg. The star of the Union was again in the ascendant; and the hearts of a dispirited people were once more filled with joy. The fall of Vicksburg was a great triumph to the nation. It settled the question of the free navigation of the Mississippi, and it determined the fate of the rebellion. It was a great triumph for General Grant, because it stamped him as the first soldier of the Republic. His praises were in every mouth; and the country rang with applause. Congratulatory letters came to him from all quarters; but those most prized were from Commander-in-Chief Halleck and from President Lincoln, both of whom, it was known, had at one time doubts as to the wisdom shown in his movements. Halleck was lavish of praise; and Lincoln concluded his noble letter by saying, "I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong."*

The result of the campaign, as summed up by Grant himself, was "the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg, its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, among whom were fifteen general officers; at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and Green; and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of stragglers who can never be collected and recognized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our hands, besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads, loco-
motives, cars, steamboats, cotton, &c.; and much was destroyed to prevent our capturing it." His own losses he admitted to be 8573, of whom 943 were killed." He owed much to Generals Sherman, McPherson, Logan and Admiral Porter, all of whose services were handsomely acknowledged.

One of the immediate results of the occupation of Vicksburg was the fall of Port Hudson; but of this we shall have to speak more in detail in the next chapter. Grant's immediate attention, after placing McPherson in charge of Vicksburg, was given to Johnston. As soon as that general heard of the surrender, he fell back to Jackson. Sherman was already in pursuit, with an army of 50,000 men; and Grant was resolved that Johnston should not escape. On the 8th, the National army, under Sherman, had reached the neighborhood of Clinton. The weather was extremely hot, and the water scarce. All the ponds were filled with dead animals, which Johnston on his march had driven in and shot. On the 10th, Sherman was before Jackson; and the Confederates had been driven in behind the intrenchments. On the 11th, pressing close in, the Nationals shelled the town from every direction. It unfortunately happened that Lanman's brigade, on this occasion, got too close, and was roughly handled, some 250 men being killed and wounded, and as many captured. Lanman, who had the reputation of being a brave and capable officer, was greatly blamed for his rashness or his folly, and at the request of Ord, his corps commander, was relieved of his command. In spite of the excessive heat, Sherman was pressing the siege day and night, and preparing for a vigorous and final assault, when, on the morning of the 17th, the place was found to be July evacuated—Johnston thus once more vindicating his reputation as a "hero of retreats."* Steele's division pursued as far as Brandon, a distance of fourteen miles; but as Johnston was found to be safely off, with his whole army, the pursuit was not continued. On the 27th of July, Sherman was back in his old position between Haines' Bluff and the Big Black, indulging the hope that both himself and his troops would enjoy rest for the remainder of the summer. Thus ended one of the greatest, and, in many respects, most important campaigns of the Civil War.

*The town of Jackson suffered terribly from these repeated occupations and evacuations. Situated on the right bank of the Pearl River, and adorned with many magnificent public buildings, such as the capitol, the penitentiary, the governor's house, the asylum for the deaf, dumb and insane, as well as with many handsome residences—the entire place being tastefully laid out and beautified by trim gardens—Jackson was one of the most elegant towns of the South. It had suffered much from the first occupation by the National troops. The Confederate soldiers, under Johnston, showed little respect either to the beauty of the situation or to the value of the property. The Nationals, in this last occupation, showed even less. The soldiers, for a time, were allowed to give themselves up to license. Some of the finest buildings and most useful public works were burned to the ground. Houses were ransacked; pianos and other articles of furniture were demolished; libraries were torn to pieces and trampled in the dust; pictures were pierced with bayonets; and during all hours of the night the place was illuminated by burning buildings. Such conduct, too common in war, was happily exceptional in the great American conflict.
CHAPTER XXV.

Effect of the Surrender of Vicksburg.—The Mississippi.—"Unvexed to the Sea."—The Department of the Gulf.—General Butler.—Minor Engagements.—The Confederate Ram, Arkansas.—Farragut and Williams.—The Yazoo.—Bombardment of Donaldsonville.—Baton Rouge.—Van Dorn and Breckenridge.—Battle of Baton Rouge.—Williams Killed.—The Confederates Fall Back and Retreat.—The Arkansas Again.—Porter in Search of Her.—The Arkansas Exploded.—La Fourche.—Expedition under Weitzel.—The Confederates under McHeeters Defeated.—La Fourche Reclaimed.—General Banks at New Orleans.—His Expedition.—How he was Received by Butler.—The Nineteenth Army Corps.—The General Instructions Given to Banks.—The Departure of Butler.—Galveston.—Commodore Renshaw.—The Forty-Second Massachusetts.—Colonel Burrill.—General Magruder.—Virginia Point.—Magruder's Fleet.—Description of Galveston.—The Confederate Attack.—Sibley's Brigade.—Fighting on Land and Water.—The Massachusetts Men Make a Bold Resistance.—The Bayou City and Neptune Fall Upon the Harriet Lane.—A Rush Together.—The Neptune Sunk.—The Bayou City in Danger.—She Rushes for the Harriet Lane.—The Two Vessels Become Entangled.—Commander Wainright Refuses to Surrender.—Wainright Killed while Defending Himself.—The Harriet Lane Captured.—The Westfield Aground.—Demand for Surrender.—Refusal.—She is Prematurely Blown Up.—Terrible Destruction of Life.—Renshaw Involved in the Common Ruin.—Several Other Vessels Captured.—The Troops Surrender.—The Sabine River.—The Morning Light and Velocity.—Capture of Sabine Pass.—The National Vessels Driven to Sea and Captured.—The Sugar Districts of Louisiana.—The Red River Country.—The Bayou Teche.—The J. A. Cotton.—Brashear City.—Weitzel and McKean Buchanan on the Teche.—Carney's Bridge.—Torpedoes and Batteries.—Buchanan Killed.—A National Victory.—The Return to Brashear City.—A Joint Expedition to Port Hudson.—An Attempt to Run the Batteries.—An Awful Scene.—Another Louisiana Expedition.—Port Biloxi.—The Confederates Again Retreat.—General Dick Taylor.—A Successful Expedition.—Success of General Augur.—Farragut.—The Hartford and the Albatross.—At Grand Gulf.—At Warrenton.—At the Williams Canal.—In Communication with Grant and Porter.—Reinforcements and Supplies.— Destruction of the Lancaster.—Going Down the River Again.—Farragut on the Red River.—At Gordon's Landing.—A Severe Engagement.—The Mary T. and the Grand Duke.—Heavy Firing.—The Albatross Injured.—The Confederate Vessels Badly Punished.—Banks Again on the Mississippi.—At Bayou Sara.—Concentration of his Forces.—Preparations for Investing Port Hudson.—Joined by Sherman and Augur.—Port Hudson Plains.—Description of Port Hudson.—The Strength of the Place.—The First Assault.—A Tremendous Fire.—The Great Bravery of the Troops.—Temporary and Partial Success.—The Troops Withdrawn.—Negro Soldiers.—Complimented and Praised by General Banks.—Disappointed, but not Disheartened.—Preparing for a Regular Siege.—Digging Trenches.—The Hot June Sun.—General Gardner in a Sad Plight.—The 11th of June.—The Second Assault.—Another Failure.—The 14th of June.—Gardner Called Upon to Surrender.—He Refuses.—Another Assault.—Tremendous Fighting, both on the Right and Left.—Another Failure.—A Regular Siege the Only Hope.—Mining and Counter-mining.—The Heroic Garrison.—The Confederates Again in Louisiana.—Capture of Brashear City.—Banks' Misfortune.—The 7th of July.—News of the Fall of Vicksburg.—Rejoicing in the National Ranks.—Gardner in Despair.—A Council of War.—Proposals for Surrender.—Honorable Terms.—The Surrender.—The Spoils of Victory.—The Hero of Port Hudson.

Three days after the surrender and occupation of Vicksburg, a correspondence was opened between Major-General Gardner and Major-General Banks, with a view to the surrender of Port Hudson. On learning that Vicksburg had fallen, Gardner feeling convinced that further resistance was useless, and that he had defended the city as long as duty required him, expressed a willingness to surrender the stronghold in his charge. Con-
missioners having been appointed on both sides, and the terms of capitulation having been drawn up, the surrender was formally made on the 8th of July, General Banks and the National troops entering and occupying the place on the following day. Port Hudson fell because Vicksburg fell; and the fall of the one, as of the other, was due to the persistent, patient, persevering genius of General Grant. On one occasion General Sherman said, "The possession of the Mississippi River is the possession of America." It was his opinion that if the Confederates had been able to hold, with a grip sufficiently strong, the lower portion of that great river, the Union could not have been restored. This opinion was shared by General Grant and by the best minds in the North. It was this opinion—this deep-rooted conviction—that gave importance to the capture of Vicksburg; for so long as the Confederates held that stronghold, they were, to all intents and purposes, masters of the waters of the lower Mississippi, and that river was comparatively useless. With Vicksburg fell Port Hudson; the great object aimed at by the Western armies was accomplished; the backbone of the Confederacy was broken; and the Mississippi, as President Lincoln expressed it, rolled "unvexed to the sea."

The fall of Port Hudson, however, formed the climax of a lengthened series of detailed operations, not necessarily connected with Vicksburg. Some of these operations were of greater, some of them of lesser, importance; but they had all of them a common bearing, and were conducted, for the most part, under the direction of one controlling mind. In the present chapter, therefore, we shall endeavor to group these operations together, describe them in detail, and, as far as possible, present them as a connected whole.

In a previous chapter we have described at length the operations which resulted in the capture of New Orleans. In that chapter, it was incidentally stated that Baton Rouge and Natchez speedily shared the fate of the Queen City of the South. Previous to the recall of General Butler from the command of the Department of the Gulf, there occurred a few engagements of a minor character, each of which is entitled to a passing notice—all the more so that the reader will thus be enabled the more easily and the more clearly to understand what follows. No account of the battles of the Civil War could be regarded as complete, if it omitted all reference to the Confederate "ram" Arkansas. After the first unsuccessful attempt, made upon Vicksburg by Farragut and Williams, and when the National vessels, with comparatively little harm, had been run up past the city, Farragut was made aware that a Confederate steam-ram, of immense dimensions and of enormous power, was lying in the Yazoo. This vessel, it appeared, had been commenced at Memphis; but two days before the evacuation of Fort Pillow, she had been towed down the river to a place of safety, in order to be finished. She was now completed, and
ready for action, her engines, which were low pressure, possessing an aggregate strength of 900 horse-power. This was the Arkansas. Farragut lost no time in offering the monster battle. July 15. On the 15th July, 1862, the gun-boats Carondelet and Tyler, and Ellet’s ram, Queen of the West, were sent to reconnoitre her position. They had sailed about six miles up the Yazoo, when they found themselves in the presence of their powerful antagonist. The fire was opened at once, on both sides. After a sharp encounter, the National boats were compelled to retire, the Arkansas making her way down the Yazoo into the Mississippi, and taking shelter under the batteries at Vicksburg. In this encounter the Carondelet was badly injured, having lost 14 men in killed and wounded. On board the Arkansas there were 20 killed and wounded. The idea of further demonstration being made against Vicksburg for the present having been abandoned, Farragut ran past the batteries again. Another attack was made July 22. time by the Essex, Captain W. D. Porter, and Ellet’s Queen of the West. It was unsuccessful; and, as the river was now falling rapidly, the fleet was ordered to return to New Orleans.

The progress down the river was diversified by some lively incidents. When passing Donaldsonville, fire was opened upon the fleet by a band of guerrillas. Having warned the inhabitants of his intention, Farragut bombarded the village, setting it on fire. The place was afterwards occupied by National troops, and named Fort Butler. Arrived at Baton Rouge, General Williams and the land force disembarked, with the view of permanently occupying the place. Reinforcements were sent to Williams; and Farragut held himself in readiness to give what assistance might be necessary. Van Dorn, not ignorant of the intentions of the National commanders, and aware that the troops were suffering much from sickness, was prepared to offer them battle. General J. C. Breckinridge was sent towards the city with 500 men; and the Arkansas was ordered down the river to take part in the fight. A severe battle ensued on the 5th of August, and lasted for the better part of two hours. Williams’ troops, although attacked by greatly superior forces, offered a stubborn resistance. During the struggle, the Twenty-First Indiana won great distinction. Discovering that it had lost all its field-officers, General Williams placed himself at its head, exclaiming, “Boys! your field-officers are all gone. I will lead you.” Loud cheers greeted his words. Scurrely, however, had he spoken, when he fell to the ground dead, pierced by a bullet-wound in the breast. He had just ordered the line to fall back. Colonel T. W. Cahill, of the Ninth Connecticut, taking the command, the movement was conducted in good order. The battle, however, was now ended; for the Confederates also fell back, and then retreated. The National loss was 90 killed and 250 wounded. The Confederate loss was considerably greater, the
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Nacionales claiming that they themselves buried 300 of the enemy’s dead. The Arkansas did not arrive in time to take part in the conflict. In coming down the river, her machinery got disabled, and she became unmanageable.

On the following morning, the 6th of August, Porter, who had done some good service at Baton Rouge, in repelling the enemy, was waiting in readiness for the appearance of the “rebel ram.” Impatient of her delay, he set out in search of her with his gunboat, the Essex, accompanied by the Cayuga and Sumter. The huge monster was discovered on the river, about four miles above. She was really helpless. When within half a mile of her, and about 10 A. M., Porter opened fire. After an action of about twenty minutes, she was discovered to be ablaze. She was then headed to the river bank; and, about noon, she exploded with a tremendous noise, being literally shattered into fragments. Such was the end of the famous iron-clad which was to “drive the Yankees from New Orleans,” and which was as much a terror to the inhabitants on the banks of the lower Mississippi, as it was the hope of the Confederate government.*

In the early part of October, detachments of the fleet were employed to advantage against the defenses of the harbor and city of Galveston and on the Sabine River; and both Galveston and Sabine Pass were occupied.

Later in the month of October, an effort was made to “re-possess” the rich district of La Fourche, on the west side of the Mississippi. On the 27th, at Labadieville, a sharp encounter took place between the Nationals, under General Weitzel, and the Confederates, under McPheeters. The Confederates were driven back, and pursued about four miles. Weitzel captured 268 prisoners and one piece of artillery. His loss was 18 killed and 74 wounded. The result of this engagement was the recovery of two congressional districts, each of which, in December, sent representatives to Washington.

General Banks had been appointed to the command of the Department of the Gulf late in the autumn. He did not arrive in New Orleans until the 14th of December. Banks sailed from the North at the head of an expedition consisting of 26 steam vessels and 25 sailing vessels, and carrying with him a military force of about 10,000 men. The destination of the expedition was, for obvious reasons, kept a secret. The secret was well kept, although, by the time the fleet set sail, it began to be whispered about that its destination was the coast of Texas. On his arrival at New Orleans, Banks was received by Butler in the most courteous manner. Banks immediately took command of the department; and what, with the 17,000 well-trained troops—some of them colored—handed over to him by Butler, and the 10,000 which he had brought with him from the North, ho

* Difference of opinion exists as to the origin of the fire which destroyed the Arkansas. It was claimed by Porter that he set her on fire by an incendiary shell of his own invention. It was claimed by the officers and crew, all of whom escaped, that they set her on fire when she became unmanageable.
found himself at the head of an armed force of 30,000 men. This force was designated the Nineteenth army corps. It was expected that, with these troops, Banks would co-operate with Grant generally in the opening of the Mississippi—that he would attempt the destruction or capture of Port Hudson, take possession of the Red River region, expel the Confederates from Louisiana, and restore the National authority in Texas.

On his arrival in New Orleans, Banks discovered that matters were not in so hopeful a condition as they seemed at a distance. Grant had met with reverses on his way to Vicksburg, and had deemed it prudent to fall back. Sherman was meeting with but little success at Chickasaw Bayou. He re-occupied Baton Rouge with a force of 10,000 men, under General Cuvier; but such was the strength of the enemy in and around Port Hudson, that the advance on that place was for the present delayed. We have seen already that the Nationals had resumed possession of Galveston, and also of the Sabine Pass—both of them positions of first-class importance. In the possession of these, however, they were not to be allowed long to remain. At the close of December, and at the request of Commodore Renshaw, who was in charge of Galveston, Banks sent to that place, from New Orleans, three companies of the Forty-Second Massachusetts Volunteers, under Colonel Burrill.

When they landed and encamped on the 28th, the gunboats Westfield, Clifton, Harriet Lane, Owasco, Corypheus and Sachem, were lying in front of the town. At this time General Magruder, who had distinguished himself in the Peninsula by his skilful resistance of McClellan, was in command in that department. Magruder seems to have had a high opinion of the courtesy and good-nature of Renshaw. At Virginia Point, opposite Galveston, he spent a whole night, with some 80 men, inspecting the defenses. Renshaw was made aware of the fact—was warned even—that an attack was contemplated; but he made no preparations. Meantime, Magruder, who had collected from the adjoining rivers all the available troops in the neighborhood, with four steamboats, on which he had put guns, and which he had fortified with cotton bales, proceeded towards Galveston, with the view of making an attack on Renshaw at dawn on the morning of the 1st of January, 1863.

The island on which Galveston is built is a sand bank, some thirty miles long and two wide. It is connected with the main-land by a wooden bridge, two miles long, over which runs the Galveston and Houston Railroad. It was bright moonlight, shortly after midnight, Jan. 1, when Magruder crossed the bridge on a train of cars, carrying with him his troops and field-pieces. He had actually reached a point within two squares of the camp of the Massachusetts soldiers, and had planted his cannon so as to bear upon Renshaw's gunboats. His steamboats were now seen in the bay. The moon had gone down; it was now about four o'clock; and, under
cover of the darkness, a storming party, 500 strong, and a battalion of sharpshooters, fell with great fury on the Massachusetts troops, the Confederate cannon, at the same time, opening fire on the gunboats. The Massachusetts men were found not wholly unprepared. Posted behind a breast-work, which they had constructed with the torn-up planking of the wharf, they offered a gallant resistance, and ultimately, notwithstanding their inferiority of numbers, succeeded in repulsing the storming party, and silencing the guns. But the enemy was not to be so easily defeated. The Confederate steamers now arrived on the scene. They were well manned by a portion of Sibley’s brigade. Two of these steamers—the Bayou City and Neptune—rushed at once upon the Harriet Lane, the troops on board the two former sweeping the deck of the latter with a perfect storm of bullets. The Harriet Lane ran into the Bayou City, carrying off her wheel-guard, but doing little other damage. The Neptune then ran in upon the Harriet Lane, and so damaged herself that she was compelled to fall back to the flats, where she sank almost immediately. A sixty-eight pounder, the only gun on board the Bayou City, had burst, and it seemed as if she, too, must go down. But no. Making another rush for the Harriet Lane—and this time her bow penetrating the wheel of her rival—the two vessels became entangled. Sibley’s soldiers, discharging volleys of musketry on the gunners, began to swarm on board the Harriet Lane. In the brief struggle which ensued, Commander Wainright, who refused to surrender, was killed, while bravely defending himself with his revolver. Lieutenant-Commander Lee was also mortally wounded. The Westfield had even a sadder fate than the Harriet Lane. She had gone out to meet the Confederate steamers in Bolivar Channel, and had run aground at high tide. The Clinton, Lieutenant-Commander Law, hastened to her relief. Scarcely had the Clinton arrived when Renshaw, hearing the sound of arms, and knowing that the attack had begun, ordered Law to return. Having returned, he opened fire upon the batteries at Fort Point; but as the Owasco had grounded in the attempt to reach the Harriet Lane, he did not venture further. About sunrise messengers, bearing a flag of truce, arrived, demanding a surrender. Law, refusing to take upon himself the responsibility, was allowed time to communicate with Renshaw, on board the Westfield. Renshaw would not surrender. He gave orders that the National vessels and troops should make their escape, if possible. As the Westfield was hopelessly grounded, he proposed to blow her up, and, with his officers and crew, make his escape to two of the transports. The match, unfortunately, was applied too soon; and, before they had time to escape, Renshaw himself, Lieutenant Zimmerman, Engineer Green and about a dozen of the crew were involved in the common destruction. They all perished; and nearly as many men, who were in the Commodore’s gig, close to the Westfield,
shared the same fate. Law, making the Owasco his flagship, escaped with what remained of the fleet to New Orleans. The Harriet Lane and two coal barks, the Cavallo and Elias Pike, were left in the hands of the enemy. The troops had no choice but surrender. This affair at Galveston was hailed as a great victory by the South. It was claimed by Magruder that the blockade of that port was raised, and that “the Harbor of Galveston was open for trade to all friendly nations.” It proved, however, but a barren victory; for before the Harriet Lane could get to sea in her new capacity as a Confederate pirate, Farragut had re-established the blockade.

Emboldened by their success at Galveston, the Confederates resolved to make a similar attempt on Sabine Pass. The occupation of this place by the Nationals was a great inconvenience to the Southern authorities. The Sabine River, which the pass commands, is the boundary line between Louisiana and Texas, and is conveniently situated for the foreign trade through Mexico and the West Indies. It was, therefore, of great utility to them in exporting cotton and importing munitions of war and other supplies. The pass, since its occupation by the Nationals in October, had been blockaded by two gunboats, the Morning Light and Velocity. The Morning Light was well armed, carrying a formidable battery of nine guns—one of them a thirty-pound pivot-rifled gun; the other eight, thirty-two pounders. The Velocity carried one small howitzer. The Confederates fitted out four vessels, protected by cotton bales, after the manner of the vessels which were employed in the capture of the Harriet Lane. The largest of the fleet—a steamer—carried two eighteen-pounders; another, a long thirty-two pounder; and the others, one gun each. On the morning of the 21st of January, the weather being favorable, they pushed down the Sabine, drove the National vessels out to sea; where, being pursued by the John Bell and the Uncle Ben, they were captured, with their guns, prisoners and a large amount of stores. The soil of Texas was once more completely in the hands of the Confederates.

General Banks had, meanwhile, been giving his attention to the rich sugar districts of Louisiana, to the west of the Mississippi. This was the more necessary that, if the Confederates were allowed to concentrate in any strength in that region, they would be able to give him trouble on his flank and rear, and seriously to menace New Orleans. Already, as we have seen, a portion of that territory had been overrun by the National troops; but there were portions more particularly in the direction of the Red River, into which they had not yet penetrated, and the inhabitants were, for the most part disloyal. It is a peculiar country, badly adapted for the movement of large bodies of men and artillery—much better adapted, in fact, for defense than for attack. There are large and productive plantations; there are also extensive forests, and the entire country is intersected with
Iagoons, bayous, and impassable swamps. The waters abound with alligators; and the intervening ground, which is for the most part soft and slushy, is darkened by huge cypress trees, which spread their umbrageous foliage all around. At that particular season, in consequence of the overflow of the Mississippi and its tributaries, the district was half submerged in water. In addition to those natural difficulties, obstructions had been placed in the streams; and, at points favorable for defense, fortifications had been constructed.

About eighty miles west of New Orleans, at a point where the waters of the great Bayou Teche meet those of the Atchafalaya, stands Brashear City. This city is connected with New Orleans by a single railroad. On the Teche, it was known, there was an armed steamer, called the J. A. Cotton. At different parts on the Teche, and also on the Atchafalaya, there were strong earth-works. Banks resolved to draw the Confederates from their strongholds in the neighborhood of Brashear City. An expedition for that purpose was organized, and placed under the direction of General Weitzel and Commodore McKean Buchanan. About the 11th of January, Weitzel was at Brashear City. There he placed his infantry on the gunboats, his cavalry and artillery being sent forward by land. At Carney's Bridge, just above Pattersonville, they were brought to a halt by the demolished structure, against which lay a sunken steamboat, laden with brick. Immediately above was the formidable steamer, Cotton; and on each side of the bayou there were powerful batteries, defended, as it turned out, by about 1100 men.

On the morning of the 15th, Buchanan opened fire on the enemy's position. The Confederates responded sharply, both from the Cotton and from the batteries. The engagement had not lasted long when a torpedo exploded below the gunboat, Kinsman, lifting her stern, but not doing serious damage. Heedless of the warning, Buchanan passed on in the Calhoun, in the face of a fierce cannonade. He was standing on the bow of the boat, with his spy-glass in his hand. A spent ball from a rifle-pit hit his chief engineer on the thigh. "Ah, you've got it," he said. The next moment he fell dead, a bullet having penetrated his head. By this time the Eighth Vermont, having reached the Confederate rear, was clearing the rifle-pits, while the batteries of the Fourth Maine and Sixth Massachusetts, supported by Fitch's sharpshooters and the One Hundred and Sixteenth New York, had flanked the defenses on the south side of the bayou.

The Cotton, which was now exposed to an enfilading fire, was soon compelled to retreat. So, also, were the land forces, the latter leaving forty of their number prisoners. The Cotton more than once returned to the fight, every time to be terribly punished; and, on the morning of the 16th, she was seen floating on the bayou, deserted and in flames. It was a swift, sharp, bitter fight. The monster vessel having been destroyed, it was deemed unnecessary to
proceed further. Including Buchanan, whose death was a great calamity, for he was a brave and deserving officer, and had sacrificed much by clinging to the National cause, there were 7 killed and 27 wounded. On the night of the 15th—the dead and wounded having been placed on a raft—the expedition sailed back to Brashear City under the pale light of a January moon.

The forces were now concentrated at Baton Rouge. It was resolved to make a joint land and naval movement in the direction of Port Hudson. Farragut determined, if he could not do more, that he would at least attempt to recover possession of the river from that point to Vicksburg. He, therefore, assembled his fleet at Prophet's Island, a few miles below Port Hudson; and, on the same day, Banks sent forward 12,000 men to engage the attention of the enemy, while the perilous attempt at running the batteries should again be made. It was now the 13th of March.

Some little progress was made. The pickets were driven in; and fire was opened on the Confederate works by the gunboats and the mortars. It was Farragut's intention to run the gauntlet of the batteries next morning. The night, however, seemed favorable for an attack. It was exceedingly dark; and he was now perfectly familiar with the channel. The fleet consisted of the frigates Hartford, Mississippi, Richmond and Monongahela, the gunboats Albatross, Genesee, Kineo, Essex and Sachem, with six mortar schooners. The vessels moved in the following order: the Hartford, Captain Palmer, Farragut on board, with the gunboat Albatross lashed to her side; the Richmond; the Genesee; the Monongahela; the Kineo; the Mississippi. As they moved along through the deep darkness, the mortars kept up their fire. The darkness, however, was not dense enough to put the Confederates off their guard, or to make them forgetful of their duty.

As the vessels approached the fort, the batteries suddenly opened fire, and immense bonfires were kindled on the hill-sides, lighting up the whole scene. The bonfires gave a brilliant but local light, which was hemmed in, so to speak, by the surrounding darkness, while what seemed meteors bursting now from the batteries on the bluffs, and now from the vessels on the river, created a pandemonium-like picture more horrible than the onlooker, in his most imaginative moods, ever before conceived. The batteries being high, the Confederates had all the advantage. It was a most unequal struggle. The fleet, however, kept moving on, vainly replying to the deadly fire, which poured like hail from the heights on their right. Grape, canister, shrapnel, shot, and the scarcely less destructive bullets of sharpshooters, swept murderously over the decks of the vessels as they drew nearer and nearer the bluffs. For an hour and a half the terrific cannonade continued. What had happened in that space of time was known only on board the separate vessels.

About one o'clock the firing ceased. Only the Hartford and the Albatross had passed the batteries. Most of the
MAP OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, SHOWING FREDERICKSBURG, CHANCELLORSVILLE, SPOTTSYLVANIA, THE WILDERNESS, ETC., ETC.
CAPTURE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.
MAP SHOWING THE ENTRANCES TO CAPE FEAR RIVER AND THE APPROACHES TO WILMINGTON, N.C.
DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO' OR STONE RIVER.
MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN MURFREESBORO AND CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE.
MAP SHOWING THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY, THE SCENE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT CAMPAIGNS.
CAVALRY CHARGE
MAP SHOWING THE ROUTE TAKEN BY SHERMAN IN HIS MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA.
MAP SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES NEAR PETERSBURG, VA.
other vessels had suffered severely. The Richmond received a shot in her steam-drum, and was compelled to fall back and anchor. The captain of the Monongahela was seriously injured; that vessel, also, fell back and anchored. The Kineo had her rudder-post shot through; her propeller was made foul by a hawser; she, too, floated down and anchored. The Mississippi had the worst fate of all. Grounding at a point where she was exposed to the fire of three batteries, she was terribly punished. For a time, however, she kept up a most vigorous fire, replying shot for shot to every one that struck her. As it was found impossible to relieve her, it was resolved to abandon her to her fate. Her guns, in consequence, were spiked; she was set on fire; and what remained of the officers and crew found safety on the shore opposite the batteries. It was believed that many jumped overboard and were made prisoners. Of 133 officers and men, 29 were found to be missing. A little later, and after she had drifted off and floated a short distance down the river, she exploded, and went to the bottom, with her fine armament of twenty-one heavy guns and two howitzers. The fleet, with the exception of the two vessels which had passed the batteries, fell back to Baton Rouge, and there found shelter. It was another failure; but neither Farragut above nor Banks below had given up their purpose regarding Fort Hudson.

The Louisiana region west of the Mississippi again commands our attention. Again there was a concentration of forces at Brashear City, General Banks commanding in person. It was the Teche expedition over again, but on a grander scale. When General Weitzel returned to Brashear City, after the expedition in January, the Confederates resumed their old position in the neighborhood of the Teche. It was resolved to drive them effectually out of this rich and productive district. On the 10th of April, General April Brashear City, crossed over to Berwick, on the opposite side of the bayou. The landing was not disputed; but it was discovered that the enemy, in considerable strength, was not far distant. General Richard Taylor, it was known, was in command. On the next day—Saturday—the infantry advanced a short distance.

On Sunday, the 12th, General Emory crossed, with his division. A further advance was made, the enemy resisting, but not obstinately. General Emory slowly moved back to the shelter of the works above Pattersonville. On the same day on which Emory crossed the Teche, General Grover, with his division on transports, accompanied by four gunboats—the Clifton, Calhoun, Arizona and Estrella—moved up the Atchafalaya into Lake Chatimacha towards Irish Bend, his object being to fall upon the rear of the Confederates and cut off their retreat, in the event of their being driven from their position at Fort Bisland. It was difficult to effect a landing; and some time, in consequence, was lost. Grover was vigorously attacked; but he succeeded
in repelling the assailants, who fell back into the woods. This success of Grover weakened the confidence of the enemy in front of General Banks, who was some eleven miles distant. The entire Confederate force, therefore, retreated towards Opelousas, making a stand at Vermilion Bayou. In their retreat, they burned several steamboats at Franklin, and destroyed the bridges in their rear. So rapid was the pursuit made by Weitzel’s brigade, supported by a portion of Emory’s division, under Colonel Ingraham, that Taylor, finding it impossible to carry them with him, destroyed, at New Iberia, five transports laden with commissary stores and ammunition, and an iron-clad which was in course of construction. On the 17th, Emory came up with Taylor at Vermilion Bayou. The contest was brief, but sharp, Taylor again retreating, and burning the bridges behind him. The night of the 17th and the following day were spent in rebuilding the bridges.

On the 19th the march was resumed, and continued to the vicinity of Grand Coteau; and, on the 20th, General Banks entered Opelousas in triumph. On the same day on which Banks entered Opelousas, Lieutenant-Commanding A. P. Cooke captured Butte à la Rose, with its garrison of 60 men, 2 heavy guns, and a large quantity of ammunition. The way was thus opened through the Atchafalaya to the Red River; and the Arizona, having passed through, reached Admiral Farragut, above Port Hudson, on the 2d of May. Banks continued to push forward to Alexandria, Taylor still retreating before him. On the 6th of May, his advance, under General William Dwight, entered Alexandria; but Admiral Porter, who had ascended the Red River with a fleet of gunboats, had arrived some hours before him and taken possession of the place. Weitzel pursued Taylor as far as Grand Ecore, when the chase was discontinued. The expedition had been completely successful; and Banks, on the 7th of May, wrote to Washington, saying: “We have destroyed the enemy’s army and navy, and made their reorganization impossible by destroying or removing the material. We hold the key of the position. Among the evidences of victory are 2000 prisoners, 2 transports and 20 guns taken, and 3 gunboats and 8 transports destroyed.”

While Banks had been thus engaged, the division of General T. W. Sherman, which had been quartered at New Orleans, had not been idle or inactive. At Tickfaw Station, near Lake Pontchartrain, a large quantity of cotton, lumber, corn and bacon had been captured; a large tannery, a car-shop, the Tangipaho Bridge and other valuable property had been destroyed; and four schooners, with cargoes of contraband goods, had been burned on the lake. A detachment from the force, under General Augur, who had returned to Baton Rouge, had encountered and routed a body of the enemy on the railroad, between Port Hudson and Clinton. About this same time, Grierson, to whose successful raid reference has already been made, captured, near Port Hudson, some 300 head of cattle. The
ground was thus cleared of the enemy on both sides of the great river; and Banks was left at liberty to concentrate his troops, with a view to the fresh attack on Port Hudson.

We left Admiral Farragut as he passed the batteries at Port Hudson with his now veteran flag-ship, the Hartford, and the gunboat Albatross. Before halting finally with Banks at Port Hudson, let us follow Farragut, and take note of his experiences until the commencement of the siege. The Hartford and the Albatross, having passed the batteries, proceeded up the river. They encountered little or no opposition until they reached Grand Gulf. Here, however, they were roughly treated, both vessels being more or less injured. The Hartford was struck fourteen times; and three of her men were killed. In passing Warrenton, they experienced a similar fate, the Confederate batteries at that point opening upon them a heavy cannonade. It was not possible, however, to hinder Farragut from moving upward. On the 26th of March, he anchored below Vicksburg, at the mouth of the Williams Canal, to which reference has frequently been made in the preceding chapter. Here he opened communications with General Grant and Admiral Porter. The latter, yielding to his call for reinforcements and supplies, sent him two rams—the Lancaster and the Switzerland—together with several flat-boats, laden with coal. The Lancaster was destroyed while attempting to pass the batteries at Vicksburg. The Switzerland was disabled; but, being rescued by the Albatross, she was towed down to a safe position. The gunboats floated past without damage. The Switzerland was speedily repaired; and the three vessels proceeded on their downward course. On the 30th of March, the fleet witnessed the destruction of the Confederate steamer Vicksburg, as already described. Warrenton was again passed on the morning of the 31st of March; and, on the night of the same day, the three vessels, after some fifteen minutes' bitter experience from the batteries at Grand Gulf, had anchored below that place.

On the following day they weighed anchor, and proceeded to the mouth of the Red River. Over the mouth of the river and the adjoining country, Farragut kept a vigilant guard. It was not deemed safe to make any further attempt to pass the batteries at Port Hudson. It was as little desirable to repeat the fruitless efforts which had been made in the direction of Vicksburg, especially with the heavier vessels. Farragut was thus in some danger of falling a victim to the enemy. The Switzerland had returned and joined the fleet of Admiral Porter, who was now co-operating with General Grant against Vicksburg. Towards the end of April, Farragut, who had sailed on an expedition up the Red River, had a severe engagement with the enemy. He had taken him, in addition to the Albatross, the Estrella and the Arizona. At Gordon's Landing, he encountered two Confederate vessels—the Mary T. and the
Grand Duke. The Estrella and the Arizona were somewhat in the rear, as they had been ordered not to advance. The Albatross moved up to within four hundred yards of the Mary T. At this point, she was stopped by obstructions in the river. A vigorous fight, however, now began, the Grand Duke coming to the aid of her consort. The firing of the Confederate vessels told with terrible effect from the very commencement of the contest. The pilot-house of the Albatross was demolished. One of the pilots was killed outright; and the other lost his hand. The rigging was badly damaged; and the main-mast was cut in two. A ball passed through her hull; and her machinery was partially disabled. The Confederate vessels were more severely punished. The first broadside from the Albatross carried away the steam-connection pipe of the Mary T., at the same time killing and wounding some 30 persons. The Grand Duke was so severely punished that she steamed off up the stream, under cover of the woods. While Farragut, who had fallen back, was consulting with Captain Cook as to the practicability of capturing the now disabled Mary T., the Grand Duke came back and towed away her crippled companion. The fight lasted about forty minutes. The Albatross had lost some seven men in killed and wounded. The Confederate loss on each vessel was understood to be much greater. After this, Farragut was comparatively inactive until the first assault was made on Port Hudson.

Banks, as we have seen, had swept the entire country, on both sides of the great river, from New Orleans to a point beyond the mouth of the Red River. Having returned to the Mississippi, he lost no time in pushing his army across to Bayou Sara. The landing was effected on May the 21st of May. On the following day, he was joined by Brigadier-General Sherman and Major-General Augur, the latter of whom, on the 22d of May, and while taking position, had a severe encounter, on Port Hudson Plains, with a portion of the enemy’s force. On the 25th, the Confederates were compelled to abandon their first line of works. On the 27th, all the necessary preparations having been made, a general assault was ordered.

Port Hudson, originally a place of comparatively little importance and of no great strength, had been strongly fortified, and converted into an almost impregnable fortress. It stood on the east side of the Mississippi, on a bend of the river, about twenty-two miles above Baton Rouge and one hundred and forty-seven above New Orleans. Approaching the place by water from the south, the front batteries were on a bold bluff, about forty feet above high water mark. From this point, three series of batteries extended along the heights above the town to a point on Thompson’s Creek, making a continuous line about three and a half miles long. Beyond Thompson’s Creek there is an impassable marsh, which forms a natural defense. From the lower battery there stretched out, in semicircular form, a line of land fortifications, which terminated at Thompson’s Creek. The place
was strong by nature; and everything which art and science could accomplish had been done to make it impregnable. But for the fall of Vicksburg, the presumption is that it could not have been reduced, except by a formal siege. The guns on the works were of heavy calibre; and there were numerous light batteries, which could be removed to any part of the line. The place was under the command of General Frank Gardner.

When the order for the assault was given, fire had already, for some days, been opened on the place from the river. Farragut, with the Hartford and Albatross, and one or two gunboats, were above Port Hudson. Commander C. H. B. Caldwell, with the Monongahela, Richmond, Essex and Genessee, was below. The firing from the land batteries commenced about six o'clock on the morning of the 27th, and continued all day. At about ten o'clock, and while the batteries were vigorously at work pouring shot and shell into the place, an attack was made on the right of Banks by Weitzel, Grover and Paine. It was long past noon when Augur, in the centre, and Sherman got fairly to work. For hours the battle raged with great fury. The batteries on the land, and the batteries on the river, kept up a most destructive fire, while the brave soldiers rushed forward over the broken ground, over abatis, the Confederate shot and shell sweeping the entire space like a very besom of destruction. Never was more bravery exhibited by any troops. The fight was most severe on the right. Three desperate charges were made.

They pushed their way across Big Sandy Creek; and, by four o'clock, they had driven the enemy through the woods, and forced their way up to the very edge of the works. The attack was made with equal bravery in the centre and on the left; and, by sunset, the Confederates, who made a gallant resistance, were at every point compelled to seek shelter behind their fortifications. The right continued to hold the position which it had won in front of the parapet; but the left, being exposed to a flank fire, withdrew to the cover of a belt of woods close at hand. In the evening the troops were withdrawn. It was a bold effort, daringly and bravely made; but it proved a disastrous failure. The National loss was 293 killed and 1549 wounded. On the Confederate side, the killed and wounded did not exceed 300.

The employment of negro soldiers was a feature of this engagement. It was the first time that they had been employed in any great numbers. The bravery which they exhibited, their patience and endurance under fire, commanded alike the admiration of their white companions-in-arms and the praises of their commanders. In his report, General Banks makes special mention of the manner in which they conducted themselves. "The position occupied by these troops" (the First and Second Louisiana), says that commander, "was one of importance, and called for the utmost steadiness and bravery in those to whom it was confided. It gives me pleasure to report that they answered every expectation."
In many respects their conduct was heroic. No troops could be more determined or more daring. They made, during the day, three charges upon the batteries of the enemy, suffering very heavy losses, and holding their position at nightfall with the other troops on the right of our line. The highest commendation is bestowed upon them by all the officers in command on the right. Whatever doubt may have existed heretofore as to the efficiency of organizations of this character, the history of this day proves conclusively to those who were in condition to observe the conduct of these regiments, that the government will find in this class of troops effective supporters and defenders. The severe test to which they were subjected, and the determined manner in which they encountered the enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt of their ultimate success. They require only good officers, commands of limited numbers, and careful discipline, to make them excellent soldiers."

Banks must have been disappointed; but he was not disheartened. He had no need to be. The stone walls and earth-works, and the powerful and well-manned batteries of the enemy were, a few miles further up the river, baffling the skill and trying the patience of a greater soldier than he. The day after the assault was occupied in burying the dead. It became more and more apparent that the place might prove too strong for the forces at his command, and that he might have to depend on a regular siege for its final reduction. With this probability before him, he set his men to work. Under the hot June sun, the men worked with a will, digging trenches, throwing up earth-works, and undermining the enemy's fortifications. They were daily and hourly exposed to the heavy guns, and to the sharpshooters behind the works. On both sides, the firing was kept up with but little intermission. The shot and shell from the gunboats on the river, as well as from the batteries on land, allowed the garrison no repose. It was the same thing day and night. Gardner's position was daily becoming more critical. His provisions were growing scarce; his medical stores were all but exhausted; and, what was worse, he had but small hope of deliverance. In his case, as in the case of Pemberton, everything depended upon Johnston. Even if unable to relieve Vicksburg, he might succeed in sweeping around Grant's rear, and give Banks a surprise at any moment. This was his strongest consolation. Banks was scarcely in a better plight. His army was small. Around Port Hudson, he had not more than 12,000 effective men. The Confederate cavalry were concentrating in his rear. General Taylor was collecting troops, with a view to fresh efforts of aggression in the adjoining regions of Louisiana. He, too, had his thoughts about Johnston; but what was Gardner's hope was Banks' fear.

It was in the last degree desirable, so far as the National commander was concerned, that Port Hudson be reduced with as little delay as possible. Another assault, therefore, was planned.
The men had done good work in trenching and throwing up works since the last attack. On the 11th of June, an attempt was made to establish a new line within easy attacking distance of the Confederate works. If this line could be established, all the dangers of a movement over a broad intervening space would be avoided. At three o'clock in the morning, under cover of a heavy fire of artillery, the National troops advanced. They had made their way through the abatis, when the garrison came out in force. A fierce struggle ensued. The Nationals not only held their ground for a time, but forced some of the Confederates back behind the fortifications. The attempt was gallantly made, but it was fiercely repelled. Lieutenant Stanton Allyn, a brave young officer from Connecticut, alone reached the parapet; but both he and his men were driven back over the abatis, with a heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.

This partial attempt, although a failure, did not prevent Banks from making a general assault along the whole line three days afterwards. He had made up his mind to take the place by storm, if it were at all possible, and had taken some pains to rearrange his troops, which at this time lay for the most part in two lines—a right and a left, but no centre. Joined together, they made a right angle. Grover’s division, on the upper side of Port Hudson, extended over three miles from the mouth of Thompson’s Creek into the interior of the country. Augur’s division, from a point within supporting distance of Grover, extended some three miles towards the river below Port Hudson. At its extreme point near the river, this line was within hailing distance of the fleet. The enemy was well posted, and not unprepared for the advance of those bright lines of glittering steel which, stretching out on either side of them, met in their front. The defenses of the enemy formed a right angle, both lines of which extended to the river, and enclosed a sharp bend. In front of the earth-works, which seemed covered with gleaming bayonets, there was a deep ditch nearly twelve feet in width; and within short range, enfilading breast-works commanded every approach. The point of attack was the extreme northeasterly angle of the Confederate position. The attack was to be made by Grover and Weitzel. Generals Augur and Dwight were instructed to make a feint or a real attack on the enemy’s right, as circumstances might determine. When the final disposition was made, General Gardner was entreated to surrender, and thus prevent the effusion of blood which must necessarily follow the attack. The shot and shell were already spreading death and destruction all around him; but Gardner, like Pemberton, hoping against hope, and still more than half believing that Johnston might come, refused to yield.

It was now early dawn, on the morning of the 14th of June. The onward movement had already commenced. There was the same deafening roar of artillery as on the occasion of the first attack. The Confederate
works literally blazed, while the booming of the National land batteries was echoed back by the thunders from the river. Two regiments of sharpshooters—the Seventy-Fifth New York and the Twelfth Connecticut—were pushed forward in advance. These were to creep up and lie on the exterior slope of the breast-works. Another regiment followed, each man, in addition to his musket, carrying a five-pound hand grenade, which he was to throw over the parapet. Still another regiment followed, carrying sand-bags full of cotton, which were to be used in filling the ditch in front of the breast-works. These, again, were followed by Weitzel's brigade, with the brigades of Kimball and Morgan, in support. In conjunction with these, and to the left, moved the old division of General Emory, under General Paine, forming a separate column. Both parties were under the command of General Grover, who planned the attack. It was expected that Weitzel would succeed in effecting a lodgment in the Confederate works, and thus prepare the way for the action of Paine's column. The advance, as we have said, was made about dawn. The troops moved along a covered way, until they were within three hundred yards of the enemy's position. At this point, the ground was extremely irregular, broken into deep hollows, and covered with tangled brushwood and creeping vines. On this almost impassable ground, and in full front of the enemy's guns, the advance was met by the Confederates, who, advised of the intended attack, were massed in great force, and offered a most determined resistance.

On, however, the Nationals moved, some of the skirmishers actually reaching the ditch, where they were terribly punished, being exposed to an enfilading fire. The hand grenades were found to be a curse to their bearers; for they were at once caught up by the besieged, and hurled back to explode in the ranks of the assailants. The assaulting column was not deterred by what was happening to the skirmishers in front. The men pushed boldly forward, in the face of a tremendous fire, making a series of vigorous assaults; but all in vain. The point of attack was too strong. It could not be taken. Meanwhile, Generals Augur and Dwight had not been idle on the right. But their efforts were attended with no better success. The Confederates fought at all the points attacked with skill and determination. At eleven o'clock, the Nationals had been repulsed along the whole line. The firing ceased; and the Confederates remained masters of the situation. In this assault, Banks lost 700 men. General Paine, whose division had done most of the hard fighting, had been wounded. The Nationals had gained one advantage. They had established themselves in strong positions, and on ground considerably nearer the Confederate works. Dwight had carried a hill which commanded the "citadel"; and, from the advantage thus gained, he was enabled within a few days to advance and secure a strong position within ten yards of the Confederate line.
After these repeated failures, the conviction was forced upon Banks that the place could be reduced only by a regular siege. Mining operations were carried on with great energy; and the firing was not intermitted either by the land batteries or by the vessels in the river. Steadily, day after day, the investing lines were pushed closer upon the doomed city; and the sufferings of the garrison, already reduced to the necessity of living upon mule-meat, and even upon rats, were greatly aggravated by the continuous explosion of shells. Thus day followed day, nothing occurring to relieve the wearisome monotony. A huge mine has been all but completed; and, in a few days more, unless the place is surrendered, thirty barrels of gunpowder will be exploded under the citadel. Gardner's spirit now begins to sink within him. It was useless any longer to look to Johnston for relief. Such was the condition of things towards the end of June. The heroic little garrison had manifested the utmost bravery, and had endured privation without murmur or complaint.

While General Banks, his troops being all concentrated at Port Hudson, was giving his undivided attention to the conduct of the siege, the Confederates, mainly under the direction of General Dick Taylor, reappeared in force on the western bank of the Mississippi. They overran the Teche and Attakapas regions, from which they had been so recently driven by the National troops. They seemed specially bent on gaining possession of the New Orleans and Opelousas Railroad. Opelousas was soon reoccupied; a successful raid was made upon Plaquemine; and, pressing southward, the Confederates, before the end of June, had made themselves masters of Brashear City. At the last-mentioned place, the raiders were rewarded with immense booty, including commissary, medical and other stores, to the value of several millions of dollars, with an indefinite number of horses, mules, flags, tents, small arms and siege guns. The capture of Brashear City was esteemed in the South as almost an equivalent for the loss of Vicksburg. Having made good their position on the western bank of the river, their sharpshooters proved a fruitful source of annoyance to the Nationals. Massing themselves now at one point and now at another, so as to evade the fire of the gunboats, they rendered transportation next to impossible.

On the 28th of June, an attempt was made upon Donaldsonville. This June place had been garrisoned by General Banks; and what with the resistance the garrison was able to make, and the spirited aid rendered by the gunboats, the attack proved a failure. The Confederates had not yet abandoned all hope of regaining possession of New Orleans. If they could obtain control of its land approaches, it was impossible to predict what might be accomplished by the many friends of secession still in the city. Their main object, however, in all these movements, was to distract the attention of General Banks, to divide his forces, and so aid the beleaguered garrison at Port Hudson. It was Banks' misfortune, that the force at his com-
mand was too small for the demands which were made upon it. He could not, at one and the same time, successfully protect the vast territory committed to his care from the incursions of the enemy, and effectively carry on the siege of Port Hudson. After the surrender of Vicksburg, Grant sent some troops to his assistance; but they were the less necessary, that the fall of Vicksburg sealed the fate of Port Hudson, and enabled Banks to operate his troops in other directions.

It was near the 7th of July. Loud July cheering, and other joyous demonstrations made along the National line, reached the ears of the besieged. These were accompanied by thunders of artillery, which sounded like salutes, from the gunboats and the batteries. The meaning could hardly be mistaken; but doubt was not permitted; for the Confederates on the outer works could distinctly hear the words, as they were joyously repeated by the advanced pickets of the besiegers—"Vicksburg has surrendered!" The intelligence was immediately communicated to General Gardner. He was not yet reduced to absolute despair. The garrison was not murmuring. The mule-meat and the fricasseed rats were still quieting, if not satisfying, the cravings of nature. He could, if he chose, hold out a few days longer. But would it be wise? In this state of mind, Gardner summoned a council of war on the night of the 7th. There were present General Beale, Colonels Steadman, Miles, Lyle and Shelby, and Lieutenant Marshal S. Smith. It was the unanimous opinion of the officers that further resistance would be vain. A correspondence was, in consequence, immediately opened with General Banks. Gardner, in his first letter, referred to the rumor regarding the surrender of Vicksburg, asked whether the rumor were true, and expressed a desire that if it were true, Banks would consent to a suspension of hostilities, with a view to arranging terms of surrender. On being assured of the fact that Vicksburg had fallen, but that there would be no cessation of hostilities for the purposes indicated, Gardner again wrote, requesting the appointment of a commission of three officers, to meet a similar commission appointed by himself, that they might agree upon and draw up the terms of surrender. For this purpose he asked a cessation of hostilities. These terms were complied with. A committee of three were appointed on either side; and instructions were given by both commanders, to the effect that hostilities should cease until further orders.

Honorable terms were granted to the vanquished; and, on the 9th July of July, General Andrews, Chief of Staff of General Banks, with Colonel Berge leading his column, followed by two picked regiments from each division, with the batteries of Holcomb and Rowle and the gunners of the naval battery, entered the works. The National troops were then drawn up in two lines, with their officers in front. The Confederates, their backs to the river, were drawn up in line, with their officers in front, on the opposite side of the road. General Gardner then advanced and offered to surrender his sword, with
Port Hudson. He was politely requested to retain his sword, in consideration of the respect which his bravery commanded in the breasts of his rivals. He then said: "General, I will now formally surrender my command to you, and for that purpose will give the order to ground arms." With the post thus surrendered, there fell into the hands of the Nationals, 6233 prisoners, 51 guns, 2 steamers, 4400 pounds of cannon powder, 5000 small arms, and 150,000 rounds of ammunition. The little hamlet of Port Hudson, originally consisting of a small church and a few houses was completely in ruins. After the surrender, Farragut moved down the river, arriving in time to receive the cordial greetings of the victorious and exultant troops, and to take part in the general rejoicing. So ended the protracted struggle for the possession of Port Hudson.

This chapter on Port Hudson, and connected engagements, is so intimately related to the chapter on Vicksburg, that to enlarge on the importance of the fall of Port Hudson, would only be a useless repetition of what has already been said. It was impossible for the Confederates to hold out in Port Hudson, after Vicksburg had surrendered.

If Vicksburg had not surrendered at the time it did, Gardner might have held out for a few days, but he could not have held out long. Nothing but the appearance of a powerful force in the rear of Banks could have tempted Gardner to make a sortie. Of the appearance of such a force there was but little hope; and, even if such a diversion had been made, it is questionable whether, in the exhausted condition of the garrison, a sortie would have been attempted, or, if attempted, would not have resulted in complete and disastrous failure. Looked at in the light we now enjoy, the glory attending the capture of Port Hudson, was eclipsed by the greater glory of Vicksburg. This much, in addition to what has been said in this chapter already, it is only fair to say in vindication of General Banks and the brave officers and men who fought under him. He would have done better if he had had a stronger force at his command, and less territory to protect. As it was, Banks reduced a fortress second only in importance to that of Vicksburg; and, by the conspicuous service which he rendered his country, the hero of Port Hudson shared the favors which were then being poured out so lavishly on Meade and Grant.
CHAPTER XXVI.

The West and the East.—After Fredericksburg.—Changes in the Army of the East.—General Hooker.—His Past Career.—His Personal Appearance.—Hooker’s Address to the Army.—The Emancipation Proclamation.—Its Effect on the Army.—Rearrangement of the Army.—The Position of General Lee.—Condition of his Army.—Description of the Ground.—Hooker Preparing to Attack.—His Plan of Battle.—The National Army in Motion.—The Crossing of the Rappahannock.—The Crossing of the Rapidan.—At Chancellorsville.—The Position Described.—Sedgwick’s Operations Below Fredericksburg.—A Successful Feint.—Hooker’s Plan Working Admirably.—Hooker Advances Towards Fredericksburg.—The Three Roads.—Sykes Compelled to Fight his Way.—The Advance Successful.—A Splendid Position Won.—Fortune Smiling on Hooker and the National Army.—Hooker’s First but Fatal Blunder.—The Plan of Battle Changed.—On the Defensive.—The Line of Battle.—The Confederate Lines.—Jackson Pushed Towards Chancellorsville.—Disposition of the Confederate Troops.—Lee’s Description of the National Position.—Jackson’s Plan.—A Bold Experiment.—Jackson’s Movement to the National Right.—Hooker in Ignorance of Jackson’s Plan.—The Confederate Column Seen at the Furnace.—Advance of Sickles.—Capture of the Twenty-Third Georgia Regiment.—An Attempt to Intercept the Confederate Train.—Jackson on the Plank Road and the Turnpike.—Ready to Strike.—The Unsuspecting Nationals.—Started Game.—A Mighty Cheer.—A Panic.—The National Right Demolished.—The Battle of Bull Run Repeated.—Advance of Birney and Best.—Jackson Cheeked.—Sickles Recalled from the Furnace.—Hazel Grove.—Crutchfield Wounded.—A Midnight Battle.—“Stonewall” Jackson Mortally Wounded.—His Death.—A. P. Hill Takes Command, and is Wounded.—The Command Devolves upon Stuart.—Hooker’s Mistake.—Sedgwick ordered to Advance.—Hooker Takes a New Position.—The Battle Resumed.—Sickles Ordered to Abandon the Key-Position of the Field.—“Charge, and Remember Jackson.”—Tempest of Lead.—The Nationals Driven Back.—Lee Pressing on Slocum and Hancock.—The Confederate Line United.—The National Line Melts Away.—Chancellorsville House Abandoned.—Hooker Stunned and Stupefied by a Cannon Ball.—A Lull in the Fight.—The New Position.—Lee About to Strike a Decisive Blow.—His Arm Arrested.—News of the Advance of Sedgwick.—The Occupation of Fredericksburg.—The Storming of the Heights.—Marye’s Hill.—The Plank Road.—The Famous Stone Wall.—Magnificent Attack on Marye’s Hill.—The Shout of Victory.—The National Flag on Marye’s Hill.—Howe at Hazel Run.—He Captures Lee’s Hill.—Sedgwick in Full Possession of the Heights.—Sedgwick’s Advance.—The Confederate Forces Divided.—Lee’s Dilemma.—Estimate of Lee.—He Resolves to Intercept the Advance of Sedgwick.—Wilcox on the Plank Road.—Salem Church.—McLawns Arrives with Three Brigades, and Takes Command.—The Battle of Salem Church.—Newton’s Advance.—Bravery of Bartlett.—The Nationals Carry the Crest.—A Temporary Triumph.—The Nationals Driven Back.—A Bloody Repulse.—Lee Resolved to Crush Sedgwick, and then Fall Back on Hooker.—McLawns Reinforced.—Lee at Salem.—The Confederate Attack Renewed.—The Fighting Severe.—Sedgwick Crosses the River.—Lee Hurries Back to Attack Hooker.—A Fearful Rainstorm.—Hooker Resolves to Retreat.—Crosses the River at Midnight.—Disappointment of Lee.—Stoneman and his Cavalry.—A Profitless Raid.—The National Army in its Old Encampment at Falmouth.—A Boastful Address.—General Lee to his Army.—Stanton’s Despatch.—The Draft Proclamation.

While we have been giving our attention to the military and naval movements of the West and Southwest—to that series of events which culminated in the fall of Vicksburg; and to that other series of events which culminated in the fall of Port Hudson—movements of equal importance, taking place in the East, have been pressing themselves upon our notice. In two great battles—that of Chancellorsville, and that of Gettysburg—the National army of the Potomac and the Confederate army of Virginia had met and tested each other’s skill and strength. The former resulted in a great National
disaster: the latter was a National triumph. The former inspired the Confederates with hope and confidence, and led them to the adoption of daringly aggressive measures: the latter, occurring as it did simultaneously with the final struggle and triumph at Vicksburg, and being followed so closely by the fall of Port Hudson, swelled the National heart with joy and gratitude, and, by contributing with the other victories just named to the establishment of fresh confidence and to the creation of fresh resolves, gave a new phase to the general contest.

In the present chapter, we propose to give an account of the great but ill-managed and disastrous battle of Chancellorsville. In a previous chapter, we have related the causes which brought about the removals of Generals Burnside, Franklin and Sumner from the army of the Potomac, and the placing of General Joseph Hooker in the supreme command.* The elevation of Hooker may have given offense to some of his brother-officers; but it was on the whole, so far as the army was concerned, a popular and acceptable appointment. Outside the army, opinion was divided. There were many who regarded the elevation of Hooker to the chief command of the army of the Potomac with extreme satisfaction. Since the commencement of the Peninsula campaign, he had been prominently identified with that army. He greatly distinguished himself at the battle of Williamsburg; and, from that day to the end of the campaign, he was ever ready with his well-trained and devoted division, to perform any duty, to run any risk, to make any sacrifice. At the battle of Antietam, where he literally covered himself with glory, he proved himself to be the bravest of the brave. He was one of the few of McClellan’s generals, who gave to Pope a willing and honest obedience during his campaign against Lee in Virginia. When the army of the Potomac again changed its leader, he did not withhold his allegiance from Burnside, although he was not without reasons for being dissatisfied with this appointment; and at the battle of Fredericksburg, where he commanded the centre, he yielded to duty against his better judgment, and, in obedience to orders, attempted the performance of a perilous and an impossible task. In his case, from first to last, personal feeling was not allowed to interfere with the discharge of public duty. His fine appearance and his agreeable manners, which made him a great favorite with his own men, recommended him to all with whom he was brought into contact. Tall, erect, muscular, but not heavily-built; light of complexion, with a fresh, ruddy countenance; fine, clean-cut, intellectual features, lit up by large, clear, mild yet

* Burnside was appointed to the command of the Department of the Ohio. Franklin was ordered south, to take command of a corps under Banks in Louisiana. Sumner was assigned to the command of the Department of Missouri, then threatened with fresh trouble by the guerrillas. While preparing to set out for his more distant command, he was taken ill at the house of his son-in-law, in Syracuse, N. Y. He died, after a few days’ illness, on the 21st of March, 1863. General Sumner had just completed his sixty-seventh year. He died universally regretted. In him the country lost one of its best citizens, and the army one of its bravest soldiers.
expressive eyes; a lofty forehead, his hair brown, but tinged with gray; quick and decided in all his movements—such at that time was General Joseph Hooker. In figure and in bearing he had few if any equals among the officers of the army. It was hoped that under such a leader the army of the Potomac would yet prove itself worthy of the care which had been bestowed upon it, and justify the expectations which it had raised in the hearts of the Northern people. There were not a few, however, who regarded the appointment of Hooker with doubt and misgiving. His bravery, which had been put to the test on many a battlefield, was not to be called in question; his ability as a corps or division commander had been abundantly established; but the qualities which had served him in good stead and carried him to victory, in a secondary capacity, might not be sufficient for him as commander-in-chief. The skilful lieutenant has oftentimes been found helpless when left alone. "He was my right arm," said Napoleon of Murat, "but without me he was nothing. In battle, he was, perhaps, the bravest man in the world; left to himself, he was an imbecile without judgment." Of Ney, he said: "He was the bravest of men; there terminate all his faculties." The army of the Potomac had already furnished two examples of conspicuous failure. Might not Hooker, like Pope and Burnside, be found wanting? It had certainly yet to be proved whether he were possessed of the higher qualities requisite in a general-in-chief. The broad conception, with the power to combine and utilize the forces at his command; the comprehensive grasp, with minute attention to detail; the quick eye and the clear head to perceive and know where relief is needed or where a deadly blow may be struck; the lightning-like promptitude of action which always implies self-reliance and the full courage of conviction—these were the qualities needed in the man who would lead to victory the army of the Potomac; and if there were some who doubted whether these were all united in General Hooker, it was not because they underestimated his abilities or disesteemed his past career, but because he had not been tested in this lofty and exacting sphere of duty.

General Hooker's elevation commanded the greater attention, that he had been open-mouthed regarding the errors, real or supposed, of his predecessors. His estimate of his own abilities was undoubtedly high. When questioned by the Congressional Committee as to the cause of the failure of the Peninsular campaign, he answered: "I do not hesitate to say that it is to be attributed to the want of generalship on the part of our commander." It was his opinion—and he did not disguise it—that there were several occasions during that campaign, on which, if he had been at liberty to act, he could have taken Richmond. His views were expressed with equal freedom, and were of similar import, after the battle of Fredericksburg. If, therefore, he was about to be judged by a high standard, it was a standard which he,
himself, had been mainly instrumental in setting up.

Hooker assumed command on the

Jan. 26th of January. On the same
day he issued an address to the
army. "The undersigned," he said,
"assumes command of the army of the Potomac. He enters upon the discharge of the duties, imposed by the trust, with a just appreciation of their responsibility. Since the formation of this army he has been identified with its history; he has shared with you its glories and reverses, with no other desire than that these relations might remain unchanged until its destiny should be accomplished. In the record of your achievements there is much to be proud of, and, with the blessing of God, we will contribute something to the renown of our arms and the success of our cause. To secure these ends, your commander will require the cheerful and zealous co-operation of every officer and soldier in the army. In equipment, intelligence and valor the enemy is our inferior. Let us never hesitate to give him battle whenever we can find him. The undersigned only gives expression to the feelings of this army when he conveys to our late commander, Major General Burnside, the most cordial good wishes for his future.

"JOSEPH HOOKER."

When Hooker took command, the army of the Potomac was in a dreadfully demoralized condition. It still lay at Falmouth, and occupied Stafford Heights. The emancipation proclamation had produced a bad effect among the officers, many of them openly de-

claring that had they known what was to be done in the matter of slavery, they would never have joined the army. There was, besides, a lingering affection for McClellan, both on the part of officers and men; and neither the one nor the other could forgive Hooker for his statement that the Peninsular campaign had failed on account of bad generalship. The demoralization, which set in immediately after the battle of Fredericksburg, was increased greatly by what was called Burnside's "Mud" campaign. Desertions to the number of 200 men were occurring daily. As many as 2922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 men were reported absent. This was not all. In the spring, 40,000 men, who would have completed their term, would be at liberty to go home. Hooker set himself busily to the work of reconstruction. The division system was abolished; and the army was divided into seven corps. The First corps was commanded by Reynolds; the Second by Couch; the Third by Sickles; the Fifth by Meade; the Sixth by Sedgwick; the Eleventh by Howard; the Twelfth by Slocum. The cavalry, which consisted of four divisions, commanded respectively by Pleasonton, Buford, Averill and Gregg, was consolidated into one corps, under Stoneman. The army of the Potomac needed rest; and, for three months, it lay inactive in winter-quarters at Falmouth. Hooker, however, was not idle. Desertions were checked; the ranks were gradually filled up by the return of absentees; the discipline was improved; and, by the end of April,
the army was in a state of high efficiency. The infantry and artillery amounted to 123,000 men; there were 13,000 cavalry and 400 guns. "All were actuated," said Hooker, "by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the Republic."

In front of Hooker, on the south side of the Rappahannock, and occupying the now famous heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, lay the army of General Lee, 62,000 strong. This army which, after the battle of the 13th of December, needed rest quite as much as the army of the Potomac, had also, during the winter months, been brought up to a high state of efficiency. Such was the effect of the Conscription Act, now fairly in operation, that, in three months, Jackson's corps increased from 25,000 to 33,000 muskets. Fredericksburg, and the country in the immediate neighborhood, has been fully described in a previous chapter. It will be remembered that the hills to the rear of that city rise at some little distance from the river, leaving not exactly a plain but open and comparatively level ground between. Above Fredericksburg, and opposite Falmouth, the ridge approaches close to the river; but from that point, the distance between the river and the heights gradually widens, until, about four or five miles below the town, the open ground is about a mile and a half wide. The Confederates, as we have said, occupied the heights, their line extending from Banks' Ford on the left, to Port Royal on the right—a distance of twenty-five miles. Their cavalry extended to the left as far back as Buckley's Ford, on the Upper Rappahannock, and scoured the country as far south as the Pamunkey River. During the winter, General Lee had exerted himself to the utmost to make his position secure. He extended and strengthened the fortifications in the rear of Fredericksburg, and constructed a system of elaborate works along his whole front. Inside of these lines, he might have hidden defiance to an army twice or three times the strength of his own. Such was the nature of the works, and such was the arrangement of his troops, that he could concentrate with the utmost rapidity, and, with a powerful force, resist an attack at any point. From this position, however, he had only two main lines of retreat—one towards Richmond by railroad, and the other towards Gordonsville.

It was now near the end of April. As it was vain to attempt any direct attack in his position at Fredericksburg, Hooker resolved upon a bold experiment, the object of which was to compel Lee to come out of his intrenchments and accept the gage of battle in the open ground. He was the more encouraged to adopt this course, without further delay, that Longstreet had been detached, with several of his divisions, to the south of the James River. Some feigned movements were made as early as the 21st of April; but it was not until the 27th, that the real onward movement began. Hooker's purpose was to effect the complete destruction of the Confederate army. With this
end in view, he ordered Sedgwick to make a pretense of reversing Burnside's plan of attack, by crossing the river below Fredericksburg and making there a vigorous demonstration. He himself proposed to move, with the larger portion of the army, to his own right, and to push his forces by a circuitous route across the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, to drive off or capture the guards at the forts, and then wheeling round on his left, as on a pivot, so as to face eastward, to march towards the river. It was his hope that he would thus be able to emerge from the wilderness before the Confederates were aware of his approach, and, by dealing them a deadly blow on their left flank, compel them to face about and offer battle. Fully confident that his plan would be successfully carried out, and in order to make Lee's retreat to Richmond impossible, he had already detached all the cavalry under Stoneman, with the exception only of 1000 men left in charge of Pleasonton, with instructions to destroy all the bridges and tear up all the railroads in the Confederate rear. The plan was excellent; and, as we shall see, it was in the first instance at least admirably executed.

It will be observed by referring to the map, that about three miles above Fredericksburg in a straight line, or about five following the river, is a crossing called Banks' Ford. Some seven or eight miles further up, and at no great distance from the confluence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, or, as they were wont to be named, north and south forks, is another crossing, known as United States Ford. Following up the Rappahannock, or north fork, we come to Kelley's Ford, about twenty-seven miles from Fredericksburg. Following up the Rapidan, or south fork, we come first to Ely's Ford, and then, at some little distance, Germania Ford. As Kelley's Ford is several miles above the confluence of the two streams, it was necessary for the troops who crossed the Rappahannock at that point to cross also the Rapidan, either at Ely's or Germania Ford, before they could reach their point of destination. All these fords, but particularly those on the line of the Rappahannock, were strongly guarded by Confederate troops; and the water in the river, as it generally is at this season, was high.

On the 27th, Monday, the weather was favorable, and the movement commenced. The turning column consisted of the Fifth corps, General Meade; the Eleventh corps, General Howard; and the Twelfth corps, General Slocum. On Tuesday, the 28th, they reached Kelley's Ford. During the night and following morning all the troops were safely pushed across. The infantry was moved in two columns—the Eleventh and Twelfth towards Germania, and the Fifth towards Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan. At both fords the Confederate pickets were driven off without difficulty. At Germania, 150 pioneers were attempting to build the bridge which Stoneman had destroyed some days before. All of these were captured. The troops
were in the best of spirits. Impatient to reach the opposite shore, large numbers of them plunged into the flood, wading to the arm-pits, their clothes and their cartridge-boxes carried high on the points of their bayonets. Bonfires blazed during the darkness; and, at both fords, all were safely got across. Once on the south side of the Rapidan, the united columns moved eastwardly towards United States Ford, driving off the Confederate guards. This ford being thus uncovered, General Couch, who, with a portion of the Second corps, had, since Tuesday, been lying on the other side, waiting for his opportunity, crossed the Rappahannock on a pontoon bridge. The combined forces then moved southward, and on Thursday night took position at Chancellorsville. On the evening of the same day, General Hooker, who had superintended the crossing of Couch’s troops, arrived at Chancellorsville; and, at a large and substantial brick house, with out-buildings—the only house in the near neighborhood, and formerly an inn—he established his headquarters.

The position thus secured offered many advantages. Around the house was an open, cultivated space; and immediately in front was a little stream which flowed into the Rappahannock. It was about eleven miles from Fredericksburg, and was connected therewith by three main roads—the plank-road on the right, the river road on the left, and the turnpike between them. It communicated also with Orange Court House, and with Gordonsville, by a road through the wilderness.

While Hooker had been carrying out his plan, and apparently with complete success on his right, Sedgwick had not been inactive on his left. This general, it will be remembered, was left behind at Falmouth, with the First, Third and Sixth corps, comprising some 30,000 effective men. His special instructions were that he should, at the time appointed, throw a portion of his troops across the river below Fredericksburg, and, by making a vigorous demonstration, create the impression that the plan of Burnside was about to be repeated. On Monday, the 27th, the First corps, General Reynolds, the Third, General Sickles, and the Sixth, in immediate charge of Sedgwick himself, moved from their camps, and took a position down the river, about ten miles below Fredericksburg. Pontoons were thrown across at three points; and, on the morning of the 29th, troops were pushed over, and such demonstrations were made as seemed to imply that the real attack was to be made in that direction. So far as Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, or any of the National commanders could judge, the feint made by the left had been completely successful. The plan of the commanding general had, up to a certain point at least, worked admirably. All the upper fords of the Rappahannock were in his hands; and he had massed a powerful army at Chancellorsville. Further demonstrations being considered unnecessary, for the present, on the part of the left, Sedgwick was instructed to remain at Falmouth and assist developments on the right. Sickles, meanwhile, was de-
tached, and ordered to cross with the Third corps, at United States Ford, and join Hooker at Chancellorsville. Reynolds, in due time, was to follow. Sickles arrived at Chancellorsville on the morning of the 1st of May. It was not wonderful that, at this stage, Hooker should have felt elated, or that his men should have been confident of victory. It might have been wiser, however, if such feelings had been less boisterously expressed. On the 30th of April, Hooker issued a general order. "It is with heartfelt satisfaction," he said, "that the commanding general announces to the army, that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth corps have been a succession of splendid achievements." Hooker seemed to feel that the prize was in his grasp. In the hearing of some of his officers and certain gentlemen connected with the press, who were present at his headquarters, he exclaimed: "The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond, and I shall be after them."* Hooker really had reason to be proud. His plan, as we have said, had worked well. Up to this point, it could hardly have worked better; and it is not at all improbable that if the head which conceived it, and which had so far given it development, had remained cool and steady throughout, his magniloquent language would have been abundantly justified. Lee's position was the reverse of enviable. In his front there was a well-trained, well-equipped army of 70,000 men; in his rear there was a broad river, guarded by another army of 30,000 men; while his retreat was cut off by 12,000 cavalry. Everything, however, now depended upon steadiness of purpose and rapidity of movement.

Gratified as Hooker was with the success which had attended his movements hitherto, he knew that he had only entered on the threshold of his great undertaking. He resolved, therefore, to turn his success to account, and to press his advantage. On Friday, May 1st, having arranged his troops in three columns, he pushed them eastward towards Fredericksburg, by the three principal roads already mentioned. His object was to get out of the wilderness into the clear, open country beyond, where there was free fighting room, and where artillery and cavalry could be easily and effectively handled. The left, composed of two divisions of Meade's corps—those of Griffin and Humphreys—advanced by the river road; the centre, Sykes' division, also of Meade, supported by Hancock, advanced by the turnpike; while Slocum's corps on the right marched along the plank road. The left marched along the river road for five miles, and came in sight of Banks' Ford without

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*The words were spoken in the hearing of Mr. William Swinton, who was present on the occasion.—Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, p. 275.
encountering any opposition. The centre had moved along the turnpike for about a mile to the east of Chancellorsville, when it encountered the enemy in some force. Vigorous firing was kept up on both sides for some hours; but Sykes pressed forward his gallant little band, and, the foe falling back, he reached the place assigned him early in the afternoon. The right moved to its destined point without difficulty, and without meeting any resistance. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the advanced position thus gained by these different bodies of men. It was an elevated ridge, beyond the bounds of the wilderness, completely protecting Chancellorsville, and commanding the clear, open country in rear of the Fredericksburg Heights. On the left it uncovered Banks' Ford. Artillery could be planted advantageously on the face of the ridge; while the clear open ground in front was admirably adapted for the use of artillery. This, however, was not all. It shortened by twelve miles the communication between the main force at Chancellorsville and that under Sedgwick at Falmouth, and below Fredericksburg. It was surely natural to expect that such a position would be seized, and held at any cost, and that to this vantage-ground Hooker would push forward his whole army. It was not to be so. Fortune was smiling on the National commander; but, strange to relate, with a perversity which is almost unexampled, he turned his back upon the favoring goddess, when she was about to confer upon him her richest rewards. Victory seemed to be within his grasp; but he flung away all that he had won, and his splendid opportunity besides. In spite of the earnest remonstrances of his officers, he ordered the columns to fall back to Chancellorsville, where he resolved to take position, and await the attack of the enemy. His original plan was abandoned at once. It was Hooker's first blunder in this campaign; but it was fatal.

Hooker now gathered his forces around him at Chancellorsville, threw up intrenchments, and prepared to receive, not to make an attack. The tide of battle was thus, by a fatal infelicity, turned before the battle was commenced. It was only two days since the proud words were uttered; yet the boastful National commander was already on the defensive. The ground selected was by no means so well adapted, either for attack or defense, as the ground which he had abandoned. It was commanded by high grounds, and surrounded on all sides by the forest. In this new position, however, the disposition of the troops was not unskilfully made. Not knowing from what direction the blow might come, and resolved to preserve his communications with the river, Hooker arranged his forces in a form which, for the benefit of the reader has been compared not inaptly to the letter U. The limbs of the U pointed towards the Rappahannock, the one side facing to the east, and the other to the west. The eastern side was held by Meade and one division of Couch; the centre was held by Slocum and one division of Sickles;
and the right by Howard. Every effort was made to strengthen the front by rifle-pits and abatis. Howard, who little dreamed of an attack on his side, took too little pains to prevent a surprise. Two divisions of the Second and two divisions of the Third corps were held in reserve. Pleasonton, with his cavalry, was also on the right. Such was the position of the National army on the night of Friday, the 1st of May.

Let us now see what the Confederates were doing in the interval since the National troops began to move on the 27th April. It has been claimed by Southern writers that Lee was aware of Hooker's movements and plans, if not from the commencement, at least from a much earlier date. than is commonly believed. There can be no doubt, we think, that up until the 29th, he was disposed to believe that the real attack was to be made from Falmouth and by the lower Rappahannock. The feeble efforts made by Sedgwick on the morning of that day, and his subsequent inactivity, must have filled Lee's mind with doubt, if it did not convince him that the threatened movement from that quarter was intended only as a feint. We know that, on the afternoon of the 29th, he received from Stuart definite information of the fact that heavy columns of Nationals had crossed the upper Rappahannock, and that they were marching towards Germania and Ely's fords. Anderson, who was hurried forward to Chancellorsville, occupied that place on the night of the 29th. Learning that the National troops had crossed the Rapidan in great force, he withdrew on the following morning. On the morning of the 30th, Jackson's corps was still in line of battle at Hamilton's Crossing, his left extending for upwards of a mile towards the northwest, his right resting on the Rappahannock, at the mouth of Massaponax Creek. McLaws' division, of Longstreet, was still in its camp, his line extending from Fredericksburg some two or three miles up the river. Barksdale's brigade occupied the town. Pendleton's reserve artillery was under orders to take position at Massaponax Church. Stuart, with Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry, having crossed the Raccoon Ford during the night, was moving to harass the National advance. There was another strong Confederate brigade at Culpepper, in Stoneman's front. Anderson had taken up a line perpendicular to the plank and turnpike roads, near their junction with the old Mine Road. At midnight, McLaws was ordered to move his division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, in the direction of Anderson, and take position on his right. Jackson was ordered to move at daylight, on the 1st of May, with three of his divisions, in the same direction, and to take command of the field. Early was left to defend the works from Hamilton's Crossing to Fredericksburg. The force under his command for this purpose, as stated by a Confederate authority, consisted of his own command, Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws', Andrew's battalion of artillery, and a part of the reserve artillery.
under General Pendleton, and amounted to 8500 muskets and 30 guns. From the resistance which Franklin experienced, as we shall see by and by, the presumption is that this force was much stronger. McLaws reached Anderson by the early dawn. Jackson came up at eight o'clock, and ordered a general advance. It thus happened that both armies were in motion at the same time, but in opposite directions. Jackson was moving towards Chancellorsville; Hooker was moving his army towards Fredericksburg; and each was prepared to offer the other battle. This advance movement of Jackson explains the resistance which the National centre experienced on the old turnpike road, on Friday, the 1st of May.

On the night of the 1st, General Lee had come to the conclusion that the National position was too strong to be taken in front. "The enemy," he said in his report, "had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breast-works of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which the position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." What was to be done? Was an attack more practicable on the National right? The ground was reconnoitered. Hooker's line was reported to be vulnerable in that direction. The next question was whether there existed a practicable route by which, with speed and secrecy, the movement could be accomplished. This question also was satisfactorily answered. If a route did not exist, a route could be made. Seated on cracker-boxes, the Confederate leaders consulted as to what should be done. Jackson was familiar with the locality. With a map before him, he described the ground, suggested that a circuitous march of fifteen miles be made towards the extreme right of the National army, and proposed to strike a deadly blow, before the opposing hosts should be aware of his presence. It was a bold experiment; but it was just the kind of experiment which Jackson delighted to make. If it succeeded, he would certainly produce a panic in Hooker's army—he might even seize his communications with United States Ford, on which the National commander relied in case of retreat. "With what force will you attempt this?" asked General Lee. "With my whole corps present," replied Jackson. "What, in that case, would be left to resist an advance of the enemy towards Fredericksburg?" Lee again asked. "The divisions of Anderson and McLaws," was the prompt and confident answer. It was a most audacious plan, and in open violation of the first principles of the military art. As things were, the Confederate commander was confronted by superior numbers. With 42,000 muskets, he was in the presence of 60,000 or 70,000. Lee reflected for a moment. His army was already divided in two. If he consented, his army would be cut up into three parts. And then, what if Jackson failed? It would be ruin—
hopeless, irretrievable ruin. But Lee had faith in his brave and adventurous lieutenant. He gave his consent; and orders for the march were immediately given.

On Saturday morning, Jackson, with some 22,000 men, set out on his perilous expedition. He moved with great secrecy and with a speed almost incredible, considering the nature of the ground he had to traverse. Stuart's cavalry was employed to conceal his column from view, and to distract the attention of the National troops. Lee, too, made frequent demonstrations, so as to engage attention in front. Hooker, however, was not without warning, nor was he wholly without suspicion. On Friday night, the Confederates were observed cutting a road past the National picket lines on the right. On Saturday morning, trains and ambulances were seen passing over a hill in Sickles' front. When informed of the movement of Jackson, Hooker sent orders to the officers commanding on the right, to be on their guard against an advance of the enemy on their flank, and directed them to strengthen that portion of their line to meet such an emergency. Birney reported to Sickles that he saw, in the direction of what was called the Furnace, a Confederate column, as it marched down the hill and crossed Lewis' Creek. Sickles went forward in person, and satisfied himself of the truth of the report. He saw the trains of artillery wagons and ambulances which followed in Jackson's rear; but he concluded that the Confederates were in full retreat. A battery was pushed forward, and the moving column was shelled at a distance. As it soon disappeared, it was believed that the movement, whether of attack or retreat, had been abandoned. It soon again reappeared; and Sickles was ordered to push forward two divisions to develop the strength or the intentions of the enemy. This force, which consisted of the divisions of Birney and Whipple, with Barlow's brigade, of Howard's corps, soon came up with the enemy. A sharp skirmish ensued; and, by the aid of Randolph's battery, some 400 men, including several officers of the Twenty-third Georgia regiment, were captured. Information received from the prisoners removed all doubt as to the character or purpose of the mysterious column. It was Stonewall Jackson's corps; its redoubtable chief was at its head; and it was moving, with hostile intent, to the flank and rear of the National right. It was no time now for trifling. Jackson, it was evident, meant business. Sickles, therefore, pressed forward with fresh energy, and with the view of intercepting the train in Jackson's rear. Williams, who was ordered to co-operate, advanced at the same time with his division, of Slocum's corps, and commenced a vigorous flank movement on Jackson's right. It was believed, for a moment, that the Confederate general would be caught in his own trap—that, if not captured, he would be compelled to retreat. It was a mistaken belief. A Confederate battalion of artillery, under Colonel Thompson Brown, happened to be close at hand. Brown got his guns into po-
sition, and supported them by such companies of infantry as could be got together. Meantime, Archer, with his own and Thomas’ brigade, of A. P. Hill’s division, hearing of the capture of the Georgia regiment, fell back to the menaced point. By these means, Sickles was held in check, and Jackson’s train was enabled to pass on. What was more important still to the Confederates, time was gained. Jackson was now beyond reach. While this skirmishing was going on, on his flank and rear, he was pushing forward through the tangled wilderness with incredible speed. Obstacles seemed to disappear as he advanced. Where there was no opening in the woods, a passage was soon created, the sturdy forest trees yielding to the vigorous blows of his hardy pioneers. When Sickles, who, after the Confederates retired, held possession of the road in the neighborhood of the Furnace, was preparing to follow up Jackson and strike him in the rear, the Confederate chieftain, having reached his chosen ground, was about to burst like a whirlwind on his unsuspecting foe.

After passing the Furnace, and plunging into the forest, Jackson, being under complete cover of the woods, pursued his way unmolested. As he moved around, he was continually feeling the National lines. On reaching the plank road, he halted for a time, and, from a commanding eminence, surveyed the position and works of his antagonist. Fitz Lee’s cavalry, supported by Paxton’s brigade of infantry, was ordered forward on the plank road.

Jackson himself, with the mass of his command, pushed on through the jungle to the old turnpike. He was now near the outskirts of the National encampment. Secrecy had become more important than ever. The knowledge of his whereabouts, on the part of the National commanders, before he was fully prepared to strike the decisive blow, might, at the last moment, mar all his plans. Orders were, therefore, given in a low tone; the firing of guns was forbidden; no cheering was allowed as the general passed by; and the well-trained battalions, disciplined almost to perfection, moved along slowly, silently, and with cat-like caution. Arrived at the turnpike, he turned to the right, and moved along that road to some distance in the direction of Chancellorsville. Here he arranged his troops in three lines of battle, perpendicular to the turnpike, and extending about one mile on either side. Rodes, with his own brigade and that of Iverson on the left, and those of Doles and Colquitt on the right, occupied the first line. Colston, who commanded Trimble’s division, with his own brigade and those of Nicholls and Jones, took position two hundred yards in the rear of Rodes. A. P. Hill’s division, as it came up, was formed into the third line. Two pieces of Stuart’s artillery moved along the turnpike with the first line. The second and third line was to support the first when necessary, without waiting for specific instructions.

It was now after five o’clock. Let us look within the National lines. Hooker was still at his headquarters at
Chancellorsville; and, although watchful of his whole line, he had a special care of his front and the side looking towards Fredericksburg. In this latter direction, as we have seen, Meade and Couch kept guard—Sickles and a portion of Slocum's troops were at the Furnace, preparing to follow Jackson. The right of the National army was protected by the Eleventh corps, General Howard, one of the bravest officers in the National army. The outworks at this point ran parallel to the plank and turnpike roads, and faced to the south. Steinwehr was on the left, Schurz in the centre, and Devens on the right. Devens' position was near Talley's House. It was now near six o'clock. All fear of danger, for the day, had been abandoned. Their arms were stacked, and the men were cooking or eating their evening meal. All of a sudden there is a commotion in the woods. Startled game, as if disturbed in their quiet retreats, appear in large numbers, and rush to and fro in wild bewilderment. Deer leap over the works, and dash through the National lines into the woods beyond. Jackson has given the signal to advance; and these scared creatures of the wood, frightened by the presence of man, and running they know not whither, are but an emblem of what is soon to be witnessed, on a far grander scale, on the right wing of the great and invincible army of the Potomac. A second more, and the bugles are heard. Then a mighty cheer, followed by a terrific volley, the deadly missiles coming crashing through the trees, and falling like hail among the unarmed and unsuspecting Unionists, and it is known that "Stone-wall" Jackson is upon them. It is an instant panic. The high and commanding ground at Talley's is at once abandoned, Devens' men fleeing precipitately and in the wildest confusion, many of them without having picked up their muskets. Schurz's men behave even worse—joining in the rout without even waiting for the attack. In vain does the brave Devens, a second time wounded, in vain does the heroic Howard, galloping among the broken columns, urging them by voice and gesture, and waving, banner-like, his empty sleeve, attempt to rally the fugitives, and turn them against their pursuers. Once and again a regiment is halted, but it is only to be torn to pieces by the merciless fire of the on-rushing and now triumphant Confederates. Suddenly, however, a halt is made on the part of both pursuers and pursued. The works at Melzi Chancellor's or Dowdall's Tavern, on Howard's extreme left, have been reached. Into these works Steinwehr has thrown Bushbeck's brigade, his other brigades being absent with Sickles. Bushbeck has been joined by some of Schurz's regiments, which have been rallied and brought to order. At this point a gallant resistance is made. The Confederates are held in check, but it is only for a brief period. Jackson, impatient of resistance, pushes forward his legions. Rodes, who has been held at bay, is speedily joined by Colston; and their united divisions, already flushed with success, and uttering their ac-
customed yell, rush bounding into the works, shivering to pieces the last solid remnant of Howard's splendid corps. The rout of the right wing was now complete. All semblance of organization was gone. Headless of the dead and dying who lay crowded on the turnpike and in the adjoining woods, and flinging from them their muskets, their knapsacks, and every other encumbrance, the routed troops rushed pell-mell towards Chancellorsville. Artillery, wagons, ambulances, pack-mules and cattle, all inextricably commingled, were being hurried along in the same direction. It was a scene of the wildest confusion. No such scene had been witnessed since the first battle of Bull Run.

It was now sever o'clock, one brief hour since the attack commenced, and darkness was coming on. The situation was critical in the extreme. Jackson was in full possession of the breastworks, and within half a mile of Hooker's headquarters. It was necessary for the National commander to form a new line of battle. This, however, was a task of peculiar difficulty. Lee was pressing Hooker hard, both on his left and centre; and the tornado-like rush of the retreating hosts had all the effect of an invading army. Hooker, on hearing of the disaster to Howard, sent forward the choicest division of the army—a division which he himself had created, and which he had often led to victory, and now under the command of General Berry. The batteries of this division, under Captain Best, posted on a ridge across the turnpike, having opened a most murderous fire, checked the Confederate advance. At this point the battle raged fiercely. Sickles was recalled from the Furnace, where he had been joined by Pleasonton, with 1000 cavalry, his instructions being that he should attack Jackson in flank. He at once hurried forward Pleasonton and Birney. Pleasonton, with two of his regiments and his battery, arrived at Hazel Grove—where Sickles had been compelled to leave a portion of his artillery—just as Howard's corps was hurrying past in full retreat. Comprehending the situation at a glance, he hurled the Eighth Pennsylvania on the pursuing columns. The regiment was overwhelmed, and its commander instantly killed. Disastrous as the charge was to the regiment, it nevertheless accomplished its object. The Confederate onrush was temporarily checked. In a few minutes, what with his own battery of horse artillery, some guns belonging to the routed corps, and those which Sickles had left behind him, he had thirty pieces in position. A heavy cannonade was opened by Colonel Crutchfield, from the Confederate batteries on the plank road, his object being to prevent the National troops from reforming. Pleasonton replied with tremendous energy; and as often as the Confederates came up to the charge, their ranks were decimated by his double-shotted guns. During this encounter, General Crutchfield was wounded, and some of his guns were silenced.

It was now night. The daylight had sped, but it was not dark; for the moon was bright and full. There was no
disposition on either side to discontinue the contest. It was absolutely necessary that Hooker should, before morning, re-connect his broken lines, and re-establish his communications. It was necessary, in fact, that he should take a new position. Jackson, on the other hand, felt the importance, if not necessity, of pushing the advantage he had won. The relative positions of both armies was much the same as at night-fall. Lee continued to claim a large amount of Hooker’s attention on the left. Jackson held the advanced positions he had won on the old turnpike and plank roads. Berry kept the ground he had taken towards the close of the evening’s contest. His artillery, under Best, crowned the crest at the western end of the clearing around Chancellorsville. Birney had come up and taken position on the left. Ward’s brigade, of his division, was ordered to be ready to make an attack on the enemy’s lines at 11 o’clock. Meanwhile Jackson was impatiently awaiting the arrival of A. P. Hill, to replace the divisions of Rodes and Colton, which, after the severe work of the afternoon, and because of the thick and tangled woods in which much of the fighting was done, had fallen into confusion. At the appointed time, Best opened a tremendous fire on the Confederate lines, and Ward’s men rushed to the charge with terrific fury. It was again and again repeated. In one of these charges, a portion of the artillery lost by General Howard, was gallantly re-taken. This almost midnight attack has been described as presenting one of the grandest and most soul-rousing scenes of the war. “The moon,” says an eye-witness, “shone bright, and the foe could be seen at good musket range. The air was very still, and the roar and reverberation of the musketry and artillery exceeded all conception. Malvern Hills was a skirmish compared to this, except in the degree of slaughter.” The attack was completely successful, the Confederates having been driven back half a mile. The battle ceased; but there was little repose in either camp during that anxious night.

At the very commencement of the night attack, a terrible calamity befell the Confederate army. General “Stonewall” Jackson, the author of that day’s splendid achievement, in many respects the greatest soldier of the Confederacy, fell mortally wounded. While waiting for Hill, and just before the batteries of Best opened fire and Ward made his attack, he rode forward to reconnoitre the ground. He was accompanied by a portion of his staff, couriers and other officers. On setting out, he gave positive orders to his troops not to fire unless cavalry approached from the direction of the enemy. He advanced to a considerable distance beyond his own pickets. When near what was called the Van Wert House, some one remarked to him, “General, you should not expose yourself so much.” “There is no danger,” he said. “Go back and tell General Hill to press on.” When returning, and, as he approached his own lines, he and his escort, mistaken for Federal cavalry, were received with a volley of musketry. Several of the party fell,
some of them killed, others of them severely wounded. Turning aside, the party entered a thicket, still moving towards the Confederate lines. A moment more, and being still mistaken for Federal cavalry, they were again fired upon, and at a distance of not more than thirty or forty yards. Jackson received three balls, one in the right hand, and two in the left arm, one of which shattered the bone two inches below the shoulder, and severed the artery. Half of his escort, including Captain Boswell, of his staff, were killed or wounded. His frightened horse rushed towards the National lines. Quickly recovering himself, he managed, with his bleeding hand, to rein it up and turn it into the plank road. Captain Wilbourn, of his staff, now rushed to his aid. Bleeding and fainting, the general was taken from his horse, carried to the road side and laid under a tree. It was at this moment the guns of Best opened fire; and the National troops, coming up in great force, charged over Jackson's body. The Nationals again falling back, he was placed upon a litter; but Berry's guns were now sweeping the road; and, one of the litter-bearers being shot down, the wounded general fell to the ground, receiving a severe contusion on his right side. As the firing continued, the whole party lay flat on the ground, till the storm of grape and canister was turned in another direction. He was soon afterwards conveyed safely to the hospital in the rear. It was found necessary to amputate the arm. Jackson died on Sunday, the 10th of May. He lived to see the fruit of this day's work. His death was a great blow to the Confederate cause. It was equal to a National victory. General Stonewall Jackson will live in history as the hero of Chancellorsville.*

Hill came to the front just as Jackson was wounded, and prepared to assume the command. Scarcely, however, had he issued his first instructions, when he too was disabled, having received a severe contusion from a piece of shell. General J. E. B. Stuart was the officer next in rank; but he had moved off in the direction of Ely's Ford, his inten-

* In an ably-written paragraph, which is evidently intended to be eulogistic of General Stonewall Jackson, Swinton, yielding to a spirit of detraction, which is too common a characteristic of Northern writers, makes some remarks which are scarcely just to the Confederate soldier. He speaks of Jackson as "devoid of high mental parts, and destitute of that power of planning and combination, and of that calm, broad, military intellect which distinguished General Lee." He has just described him as "essentially an executive officer." Without referring to General Jackson's entire military career, we have no hesitation in saying that such remarks were singularly inapplicable to the man, after the first day's fighting at Chancellorsville. The Chancellorsville plan of battle was Jackson's throughout. It was his conception; and it was he who gave it development, and determined its success. It is not too much to say that but for the death of Jackson, the National army might have been captured or cut to pieces. It would certainly have been placed in great peril. Such was Jackson's own opinion. "If I had not been wounded," he said, "I would have cut the enemy off from the road to United States Ford; we would have had them entirely surrounded; and they would have been obliged to surrender or cut their way out—they had no other alternative." Nor do we think it fair to characterize Jackson as a "fanatic in religion." The word "fanatic" has come to have an offensive meaning. In the sense in which it is now generally used, it certainly cannot be applied to Jackson. In the sense in which Jackson was a fanatic, so was Oliver Cromwell; so, too, in a milder sense, was George Washington. Thus applied, the epithet is not opprobrious; but, in this latter sense, it is now rarely used. He was certainly a religious enthusiast; but a fanatic, in the offensive sense, he was not.
tion being to seize that place and occupy it. Such was part of General Jackson’s plan. In the circumstances, and until the arrival of Stuart, who was at once recalled, the command of the Confederate left devolved upon Brigadier-General Rodes. It was a trying moment. Jackson had fallen, mortally wounded; Hill had been disabled; and Stuart was some miles distant. This, however, was not all. Berry was repeating his tremendous assaults; and his artillery, under the direction of Best, was maintaining a fierce cannonade. It is not wonderful that Rodes should have hesitated to make any attack or run any serious risk until the morning. In this view of the case Stuart, on his arrival, concurred. It had the approval, also, of Hill who, although disabled and placed on a litter, had not been removed from the field. Stuart sent a messenger to Jackson, asking for instructions. Jackson was so feeble and suffering so much, that he could only give for answer: “Tell General Stuart that he must use his own judgment.” The night was spent by the new commander and his staff in visiting the different parts of his line, in locating his troops, and in making the other necessary arrangements for the coming day.

It had already become apparent to the different officers of the National army—it must have been apparent to General Hooker himself—that a great blunder had been committed on the Thursday, when no effort was made to bring up the three corps under Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, so as to make the army a unit, and that, if possible, a still greater blunder was committed on the Friday, when the entire right wing, having advanced towards Fredericksburg by three different roads, and having gained advantageous positions in the clear, open country beyond the woods, was compelled by the mere will of its chief to fall back, and wait for the onset of the enemy in the tangled jungles of the wilderness. These blunders—one or other or both—had brought about all the sorrows of Saturday; and superior as were the Nationals in numbers, and excellent as was the spirit of the troops, it was a doubtful question with many whether greater sorrows were not in store for them. The discipline of the army, however, was well preserved. Hooker, showing no indiscipline, adopted his course with firmness, and after the disasters of the afternoon and evening made his arrangements for the morrow. On the evening of that day, Reynolds, with his corps of some 17,000 men, having come up from before Fredericksburg and crossed the United States Ford, joined the forces immediately under Hooker, and by their presence more than compensated for the losses sustained by the Eleventh corps. Sedgwick was still below Fredericksburg with his own entire corps, which numbered some 24,000 men. Late on Saturday night, Hooker sent instructions to Sedgwick to put himself in motion immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, to seize the heights in the rear, to gain the plank road leading thence to Chancellorsville, and to move out, fighting his way, as best he might, with the view of joining the main body by daylight:
on Sunday morning. It was, beyond all question, of the utmost importance, that Sedgwick should be able to accomplish the task thus assigned him. The best results might naturally enough be expected to flow from it. But it was an almost impossible task. Hooker made little account of the more than possible difficulties to be encountered in seizing the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg—difficulties of which he himself had had so bitter an experience in the Burnside campaign. It would have been more wise, if the order had been given at an earlier hour, or on an earlier day. It was not unwise to give it now; but most certainly it was the duty of the general-in-chief to think of the obstacles which might hinder the progress of his lieutenant, and by every conceivable means to facilitate his advance.

During the night, the National commander succeeded in rearranging his lines, and taking a new position. His new line resembled somewhat the letter V, or rather a triangle slightly prolonged at the apex, the left leg being considerably larger than the right, and both extremities reaching close to the river, thus covering United States Ford. His lines were contracted, as compared with those of the previous day, and he had drawn nearer the river. He held possession of the heights between Melzi Chancellor's and Fairview, including Hazel Grove—an eminence which commanded the apex, and the holding of which was essential to the safety of the new position. Reynolds was on the extreme right, at the upper end of the left limb of the triangle. Meade's forces came next; then those of Sickles, commanding the line on the left of the apex; then those of Slocum on the right of the apex; and then, connecting with Slocum, but more to the north on the right limb of the triangle, came Howard's corps, which, with marvellous rapidity, had been brought together, and restored to something like order. On the left limb of the triangle, the National forces were heavily massed. In the centre of the triangle or V, and almost behind Meade, was stationed Couch, that he might be able to act in either direction, as occasion might require. Reynolds and Meade were some distance on the north of the turnpike. Sickles covered the road; Berry, with Whipple in his rear, being on the north side; and Birney, with Williams, of Slocum's corps, in his rear. Slocum, with his other division, that of Geary, guarded the apex. Hancock's division of Couch was on Slocum's left, and stretched out towards Howard. Sickles' artillery, under Best, was massed on the ridge in the centre of the open ground, all the guns pointing west, so as to command the approaches to the turnpike. Hooker had 60,000 infantry immediately available at Chancellorsville. The combined forces of Lee and Jackson were far short of that number, not much exceeding 40,000 men. Hooker had, besides, the prospect of being joined by Sedgwick, whose corps, some 24,000 strong, was equal to a large army. Sedgwick was only ten miles distant. He had, it is true, some difficulties in his way; but these might be overcome. If Sedgwick
should come up in time, might not Hooker yet be able to destroy first the Confederate right, and then fall back with all his force and deal a deadly blow to the Confederate left? If such is to be the result, the National commander must exhibit at once more skill and nerve than he has revealed since the fighting commenced.

The Confederate commander had been equally active during the night. He had drawn up his men in three lines of battle. Hill's division was in advance. Its different brigades were arranged across the road in the following order: Archer's, McGowan's, and Lane's were on the right of the road; Pender's and Thomas's were on the left. Hill's brigade was in reserve, supporting Lane and Pender; Archer and McGowan were thrown back, somewhat obliquely, so as to confront Sickles. The rest of the line was perpendicular to the road. Colston's division formed the second line, and that of Rodes the third. The ridge, occupied by the right of the corps, was covered by artillery. Such was the disposition of the left wing of the Confederate army, on the morning of May 3d.

Lee, meanwhile, had concluded to effect a junction, if at all possible, of his right and left wings; and instructions were given to Stuart, McLaws and Anderson, that they should direct their movements accordingly. It will be remembered that Sickles held a commanding position at Hazel Grove. It was the key-point of the battle ground, and advantageous, not only because it commanded the enemy's flank, but because if occupied by the enemy, it would imperil the safety of Slocum's entire line. Sickles, who was naturally proud of the position, had been at great pains to strengthen and turn it to the best account. It was not, therefore, without mingled surprise and pain that he received orders from Hooker, before daylight on Sunday morning, to the effect that the ground, the holding of which he deemed of so much importance, should be immediately abandoned. It was another of those inexplicable blunders which Hooker had been making since the moment he first felt the pressure of his antagonist. Quick as lightning, and with the earliest dawn, Stuart saw the advantage which the blundering mismanagement of his opponent had given him, and immediately occupied the abandoned position. In so doing, he became engaged with Sickles' rear. The crest, however, was seized; thirty pieces of artillery were got into position; and a heavy fire was opened at once on the open ground around Chancellorsville House. The battle of the 3d of May was begun. In a few seconds, it was raging along the whole line. "Charge, and remember Jackson!" was the Confederate battle-cry; and never was battle-cry more effective in evoking military enthusiasm. With a fury which seemed to be blind, with an energy which was irresistible, and with a purpose and determination which death only could restrain, on came the brave Confederates. Jackson was not with them; but, it was evident, his spirit was there. Brave as they were, however, they were about to encounter foe-
men worthy of their steel—men who feared no foe, who knew how to resist and how to attack. Sickles was on hand with his well-trained and war-hardened veterans—Berry on the right, Birney on the left, Whipple and Williams supporting—ready to receive the onslaught. Best's forty pieces of artillery were all pointed to the road along which the attacking column was approaching. As the Confederates came forward, they were received with a perfect tempest of lead, which burst upon them, tornado-like, from the firm lines of Berry and Birney, and also, from Whipple and Williams, who had already been pushed to the front. Reckless of this tempest of lead, and reckless, also, of the more destructive tempest of grape and canister, which bursts upon them from the batteries on the hill, the column still advances. "It is cut up and gashed, as if "pierced, scarred, ploughed by invisible lightning." Companies, whole regiments even, seem to melt away; but still they come. No such bravery, in assault, has been exhibited by the Confederates since the famous battle of Corinth, when they advanced against the storm of bullets "with faces averted, like men striving to protect themselves from a driving storm of hail." Will nothing check their forward rush? Berry and Birney, now massing their troops, rush upon them with the weight and impetus of an avalanche. The shock is terrific. Like waves driven by contrary winds, the opposing hosts, dash and roll against each other, but dash and roll apparently in vain. Neither prevails: neither yields. It seems an endless, wasteful struggle. Now the Nationals fall back; and it seems as if the Confederates are about to win the victory. It is only, however, for a moment. The Nationals charge again; the batteries pour forth their destructive fire; and Jackson's men, their ranks literally torn to pieces, their dead and wounded lying in groups on the field, are driven back to their original position. Again there is a Confederate charge; again a terrific shock and stubborn resistance; again victory oscillates, yielding now to the one side, and now to the other; and so the battle rages until about eight o'clock, when Stuart, putting forth all his disposable strength on that point, drives the Nationals back and back, and captures the works in Sickles' front.

The struggle, however, is not yet abandoned. The Confederates have undoubtedly gained an important advantage. They have pressed the Nationals back from their first line of works. It is, in a qualified sense, a Confederate victory. But Sickles, if discouraged, is not yet dismayed. He has already sent for reinforcements. If these should arrive in time, he may yet turn the tide of battle. He, therefore, boldly holds his ground. The battle rages again with tremendous fury. The works are repeatedly taken and retaken. The Confederates, becoming more confident, press upon the National columns with increasing energy. As it has become dangerous or impossible to make any very effective use of the National artillery in his front, Sickles is compelled to depend on the resisting power
as we have seen, was holding the apex on the eastern side, with Geary's division, Hancock, of Couch's, being on his left. On this point, Lee, from an early hour, had been directing all his disposable strength. We have already mentioned that instructions had been sent to Anderson and McLaws to direct their movements so as to form a junction with Stuart's right, and thus unite the Confederate line. The Confederate guns at Hazel Grove had made Slocum's position almost untenable from the commencement of the fight in the early morning. Anderson, having been pushed along the plank road, which connects Chancellorsville with Fredericksburg, fell with tremendous weight on Slocum. McLaws, moving in a direction a little further north, pressed heavily upon Hancock. After repeated attacks and repeated failures, McLaws not only found it impossible to make any impression on Hancock, but was handsomely repulsed. Anderson's effort was attended with better success. Pressing with great stubbornness on Slocum at the point of the triangle, he contrived to throw around his left, and thus, by a thin line, to form a junction with Stuart. The object, so ardently desired by Lee, was at last effected. His army, which had been divided since the morning of the 2d, was again united. His two wings thus brought together, Lee bore in upon the Nationals with his whole line. Sickles and Slocum were forced back; and the National line seemed to melt away, Hancock alone holding his position, and resisting, with great firmness and determination.
the fierce and persistent onslaughts of the already triumphant Confederates. Hooker ordered the troops to fall back upon Chancellorsville; and here again, at the angle of the woods, the battle for a time raged with great fury, the artillery on both sides doing terrible execution. The Chancellorsville House, which was still General Hooker's headquarters, was now discovered to be on fire, and had to be abandoned. The National line, in this new position, began to waver; and the Confederates, already flushed with success, seeing their opportunity, made a tremendous dash, and, springing forward with wild yells, captured Chancellorsville, with a considerable number of prisoners. It was now a few minutes past ten o'clock. The battle had lasted, almost without intermission, for more than five hours. The Nationals, although pressed vigorously by the triumphant Confederates, whose guns were sweeping the open ground around Chancellorsville, fell back in good order, and took a new and well-fortified position about a mile nearer the river. The new line was still in the form of a triangle, or V, but shorter and somewhat flatter than before. The apex was at Bullock's House. The left limb extended along the Ely's Ford road, towards the mouth of Hunting Run. The right extended along Mineral Spring road, towards what is known as Scott's Dam. Thus ended the second great battle at Chancellorsville, fought on the 3d of May, 1863. Among the many brave men who perished that day was General Berry.

At an early stage of the contest, a severe misfortune befell the National army. While the conflict was at its height, General Hooker was standing on the balcony of the Chancellorsville House, leaning against one of the pillars. The pillar was struck by a cannon-ball; and the general was thrown down by the violence of the concussion. He was stunned and stupefied, and rendered incapable of command. This misfortune goes far to explain some of the mysteries of that mysterious day, when Sickles and French and Slocum were struggling against the superior numbers of the enemy, and vainly calling for reinforcements, while 40,000 men, composing the corps of Reynolds and Meade and Howard, were doing nothing. Hooker was still insensible, and unfit for duty. The responsibilities of general-in-chief, at this supreme crisis, and in these peculiar circumstances, devolved upon General Couch, who, from some as yet unexplained cause, did not prove himself equal to the requirements of the situation. Had these 40,000 men, who were unused, and, therefore, useless in the fight, been hurled against the foe at the different points of attack, there can be no reasonable doubt that the tide of victory would have rolled in an opposite direction. The Nationals, in such a case, would certainly have fully engaged Lee's attention, and occupied his army. The plank road would have been preserved; and Sedgwick, if his arrival at the point of destination must still have been a little late, would at least have been able to march comparatively unmolested from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. The mystery of
Chancellorsville will, perhaps, never be explained. It is certainly but little likely to be explained during the lives of the principal actors in the great and tragic drama. The accident which befell Hooker was undoubtedly a misfortune to the National army. It explains much; but it does not explain all.

Sunday, the 3d of May, was yet young. Sacred as was this day, and severe as had been the work already accomplished, there was no disposition to rest on either side. Hooker, now partially recovered, busied himself in strengthening his line, and preparing for another attack, as well as securing his lines of communication with the United States and Ely’s Fords, in the event of further retreat being judged necessary. Howard and Slocum were stationed on his left; Meade and Reynolds were on the right; and, at Bullock’s House—a commanding plateau, the vertex and key of the position—Sickles and Couch were massed with a large number of pieces of artillery.

Lee had not been less active. He had already displayed his army on the plateau at Chancellorsville. The scattered regiments, brigades and divisions which had been broken in the confusion of battle, were again brought together. A line of battle was formed along the plank road to the west of Chancellorsville, and extending down the old turnpike, to the east of that place. Rodes, with his right on Chancellorsville, extended up the plank road. On his left was Pender, with half of the division of A. P. Hill. To the east of Chancellorsville was Colston, with Ander-son and McLaws in order, on his right.

There was quiet on the battle field, but everything indicated preparation and readiness for a resumption of the fight. While the armies were in this expectant condition, a fire broke out in the forest, on the north side of the plank road, where the battle had raged in the morning. In consequence of the dryness of the leaves and the brushwood, it spread with great rapidity. The wood was filled with the dead and wounded of both armies; the wounded were most the objects of anxiety and care; but it was found impossible to remove them in time to save them from the flames. The smoke arising from the burning material had a strange, offensive odor. It was a sad sight. It revealed the demon of war in one of his most horrid aspects. In spite of all this, however, Lee, resolved to push his advantage, was hurrying forward his preparations for a fresh attack on the National army behind its rear line of works. His troops and artillery were ordered into position, and reconnoissances were made of the National line. It was evidently Lee’s intention to strike at Hooker a deadly blow before Sedgwick could have time to come up from Fredericksburg. If he could drive Hooker from behind his new line of fortifications, force him towards the river, he might, in the confusion which must result from any attempt at crossing, succeed in capturing or destroying the greater portion of the National army. Success was not to attend him from such calculations. His arrangements were
all but completed; his arm was, so to speak, uplifted and ready to strike, when the blow was arrested, and his purpose changed by a despatch, which informed him of the capture of Marye's Hill, and of the advance of Sedgwick.

Leaving the army of Hooker and the army of Lee in the positions which we have described, let us now turn our attention to certain important movements which have been made, or which are just about to be made, in the immediate neighborhood of Fredericksburg. In an earlier part of this chapter, we have shown how, and for what purpose, Sedgwick was left behind at Falmouth, with his own corps—the Sixth—and also with the First and Third. We have seen how, after the demonstration successfully made on the 29th of April, the Third corps, under Sickles, advanced by the north bank of the river, crossed at United States Ford, and joined Hooker at Chancellorsville. We have seen how the First corps, under Reynolds, following the same path, joined the main army on the night of the 2d of May. We have also seen how, on the same night after the fatal surprise by Jackson, Sedgwick, who had already crossed the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, was ordered to put his troops in motion immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, by Gibbon's division, of Couch, which had been left behind at Falmouth, to seize the heights in the rear of the city, to gain the plank road leading to Chancellorsville, to move along that road towards the main body of Hooker's army, and to be at the place assigned by daylight the following morning. It remains to be seen how this order was executed.

It was past eleven o'clock, on the night of Saturday, the 2d, when the order was received. The officers and men had already gone to sleep; and it was midnight before the instructions to advance were fully communicated. Sedgwick was lying on the south bank of the river, about three miles below Fredericksburg. Without delay, he put his corps in motion by the flank, proceeding towards the town. It was a critical march. On the right was the river, about a mile distant; on the left was the range of heights on which the watch-fires of the enemy could be distinctly seen. The column was long, and exposed along its whole flank to the enemy on the heights. It was moonlight; but a heavy fog had settled over the low ground and the river. Newton led the advance; and his instructions were that, in the event of any attack being made, the regiments attacked should face the hills and charge without further instructions. The head of the column had advanced but a short distance, when it encountered the Confederate pickets. There was some slow marching, and some little delay was experienced; but the Confederates fell back. On the outskirts of the town, on the banks of a small creek, the Confederate skirmishers were again encountered; but they were driven back without much difficulty. The column was now within a short distance of Marye's Heights. At two o'clock, General Warren arrived from Hooker's headquarters, his object being to hasten
forward the movement. It was near
dawn when the head of the column
entered Fredericksburg. Here Sedgwick was joined by Gibbon, with his
division of the Second corps.

We have already mentioned what
provision Jackson made for the protec-
tion of Fredericksburg and the heights,
when he set out to meet Hooker at
Chancellorsville. He left behind him
Early's division of four brigades, with
Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' divi-
sion. Barksdale was charged with the
protection of the heights immediately in
the rear of the town, including Marye's
Hill and the stone wall, made famous
by the Burnside campaign. His bri-
gade consisted of some 1400 men. It
was disposed as follows: seven com-
panies of the Twenty-First Mississippi
were posted between the Marye House
and the plank road; the three remaining
companies of the Twenty-First were
posted on the telegraph road, at the
foot of Marye's Hill; his other two
regiments were on the hills further to
the right. Batteries were set up at Lee's
Hill, and at the Harrison House; while
four pieces of General Pendleton's
artillery were stationed at the Marye
House, two on the right and two on the
left. As soon as Early was made aware
of Sedgwick's movement, he sent Hays'
brigade to reinforce Barksdale. The
Confederates, it is manifest from the
small number of troops left at this point,
had perfect confidence in their ability
to hold the heights.

As soon as the opening dawn per-
mitted it, Sedgwick moved forward
four regiments from the town in the
direction of the heights. As they ad-
vanced stealthily over the ground, so
sadly memorable, not a sound disturbed
the death-like stillness of that dull, dark
Sabbath morning. The stillness, how-
ever, is not to be of long duration. A
few paces more, and the regiments will
have reached the fatal stone wall. Sud-
denly, and simultaneously, light flashes
from the summit of the hill and from
the rifle-pits at the base. The Con-
federates have opened upon them with
both artillery and musketry. The regi-
ments fall back under cover of the fog,
but not without considerable loss. This
attempt having failed, Sedgwick now
resolved to turn the Confederate pos-
tion. Howe was ordered to advance
on the left of Hazel Run, and to attack
the Confederate right, while Gibbon
was ordered to move up the river and
make a vigorous attack on the Confede-
rate left. Howe found his progress
barred by the strength of the works in
his front; and the stream deterred him
from moving to the right and attacking
in flank the works at Marye's Hill.
Gibbon, who attempted to carry out
Sedgwick's instructions on the extreme
right, had no better success. Having
advanced by the river road, he found
the canal impassable; and the vigorous
fire which was opened upon him from
Taylor's Hill, where Wilcox, who had
hurried up from Banks' Ford, had
planted two pieces of artillery, com-
pelled his men to seek shelter in the
cuts of the road. These experiments
were so far unsuccessful; and yet it
would be unjust to pronounce them
failures; for it is oftentimes only by
such experiments that a knowledge of what it is right to do can be arrived at. It was by such experiments that General Grant was, at last, to make himself master of Vicksburg. Benefiting by the experience thus acquired, and knowing at least what could not be done, Sedgwick felt that he was left no alternative but to make a powerful, concentrated effort, and take the works by storm.

It was now near ten o'clock. Precious time had unavoidably been lost. If this work was to be done, it must be done without further delay. Newton was ordered to send forward two storming columns against Marye's Hill and the adjoining works. Howe, who was more to the left, was ordered to repeat his attack up Hazel Run, on the second line of heights. Newton's right-hand column was composed of the Sixty-First Pennsylvania, and Forty-Third New York, supported by the Sixty-Seventh New York and the Eighty-Second Pennsylvania, and was commanded by Colonel Spear, of the Sixty-First Pennsylvania. His left was composed of the Seventh Massachusetts, and Thirty-Ninth New York, and was commanded by Colonel Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts. These columns moved up the plank road, and to the right. Colonel Burnham, with four regiments, at the same time moved to the left of the plank road, and directly against the rifle-pits at the base of Marye's Hill. The National columns meet with but little resistance, until they are within three hundred yards of the Confederate works. At this point, the guns on the hill pour from their murderous throats a tremendous shower of canister. Nothing dismayed, the columns push on, until within close musket range. Here the Confederate infantry, rising from behind the stone wall, open upon them a terrific fire. The Nationals reel and stagger, and threaten to break. Quickly rallied, they rush again to the attack. The storm of lead abates not. The volleys are swifter and more sure. Nothing, however, can damp the courage, check the enthusiasm, or arrest the progress of these heroic men. Right, left and centre, each emulous of the other, nerved by the same purpose, and inspired by the same hope, press eagerly forward. Spear falls; but Shaler is at hand. The right is rallied; and the attack is resumed. Johns is wounded; but Colonel Walsh, of the Thirty-Ninth New York, takes the brave fellows in charge; and the left, in the rivalry and onward rush, resumes and maintains its proud position. The supporting columns vie with the other two; and Burnham, of the Sixth Maine, performs deeds of daring, which command at once admiration and envy. It is a race for a prize; and the prize is on the summit of the hill. The stone wall has been cleared; the rifle-pits have been seized and silenced; but the artillery on the hill still thunders and belches forth its murderous shell and canister. Ploughed through and through, and torn to pieces, their comrades falling in dozens by their side, these gallant fellows rush fearlessly on. There is a lull in the thunderstorm of artillery. There is a loud-resounding cheer. It is the shout of victory. The race is run; the task is accom-
plished; and the Union flag waves proudly on the crest of Marye's Hill.

While Newton has been carrying the National standard to victory in the centre, success not dissimilar has been attending Howe on the left. When pressing forward on the left of Hazel Run, he was vigorously confronted by the Confederate skirmishers, who were intrenched in rifle-pits behind the embankment of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad. Lee's Hill and the adjacent heights, which constituted Howe's objective point, were occupied by the Confederate artillery, and by their main line of infantry. Howe advanced with two columns—six regiments composing that on the right, three that on the left. There was a third column, which moved still further to the left, and which was instructed to strike the Confederate position in the rear, and then co-operate with the others when they should have carried the works in front. Three regiments of the principal column to the right, getting separated from the others, crossed the Run, and took part in the attack on Marye's Hill. The remainder pushed forward, and soon obtained a firm footing on Lee's Hill. Here, for a time, the struggle was vigorously maintained. After the capture of Marye's Hill, Lee's Hill and the adjoining heights were no longer tenable. The Confederates, therefore, abandoned the works, and fell back by the telegraph road. In addition to the actual gain of the position, five guns and a considerable number of prisoners rewarded this brilliant feat of arms.

Early hurried up from Hamilton's Crossing, and the pursuit of the retreating Confederates was discontinued; but the entire range of hills in the rear, and to the south of Fredericksburg, was in Sedgwick's possession.

It was as yet only eleven o'clock. In this brief struggle, there had been a fearful loss of life. In the space of ten minutes, when the conflict raged most fiercely at the base of Marye's Hill, nearly 1000 men were killed or wounded. The Confederates suffered as severely, as they bravely fought. The rifle-pits were full of dead and dying men, who fell, many of them, in a hand-to-hand struggle. In addition to the loss of the rank and file, the Nationals lost some of their ablest officers, among whom was the gallant Colonel Spear, and Majors Basset, Faxon and Haycock. But the sacrifice had not been made in vain. The heights had been carried; the Confederate forces were divided; and the plank road which led direct to Chancellorsville was open. Sedgwick was now free to advance to the assistance of Hooker. He did not know that the latter had already been driven behind his last line of intrenchments.

It was this alarming state of things which was reported to Lee when, elated with success, he was about to strike a final blow at Chancellorsville. Lee found himself in a most critical situation. There were several courses open to him; but every one of them was beset with difficulty. He might carry out his original purpose, and fall on Hooker with all his might, cripple or destroy
him, and then give his attention to Sedgwick; but in that case, he would expose himself to the risk of being attacked by Sedgwick in flank and rear. He might fall back towards Fredericksburg, meet and demolish Sedgwick, and being relieved from all danger in this direction, face about and press matters to a final issue with Hooker; but in that case, he would be exposing himself to a similar and even greater risk; for Hooker might sally forth from his intrenchments and fall with crushing effect on his rear. He might remain in his present position, defer his meditated attack on Hooker, detach a sufficient number to check or destroy Sedgwick, leaving events themselves to determine in which direction the first crushing blow should be dealt; but in that case, he would run the risk of being compelled to fight two battles at once, if indeed, he was not caught as in a vice, between two powerful armies. The last course, perilous as it was, was the one he adopted. It was a course justified by the highest principles of the military art, and sanctioned by some of the greatest examples of the past. Never over-bold, Lee had an advantage over most of the generals, either in the Confederate or National armies, in coolness of head and clearness of vision. He had, also, great steadiness of purpose. In some of these qualities he was approached by McClellan; but the unquestionably great talents of that general were ruined by his excess of caution. In all that made Lee a great general, he was equalled only by Grant; but Grant surpassed him in self-reliance, in strength of will, in deep intensity of purpose, and in a certain bull-dog tenacity of grip. In the present instance, as the result proved, Lee’s judgment stood him in good stead. He had wisely measured Hooker. He believed that with a reasonable show of force, he could keep him behind his intrenchments. Without delay, therefore, he detached McLaws, with his own three brigades—those of Wofford, Semmes and Kershaw—together with Mahone’s brigade, of Anderson’s division, with instructions to advance towards Fredericksburg, to co-operate with Wilcox and Bardsdale, and the other troops under Early, with a view to the interception or destruction of Sedgwick.

After the capture of the heights, Sedgwick pursued the retreating Confederates about two miles along the telegraph road; but at that point, Early, who had come up from Hamilton’s Crossing, halted the commands of Bardsdale and Hays, and reinforced them with three regiments of Gordon’s brigade. Sedgwick had no motive in pushing along the telegraph road. His destination was Chancellorsville. He, therefore, discontinued the pursuit, and turned towards the plank road. He had advanced but a little way when he found the Confederates in some strength on the ridge, which stretches along the road from Guest’s to Stansbury. It was Wilcox’s brigade. Wilcox, it will be remembered, was at Taylor’s Hill, when the attempt was made by Gibbon to cross the canal and turn the Confederate left. Hays was at Stansbury’s Hill. When the combined attack
was made on Marye's Hill and to the left, they had been ordered to come up, but they had not had time; and so rapid was the advance of Sedgwick, that they found themselves—Wilcox with his whole brigade, and Hays with a portion of his—cut off from the main body of the Confederates, and left on the north side of the plank road. Hays, by retreating parallel to the road, succeeded in getting round the head of the National advance, and rejoining Early. Wilcox remained behind; and, yielding to the instincts of a true soldier, as well as resolved to make the best use possible of the means at his disposal, drew up his brigade in line on the ridge above referred to, and placed in position four pieces of artillery. Sedgwick was now advancing slowly, and with great caution. Wilcox, for a time, offered a spirited resistance, and greatly annoyed the National advance. The Nationals coming up in greater force, Wilcox, fearing lest he should be surrounded, fell back to the river road, about half a mile in rear of Taylor's House. Sedgwick was still advancing with slow and cautious steps. Taking courage from the leisurely movement of the National troops, and determined to retard their progress as much as possible, Wilcox again pushed forward his brigade, with the artillery, this time taking position in the neighborhood of Salem Church, some five miles distant from Fredericksburg. The heights in the vicinity of the church, extending on both sides of the road, and about two hundred and fifty yards to the east, were thickly wooded. Beyond the wood, and on slightly lower ground, there were cleared fields spreading out on both sides of the road, and reaching as far as and beyond the tollgate, which was distant from the church about one thousand yards. Advancing his troops to the tollgate, and placing two rifled pieces on the road, Wilcox awaited the approach of Sedgwick. He had not long to wait; for Collins and the cavalry skirmishers came up almost immediately. The artillery on both sides opened fire at once. Meanwhile, McLaws, who had come up with his three brigades, was taking position on the high ground in the rear of Wilcox, and to the right and left. As soon as McLaws came up, he ordered Wilcox to fall back on Salem Church.

It was now four o'clock. The Confederates were well posted. The ground was high, and, as we have seen, well wooded. McLaws had drawn up his line of battle perpendicular to the road. Mahone was on his extreme left, then Semmes, then Wilcox—who, having fallen back, crossed the road, having three regiments on the right or south of it, and two on the left—and then Kershaw. Wofford came up later, and took position on Kershaw's right. The artillery was so disposed as to command the road, and to cover both flanks. On the road, in the front of his centre, Wilcox had four guns. Troops were posted in the church, and also in the school-house, some sixty yards in advance. Scarcely had these arrangements been completed, when the Nationals came up in force. Sedgwick threw forward Brooks' division, which
had moved up the road and on both sides of it. Brooks was followed by Newton, in support. Bartlett's brigade was on the National left, and the First New Jersey on the right. Getting his guns into position at the toll-gate, Sedgwick opened a terrific fire, shelling the woods to the right and to the left. The Confederate artillery for some minutes replied with great spirit. Gradually, however, the fire slackens; and the skirmishers fall back, first to the wood and then to their line of battle. The Nationals, having passed on to the edge of the road, uttered a loud and triumphant cheer, and then rushed forward to the charge. When within about eighty yards of the opposing line, the Confederates, who had reserved their fire, opened upon them a tremendous volley. The effect was dreadful. The National line wavered, but it was only for a moment. Bartlett dashed forward; and, in a second, the school-house was surrounded, and the garrison captured. A few minutes more, and he has fallen with crushing weight on the line in the rear, and nearly demolished a whole regiment. The Confederates waver and break, yielding the ground to the advancing and triumphant Nationals. The crest has been won. At this point, however, the tide of victory turned. Wilcox had still in reserve the Ninth Alabama regiment. At this supreme moment, when all seemed lost, he hurled this regiment upon the advancing Nationals. Firing at close quarters, the Alabamians charged with great fury. The shock was irresistible. The Nationals yield-
ed, and fell back in terror. In vain did Bartlett strive to hold the advantage he had won. At this point the struggle was most fierce. Sedgwick hurried forward his second line; but it was little purpose. The fury of the Confederate onset, the weight of the pressure, was irresistible. Step by step the Nationals were driven back—back behind the school-house, which was recaptured and reoccupied by the Confederates—back through the open fields, in which it was found impossible to make a fresh stand—back to the toll-gate, where the retreating columns were sheltered, and the enemy’s advance was checked by the well-directed fire of Tompkins’ batteries. It was now night; and neither the one side nor the other seemed anxious to prolong the contest. Sedgwick had not been defeated; but he had met with a bloody repulse.

Sunday, the 3d of May, in spite of the ray of promise revealed on the heights of Fredericksburg, was a day of disaster to the National cause. All the plans of the morning had been frustrated. Lee, in place of being crushed between the two wings of the National army, had whipped first the one and then the other; and while Hooker, with his splendid army, was shut up, prisoner-like, behind his own intrenchments, Sedgwick was being effectually hindered from coming to his relief.

On Monday, the 4th, the opposing armies found themselves in a peculiar plight. The final upshot of the campaign was revealing itself more and more clearly. But it could not be
SALEM CHURCH.

Anderson was to take position on McLaws' right, with the view of forming a connection with Early. Lee went forward in person to direct operations.

On Monday morning, Sedgwick found himself confronted by McLaws, and threatened in the rear by Early. The latter had experienced little difficulty in recapturing the heights. Sedgwick, although not yet aware of the approach of Anderson and Lee in person, telegraphed to General Hooker that large masses of the enemy were moving from his right to his left, and asking whether the main army could support him. The answer was that no support must be expected. Sedgwick, cut off from Fredericksburg by the advance of Early, formed his line so as to cover Banks' Ford and the pontoon bridge near that point. Howe was upon his left; Brooks was upon the right of Howe, and at right angles to him on the plank road; and Newton was on the right of the line, perpendicular to the road, much as he had been the previous evening. It was noon before Anderson arrived at Salem Church. Preparations for the attack were not completed until about six o'clock, although there had been skirmishing, both on the National right and left, from an early hour.

Sedgwick, perceiving that he was about to be attacked both in front and rear, had notified Hooker that his position was untenable, and that the bridges might be sacrificed, and had received for answer that he must not cross the river "unless compelled to do so." At the appointed time—it was close upon six o'clock—the signal was given,
and the Confederates moved to the attack along the whole line. It was made with great impetuosity. The Nationals resisted with great stubbornness; but they were compelled to fall back towards the river, Sedgwick still holding possession of Banks' Ford. The fighting was severe, both armies suffering terribly. Darkness ensued; and the nature of the country was such that the Confederates were prevented from following up their advantage. Under cover of the night, having received permission to withdraw, Sedgwick recrossed the river at Banks' Ford with his whole force.* The last brigade had crossed before day-break. In the three engagements—the storming of the heights, the battle of Sunday, and the battle of Monday—Sedgwick had lost 5000 men.

It was, no doubt, a great misfortune that Sedgwick did not succeed in forming a junction with Hooker. That he did his best to accomplish this object, no impartial mind, in view of all the facts, can refuse to admit. It is greatly to be regretted that General Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee of Congress on the conduct of the war, should have so far forgotten himself as attribute his defeat at Chancellorsville to the failure of Sedgwick to join him on Sunday morning. The reader of these pages, unless we greatly mistake, must have come to another and very different conclusion; and we do not see how the cruel and most unjust charge of Hooker can ever be endorsed by the impartial historian. "In my judgment," says Hooker, "General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it. His movement was delayed so long that the enemy discovered his intentions; and when that was done, he was necessarily delayed in the further execution of the order." It is unnecessary to repeat what we have already said, believing, as we do, that our narrative is sufficient disproof of these assertions. We agree with Swinton—whose observations, at the close of his account of the battle of Chancellorsville, reveal the keen sense of the military critic, and whose arguments are unanswerable—in pronouncing this statement of Hooker to be "a cruel charge to bring against a commander, now beyond the reach of detraction; whose brilliant exploit in carrying the Fredericksburg Heights, and his subsequent fortitude in a trying situation, shine out as the one re

* At one o’clock, A. M., on the 5th, in reply to a despatch sent to Hooker at 11.45 on the night of the 4th, General Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick to "withdraw under cover." The movement to recross was at once commenced, and by five o’clock on the following morning, the troops were all on the other side, and the bridges taken up. When the last brigade was crossing, an order was received from Hooker countermanding the withdrawal. This latter order was based on a despatch of Sedgwick, sent in the afternoon, stating that he could hold a position south of the Rappahannock—a despatch which reached Hooker subsequent to the one which called forth the permission to withdraw. We subjoin the last order and the reply.

"May 5, 1863—1.20 A. M.

"General Sedgwick:

"Yours received one A. M., saying that you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.

"Joseph Hooker,
"Major-General Commanding."

To this Sedgwick replied, at 5 A. M.:

"The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung, and in process of being taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The despatch countermanding my movement over the river was received after the troops had crossed."
lieving brightness, amid the gloom of that hapless battle."

It was felt by both parties that the struggle and defeat of Sedgwick on Monday had decided the contest. Some of the National generals were willing, and even anxious, to make another effort. All fight, however, seemed to have passed out of Hooker; and he resolved to retire his troops to the north bank of the river. Preparations for this movement were begun on the morning of Tuesday, May 5th. The engineers were ordered to prepare a new line near the river, so as to cover the crossing. The roads and bridges were, in consequence, repaired; and an interior line of works was constructed from Scott's Dam to the mouth of Hunting Run, on the Rapidan, a distance of three miles. Lee, eager to push the advantage he had gained, and impatient to deal a deadly blow before his antagonist should have time to escape, left Early's division and Barksdale's brigade to guard the river from Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg and the crossings below, and ordered Anderson and McLaws to hurry back to Chancellorsville. Early in the afternoon, a violent rain-storm broke out. It continued during the remainder of the day, deluging the spongy soil, swelling the streams to overflow, and covering the low flats with water. It was late, in consequence, when the Confederate troops had reached their destination at Chancellorsville. As the storm continued to rage, nothing could be done till the following morning. The elements on this occasion, while they de-

layed the Confederates, and made an attack impossible on the National position, were scarcely less unkind to the Nationals. The river was rising rapidly, and the bridges were in peril. The National generals were divided as to the course which should be pursued. Some of them were in favor of an advance. Others deemed it more prudent to withdraw. The attempt was made. Straw and branches were laid on the bridges, to deaden the noise of the trains, which were sent over first. The trains having been safely transported, the troops followed in order; and so, during a night in which nature seemed strangely in sympathy with the situation, fretting and fuming, and as if scowling upon defeat, the great army of the Potomac, which was to put the enemy to inglorious flight, found itself, after a feeble campaign of six days, ingloriously transported to the northern banks of the Rappahannock. In the morning, when Lee advanced to attack, he found that his enemy was gone.

The losses in the battle of Chancellorsville were heavy. The Confederate loss, according to General Lee, amounted to 13,000, of whom 1581 were killed, 8700 wounded, and nearly 3000 prisoners. Hooker's loss was 17,197, of whom 5000 were unwounded prisoners. He had lost, also, 14 pieces of artillery and 20,000 stand of arms.

It will be remembered that it was Hooker's intention that the cavalry force of his army should play an important part in this campaign. We mentioned in the earlier portion of this chapter that the entire cavalry force of
the army of the Potomac had been organized in four divisions, making one distinct and separate corps, under the command of General Stoneman. His four division officers were Pleasonton, Buford, Averill and Gregg. The corps numbered from 10,000 to 13,000 sabres. Neither at Chancellorsville nor at Fredericksburg nor at Salem have we seen much of this branch of Hooker’s army. Some account of the operations of this corps is necessary, to complete the story of the Chancellorsville campaign.

As early as the 12th of April, Stoneman went forth on his expedition, the principal object of which was to destroy the railroads, bridges and other means of communication in Lee’s rear, and so cut him off from Richmond. He rode up the Rappahannock, and attempted to effect a crossing. On the 14th, he had succeeded in throwing over one division; but a violent storm coming on, and the low grounds becoming flooded, the division was recalled, the horses taking to the water, and bravely swimming to the opposite bank. As the weather did not improve, and the upper Rappahannock was still flooded, Stoneman remained inactive until the general advance movement of the whole army was commenced on the 27th. On the 28th, he crossed the Rappahannock at Kelley’s Ford, at the same time with the main body. On the following day, he crossed at Morton’s Ford and at Racoon Ford. In the meantime, by order of General Hooker, Stoneman had divided his troops into two columns. One column,

which consisted of about 4000 men, under General Averill, was ordered to move on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, the main body, under Stoneman in person, being charged with the destruction of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. Averill encountered a cavalry force, under W. H. F. Lee, on the 1st of May, near Rapidan Station. Lee, after burning the bridge over the river, retired to Gordonsville. Averill moved to the north along the railroad as far as Culpepper, dispersing some Confederate troops who were there assembled, and destroying a large quantity of the enemy’s stores. On the 2d, he was recalled, and ordered to join Hooker at Chancellorsville. At 10.30 that night he reached Ely’s Ford. Later the same night, he was surprised by the Confederate cavalry; and it is more than probable that he would have suffered severely, had it not been that the fall of Jackson and the accident which befell Hill almost immediately afterwards, compelled Stuart to return with all haste, and take command of the Confederate troops near Chancellorsville. Finding it difficult, or, as he thought, impossible, from the character of the country, to operate cavalry on the Confederate left, he remained inactive in camp, taking no part in the engagements of Sunday, the 3d of May. Hooker, on account of this, displaced him, and turned over his command to General Pleasonton.

It was the 3d of May before Stoneman reached Louisa Court House, and before the important line of communication by the Richmond and Fred-
The Mathiessen Railroad was struck. The troops were divided into six bodies, and, having received special instructions, were sent out in all directions. Colonel Wyndham, with his party, proceeded to Columbia, on the James River. Here the river is crossed by the Lynchburg and Richmond Canal. An attempt was made to destroy the aqueduct. It was not successful; but the canal was greatly damaged, and much public property destroyed. Fitz-Lee, hearing of what was being done in that direction, made a rush towards Columbia. Wyndham retired down the river, and then, changing his course, rejoined Stoneman at Thompson’s Cross-Roads at ten o’clock the same night. Colonel Kilpatrick, who was ordered to move in the direction of the Chickahominy, having travelled all day and all night Sunday, reached Hungary Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, at daylight on Monday. At this point, he destroyed the depots and tore up the railroads. Crossing to Brook Turnpike, he advanced to within two miles of Richmond. He then moved to Meadow Bridge, where the Central Railroad crosses the Chickahominy. Having destroyed this bridge, and an engine which he intercepted, he crossed the Pamunkey at Harristown, to avoid pursuit. On the 7th, after having crossed the Mattapony, and having raided through Essex and the neighboring counties, he reached Gloucester Point, having encountered by the way but little opposition. Colonel Davis, who was sent down the South Anna, struck the Fredericksburg Railroad at Ashland on Sunday evening. He first captured an ambulance, filled with the wounded from Chancellorsville. Having destroyed the engines and torn up a portion of the railroad, he pushed on towards Hanover Court House, on the Central Railroad. Here he burned the depot and tore up the rails. At T unstall’s, near the White House, he encountered a small body of infantry, with some artillery, and fell back upon Gloucester Point, reaching it without much further difficulty. Colonel Gregg destroyed the bridge across the South Anna, on the road from Columbia to Spottsylvania; thence he moved east, and destroyed the road to Beaver Dam Station. On Tuesday, the 5th, the whole command, except Davis and Kilpatrick, was concentrated at Yanceyville, on the South Anna; and, on the evening of that day, the retrograde movement commenced. On the 8th, the whole force recrossed Kelley’s Ford, on the Rappahannock.

This raid must be pronounced a failure. No doubt it did much damage to Confederate property; and it must have struck terror into the hearts of the peaceful inhabitants. But it failed of its object. It did not seriously interfere with General Lee’s operations. It did not affect his commissariat to any appreciable extent. It did not cut him off for any length of time from his communications with Richmond; for in three or four days the railroad was repaired and in excellent running order, and navigation on the canal was resumed. This was all that was accomplished by that splendid army of mounted troops—
in appearance one of the most magnificent bodies of cavalry that ever went forth to battle. Employed as they were, they contributed nothing towards the possible success of the campaign; they won no glory, for they found no foe; and, when General Hooker most needed them, they were not available.

On Wednesday, the 6th of May, the army of the Potomac—except the cavalry, which, as we have seen, did not cross the river till two days later—resumed its old quarters at Falmouth. On that day—and with a bad taste which was only in keeping with his blundering conduct since the moment he first felt the enemy, in the advance towards the open ground in the rear of the heights at Fredericksburg—Hooker issued the following address to his army:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 6, 1863.

"The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say, they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resource.

"In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock, before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it represents. On fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interest or honor may demand. It will also be the guardian of its own history and its own arm. By your celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers was undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel ventured to follow.

"The events of last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army. We have added new lustre to its former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his entrenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have inflicted heavier blows than we have received. We have taken from the enemy 5000 prisoners; 15 colors; captured and brought off 7 pieces of artillery; placed hors de combat 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his depots, filled with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions, and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle.

"By command of

"Major-General Hooker.

"S. Williams,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

General Lee, who had certainly more reason to use boastful language, issued an address to his soldiers on the
7th; but he writes with a dignity and modesty becoming the occasion.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,\{ May 7, 1863.\}

"With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men, during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged.

"Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly entrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance He has wrought. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name. Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defense of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example. The army and the country alike lament the absence, for a time, of one to whose bravery, energy and skill they are so much indebted for success.

"The following letter from the president of the Confederate States, is communicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of its success:

'I have received your despatch, and reverently unite with you in giving praise to God for the success with which He has crowned our arms.

'In the name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself, and the troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great victories which your army has achieved.

'The universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and wounded.'

"R. E. LEE, General."

On the 8th, the following despatch was sent by the secretary of war to the governors of the Northern States:

"WASHINGTON, May 8, 1863.

"The president and general-in-chief have just returned from the army of the Potomac. The principal operations of General Hooker failed, but there has been no serious disaster to the organization and efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its former position on the Rappahannock, having recrossed the river without any loss in the movement. Not more than one third of General Hooker's force was engaged. General Stoneman's operations have been a brilliant success. Part of his force advanced to within two miles of Richmond, and the enemy's communications have been cut in every direction. The army of the Potomac will speedily resume offensive operations.

"E. M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War."
On the same day, President Lincoln issued the famous proclamation, announcing his intention to enforce the law of enrolment and draft, which had been passed by Congress at its previous session. All able-bodied male citizens, and persons of foreign birth, who, although not yet citizens, had declared their intention to become such, were proclaimed to constitute the National forces, and to be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States, when called out by the president for that purpose. It was evident that, if the Confederates had acquired fresh courage and fresh hope from this latest triumph, the government at Washington had become more resolved than ever to put down the rebellion and to restore the Union. The spirit which prevailed at Washington was the same spirit which, except among certain classes who had never been in favor of the war, pervaded and animated the whole people.

Such, then, is the story of the great but, to the National forces, disastrous battle of Chancellorsville—a battle in which, as has been well said, "the rank and file had been foiled without being fought, and caused to retreat without the consciousness of having been beaten." After the battle, General Hooker's reputation suffered an eclipse from which it has not yet fully recovered.

General George Hiram Berry.—This brave and talented officer was killed, as has been mentioned in the text, during the second day's fighting at Chancellorsville. It was his division, formerly Hooker's own, which, on the first day, saved the National army from destruction. The situation was already desperate when Hooker ordered forward this choice division. "Go in, general," said Hooker; "throw your men into the breach; don't fire a shot—they can't see you—but charge home with the bayonet." Never was a charge more nobly made or more gallantly sustained. For three hours, almost alone, this division resisted, and even repelled, the fierce onslaughts of the already triumphant enemy. On the ground which he had won, Berry resumed the battle early the following morning. Determined to drive the Confederates back, he thrust his brigades forward, making several successful charges. In one of these, while at the head of his men, and cheering them on, he was instantly killed. Berry was a native of Rockland, Maine, where he was born on the 27th of August, 1824. Bred a carpenter, he subsequently devoted himself to navigation. Later, he cultivated a taste for military affairs, and was the originator of the Rockland Guard—a volunteer company which, before the war, had attained a high state of efficiency. He was several times elected to the State legislature by his fellow-townsmen, and was once mayor of Rockland. When the war broke out, he entered the volunteer service as colonel of the Fourth Maine regiment. He fought at Bull Run. He was raised to the rank of brigadier-general in April, 1862. He was in the peninsula with McClellan, and, as commander of the Third brigade of the Third division, of Heintzelman's corps, took part in most of the engagements. He followed the fortunes of Pope in Virginia, and those of Burnside at Fredericksburg. At the latter battle, he greatly distinguished himself. In March, 1863, his nomination as major-general of volunteers was confirmed by the Senate; and he was placed in command of the Second division of the Third army corps, then under Sickles. In this capacity he fought at Chancellorsville. Berry was greatly lamented by the army and by the nation at large.
CHAPTER XXVII.

Dark Days.—After Chancellorsville.—The Army of Lee and the Southern People.—High Hopes.—The Invasion Mania.—Hooker Watchful.—Lee's Army in Motion.—Longstreet at Culpepper.—A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg.—Hooker and Sedgwick Deceived.—Pleasanton Reconnoitres.—The Discovery.—Both Armies Moving North.—Hooker Protects Washington.—At Fairfax and Manassas.—The Confederates at Winchester.—Milroy Abandons the Place.—A Blunder.—Berryville and Martinsburg.—Harper's Ferry.—The Valley Cleared of National Troops.—Hooker's Mistake.—Too Much Advice.—Excitement in the North.—Maryland and Pennsylvania Aroused.—Confederate Raids.—Chambersburg Open to the Invader.—Hooker No Longer Doubtful.—Crosses the Potomac at Harper's Ferry.—At Frederick.—Hooker Removed.—Meade in Command.—Sketch of Meade.—Modest, but Firm.—His Request.—Lee Moving on Harrisonburg.—Stuart's Detour.—Lee's Ignorance of the Whereabouts of the National Army.—The Cumberland Valley.—Lee's Discovery.—His Change of Purpose.—Moving Towards Gettysburg.—Meade's Purpose.—Gettysburg.—Its Position and Surroundings.—Buford at Gettysburg.—The Battle Begun.—Arrival of Reynolds.—The Iron Brigade.—Reynolds Killed.—Doubleday in Command.—Arrival of Howard.—Cemetery Ridge Occupied.—The Tide Turns.—Ewell on the Field.—The Stonewall Brigade.—Howard's Mistake.—The Nationals Driven Back.—Terrific Fighting.—Arrival of Hancock.—Buford, the Good Angel of Gettysburg.—The Nationals Again in Position.—The Confederate Skirmishers Recalled.—End of the First Day's Fighting.—Meade Coming up from Taneytown.—The Whole Army Moving towards Gettysburg.—Arrivals of the Different Corps.—Disposition of the Troops.—The Confederate Prospect.—The Relative Strength of the Two Armies.—Lee's Original Intention.—Necessity.—One Opportunity Lost.—The Morning of the 2d of July.—A Peaceful Scene.—Lee's Order of Battle.—Waiting for the Attack.—Sickles' Mistaken Position.—The Round Tops.—Longstreet's Fierce Attack on the National Left.—Severe Fighting.—Hood's Texans.—General Warren on Hand.—Terrible Slaughter.—Little Round Top Secured.—Birney's Left.—The Salfent Peach Orchard.—Terrible Pressure.—The Orchard Captured.—Birney's New Position.—Birney's Brigades.—Caldwell's Division.—The Battle Boils and Bubbles.—The Nationals Again Driven Back.—The Confederate Advance Checked.—Crawford's Splendid Charge.—Humphrey's Peculiar Position.—His Successful Retreat.—Hancock to the Rescue.—The National Position in Danger.—Slaughtered Heaps.—The Ridge Secured.—The National Right Weakened.—The Confederate Attack on the Left a Failure.—Ewell's Attack on the National Right.—The Bravery of Greene.—Cemetery Hill.—The Ravine.—Benner's Hill.—A Tremendous Onset.—A Terrible Reception.—Culp's Hill.—Johnston's Attack.—Seizure of the Vacant Breast-Works.—The Darkness.—The Breast-Works Held.—End of the Second Day's Fight.—Heavy Losses on Both Sides.—Lee Not Dissatisfied.—Meade Still Confident.—The Troops Restored to the National Right.—Ewell's Attack Resumed.—General Geary on Hand.—A Terrible Morning's Fighting.—The Confederates Driven Back.—The Position on the National Right Secured.—A Lull in the Fight.—Arrival of the Cavalry.—Lee Preparing for Another and Final Attack.—A Terrific Cannoneade.—The Advancing Columns.—Mowed Down by the National Artillery.—Pickett's Brave Virginians.—Stannard's Brave Vermonters.—Caught on Flank.—In Front of Hancock.—A Terrific Musketry Fire.—Pettigrew's Lines Broken and Routed.—Pickett's Men Stand Firm.—A Tremendous Charge.—The National Line Penetrated.—Doubleday's Men to the Rescue.—The Lines Re-formed.—The Confederates Repulsed.—Harov and Victory.—Wilcox's Vain Attempt.—Cavalry Charges on the Left and Right.—Driven Back at all Points.—The Battle Ended.—Lincoln's Announcement of the Victory.—Lee's Disappointment.—Imboden and Lee.—'We Must Return to Virginia.'—Burying the Dead.—The Retreat.—The Pursuit.—Williamsport.—Crossing the Potomac.—On to the Rapidan.—End of the Campaign.—Reflections.

The months of May and June, 1863, will be remembered as a period of great darkness in the history of the Civil War. The year, so far, had been marked by no great National triumph. On the contrary, reverse had followed reverse in rapid and alarming succession, until it seemed as if the last
ray of hope were about to be extinguished, and until the hearts of many brave men were failing them for fear. Galveston, which had been restored to the Union at the close of 1862, was again in the hands of the Confederates; Beauregard, at Charleston Harbor, was successfully resisting all the skill and energy of Dupont; Rosecranz, who had accomplished nothing since the famous encounter at Murfreesboro, was effectually held in check by Bragg at Chattanooga; Banks was vainly courting victory on the lower Mississippi; Vicksburg had not yet yielded to the stubborn pertinacity of General Grant; and in two great battles—at Fredericksburg and at Chancellorsville—the army of the Potomac had sustained inglorious defeat. It was of all things most natural that, in such circumstances, there should be sorrow in the North, and contrasted joy and hope in the South.

The state of things which existed after the battle of Chancellorsville was not unlike that which supervened upon the defeat of Pope, in August of the previous year. Now, as then, it seemed as if fortune were smiling on the South, and as if a favorable opportunity had arisen for abandoning the defensive, and striking a final and decisive blow. The Confederate troops were in excellent spirits; and General Lee was not to be blamed if he shared their feelings. In two great battles, although confronting by superior numbers, they had come off victorious, and inflicted terrible punishment on the National forces. If victory was so easily won on their own territory, might not similar success attend them on the territory of their enemy? They had twice over repelled an invading army, which was supposed to be invincible: were they not justified in playing the part of invaders in turn? The morale of Lee's army could never again be higher. If, therefore, a bold and vigorous effort were not made now, the opportunity might be lost forever. It was well known to General Lee, and to the authorities at Richmond, that Hooker's army had been largely reduced, because of the extensive out-mustering of short-term troops. Lee's army, on the other hand, had gained in strength. Longstreet had come up from the south of the James, where he had been operating at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville; and a rigidly enforced conscription had brought up the total of the army to over 70,000 men. The resources of arbitrary power had been exhausted to clothe, equip and otherwise put the army in a condition to undertake what some were sanguine enough to hope might prove a successful and final campaign. The army of Northern Virginia had never before been so well provided with all the essentials of war. It was, in the words of Longstreet, "in condition to undertake anything." If there was deficiency anywhere, it was in the commissariat; but this was the less an inconvenience that, in the rich granaries of Pennsylvania, which awaited their approach, there was enough and to spare. In addition to these various reasons, which prompted the Southern leaders to immediate and vigorous action, there was
unquestionably this other: there was the inspiring hope that a successful campaign in the free States of the North would take from foreign governments their last excuse for refusing to recognize the independence of the Confederation. By the end of May, Lee's army, reorganized into three separate army corps, commanded respectively by Longstreet, Hill and Ewell, was ready to launch forth on what seemed a promising but in reality, as the result proved, an ill-starred expedition.

The two armies, since the battle of Chancellorsville—the one paralyzed, and unable to strike, the other in seeming idleness, and apparently without plan or purpose—lay encamped on the opposite sides of the Rappahanock. Hooker was at Falmouth, his left extending several miles down the river. Lee, on the south and west of the river, occupied that line of impregnable earth-works which, from one extreme to the other, dotted the country for thirty miles. On neither side had any demonstration been made. Behind this mask of idleness, there was real activity in the Confederate ranks. Lee was busy perfecting his arrangements for his projected movement toward the North. Hooker was ignorant of the plans of his antagonist; but he was watchful and not unprepared to act, as soon as the movements of the enemy should reveal his purpose.

It was now the 3d of June. On that day, Lee began to move his troops, McLaws' and Hood's divisions, of Longstreet's corps, being pushed forward in the direction of Culpepper Court House. On the 4th and 5th, Ewell's corps was marched in the same direction. In order to disguise his movement, and to keep the National commander off his guard, Lee left the corps of A. P. Hill to occupy the lines of Fredericksburg. It was not possible, however, that so gigantic a movement, as that which Lee contemplated, could be conducted for any length of time in secrecy. Discovering signs of more than ordinary activity in the camp of the enemy, and suspecting its cause, Hooker sent instructions to Sedgwick, on the 6th, to throw a portion of his troops across the Rappahanock at Franklin's Crossing, and make a close reconnoissance of the enemy's position. The reconnoissance was made accordingly. Hill held his position with such tenacity, and made such a display of strength, that Sedgwick and Hooker were, for the time, deceived. It was the conviction of both that, whatever might be Lee's immediate purpose, the Confederate forces had not, as yet, in any very large numbers, been removed from their old encampments. It soon became manifest, however, that Lee was bent on a movement to the North. On Tuesday, the 9th, General Pleasonton, taking with him two divisions of cavalry, under Buford and Gregg, with two picked brigades of infantry, under Russell and Ames, crossed the Rappahanock at Kelley's and Beverley's Fords, his intention being to move by converging roads on Culpepper. It was known that Stuart was already at Culpepper; and it was Hooker's expectation that
by sending his whole cavalry corps forward, he might succeed in breaking up Stuart's camp. Stuart, meanwhile, had moved on from Culpepper to Brandy Station, his object being to form the advance, and to cover the flank of the main movement. Having crossed at Beverley's Ford, Buford came immediately into contact with a Confederate brigade, under General Jones. This brigade he drove back for a couple of miles, when he found himself checked by the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and Wade Hampton, who had come to the support of their companion in arms. At this point, some severe fighting ensued. Meanwhile, Gregg had crossed at Kelley's Ford; and, having pushed on toward Brandy Station, he was about to fall with effect on Stuart's rear. Stuart was compelled to draw off from Buford's front, so as to face this new foe. Getting into position, Stuart fell with tremendous force upon Gregg. A spirited contest at once took place for the possession of the heights. For a time, the battle raged with great fierceness. It was one of the very few genuine cavalry engagements during the whole war, and possessed additional interest from the fact that it was between the entire mounted force of both armies. Gregg carried the heights; but finding that the other column was not able to come up and form a junction with him, he fell back toward his right and rear, and united with Buford. Pleasonton then retired his whole command across the Rappahannock, but not until he had discovered, through captured correspondence, that Lee was present in force at Culpepper, and that the object of the Confederate leaders was the invasion of the North. In this engagement, the loss on each side was about 600. Among the wounded on the Confederate side was W. H. F. Lee.

There was now no longer any doubt as to the intention of the enemy. His object was invasion. It was still uncertain, however, whether Lee meant to move on Washington or to push his way into Maryland and Pennsylvania. It was known that the Confederates felt sore because of the raids of Grierson in Mississippi, and of Davis and Kilpatrick in Virginia; and threats had been made against both the States above named. At the same time, Washington would be a rich prize to the Confederates; and it was not improbable that an attempt would be made to capture the National capital. Hooker's first move was to throw his army along the line of the Rappahannock, his right being advanced so as to cover the fords of that river. While Hooker was thus occupied, Lee had actually turned his right, and thrown the head of a column into the Shenandoah Valley. Hill was left in his old position at Fredericksburg; Longstreet remained at Culpepper; while Ewell, on the 10th, was pushed forward to the west and north. Striking the Blue Ridge, he moved along the eastern side of that range until he reached Chester's Gap. Passing through the gap, he crossed the Shenandoah at Front Royal. Bursting into the valley, he advanced by forced marches toward Winchester, at which place he arrived on the evening
June 13. of the 13th, having accomplished the distance from Culpepper, some seventy miles, in three days.

While Ewell was making this rush towards Winchester, Hooker was still guarding the fords of the Rappahannock. It was not until the 15th that he was made aware of the march which his antagonist had stolen upon him. The intelligence fell upon him like a thunderbolt. Abandoning his camp on the Rappahannock, he fell back towards Washington, taking positions which would enable him, if necessary, to defend the capital, while at the same time he could watch the development of Lee's plan of operations. On the 15th and 16th, he had fallen back as far as Fairfax and Manassas. Here, for some days, he remained. As soon as Hill, who had been left behind at Fredericksburg, observed the disappearance of the Union army, he marched towards Culpepper, where Longstreet still held position. Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, was ordered forward to Winchester to co-operate with Ewell. Imboden, with his troops, was sent out in the direction of Romney, his instructions being to cover Winchester, and to prevent reinforcements arriving by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Ewell had detached Rodes' division to Berryville, with the view of cutting off communications between Winchester and the Potomac. General Milroy, then in command at Winchester, had under him a force of 7000 men, with three pieces of field-artillery, and six siege pieces in a fort. Milroy held out against the vigorous and persistent attacks of the rapidly increasing forces of the enemy during the 13th and June 14th, repelling some of the assaults with great spirit; but, on the night of the 14th, discovering that the whole corps of Ewell and of Longstreet were at hand, he attempted to retreat. It was too late. He was almost surrounded. Only a small portion of his troops managed to effect their escape, some finding their way to Harper's Ferry, and some to Pennsylvania. His losses were 4000 taken prisoners, 29 guns, 277 wagons and 400 horses. General Milroy was severely taken to task by some for his conduct at Winchester: he was vindicated by others. President Lincoln, pronouncing on the evidence laid before him by the judge-advocate-general, declared that neither Milroy nor Schenck, his immediate superior, and between whom the blame must be divided, were seriously to blame, and that a court-martial was not necessary in the case. The mistake was in not abandoning the place at an earlier day. It is doubtful whether Milroy could have held out until succor reached him; but certainly defeat and surrender could not have been more disastrous than was the retreat.

Berryville and Martinsburg, at the same time, yielded to the attacks of General Rodes; and the garrison at Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland Heights. The valley was thus cleared of National troops.

Judged from a high military standpoint, General Hooker's line of action, after he was made aware of the surprise at Winchester, is open to severe criti-
cism. It was clearly the duty required by the situation to interpose between Hill at Fredericksburg and Longstreet at Culpepper. A blow vigorously dealt ought to have resulted in the capture or destruction of Hill. Even if neither of these results followed, the presumption is that such a movement would have brought Lee back to the assistance of his lieutenant, and so made an end of the invasion. It is only just to Hooker to say that, if we are to judge from the correspondence which took place between him and Halleck and President Lincoln, a short time before Lee began his Northern movement, the course which Hooker did adopt was opposed to his own better judgment. The course which we have indicated as the right course to follow in the circumstances was the course which he actually suggested, in the event of Lee moving as he did. It was condemned by Halleck, and, in the most emphatic and characteristic manner, discouraged by Lincoln. "If Lee," said the president, "should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, he would fight you in entrenchments, and have you at disadvantage; and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would, in some way, be getting an advantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other." *

* Despatch from President Lincoln to General Hooker, June 5th.

The disaster at Winchester, and the appearance of Confederate troops on their borders, created the wildest excitement in Maryland and Pennsylvania. The excitement was shared, in fact, by the whole of the Northern States. Appeals to the people were published by the governors of Maryland and Pennsylvania; and, on the 15th of June, a proclamation was issued by the president, calling for 120,000 militia. Pennsylvania was to furnish 50,000; Ohio, 30,000; Maryland, 10,000; West Virginia, 10,000; New York, 20,000. These calls were promptly and heartily responded to. Meanwhile, lively scenes were being witnessed in the larger towns, threatened by the invading troops. Of some of those scenes stirring descriptions have been preserved. The 16th, in Harrisburg, is thus described by an eye-witness: "The morning broke," he tells us, "upon a populace all astir, who had been called out of bed by the 'beat of the alarming drum,' the blast of the bugle, and the clanging of bells. The streets were lively with men, who were either returning from a night's work on the fortifications, or going over to relieve those who were toiling there. As the sun rose higher, the excitement gathered head. All along the streets were omnibuses, wagons and wheelbarrows taking in trunks and valuables, and rushing them down to the depot, to be shipped out of rebel range. The stores, the female seminaries and almost every private residence were busy all of the forenoon in swelling the mountain of freight that lay at the depot. Every
horse was impressed into service, and every porter groaned beneath his weight of responsibilities. The scene at noon at the depots was indescribable, if not disgraceful. A sweltering mass of humanity thronged the platform, all furious to escape from the doomed city. At the bridge, and across the river, the scene was equally exciting. All through the day a steady stream of people, on foot and in wagons, young and old, black and white, was pouring across it from the Cumberland Valley, bearing along with it household gods and all manner of goods and stock. Endless trains, laden with flour, grain and merchandise, hourly emerged from the valley, and thundered across the bridge and through the city. Miles of retreating baggage wagons, filled with calves and sheep tied together, and great, old-fashioned furnace wagons, loaded with tons of trunks and boxes, defiled in continuous procession down the pike and across the river, raising a dust that marked the outline of the road as far as the eye could see."

Pittsburg, on the 19th, presented a scene of great activity. "Work on the city defenses is still progressing vigorously, and some of the more important works are now ready to receive the guns. The number of men employed on the fortifications yesterday was 4605. The works are on Herron's Hill, on Harrison's Hill, on Mount Washington, on Squirrel Hill, and on Negley's Hill. There are upward of 5000 men in the trenches today; and, with such a large working force, it cannot take many days to finish the works now in hand. General Bernard, with a competent staff of engineers, was engaged in laying out new works yesterday on the outer side of the Alleghany, so as to render the city secure against an advance from that direction. Works have also been laid out near Turtile Creek and other important points."

In Baltimore, similar preparations were made for the approach of the invaders. "The work of erecting barricades progressed rapidly on Friday and Saturday, and, on Sunday morning, the entire circle of the city was completed, and ready for military occupation at any moment that the scouts should announce the approach of the enemy. The erection of lines of entrenchments and fortifications on all the approaches to the city have also progressed rapidly. On Saturday, about 1000 colored men were gathered by the police from different sections of the city, causing much excitement among that portion of our population, as they were marched out to the different locations for the defensive works. At night another force was secured, to relieve those who had been at work throughout the day, and another relief gang was provided on Sunday morning and evening, so that rapid progress has been made, and the works are now ready for immediate use."

While Hooker remained at Fairfax and Manassas, there were occasional cavalry skirmishes in the neighborhood of Ashby Gap. In some of these the fighting was severe; in all of them the National troops distinguished themselves for dash and daring, not only holding their own, but driving the
enemy before them. These encounters, however, exercised no perceptible influence on the campaign. Lee was not hindered from posting himself in strength in the Shenandoah Valley, where he was ready to meet Hooker, if he should deem it prudent to attack him, and where also he could send foraging parties into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Jenkins' troopers had already penetrated as far as Chambersburg, and ravaged the country for miles around, frightening the peaceful inhabitants, and carrying off much booty, particularly in cattle and horses. On the 22d, Hill and Longstreet having come up and relieved him in the valley, Ewell, at the head of the invading columns, passed into Maryland, Imboden moving to the west, and breaking up the lines of communication by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The whole region of Western Pennsylvania, up to the Susquehanna, was now open to the invaders. On the 24th and the 25th, Longstreet and Hill followed Ewell. The objective point of the Confederates was Chambersburg. On the 26th, the entire Confederate army had crossed at Williamsport and Shepherdstown. On the same day, Hooker, no longer in doubt as to Lee's plan, led his army across the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, and moved towards Frederick. This, as we shall see, was a wise and politic movement on the part of the National commander. It led to the happiest results, although Hooker himself was not to reap the glory.

At this conjuncture there occurred an unlooked-for circumstance, which June might have had a most disastrous effect on the campaign and on the prospects of the North. On the 27th, when Hooker had marched upon Frederick, and when it became manifest that a great battle was imminent, the public were astounded by the intelligence that General Hooker had resigned the command of the army of the Potomac, and that the important and somewhat perilous trust had been committed to General Meade. What was it that brought about this sudden, unexpected, and, to all appearance, untimely change? The story can be briefly told. At the time Lee began his movement northward, the National forces in the east were divided into several separate and independent commands. General Heintzelman commanded the department of Washington, with a force of 36,000 men; General Schenck had charge of the middle department, including the garrisons at Harper's Ferry, Winchester, and other contiguous places; and General Dix, with a considerable force, lay idle on the peninsula. Hooker, who had expressed a strong desire that the troops of Heintzelman and Schenck should be placed under his control, had at length so far overcome the scruples of Commander-in-Chief Halleck, that he obtained a reluctant consent. Hooker had sent General Slocum to Harper's Ferry, with the understanding that he should be joined by the 10,000 or 11,000 troops stationed there under French, and that the united force should make a demonstration on Lee's
rear by a movement up the Cumberland Valley. Such an arrangement implied the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, but to this Halleck would not consent. It was in vain that Hooker reasoned, showing that the place was comparatively of no importance, that it commanded no ford of the Potomac, that the removal of the troops would not affect the fortifications, that it was without public stores, and that there was only a very small likelihood that the enemy would think of taking possession. He was met by the reply, "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity." Hooker requested to be relieved from the command of the army. His request was at once complied with. Hooker has been severely blamed for deserting his post at this critical juncture. It was a perilous experiment to change the commander-in-the-field, on the eve of what, it was evident, must prove a great and decisive battle. It does seem, on the surface, as if Hooker allowed personal considerations to triumph over what he ought to have regarded as the welfare of the nation. But, undoubtedly, Hooker had other reasons for the course he took than that which he openly assigned. His relations with the government had not been cordial from the first. His claims, after the removal of McClellan, had been passed over in favor of Burnside; and when, after the battle of Fredericksburg, it was found impossible longer to ignore him, the command of the army of the Potomac was grudgingly given him. He had scarcely entered upon his duties, when the president wrote him, informing him of strange charges which were rumored against him, such as ambition to play the rôle of dictator, reminding him that the most effective method of securing the gratification of desires so ambitious was to overthrow the insurgents, and make an end of the rebellion, and assuring him that, if he allowed disaster to befall the army of the Potomac, he would never be at the head of the American or any other government. Hooker's relations with the government were not improved by his failure at Chancellorsville. On the 14th of May, Lincoln wrote him: "I must tell you that I have some fearful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true." These things being known, it is not much to be wondered at either that, in the circumstances, Hooker should have resigned, or that his resignation should have been so promptly accepted. On the morning of the June 28th of June, an order arrived from Washington, transferring the command of the army to Major-General Meade, of the Fifth army corps. On the same day appeared the two following orders:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac,}
Frederick, Md., June 28, 1863."

"In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27th, 1863, I relinquish the command of the
army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Major-General George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotion. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumph of its arms may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,}
June 28, 1863."

"By direction of the president of the United States, I hereby assume command of the army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigue and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve, in the command of this army, an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me. GEORGE G. MEADE,

"Major-General Commanding."

The change produced some surprise in the army; but the appointment of General Meade was generally well received. The report of the change soon extended to the several corps, and their commanders hastened to bid farewell to General Hooker. By three o'clock, a large number of officers had assembled, and, soon after, the general appeared in the avenue before his tent. Some time was spent in social intercourse, and, to the last, all formalities were dispensed with. The parting was painful to every one, particularly to those who had become endearing to the general by old associations. General Hooker was deeply grieved. He had been identified with the army of the Potomac, he said, since its organization, and had hoped to continue with it to the end. It was the best army of the country, worthy of the confidence of the nation, and could not fail of success in the approaching struggle. He spoke of his successor as a glorious soldier, and urged all to give him their earnest support.

Major-General George G. Meade, to whom the destinies of the army of the Potomac were now entrusted, was born in Spain, in 1815, his parents residing at the time of his birth, in Barcelona.
He graduated at West Point, June 30th, 1855, and entered the regular army of the United States as second lieutenant of artillery. In 1836 he resigned his commission, and lived in retirement for six years. On the 19th of May, 1842, he resumed his connection with the army, and took part in the Mexican War, winning special distinction in the battles of Palo Alto and Monterey. When the call was made by the president for 300,000 volunteers, and McCall's division was organized at Tenallytown, Meade was appointed to the command of the second brigade. At Mechanicsville, at Gaines' Mill, at Charles City Cross Roads, at the second battle of Bull Run, at South Mountain, at Antietam, at Fredericksburg, and at Chancellorsville, General Meade had given evidence of soldierly abilities of the very highest order; and the manner in which he conducted the retreat from Chancellorsville marked him out as the probable future commander of the army of the Potomac.

The appointment of General Meade to the chief command of the army of the Potomac, a surprise to many, was perhaps the greatest surprise to General Meade himself. He had been disgusted with the conduct of Hooker at Chancellorsville; and his conviction of Hooker's incapacity, as revealed in that campaign, he had had the courage frankly to express. It was known to some that Meade's conduct at Chancellorsville had attracted the attention of the president, and commanded his admiration. "I tell you," said Lincoln a few days after the Chancellorsville retreat, "I think a great deal of that fine fellow, Meade." It is doubtful, however, whether Meade was aware that he stood so high in the good graces of the president. One thing is certain. He knew that he had given offense to Hooker; and when, on the night of the 27th, he was awakened from sleep in his tent, by the messenger from Washington, his first question was whether he had come with an order for his arrest. General Hardie evaded the question, told him to strike a light, and then put in his hand a paper, which he found appointed him to the command of the army of the Potomac, with almost absolute power to conduct the war according to his own judgment. Meade was not what might be called a popular officer, but yet he was held in high esteem by all his comrades in arms. Some forty-eight years of age, tall and slim in person, long visaged and thoughtful, he had the aspect of a scholar rather than that of a soldier. He was an excellent tactician, and imbued with sound military ideas. The well-known character of the man, and his long and intimate connection with the army of the Potomac, secured for him the confidence of both officers and men. They knew that in his case, at least, performance would be equal to promise.

To Meade was granted a large amount of authority—much larger than had been enjoyed by Hooker. The president waived in his favor all the powers of the Executive and the Constitution. Meade, in fact, was untrammeled. But he made a wise and cautious use of the power entrusted to him. He made as
few changes as possible, and only those which were absolutely necessary. He retained the officers who had formed General Hooker’s military family—General Butterfield, chief of staff; General Warren, chief of engineers; General Hunt, chief of artillery; and General Williams, adjutant-general. His desire was to understand and give effect to the plans and purposes of his late chief. In his telegram, accepting the chief command of the army of the Potomac, he said: “Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops, and position of the enemy, I can only now say that, it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and, if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or, if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force.” In response to this request, the garrison at Harper’s Ferry was placed at his disposal; so, also, was the entire force of militia, under Couch, at Harrisburg; and, in addition, such forces as could be spared from West Virginia, Baltimore, Washington and Fortress Monroe, with the returning troops from North Carolina, were hurried to his support. Sykes was placed in command of the Fifth corps, which had been Meade’s; Hancock had charge of the Second, since the assignment of Couch to the department of the Susquehanna; Reynolds commanded the

First; Sickles the Third; Sedgwick the Sixth; Howard the Eleventh; Slocum the Twelfth. The entire effective force was about 100,000 men.

The opposing armies, at this time, were nearly equal in point of numbers. Lee’s force, as it passed through Hagers-town, was estimated at 97,000, with 280 guns. This, however, did not include the strong cavalry force which, as we shall see, was moving by a route different from that followed by the main army. When General Meade took the place of General Hooker, the army of the Potomac was lying at Frederick. General Lee had his headquarters at Chambersburg, with the corps of Longstreet and Hill. Ewell had advanced as far as York and Carlisle. On the 27th, Lee issued the following order to his army:

“Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia. 
Chambersburg, Pa., June 27, 1863.

“The commanding general has observed, with marked satisfaction, the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results commensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could have displayed greater fortitude, or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. Their conduct, in other respects, has, with few exceptions, been in keeping with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise.

“There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness, on the part of some, that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties exacted of us by civili-
zation and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own.

"The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenseless, and the wanton destruction of private property that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators, and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement. It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered, without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain.

"The commanding general, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, with most scrupulous care, from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property; and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject.

"R. E. Lee, General."

The actual conduct of the Confederates was in striking contrast with the spirit of these instructions. They were living on the country, making requisitions on the farmers and tradesmen, and exacting ransoms from the towns. The severity of these exactions may be illustrated by one example. On the 28th of June, the little town of York alone was ordered to furnish 165 barrels of flour, or 28,000 pounds of baked bread; 3500 pounds of sugar; 1650 pounds of coffee; 300 gallons of molasses; 1200 pounds of salt; 32,000 pounds of fresh beef, or 21,000 pounds of bacon or pork; 2000 pairs of shoes or boots; 1000 pairs of socks; 1000 felt hats, and $100,000 in money. Such was the comfort which the invasion brought to Maryland and Pennsylvania.

On the morning of the 29th, Meade put his army in motion. Giving June up the idea of moving to the west of the South Mountain, he took a course due north, ascending the course of the Monocacy towards the Susquehanna. The army moved in three columns, covering, as it advanced, the lines of approach to Baltimore and Washington. The First and Eleventh corps were directed on Emmettsburg; the Third and Twelfth on Taneytown; the Second on Frizzleburg; the Fifth to Union; and the Sixth to Windsor. On the evening of the 29th, the National army was in position—its left at Emmettsburg and its right at Windsor.

The same day on which Meade put his army in motion, General Lee had completed all the necessary preparations for an advance on Harrisburg. On that day, however, he learned for the first time, by means of a scout, that the National army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached
the South Mountain. Lee's ignorance of the whereabouts of the National army is explained by the fact that Stuart, on whom he depended for information, had been left behind to guard the passes of the mountains, and to obstruct, as much as possible, the progress of the enemy. In the event of the Nationals succeeding in crossing the Potomac, his instructions were to follow, crossing the river to the east or west of the Blue Ridge, as he deemed the more convenient, and take position on the Confederate right. Unable to hinder the Nationals from crossing the river, and anxious to execute the remaining portion of his instructions, Stuart was compelled to make a wide detour to the east by way of Fairfax Court House. When, on the evening of the 27th, he reached the Potomac at the mouth of Seneca Creek, he found the river greatly swollen by recent rains; and it was only by tremendous exertions he gained the Maryland shore. He then learned that the Nationals, having crossed the day before, were on their way to Frederick. The National army thus lay between him and Lee; and he was compelled to march northward, through Westminster, to Hanover, in Pennsylvania, where he arrived on the 30th of June. It was Hooker's misfortune to fight without his cavalry, at Chancellorsville. A similar misfortune had now befallen Lee. Without those eyes of the army, he had been moving about in ignorance of the whereabouts of his antagonist.

The intelligence of the near approach of the National army fell upon Lee like a thunderbolt. Dreading an irruption of the National forces into the Cumberland Valley, and foreseeing the peril which thus threatened his communications, Lee resolved to concentrate on the east side of South Mountain, and prevent, if possible, the further progress of the opposing army. The movement on Harrisburg was, in consequence, countermanded. Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg, defiling through the South Mountain range towards Gettysburg; and Ewell was ordered to countermarch from York and Carlisle, on the same point.

On the 30th, Meade was still ignorant of the change of purpose on June 30. It was his belief that the Confederates were pressing northward to the Susquehanna. He had little doubt, however, that a collision was imminent. On that day, he pushed his right forward to Manchester, his left still remaining at Emmettsburg, where three corps—the First, Eleventh and Third—were under orders of Major-General Reynolds. Realizing the gravity of the situation, he issued to the army the following order:

**Headquarters Army of the Potomac, June 30, 1863.**

"The commanding general requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers address their troops, explaining to them the immense issue involved in the struggle. The enemy is on our soil. The whole country looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe,
Our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of the army. Homes, firesides and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well heretofore. It is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails to do his duty at this hour.

"By command of

"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE.

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

It was not until the night of the 30th that Meade became satisfied that Lee was concentrating his forces on the east side of South Mountain. He at once proceeded to select a position on which he might make a rapid concentration of his troops, and so receive battle on advantageous terms. The general line of Pipe Creek seemed to offer the advantage sought; but its final adoption was left to be determined by the necessities which might arise. Orders were issued for an immediate advance of the different corps. The Sixth corps, Sedgwick's, forming the right wing of the army, was ordered to Manchester, in rear of Pipe Creek; headquarters and Second corps, Hancock's, were directed to Taneytown; the Twelfth corps, Slocum's, and the Fifth corps, Sykes', forming the centre, were to move on Two Taverns and Hanover; and the left wing, consisting of the First, Reynolds', Third, Sickles', and Eleventh, Howard's, all under General Reynolds, was ordered to Gettysburg. The movement of the left wing was intended only as a mask, behind which the army could take position at Pipe Creek. It was not the intention of either Lee or Meade to make Gettysburg the battle field; but, unconsciously to both, a collision was becoming more and more inevitable in the immediate neighborhood.

The little town of Gettysburg, which was soon to be rendered immortal as the theatre not only of the greatest battle of the Civil War, but of one of the greatest battles of modern times, is about ten miles east of the South Mountain range. The topographical features of the neighborhood are peculiar, presenting a series of ridges which, for the most part, run parallel with South Mountain, and give to the landscape a rolling and diversified character. Some of the streams flow to the northeast, and empty themselves into the Susquehanna; others flow southward, and find an outlet into the Potomac. The town is built at the base of one of the ridges, and is the centre from which radiate a large number of roads. There is the Chambersburg road, leading to the northwest; the Carlisle road to the north; the Harrisburg road to the northeast; the Baltimore road to the southeast; and others, which lead in the direction of the Potomac to the southwest. To the immediate south of Gettysburg, and extending some four or five miles, is a ridge which bears a close resemblance to a fish-hook. The point of the
hook is known as Wolf's Hill; the barb is known as Culp's Hill; while the stem—a succession of ridges—ending in Little Round Top and Round Top, bears the general name of Cemetery Ridge. Little Round Top is about two hundred and eighty feet high. Round Top, which shoots up from the former, reaches a height of some four hundred feet. These two elevations constitute the military keys of Cemetery Ridge. At their base runs a marshy stream, called Plum Run. Between Wolf's and Culp's Hills flows what is called Rock Creek. The nearer part of the bend, which fronts the town, had been used as a Cemetery—hence the generic name of the ridge. The broken character of the ground, abounding with rocky ledges and covered with huge boulders, make it a sort of natural fortification. It is an admirable position for defensive operations. On the west side, the ground falls off into a cultivated valley, which it commands, and then gradually rises until, nearly a mile distant, it forms another and a parallel crest, called Seminary Ridge—from a theological school which crowns one of its heights and forms a conspicuous feature of the landscape. This ridge is covered with oaks, and is locally known as Oak Ridge. In the valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges is the Emmettsburg road. Such was the ground on which, for three consecutive days, the contending hosts of North and South were about to strive, in bloody and merciless contest, for the mastery of the Republic.

On the morning of Wednesday, the 1st of July, General Buford, who had been occupying Gettysburg for the two days previous, passed through the town with his cavalry, and, advancing beyond Seminary Ridge to the next ridge, more to the west, about two miles distant, took position on the near side of Willoughby Run. His line was drawn up across the Chambersburg road, along which Longstreet and Hill were advancing. It was about nine o'clock. All of a sudden, he found himself in collision with the leading division of Hill, under Heth. It was the commencement of the battle of Gettysburg. Knowing that Reynolds, who had bivouacked the night before at Marsh Creek, only four miles off, was within striking distance, Buford resolved to hold the Confederates in check until the arrival of his chief. It was a perilous undertaking; but by skilful deployments, he accomplished his task. He had fallen back somewhat; but his ranks were unbroken, and his men were offering a spirited resistance when, at about ten o'clock, Reynolds arrived with Wadsworth's division. Reynolds had no instructions to bring on a battle; but the necessities of the situation supplied the place of instructions. Buford was sorely pressed, and he must support him. Swinton suggests that, probably, his fine military eye took in at a glance the features of the rocky ridge of Gettysburg as an eminent vantage ground for a defensive battle, and that his object in bringing on the battle was to hold the enemy in check beyond the town, and thus give the army time to
DEATH OF REYNOLDS.

concentrate on the fastness of hills. This, of course, is mere conjecture; and whether he had such thoughts, and was influenced by such motives, we shall never know. But for his own untimely loss, there would be little cause for regret that he acted as he did. Wadsworth's troops were immediately deployed; and Reynolds sent instructions to Howard to advance as promptly as possible. Wadsworth was ordered to place his only battery—that of Hall—in position by the side of the road leading to Cashtown. Cutler's brigade was thrown into position on the right, while Doubleday, who had just come up with the van of the infantry, was ordered to move Meredith's Iron Brigade, as it was called, to the left of the road, into a piece of wooded ground which skirted Willoughby Run. Determined to bring matters to an immediate issue, Reynolds, with animating words, gave the regiments in the skirt of the woods the command to charge. The order was being gallantly obeyed, when, shot through the neck, he fell mortally wounded, dying before he could be removed from the field. The command now devolved on Doubleday. There was no pause in the battle. The Iron Brigade fell with tremendous force on the flank of Archer's brigade, which was pushing its way across Willoughby Run, capturing Archer himself and several hundreds of his men. While these events were taking place, there was desperate fighting on the right. Hall's battery, left for a time unsupported, was in imminent danger of being captured, when the Fourteenth Brook-

lyn and the Ninety-Fifth New York, joined by the Sixth Wisconsin, having made a change of front, charged to the relief of the guns. Such was the impetuosity of the onset that Davis' two Mississippi regiments were driven for shelter into the cut of an unfinished railroad, surrounded, and captured with their battle-flags. So far, success had been with the Nationals.

The tide of battle was destined soon to turn. Reinforcements, in increasing numbers, were coming up and joining both of the contending parties. The Nationals were strengthened by the arrival of the two remaining divisions of the First corps, under Rowley and Robinson, the former having taken command of Doubleday's men. Robinson's division remained for a time in reserve on Seminary Ridge; but the other division was pushed forward at once to the assistance of the sorely pressed left. These fresh troops were in excellent spirits. One of the brigades of Rowley's division, commanded by Colonel Roy Stone, having been assigned to a position dangerously exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, Stone remarked to his men, "We have come here to stay." The saying was promptly taken up. "We have come here to stay!" resounded throughout the ranks. The words were too truly prophetic; for a very large number of the brave fellows never left the ground. The battle continued to rage with great fierceness, the Nationals still firmly maintaining their position. Meanwhile, Hill was reinforced by another division, under General Pender. It was now
past noon. The sun had been blazing since early morning. The heat was intense. About one o'clock, General Howard arrived on the battle ground, and took command of the field. He had brought with him the divisions of Schurz and Barlow, the former now commanded by Schimmelpfenig, Schurz being in charge of the corps. These divisions Howard posted to the right of the First corps, and in such a manner as to prolong the general lines and cover the approaches to Gettysburg from the north and northwest. The other division, under Von Steinwehr—an experienced and skilful officer, who had been bred in the service of Prussia, and who had done good work on that fatal first day at Chancellorsville, when Jackson fell on Howard's corps with the force of an avalanche—he had left as a reserve on Cemetery Ridge. It was a wise and prudent step, as the result proved, and was taken, it is understood, in obedience to the instructions of Reynolds.

It was now about two o'clock. Howard had had little more than time to get his men in position, when the spectator on Cemetery Hill might have seen a long, gray line, serpent-like, creeping down the pike, and near the railroad on the northeast side of the town. They were “Stonewall” Jackson's men—led now by General Ewell, Jackson's most trusted and loved lieutenant—who were hurrying from York and Carlisle to decide the issues of that day. Their march seems to quicken as they approach the battle-ground. Before three o'clock, they have come up from the York road, debouched into the woods, and, with their old, wild battle-yell, fallen with crushing effect on Howard's right. Early's division, of Ewell, was thrown upon the right face of the Eleventh, commanded by Barlow. Rodes' division, of the same corps, moved further round and formed a connection with the left of the corps of General Hill. There was a commanding height, called Oak Hill, opposite the National line, where the left of the Eleventh and the right of the First corps approached each other, but did not meet. With the eye of a skilful general, Rodes perceived that this was the key-point of the field, and seized it immediately. The Eleventh, confronted by their old antagonists, seemed resolved to redeem the honor lost at Chancellorsville. They fought with the utmost bravery. But the battle had now become unequal—it was 50,000 men against 21,000; and Howard had fallen into an error not uncommon during the war. He had attempted to cover too much. It was impossible for his extended line, attenuated almost to feebleness, to resist the persistent attacks and now overwhelming numbers of the enemy. From his high vantage ground, where he had planted artillery, Rodes poured an oblique and destructive fire on the left of the Eleventh. A general advance was ordered about three o'clock. Rodes, having massed his infantry, came sweeping down through the opening of the National line in his front, breaking and cramping the left of the Eleventh, and turning and forcing back the right
of the First. Early, at the same moment, fell with equal energy on the right of theEleventh. The gallant Barlow made a stubborn resistance near the almshouse; but, in the midst of the struggle at this point, he was wounded, and fell helpless into the hands of the enemy. Schimmelpfenig was also taken prisoner, but he subsequently contrived to escape and rejoin his regiment. The National right was thus driven back in confusion into Gettysburg. The troops on the right of the First, or National left, were in a similar plight. They, too, were driven into the town, where they became entangled with Howard's corps. Ewell pursued the disordered mass into and through the streets of Gettysburg, capturing some five thousand prisoners and occupying the place.

Such was the state of things on the National right, and on the right of the National left, at a comparatively early hour in the afternoon of July 1st. How was it on the extreme left of the National line? These troops had been under fire from the commencement of the fight—some of them for five, some for six hours. At the same moment that Ewell, with the two divisions of Rodes and Early, came thundering down upon the Eleventh, A. P. Hill, strengthened by Ewell, renewed the attack upon the heroic and not yet completely exhausted First. Robinson and Doubleday and Wadsworth did their best to keep their men in position, and to hold the enemy at bay; but they, too, began to feel themselves weak under the fierce and persistent pressure of superior numbers. "We have come to stay," was still the watchword and battle-cry of many of the men. They were willing to wait and fight to the bitter end. But when it became known that the right of their corps had been turned, and that the Eleventh had been routed, the conviction of danger in their present position was forced upon them. It was with a stubborn reluctance they began to retire, and not until they had suffered most severely. They had saved and moved to the rear all their artillery, with the exception of one piece, and all their ambulances, before they let go their hold on Seminary Ridge. When they fell back behind the town, they did so in something like order. Doubleday handled his men during this crisis with marvellous ability. In managing affairs on the National left, he had received little or no assistance from Howard, whose attention was engrossed from the first with his own corps and the general state of things on his right. The fighting, as we have seen, was severe on the left during the whole day. There were special moments, however, when the firing was terrific. Some of the men had been through all the great battles of the East. They had been in the Peninsula, and under fire at Malvern Hills; with Pope, and under fire at Cedar Mountain, at Manassas, and at Centreville; with Burnside, and under fire at Fredericksburg; with Hooker, and under fire at Chancellor'sville; and they gave it as their opinion that the firing of that day was the most terrific they had ever experienced. In
one brigade alone—that of Cutler—in the brief space of twenty minutes, every staff-officer had his horse shot under him. Some of them lost two, some three horses. In thirty minutes, not a horse was left to the general or his staff, but one, and that one was wounded.

The remnants of the two shattered corps, reduced to one half of their original strength, found a refuge and a resting-place on Cemetery Hill. The wisdom of leaving Steinwehr behind to strengthen and fortify the position was now apparent to all. Steinwehr had made excellent use of his time. His guns were admirably posted, so as to guard the approaches to the heights; and behind every ledge of rock, every stone wall, every building, there was a living barrier—an abatis of bayonets. When the disordered masses were pouring through Gettysburg and towards the ridge, Hancock had arrived on the ground. Meade was still at Taneytown, some thirteen miles distant. So soon as he was made aware of the battle, and of the death of Reynolds, he sent Hancock forward to take command. He was to use his own judgment as to whether the forces should be retained at Gettysburg, or retire to the line of Pipe Creek. If he found the ground advantageous, he was so to advise the commander, and the troops would be ordered up at once. Hurrying forward in an ambulance, and studying the map by the way, Hancock arrived on the field at about half-past three o'clock. "I found," he says, "that practically the fight was over.

The rear of our column, with the enemy, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg. General Howard was on Cemetery Hill, and there had evidently been an attempt on his part to stop and form some troops there," Hancock was a great favorite with the rank and file of the army of the Potomac. His fine personal presence, and the magnetism of his manner, did much towards restoring the confidence of the men and reestablishing order. There was a nucleus of order in Steinwehr's division, and in the cavalry of Buford, which having been deployed in the plain to the left of the town, and in front of the ridge, presented a bold and firm front. Buford has been described as the good angel of Gettysburg. He certainly performed heroic services on the morning of that first day, and also at this supreme moment, when weakness or hesitation would have been ruin. Never were cavalry more superbly handled. Never did mounted men more heartily or more effectively obey the behests of their chief. As the routed Nationals came up, Hancock quickly formed them into line. He was soon able to present what seemed a formidable front to the enemy. The National army, however, was really in great peril. The day was yet young; several hours had to elapse before sunset. If Lee had made a vigorous attack with all the forces at his command, it is scarcely possible that Hancock could have offered an effective resistance. To his surprise, and, no doubt, to his delight, the Confederate skirmishers, who were already
breasting the hill, were recalled; and thus ended the first day's fighting at Gettysburg. General Lee made a mistake in not pressing the advantage he had won. But he acted up to the best of his knowledge. "The attack was not made that afternoon," he tells us, "because the enemy's force was unknown, and because it was considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops." It was a fatal pause—fatal to the hopes of Lee himself, and to the plans and purposes of the Confederate rulers.

Hancock lost no time in reporting to Meade. Soon after arriving, he sent a message informing him that he could hold the ground till dark. Shortly after five o'clock, he sent the following despatch: "When I arrived here, an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, which cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right. But we have, as yet, no troops on the left, the Third corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank march will, in a degree, protect our left flank. In the meantime, Gibbon [who had been left in command of the Second] had better march so as to take position on our right or left to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. * * * The battle is quiet now. I think we shall be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes on, it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable, with good troops." Having completed his dispositions, and having turned over the command to Slocum, who out-ranked him, and who had just arrived, he went back to Taneytown to see Meade personally. Meade had already made up his mind; and he set his army in motion at once.

The Twelfth corps, Slocum's, which had been urgently summoned by General Howard during the afternoon, and which had been pushed forward with as little delay as possible, arrived before six o'clock. It was immediately put into position. The Third corps, Sickles', which had also been summoned up by Howard, arrived some of them that night at sunset, and the remainder during the night and following morning. The Second corps, Hancock's, which had only to travel from Taneytown, a distance of thirteen miles, came up shortly after midnight. The Fifth corps, Sykes', was at Union Mills, twenty-three miles distant, when the order was given, but it was on the ground at an early hour in the morning. The Sixth, Sedgwick's, was at Manchester, thirty-two miles distant. It was known that its commander would hurry forward with all possible despatch; and it was confidently expected that he would reach the field in time to take part in the fight of the following day. Meade, himself, as soon as he had received Hancock's representations, broke up his headquarters
at Taneytown, sent his trains to Westminster; and hastened to Gettysburg, which he reached at one o'clock on the morning of the 2d. Soon after he arrived on the ground, he fixed his headquarters at a little frame house on the Taneytown road, in rear of and to the south of Zeigler's Grove. It was sheltered from infantry fire by a swell in the ground; but there was nothing to prevent it from becoming a target for the enemy's artillery.

With the earliest light Meade was July up, inspecting the ground, and 2d making arrangements for the disposition of his troops. Some of the corps were already in position. The others were placed as they came up. The Eleventh retained its position on Cemetery Hill, and was supported by Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions, of the First, now commanded by General Newton. On the extreme right was the Twelfth, which, with the division of Wadsworth, also of the First, held Culp's Hill. The Second and Third were ordered to occupy the continuation of Cemetery Ridge, to the left of the Eleventh. The Fifth was held in reserve. When Sedgwick came up, he was to be placed on the extreme left, behind the Round Tops. The order, from right to left, was, therefore, as follows: Sloeum, Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sickles. The entire army was concentrated on an area of about three square miles. The reserve forces were within thirty minutes' march of any part of the line. Batteries were posted along the crest; and rock-ledges, improvised earth-works and stone walls in the rear gave shelter to the soldiers.

On the morning of Thursday, the Confederate prospect was not quite so bright as it had been the night before. True, Longstreet had arrived; but it was manifest at a glance that the National army had been largely reinforced, that it occupied a position of formidable strength, and that to attempt to dislodge it meant a tremendous expenditure of force, as well as a fearful sacrifice of life. At early dawn, Lee, Longstreet and Hill were in eager consultation on Seminary Ridge. The summits of the ridge were covered with oak and pine trees; so, also, was its western slope, thus affording excellent concealment for the troops. Along this ridge, and round to the east of Gettysburg, in the form of a vast crescent, over five miles in length, its concavity facing the National line, the Confederate army was arranged. The eastern slope was dotted thickly with artillery, which looked frowningly over the intervening valley. Longstreet was on the right, Hill in the centre, and Ewell on the left. Between Ewell and Hill there was a gap of nearly a mile. The army was about 80,000 strong, numerically equal to that on the opposite heights, even if Sedgwick should get up in time. Lee's one inconvenience was the extent of his line, and the consequent difficulty of communication. Meade had the advantage of compactness; and communication was easy.

It was evident already that the attack, if there was to be an attack, would come from the Confederates.
Meade's position was merely defensive. It was for this purpose, and this purpose alone, that Cemetery Ridge had been occupied and strengthened. It was no part of his intention at this particular juncture to initiate aggressive measures. It had not been the original intention of Lee to fight so far from his base, unless attacked by the enemy; but it had become difficult, next to impossible, to withdraw his troops now that they had come into actual contact with the National army, and tasted somewhat of the sweets of victory. It may well be doubted whether, if an order had been given for retreat, his men, elated as they were with past successes, and flushed as they were with the fresh triumphs of yesterday, would have calmly submitted. General Lee was not ignorant of the difficulty and danger of assaulting a powerful foe behind entrenched lines, and in so commanding a position as that now occupied by the National army. Still, as he himself tells us, a battle had become, in a measure, unavoidable; and, "encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the previous day, and in view of the valuable results which would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack." The Confederate commander, however, made one mistake when he paused, on the eve of victory, on the afternoon of the 1st. He made another mistake when he delayed his attack on the morning and forenoon of the 2d. A vigorous assault made on the afternoon of Wednesday, or even on the early hours of Thursday, could scarcely have failed of success. Bent on invasion as he was, he flung away his opportunities. By delaying as he did, he gave the National forces not only time to come up and concentrate in strong positions in his front, but time to enjoy, after the fatigues of their march, some hours of refreshing rest.

It was still, however, early morning. The Confederate generals had not yet completed their plans. Meade was uncertain on what part of his line the first blow would be dealt, but he was guarding every point with scrupulous care. All was calm and still. There was a balmy sweetness in the summer air; music in the woods; beauty in the landscape. As the eye of the spectator on the heights fell upon the valley below, it was attracted by blooming orchards, by smiling fields, already growing yellow with rich crops of ripening grain, by contented cattle grazing at will on the meadow, or lazily resting in the shade. Nature seemed all-unconscious of the terrible tempest of human wrath which was about to burst forth, and which was so soon to convert those scenes of peace and happiness into scenes of tumult and horror, to fill the air with the sounds of destruction and the shrieks of agony, to cover the valley and the hillsides with the ghastly bodies of the slain, and to deluge those fields and redden those streams with blood.

It was four o'clock in the afternoon before Lee had completed his arrangements for attack. There had been some lively skirmishing earlier in the
day. In the morning, Ewell's movements created the impression that an attack was about to be made on Culp's Hill; and General Meade was disposed for a time to assume the initiative at that point; but the ground being found unfavorable, and the enemy not making further demonstrations, the purpose was abandoned. General Sedgwick arrived on the field, with the Sixth corps, about two o'clock, having accomplished his long march with marvellous rapidity; and General Meade immediately thereafter directed Sykes, who, with the Fifth corps, had been in reserve on the right, to move over and take position as a reserve on the left. Meantime, General Lee had decided on his plan of assault. "It was determined," he tells us, "to make the principal attack on the enemy's left, and endeavor to get a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of Hood and McLaws on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in. General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's centre, so as to prevent reinforcements from being drawn to either wing, and to co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack; General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration on the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack, should opportunity offer."

Let us now see how this plan was carried out. It was Meade's intention, in posting his troops, to occupy the ridge continuously from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops. Sickles had been instructed in the morning to form his corps in line of battle on the left of Hancock's corps; his right flank to rest on Hancock's left; and his left to extend to the Round Top, occupying it, if practicable. At the point indicated, there is a depression on the ridge; and General Sickles, believing that he would be more advantageously posted on the intermediate crest, about three quarters of a mile in front, and along which runs the Emmetsburg road, assumed the responsibility of occupying that position. It was not till within a few minutes of four o'clock, when General Meade arrived at this part of the ground in person, that he discovered the perilous position in which Sickles had placed himself, his men, and, indeed, the entire National army. Instead of connecting with the left of Hancock, Sickles had thrown his right flank forward some four hundred yards in front, thus leaving a gap between his right and Hancock's left; his left, instead of being near the Round Top Mountain, was in advance of it; and his line, instead of being a prolongation of Hancock's line, made an angle of about forty-five degrees with that line. Meade expressed his disappointment, Sickles his regret; but it was too late to make any radical change. Sickles, undoubtedly, meant well; but it was a weak, exposed, and otherwise faulty position. Round Top was really the key of the battle ground; and it was at once uncovered and unoccupied. Lee discovered at once the blunder which had been committed. In his report he says: "In front of
General Longstreet, the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge." Sickles, who was thus singled out as the special object of attack, was to pay dearly for his temerity. His interview with Meade had not ended; the latter, in fact, was just expressing his fear that the enemy would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change or movement, when the Confederate batteries opened upon the position, and the action was commenced.

It was, as we have said, about four o'clock in the afternoon when the signal for battle was given. The signal came in the character of a terrific cannonade from the Confederate artillery. The National guns soon hurled back defiance. The din was deafening, and the air was alive with missiles of every description. This, however, was but the prelude to more desperate work. Meade did not lose his self-possession. Assuring Sickles of every assistance possible, he hurried off to give more general direction. Sickles' right, commanded by Humphrey, was disposed along the Emmettsburg Road. On Humphrey's left the line was continued by Graham's brigade, of Birney's division, as far as the Peach Orchard. At this point the remaining brigades of Birney's division—those of De Trobriand and Ward—were refused, and thrown back obliquely towards Round Top. The salient or apex of the angle was Sickles' weakest point. It was the point which most invited attack, and the driving in of which offered the greatest advantages. Under cover of a heavy artillery fire, and partially concealed by the smoke, Longstreet was seen to be pressing forward with his whole corps—nearly one third of the Confederate army. Batteries were quickly got into position; and Sickles was already under a most murderous fire, both of artillery and musketry. The Confederate flank, it was observed, extended far beyond the National left. As Longstreet came up, with his warrior columns, defiance in their eyes and destruction in their firm and steady tramp, his extreme right, under Hood, was seen to bend in towards the National left and in the direction of Little Round Top. As the Confederate line draws near, it bends in more and more. It is evidently Longstreet's intention to overlap Sickles' left, and to fall with accumulated force on the extremity of his line. His purpose is quickly revealed. Rushing forward at the double-quick, the men in grey fell with tremendous energy upon Ward's brigade, who held the extremity of the National line. Ward was not unprepared. This was the point which was struck first; but Hood's men kept closing in along the whole of Birney's front, until the battle raged from the orchard to the base of Little Round Top. At the orchard, and along the refused line towards Little Round Top, the waves of battle surged and rolled for weary hours, victory now inclining to the one side and now to the other. Ward and De Trobriand...
and Graham performed prodigies of valor; Birney, too, and even Sickles, were ever at the point of danger; cheering the men by their words, and inciting them by their example; but no amount of valor or self-sacrifice could atone for the inherent weakness of the position.

Little Round Top was the objective point of this well-directed Confederate attack. It was the prize which the Confederates wished to win, and which the Nationals wished to keep. We have already described this hill, and pointed out its connection with the general range, on the crest of which the National forces, for the most part, were posted. It is a steep and rocky spur of the loftier Round Top. It is bald and naked, its summit and its sides being cut up into ledges, and covered with mighty boulders. This hill was destined to be the scene of one of the most heroic, and, at the same time, most awful, yet glorious, 2d of July, at Gettysburg. While the battle was raging along Birney's front, the fiery and impetuous Hood had discovered that Little Round Top was not occupied, and that only a thin curtain of soldiers—the Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania—hung in its front. If that position were in his hands, the whole army of Meade could not again dislodge him. Nay, more: the battle of Gettysburg would be the crowning triumph of the Confederate cause. Selecting his chosen band of Texans, his most trusted soldiers, he pointed out the black and rugged mass, and sent them on their mission. With the speed of lightning, they rushed forward to give effect to the behests of their chief. But they were too late. The path was blocked when they reached Plum Run, a stream which skirts the base of the hill on its western side.

Let us see how this came about. When the battle commenced, General Warren, Meade's chief-engineer, after having inspected Sickles' position in company with the general commanding, proceeded to Little Round Top, whence he had a magnificent view of the whole field of battle. He saw the first fierce onset of the enemy, and how nobly it was resisted by the division of Birney. But it was not that which fixed his attention and engaged his thoughts. It was the unprotected condition of Little Round Top, the key of the National position, and the terrible consequences which must inevitably follow, if it should fall into the hands of the Confederates. There was no time for delay. The hill had been used as a signal station; and the signal-men, when they beheld the onward rush of the Confederate masses, commenced to fold their flags and otherwise to prepare for retiring. At this moment, the head of Barnes' division, of Sykes' corps, was approaching at the double-quick to reinforce Sickles. Warren assumed the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade from that division, and ordering it upon Little Round Top. Hazlitt's battery, also, was immediately ordered up; and by almost superhuman efforts, it was raised to the crest of the hill, and placed in position. Vincent
so disposed his men around the base
of the hill, that the approaches were
guarded at every point.

The arrangements were completed not
a moment too soon. Scarcely had Vin-
cent's regiments—the Sixteenth Michi-
gan, Lieutenant-Colonel Welch; the
Forty-Fourth New York, Colonel Rice;
and the Twentieth Maine, Colonel
Chamberlain—taken position behind
the huge boulders, when, in the words
of one of the officers present, there was
heard "a loud, fierce, distant yell, as if
all pandemonium had broken loose
and joined in the chorus of one grand,
universal war-whoop." Three lines
depth, at double-quick, on they came.
Hazlitt's battery opens upon them its
murderous fire; musketry blaze forth
from behind every boulder; but in
vain. Those impetuous Texans will
not be checked. On, on they come
in ever-increasing numbers. Assault
follows assault; but each time they
are driven back, broken, bleeding and
thinned, their dead and dying com-
rades left lying in heaps among the
rocks. For over half an hour the sav-
age contest lasted; but Vincent's men
stood firm; and being joined by Weed's
brigade, of Ayres' division, also of the
Fifth corps, the Confederates were
driven from the slope and over the
rocky ledges, and the position was se-
cured. Not yet, however, was the
struggle ended. Clinging to the rocky
hollow which divides the Round Tops,
they pressed forward, and, although
received by a withering musketry fire,
succeeded in turning the left flank of
the brigade. At this stage, the fight-
ing was furious. Chamberlain's Twen-
tieth Maine fell upon their assailants
with the energy of despair, and, with
the butts of their muskets, clubbed
them to death. The enemy was re-
pulsed, but not destroyed. They still
clung to the rocky hollow. Chamber-
lain's left flank was dangerously ex-
posed. He called for help, but in vain.
Suddenly, the enemy began to show
some signs of weakness; and Cham-
berlain, finding his opportunity, rising to
the dignity of the occasion, and yield-
ing to the severe requirements of the
emergency, ordered his men to fix bay-
onets, and, sweeping like a whirlwind
upon the now dispirited Texans, he
drove them before him in utter rout. At
this opportune moment, a brigade of the
Pennsylvania reserves charged up the
hill, under the personal leadership of
General Crawford; and the enemy, be-
lieving that heavy reinforcements had ar-
rived, gave up the contest. The hollow
ground between the Round Tops was
cleared of the foe. Little Round Top, the
key of the position, was secured. The
victory was complete; but it had been
won at a great sacrifice. The slaughter
had been terrible. It recalled the mem-
ory of Ball's Bluff, and the valley of
the shadow of death, at Pittsburg
Landing. The dead were found piled
in heaps behind the rocks; and the
narrow valley was literally covered
with the mangled bodies of the dead
and wounded. The gallant Vincent
had yielded up his life. Weed, too,
had been killed; and Hazlitt, when
bending over the prostrate form of his
chief, had received his death-wound.
While this struggle was going on for the possession of Little Round Top, there was even more severe fighting on Birney's right, and at the salient in the Peach Orchard. We have already seen that at the same time that Hood pushed his men on Birney's left, and worked his way through the gap between the left and the Round Top, he drew his line steadily in, and pressed more closely upon Birney's right, until the battle raged between the Round Top and the Peach Orchard. In this attack on Birney's right, and particularly on the salient at the orchard, Hood was assisted by McLaws, and eight regiments of Anderson's division, of Hill's corps. Longstreet's great object was to break Sickles' line at the salient, or as it may be called, the centre, and obtain possession of the orchard. The onset of Hood and McLaws on Birney's front was made with great vigor; and such was the pressure that Sickles was compelled immediately to send for reinforcements. It was in response to this call that Barnes' division, of Sykes', was sent forward. Vincent's brigade of this division was, as we have seen, detached by General Warren, and sent to hold Little Round Top. The other two brigades—those of Tilton and Sweitzer—hastened to the support of Birney. The struggle, at this point, was fierce and terrible. The Nationals made a gallant and determined fight. The Confederates, however, getting their guns into advanced positions, were able to enfilade the National line. The pressure was now irresistible. Sickles' men fell back. The National line was broken; and the much coveted orchard was in possession of the enemy.

Birney, still resisting fiercely, made a gallant stand on a new position on wooded ground adjoining the wheat field, and intermediate between his last front and the Round Top. De Trobriand's brigade, which had fought most bravely since the first moment of the attack, and which had offered a most stubborn resistance to the advance of the enemy, after the occupation of the orchard, had by this time melted away. The battle was now at its height, and Sickles, who fearlessly exposed himself, was wounded and carried from the field. The command for the time being devolved upon Birney. In his new position, he placed Sweitzer on his left and Tilton on his right. Here again, for a time, the battle raged with great fury. Attempts were again and again made to regain lost ground, and to repel the enemy's advance. It was all in vain. Birney's original front had already been pierced; and Barnes' brigades, after some stubborn fighting, had been compelled to fall back. Not yet, however, was the struggle to be abandoned. Hancock, made aware of the distressed condition of Birney, detached from his front Caldwell's splendid division, and sent it to his aid. Arrived on the already blood-stained wheat field, Caldwell pushed his men into action. Cross and Kelley were in advance, and were soon in the thick of the fight. The Confederates, as if gathering fresh strength, fell upon them with destructive fury. Both
brigades were terribly punished; and the gallant Cross, whose bravery had been exhibited on many a battle field, was killed. Caldwell then advanced his other two brigades, those of Brooke and Zook. At this moment, as one has put it, the "hot battle boiled and bubbled as though it were some great hell caldron." Zook fell, mortally wounded, as he led his men into action. Brooke was more fortunate. He advanced gallantly against the enemy, and drove him from a strong position which he held under cover of the woods. Caldwell's troops performed deeds of valor; and, for a moment or two, it seemed as if the tide of battle would be turned. But no. The Confederates come rushing forward in tremendous force, through the opening made at the Peach Orchard, and, falling upon him with resistless energy, envelop his right and penetrate almost to his rear. After losing one half of his men, Caldwell, like Birney and Barnes, is compelled to retire. The victorious Confederates now rush through the woods, fall upon Sweitzer, who has joined in this last attack, and hurl him before them. Ayres has just come up, with two brigades of regulars, from the Fifth corps. In their onward and triumphant rush, the Confederates strike his right and rear, and almost completely envelop him. It was only with great difficulty, and after much sacrifice, that he was able to fight his way back to his original line of battle. Ayres was thus made to share the fate of Birney, of Barnes and of Caldwell. The Confederates have now reached the base of the hill. Here they halt, and well they may; for the heights are crowned by the battalions of the Fifth and Sixth corps. Disorganized by their advance, and suffering terribly, although for the moment victorious, they hesitate as to what to do. The moment is opportune for a parting blow. Crawford, now on the heights with his brave Pennsylvania reserves, sees his opportunity, and turns it to account. Stealing down the heights, he flings his men on the triumphant but now baffled foe. A severe struggle ensues for the possession of a stone wall. For a time, the battle rages at this point again with tremendous fury. The Confederates, eager to hold the position, offer a most stubborn resistance; but they are ultimately driven back to the woods, beyond the wheat field, where they rest for the night.

Such was the end of the struggle, which for hours raged so fiercely on Sickles' left and left centre. The position held by that wing at the commencement of the contest, and which had been defended by Birney with so much valor, had been finally abandoned. In the original disposition of Sickles' troops, as we have seen already, Humphrey's division, with the brigade of Graham, held the right, above and beyond the salient, and facing to the west. Humphrey's position had been peculiar from the commencement of the fight. It will be remembered that on his right, in consequence of the advanced position of the corps, there was a gap of nearly half a mile between him and Hancock. For a
time, after the action commenced on the left, Humphrey was left unassailed. When Birney was sorely pressed, and when the combined strength of Hood and McLaws was brought to bear upon the salient at the Peach Orchard, Humphrey was able to send assistance to the sister brigade. The Peach Orchard had been taken; the Confederates had rushed through the gap in the National line; Birney had fallen back to the new position at the wheat field, where, reinforced first by Caldwell and then by Ayres, the tide of battle again surged and rolled like a tempest-tossed sea; but still Humphrey was unassailed. Why was this? Let us see. In the disposition of his troops, as has already been noticed, General Lee had so far extended his right beyond the National left, that it was able to overlap or outflank the latter by at least two brigades. The result of this was that Longstreet's left was pushed so far to the right that Humphrey was confronted not by Longstreet, but by Hill. Lee's instructions to Hill were that, in the first stages of the contest at least, he should content himself with making demonstrations against the enemy's centre, so as to prevent reinforcements being drawn to the assistance of either the right wing or the left. Thus it was that, while the battle raged most fiercely on his left, Humphrey remained untouched. About six o'clock in the evening, and when Birney was about to fall back from his position facing south—a position which was nearly at right angles with the division on his right—Birney notified Humphrey that Sickles had been wounded, and that he was in command of the corps, and requested him also to fall back, so as to connect with his right. This meant that Humphrey, while holding on to the crest on the Emmettsburg road with his right, should swing back with his left, so as to make change of front, and at the same time keep the line intact. It was a most difficult operation; but it was performed with skill and success. As the immediate result of this manœuvre, Humphrey's right was thrown entirely out of position; and when, finally, the whole left, and the troops which had been sent in support, were driven back, and the forces of Hood and McLaws came rushing through the gap thus created, his right was fearfully exposed, his own coolness and intrepidity alone saving it from complete destruction. Hancock—who was now in command of Sickles' corps, as well as his own—ever watchful, and seeing the exposed condition of Humphrey's right, sent to its support two regiments, the Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Eighty-Second New York from Gibbon's division; and, to protect him on the left, he pushed forward Willard's brigade, of Hays' division. At the same time that the triumphant Confederates, having pierced Sickles' line, were falling heavily on the left, Hill, abandoning his passive attitude, came down like a thunderbolt on the right. Humphrey was thus caught between two fires. "I was attacked," he says, "on my flanks, as well as on my front. I never have been under a hotter artil-
lery and musketry fire combined. I may have been under a hotter musketry fire. For a moment, I thought the day was lost. I did not order my troops to fall back rapidly because, so far as I could see, the crest in my rear was vacant, and I knew that when troops got to moving rapidly, it was exceedingly difficult to stop them just when you wanted to stop them. At that moment, I received an order to fall back to the Round Top Ridge, which I did slowly, suffering a very heavy loss.”

Humphrey, in truth, was for some time in most difficult and critical circumstances. His division, when left alone by the retirement of Birney, bore a general resemblance to the one side and the two ends of a parallelogram; and, upon both his front and flanks, the enemy was rushing with demon-like fury. The attacking party, consisting of the brigades of Wilcox, Perry and Wright, from Anderson’s fresh division, had not been engaged in the previous struggles of the day, having been held in readiness for this supreme effort, when the proper time should come. Humphrey was most savagely attacked by Wright; but he cautiously retired his men until he reached the ridge in his rear, which was still, in consequence of the original mistake of Sickles, imperfectly protected. So fierce were the attacks, and so great was the pressure, that he was compelled to leave behind him three of his guns, the horses having been killed. Back to the base of the hill and up the crest he was compelled to move, the enemy still pressing heavily on his front. Wilcox and Wright were both well advanced. Cemetery Ridge, it will be remembered, is at this point slightly depressed. It was also, as we have pointed out already, in consequence of the advanced position taken by Sickles, but imperfectly defended. Determined to effect a lodgment here, the Confederate battalions rush up the hill, past the National guns, and threaten to take possession of the ridge. A little more success, especially if well supported, and they will be almost masters of the position. Their apparent success, however, is to be their ruin. They are now within range of the musketry of the Second corps, which lies concealed behind a stone wall: The men of the Second rise before them like an apparition. The stone wall seems to blaze. The Confederates, reeling and staggering under the terrific volley, fall back, leaving their comrades in slaughtered heaps on the blood-stained ground.

Not yet, however, was the contest abandoned. The Confederates seemed confident in the thought that the attack would become general, and that thus they would be able to hold their advanced position. In this expectation, they were doomed to disappointment. Posey and Mahone, of Anderson’s division, did not advance. Pender’s division, and that of Heth to his left, remained inactive. Perry’s brigade had been driven back; but the brigades of Wilcox and Wright kept their face to the foe, and performed prodigies of valor. But it was all in vain. The
National position was momentarily gaining strength. Meade had been busy filling up the gap between the corps of Hancock on the right and that of Sykes on the left. Both those corps were drawn upon largely to meet the emergency. A large portion of the First corps and the greater portion of the Twelfth were brought over from the right, to strengthen the weak and menaced left. Sedgwick's troops, too, although weary and footsore with the long march which they had just accomplished, gladly responded to the call which was made upon them, and came to the front. The series of charges and counter-charges, made at this part of the line for the possession of the ridge, gave to some of the regiments and brigades splendid opportunities for winning distinction. The First Minnesota, coming up at a critical and most opportune moment, performed gallant service, and mightily increased its already rapidly rising reputation. The same was true, to a greater or less degree, of the Thirteenth Vermont, of the One Hundred and Forty-Ninth and One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania regiments; and Lockwood's Maryland brigade, of Ruger's division, of the Twelfth corps, on that 2d day of July, on the National left, covered itself with glory. The Confederates had now well-nigh exhausted themselves. Their losses had been heavy. Some of their best and most daring officers had fallen. Barksdale, the most impetuous leader of the boldest attack which had been made in that direction, was lying, in his death-agony, inside the National lines. Gathering up his strength for another and closing effort, Hancock fell upon the persistent foe with tremendous energy. It was all that was needed. The Confederates were driven back, with great loss and in much confusion; and, as it was now dusk, the fighting ceased. In this final charge, Humphrey's little band took part: and the general had the satisfaction of recapturing and bringing back his lost guns. Thus ended the great struggle on the National left. The position held by Sickles in the forenoon was lost; but Little Round Top had been secured, and the enemy had failed to effect a lodgment on Cemetery Hill. What the Confederates had now won was but sorry compensation for what they had lost. Before morning, Little Round Top will be rendered all but impregnable; and what with the shattered remnants of Sickles' divisions, and the divisions of Doubleday and Robinson, from the First corps, and a powerful detachment, under Williams, from the Twelfth, a new line will be formed where the original line ought to have been, and the National front will be closed.

Such was the issue of events on the National left. Let us now turn our attention to the National right. This position, it will be remembered, was held by Slocum, by Wadsworth's division, of the First corps, and by Howard, and in the order named, Slocum being on Culp's Hill, at the extreme right. Opposed to these, on the Confederate left, were the forces of General Ewell. According to the order given
by General Lee to his corps commanders, Ewell, when Longstreet had fallen on the National left, was to attack "directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified." For some unexplained reason, the attack was not made until about six o'clock. During the two hours which had elapsed since the fighting commenced on the left, Meade, discovering no signs of any aggressive movement on the part of Ewell, sent detachment after detachment to the assistance of the left. The whole of the Twelfth corps, with the exception of Greene's brigade, of Geary's division, had thus been hurried away. The result was that the forces on the right were greatly reduced, and that the position was comparatively unprotected. But for the nerve of Greene, this unfortunate arrangement might have proved ruinous to the National army, and decided the fortunes of the day. Between Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, there is a little ravine or depression which marks the end of the one hill and the beginning of the other. To the left of this ravine, and extending around the breast of Cemetery Hill, was Howard's corps, under cover of the stone wall, the summit of the hill being crowned by the batteries of Wiedrich and Ricketts. To the right of the ravine, and on the extreme left of Culp's Hill, guarding the ravine and the approaches from the town, was Stevens' Maine battery, which had done some excellent work during the action of the first day. On the right of the battery was the breast-work which had been thrown up by Wadsworth, and which, being carried around the hill, was taken up by Greene. Greene had refused his right and carried his breast work back so as to protect his flank. On Benner's Hill, a little to the northeast of Culp's Hill, Ewell had planted his advance batteries.

About six o'clock, the Confederate guns on Benner's Hill opened a tremendous fire. The National guns were quickly got in range; and, an eyewitness has told us, that in about twenty minutes, the batteries on Benner's Hill were "knocked into pi." The sun was already near his setting, and the fire of the Confederate guns was noticeably slackening, when Ewell pushed forward from the town the two divisions of Early and Johnson—the former on Cemetery, the latter on Culp's Hill. Early's columns consisted of the brigades of Hays and Hoke, and were headed by the famous Louisiana Tigers. On they came in magnificent array. A terrible reception they knew awaited them; but there was neither fear in their looks nor trembling in their footsteps. When within eight hundred yards, Stevens opened upon them with all his guns, Wiedrich and Ricketts speedily joining in the chorus. Quickly wheeling into line, they dash up the hill, a very tempest of shrapnel and canister falling upon them, and ploughing huge gaps in their unmasked front. Fearless of the death-dealing batteries, and heedless of the cries of agony which come from comrades falling by their side, on they press. They are now within musket
range of the stone wall. While the batteries are being fired at the rate of four shots a minute, Howard's men leap from their concealment, and pour volley after volley into their already decimated ranks. On their left, and at the centre, the Confederates are beaten back. Their right, however, pushes on with a stubbornness which is heroic, and with an energy which is irresistible. With one wild leap, and uttering their accustomed yell, they clear the stone walls. Nationals and Confederates are now mixed up in inextricable confusion. Stevens, fearful lest he should be killing friend as well as foe, is compelled to cease firing. Wiedrich's battery is overrun, his supports and his own men being swept away as with the force of a whirlwind. At Ricketts' battery, a tremendous struggle takes place. It is man to man—hand to hand. Bayonets are crossed; guns are clubbed, and when these fail, handspikes, rammers, stones are freely used. "Death on our own State soil, rather than give up the guns!"—such was the cry of the brave cannoneers.

The situation really had become critical. Howard's men had been broken and demoralized by the fierceness of the onset. At this critical moment, help arrived. Carroll's brigade, voluntarily sent by Hancock when he heard the firing, rushed upon the scene. The Confederates, surprised by this fresh opposition, fell back in confusion; and Ricketts' men, again at their guns, gave them a parting salute in the form of double-shotted canister. Such was the end of Early's grand charge, led by the famous, and hitherto invincible, Louisiana Tigers. The Tigers went back bravely, 600 strong, and were never afterwards known as a separate organization.

While this daring and desperate, but unsuccessful, effort was being made for the possession of Cemetery Hill, a no less daring and equally desperate effort was made for the possession of Culp's Hill, on the extreme right of the National line. The attack was made, as we have already indicated, by Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, and was led by the redoubtable "Stonewall brigade." The position, as we have seen, was held by Wadsworth's division, of the First corps, and by Greene's one brigade of the Twelfth. In the absence of the greater portion of the Twelfth corps, the works which had here been thrown up, and which were of considerable strength, were peculiarly at the mercy of a daring antagonist. Sweeping across Rock Creek, which at this season of the year is easily fordable, the attacking columns, fired with the spirit of their former leader, rushed through the woods, which spread out from the base of the hill and down towards the creek. As yet, they have encountered no resistance; for the National skirmishers, thrown out towards the front, yield and fall back at the first touch. They are now in full view, and within musket range of the breastworks, behind which Greene and Wadsworth are entrenched. The breastworks blaze; and there is heard the sharp, clear rattling, as of thousands of musket shots. Volley succeeds volley
CLOSE OF THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHTING.

with amazing rapidity; and before this murderous fire, the Confederate battalions for a moment recoil. Discovering that the breast-works to Greene’s right are unoccupied, they make another tremendous rush, and, almost unresisted, gain a foothold within the National lines. The burden of the attack now falls upon Greene. This veteran soldier had but few men; yet he had a brave heart and an enduring spirit; and happily, too, he had strongly secured his right flank by a powerful earth-work. On this point, the Confederate leader concentrates his strength. Assault after assault is made, but in vain. Greene makes a gallant resistance, repelling every advance of the foe with tremendous loss; and Wadsworth, no longer so sorely pressed on his front, comes nobly to his aid. Such was the state of things when darkness fell upon the scene, and Ewell, happily for the National army, discontinued the contest. Greene still held his position; and Johnson’s men occupied the vacated breast-works. So ended the second day’s fighting at Gettysburg. Both sides had suffered severely. General Meade lost 10,000 men. The Confederate loss must have been much greater.

General Lee was not dissatisfied with the result of the day’s fighting. It was his belief that, from the success which had attended the efforts of the day, “he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy.” It was his determination, therefore, to continue the assault next day. Nor, it must be admitted, was General Lee without good reason for so regarding the situation. Longstreet, if he had not been completely successful, had driven the Nationals before him, and occupied the whole front held by Sickles and his Third corps at the commencement of the fight; Ewell, having thrust his extreme left inside the breast-works on the National right, held a position from which, if he was not driven, he might be able to take Meade’s entire line in reverse; and although the losses on the National side could not be greater than his own, they had been so heavy as to warrant the opinion that they would have a demoralizing influence on the troops. On the whole, Lee was not to be blamed if he arrived at the conclusion that fortune was on his side. If he had known more, he would have known that the battle was lost when Ewell allowed the darkness to interrupt the fighting; for, knowing what we know now, there is scarcely room for doubt that, if that general had pushed his advantage, he might have played havoc with the trains, and forced the whole National army into an inglorious retreat. As it was, Lee’s inferences were more reasonable than just or correct; for the position gained in front of the National left was a gain more apparent than real; and, before the morning light, the front of the left will be restored, and made strong and secure in what was intended to be its original position, and the troops withdrawn on the previous day, unwisely and at serious peril, will be massed again on the exposed and almost defenseless right. It was not, therefore,
without good reason that, while Lee was counting with confidence on victory on the morrow, Meade and his generals, in council assembled, should have resolved to abide in their position, and to "fight it out at Gettysburg."

During the darkness, Johnson's force, which had gained a position of advantage, held close to Culp's Hill. His numbers were largely increased; and the position was strengthened. Meade, however, determined to continue the fight, was not idle. A large number of guns were got into position, so as to bear upon the point entered and held by the enemy. Geary's division, in obedience to orders, returned to occupy the abandoned works. When moving towards them, all unsuspicous of danger, the advance was suddenly arrested by a volley from behind a stone wall. It was not until then that Geary became aware that the works were in the possession of the enemy. He then took position on the right of Greene; and his men, disturbed only by the occasional firing of skirmishers, slept on their arms. Later, Williams' division, of the same corps, now under Ruger—Williams having assumed chief command—came up, and was posted on the flank and rear of the enemy.

As early as three o'clock on the morning of the 3d, there were signs of activity in the enemy's front. It was evident that an attack was intended; and Geary, having been informed by General Kane, who commanded his first brigade, of what was going on, resolved to seize whatever advantage might be gained by opening the battle himself. His men were aroused; and at twenty minutes before four o'clock, he gave the signal for attack by discharging his pistol. The battle at once became general. A fearful struggle ensued. A heavy artillery fire was opened at once on the enemy's position. But, as the ground was rugged and broken, and also covered with trees, and as every advantage was taken of places of shelter and concealment, the fight partook very much of the character of sharpshooting on a grand scale. As the battle progressed, the contestants got intermingled; and it became more and more difficult to use the artillery. The Confederates not only held their position, but charged again and again, in heavy masses, on the National lines, only, however, to be repulsed with tremendous loss. The slaughter was terrible. The sun arose; the day advanced; the air became clouded with dust and smoke; the heat became almost intolerable; but still the battle raged. At last there is a lull in the long-continued tempest. Then, suddenly, there is a fierce yell from thousands of throats; and Ewell's men, having gathered up their strength for a final effort, are seen rushing forward with tremendous fury. They are allowed to come within easy musket range, when the men in blue, springing to their feet, pour in upon them a deliberate volley. It was the last charge on this part of the line. Discomfited and discouraged, torn and bleeding, their dead and wounded companions piled in heaps on the ground where they fell, the survivors drew
back through the woods towards Rock Creek, fighting, as they retired, with a courage which commanded the admiration of their foes. Shouts of victory now filled the air. “Men,” says one who was present, and shared in the triumph, “cheered themselves hoarse, laughed, rolled themselves on the ground, and threw their caps high in air, while others shook hands with comrades, and thanked God that the Star corps had again triumphed.” Geary, not disposed to allow the Confederates to re-form, as soon as this charge was repelled, made a vigorous counter-charge; and the enemy, yielding easily, the breast-works were reoccupied, and the right flank secured. Thus ended the fighting on the right.

Ewell had been completely baffled in his plan. He had flung away his opportunity the night before; and, to reclaim it, he had now done his best, and failed. He could not find fault with his men; for never, even under Jackson, had they fought more bravely. “It cannot be denied,” says General Kane, who, with his glorious first brigade, of Geary’s division, bore the burden of that morning’s fight, “that they fought most courageously.” But they were pitted against men of equal bravery, of equal determination with themselves—men who were now on their own soil, and fighting for the sanctity of their own homes. Never, perhaps, before, since the war commenced, had the fighting been more determined and severe than it was during those long, dreary morning hours. The ground, after the battle, red with gore, and thickly covered with the bodies of the slain, gave evidence of the terrible character of the struggle. The grey and the blue uniforms were sometimes found in one common heap. Some poor fellows, after hours of suffering, and having almost bled to death, were found writhing in mortal agony. The wood in which the battle raged was “torn and rent with shells and solid shot, and pierced with innumerable minie balls.” In the following summer, the trees were leafless, as if the mute but stalwart giants of the forest had yielded up their lives with those who fell beneath their shade.

It was now shortly after ten o’clock. The last sounds of battle had died away. There was silence over the whole battle field. It was evident, however, that preparations were being made inside the Confederate lines for another gigantic and possibly crowning effort. The morning sky had been obscured by broken clouds. As the forenoon advanced, the clouds dispersed; and a hot July sun poured down his rays with a tropical intensity. Pickett’s division, of Longstreet’s corps, which had not come up on the previous day, had now arrived on the field. Stuart, also, after his long detour, had joined Lee with his cavalry. It soon began to be manifest that the point of attack was to be the National left centre—the depressed part of the ridge immediately north of Little Round Top. By noon, the guns were got into position on the ridge occupied by Longstreet and Hill. Meade had an abundant supply of the same instru-
ments of war; but, owing to the peculiarity of the ground, he could only, out of 300 guns, make use of 80, against those of the enemy. About one o'clock, the report of a Whitworth gun was heard. It was the signal for attack. Seminary Hill seemed as if swept with a tongue of flame. Then came the loud, thundering roar of artillery; and 145 guns, from their angry mouths, poured death and destruction on the National lines. The National commanders ordered their men to lie flat on the earth, and to take every advantage of objects of protection. All this was done; but, notwithstanding every precaution, the destruction of life and property was terrible. Solid shot, chain-shot, shrapnel, shells, fell with deadly effect inside the National lines. Men and horses were dreadfully cut up; caissons filled with ammunition were exploded; and gun-carriages and other pieces of war material were shattered to pieces. The shot and shell and canister fell thick and fast in and around General Meade's headquarters, killing men and horses, ripping up the roof and knocking away the pillars of the cottage.

General Hunt, Meade's chief of artillery, was in no haste to reply. Waiting until the first hostile outbreak spent itself, he then ordered the batteries to open fire. Instantly, the whole ridge, from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops, seemed ablaze. The din was terrific, the thunder of artillery rivalling, in fierce grandeur, the most magnificent displays of nature. For two hours this artillery duel lasted; and, during that time, war was exhibited in its sublimer and more imposing aspects. In his *Decisive Battles of the War*, Swinton tells us that "as a spectacle this, the grandest artillery combat that ever occurred on the continent, was magnificent beyond description, and realized all that is grandiose in the circumstance of war." A spectator in the Confederate army says "the air was made hideous with discordant noises. The very earth shook beneath our feet; and the hills and rocks seemed to reel like a drunken man."

At the expiration of two hours, there was a lull in the cannonade. Hunt, dreading the possible exhaustion of his ammunition, and not willing to bring up loads of it from the rear, lest it should be exploded, had ordered a gradual slackening of the fire. The Confederates were deceived. It was Lee's belief that he had silenced all the enemy's guns, except a few which still kept firing from a clump of woods. Now came the more serious business of war. The fire of the Confederate guns also slackened; and the columns of attack were seen forming on the edge of the woods which crown the summit of Seminary Ridge. It was just three o'clock. When formed, the front was about a mile in extent; and, as it emerged from the woods, and began to move steadily and firmly down the slope of Seminary Ridge, a thrill of admiration passed through the National ranks. It was a splendid sight, and well fitted to call forth admiration, even in the breast of an enemy. The divisions of Hood and McLaws, as we have
seen, had been sorely tried in the fighting of the 2d; and it was part of the arrangement of Longstreet, who this day again was to play the part of the aggressor, that these divisions should cover his right flank, while he made the attack. The fresh division of Pickett, composed mostly of veteran Virginians, was, therefore, singled out, and appointed to lead the van. Pickett's men were formed, arranged in double line of battle, the brigades of Kemper and Garnett being placed in front, and that of Armistead slightly in the rear. On Pickett's advanced right was one brigade, of Hill's corps, under General Wilcox, formed in column by battalions; and on his left, but somewhat in the rear, was Heth's division, also of Hill's corps, commanded by Pettigrew. The attacking force numbered about 18,000 men. On came the Confederates in the order which we have described. The distance between the two lines of battle was about a mile. For the attacking party, there was a hill to descend and a hill to climb, and a valley between. It was matter of observation that, as the columns advanced, the Confederate guns were silent. "Why?" was the question put by the men who were rushing into the jaws of death. "Why?" said the men on the heights behind. "Why?" said the Nationals on the heights in front. The reason was not known till afterwards. It was not then known to Lee himself. His ammunition was already exhausted. The silence of the guns in their rear did not affect the firm and steady step of the advancing columns.

It did not encourage the Nationals to slacken their artillery fire. On came Longstreet's men, in face of the withering tempest of bullet and canister and shell which, at each successive step, decimated their front. On, on they came; and it was already a question in the National ranks whether their own thin line of defense could resist the fierce onset of those firm and compact battalions who seemed to fear no fire, to dread no foe.

The Nationals, however, were not ill-prepared for the attack. Doubleday was on the left, with Stannard's brigade, of Vermont troops, well advanced in a little grove on his own right, and at an angle with the main line. Hancock was more to the right, with his two divisions, of Gibbon and Hays, in front. From the direction in which the assaulting columns were moving, it seemed for a time as if the first heavy blow would fall upon Doubleday. Such, however, was the severity of the artillery fire from Little Round Top, that they were forced to bend more to their own left. Still they moved on, their line of march now bringing them more directly in front of Hancock's position. Now came the opportunity for Stannard's brave Vermonters. In the original line of march, the direction was such that Pickett's centre would have struck the grove in which Stannard's men were sheltered. The doubling in towards their own left carried the attacking columns somewhat to the north of the grove, but only so far north as to leave their exposed right flank within easy range of Stannard's muskets. The Vermonters were in no
haste to waste their ammunition. The Confederate columns were allowed to come so well forward that their right flank was fully exposed. Then, at the signal given, the Vermont men pour forth a well-directed and most destructive fire. Volley succeeds volley in rapid succession; and the now trembling lines, already torn and tattered, are under the oblique fire of eight batteries, in charge of Major McGilvray. Not a few of Pickett’s men, unable to endure this terrific fire, were compelled to surrender. The main body, however, presses on; and, inclining still more to his own left, Pickett is moving straight on the divisions of Gibbon and Hays. “Hold your fire, boys! they are not near enough yet,” was Gibbon’s injunction, as he moved calmly and composedly along the ranks. The rifled guns of the National artillery, having fired away all their canister, were now withdrawn to await the issue of the struggle between the opposing infantry. The hostile lines are now within two and three hundred yards of the National front. Gibbon and Hays simultaneously open upon the advancing columns a most destructive fire. The response is swift and well-directed, the Confederates using their muskets for the first time since they began to face this terrific storm of artillery and musketry. All at once the battle becomes general.

The swing made by the advancing columns to their own left, after the terrific blow received by them from Stannard, had the effect of flinging Pettigrew, who commanded Heth’s division, of Hill’s corps, well towards Hays’ right. Pettigrew’s men were, for the most part, North Carolina troops, and were comparatively raw and unused to battle. They had been deceived into the belief that they would meet only the Pennsylvania militia. They were quickly undeceived. Hays’ men were admirably posted. His right was well advanced; and the nature of the ground was such as to enable him to open a simultaneous fire on Pettigrew’s troops, not only with his right and front, but also with several lines in his rear. Woodruff’s battery was also in position; and the destructive effects of a very tempest of bullets were to be aggravated by showers of grape and canister. All at once, this tremendous fire fell upon the already torn and decimated lines on Pickett’s left; and they knew they were in the presence of the army of the Potomac. There was no more flight in them. Terror-stricken, Pettigrew’s men broke in utter confusion, large numbers of them flinging down their arms, and accepting mercy at the hands of their antagonists. General Pettigrew himself was wounded; but, being able to retain command, he vainly strove to rally his men. Fifteen colors, and 2000 prisoners rewarded the skill and activity with which Hays met the threatened attack.

While disaster was thus befalling the Confederate columns on the right and left, Pickett’s brave Virginians were pressing forward vigorously towards Gibbon’s front, and were about to fall with all their weight on Owen’s
brigade, now temporarily commanded by General Webb. This brigade comprised the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania—Owen's own—composed mostly of Irishmen renowned for their gallantry in the Peninsula; the Seventy-First, originally recruited and led by Baker, who perished at Ball's Bluff, and now commanded by Colonel R. Penn Smith; and the Seventy-Second, commanded by Colonel Baxter. It was a veteran brigade, and was now to be sorely tested. General Gibbon, to allow the artillery to play upon the advancing column with grape-shot, had ordered this brigade to fall back behind the batteries. The Sixty-Ninth and the Seventy-First took position behind a low stone wall, with a slight breastwork in front; the Seventy-Second was behind the crest, some sixty paces in the rear, and was so placed as to be able to fire over the heads of those in front. In spite of the dreadful fire of artillery and musketry which was mowing down their ranks, Pickett's men rush bravely on. They are now close to the stone wall. The two National regiments in front yield and fall back to the regiment in the rear. Webb and his officers are at hand; the retreating regiments are quickly rallied and re-formed; and the second line is held. But the Confederates have pushed themselves over the breast-works, and planted their battle flags on the wall. The struggle now becomes fierce and terrific in the extreme. It is a hand-to-hand conflict, man facing man, and fighting with the energy of despair. The clothes of the men are actually being burned by the powder of the exploding cartridges; and the National cannoneers, refusing to retire, are clubbed and bayoneted at their guns. Pickett, however, is now left entirely alone. The forces which were intended to cover his left have been defeated, captured or driven from the field. Wilcox, whose duty it was to come up and cover his right, has failed to advance. The right of his own division has been badly cut up and destroyed. Hancock, who this day revealed all the qualities of a great commander in actual conflict, now massed his men on the point which was in danger. Hall and Harrow, who had now no longer an enemy in their front, were brought over with their brigades to reinforce the centre. The Nineteenth Massachussetts, Colonel Devereux and Mallou's Forty-Second New York, both of Gate's brigade, of Doubleday's division, of the First corps, were moved in the same direction. Stannard, at the same time, moved forward two of his Vermont regiments to strike the enemy on the right flank. The situation, Hancock tells us, had now become very peculiar. "The men of all the brigades had, in some measure, lost their regimental organization, but individually, they were firm. The ambition of individual commanders to cover the point penetrated by the enemy, the smoke of the battle and the intensity of the engagement caused this confusion. The point, however, was covered. In regular formation, our line would have stood four ranks deep." Pickett's men were now pressed on all sides.
The colors of the different National regiments were well advanced. Cheered by the words, and fired by the example of their officers, the men pressed bravely forward. It is the climax of the fight; but the end is at hand. Pickett's men had done their best and their utmost—they had fought like true heroes; but now, utterly overpowered, and reduced to the last stage of desperation, they give up the fight. Flinging their arms from them, many of them raise their hands in token of surrender; others fall upon the ground to escape the destructive fire; the remainder seek safety in flight.

In this last struggle, Gibbon's division took 12 colors and 2500 prisoners. So far, Hancock had captured 27 battle flags and 4500 prisoners. It was a magnificent trophy. The losses on both sides were very heavy. The face of the hill and the low ground was literally covered with the dead and wounded. In no previous battle had the officers suffered so severely. On the National side, large numbers had been struck down, Generals Gibbon and Hancock being among the wounded. The Confederates left on the field fourteen of their field-officers, only one of that rank escaping unhurt; and, of the three brigade commanders, of Pickett's division, Garnett was killed, Armitage fell within the National lines, fatally wounded, and Kemper was carried off the field, dangerously hurt.

Substantially, the battle of Gettysburg was now ended. Another feeble and foolish attempt, however, was made on the National lines. Wilcox's command, it will be remembered, had originally been placed on Pickett's right, the intention being that it should cover that flank. Wilcox, however, failed to advance, keeping to the right when Pickett bent towards the left. After the repulse of Pickett, Wilcox advanced to the attack alone. In passing over the plain, and when within a few hundred yards of Hancock's line, he was met by a tremendous fire of artillery; and Stannard, who was again in position, fell upon his flank and rear, doing terrible damage, and capturing several hundred prisoners. While the battle was raging in Hancock's front, there was evidence that vigorous movements were about to be initiated by Ewell against the extreme National right, and by Longstreet against the extreme National left. The main attack, however, was so much of a failure from the commencement that neither of those commanders felt justified in rashly risking the lives of their men, and making what might prove to be a useless and costly sacrifice. Some of Longstreet's men had remained in the woods beyond the wheat fields, in front of Little Round Top; but, after Pickett and Wilcox had been driven back, Crawford charged through the woods, driving the enemy in confusion before him, and capturing some hundreds of men, with a large quantity of arms. During the day, there had been some severe cavalry engagements, Kilpatrick holding the enemy's horse in check on the National left, and Gregg having a severe but successful encounter with Hampton on the right. Farnsworth,
while heading a charge on the left against one of Hood’s brigades, supported by Stuart’s cavalry, was killed, with many of his officers. The final charge, made by Gregg on the right, is said to have been one of the most brilliant sabre charges made during the war. It had evidently been Lee’s intention, in the event of success crowning his infantry attack, to make a liberal use of his cavalry force, and, if he found himself unable to surround and destroy the National army, at least to harass its retreat. Happily, success was denied him; and the execution of this contingent purpose was rendered unnecessary.

What remained of the broken and shattered Confederate columns, after having been driven across the lower ground and terribly punished by the National artillery, was at length covered by Wright’s brigade, which had been moved forward by Lee for that purpose, and was thus finally brought back within the lines on Seminary Ridge. Lee did not choose to resume the attack; and Meade did not follow up the victory. The armies, when night came, had resumed their respective positions on the opposing heights. Thus was fought, for three weary days, and thus was ended, the famous battle of Gettysburg—“the greatest in respect of its proportions, and the weightiest in respect of the issues involved, of all the actions waged during four years, between the mighty rival armies of the East.” The losses alone entitle it to rank with the first-class battles of history. The Confederate loss reached the enormous aggregate of 36,000 men, of whom 5000 were killed, and 23,000 wounded. The National loss was 23,000, of whom 2834 were killed, 13,733 wounded, and 6643 missing.

On the evening of the 3d, at 8.30 o’clock, General Meade wrote to General Halleck: “The enemy opened at one o’clock P. M., from about 150 guns. He concentrated upon my left centre, continuing without intermission for about three hours, at the expiration of which time he assaulted my left centre twice, being, upon both occasions, handsomely repulsed with severe loss to him, leaving in our hands nearly three thousand prisoners. Among the prisoners are Major-General Armistead, and many colonels and officers of lesser note. The enemy left many dead upon the field, and a large number of wounded in our hands. The loss upon our side has been considerable. Major-General Hancock and Brigadier-General Gibbon were wounded. After the repelling of the assault, indications leading to the belief that the enemy might be withdrawing, an armed reconnaissance was pushed forward from the left, and the enemy found to be in force. At the present hour, all is quiet. Brigades of our cavalry have been engaged all day on both flanks of the enemy, harassing and vigorously attacking him with great success, notwithstanding they encountered superior numbers, both of cavalry and artillery. The army is in fine spirits.” On the following day, he issued an address to the army of the Potomac, in which, in behalf of the country, he expressed his
thanks to officers and men for the glorious result of the recent operations. "Our enemy," he said, "superior in numbers, and flushed with the pride of a successful invasion, attempted to overcome or destroy this army. Utterly baffled and defeated, he has now withdrawn from the contest. The privations and fatigues the army has endured, and the heroic courage and gallantry it has displayed, will be matters of history, to be ever remembered. Our task is not yet accomplished; and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts, to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader. It is right and proper that we should, on suitable occasions, return our grateful thanks to the Almighty Disposer of events that, in the goodness of His providence, He has thought fit to give victory to the cause of the just." On the same day, the following suitable announcement was issued by the president:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4, 1863—10 A. M.

"The president of the United States announces to the country that the news from the army of the Potomac, up to ten o'clock P. M., of the 3d, is such as to cover the army with the highest honor, to promise great success to the cause of the Union, and to claim the condolence of all for the many gallant fallen; and that for this he especially desires that on this day, 'He whose will, not ours, should ever be done,' be everywhere remembered and revered with the profoundest gratitude.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

Lee's disappointment, by the complete failure of his attack on the 3d, must indeed have been great. His dream of invasion was at an end. A second time he had entered the Northern States in triumph. A second time he had been compelled to abandon his purpose, and to fall back towards Richmond. This time, he had confidently believed that victory was within his grasp. After an effort so mighty and so persistent, and after a failure so decided, he could hardly hope for another opportunity. One of his colonels, who was present at his headquarters when, on the third day, the attacking columns broke and fell back in wild disorder, says, speaking of Lee: "If Longstreet's behavior was admirable, that of General Lee was perfectly sublime. He was engaged in rallying and encouraging the broken troops, and was riding about, a little in front of the wood, quite alone—his staff being engaged in a similar manner, further to the rear. His face, which is always placid and cheerful, did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care or annoyance; and he was addressing to every soldier a few words of encouragement, such as, 'All this will come out right in the end: we will talk it over afterwards; but, meanwhile, all good men must rally.' He had words of kindness for the wounded, many of whom, as they were carried past, took off their hats and cheered him. 'We cannot expect,' he said, 'always to win victories.' To Wilcox, when he came up with his shattered division, he said, 'All this has been my fault; it is
who have lost this battle.’” Imboden has preserved for us a touching picture of the general, as he saw him about one o’clock on the morning of the 4th of July. He had been sent for by Lee, who directed him to wait for him at his own headquarters. When Lee joined him, there was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was about. 

“The moon was high in the heavens, shedding a flood of silvery light, almost as bright as day, upon the scene. When he approached and saw us, he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him; but before I reached the saddle, he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle to rest himself, and, fixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence on his equally weary horse, the two forming a striking group, as motionless as a statue. The moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine face before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had passed. I waited for him to speak until the silence became painful and embarrassing, when, to break it and change the current of his thoughts, I remarked, in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue: ‘General, this has been a hard day on you.’ This attracted his attention. He looked up and replied, mournfully: ‘Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,’ and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude.” A little later, he turned to Imboden, and, straightening himself to his full height, with energy and excitement in his manner, and in a voice tremulous with emotion, said: “General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett’s division of Virginians did today in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported, as they ought to have been—but, for some reason unknown to me, they were not—we would have held the position they so gloriously won, at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have been ours.” After a moment, he added, in a tone almost of agony: “Too bad! too bad! oh, too bad!!!” Into the inner agonies of that noble soul, at that trying moment, it is not for us to penetrate. “We must go back to Virginia,” he soon afterwards exclaimed; and Imboden received his instructions to guard the trains in their backward course.

It was Lee’s conviction that another attack would be beset with serious danger. He puts it mildly, in his report, when he says: “The severe loss sustained by the army, and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy unadvisable.” He, therefore, made immediate preparations for a retreat. Ewell was drawn back, on the morning of the 4th, from the base of Culp’s Hill and from Gettysburg; and a strong line of works was thrown from the seminary towards the northwest; while another line was formed on the right flank, perpendicular with the general front, and extending back as far as Marsh Creek. In this position, he re-
mained over the 4th, burying his dead, sending off the wounded, not disposed to resume the aggressive, but, according to good and reliable authority, not unwilling to be attacked. The day was similarly spent by the National army. It had been Lee's intention to retire his whole army on the night of the 4th. But a severe storm had come on shortly after midday; and the rain fell in torrents during the afternoon, and continued far into the night. The condition of the roads made a rapid retreat impossible. It was not, therefore, until the forenoon of Sunday, the 5th, that Ewell's corps, which brought up the rear, left its position near Gettysburg. After a difficult and toilsome march, by the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads, through South Mountain, the Confederate army reach Hagerston on the afternoon of the 6th and the morning of the 7th of July.

As soon as the Confederates had abandoned their position at Gettysburg, General Meade made preparations to follow up the retreat. There were two courses open: he might make a direct pursuit, pass through the South Mountain in their rear, and press them down the Cumberland Valley; or he might make a flank movement by the east side of South Mountain, defile through the Boonsboro' Passes, and either head off the enemy or take him in flank. Sedgwick's corps, the freshest in the army, was ordered to follow the enemy by the Fairfield road, and harass his rear. On the evening of the 6th, Sedgwick overtook the Confederates at the Fairfield Pass; but they were strong-ly posted that he deemed it unadvisable to attack. Meanwhile, Meade had made up his mind to pursue the other route; and Sedgwick was recalled. General French, who since the evacuation of Harper's Ferry had been occupying Frederick, was thereupon ordered to seize the lower passes of South Mountain in advance, and also to repossess himself of Harper's Ferry. All this he did; and, in addition, by pushing forward a cavalry force, he succeeded in destroying a Confederate pontoon bridge which, at that point, had been thrown across the Potomac. When Lee's army reached Williamsport, the river was still greatly swollen, and the pontoon bridge had been destroyed. On the 12th, when Meade came up with his whole army, Lee had taken a strong position on the Potomac, extending from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and had thrown up entrenchments along his whole line. Meade had once more an opportunity of striking the enemy in what seemed advantageous circumstances. But the reasons which prevailed and prevented an attack after the battle of the 3d, prevailed again, and prevented an attack on the 12th. On the 13th, Lee's engineers had succeeded in throwing over another pontoon bridge; and the waters had fallen so much that, at a certain point, they were fordable. By the aid of the bridge and the ford, the Confederate army was safely pushed across to the southern side of the Potomac. Meade crossed the river immediately afterwards; but Lee, still refusing battle, fell back to the banks
of the Rapidan, where the opposing armies took position. This was the end of the Gettysburg campaign.

This campaign, from first to last, has been a fruitful theme of discussion among military critics. Military criticism, in any high sense, is not the purpose of this work. Our aim, rather, is to give a clear, intelligible and interesting account of what actually took place, leaving the reader to come to his own conclusions. There are, however, connected with this campaign, questions which are still discussed, and some of which will never be settled. These it is impossible to pass over in absolute silence. There is the unsettled question between Meade and Sickles. It is undeniable that the advanced position which Sickles took on the 2d encouraged the Confederate attack on that day, and very nearly ruined the National prospect. It is as little to be denied that Sickles, in assuming the responsibility of taking such a position, made a mistake. A more perfect military training, a more practised military eye would have made such a choice of ground impossible. But Sickles was not alone to blame. It was Meade's business to attend not to one part of his line, but to the whole of it; and it is notorious that, on his first arrival on the field, his anxiety for his right made him neglectful of his left. It is true that he gave Sickles instructions to continue the line on the ridge between Hancock and the Round Tops. But it is also true that Sickles notified him of the peculiarity of the ground in the position assigned him, and of his desire and intention to occupy the elevated ground in front. Then, again, it was only at the last moment, when the first thundering discharge of the enemy's artillery was about to fall upon the doomed position, that Meade came to inspect the ground. If Sickles erred in judgment, it does seem as if Meade was neglectful of duty. It is important also to bear in mind that, but for the accidental presence of General Warren at a most critical moment, Little Round Top, the key of the National position, would have been at the mercy of the enemy. Meade was, no doubt, justified in believing that his orders would be obeyed; but it was clearly his duty to see in time that they were strictly carried out.

There is the other question on which so much difference of opinion exists, and which probably ever will exist. Meade has been blamed by many—he has been justified by not a few—for his excessive caution in following up the victory of the 3d. It does seem, at first sight, as if he ought to have pursued his advantage at once, and made a vigorous onset on the Confederate lines, when they were thrown into confusion by the rout of Pettigrew, Pickett and Wilcox. This was the opinion of General Hancock; and it was his belief that, if Meade had advanced at once, he would have won a great victory. It was Meade's own intention to make an immediate assault; and he has given us his reasons why it was not done. "The great length of the line," he says, "and the time required to carry these orders out to the front, and the move-
ment subsequently made, before the reports given to me of the condition of the forces in the front and left, caused it to be so late in the evening as to induce me to abandon the assault which I had contemplated.” Possibly, it was just as well that the assault was not made. Mr. Swinton tells us that, in a conversation had with Longstreet, in regard to the proposed attack, the latter said to him: “I had the divisions of Hood and McLaws, that had not been engaged during the day; I had a heavy force of artillery; and I have no doubt that I should have given the Federals as severe a repulse as that received by Pickett.” Meade was, perhaps, more to blame for the manner in which he conducted the pursuit when the enemy abandoned his position and fell back towards the Potomac. He chose the longer route for a questionable advantage; and his movements were so slow that Lee reached the Potomac six days before him. When he came up in force, on the 12th, he had certainly a splendid opportunity to strike his antagonist; and it will ever partake of the character of a mystery why Lee, with the National army in his front, was able, with so much ease and so little molestation, to retire his whole army across the Potomac. There was a sting in what Lincoln said to Meade shortly afterwards: “The fruit seemed so ripe, so ready for plucking, that it was very hard to lose it.”

The commanding generals on both sides had causes for regret and causes for joy and rejoicing. General Lee made some mistakes during the three days’ fighting at Gettysburg. He attenuated, and therefore weakened, his lines by too much extension, in order to cover the entire front of the National position; his assault on the 2d ought to have been more concentrated, and, where concentrated, more forcefully sustained, or made along the whole length of his line; and “the attack” on Hancock’s front, on the 3d, to quote the words of Longstreet, “should have been made with 30,000, instead of 15,000 men.” But, if General Lee had reason to regret the result at Gettysburg, he was not without reason for being proud of his retreat. General Meade was in a position not wholly dissimilar. His conduct of the pursuit reflected on him but little credit. The victory at Gettysburg was due more, perhaps, to the intelligence, the skill, the pride, the pluck of the individual soldier, than to the superior genius, the tactical skill, or the wise arrangements of the commander-in-chief. But the army of the Potomac, after a series of painful and even shameful reverses, had at last won a splendid victory; and to General Meade, as its chief, legitimately and fairly belonged the glory.

This great National victory marked a turning-point in the history of the Civil War. A Confederate success at Gettysburg would have had a most damaging influence on the National cause. It might, as we have already hinted, have had the effect of permanently dividing the Union. It would certainly have greatly encouraged that growing dislike of the war which was finding
powerful expression in the large centres of population; and there is reason to fear that it would have given foreign governments a pretext for recognizing the South. Meade's great victory, occurring as it did simultaneously with Grant's equally glorious victory at Vicksburg, and followed so quickly by the surrender of Port Hudson, turned the tide of popular sentiment. The Confederacy was doomed. Its complete collapse was now merely a question of time. After two years of darkness and sorrow, the rainbow of promise was revealed: and the National heart was glad

Among the illustrious men who perished at Gettysburg, there was no greater or more honored name than that of Major-General John Fulton Reynolds. He was born in Lancaster, Pa., in 1820. He graduated at West Point on the 30th of June, 1841, and, on the 23d of October following, received his commission as second lieutenant in the Third artillery. He attained the rank of first lieutenant in June, 1846, and served through the Mexican War; and, for his gallant and meritorious conduct at Monterey and Buena Vista, was brevetted captain and major. After having been engaged in military service in California, and against the Indians on the Pacific Coast, he was appointed aide to General Wool; and, on the 3d of March, 1855, he was promoted to a captaincy in the Third artillery. In May, 1861, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry. On the 20th of August, 1861, he was commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers, and appointed to the command of the First brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserve corps, then under General McCall. In June, 1862, the reserves joined the army of the Potomac; and General Reynolds took part in the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill. He was also engaged at Savage's Station, and at Charles City Cross Roads, where he took command of the division, when McCall was made prisoner. Later on the same day, he himself was captured, and sent to Richmond. After his release, he returned and took command of his division on the 26th of September, soon afterwards taking command of the First army corps by virtue of seniority of rank. He commanded this corps at the battle of Fredericksburg. In January, 1863, he was nominated major-general of volunteers. At Chancellorsville, he was in the reserve, and took no active part. On the 12th of June, he was appointed to the command of the right wing of Hooker's army, having charge of three corps. How he brought on the engagement at Gettysburg, and how he came by his sudden and untimely end, has just been shown. In General Reynolds, the National army lost one of its ablest soldiers, and the Union one of its noblest defenders. But for him, the National army might have failed to occupy Cemetery Ridge and the adjoining heights; and the non-occupation of those heights might have led to defeat at Gettysburg.
CHAPTER XXVIII.


Our attention must now be given to the army of the Cumberland. In a previous chapter, we have described the famous battles of Perryville and Murfreesboro, in both of which engagements the Nationals were victo
object of the Confederates was, by reoccupying Fort Donelson, to interrupt the navigation of the Cumberland, and so prevent the transportation of supplies to Nashville for the use of the National army. On the 3d of February, a little after mid-day, a demand was made for the surrender of Fort Donelson and the garrison. Weak in numbers, Harding was strong at heart. He defied the foe, and sent a small steamer down the river to summon to his aid some gunboats, which he knew were not far off. Meanwhile, Wheeler and his men had approached within cannon range. Harding opened upon them with his 32-pounder and his four smaller guns. The fight continued till dark, Harding holding his position, although he had lost 45 of his 60 artillery horses. At eight o'clock in the evening came up the gunboat Fair Play, Lieutenant-Commanding Fitch, and opened upon the Confederates a raking fire. Wheeler and his men were dismayed; and, as other gunboats were seen coming up to take part in the contest, they fled precipitately, leaving behind them, dead on the field, some 150 men, and about the same number of prisoners. Harding lost 126 men, of whom 50 had been made prisoners. Fort Donelson was henceforth left undisturbed. While Wheeler was on the Cumberland, General J. C. Davis, with two brigades of cavalry, under Colonel Minty, was operating in his rear. Moving westward from Murfreesboro, Davis scoured the country, and, at the end of thirteen days, he returned to camp, with 141 of Wheeler's
men as prisoners, among whom were two colonels and several officers of rank.

There was a period of repose. Early in March, however, it became known that General Van Dorn, with a large mounted force, was in the vicinity of Franklin. General John Colburn, who was stationed at Franklin, and General Sheridan, who was with the main army at Murfreesboro, were ordered, with their respective commands, to move simultaneously against Van Dorn. Colburn, on the 4th of March, with some 2700 men, some 600 of whom were mounted, set out in the direction of Spring Hill. He had advanced but a little way when he came into contact with the Confederate skirmishers. These, however, were easily repulsed. Colburn experienced no further resistance during the remainder of that day; but, as evening approached, the enemy appeared in his front, in very considerable force. Halting, and encamping for the night, Colburn resumed his forward movement early next morning. Soon after starting, he found himself attacked by a vastly superior force, under Van Dorn and Forrest. The Nationals made a bold resistance; but, being greatly outnumbered, and his ammunition being exhausted, Colburn was compelled to fall back and seek safety in flight, leaving some 1300 of his men in the hands of the enemy. Sheridan, with his division, and some 1800 cavalry, under Colonel Minty, moved first towards Shelbyville and then round in the direction of Franklin. After various skirmishes, he encountered Van Dorn and Forrest at Thompson’s Station, on the 14th of March. There was a sharp fight; but the Confederates were ultimately driven back behind the Duck River. Sheridan returned to Murfreesboro, after a ten days’ ride, having lost only 5 men killed and 5 wounded. He brought with him 100 prisoners.

In the beginning of April, Van Dorn again appeared in force in the neighborhood of Franklin. General Gordon Granger was in command of the National troops at that station. Granger had timely warning of the approach of the enemy, and made every preparation to give him a warm reception. Granger had all but completed a new fort—which afterwards bore his name—on the northern side of the Harpeth River, and on a commanding eminence about fifty feet above the stream. The fort, on which already were in position two siege guns and two rifled cannon, completely commanded the approaches to Franklin. Granger’s infantry and artillery were under the immediate command of Generals Baird and Gilbert. Generals G. C. Smith and Stanley had charge of the cavalry. Baird was posted so as to guard the ford below Franklin; Gilbert was placed so as to meet an attack in front; Stanley was pushed out four miles on the road towards Murfreesboro; while Smith was held in reserve, to be ready, if occasion should call for it, to rush to Stanley’s assistance. On the 10th of April, Van Dorn, with a mounted force of about 9000 men and two regiments
of foot, came up the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell heavily on Granger's front. Granger, however, was ready to receive him. The National troops stood firm; and the guns from the new fort opened upon the assailants a most destructive fire. Stanley, seizing his opportunity, rushed forward and struck Van Dorn a tremendous blow on the flank. Smith's troops were already in motion, to support Stanley; and Baird's men were already across the river and taking part in the fight. For a time, it seemed as if the Confederates would be overwhelmed, and driven ingloriously from the field. In Granger's front, they were completely defeated; they had sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded; and some 500 men had been made prisoners. Van Dorn, however, was a daring and capable officer, and not easily induced to believe in defeat. Gathering up his whole strength, he flung himself upon Stanley, before Smith had found time to come to his aid; and such was the vigor and weight of the onset, that Stanley was compelled to fall back, thus permitting Van Dorn to recover most of his captured men, and, at the same time, to make good his escape. The Confederate commander retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about 300 men in killed, wounded and prisoners. Granger's loss was comparatively trifling, amounting in all to about 37 killed, wounded and missing.

During the month of April, there were many such skirmishes, not all of equal importance, and some of them resulting advantageously, some of them disastrously to the National cause. Prominent among the expeditions sent out at that date was that of Colonel Minty, who, starting from Murfreesboro, with a powerful force, scoured the country in the direction of McMinnville, and destroyed a large amount of property, making many prisoners, and capturing large numbers of mules and horses. About the middle of that month, an expedition, composed of the Fifty-First Indiana, Eighteenth Illinois, and a part of two Ohio regiments—some 1800 men in all—and commanded by Colonel A. D. Streight, set out from Nashville, on a mission from which great things were expected. This force was called "an independent provisional brigade," and was created for "temporary purposes." Streight's instructions were that he should destroy the railroads, the stores, the manufactories, in the rear of the Confederate army, and in every way make retreat difficult, if not impossible. With his command on board steamers, Streight left Nashville on the 11th of April. On reaching Dover, he disembarked his troops, and marched them across the country to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River. There he waited for the boats which had gone around by the Ohio. Embarking again, he went up the Tennessee to Eastport, where he landed; then, moving southward, he joined General Dodge, who was moving towards Tuscumbia, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. It was not intended that he should remain in conjunction with Dodge, but only
that he should march with him long enough to create the impression that his troops formed a part of that leader’s command, and at the proper time to strike off from Tuscumbia towards Russelville or Moulton. On their departure from Nashville, Streight’s men were not provided with horses. It was expected that they would be able to pick them up by the way. When they joined Dodge, one half of the command was still on foot. At Tuscumbia, the joint forces encountered and defeated a strong body of Confederates; and, as his men were well mounted, Streight, without delay, set out for Russelville. Having reached that place, he turned to the east, his object being to strike the important cities of Rome and Atlanta, in Northern Georgia. At Rome there were extensive iron-works; and Atlanta was a great railroad centre. Streight was not to be allowed to proceed on his mission unmolested. He had scarcely commenced his march, when he was pursued by a powerful cavalry force, under the Confederate leaders, Forrest and Roddy. The Nationals were overtaken in the neighborhood of Moulton, Lawrence County, Alabama. At Drivers’ Gap, of the Sand Mountain, there was a severe encounter, which lasted the greater part of a day. Then commenced a running fight, which continued for four days, and during which there were two severe battles and several spirited skirmishes. In a circuit of about one hundred miles, the Nationals destroyed a large quantity of corn, collected for the use of the Confederate army, burned several bridges and one cannon foundry, and captured many animals. When about fifteen miles from Rome, a detachment, which had been sent forward to that place, fell back on the main body; and, at the same time, the pursuers, now 4000 strong, under Forrest, fell with great force on the National rear. His ammunition being now exhausted, and his men overpowered by fatigue, Streight had no choice but surrender. The captives were sent to Libby Prison, where they were held until February, 1864. when they effected their escape by digging under the foundations of the building. Meanwhile, Dodge had had better success. When Streight set out for Rome and Atlanta, he struck off to the south; and having made a sweeping raid in Northern Alabama and Mississippi, he returned to his headquarters at Corinth.

During the month of May and the greater portion of June, the armies of Rosecranz and Bragg remained in their old positions, the former at Murfreesboro, the latter along the general line of the Duck River, neither evincing any signs of a disposition to attack. In this month, there was a prevailing feeling of disappointment, because of the long-continued inaction of the army of the Cumberland. In some quarters, this sentiment found free and full expression. By his victory at Murfreesboro, Rosecranz had won the affections and confidence of the people. What he had done, it was thought, was but a proof of what he could do, and an earnest of greater things yet to be accomplished by the army of the Cumber-
land, under its skilful and accomplished leader. One half year of inaction, after a victory so splendid, had been sufficient to give an entirely altered tone to the sentiment of the North. Rosecranz, however, was not without good reasons for his delay. His army, after Murfreesboro, was in a dreadfully shattered condition; and when gradually, through rest and reinforcements, he became strong enough to justify an offensive movement, he felt restrained, by military considerations, from resuming the conflict. It was the opinion of Rosecranz that it would be unwise for him to hazard a battle until the fate of Vicksburg should have been determined. Considering the relative positions of his own army and that of Grant, he deemed it impolitic "to risk two great and decisive battles at the same time." Such, however, were not the views entertained at headquarters at Washington. It was the opinion of Halleck that the time was opportune for Rosecranz to put his army in motion, and, by falling heavily on his antagonist, driving him into Georgia, and relieving East Tennessee, to pierce the very heart of the Confederacy. Orders were given accordingly. In a former chapter we have pointed out the importance of this natural stronghold. Its strategic worth was seen and admitted alike by the National and Confederate leaders from the commencement of operations in the West. Buell, it will be remembered, was detached from the army of the West, after the battle of Corinth, and ordered by Halleck to advance and take pos-

session of Chattanooga. Bragg, however, was intent on the same purpose; and, pushing forward with the utmost rapidity, he outstripped Buell and secured the stronghold. In spite of the defeat at Perryville, and the more crushing blow received at Murfreesboro, Bragg remained master of Chattanooga and the mountain fastnesses around. The possession of the place, however, had not ceased to be an object of ambition with the National government; and the contest, suspended since the battle of Murfreesboro, was about to be resumed.

The majestic folds of the earth's surface, known as the Appalachian Ranges, separate the Atlantic portion of the Southern States from the Mississippi Valley. These folds, for the most part, run parallel to each other, and are crossed at intervals by transverse depressions or gaps. Such passages, it can readily be understood, are of great commercial, political, and military importance. From the region of Chattanooga, the earth-folds range in a southwesterly direction, the more elevated ridges being named respectively Chickamauga Hills, Pigeon Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, and Raccoon or Sand Mountain. The name Chattanooga signifies, in the Cherokee language, "Hawk's Nest." The town of that name is built in one of those transverse depressions, on the south bank of the Tennessee River, and at the mouth of Chattanooga Valley. This valley, through which runs a stream of the same name, is flanked on the west by Lookout Mountain,
which rises to the height of 2400 feet, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so named, because it was an early and influential seat of Catholic missions among the Cherokee Indians. The depression between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain is called Chickamauga Valley. The two valleys, Chattanooga and Chickamauga, spring from a common centre, McLemore's Cove, which is shut in by Lookout on the west and Pigeon on the east. Such was the region now about to become the theatre of a series of desperate and bloody contests.

On the 24th of June, Rosecranz, in obedience to instructions from June 24. headquarters, set his army in motion. He had under him some 60,000 effective men. General Burnside, who was in Kentucky, was ordered to advance through the mountain passes into East Tennessee, and connect his right with Rosecranz's left.

Bragg's army, which consisted of some 40,000 men, was strongly posted at Shelbyville and at Wartrace, with outposts at Hoover's and Liberty Gaps. He held a strong position also at Tullahoma.

Rosecranz was well aware of the strength of Bragg's position; and it was his purpose, from the outset, so to manoeuvre as to tempt him to take less advantageous ground. His real object was to turn the Confederate right. His ostensible object, as he wished it to be regarded, was to fall heavily on the Confederate left and centre. In the midst of a rain-storm of almost unprecedented severity, the National army began its forward movement. The right, which was under McCook, moved towards Shelbyville. The centre, under Thomas, moved towards Manchester. The left, under Crittenden, marched in the direction of McMinnville. General Gordon Granger's reserve corps moved forward in support of McCook and Thomas. The orders were strictly obeyed and successfully executed. Sheridan's division, of McCook's command, led the advance on the right. This was followed, at the distance of a few miles, by the divisions of Johnson and Davis. While Sheridan kept moving towards Shelbyville, those latter divisions turned off to the left, and moved in the direction of Liberty Gap. Wilder, with his mounted infantry, led Thomas' advance. General Reynolds followed, with the remainder of the division. Wilder was instructed to halt at Hoover's Gap until the arrival of Reynolds. This he intended to do, but finding the place unoccupied, he pushed through, capturing a wagon-train and a drove of beeves. At the other extremity of the gap he was met by the Confederates in great force. He was able, however, to hold the gap until the arrival of Reynolds, when it was secured. In the meantime, McCook had been equally successful at Liberty Gap. Near the entrance, General Willich, whose brigade led the column, encountered the enemy in very considerable force. At the command of General Johnson, Willich fell upon the Confederates with tremendous energy, driving them before him, and capturing their tents, baggage, and supplies. Johnson sent
Colonel Baldwin forward to clear the upper end of the gap. The order was promptly executed; and, after a sharp encounter, the position was occupied. These were important gains. But success was attending Rosecranz in other directions. Granger had started from Triune, on the extreme right of the National army, on the morning of the 23d, and, having pushed rapidly forward, he reached Christiana without difficulty. At that place he was joined by Stanley and his cavalry. The combined forces pressed on to Guy's Gap, securing it after a struggle of about two hours. The Confederates fled, but were closely pursued for about seven miles. About three miles from Shelbyville, they halted, taking position in their rifle-pits. A vigorous charge was made by Stanley's horsemen. The Confederates were driven from the rifle-pits, and compelled to fall back on the near defenses of the town. It was now six o'clock in the evening. Granger came up with his infantry; Stanley charged again; and before seven o'clock Shelbyville was in the possession of the National troops Wheeler and his troopers escaped by swimming Duck River. In addition to the possession of Shelbyville, three guns, a quantity of corn, and 500 prisoners rewarded the daring and enterprise of Granger and Stanley.

Not now to perceive the advantages which he had gained, Rosecranz pressed through the mountain passes; and on the 27th he had established his headquarters at Manchester. Two days later, McCook and Thomas had also arrived, with all their forces. Preparations were at once made to flank Tullahoma, whither Bragg had now retired. Wilder was ordered to move around and strike the railroad in the Confederate rear at Decherd, and to destroy the bridge over the Elk River. Wilder had little difficulty in reaching Decherd; the railroad was injured, but the bridge defied all his efforts and all his skill. Convinced that the National army was about to move upon him in force, and believing that his position was untenable, Bragg, on the night of the 30th of June, abandoned his entrenched camp at Tullahoma, and fell back to Bridgeport, Alabama. The extensive works which had been constructed during a period of several months, between Shelbyville, Wartrace, Tullahoma and Decherd, were thus abandoned, without any serious blow having been struck in their defense. "Thus ended," says Rosecranz in his report, "the nine days' campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions, and gained possession of Middle Tennessee. Conducted during one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in that country, at that period of the year, and over a soil that seemed almost a quicksand, our operations were retarded thirty-six hours at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Manchester, which alone prevented us from getting possession of his communications, and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle." The National loss in these various operations was about 560 killed, wounded and missing. The Confederate
loss was about 6000, large numbers of these having deserted during the retreat. Bragg managed to carry with him all his guns and supplies along the railroad, which he destroyed as he went on. He pushed on through the Cumberland Mountains, crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, where he burned the railroad bridge behind him, and made his way to Chattanooga. If it must be said of Bragg that he showed lack of generalship in offering so little resistance to the National advance, it must also be admitted that he conducted his retreat with marked ability and with signal success. So complete was the destruction which he worked, as he moved along, that it was not until the 16th of August that the National forces commenced to cross the Cumberland Mountains.

We have already stated that General Burnside, who had been assigned to the command of the army of the Ohio, was ordered to co-operate with the army of the Cumberland. Burnside assumed his new command in March. He had had several small encounters with the enemy before he was ordered to act in conjunction with Rosecranz. By one detachment, under Gillmore, he had defeated the Confederate general, Pegram, at Somerset, and thus prevented a dangerous incursion into Southeastern Kentucky. By another detachment, under Sanders, he had made a successful raid against the Confederates, in the direction of Knoxville. Sanders passed through the Cumberland Mountains from Kentucky, struck the East Tennessee and Georgia Rail-

road at Lenoir Station, destroyed a large portion of the road which led to Knoxville, passed round that city, struck the road again at Strawberry Plain, and burned two bridges. After destroying a large quantity of war material, Sanders made his way back to Kentucky, having sustained but little loss, and bringing with him three of the enemy’s guns, 10,000 small arms, and 500 prisoners. At the time this call was made upon Burnside to co-operate with Rosecranz, his command had been considerably diminished, numbering not more than 20,000 men, the Ninth army corps having been detached, some time before, to assist Grant before Vicksburg. When Burnside began his march to form a connection with the army of the Cumberland, General Simon B. Buckner, acting under instructions from Bragg, was in command of about 20,000 men in East Tennessee, with his headquarters at Knoxville. Buckner might have been able, had he been allowed, to interpose serious obstacles to Burnside’s advance. Buckner, however, was elsewhere needed. It was all-important to the Confederacy that Chattanooga should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the Nationals. As soon, therefore, as Bragg found that he was in peril, he ordered Buckner to evacuate the valley and hasten to his assistance at Chattanooga. On the approach of Burnside, Buckner fled; and Knoxville was occupied by the National troops, after a long and fatiguing march, during which the Confederates offered little other resistance than that of burning the bridges in
their rear. It was on the 3d day of September that Burnside entered Knoxville. By the citizens and by the people of the neighborhood, he was hailed as a great deliverer. "As we neared Knoxville," says one who was present, "the evidences of the intense devotion to the Union, dwelling in the hearts of the people, became more and more apparent. Along the entire route, especially the last ten or fifteen miles, the whole population seemed gathered on the roadside to give welcome to the Yankees. On the appearance of General Burnside on the outskirts of the town, the news of his arrival spread, and everybody, rich and poor, the lame and the halt, rushed out to greet him. It was no vulgar curiosity to see a man famous in the world's history—it was the greeting of an oppressed people to their deliverer. Uncovered, and at a slow pace, the general rode through the streets to his headquarters. His progress was constantly impeded by the rushing of men to his horse's side, to seize him by the hand and say, 'God bless you.' On arrival at headquarters, a large crowd assembled in the yard, and were clamorous for speeches. Brigadier-General S. P. Carter, a native of East Tennessee, came forward, and in a few words congratulated them on their deliverance. In response to repeated calls, General Burnside then appeared, and said that although his profession was arms, and not speaking, yet he would take the occasion to say that, from the moment he took command of the department of Ohio, it had been his fervent wish to lead an army into East Tennessee to their deliverance; and he took great pleasure in saying that he had come with means sufficient, with their assistance, to hold the country permanently and securely." The same witness tells us that, when the speaking was ended, the wildest enthusiasm was manifested by the people. "The garrison flag of the United States was flung from the portico, and the crowd rushed up and seized it in their hands, many of them pressing it to their lips. While this was taking place at headquarters, the troops had been waylaid all over the city, and carried off by violence, to be feasted, without money and without price, on the best which the land afforded." Nor did this bounteous hospitality find expression towards the officers alone; it extended to the rank and file, all of whom, without any distinction, were regarded as deliverers.

At Knoxville, the Nationals took possession of a large amount of Confederate property—such as locomotives, cars, and machine shops. On the 4th, a movement, under the immediate direction of General Shackelford, was made upon Cumberland Gap. On the 7th, the gap was invested; and a call was made for surrender. This, General Frazier, who was in command of the Confederate force at that point, refused to do, believing, as he said, that he was able to hold out. It was not until the arrival of Burnside himself, on the 9th, that Frazier would listen to any proposals. On that day terms were agreed upon; and a surrender was made unconditionally. The officers retained their
side-arms. About 40 wagons, 200 mules, 4000 pounds of bacon, 2000 bushels of wheat, a large quantity of other stores, and ten pieces of artillery, were surrendered. Some 2000 men were made prisoners. Cumberland Gap was thus again in the possession of the National troops; and the great valley between the Alleghany and the Cumberland Mountains, from Cleveland to Bristol—of which Knoxville may be regarded as the chief city—was, for the time at least, rid of armed Confederates.

Chattanooga now became the object of universal attention. It was felt that in that region the next great struggle for supremacy was to be made. It might not be final and decisive; but, however it might result, it would be certain to exercise a determining influence on the ultimate issue of the contest. Both armies were the objects of anxious care to their respective governments. The Richmond authorities, trembling for the safety of the Atlantic States, exerted themselves to the very utmost to strengthen Bragg, so that he might turn on Rosecranz and deal him a crushing blow, or force him towards the Cumberland. Buckner, as we have seen, was ordered to join him. Johnson sent him a strong brigade from Mississippi, under General Walker. Polk had come up in force from Alabama. Longstreet’s corps, detached from the army of General Lee, was hurrying forward from Virginia. A merciless conscription was enforced in Georgia and Alabama; and every available man was pushed forward in the direction of Chattanooga. Nor was this all. In shameful violation of the terms of the surrender, and contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, Bragg’s ranks were swelled by thousands of prisoners who had been paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Altogether, the Confederate general was able to count on an effective force, under his own immediate direction, of fully 80,000 men.

Rosecranz was not less the object of solicitude on the part of the National government. It was found difficult, if not impossible, to penetrate the designs of the enemy. It was rumored that Bragg was sending reinforcements to Lee, and that preparations were being made for another and more successful invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. This rumor received encouragement from the slight resistance which had been offered, as yet, either to the advance of Rosecranz or to the advance of Burnside. It was soon discovered that the rumor had no foundation in fact. Trains were heard running night and day, for thirty-six hours, on the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad; and Meade was able to report that, in his judgment, Lee’s army had been reduced by the whole of Longstreet’s corps, and by some regiments from Generals Ewell and Hill. Halleck took immediate steps to reinforce Rosecranz. Burnside received fresh instructions to make the required connections with the army of the Cumberland. General Hurlbut, who was at Memphis, was ordered to send all his available forces to Corinth and Tuscumbia, so as to be ready to check any
flank movement which might be attempted by the enemy. He was authorized to call upon Grant or Sherman for reinforcements, if such were needed. A telegraphic communication was sent to the commander at Vicksburg, to send all his available forces to the line of the Tennessee River. Instructions of like import were sent to Schofield in Missouri, and to Pope in the North-western Department. It was the determination of the National government that Kentucky and Tennessee, once more reclaimed, should not again fall under the domination of the Confederacy; and now that both Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen, the great armies of the West and South were so far liberated, and able to lend a helping hand, there seemed to be no good reason why this determination, if expressed with sufficient vigor, should not be attended with practical and satisfactory results.

Rosecranz reached the Tennessee on the evening of the 20th of August. He made arrangements at once for the crossing of the river. Crittenden, with the left wing, was to cross at Battle Creek, and move on Chattanooga; Thomas, with the centre, was to pass his corps over the river—one division at Caperton’s Ferry, one at Battle Creek, and one at Shell Mound. He was to concentrate at Trenton, and then to move by way of Stevens’ and Cooper’s Gaps, through Lookout Mountain, into McLemore’s Cove. McCook was to push two of his divisions across at Caperton’s Ferry, while his other division, that of Sheridan, was to cross at Bridgeport. He was to concentrate at Winston’s Gap. Bridges were thrown across the river at the points indicated; and by the 8th of September, the troops had crossed and taken the positions assigned them. Thomas was at Trenton, and in possession of Stevens’ and Cooper’s Gaps, on Lookout Mountain. McCook having reached Valley Head, was in possession of Winston’s Gap. Crittenden having crossed to Wauhatchie, was communicating with Thomas’ right, and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout Mountain. It was the expectation of Rosecranz that these combinations would have the effect of inducing Bragg to abandon Chattanooga. In this expectation he was not to be disappointed. The National generals had conducted their operations with great expedition and with wonderful secrecy. It was not until the cavalry of Rosecranz, having advanced up the Will’s Valley Railroad, were already at Wauhatchie, that Bragg was convinced that his antagonist had crossed or was crossing the river; and, supposing that he was about to be flanked on his left, he made preparations for the abandonment of Chattanooga. It was now the 7th of September. Bragg left Chattanooga on the 8th, and concentrated strongly at Lafayette. On the following day, September 9, Crittenden, from the summit of Lookout Mountain, discovered that the place was abandoned. His corps quickly entered in and took possession. Thus, without any fighting, was accomplished the first great object of the campaign.
Affairs now looked hopeful in the extreme for the National arms. There was great joy all over the North, when it became known that Chattanooga was occupied. There was corresponding depression of spirit in the South. From the Confederate standpoint, the outlook now seemed gloomy enough. Pemberton had quite recently surrendered a large army at Vicksburg. Gardner had surrendered another army at Port Hudson. Lee had been compelled to fall back from Pennsylvania, after sustaining heavy losses. And now Bragg, without striking a blow for its defense, had abandoned Chattanooga.

To the army of the Cumberland there had now arrived a great opportunity. A concentrated effort and a well-directed blow might be sufficient to crush, or drive into helpless retreat, the Confederate army. The star of Rosecranz was still in the ascendant. Nothing had yet happened to tarnish the glory which he had won at Murfreesboro. It was not doubted—there was no reason why it should be doubted—that the conqueror at Murfreesboro would add to his laurels by a greater and more decisive victory at Chattanooga. Let us see how matters turned out.

It was the conviction of Rosecranz that Bragg was in full retreat towards Rome. Impressed with this belief, and not yet informed of the fact that Longstreet was rapidly coming up to swell the forces of his antagonist, Rosecranz, instead of concentrating his army at Chattanooga, scattered them over a wide surface of rough, broken country. Crittenden was ordered to leave one brigade at Chattanooga, as a garrison, and to move with the rest as far as Ringgold; Thomas was to march on Lafayette; while McCook was to move in the direction of Alpine and Summer Creek. These movements were promptly made; and when, on the 12th, it became positively known that Bragg was not retreating but, on the contrary, concentrating in great force at Lafayette, and preparing to strike a decisive blow, the National army was scattered over an immense space of rough, broken country, the line extending from the east side of Chickamauga Creek to Alpine—a distance of fifty-seven miles from flank to flank. Rosecranz, in truth, was completely deceived as to the movements and intentions of his antagonist. While, on the 9th, he was giving orders for pursuit, Bragg was actually preparing to assail Thomas in McLemore’s Cove; and but for misunderstandings among the Confederate officers, the battle might have been precipitated, and serious detriment might have resulted to the National army. It is difficult to acquit Rosecranz of blame in this matter. He was certainly found wanting in vigilance. Before attempting the hazardous experiment of so extending his line, and thus rendering himself incapable, at any one point, of resisting a vigorous attack, he ought, by a more thorough reconnaissance, to have been more accurately informed of the whereabouts of the enemy. The truth seems to be that, in his excessive desire to win renown by capturing his foe, or driving him in confusion to the gulf, the National
commander partially lost his head. It was the opinion of more than one of his officers that the general-in-chief was in error. As early as the 11th, a negro had reported to Wood that "the bulk of the rebel army, under Bragg in person, was at Lee and Gordon's Mills." Subsequent developments, according to Wood, proved that report to be singularly correct. In a letter to Thomas, Negley remarks that he is "confident that Rosecranz is totally misinformed as to the character of the country, and the position, force and intentions of the enemy."

If Rosecranz was to blame for the disposition he made of his troops, Bragg was even more to blame for not seizing the opportunity which Rosecranz had created for him. With the forces at his disposal, he might easily have crushed Thomas, Crittenden and McCook in rapid succession; and, having done so, he could then have moved along the Cumberland, and fallen, like a destroying angel, on Burnside's rear. The opportunity presented to Bragg was similar to that which Napoleon, by protracted and skilful manœuvring, secured at Marengo. Had Bragg been a Napoleon, he would have destroyed the army of the Cumberland. Fully alive to the peril of the situation, Rosecranz ordered a concentration of his forces. For six days, Bragg remained comparatively inactive. When the six days were ended, his opportunity was gone forever; for Rosecranz had already brought his scattered forces within supporting distance of each other; and on Sep. 18, the night of Friday, the 18th, the concentration was completed, and the army well in hand.

The two armies were now confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Chickamauga—a stream which, rising at the junction of Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain, at the southern extremity of McLemore's Cove, flows in a northern direction down the cove by Crawfish Spring. At Lee and Gordon's Mills, it reaches the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road. Further on, it joins the main creek, and empties into the beautiful Tennessee, a little above Chattanooga. Chickamauga, in the Indian tongue, means "The River of Death"—a name which was soon to be literally and terribly appropriate.

Rosecranz was on the west bank of the stream. His right was no longer at McLemore's Cove, but where his left had been, at Lee and Gordon's Mills. His left was near the road across from Rossville. His reserves were in the rear of the right. In this position, as will be seen by a reference to the map, he covered Chattanooga. It was Bragg's intention, by a flanking movement, to interpose between the National left and Chattanooga. In order, however, to deceive his antagonist, he had sent Wheeler, with his cavalry, to press the National right. It deserves to be borne in mind, at this stage, that Bragg had been greatly reinforced. Buckner had come up from East Tennessee, with the remnants of the army of the Mississippi; and the advance of Longstreet's corps, under Hood, was already on the field.

The morning of the 19th was bright and beautiful. A crisp,
white frost had collected on the grass, but it soon disappeared, under the genial heat of the September sun. Soon as the morning mist was dispersed, the rival hosts were ready for battle. McCook was in command on the National right; Crittenden was in the centre; Thomas was on the left. During the night, Bragg had contrived to push across the creek some 30,000 men. His army was arranged in two corps, the right commanded by Polk and the left by Hood, Longstreet not yet having arrived in person. It was Bragg's intention to strike and bring on a battle. It was Thomas, however, who had the honor of striking the first blow. It was now about ten o'clock. Thomas, on being informed by Colonel D. McCook that a Confederate brigade was on the west side of the Chickamauga, and apparently alone, and that as Reed's Bridge behind them was destroyed, he thought they might be easily captured. Thomas ordered General Brannan to advance, with his brigades, on the road to Reed's Bridge, while Baird was to throw forward the right of his division on the road to Alexander's Bridge. It was expected that, by this double movement, the isolated brigade would be captured. The battle commenced at once.

It was soon discovered that what seemed a solitary brigade was really the advance of the opposing army. Brannan soon became engaged with Forrest's cavalry, which was strongly supported by two infantry brigades, from Walker's column. Baird, having come to the aid of Brannan, the Confederates, after a terrible struggle, were driven back with great loss. Liddle's division was now thrown into the fight; and the Nationals, in their turn, were driven back, losing two batteries and over 500 prisoners. In this charge, Lieutenant Van Pelt, who commanded one of the batteries, died gloriously by the side of his guns, resisting the enemy to the last. Thomas now threw into the fight the division of Reynolds; McCook pushed forward the division of Johnson; and Crittenden came to the rescue, with Palmer's division, which took position on Baird's right. The Nationals, thus strengthened, and outnumbering and outflanking the Confederates, fell upon them with great fury, driving them back in disorder for a full mile and a half, on their reserves near the creek. By this charge, one of the lost batteries was recovered. It was now near four o'clock in the afternoon. There was a lull in the battle for about an hour. In the interval, Brannan and Baird re-formed their shattered columns, and took a commanding position between McDaniel's House and Reed's Bridge. The battle was resumed at five o'clock. The divisions of Liddle and Gist fell with great weight and with more than ordinary fury on Reynolds' right; and, while Thomas was endeavoring to concentrate his forces, they fell with equal weight and fury on Johnson, Baird and Van Cleve. Thomas, at this crisis, was in great peril. His men were falling back in the wildest confusion. At this critical moment, Hazen, who covered himself with glory, and saved the day at Murfreesboro, came gallantly to the rescue.
He had been sent back to the Rossville Road to take charge of a park of artillery, consisting of four batteries, twenty-one guns in all. These, it appears, had been left without guards. Hazen had arrived in time, not only to save the guns, but to turn them to good account. They were already in position, on a commanding ridge, and manned with such infantry supports as he could hastily collect, when the Nationals fell back, closely pursued by the victorious Confederates. Hazen made no haste to use his guns until the pursuers were within easy range. As soon, however, as they came fully up, he opened upon them a tremendous fire. The effect was terrific. Checked in full career, and torn to pieces by the merciless missiles, the Confederates, leaving their comrades in slaughtered heaps on the ground behind them, fell back towards the creek in confusion and despair. Thanks to Hazen’s prompt interference, the day was saved on the left. A charge was made, also, by General Cleburne, full on Johnson’s front, about the hour of sunset; but he failed to make any impression on the National lines.

Although the fighting had been mainly on the left, the right had not remained wholly unattacked. From an early hour, there had been lively artillery firing on both sides. While the day was yet young, a vigorous attack was made by three Confederate brigades, in rapid succession; and one of the National batteries was captured. The assailants, however, were in turn driven back, and the guns recovered. Later in the day, about three o’clock, Hood threw two of his divisions heavily on Davis, of McCook’s corps. So irresistible was the attack that Davis was driven back; and his Indiana battery fell into the hands of the enemy. The triumph of Hood’s men, however, was but short-lived; for Bradley’s brigade, of Sheridan’s division, immediately came up and joined Davis. A countercharge was made, and with complete success. The Confederates were driven back in disorder; a large number of them were made prisoners; and the lost battery was recovered. When night came the battle ceased, with apparent advantage to the National army.

The night was spent by both armies in vigorous preparations for a renewal of the conflict in the morning. As soon as the engagement closed, Bragg summoned his generals around him; and, under the light of the blazing campfire, he gave them their instructions. At midnight, Longstreet arrived in person at headquarters, and the remainder of his troops was fast coming up. Bragg divided his army, as he had done on the previous day, into two wings. The right, as before, remained under the command of General Polk; but General Longstreet assumed command on the left. The right wing was composed of Hill’s corps of two divisions, under Cleburne and Breckenridge; with the division of Cheatham, of Polk’s corps, and the division of W. H. T. Walker. The left was composed of the divisions of Stewart, Preston and Johnston, of Buckner’s corps; with Hindman’s, of Polk’s corps; and Benning’s and Lane’s and Robertson’s brigades, of Hood’s di
vision; and Kershaw's and Humphrey's, of McLaws' division. The front line of the right wing consisted of three divisions—Breckenridge's, Cleburne's, and Cheatham's—which were posted from right to left, in the order named. Walker's division was in reserve. The line of the left wing was composed of Stewart's, Hood's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions, from right to left, in the order named. Rosecranz had also gathered his corps commanders around him. After hearing their reports, he ordered General Negley, who had come down from the extreme right, to report to General Thomas early in the morning. McCook was ordered to replace Negley's troops by one of his own divisions, and to close up well on Thomas. Crittenden was to hold his two divisions in reserve, and in the rear of the centre. Thomas remained on the left, reinforced by the two divisions of Johnson and Palmer, with Brannan and Negley in reserve.

On Sunday, the 20th of September, as the blood-red sun rose on the valley of the Chickamauga, gilding with roseate hues the summits of the surrounding hills, an impenetrable mist hovered low on the ground between the two armies; and in the air there was a breathless stillness which well became the day of sacred rest, but which contrasted strangely with the approaching din and tumult and carnage of war. It had been Bragg's intention to resume the battle at earliest dawn; and instructions to that effect had been given accordingly. Polk was to strike the National left; and the attack was to be followed up in rapid succession all along the line. "The left wing," says Bragg in his report, "was to await the attack by the right, and take it up promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent." Bragg was in the saddle before daybreak—waiting anxiously for the sound of Polk's guns. But one hour and another passed; and the battle was not yet commenced. This delay has been variously explained. It had been arranged that Hill should make the first onset; but that general, it is said, was so far in the rear at Telford's Ford, that Polk's order did not reach him until long after sunrise. Another explanation is that, owing to a want of precaution, a portion of the Confederate left wing, amounting to a whole division, had been formed in front of Polk's line, and that if the attack had been made at the time appointed, that division must have been slaughtered. Whatever the cause, the delay was a grievous disappointment to General Bragg. His indignation knew no bounds, when he learned of the coolness and indifference manifested by Polk. Bragg's staff-officer, who had been sent to ascertain the cause of the delay, found Polk and his officers brilliantly attired and seated at a comfortable breakfast. "I have ordered Hill to open the action," said Polk, "and I am waiting to hear the sound of his guns. Do tell General Bragg," he added, with great emotion, "that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack—overflowing with anxiety, sir."
What was a disappointment and a positive loss to Bragg was a gain—a great gain to Rosecranz. His men had been working like beavers all night through. The lines had been drawn closer together than on the previous day. Breast-works and abatis had been constructed in their front. Rosecranz, however, was not fully prepared to receive the onset of the enemy. His troops were not sufficiently concentrated; and Thomas, on whom it was all but certain the weight of the battle would fall, not yet joined by Negley, was comparatively weak. The delay gave the National commander time to perfect his arrangements. When the fog lifted, and the enemy commenced his advance, Rosecranz was ready.

It was now between nine and ten o'clock. All of a sudden, the thunder of artillery was heard on the extreme left. With their usual tactics, the Confederates did not feel their way towards the National position, but, with concentrated strength, fell with overwhelming weight on the left which, as we have seen, was held by Thomas. The attack was made by Breckenridge’s division, of Hill’s corps, which moved forward in splendid style, in order as perfect as if on dress parade, and was followed closely by a magnificent battery of artillery. Breckenridge was accompanied by Cleburne, who advanced on his left, and more towards the National centre. Scarcely had the onward movement of the Confederates commenced, when the din of battle became terrific. The sharp rattle of musketry, mingling with the roar of artillery, gave intensity to the war thunder which echoed through the forest. Breckenridge swung around so as to flank Thomas’ left. Cleburne moved directly against the breast-works in Thomas’ front. As the first lines of the enemy approached the works, they were received by a withering fire. The breast-works literally blazed. It was one continuous, incessant flame, out of which rushed death-dealing volleys on the advancing foe. The Confederates, however, seemed rather to court death than to fear danger. On and up against the tempest of lead and iron they moved with desperate valor. Line after line was mowed down, as it advanced. Still, the tide rolled on. The broken heads of columns were continually re-formed from the ranks in the rear; and the brave Confederates, as if heedless of death, trampling on the bodies of their dead or dying companions, pressed on towards the breast-works. It seemed as if they were determined “to quench that volcano with human blood, and to choke it with living victims.” For a time it seemed as if nothing could check their advance. Cleburne was gaining ground in front; and Breckenridge was making visible progress against the National left. So overwhelming was the strength, and so vigorous were the onsets of the enemy, that Thomas was under the necessity of making repeated calls to Rosecranz for help.

It was now about noon. Repeatedly held in check, and sometimes even driven back, the Confederates contrived again and again to re-form and renew the attack. Despite the terrific fire to which they were exposed, and the awful
The carnage which they witnessed as they advanced, the dark gray masses were gradually closing on the National left. It was Bragg's determination that that wing should be turned—it was the key of the position; and, to give effect to that determination, Breckenridge, reinforced by division after division, exercised all his skill, and strained to the utmost all his energies. Reinforcements coming up on both sides, the battle raged with tremendous fury. Victory leaned now to the one side and now to the other. It was doubtful with whom the palm should remain. In one of those fierce encounters, when Vander- ver's brigade, of Brannan's division, and a portion of Stanley's, of Wood's division, came up and strengthened the wavering line on the extreme left, Breckenridge, in what seemed a moment of triumph, was thrown back in great confusion, with the loss of General Helmond Desher, killed; General D. Adams, at the same time, being severely, and Major Graves, chief of artillery, mortally wounded. Breckenridge rallied again on a commanding ridge; and having got his guns into position, and been reinforced by Walker and Cheatham, as well as by Cleburne, he resumed and maintained the fight with the energy of despair. Thomas' left showed signs of yielding; but, aided by his gallant lieutenants, he got his men well together again in a new position—his right on Missionary Ridge, his left on an eminence by the Lafayette Road—where they stood like a wall of iron.

At this supreme crisis in the progress of the fight, occurred one of those mis-haps, which are all the more liable to prove disastrous, because they cannot be foreseen or provided against, and which, when they do occur, sometimes more than neutralize all the skill of the general and all the bravery of the troops. Thomas, hard pressed, was still asking for reinforcements. Negley had been ordered forward to his aid. So, too, had Van Cleve. Rosecranz, seeing that the left centre was in peril, ordered Wood to move towards the left and close in upon Reynolds; Davis and Sheridan were to move in the same direction, so as to prevent a break in the line. It so happened, however, that Brannan was en echelon, slightly in the rear of Reynolds' right; and Wood, in carrying out the orders, as he understood them, moved by Brannan's rear, so as to reach Reynolds. It was a grievous, and, as it proved, irreparable blunder. A gap was thus created; quick as lightning, Longstreet, with his experienced eye, discovered his opportunity. With the swiftness of thought, and with the fury of a thunderbolt, Hood's division was thrown into the fatal opening; and, striking right and left, it cut the National army in two. It was in vain that Davis, of McCook's corps, tried to close in and resist the advance of the enemy. His division was literally cut to pieces. Palmer and Van Cleve, of Crittenden's corps, shared a similar fate. Sheridan, whose position was to the right of Davis, was left alone, and, for a time, made a gallant fight. Brave as he was, however, Sheridan could not perform impossibilities. He, too, was compelled
to give way. The National right and centre, shattered to fragments, were soon flying in wild confusion towards Rossville, and onwards to Chattanooga. It seemed a total rout. To some who were present, it recalled the memory of the first battle of Bull Run. The road to Rossville and Chattanooga presented a picture not unlike that which, on that fatal 21st of July, was witnessed on the road to Centreville and Washington. The field was covered with thousands of dead and dying men; and all along the line of retreat, artillery, caissons, wagons, horses, mules, and a motley multitude of fugitives were mingled together in inextricable confusion. Powerless to resist the refluent tide, Rosecranz, Crittenden, McCook's, and most of their officers were borne backwards towards Rossville. In front of the gap in Missionary Ridge, through which passes the road to Rossville—Sheridan and Davis having come up by the Dry Valley Road—McCook rallied his shattered corps, and presented a change of front, determined, at all hazards, to resist the further advance of the enemy. Meanwhile General Garfield, chief of staff to Rosecranz, had ridden back, and joined Thomas, to whom he rendered valuable assistance during the battle.

Never, perhaps, in the history of war, did more depend on the firmness of one individual will, than now depended on the will of General Thomas. Weakness, or want of decision on his part, at this trying crisis, would most certainly have brought about a terrible National disaster; and Chickamauga would have been remembered with shame, regret and sorrow. Thomas, however, was not found wanting. His clear vision, his caution, his decisive purpose, his strong will, were all to find admirable illustration. It was a fortunate circumstance that there was a perfect rapport between him and his men, from the division and brigade-officers down to the humblest soldier in the ranks. Thomas could trust them; they had perfect faith and confidence in him. It was not till towards the close of the day's fighting, that the commander of the left wing of the National army was made aware of the disaster which had befallen the centre and right. Fully alive, however, to the difficulties of his own position, he was waiting anxiously for the arrival of Sheridan, whose support had been promised him, when Wood came up and took position on the left of Brannan. Thomas now withdrew from his breast-works, and concentrated his command on a slope of Missionary Ridge, his line assuming the form of a crescent, the flanks resting on the lower spurs of the mountain. This new position was a little to the west of the Rossville Road, and was well fortified with artillery. Wood had scarcely had time to arrange his troops in the position assigned them, when the Confederates fell upon Thomas' line with redoubled energy, Polk on his centre and left, and Longstreet on his right. Thomas, however, was not to be driven from his position, nor was his line to be broken. Like a rock he stood, firm and invincible, the forces of the enemy, like surging billows, dashing themselves to pieces at his feet.
It was now about half-past three o’clock. Longstreet, impatient of resistance, and eager for an opportunity to precipitate the final issue, had discovered an opening in the hills, on Thomas’ right, communicating with a gorge directly in his rear. Into this opening he was already pouring his massive columns. It was, indeed, a critical moment. It seemed as if all were lost. Fully turned in front and flank, the National line was now to be attacked heavily in the rear. Destruction or surrender seemed to be the only alternatives. In the moment of agony, relief came. General Gordon Granger, who had heard the roar of artillery in the direction in which he knew Thomas to be posted, hurried forward from Rossville, without orders, at the head of Steadman’s division. As soon as he arrived on the field, Thomas directed him to the point of danger. Steadman was quickly on the crest of the hill, with a battery of six guns, and in perfect command of the gorge. It was not a moment too soon. Two divisions, of Longstreet’s corps, were pressing forward with all their might. They were already ascending the southern slope of the ridge, and only a few yards distant from the newly-erected battery. Opening a well-directed fire, and at the same time hurling against them the brigades of Whittaker and Mitchell, himself heading the charge, Steadman drove the too-daring Confederates down the ridge and back into the gorge, with terrible slaughter. Steadman had his horse killed under him; and he was himself badly injured by a fall. But he had saved Thomas from destruction. It was now sunset; and the attack in this direction was not repeated.

While this was going on in the rear, Thomas was hotly engaged by the Confederates, both on front and flank. In vain did Polk dash against his centre and left. In vain did Longstreet hurl his well-tried and war-hardened veterans on his right. “The Rock of Chickamauga”—the name which Thomas that day won—was not to be moved. When night fell, and the battle was ended, his line was unbroken, his position unmoved. Leaving his dead and wounded in the field, Thomas, in obedience to orders from Rosecranz, who was at Chattanooga, fell back to Rossville, and took command of all the forces. His ammunition was all but exhausted. Bragg did not pursue. On the night of the following day, the entire National army was withdrawn into the defenses, in front of Chattanooga.

Such was the battle of Chickamauga. It was a Confederate victory; but it was barren of results. Chattanooga had not been recovered. The losses on both sides were heavy. The Nationals lost about 16,350 men, and 51 guns. The Confederate loss was about 18,000. Chickamauga was a battle almost without a plan. It resulted to the credit of neither of the generals-in-chief. It made an end of General Rosecranz; and it nearly ruined Bragg. It had but one hero; and that was General Thomas. “The Rock of Chickamauga” will live forever in American history.
After the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecranz proceeded to throw up fortifications around Chattanooga. In this work, he found an able and efficient assistant in General James St. Clair Morton. Within twenty-four hours after falling back from Rossville, he was strongly entrenched—so strongly that Bragg could not, with safety, venture upon an offensive movement. Bragg, in truth, was in great trouble. He felt bitter disappointment because the late battle had not resulted in more complete success. He was dissatisfied with the conduct of several of his officers. He had not lost the confidence of Jefferson Davis; but with the authorities at Richmond generally, he was in bad odor. He was expected by them to perform impossibilities. The suggestions offered him were as numerous as they were absurd. Bragg, however, had will enough to abide by his own counsel, and sense enough to attempt the one thing which was practicable. If he could not force his way into Chattanooga, he might at least starve the army of the Cumberland into submission or retreat.

With this end in view, the Confederate general drew a cordon around the city, and interrupted or cut off the various lines of communication. He made himself master of the south bank of the Tennessee, opposite Mocassin Point, and then broke the line of communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. He destroyed the bridge at the latter place, and thus severed the communication with Nashville, the base of supplies. He had, also, entire command of the river. Winter was rapidly approaching; and heavy rains had already deluged the country, making the roads impassable. There was left but one way by which the wagon-trains, which supplied Rosecranz' army, could move; and that was a circuitous route along the bottom-land of the Tennessee and Sequatchie Valleys, and over the Waldron Ridge. On this route, the supply-trains were almost entirely at the mercy of the Confederate cavalry. In one day, Bragg's troopers destroyed about 300 wagons, and killed or captured some 1800 mules. It was not long until distress began to reveal itself in the National army. The animals died in large numbers from sheer starvation. Their dead bodies lined the road-sides; and the soldiers, unable to work their way through the deep mud, used them as they would have used stepping-stones. It was calculated that at least 10,000 horses and mules had perished in supplying half rations to the men. Such a state of things, it was manifest, could not long continue.

The army of the Cumberland became a cause of great anxiety to the authorities at Washington. It was felt that if something were not done to relieve it, and that quickly, the army ran the risk of being utterly destroyed; and Chattanooga and East Tennessee would again be brought under Confederate rule. In these circumstances, the government fell back on the conqueror of Vicksburg: Grant was ordered to Chattanooga, to take sole command. He was then at New Orleans, confined by an injury sustained in falling from his
horse. As soon as he was able, he hastened to Indianapolis, where he met Stanton, the Secretary of War, and received from his hands the order appointing him to the command of the new military division of the Mississippi, comprising the three departments and armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee. By the same order, General Rosecranz was relieved of the command of the department and army of the Tennessee. At the request of General Grant, the department of the Cumberland was given to Thomas, and that of the Tennessee to Sherman. On Oct. 18th of October, Grant, having arrived at Louisville, formally assumed the command, and issued his first order. Rosecranz, on the 19th, after issuing a touching farewell address to the troops, left for Cincinnati. Thither, also, were ordered Generals McCook and Crittenden, whose corps were now consolidated into one. From Louisville, Grant telegraphed to Thomas, "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards." "I will hold the town until we starve," was the prompt and characteristic reply.

It was not enough, however, to bring Grant to Chattanooga. It was necessary that he should have under him a competent army. Arrangements had already been made for increasing the strength of the National army at Chattanooga. As soon as it became known that General Longstreet had gone to Tennessee, instructions were sent to Grant, and other commanders in the south and west, to send Rosecranz all possible assistance. Grant was yet at New Orleans; and as Sherman, who represented him at Vicksburg, did not receive the despatch until several days had elapsed, there was some unavoidable delay in sending reinforcements from the neighborhood of Vicksburg. As early as the 27th of September, Sherman, with the Fifteenth corps, in obedience to orders from Grant, had set out for Memphis, on his way to Chattanooga. Meanwhile, fearful of the consequences which must result if Rosecranz should be tempted to abandon his position, and attempt a retreat, the government had detached the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the army of the Potomac, and placing them in charge of General Hooker, hurried them along by rail to Chattanooga. Never before—not even at Solferino and Magenta—had railroads been more successfully used for transporting troops and all the necessary material of war, than on this occasion. It was Stanton's project; and in giving it effect, he bent upon it all the energies of his powerful mind and will. His purposes were admirably carried out by General Meigs, the quartermaster-general, and by Colonel D. C. McCallum, the government superintendent of military railroads. McCallum, who alone was responsible for the conveyance of the troops, was ably assisted by W. Prescott Smith, master of transportation on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In seven days the two corps, some 23,000 strong, with artillery-trains, baggage and animals, were transferred from the Rapidan to Stevenson, Alabama—a distance of 1192 miles. Grant reached Nashville on the
Oct. 21st of October. He there met and had an interview with Rosecranz and Hooker. On the 23d, he arrived at Chattanooga. Next morning he made a reconnaissance of the ground, and determined on his plan of action. He found that Rosecranz had allowed the enemy to occupy all the heights around his position, and that neither the river nor the railroad could be used. Unless the river or the roads could be opened, there was no choice but retreat; and retreat, in the present condition of the army, would be certain ruin. Thomas, and his chief engineer, General William F. Smith, had decided upon a plan by which they hoped to be able to regain possession of Lookout Valley, and to re-establish communications with Bridgeport by way of Brown’s Ferry. Hooker, by order of Thomas, had already concentrated at the latter place. This plan met the hearty approval of General Grant, who proceeded immediately to put it in execution. Hooker was to cross the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and push on by the main wagon-road to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley. Palmer, who was now opposite Chattanooga, was to move down the north side of the river to a point opposite Whiteside, where he was to cross the river and hold the road passed over by Hooker. W. F. Smith was to go down the river from Chattanooga, under cover of the darkness, with about 4000 troops, to cross at Brown’s Ferry, and to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley. A pontoon bridge was to be thrown over the river at Brown’s Ferry, so as to open communications between Hooker and Thomas. The movements of Hooker and Palmer might be made in open day; but Smith’s success depended largely on secrecy.

These movements were promptly and successfully executed. On the morning of the 26th, Hooker crossed at Bridgeport on pontoon bridges. He effected a landing on the south side without any opposition, and pushed on to Wauhatchie, which he reached on the 28th. Palmer followed, according to instructions, and took position at Whiteside, in his rear. Smith’s part of the plan, although beset with greater difficulty, because he was within reach of the enemy’s sharp-shooters during his whole course, was carried out with equal success. His force consisted of about 4000 men. Of these, 1800, under General Hazen, embarked on pontoon boats at Chattanooga; and during the dark hours of the night of the 26th and the morning of the 27th, they floated noiselessly down the river, without oars, passing the point of Lookout Mountain, and, unnoticed by seven miles of the enemy’s pickets, reached Brown’s Ferry just about dawn. The material for the construction of the pontoon bridge was thus at the point desired. Landing without difficulty, Smith drove in and scattered the Confederate pickets, and seized a low range of hills, which commanded Lookout Valley. A firm foothold having been secured, skirmishers were thrown forward; and by means of felled trees, which the axe-men soon laid low, an impassable abatis was thrown up in
front of Hazen's troops. The Confederates, unwilling to abandon the position, returned and made a fierce attack; but finding their efforts useless, they withdrew up the valley towards Chattanooga. The remainder of Smith's force, some 1200 strong, under General Turchin, having moved, meanwhile, down the north bank of the stream, across Mocassin Point, reached Brown's Ferry before daylight. They were rapidly ferried across; and, by ten o'clock, a pontoon bridge connected the north and south banks of the Tennessee.

On the morning of the 28th, as has been stated, Hooker, with the Eleventh corps, Major-General Howard, and Geary's division, of the Twelfth corps, appeared in Lookout Valley, at Wauhatchie, his left connecting with Smith at the pontoon bridge. These movements secured for the Nationals the possession of the roads and the river; and all fears of starvation in Chattanooga were now abandoned. "General Thomas' plan," said Grant, in his telegram to Halleck, "for securing the river and southside road to Bridgeport, has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled."

Bragg was not willing that his antagonist should retain the great advantage he had won, without making another attempt to dislodge him. Lookout Valley, which lies between Racoon and Lookout Mountains, and which has an average width of about two miles, is divided towards its centre by a series of wood-crowned heights, some of them rising to an elevation of 200 and 300 feet. These heights, as well as the more commanding positions on Racoon and Lookout Mountains, were in the hands of the Confederates. From these eminences, the position and movements of the National army could be easily seen. McLaws, of Long street's corps, was on Lookout Mountain, eagerly watching Hooker. It was his determination to fall upon and crush that branch of the National army, so soon as he should see a favorable opportunity. On the night of the 28th, Geary's division, on Hooker's right, was lying at Wauhatchie, Howard's corps, as has been mentioned, having been thrown out in the direction of Brown's Ferry. McLaws, desirous to take Geary by surprise, descended at midnight, and with fierce energy, his men uttering wild screams as they advanced, fell upon Geary's pickets, driving them in. The batteries on Lookout Mountain now opened fire; and while Geary's camp was furiously attacked on three different sides by the on-rushing Confederates, his men were exposed to a very tempest of shot and shell. Geary, however, was not unprepared. Knowing that he was liable to be attacked at any moment, he had been holding himself in a state of readiness. When, therefore, McLaws' men came up, they were warmly received. Full in the faces of the too-confident Confederates, Geary's brave fellows poured a deadly fire of musketry. Such a reception had not been expected. The advancing columns recoiled. Geary, however, was greatly outnumbered; and the battle continued.
Hooker was aroused by the booming of cannon and the shrill rattling of musketry. He knew, from the direction whence these sounds issued, that Geary had been attacked. Howard was ordered to double-quick his nearest division—that of Schurz—to the aid of Geary. "Forward to their relief, boys!" shouted Hooker, as Schurz's men streamed past him through the darkness. They had advanced but a short distance, when, suddenly, there came a blaze of musketry from the hills, showing that the Confederates were close at hand, as well as in force in the neighborhood of Geary's position. Tyndale's brigade was detached, and ordered to charge the heights, while Schurz, with the remainder of his troops, moved on towards Geary. A thin brigade of Steinwehr's division, commanded by Colonel Orlan Smith, of the Seventy-Third Ohio, now came up; and it was found that the hill to the rear of Schurz was occupied by the enemy. This hill Smith was ordered to carry with the bayonet. The moon was shining bright and clear; but the hill was precipitous, seamed with ravines, covered with thick brushwood, and rose to the height of 200 feet. It was a daring—it seemed almost a fool-hardy—experiment; but the order had been given, and it must be obeyed. On and up the slope rushed the brave fellows of the Seventy-Third Ohio and of the Thirty-Third Massachusetts until they had almost reached the rifle-pits, when they were received by a volley from some 2000 muskets, and driven back in confusion to the foot of the hill. There, however, they re-formed; and, although now fully aware of the nature of the ground and of the difficulties to be encountered, those noble regiments again breasted the hill; and in spite of the destructive volleys which tore through their ranks, and the shouting and yelling and taunting sneers of the men on the summit, they pressed on, without firing a shot, towards the blazing rifle-pits, and then, with one bound, bayonet in hand, swept the enemy before them. It was not until the enemy was in full retreat, and until shouts of victory were rending the midnight air, that the first volley was fired. It was a sort of parting salute, given in a species of wild glee by the Nationals, but not particularly agreeable to the retreating foe, and not likely soon to be forgotten by any of the Confederates who survived that moonlight struggle. Geary, meanwhile, although contending with vastly superior numbers, and sometimes nearly overborne, held his ground with characteristic tenacity; and at length, after three hours' fighting, he hurled his assailants back towards Lookout Mountain. Thither they retired for refuge, leaving on the field 150 of their number dead, and in Geary's hands over 100 prisoners, with several hundred small arms. It was now a little after four o'clock in the morning; and the battle of Wauhatchie was ended.

The charge made by Orlan Smith has been singled out as one of the most brilliant charges of the war. It delighted and astonished Hooker. "No troops," he said, "ever rendered more
brilliant service.” It won special commendation from so reserved a man as Thomas. “The bayonet charge of Howard’s troops,” said he, in his letter of congratulation to Hooker, “made up the side of a steep and difficult hill, over 200 feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricades on its top, and the repulse, by Geary’s division, of greatly superior numbers, who attempted to surprise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats of arms in this war.” The victory at Wauhatchie secured the possession of the communications which Smith had opened up two days before. Bragg’s plans were defeated. Soon afterwards, two little steamboats were put upon the river; by means of these, the railroad, and the other roads on the south of the Tennessee, supplies were conveyed to Chattanooga; and the army was saved from actual famine. Fortune was smiling again on the National arms; and the star of General Grant was still in the ascendant.

While these events were taking place at Chattanooga, Sherman was pressing forward from Memphis. He had left Vicksburg for Memphis, on his way to Chattanooga, on the 27th of September. His own corps followed him up the river in steamboats. He had been preceded by the divisions of Osterhaus and John E. Smith. Arriving at Memphis on the 2d of October, he received a letter from Halleck, instructing him to move by the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Athens, and to report thence to Rosecranz, at Chattanooga. He was to repair the railroads as he advanced, and to depend on his own line for supplies. On his way to Corinth, on Sunday, the 11th, having with him, as an escort, a battalion of the Thirteenth regulars, he arrived at Colliersville about noon, just in time to save the Sixty-Sixth Indiana, Colonel D. C. Anthony, from being overwhelmed and probably destroyed by a body of Confederate cavalry, some 3000 strong, with eight guns, under the command of General Chalmers. He reached Corinth that Sunday evening. Without delay, he pushed on to Iuka. At Tuscumbia, on the 27th, his advance, under General Frank Blair, came into contact with a Confederate force, some 5000 strong, under General S. D. Lee. The Confederate cavalry were severely punished; and Lee gave no further annoyance to the troops on their march. The National troops had been repairing the roads, as they moved along, in obedience to instructions received from Hallock. On the same day on which Blair chastised Lee, Sherman received a despatch from Grant, urging him to discontinue his work on the railroad, and hasten forward with all possible despatch, with his entire force, to Bridgeport. Happily, he had made arrangements with Admiral Porter to have boats waiting for him at Eastport. By means of these, he passed his troops across the Tennessee and hurried eastward, Blair covering his rear, and reached Bridgeport on the 14th. On the day following, he joined Grant at Chattanooga; and the two together reconnoitered the ground, Grant explaining his proposed
plan of attack, so soon as the army of the Tennessee was forward and ready for action.

Sherman arrived at Chattanooga at a most opportune moment. It seemed as if the fates were working in the interest of General Grant and the army under his command. The plans of the general commanding had worked to perfection; they had been admirably carried out; and they had been attended, so far, with complete success. And now, when Sherman, his trusted right arm, came up with his well-trained veterans, Bragg had invited attack by committing a huge and irreparable blunder. It was known to the Confederate commander that Burnside, at an earlier date, had general instructions to push forward from Knoxville, and form a connection with Rosecrans. Believing that if such a connection were now formed, it would be fatal to his prospects, and in the vain hope of cutting his rival off, and beating him in detail, he detached Longstreet from the army in front of Chattanooga, and ordered him to attack Burnside, and take possession of Knoxville. A more fatal blunder he could not have committed. He could not, had such been his object, have played more completely into the hands of his antagonist. Grant saw his opportunity; but he resolved to wait until the arrival of Sherman, so as to be able to turn it to full and satisfactory account. He was now ready.

Grant was not insensible to the perilous position in which Burnside was now placed; nor was he indifferent to his calls for help. But he knew that Burnside would be relieved most effectually by the plan which he himself proposed to carry out—that the threatened catastrophe at Knoxville would be best averted by a decisive victory at Chattanooga. Colonel Wilson, of his staff, accompanied by Assistant-Secretary of War, Charles A. Dana, was, therefore, sent to Knoxville to explain to Burnside the situation. He was to make the best show possible in the presence of the enemy, to allow himself to be besieged, but to hold Knoxville at all hazards. Grant, meanwhile, hurried forward his plans, and made all the necessary arrangements for the attack.

The great battle of Chattanooga—by far the most picturesque battle in the war, and the one in which General Grant most conspicuously showed that he was not only the fortunate winner of battles, but the possessor of military abilities of the very highest and rarest order of excellence—was now about to be fought. Grant's plans, as we have seen, were matured and ready for execution. It was now the middle of November. Sherman's corps had arrived at Bridgeport on the 14th. Grant made up his mind to make the general attack on the 21st. He had discovered that the north end of the Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, as also, the western bank of the river, from the mouth of the South Chickamauga, down towards Chattanooga. This point invited attack. This, however, was not all. A successful blow given in that direction would make a junction impossible between Bragg and
Longstreet. The northern end of Missionary Ridge, therefore, he singled out as the special point of attack. While the attack should seem to be general, and bearing heavily on the Confederate left, he proposed to mass his converging forces on the point thus indicated. Sherman, with his own troops and one of Thomas' divisions, was to cross the Tennessee just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and secure the heights, as far as the railroad tunnel. Thomas was to co-operate with Sherman, by concentrating his troops on his own left, leaving a thin line to guard the works on the right and centre. Hooker was to assail the Confederate left, and drive it from Lookout Mountain. Grant was the more anxious to make the attack on the 21st that, on the day before, he received from Bragg a letter, suggesting the removal of non-combatants from Chattanooga—a letter intended to convey the idea that an attack on that place was meditated, but which really confirmed the report brought by a deserter, and confirmed Grant in the belief that Bragg was about to retreat.

The general attack which was to be made on the 21st was countermanded. Sherman had experienced unexpected difficulty in passing his troops across Brown's Ferry, in consequence of the heavy rains. The pontoon bridge at last gave way. Osterhaus, whose division was still on the southern side of the river, and without the means of crossing, was ordered to report to General Hooker, with whom he remained. Howard was, at the same time, called to Chattanooga, and temporarily attached to the command of General Thomas. On the afternoon of the 23d, the Fifteenth corps, under the immediate command of General Blair, having flung pontoon bridges across the Tennessee at the point indicated above, and also across the Chickamauga, were advancing to their position on the extreme left of the National army.

Grant, now impatient of delay, and determined that if Bragg really meant to retire, he should not retire uninjured and in good order, had instructed Thomas, on the morning of the Nov. 23d, to advance and give the enemy an opportunity of developing his lines. The day was unusually beautiful. The men, now that they were relieved from their prison-house in Chattanooga, and well fed, were in excellent spirits. They were dressed in their best uniforms, and accompanied by new bands of music. The neighboring heights were crowded with spectators. The magnificent array, the steady step, the splendid uniforms, the burnished bayonets, glittering in the clear November sunlight—it was a holiday picture. It seemed a dress-parade or review, and was so regarded for a time by the Confederates, who witnessed the spectacle from the side and summit of Missionary Ridge. Wood's division, of Granger's corps, moved in advance on the left; Sheridan's division of the same corps, being on the right. Palmer, of the Fourteenth corps, supported Granger's right, with Baird's division refused; Johnson's division, of Palmer's, remain-
ing under arms in the entrenchments, to be ready to reinforce at any point. Howard's corps was formed in mass behind that of Granger. As soon as Thomas' men began to move forward, the heavy guns of Fort Wood opened upon the enemy's first position. Upon the ramparts of the fort, Grant, Thomas, Granger and Howard stood watching the advance. It was a splendid sight. On moved the mighty mass, as if it had been one solid unit. Cheers were heard to arise from the ranks of the advancing columns. The pickets of the enemy were seen to break and fly in confusion before them. In spite of the well-directed fire from its summit, Wood had already reached the base of Orchard Knob—a steep, craggy hill, rising above the general level of the valley, midway between the river and the ridge, and about a mile from Fort Wood. Without halting, Wood ordered his men to charge. It was done in gallant style, the rifle-pits on the summit being carried, and 200 men made prisoners. A heavy battery was advanced to the captured position from Fort Wood, and the place was held. This was an important gain to the Nationals.

Simultaneously with this movement of General Thomas against Orchard Knob, a cavalry brigade, by order of General Grant, was operating on Bragg's extreme right and rear. This movement was scarcely less successful than the other, resulting as it did in the burning of Tyner's Station, the cutting of the railroad leading to Cleveland, the capture of 100 wagons, with 200 prisoners, and the destruction of a large quantity of stores. No other movement of any consequence took place on the 23d. Thomas held his advanced position on Orchard Knob, and the low range of hills to the south, his troops entrenched themselves; and every available point was covered with artillery. Hooker had general instructions from Grant to take Lookout Mountain, to cross the Chattanooga Valley to Rossville, and thence, by the Rossville Gap, to advance upon Missionary Ridge. His immediate instructions were that he should take a position so as at least to be able to make a strong demonstration, but that if he felt himself equal to the task, he was not to hesitate to make the attack and drive the enemy from the mountain. Sherman, all night through, was pushing his troops across the river. As early as daylight, on the morning of the 24th, he had 8000 men, with artillery and horses, on the south side of the Tennessee. At one o'clock, P. M., the march was taken up by three columns en echelon, each head of column covered by a line of skirmishers, with supports. It was a dull, drizzly day. The clouds were low; and the movements of the troops could not be easily seen by the enemy. At half-past three o'clock, Sherman had possession of the whole northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, as far almost as the railroad tunnel. In the afternoon and during the night, he threw up entrenchments, and established himself in a really strong position. Sherman had thus, so far, car-
ried out; his part of the general plan. Such was the state of things on the National left, at the close of Tuesday, the 24th.

On the National right, matters were, if possible, even more favorable. Hooker had performed a brilliant feat of arms on Lookout Mountain. At four o'clock, on the morning of the 24th, he had reported that his troops were in position, and ready to advance. Soon afterwards the movement commenced. It had been Hooker's intention to push his men across Lookout Creek, and strike the enemy in front. It was a hazardous undertaking; for Lookout Mountain, with its high, palisaded crest, its steep, rugged slopes, its numerous rifle-pits, its encircling lines of earth-works and redans, was deemed by Bragg impregnable. It so happened, however, that Lookout Creek was so swollen by the recent heavy rains, that it was impassable. A direct movement by the main road could not be attempted until temporary bridges were constructed. Hooker, therefore, ordered Geary, with his own division, and Whittaker's brigade, of Cruft's division, to march to Wauhatchie, to cross the creek there, and move down on the right bank, while he employed the remainder of his forces in throwing bridges across on the main road. The day was favorable for conducting such operations. A heavy mist enveloped the mountain, and spread itself over the adjoining valleys. The attention of the enemy had been drawn to the bridge-builders, of whom an occasional glimpse could be had, as the mist drifted with the breeze; but no notice had been taken of Geary, who reached his appointed place at Wauhatchie, unobserved. It was about eight o'clock when he began to cross the creek. Passing over without molestation, he surprised and captured the picket-guard; and immediately facing to the north, he extended his line on the right to the base of the mountain. The Confederates, caught at once on both flank and rear, offered a stubborn resistance. Meanwhile, the bridges were constructed; and Osterhaus' division, having been brought up from Brown's Ferry, the Nationals were soon in great force on the right bank of the creek. Under cover of the two batteries—the Ohio, on Bald Hill, and the New York, on the hill in the rear—Hooker's men went dashing down the valley, sweeping everything before them, capturing the rifle-pits, and making a large number of prisoners. At the same time the troops to the right, passing directly under the muzzles of the Confederate guns, were rushing up the rugged sides of the hill, leaping over boulders and ledges of rock, cutting their way through the abatis, and gradually forcing position after position until the plateau was cleared, and the retreating Confederates were seen plunging themselves down the jagged and precipitous face of the mountain, and flying in confusion and utter rout towards Chattanooga Valley. Hooker had not expected to accomplish so much in the same space of time. Nay, he had been unwilling that his men should attempt so much. Not knowing to what extent 'he enemy might
be reinforced, and fearing disaster from the rough character of the ground, he had given directions that the men should halt when they reached the high ground. But aroused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and with a flying foot before them, a halt was impossible.

It was now about two o'clock in the afternoon; and such was the density of the mist which shrouded the mountain and hung heavily over the valley, that it was found necessary, temporarily at least, to suspend operations. Hooker, not deeming it advisable to descend into the valley in pursuit, established his line on the east side of the mountain, his right resting on the palisades, his left near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. The battle had literally been fought above the clouds. It was not until nightfall that the sky cleared, and revealed to thousands, in the valley below, the actual progress which Hooker had made. As soon as it became known that behind that veil of clouds a great battle had been fought and won, and that the National arms had been victorious, the soldiers gave way to the wildest enthusiasm; and loud cheers for "Old Hooker" coming up, resounding from the valley, were echoed and re-echoed among the blood-stained hills. The night which followed was beautiful in the extreme. The mist disappeared; and a full moon shed her mellow light over a scene of matchless magnificence. It was Hooker's conviction that the enemy would withdraw from the summit of the mountain before daylight. In antici-

pation of such a movement, he detached parties from several regiments, with instructions to scale the palisades. When morning came, the Confederates were gone. In their haste, they had left behind them 20,000 rations, the camp and garrison equipage of their brigades, and a large quantity of other war material. The Eighth Kentuckians were the first to reach the crest; and at sunrise, in the clear, crisp November air, amid echoing cheers from the troops below, they had the honor of unfurling the National banner from Pulpit Rock. The importance of this victory at Lookout Mountain, it is hardly possible to over-estimate. It enabled Grant greatly to contract his line of battle, and by so much to concentrate his strength. It made an end of the blockade of the Tennessee; and from that day there was no more difficulty about supplies for the National army.

Such was the condition of things on the night of the 24th and the morning of the 25th of November. The National army maintained an unbroken line, with open communications from the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Chattanooga Valley to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Carlin had taken position so as to connect Hooker with the centre; and Howard, with the Eleventh corps, having been moved up from the right, connected the centre with Sherman. The Confederates, having abandoned Chattanooga Valley, concentrated on Missionary Ridge. Their line extended from Tunnel Hill to Rossville. Bragg's
right, consisting of the divisions of Cleburne, Walker, Cheatham, and Stevenson, was commanded by Hardee; his left was commanded by Breckenridge, and was composed of that general’s own division, now under Lewis, and those of Stewart and Anderson. General Grant’s headquarters had been removed from Fort Wood to Orchard Knob, or as it was also named, “Indian Hill”—a commanding eminence which Thomas had now strongly fortified, and from which could be seen the embattled hosts spread out, as in a vast amphitheatre.

The morning of the 25th rose in Nov. 25. beauty. Far almost as the eye could reach, the sun fell upon the compact lines of polished steel. In front, towering up, the huge form of Missionary Ridge, its precipitous sides defying attack, its summit swarming with armed men, and crowned with artillery; away to the right, and standing out clear and well-defined, the bold outlines of Lookout Mountain; Hooker’s men spread out in the valley below to the right, Sherman’s massed in compact phalanx above to the left, while Thomas’ well-trained bands, eager and ready for the fray, are gathered together in close array around the headquarters of the chief—such was the sight which met the eye of the beholder, as he stood on Orchard Knob, on the morning of the day which was to witness the final struggle and the crowning National victory at Chattanooga. It was a magnificent spectacle, and one which it rarely falls to the lot of mortals to witness.

At an early hour the preparations were complete. The sun had arisen, however, before the bugle sounded “Forward!” Hooker had received orders to move on the Confederate left; Sherman was to move against the right; while the centre, under the immediate eye of General Grant, was to advance later in the day, and whenever the developments made on either wing should justify the attack. Shortly after sunrise, Hooker, who has left a small force on Lookout Mountain, is seen, with the mass of his troops, moving down the eastern slope of the mountain, and sweeping across the valley. Sherman moves at the same time on the Confederate right; and it soon begins to be evident that Bragg, believing that the main attack is to be made on his right, is massing his troops on Sherman’s front. A fierce artillery duel at once commenced between Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge. Hooker, pressing on towards Rossville Gap, encountered an unexpected obstacle at Chattanooga Creek. The bridge had been destroyed by the Confederates as they retired from the valley in the early morning. It was an unfortunate circumstance, necessitating as it did a delay of three hours. As soon as the bridge was completed, the troops were pushed over. Rossville Gap was quickly occupied; and Hooker, moving Osterhaus along the east side of the ridge, Geary at its base, with the batteries, on the west side, and Cruft on the ridge itself, marched northward, driving the enemy before him. The Confederates did not yield without
offering a stubborn resistance. It was found impossible, however, to withstand the energy and dash of the National troops. The skirmishers were speedily driven in and pressed back upon the main body. Cruft, now forming his column in battle-line, fell with all his weight on the front line of the enemy, Geary and Osterhaus, on both flanks, opening a murderous fire. The fighting continued till sunset, when the Confederates, having been driven steadily backward from one strong position to another, although they resisted nobly, broke and fled in wild confusion. The fugitives who sought safety by running down the eastern slope, fell into the hands of Osterhaus; those who tried to escape by the western slope, fell into the hands of Geary; while those who retreated along the ridge ran helplessly into the ranks of Johnson's division of the Fourteenth corps, and were captured. Shortly after sunset, the victory on the National right was complete. Breckenridge had proved himself no match for Hooker.

Let us now see what was going on towards the left and at the centre. On the morning of the 25th, Sherman was in the saddle before it was light. During the night he had strongly entrenched his position. His order of battle was similar to that of Hooker. General Corse, with three of his own regiments and one of Lightburn's, moved forward on the crest of the hill; General Morgan L. Smith, with his command, advanced along the eastern base; while Colonel Loomis, supported by the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith, advanced along the western base. The brigades of Cockrell and Alexander, and a portion of Lightburn's, remained behind, holding the position first occupied. Almost from the commencement of the forward movement, the advancing columns were exposed to the guns of the enemy. Without experiencing any very great inconvenience, Sherman's troops descended the hill on which they had been drawn up in battle order, crossed the valley in their front, and rushed up the opposite hill, which they seized and held. At this point, it was discovered that the ground to be traversed was not so free from obstructions as had been supposed. It was not a continuous ridge, but rather a chain of hills, each well wooded and fortified. This secondary crest, on which Corse had obtained a foothold, was commanded by a higher hill, and thus exposed to a plunging fire. Between these hills was a deep gorge, through which passed the railroad tunnel, and in which the Confederate commander sheltered his masses until they could be brought into action. Corse called forward his reserves, and asked for reinforcements. The ridge, however, was narrow; and as the enemy, from his superior position, could bring to bear upon the assaulting columns a destructive, enfilading fire of artillery and musketry, it was not well to crowd the men. A severe hand-to-hand contest ensued, and continued for more than an hour. The tide of battle ebbed and flowed, victory now leaning to the one side and now to the other.
It was a desperate grapple, and the loss of life was terrible. No decided progress was being made on either side. Corse found it impossible to carry the works in his front; the Confederates were equally unable to drive him from the position he had won. The columns which, under Loomis and Smith, moved along the sides of the ridge, encountering fewer difficulties, were attended with better success. Smith kept gaining ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, while Loomis on his side got abreast of the tunnel and the railroad embankment. The fire of the one and the other, striking the Confederates on both flanks, and slightly in rear of their front, had the effect of withdrawing attention, and thus to a certain extent of relieving the assaulting party on the crest of the hill.

It was now about three o'clock. The battle was raging with tremendous fury. Column after column of the enemy came streaming down upon Sherman's men, gun upon gun pouring upon them its concentrated shot from every hill and spur, as they vainly struggled in the valley and attempted to force their way to the further height. Neither, however, was gaining any advantage. Almost at the crisis of the fight, it seemed to the anxious watchers at Chattanooga as if Sherman was losing ground. There was, indeed, a backward movement. It had seemed to General J. E. Smith that Colonel Wolcott, who now commanded on the crest—Corse having been wounded early in the day—was sorely pressed, and in danger of being overpowered.

He, therefore, sent to his aid the two reserve brigades of Runion and Mathias. Having crossed the intervening fields and climbed the hillside, in spite of a most destructive fire of artillery and musketry, they effected a junction with Wolcott. The ridge, however, being narrow, they were forced to take position on the western face of the hill, where, being exposed to attack on right and rear, the enemy, rushing from the tunnel gorge, fell upon them in overwhelming numbers, driving them down the hill and back to the lower end of the field. There they were re-formed; and the Confederates, who had ventured to pursue, were struck heavily on their flank, and compelled to retire to the shelter of their works on the wooded hills. It was this backward movement of Smith's brigades which, being seen at Chattanooga, created the impression that a repulse had been sustained by the National left. Sherman has taken some pains to correct this false impression, and informs us that the "real attacking columns of General Corse, General Loomis and General Morgan L. Smith, were not repulsed," but, on the contrary, held their ground, and struggled "all day persistently, stubbornly and well."

Long and wearily had Sherman waited for the attack in the centre. An occasional shot from Orchard Knob, and some artillery and musketry fire, away in the direction of Lookout, were the only signs of activity in the National ranks on his right. It was not until shortly after three o'clock, that he saw a white line of
smoke in front of Orchard Knob—the line extending further and further to the right. It was evident that something decisive was happening. He had faith in the result; for he knew that, by his repeated and persistent attacks, he had compelled Bragg to concentrate large masses of his troops on his own right. He had thus weakened the Confederate centre, and created the opportunity for Grant and Thomas.

During these hours of sore trial and deep anxiety, Grant’s attention was quite as much directed to the left as was that of Sherman to the centre. Grant’s headquarters, as we have seen, were at Orchard Knob. He had a commanding view of the entire battleground. He knew that Bragg was concentrating on his own right, and, determined to penetrate the National left and force his way to Chattanooga, was hurling against Sherman his well-disciplined legions in overwhelming masses. He feared lest his trusted lieutenant, sorely pressed, should be yielding to impatience, because of the continued inaction at the centre. But it was necessary to wait for Hooker, who, as has been stated, had been delayed three hours in reconstructing the bridge across Chattanooga Creek. It was desirable, at least, that the Confederate left should be well engaged, as well as the Confederate right, before the decisive blow was dealt at the centre. With any other commander on his left, Grant might have risked too much by leaving him so long, unaided or unrelieved, to struggle against the strong position and the ever-increasing numbers of the enemy. Grant, however, had not forgotten Shiloh. He remembered how, on that day, at the foot of the bridge, over Snake Creek, Sherman had stood like a wall of adamant, his men massed around him, and presenting to the almost triumphant foe what seemed a huge and solid shield of shining steel, effectually resisting, and ultimately turning the tide of battle. What he had done then, he had, on many a battle field since, proved his ability and willingness to do again. Grant was asking much from his lieutenant; but he felt convinced that Sherman would not be found wanting. Meanwhile, he had the satisfaction of perceiving that his plan was working admirably. Bragg, completely out-generalled, was weakening his own centre, and preparing for him his opportunity.

It was now half-past three o’clock. Grant was pacing to and fro on Orchard Knob. Concerned for the welfare of Sherman, seeing his opportunity rapidly ripening, and impatient to strike, yet unwilling by premature action to imperil the hoped-for and what seemed now the inevitable result, he kept turning his eyes wistfully in the direction in which Hooker should make his appearance. Still there were no signs of his coming. Hooker, as the reader knows, was successfully moving along the ridge and driving the enemy before him. But Grant was, as yet, ignorant at once of the cause of his delay, and of the progress he had made. The opportune moment, however, had come. He saw
that Bragg had greatly weakened his centre to support his right; and having faith that Hooker must be close at hand, he gave Thomas the order to advance. The thunderbolt was hurled. The signal guns were fired—one—two three—four—five—six; and the divisions of Wood, Baird, Sheridan and Johnson, long since impatient of delay, advanced with firm and steady step. These were preceded by a double line of skirmishers, drawn mostly from the divisions of Wood and Sheridan. The orders were to carry the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge, and then to re-form and push their way to the summit. The whole movement was conducted with the regularity and precision of clock-work. The skirmishers dashed forward, the main body following within easy supporting distance. Missionary Ridge all at once seems ablaze. On all the forts and batteries the heavy guns open fire; and, from their hollow mouths they bellow harsh thunder, and vomit forth their missiles of destruction. Full thirty guns are pouring shot and shell into the advancing columns. Nothing, however, can cool the ardor or restrain the impetuosity of the National soldiers. "Rolling on the foe," on moves this "fiery mass of living valor." The picture of the poet becomes here a living reality. The brigades of Hazen and Willich are already at the base of the mountain. Like "bees out of a hive," to use the expressive words of General Grant, the gray-coated Confederates are seen swarming out of the rifle-pits and rushing up the hillside. Fired now with the wildest enthusiasm, the brave Nationals, scarcely taking time to re-form, push their way up the steep and rugged sides of the mountain. They are fully exposed now to a terrific fire from the enemy's guns, on the heights above them. Shell, canister, shrapnel, bullets are falling upon them with deadly effect. Nothing daunted, however, on they press; and, from Orchard Knob, the National colors are seen fluttering higher and still higher, and gradually nearing the summit. Order now begins to disappear. The brigades, partly because of the nature of the ground, and partly because of the severity of the fire, break up into groups. There is, however, neither lack of purpose, nor lack of enthusiasm. Every group has its flag, and, in wedge-like form, each eager to be first and emulous of the other, is seen pressing onward and upward. It seems as if the color-bearers are running a race. To plant the first color on the summit appears to be the ambition of every brigade, of every group, of every soldier. Now they are clambering over the rugged ledges, now they are seeking momentary shelter in the ravines or behind the overhanging rocks; but they are ever, in spite of the heavy guns and the murderous volleys of musketry from the rifle-pits, nearing the summit.

Meanwhile, the work of destruction had been terrible. The color-bearers had suffered fearfully. The first to reach the summit was a group of men from the First Ohio, and a few others from other regiments, under the lead of Lieutenant-Colonel Langdon. Six
color-bearers of this party had fallen, when Langdon, waving forward his men, and leaping over the crest, was instantly shot down. The breach, however, had been made; and the brigades of Hazen and Willich were soon on the summit. These were quickly followed by the brigades of Sheridan’s division—Sheridan himself taking an active part, and specially commanding the attention of General Grant. The National advance was within a few hundred yards of Bragg’s headquarters. There were still desperate hand-to-hand struggles after the Nationals had reached the summit. But, as the shouting victors came pouring into the works, bayoneting the cannoneers at their guns, the bold and resolute front gave way. It was now sunset. The Confederates were in full retreat, their own guns turned upon them by the triumphant Nationals. It was only with difficulty that Bragg was able to make good his escape, along with Breckenridge, who by this time had joined him. Missionary Ridge was now occupied and held by the National troops. Hooker, as we have seen, had been victorious on the right; Sherman had held his ground, and, after a gallant and protracted struggle, against superior numbers, had driven the enemy from his front; and now the brave and well-trusted soldiers of the army of the Cumberland had pierced and routed the Confederate centre. The battle of Chattanooga had been fought and won. It was another great victory for General Grant. Bragg was one of the most trusted leaders in the Confederacy, and a special favorite of Jefferson Davis. He was defeated not by superior numbers, not by superior bravery, but by superior tactics. He was defeated, because he was out-generalled. He committed his first mistake when he detached Longstreet, with his command, and sent him to operate against Burnside, at Knoxville. He committed his second mistake when he weakened his centre, and moved his troops to the right to operate against Sherman. Both were serious blunders. It is surprising how a general of Bragg’s experience could have committed the one or the other, in the presence of such a commander as Grant. The first blunder encouraged immediate action, concentration, and aggressive effort against Missionary Ridge. The second blunder provoked the attack on the Confederate centre, which decided the battle. In the glory resulting from the victory, Sherman and Hooker and Thomas were fully entitled to share. Each had accomplished the task assigned him, nobly and with complete success. It was a victory of which the whole army, from the general in command down to the humblest of the rank and file, had reason to be proud. “Impartial history,” says Coppée, whose description of Chattanooga sometimes rises to the grandeur of an epic, “will be just to all the acts and the actors; but above them all will shine, in golden characters, the name of the great commander, who, upon the heels of one great conquest, transformed a beleaguered army of starving soldiers.
into fiery columns of attack, and snatched an immortal victory out of the jaws of disaster and anticipated ruin. That man was Grant." The modesty of the man—the utter absence of vain-glory—is strikingly revealed in the despatch which he sent to General Halleck immediately after the battle. "Although the battle lasted," he says, "from early dawn till dark this evening, I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg. Lookout Mountain top, all the rifle-pits in Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge entire, have been carried, and are now held by us."

The final struggle of the day was in the neighborhood of the tunnel on Thomas' left and in Sherman's front. At that point the Confederates made a most obstinate resistance. This resistance, and the darkness which intervened, prevented an immediate pursuit. During the night, Missionary Ridge blazed with Union camp fires, the Confederates having fallen back in the direction of Ringgold, by way of Chickamauga Station. Bragg left behind him some 600 prisoners, besides a large number of stragglers, 40 guns, upwards of 7000 small arms, and a large quantity of ammunition.

Next morning Sherman, Palmer and Hooker were in eager pursuit. Sherman pushed on towards Greysville, passing Chickamauga Station, where he found everything in flames. Palmer and Hooker advanced by the Rossville road, intending to strike the railroad between Greysville and Ringgold. At the latter place, Hooker came into contact with the Confederates, under Cleburne, who was covering Bragg's retreat. A severe encounter took place, Cleburne turning and offering a most stubborn resistance. The battle lasted the greater part of the day, both sides suffering severely. Cleburne did not retreat until he had inflicted on the Nationals a loss of 432 men, of whom 65 were killed, some of them being most valuable officers. The Confederates left on the field 130 in killed and wounded. The pursuit was now discontinued, as Grant felt it to be his first and most important duty to relieve Burnside, who was at that time closely besieged in Knoxville by the Confederate forces, under Longstreet. Bragg's army continued the retreat to Dalton, where it established a fortified camp. The Nationals fell back towards Chattanooga; and the campaign against Bragg ended.

The immediate result of the victory at Chattanooga was the relief of Knoxville. With a brief account of the operations which took place in that direction, we shall close this chapter.

Burnside, it will be remembered, after having been relieved of the command of the army of the Potomac, was assigned, on the 26th of March, to the command of the department of the Ohio. His headquarters were at Cincinnati; and his army, about 20,000 strong, was at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Kentucky. When Rosecranz commenced his onward movement towards Chattanooga, Burnside, who had been ordered to co-operate with him, and to affect a junction between his own right and
the left of Rosecranz, commenced, on the 16th of August, his march for East Tennessee. That district of country was then held by the Confederate general, Buckner, whose headquarters were at Knoxville. Burnside, more intent on restoring the authority of the National government in East Tennessee, moved in the direction of Knoxville. We have already shown how Buckner retired at his approach, and with what enthusiasm Burnside and the National troops were received in that town. Burnside remained in Knoxville, although repeatedly ordered to reinforce Rosecranz, believing it to be all-important that the place should be permanently occupied by National troops.

Early in November, as we have seen, Bragg detached Longstreet, with 12,000 men, and a heavy body of cavalry, with instructions to move against Burnside. Longstreet’s march was less rapid, and, in consequence, less successful than it might have been. His troops were in wretched condition; and reinforcements and supplies did not arrive as he expected. It was not until the 14th of the month that he was able to cross the Tennessee at Hough’s Ferry, six miles below Loudon. Burnside’s advance, which was at Loudon, fell back as far as Campbell’s Station, where, on the 16th, they turned upon their pursuers. A severe encounter took place, Burnside holding his own against superior numbers. Ultimately, however, he was compelled to fall back within the defenses at Knoxville; and, on the 17th and 18th, he was surrounded by Longstreet. Attempts were made to storm the beleaguered town; but Burnside being vigilant, and having made excellent arrangements for defense, these attempts failed. Longstreet, already fearing that Bragg might not be able to cope successfully with his skilful adversary, and knowing that in the event of a Confederate defeat at Chattanooga, Grant would hasten to the aid of Burnside, pressed forward the siege with the utmost vigor. On the Nov. 25th, he threw a considerable force across the Holston. His object was to seize the heights which command Knoxville from the south side of the river. Vigorously opposed by the National forces, he was not quite successful. He was unable to seize the desired position; but he obtained possession of a knob a little lower down, from which, at an elevation of one hundred and fifty feet above the level of the river, he had complete command of Fort Sanders, some five hundred yards to the north.

This advantage had just been gained, to the immense delight of the Confederates, when information reached Longstreet of the defeat of Bragg at Chattanooga. It had been Longstreet’s hope that, if he could not take the place by assault, he would reduce it by famine. Relief was now at hand. Famine was out of the question. If Knoxville was to be taken, it must be taken by storm. Preparations for a final effort were accordingly hurried forward. The point chosen for attack was Fort Sanders, on the northwest
angle of the fortifications, and commanding an approach by the river. It was a work of great strength, the ditch being ten feet deep, and the parapet of more than ordinary height. Around and in front of it, several acres of thick pine timber had been slashed; and a perfect entanglement of wire-work had been formed by connecting stump with stump. There were, besides, numerous rifle-pits and abatis. The fort was occupied by the Seventy-Ninth New York; the Twenty-Ninth Massachusetts; two companies of the Second and one of the Twentieth Michigan. The armament consisted of four 20-pounder Parrott guns, Lieutenant Benjamin, Burnside's chief of artillery; four light 12-pounders, commanded by Buckley; and two 3-inch guns. The assaulting party was composed of three brigades of McLaws' division, with those of Wolford, Humphreys, Anderson and Bogart. They were picked men, the flower of Longstreet's army.

In the gray of the morning of the Nov. 29th, the assault was made, with a vigor and determination not surpassed in the previous history of the war. What with the fierce yells of the Confederates, the rattle of musketry, the screaming of shells, the thunder of artillery, the tumult for a time was awful. The Confederates, as they approached, were received with a deadly fire from the batteries of the fort. Nothing daunted, however, by the destructive missiles which flew thick and fast around them, or by the sight of their fallen comrades, on they pressed, through the abatis, across the ditch and up the parapet, some of them forcing their way through the embrasures. The obstacles encountered, the wire net-work particularly, made their progress slow, and consequently kept them long exposed to the double-shotted guns which Ferrero, the commander of the fort, kept in active play. When the assailants reached the parapet, their ranks were greatly thinned, but their spirits were not subdued. One officer actually reached the summit, and, planting upon it the flag of the Thirteenth Mississippi, called for surrender. It was a vain call; for the next moment his body, pierced by a dozen bullets, the flag still in his hand, was rolling into the ditch. Hand grenades were freely used by the defenders; and they had a terrible effect. The assault, gallant as it was, proved a complete failure. It was tried a second time by another column; but the result was the same. The fighting was discontinued. A truce was granted to the Confederates to carry away their wounded and to bury their dead. Longstreet, still hoping against hope, and unwilling to retire, maintained the siege.*

Meanwhile, relief was coming from Grant to Burnside. Why was this re-

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* The ground in front of the fort was strewn with the dead and wounded. In the ditch alone, were over 200 dead and wounded. "In this terrible ditch," says Pollard, "the dead were piled eight or ten feet deep. In comparatively an instant of time, we lost 700 men in killed and wounded and prisoners. Never, excepting at Gettysburg, was there, in the history of the war, a disaster adorned with the glory of such devout courage, as Longstreet's repulse at Knoxville."
—Third Year of the War, p. 163.
relief so long delayed? On the evening of the 25th, as soon as success at Chattanooga had been assured, Grant had ordered General Gordon Granger to start for the relief of Knoxville, with his own Fourth corps, and detachments from others—20,000 in all. Granger was to move with four days' rations, arrangements having been made to send after him a steamer with supplies. When Grant returned from the front on the 28th he found, much to his astonishment, that Granger had not yet got off, and that he was preparing to move "with reluctance and complaints." Grant fell back upon Sherman, who was ever willing and ever ready. "I am inclined to think," said Grant, in a letter to Sherman, "I shall have to send you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee." When he received the letter from Grant, Sherman was at Calhoun, at the railroad crossing of the Hiawassee. If he had been less of a soldier, he might easily have found cause of complaint. It was only seven days since he had marched his troops from the west side of the Tennessee, with only two days' rations, without change of clothing, with but a single blanket or coat to a man, from himself to the private soldier. What provisions they had were picked up by the way. Murmur or complaint, however, with Sherman, there was none. To hear was to obey. It was enough for him that 12,000 of his fellow-soldiers were beleaguered at Knoxville, eighteen-four miles away, and that, if not relieved within three days, they might be at the mercy of the enemy. With his hardy and untiring veterans, Sherman was quickly on his way. The roads were bad; and, as the pontoon bridge at Loudon had been destroyed, there was unexpected difficulty and consequent delay. After considerable progress had been made, the troops were compelled to turn to the east, and to trust to General Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. A bridge was flung across the Little Tennessee, at Morgan-town; and by daybreak on the Dec. 5th of December, the entire Fifteenth corps was over. Meanwhile the cavalry command, which had moved forward in advance, had reached Knoxville on the 3d of December, the very day on which Burnside expected his supplies would give out. On the night of the 5th, a messenger from Burnside arrived at Sherman's headquarters, announcing that Longstreet was in full retreat towards Virginia, and that the National cavalry were in pursuit. As soon as Sherman's cavalry appeared, Longstreet, discovering that his flank was turned, raised the siege, and retreated towards Russellville in the direction of Virginia. The National cavalry followed for some distance in close pursuit. Thus ended the siege of Knoxville.

Burnside had offered a noble resistance, and had retrieved some of the laurels lost at Fredericksburg. He was not without obligations to Sherman; nor was he ungrateful. In a letter to that general, he fully acknowledged those obligations, and thanked both him and his command for so
promptly coming to his relief. "I am satisfied," he said, "that your approach served to raise the siege." Sherman, too, had great reason to be proud of himself and his command. They had been constantly in motion since they left the Big Black in Mississippi. For long periods they had been without regular rations; and the men had marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur and without a moment’s delay. After a march of over 400 miles, without sleep for three successive nights, they crossed the Tennessee, fought their part in the battle of Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than 120 miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville. After the siege was raised, Sherman, with consent of Burnside, leaving only Granger’s command, fell back to the line of the Hiawassee.

The victories at Chattanooga and Knoxville produced very different states of feeling in the North and the South. There was great indignation among the Confederates; and Bragg, at his own request, was relieved of his command. In the North, joy beamed on every countenance, and gratitude welled up and overflowed from every heart. At the recommendation of the president, the people assembled in their places of worship and rendered thanks to Almighty God "for His great advancement of the National cause." Honors flowed in upon Grant. He received a letter of congratulation from the president. Congress, on the 17th of December, voted him thanks, also a gold medal, which was to be struck "with suitable emblems, devices and inscriptions." In doing him honor, town vied with town, city with city, State with State, over the length and breadth of the Union. He had become the National hero.

The Confederates never recovered from the blow received at Chattanooga. The tide continued to rise and swell and roll against them. It was evident now to all thinking men that the end was rapidly approaching.

Fort Sanders.—This place was named after Brigadier-General William P. Sanders, who received his death-wound while gallantly resisting the attack made on the 18th of November. Sanders was a native of Kentucky, and a graduate of West Point. He had already made himself conspicuous by his deeds of daring, and had secured the confidence both of his superior officers and of the rank and file; but, by his gallantry during the famous and, to him, fatal encounter on the 18th, he won for himself imperishable renown. In his General Field Orders No. 31, and bearing date November 24th, Burnside says: "In memory of the honored dead, the fort in front of which he received his fatal wound will be known hereafter as Fort Sanders." The
CHAPTER XXIX.

Operations in 1862.—T. W. Sherman and Dupont.—James' Island.—Secessionville.—Colonel Lamar.—General Stevens.—The Gallant Seventy-Ninth.—Pocotaligo.—Battle of Secessionville.—Great Bravery of the Highlanders and the Michiganders.—General Mitchell in Command of the Department of the South.—Mitchellville.—Death of Mitchell.—General Brannan and Mitchell's Plans.—General Hunter in Command.—Fort McAllister.—Three Attempts.— Destruction of the Nashville.—A Terrific Fire.—The Fort Invulnerable.—The Attempt Abandoned.—The Case of the Princess Royal.—The Confederate Fleet.—The Mercedita and Keystone State Badly Damaged.—Proclamation of Beauregard and Ingraham.—Judah P. Benjamin.—The Confederate Claim.—The National Government Aroused.—Misunderstanding Between Hunter and Foster.—Preparations for the Attack on Charleston.—The Fortifications.—Their Number and Strength.—Impregnable.—The National Fleet.—Advance of the Fleet.—An Ominous Silence.—Thunders of Artillery.—The Wissahickon.—The New Ironsides.—The Keokuk.—The Montauk and Catskill.—"The Wars of the Titans."—The Fleet Overmatched.—The Keokuk Destroyed.—The Retreat.—Hunter Blamed.—"I Could do Nothing but Pray for You."—Bravery of Dupont.—Fort Sumter the Great Obstacle.—"It Must be got out of the Way."—Quincy A. Gillmore.—The Atlanta.—Great Hopes.—Dupont Prepared for Her Approach.—Great Expectations of the Confederates.—The Weehawken.—Captain Rodgers.—The Atlanta a Prisoner.—Gillmore's Plans.—Dahlgren Succeeds Dupont.—Movements on Land and Water.—Higginson and Terry.—Fort Wagner Attacked.—National Batteries on Folly Island.—Dahlgren's Monitors.—The Confederates Driven From Morris' Island.—Assault on Fort Wagner.—In Vain.—Not to be Taken but by Regular Approaches.—Work Resumed.—Another Assault.—Another Failure.—The Jaws of Death.—The Beach Covered with the Dead and Dying.—Parallels.—Closer and Closer.—Gillmore's Preparations Completed.—Twelve Batteries.—Twenty-Eight Heavy Guns and Twelve Mortars.—An Artillery Duel.—Fort Sumter Demolished.—The Fourth Parallel.—Calcium Lights.—Preparations for the Final Assault on Fort Wagner.—Forts Wagner and Gregg Abandoned.—Feigned Expenditure of Shot and Shell.—Attempt to Occupy Fort Sumter.—A Disastrous Enterprise.—Two Hundred Men Killed, Wounded or Captured.—Operations Discontinued.—The Position Held.—Not a Victory, but a Gain.—The Blockade Made Secure.

In previous chapters of this work, we have described at some length the more important naval and coast operations which were conducted in 1861, and in the earlier months of 1862, special attention being given to the expedition under Butler and Farragut, to that under T. W. Sherman and Dupont, and to that under Burnside and Goldsborough. Success more or less brilliant attended them all; and, as early as the 12th of April, 1862, the first anniversary of the attack on Fort Sumter, the entire Atlantic and Gulf coasts, from Cape Hatteras to Perdido Bay, excepting only the harbor of Charleston and its immediate surroundings, had been abandoned by the Confederates. Along that whole line, the National power was supreme.

Early in 1862, Hunter had succeeded T. W. Sherman in command of the department of the South. Hunter was bent on doing something which might pave the way to the reduction of Charleston. It would have been vain for Dupont, with the fleet at his command, to make any direct attempt to pass the forts. It was deemed advisable, however, to take possession of Wadmalaw Island, also John's and James' Islands, and to advance on Charleston.
May 20. The gunboats Unadilla, Pembina and Ottawa crossed the bar at the mouth of the Stono River, and proceeded up that stream as far as its junction with Wappoo Creek, only a few miles from Charleston. This expedition might have been attended with some success if the gunboats had been supported by land troops. It was nearly a fortnight, however, after the gunboats had reached Wappoo, when a portion of the troops, commanded by General Benham, accompanied by General Hunter himself, landed on James' Island. It was a week later when General Wright arrived with the remainder. Simultaneously with these movements, General Stevens made a successful raid in the direction of Pocotaligo, destroying several miles of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad.

The appearance of the gunboats at Wappoo, without a supporting land force, was a benefit rather than an inconvenience to the Confederates. It served to warn them of the intention of the National commander. They were already in a strong position at Secessionville, a delightful little village, about two miles from the Stono, almost surrounded by water, and accessible by land only on its western side. At this place, the Confederates, under Colonel J. G. Lamar, taking advantage of the time afforded them by the non-arrival of the land forces, constructed a formidable battery. Benham, as soon as he got his troops in order, resolved to carry the battery by assault. It was a week, and the morning of the 11th was fixed for the attack. Lamar, however, commenced offensive operations the evening before. Some skirmishing followed; and the meditated attack was postponed. After having made a vain attempt to silence the Confederate guns by a battery which he hurriedly constructed, Benham fell back on his original plan of assault. By this time Stevens had returned, with his troops, from Pocotaligo. On the morning of the 16th, Stevens, with about 3000 men, supported by General Wright, with about the same number, advanced to the attack. The Eighth Michigan led the way, followed close by the Seventy-Ninth New York Highlanders. It was a perilous movement. The Confederate battery could only be reached by pressing along a narrow strip of land. The Confederate pickets were easily captured; and it was hoped that the garrison, also, might be surprised and made prisoners. Lamar, however, was watchful and well prepared. As soon as the National troops began to press along the narrow strip of land which led to the battery, he opened upon them a murderous fire of grape and canister from six masked guns. The brave Michigan men and the undaunted Highlanders essayed to advance; but, in addition to this pitiless storm of destructive missiles in their front, they found themselves exposed to a severe musketry fire on their right flank. Progress was impossible. General Wright's troops came up; and, in the struggle which ensued, they took an active part. It was soon discovered,
However, that the works were too strong to be taken by assault, and that to prolong the struggle was only to make a useless sacrifice of human life. The Nationals, therefore, fell back, having lost in the brief encounter about 600 men. Such was the battle of Secessionville. Soon afterwards James' Island was abandoned by the Nationals; and, for a period, no further efforts were made against Charleston.

In the fall of 1862, General O. M. Mitchell, who had been called to Washington City from Tennessee, took command of the department of the South, thus superseding Hunter. On the 16th of September he reached Hilton Head, and established his headquarters in the house occupied by his predecessor. The place was swarming with negroes who had escaped from their owners; and Mitchell, with his usual vigor, at once took measures to make the disorganized, idle crowd more comfortable and more useful. The little town of Mitchellville soon gave evidence of the taste and humanity as well as the energy of the new commander. Mitchell was actively preparing for a decisive campaign against Charleston, when he was cut short in his work by an attack of yellow fever. He was removed to the more healthful locality of Beaufort; but he died or the 30th of October, having been in his new command only some six weeks.

Late in October, an attempt was made, under the direction of General Brannan, to carry out one of Mitchell's plans. Brannan set out with an effective force of about 4500 men. His final objective was Charleston. His immediate purpose was to reach Pocotaligo, and at that place destroy the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. Embarking at Hilton Head on gunboats and transports, he proceeded up the Broad River to the Coosawhatchie, and pushed on to Pocotaligo with but little difficulty. There he encountered

* In no battle during the whole war was greater bravery displayed than was witnessed that morning at Secessionville. A graphic picture of the affair was given at the time by a correspondent of the New York Herald. It was the 16th of June, and about half-past two o'clock in the morning, when General Stevens moved to the attack. When about four hundred yards from the fort, the Confederate guns, as has been mentioned in the text, opened a tremendous fire. The attacking column was terribly cut up, the Eighth Michigan suffering most severely. Nothing daunted, what remained of the Eighth Michigan, the Seventy-Ninth New York Highlanders, the One Hundredth Pennsylvania, the Twenty-Eighth Massachusetts, with portions of the Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Sixth New York, pressed forward, Captains Ely and Doyle, and Lieu-tenant-Colonel Morrison, mounting the parapet of the work. "Here," says the Herald correspondent, "lasted for a few moments the most exciting scene my pen has ever attempted to describe. When the Highlanders heard of the terrible slaughter of the Eighth Michigan, with whom they had for many months been brigaded, they could not be restrained, but advanced with the utmost promptness to the support of their old comrades. Colonel Morrison, whose horse was shot early in the action, led up his men on foot, shouting, 'Come on, Highlanders!' and with Lieutenant Lyons, of General Stevens' staff, was the first to scale the walls and mount the parapet of the fort. Both were wounded—Colonel Morrison in the head, the bullet entering at the temple and coming out behind the right ear, and Lieutenant Lyons severely in the arm. Captain Doyle was severely wounded; and Captains Guild, Pratt and Church were killed. It was while endeavoring to scale these works that Captain Hitchcock, of the Seventh Connecticut, was shot down. Nevertheless, the men went up, walking unflinchingly into the jaws of death. But very few escaped, and those only with garments riddled with balls. Colonel Morrison, even after he was wounded, discharged the entire contents of his revolver at the force within, and had the satisfaction of killing one rebel as he was endeavoring to screen himself in one of the numerous 'rat-holes,' with which the interior of the work abounded."

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the Confederate pickets; and, although he managed to drive them before him, he was unable to prevent them from burning the bridges in their rear, and thus interposing serious obstacles to his further advance. A heavy fire having been opened upon him by General W. S. Walker's artillery, which was supported by a powerful infantry force, Brannan, taking counsel from prudence, fell back to Mackay's Landing, where he re-embarked for Hilton Head. This expedition, which proved utterly fruitless, cost the Nationals at least 300 men.

On the death of Mitchell, Hunter resumed command of the department of the South. Charleston Harbor was still the great object of attention. Its continued and successful resistance to the National forces was a fruitful source of annoyance to the authorities at Washington. It was one of the original cradles of the rebellion; its precipitate action had plunged the nation into all the calamities of the Civil War; and, so long as it remained an integral part of the Confederacy, it involved the neutralization of an army of 30,000 men. It was of the utmost importance that the forts in the harbor should be reduced, and the National authority restored in the city and neighborhood.

It was not until the spring of 1863, that any vigorous operations were made in the direction of Charleston. Several attempts, however, were made early, in the year, to reduce Fort McAllister. This was a strong work, which was constructed at Genesis Point, on the Great Ogeechee River; and, under its cover lay the steamer Nashville, which was waiting to run the blockade and play the part of a privateer. On the morning of Jan. 27, in obedience to instructions from Admiral Du Pont, Commander Worden, of Hampton Roads renown, pushed up the river with the monitor Montauk, supported by several small gunboats, and a mortar schooner, and opened fire upon the fort. The work was found to be strong beyond expectation. It was a casemated earth-work, with bomb proofs, and mounting nine guns. Owing to obstructions in the river, the Montauk was unable to advance within effective range. The guns of the fort were well handled. The Montauk was struck thirteen times, but received no injury. Having expended her shells, she retired. A second attempt was made by Worden on the 1st of February. On this occasion, the Montauk engaged the fort at the distance of 1400 yards. Her well-directed fire did some damage to the parapets of the fort. She was herself struck some sixty-one times, without being materially injured. Feb. 1.

On the 27th of February a third attempt was made, and was attended with more success. A reconnoissance having been made, it was discovered that the Nashville was grounded a short distance above the fort; and Worden, with the Montauk, followed by the Seneca, Wissahickon and Dawn, moved up the river as far as the obstructions would permit, and opened fire upon the Nashville. His 12 and 15-inch shells fell with destructive
effect upon the doomed ship; and in less than twenty minutes she was in flames. One by one her heavy guns exploded with the heat; her magazine blew up; and in less than an hour, the dreaded privateer was almost invisible. The Montauk was struck five times by the heavy shot from the fort, and when beyond the range of the guns a torpedo exploded under her; but she sustained comparatively little injury. In this effort, Mar. Worden did not lose a man. On the 3d of March, another and even more formidable attempt was made against the fort. Dupont was greatly encouraged by the success which had attended Worden; and, as his fleet had been reinforced by the arrival of additional iron-clads, he resolved to subject their mechanical appliances to the full test of active service before entering upon more important operations. The expedition, which consisted of four monitors and several mortar schooners, was placed under the direction of Commander Drayton. The Passaic led the way, with Drayton on board, being closely followed by the Patapsco, Commander Ammen, and by the Nahant, Commander Downes. By means of skilful pilotage, the Passaic was brought up to within 1000 yards of the fort. It was not found possible to bring the other boats so near. The firing commenced shortly after eight o'clock, and was continued all day and during the night of the 3d. About 250 shot and shell were thrown into the fort; and the fire of the fort fell heavily on the Passaic, the other vessels being somewhat out of easy range. But little impression, however, was made on either side. Drayton was making but little impression on Fort McAllister; and the shot from the fort was rattling harmlessly on the turret and iron-bound sides of the Passaic. On the second day the attack was abandoned. The Passaic bore away with her some traces of the struggle. Where she was struck by the bullets of the fort, there were some deep indentations, and some of the bolts had been started by the violence of the concussion. It was Drayton's opinion that the fort could not be made untenable by any number of iron-clads, because the shallow water and narrow space would not permit them to be brought into position against it.

There were other operations connected with the blockade of the Southern ports, some of which were of greater, some of lesser importance. On the 29th of January, an English blockade-runner, the Princess Royal, attempted to run into Charleston Harbor. She had come from Bermuda with a valuable cargo, having on board two marine engines, several rifled guns, and large quantities of arms, munitions and medicines. She fell an easy prey to the blockading fleet. The loss of this vessel was a severe blow to the Confederates. It greatly enraged them; and efforts were at once made for its recapture. On the morning of the 31st, the rams, Palmetto State, Lieutenant Rutledge, and Chicora, Commander Tucker, ran out from Charleston by
the main ship-channel, and under a thick haze, surprised the blockading fleet. That fleet then consisted of the steamers Housatonic, Mercedita, Ottawa, Unadilla, Keystone State, Quaker City, Memphis, Augusta, Steet tin and Flag. The Mercedita was the first to suffer. The Palmetto State ran into her with great force, at the moment of contact, sending into her a 7-inch shell, which made a hole in her side from four to five feet square, and penetrated her steam-drum. Most of those on board were scalded by the steam, and several were killed outright. The officers and crew of the Mercedita had no choice but surrender. The Palmetto State then rushed upon the Keystone State, which was at the same time attacked by the Chicora. The Keystone State made a vigorous resistance; but when in the act of bearing down upon the nearest ram, with the intention of striking and at the same moment opening a plunging fire, she was hit by a heavy shot, which passed through her steam-chest. Neither the Mercedita nor the Keystone State was lost to the Union. The former, unaided, succeeded in making her way to Port Royal; the latter was taken in tow by the Memphis, and moved to the same place in a very crippled condition.

It was at this time that a joint proclamation was issued by General Beauregard, then in charge of Charleston, and Flag-Officer Ingraham, then commanding the naval forces of South Carolina, declaring the blockade of Charleston "to be raised by a superior force of the Confederate States." Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, at the same time issued a circular to the foreign consuls in the Confederacy, reiterating the claim of Beauregard and Ingraham. "This," added Benjamin, "is for the information of such vessels of your nation, as may choose to carry on commerce with the now open port of Charleston."

Such a claim, made at such a time, had a powerful effect in rousing up the government at Washington. General Hunter and Admiral Dupont received instructions to make an attack on Charleston without further delay; and General Foster, with the greater portion of the Eighteenth corps, was ordered from North Carolina to the assistance of the naval commander. Halleck had, unfortunately, neglected to write to Hunter, informing him of the instructions which he had given to Foster; and the result was that when Foster arrived, Hunter regarded him as an intruder. Foster, at his own request, was ultimately allowed to return to his department, his troops remaining as reinforcements to Hunter. While these events were occurring, Dupont was making vigorous preparations for the attack.

It was now Sunday, the 5th day of April. On the night of that April day, under the light of a full moon, the National fleet, consisting of fourteen vessels, anchored off Charleston bar. There were seven Ericsson monitors, another iron-clad, called the Keokuk, constructed on a new prin
ciple, and the frigate Ironsides. Du-
pont was on board the James Adger.
The National fleet had 32 guns in all. Such a fleet, as the result proved,
was totally inadequate to the task
which it was called upon to perform.
Charleston Harbor was fortified almost
to perfection. It was well fortified at
the commencement of the war, as the
reader has already learned; but it had
now been long under the special care
of General Beauregard, and his genius
had made it, if not absolutely impreg-
nable, at least proof against any attack
which could be made against it by the
National forces.

The forts which guarded the harbor
were numerous and strong. There
was one on the outward extremity of
Sullivan’s Island and guarding Maffit’s
Channel. There was another strong
sand battery on the same island,
ear the Moultrie House, called Fort
Beauregard. A little further to the
westward was Fort Moultrie; and still
on Sullivan’s Island, but yet more to
the west, was a strong earth-work,
called Battery Bee. On the mainland,
at Mount Pleasant, was another strong
battery; and in front of Charleston,
about a mile from the city, was old
Castle Pinckney. In the channel, be-
tween Sullivan’s and Morris’ Islands,
stood Fort Sumter, the most formid-
able of all the works. On the southern
side of the harbor, and near the city,
was the Wappoo battery, on James’
Island, commanding the mouth of the
Ashley River. To the right of this,
and on the same island, was Fort John-
son; and about half way between the
last-named fort and Castle Pinckney,
on a submerged sand bank, which was
called the “Middle Ground,” stood
Fort Ripley. In addition to these,
there were Battery Gregg, on Morris’
Island, at what is called Cummings’
Point; Fort Wagner, about a mile to
the south, and another powerful bat-
tery at Lighthouse Inlet. The forts
mounted, in all, some 300 guns. The
channels, too, were blocked with heavy
chains made of railroad iron; a rope,
buoyed up by empty casks, extended
from Fort Ripley to Fort Sumter; and
the entire waters were filled with tor-
pedoes. Such were the contrivances
which barred the entrance to Charle-
ston Harbor in the spring of 1863.

That the harbor was well guarded,
Dupont was well aware; but of the
nature and extent of the works he
had no exact knowledge. On the
morning of the 7th of April, the April
fleet, well brought together, lay
within the bar in the main channel.
It was noon on that day, before the
signal was given to weigh anchor. The
Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers,
led the way. The other monitors fol-
lowed in the order here given: Passaic,
Captain Percival Drayton; Montauk,
Commander John L. Worden; Pataps-
co, Commander Daniel Auneen; New
Ironsides, Commander Thomas Turner;
Catskill, Commander G. W. Rodgers;
Nantucket, Commander Donald M.
Fairfax; Nahant, Commander John
Downes; Keokuk, Lieutenant-Com-
mander A. C. Rhind. The gunboats
were the Canandaigua, Captain J. H.
Green; Housatonic, Captain W R. Tay-
lor; Unadilla, Lieutenant-Commander S. P. Quackenbush; Wissahickon, Lieutenant-Commander J. G. Davis; Huron, Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Stevens. It was Dupont's intention to disregard the batteries on Morris' Island, to attack the northwest face of Fort Sumter, and to force his way up to the city. He was as yet ignorant of the great hawser, and its dreadful appendages, which lay in the path he had prescribed. The Weehawken had a raft-like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding torpedoes. Scarce-ly had the vessels commenced to move, when the Weehawken, hindered in her movements by the raft at her bow, was brought to a standstill. The other vessels were obstructed by the Weehawken; and nearly an hour elapsed before they were all again under way. As they steered towards the entrance of the inner harbor, an ominous silence prevailed, not a shot being fired either from the forts or from the fleet. At about fifty minutes past two, just as the leading vessel was becoming entangled in the horrid net-work of obstructions, the silence was broken; and Fort Moultrie began to thunder. A few moments afterwards the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Morris' Island and Fort Sumter also opened fire. The Weehawken, in the midst of the ob-structions, could not advance; and to remain under this concentric fire would be fatal. Rodgers, therefore, withdrew his vessel; and, followed by the others, he attempted to pass by Fort Sumter, on the southern side.

He soon found his way blocked by the rows of piles which extended between the fort and Cummings' Point. At this stage the New Ironsides, in attempting to turn, was caught in the tide-way, and refused to obey her rudder. The Catskill and Nantucket, who were in her wake, fell foul of her; and, for some fifteen minutes, they remained in this helpless condition, exposed to the enemy's fire.

Dupont, before he commenced the action, had transferred his headquarters from the James Adger to the New Ironsides. Finding himself thus entangled, and compelled to come to anchor, he signalled to the other vessels to disregard the flag-ship, and take such positions as might seem best suited for effective work. This was done at once; and, shortly before four o'clock, the remaining eight vessels were ranged on the northeast of Fort Sumter, at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards. In this position, they were fully commanded by Forts Beauregard, Moultrie and Sumter, Battery Bee and Fort Wagner—a concentrated fire of at least 76 guns. The eight iron-clads could oppose to this fire not more than 16 guns. It seemed already a hopeless struggle. The iron-clads, however, went resolutely to work, bringing their fire to bear chiefly on Fort Sumter. Rhind ran the little Keokuk ahead of all the others, and came within 500 yards of the fort, hurling against it her immense projectiles. The Montauk and Catskill were close in her wake. It was impossible, however, for the fleet long to maintain the un-
equal struggle. The forts and earthworks were armed with guns of the largest calibre, and of the very best construction. "There was something almost pathetic," wrote an eye-witness, "in the spectacle of those little floating circular towers, exposed to the crushing weight of those tons of metal, hurled against them with the terrific force of modern projectiles, and with such charges of powder as were never before dreamed of in artillery firing." It recalled the pictures of the wars of the Titans, in the old mythologies.

The contest lasted about forty minutes, not one of the guns having been under fire for a longer period. In that brief space of time, five of the ironclads were wholly or partially disabled. The Keokuk, which was of a peculiar construction, and had two turrets, was struck ninety-nine times, nineteen shots piercing her at and below the waterline. Her turrets were riddled, and both her guns disabled. She had only been able to return three shots. This vessel, which was with difficulty kept afloat during the night by means of her pumps, sank next morning. The Passaic was struck twenty-seven times; and her turret was, for a time, so jammed that it could not be turned. The Nahant was also terribly punished, her turret being effectually jammed, and her pilot-house shattered. The Patapsco lost the use of her riflegun after the fifth fire. The Nantucket had her 15-inch gun permanently disabled after the third fire. The casualties were few. There was but one man killed—the quartermaster of the Nahant. In all, there were 29 wounded. It was the conviction of all the officers that any further attempt would be folly. It was Dupont's belief that if the attack had been prolonged one half hour, the fleet would have been disabled, and some of them at least left in the hands of the enemy. Worden was of the same opinion. "Charleston," he said, "cannot be taken by the naval force now present." The contest was, therefore, abandoned; and, on the April 12th, the entire fleet, with the exception of the New Ironsides, which anchored outside Charleston bar, returned to Port Royal for repairs. During the brief struggle the forts, from 76 guns, fired 2209 times; the ironclads, from 14 guns, fired 139 times.

It was the opinion of some, at the time, that this attack might have resulted differently if Dupont had been vigorously supported by Hunter with a land force on Morris Island. Hunter, it was thought, might have given the garrisons of Battery Gregg and Fort Wagner occupation, while the fleet was attacking Fort Sumter. It is doubtful whether such a diversion would have materially affected the result. Certain it is that the land troops did nothing. "I could do nothing but pray for you," wrote Hunter to Dupont the day after the fight, "which, believe me, I did most heartily."

It had now become apparent to the authorities at Washington, that it was vain to attempt to force a passage to Charleston so long as Fort Sumter guarded the channel. The reduction
of that fort, therefore, became with them a fixed purpose. A change was made in the commanders. General Q. A. Gillmore, who had distinguished himself the year before by the capture of Fort Pulaski, replacing General Hunter, assumed command of the department of the South; and Admiral Dahlgren took the place of Dupont.

Before the arrival of the new commanders, Dupont had the good fortune to capture the dreaded Confederate warrior ship, the Atlanta. That vessel had originally been a blockade-runner, bearing the name of Fingal, and had been built on the Clyde. She had managed to run up the Savannah River, about eighteen months before, with a valuable cargo, but had found it impossible again to get out to sea. The Confederates had converted her into a war ship, arming her with a thick coat of oak and pine, and covering her with heavy bars of iron. She carried four guns of large calibre, and was furnished with a powerful beak. Commanded by Lieutenant A. Webb, formerly of the National navy, who had under him a crew of 160 men, it was believed by the Confederates that the Atlanta would be a match for at least any two monitors then afloat. It was reported to Dupont that the alterations on this vessel had been completed, and that she was about to force her way out to sea. Dupont resolved to watch her movements; and, with this end in view, he sent the Weehawken, Captain Rodgers, and the Nahant, Commander Downes, to Warsaw Sound.

On the morning of the 17th of June, the Atlanta was discovered to be moving down the Savannah River, her intention evidently being to fall, with all her force, on the two monitors. She was accompanied by two wooden gunboats of Tattnall’s Mosquito fleet, which were crowded with people who had come down from Savannah, expecting to see their favorite vessel win an easy victory over the “Yankee” monitors. Their expectations were not to be realized. The Weehawken was singled out for the first blow. The ram is pushing swiftly forward. The Weehawken reserves her fire. Rodgers himself is sighting one of her heavy guns. Her powerful antagonist is now within easy range. The Weehawken opens fire. Rodgers has aimed well. The first shot—a 15-inch solid—has carried away the top of the Atlanta’s pilot-house, wounded two of her pilots, and sent the vessel aground. In less than fifteen minutes, the Atlanta is prisoner to the Weehawken, Rodgers having fired only five shots in all. The Atlanta was badly damaged, the last shot having struck her point-blank. So terrific was the impact that it bent in the iron armor, shivering the twelve inches of live oak and the five inches of Georgia pine. The Atlanta was afterwards taken to Philadelphia and exhibited.

On his arrival at Hilton Head, Gillmore found that he had an available force of near 18,000 men. After picketing a line along the coast, about 250 miles in length, and establishing posts at different points, he could still count
on an effective force of 11,000 men, mostly veterans. He had 66 guns and 30 mortars. Dahlgren had at his disposal the frigate Ironsides and six monitors, three of which were being repaired at Port Royal. With these means of offensive warfare, it was resolved to renew the attempt on Fort Sumter.

Gillmore proposed to seize the southern end of Morris’ Island, and, with the aid of the fleet, to capture Fort Wagner, a strong work near the north end, and afterwards Fort Gregg, which was beyond. These captured, it was his belief that he would be able to accomplish the destruction of Fort Sumter by shore batteries. His first movement was to erect strong batteries on the northern end of Folly Island. General Vogdes, whom he found there with a considerable body of troops, had already constructed, on the south end of the island, a battery which commanded the mouth of the Stono River. The new batteries were completed by the beginning of July. They were made of sand and marsh sod, and were very strong, being embosured and rivetted, and provided with magazines and bomb and splinter proofs. Forty-eight heavy guns were quickly got into position; and each was furnished with 200 rounds of ammunition.

It was necessary for Gillmore to disguise, as much as possible, his real intention. With this end in view, and in the hope that he might be able to distract the attention of the Confederates, he ordered General A. H. Terry to take with him 6000 troops, to proceed up the Stono River, and make a demonstration on James’ Island. Colonel Higginson was, at the same time, sent up the Edisto with a body of negro troops, with instructions to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. Higginson was compelled to fall back, without having accomplished his purpose. Terry had better success. His troops were placed on the island without difficulty; and, on the night of the 9th of July, 2000 men, under General Strong, were transferred in boats down Folly River, to the junction of that stream with Lighthouse Inlet. At daylight on the 10th, the batteries which had been erected on the north end of Folly Island, and Dahlgren’s monitors, simultaneously opened fire on Fort Wagner. Every shot from the 15-inch guns of the monitors sent a mass of rubbish into the air. Clouds of dust and smoke hung over the fort. Up to this time, Strong and his men had been lying in concealment. After a two hours’ cannonade, and while the attention of the Confederates was still occupied by the firing from the batteries on the north of Folly Island, and from the monitors, Strong threw his men rapidly ashore; and, by nine o’clock in the morning, he was in full possession of the Confederate works on the southern end of Morris’ Island, with 11 guns and much camp equipage. The Confederates fled to Fort Wagner, the Nationals pursuing as far as the Beacon House, where they were within range of the guns of the fort. There they
halted, Strong resolving not to attack Fort Wagner until the next day. Shortly after daylight, on July 11th, the assault was gallantly made. It seemed for a time as if success was about to attend the effort. Some of the brave fellows had actually reached the parapet. There, however, they were met by a fire so withering that they were compelled to fall back.

It was now evident to the National commander that Fort Wagner was not to be easily taken. Gillmore commenced at once to make preparations to assail it by regular approaches. The island was narrow; and, while he had no reason to dread any flank movements, he could rely on the effective co-operation of the fleet. On the 16th, July 16. General Terry was vigorously attacked by a Confederate force, under General Hazard; but, being assisted by the gunboats in Stono and Folly Rivers, he successfully resisted and ultimately repelled his assailants. Terry's operations on James' Island were, as has been mentioned, originally intended as a feint. His object having been accomplished, he withdrew his troops, according to previous arrangement, and joined the main force on Morris' Island, under Gillmore, who was about to repeat the attack on Fort Wagner.

July 18. It was now the 18th of July. About noon of that day, the batteries, which Gillmore had constructed across the island, opened fire upon the fort. At the same time, Dahlgren moved up his monitors, and opened fire on both Fort Sumter and Fort Wagner. Both forts replied—the latter feebly, and only from two guns. The garrison, fully persuaded that the bombardment was only a preliminary to another assault by troops, had taken shelter in their bomb-proofs. To the Nationals, it seemed as if the garrison must be demoralized. An assault was therefore resolved upon. Darkness was now approaching; and, as the cannonade ceased, there burst forth a tremendous thunderstorm. Whatever might be the condition of the garrison, it was observed that the flag was flying over the fort. The twilight was deepening, and the thunderstorm still raging, when the storming party commenced to move forward. Strong's brigade moved first, and was followed by that of Putnam. Strong's brigade consisted of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts, a colored regiment, commanded by Colonel Robert G. Shaw; the Sixth Connecticut; the Forty-Eighth New York; the Third New Hampshire; the Seventy-Sixth Pennsylvania and the Ninth Maine. The distance to be passed was about 1800 yards. When the head of the column was within 200 yards of the fort, the Confederates opened fire. With undaunted courage, their comrades falling at every step, the Nationals pressed forward. They had almost reached the ditch when the parapet blazed with musketry. The second parapet was reached, and the National standard was planted. One second more, and both standard and standard-bearer had disappeared. Shaw was killed; Strong was mortally wounded. The brigade was torn to pieces, the colored regiment being almost annihi-
lated. Putnam, with the Seventh New Hampshire, the Sixty-Second and Sixty-Seventh Ohio, and the One Hundredth New York, rushed forward and renewed the assault. It was a vain effort—a rush into the jaws of death. Putnam fell at the head of his troops; and nearly all his subordinates were killed or wounded. The remains of the shattered brigades fell back into the sheltering darkness; and the contest ceased. The ocean beach was covered with the dead and dying. The National loss fell little short of 1500; the Confederates did not lose in the struggle more than 100 men.

Abandoning the idea of assault, Gillmore pushed forward the works with great energy. The first parallel was opened at 1300 yards from Fort Wagner. Soon afterwards was completed the second at 600 yards. The guns of this parallel were trained not only on Wagner, but on Sumter and Battery Gregg. On the 9th of August, a third parallel was commenced about 330 yards in advance of the right of the second. In addition to the works on the parallels, Gillmore had, after great difficulty, constructed a battery on the marsh, on the west of Morris' Island. On this battery he had placed an 8-inch rifled Parrott gun, called by the soldiers, "The Swamp Angel." From this gun, shells could be thrown into Charleston, some five miles distant. Beauregard, however, was better supplied with the means of resistance than Gillmore was with the means of attack. He had, perhaps, double the number of men, and five times as much artillery.

By this time, the firing from all the Confederate works—from the batteries on James' Island, from Wagner, Gregg and Sumter—had become continuous and severe. Gillmore's preparations, however, were now completed. He had in readiness 12 batteries, mounting 28 heavy guns, and 12 mortars. Aug. 17.

On the 17th, aided by Dahlgren's gunboats, he opened fire upon Sumter, Wagner and Gregg. Sumter was the chief object of attention. The firing was renewed every morning until the 24th. The total number of shots fired against Sumter up to that date was 5750, of which 1336 missed. On that day, Gillmore sent a despatch to Halleck, informing him of the result. "Fort Sumter," he said "is, to-day, a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins." This was the opinion of the Confederates themselves. The artillers were, therefore, withdrawn from the work; and it was garrisoned by a body of infantry.

Gillmore's attention was now given to Fort Wagner. While his heavy shot was battering down the walls of Fort Sumter, he had been busy constructing his fourth parallel. It was now completed; and he was able to plant his guns within 300 yards of the fort on his front. About 100 yards in front of him was a ridge of sand dunes, from behind which the Confederate sharp shooters kept up an incessant fire, greatly to the annoyance of the men engaged in the advance parallel. The ridge, however, was easily cleared; and a fifth parallel was established at its base. At this point, the island is only
twenty-five yards wide, and barely two feet high. In rough weather, this part of the island is swept by the sea. It was becoming more and more difficult for the men to push forward the sap, exposed, as they were, to the converging fire from Fort Wagner and to the flank fire from James' Island. Gillmore had become fully convinced that another assault was necessary. His preparations were already completed. The light mortars were moved to the front and placed in battery; the advanced trenches were enlarged; the rifled guns in the left breaching batteries were trained upon the fort; and calcium lights were prepared, for the double purpose of giving aid to the cannoneers and sharpshooters and of dazzling the eyes of the enemy. At dawn, on the 5th of September, the New Ironsides, Captain Rowan, moved up to within 1000 yards of the sea face of the fort; and simultaneously his broadsides of eight guns, carrying 11-inch shells, and the land batteries, opened upon the parapet. For forty-two consecutive hours the bombardment was continued. In a few hours after the firing commenced, the garrison abandoned their guns and took refuge in the bomb-proof. The final assault was to be made on the morning of the 9th. All things were in readiness, when it became known that the fort was evacuated. Fort Gregg, it was afterwards discovered, was also abandoned. There were left in Wagner eighteen guns; in Gregg, seven. During the two days, 122,300 pounds of metal in the shape of shot and shell had rained upon the fort; yet the bomb-proof was substantially uninjured. The forts were immediately occupied by the National troops; and General Gillmore was able to congratulate his men, by telling them that the whole of Morris' Island was in their hands, and that the city and harbor of Charleston were at the mercy of their artillery.

On the night of the 8th of September, an expedition of thirty boats was sent from the fleet to take possession of Fort Sumter. It was under the command of Commander Stephens, of the Patapsco. It was a disastrous enterprise. Three of the boats' crews had landed. In the belief that the garrison had abandoned the fort, they were attempting to run up the steep ruins to the parapet, when they were greeted with a tremendous fire. Two hundred of the assailants were killed, wounded or captured. In their hurried retreat, the Nationals left behind them four boats and three colors. Gillmore maintained and strengthened his position; but no further active efforts were made against Charleston during the remainder of the year. Gillmore's work had not been wholly fruitless. He had not captured Charleston; he had not made himself complete master of the harbor; but he had made the blockade secure.
In an earlier portion of this work we found it convenient to group together some minor engagements which, not having direct connection with any of the great battles or campaigns, and not of sufficient consequence to be treated in separate chapters, were yet too important to be altogether overlooked. In order to cover some such engagements which took place at different times in the year 1863, that example will, in this chapter, be followed.

At the close of 1862, Major-General John J. Peck was in command of 9000 men at Suffolk. The Confederate generals, Pettigrew and French, with about 15,000 men, were at the same time on the line of the Blackwater, threatening Peck's position. Peck took such pains to construct defenses for Suffolk, that the authorities at Richmond believed he was preparing a base of operations for a movement against that city, in co-operation with the army of the Potomac. Counter-vailing measures, in consequence, were immediately adopted. A series of fortifications were thrown up from the line of the Blackwater to Fort Powhatan, on the James River; and in February, 1863, General Longstreet was placed in command of all
the Confederate troops in that region. He had under him a force of about 30,000 men. The better to conceal his purpose, and in order to distract the attention and divide the forces of the National commanders at Suffolk and at Fortress Monroe, where General Dix was in command, Longstreet, early in April, caused it to be reported that he had gone to South Carolina, while D. H. Hill was ordered to attack Little Washington, and menace New Berne. Longstreet, having been informed by spies that General Foster, who had succeeded Burnside in command in that department, had ordered Peck to send 3000 men to oppose Hill, deemed it a fitting opportunity to carry out his purpose in Suffolk. Peck, however, was prepared; he had penetrated Longstreet's designs, and notified Foster accordingly. Having been reinforced by a division under General Getty, he was about to send the required number of troops, when he learned from General Viele, who had captured a Confederate mail at Norfolk, that Hill's movement was only intended as a feint. The detachment was, therefore, detained; and Admiral Lee, in obedience to orders, sent several gunboats up the Nansemond, to co-operate with the land forces in the defense of Suffolk. Longstreet resolved to concentrate his strength and carry the place by assault; Hill was recalled from North Carolina, the besiegers now numbering about 40,000 men. Batteries were thrown up under cover of the darkness; and fire was opened upon the boats in the river. The gunboats, however, were bravely handled; the land forces, with equal gallantry, performed their part; and, by the resistance thus offered, the assailants, although overwhelmingly superior in numbers, were successfully held in check. For twenty-four days the siege continued, deeds of great daring being performed on both sides. Longstreet put forth his best efforts, and taxed his skill to the utmost to accomplish his object; but it was all in vain. Finding it impossible to give effect to his purpose, he turned his back upon Peck and retreated. It was now the 3d of May—the day on which Hooker and Lee had their severe battle at Chancellorsville. The Confederates were pursued as far as the Blackwater. Thus ended the siege of Suffolk, "which had for its object the recovery of the whole country south of the James River, extending to Albemarle Sound, in North Carolina, the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, eighty miles of new railroad iron, the equipment of two roads, and the capture of all the United States forces and property, with some thousands of contrabands." It is hardly possible to overestimate the great services rendered by Peck and his brave garrison at Suffolk. If the resistance had been less stubborn, Longstreet might have been able to rejoin Lee at Chancellorsville in time to accomplish the destruction of the army of the Potomac. His appearance at Chancellorsville on the 2d or on the 3d of May would certainly have proved a calamity to the National cause.
No account has yet been given in these pages of the famous raid made by the Confederate partisan ranger, General Morgan, into the States of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. In the month of June, and before the armies of Rosecranz and Bragg came into collision at Chickamauga, Morgan, with about 3000 mounted men and six guns, pushed across the Cumberland River, at Barksville, and advanced towards Columbia. At that place, he was encountered and held in check for some three hours by a small body of cavalry, under Captain Custer. After the death of Custer, who was unfortunately killed in the affray, the Nationals fell back, leaving Morgan to pursue his devastating march. At Green River, Morgan came into contact with Colonel Moore, who was at the head of 200 Michiganers, and well entrenched. A severe encounter ensued, the raiders being repulsed, with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. Morgan now moved in the direction of Lebanon, which was held by Colonel Hanson and the Twentieth Kentucky. The regiment was small in numbers; but Hanson, for some hours, was able to make a brave resistance. The raiders fired the town, and Hanson and his men were captured. Pushing on through Springfield and Bardstown, Morgan's advance reached Brandenburg on the 7th of July. There he seized two steamers, the Alice Dean and McCombs, and, getting his men on board, proceeded across the river. His force had now increased to eleven regiments, numbering over 4000 men, with ten pieces of artillery, including two howitzers. After burning the Alice Dean and the wharf at Brandenburg, the raiders pushed on towards the north, in the direction of Corydon, a small place in Indiana.

Meanwhile, General Hobson, with a force equal in numbers to that of Morgan, was following in close pursuit. Hobson arrived in time to see the blazing wreck in the stream. Morgan had crossed on the 8th. On the day following, Hobson, with his little band, was on the soil of Indiana. A considerable portion of General Judah's division, which had been stationed in Kentucky, between the Cumberland and Barren Rivers, was also concentrated and put in motion for the capture of Morgan.

At Corydon, which he reached on the 9th, he encountered some resistance from the Home Guards. July 9. These, however, were overpowered, and a wholesale system of plunder, combined with vandalism and brutality, was inaugurated. Having done their work at Corydon, the raiders proceeded to Salem, the capital of Washington County, where they captured between 300 and 400 militiamen, pillaged the place, destroyed the railroads, and exacted $1000 each from three mill-owners. At each town and village, it is the same story—murder, plunder, cruel exactions, and wholesale destruction of property. The pursuers were still behind; but the people, alarmed, were now rising in their own defense. At Vernon, on the 12th, July 12, Morgan was brought to a halt.
by a powerful body of militia, under Colonel Lowe. Stealing away from
the presence of Lowe under cover of the darkness, his men, in scattered det-
achments, and plundering as they ad-
anced, moved towards Harrison, where
they concentrated, preparatory to re-
turning as quickly as possible to Ken-
tucky. Morgan was already in a tight
place. Hobson was in his rear; Judah
was on his flank; and thousands of
armed citizens were blocking every
way by which he might attempt a re-
 trograde movement. Sweeping around
Cincinnati about a dozen miles to the
north, still plundering and destroying,
Morgan pushed on through the rich
 COUNTIES of Southern Ohio, in the di-
rection of Buffington Ford, a short
distance south of Parkersburg. He
July reached the ford on the 18th of
18. July, and attempted to cross un-
der cover of an artillery fire. Next
morning, he found himself completely
hemmed in. Judah’s cavalry had fallen
on his flank; the head of Hobson’s col-
umn, under General Shackleford, struck
his rear; and two armed vessels in the
river opened on his front. In this ex-
 tremity, about 800 of the raiders sur-
rendered; but the remainder, headed
by Morgan, attempted to cross to
Belleville, by swimming their horses.
Only about 300 managed thus to es-
cape. Morgan, thus foiled, fell back,
at the head of a considerable force, to-
wards McArthur, and then pushed to
the northeast, in the direction of New
July Lisbon, where, on the 26th, being
26. closely pressed by Shackleford’s
cavalry, he was compelled to surrender.

Morgan and several of his officers were
taken to Columbus, Ohio, where they
were confined in felons’ cells, in the
penitentiary. The partisan chief, with
six of his captains, by undermining
the walls of their prison, and thus opening
a passage into the yard, effected their
escape in the following November.
Morgan was spared to make another
famous raid, but it was to be his last.

We have already given an account
of the siege of Knoxville. It was not
deemed necessary at the time to follow
up Longstreet in his retreat from that
place. In this chapter, space must be
found for a brief reference to the
struggle which took place at Bean Sta-
tion. After his unsuccessful assault at
Knoxville, and the withdrawal of his
troops towards Virginia, he was pur-
sued by cavalry, under Shackleford,
Wolford, Graham and Foster, into Je-
ferson County. At the above-named
station, on the Morristown and Cumber-
land Gap Road, Longstreet turned
 Sharply on his pursuers. It was about
two o’clock in the afternoon of Mon-
day, December 14th, when the Dec.
14. National skirmishers felt the
touch of the enemy, and were com-
pelled to fall back. Shackleford was
immediately on hand. His men, dis-
mounting, the horses being sent to the
rear, were soon got into position on
the further side of the road. Colvin’s
battery was posted on a knoll, in rear
of the troops, and three howitzers were
located on a spur of the adjoining
mountain, to the left of the National
line. About four o’clock, the fighting
became general. The Confederates
felled with great force on the divisions of Wolford and Foster. The enemy was well provided with artillery, which was splendidly served. The Nationals held their ground with great firmness; but they were compelled, from time to time, to give way, and at nightfall, when the battle ceased, they had fallen back about a mile. Shackleford, who was in chief command, confessed to the loss of nearly 200 men. Longstreet's loss must have been greater. During the struggle, an attempt was made to strike Shackleford's rear, by passing a force across the Holston, at Kelley's Ford; but this movement was skilfully prevented by General Ferrero, who took the precaution to guard the ford by a strong force under General Humphrey. Longstreet held possession of Bean Station; but he was unable, in consequence of the severity of the weather, to turn it to any practical account. He, therefore, withdrew his forces to the neighborhood of Bull's Gap, a point at which the Rogersville branch joins the main road.

It was about this time that General Burnside retired from the command of the army of the Ohio. Here, again, as in North Carolina, he was succeeded by General John G. Foster. After the battle at Bean Station, and before the close of the year, there was some skirmishing between the rival forces in this department. This petty warfare was continued through the spring of 1864; but no event of high importance occurred in this region until Morgan's famous and final Kentucky raid, in May of that year.

Among the minor operations, of which as yet no notice has been taken, mention must be made of those which were conducted in the Gulf Department, and in the region west of the Mississippi, after the fall of Port Hudson. It will be remembered that when General Banks withdrew from Alexandria, on the Red River, and proceeded to Port Hudson, he took with him the greater portion of his troops, thus leaving the entire region, from which he had driven the Confederates, once again at their mercy. General Dick Taylor immediately reappeared. Alexandria was soon reoccupied; so was Opeouas; and a Confederate garrison took possession of Fort de Russy. Taylor's followers, indeed, found but little difficulty in overrunning the whole country. The National outposts were withdrawn into Brashear City. This, however, was soon abandoned; and the way to Algiers being left open, New Orleans would have been in peril but for the presence of Farragut and his fleet. After the fall of Port Hudson, Banks again directed his thoughts to aggressive measures. He was visited by General Grant in September; and it was the opinion and desire of both commanders that a joint movement should be made against Mobile—the one place of importance on the Southern coast then held by the Confederates. Considerations of foreign policy, however, determined the government to take steps for the recovery and reoccupation of Texas. Banks, accordingly, was ordered to move for the conquest of that State. He was per-
mitted to use his own judgment as to
the course he should follow; but it
was suggested that the most feasible
route might be found to be by the Red
River to Natchitoches and Shreveport.
Believing that route to be impracticable,
at that season of the year, he de-
termined to secure Sabine City, at
the mouth of the Sabine Pass. To
give effect to this purpose, an expedi-
tion of 4000 well-disciplined troops
were placed under the command of
General Franklin. The troops were
to be landed a few miles below Sabine
Pass. Farragut detached a naval force
of four gunboats, under Lieutenant
Frederick Crocker, to join the expedi-
tion. The gunboats were the Clifton,
Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City.
The Clifton was the flag-ship. The
expedition proved a complete and dis-
astrous failure. In the forenoon of the
Sep. 8th of September, the gunboats
and transports crossed the bar at
Sabine Pass. In the afternoon, the
Clifton, Sachem, and Arizona moved
towards the fort, the Granite City
being left behind to cover the landing
of a division of troops, when the proper
time should arrive. The fort mounted
eight heavy guns, three of which were
rifled. It was evident that the garri-
son was well prepared. As the ves-
sels drew near, the whole eight guns
opened at once. The boilers of the
Clifton and Arizona were immediately
penetrated by shells; the white flags
were raised; and twenty minutes after
the attack, the two vessels were in tow
of Confederate steamers. Franklin re-
fused to land his troops, and, with his
transports, hastened over the bar, and
returned to New Orleans. He left be-
hind him 200 men as prisoners, 50
killed and wounded, 2 gunboats and
15 heavy-rifled guns. Franklin was
blamed for not landing his troops; but
it is doubtful whether, in the circum-
stances, he could have acted more
wisely than he did.

Banks now concentrated his forces
at Atchafalaya, his intention being to
march directly on Shreveport. He
soon found, however, that the diffi-
culties which lay in his way were almost,
if not entirely, insurmountable. Aban-
donning the attempt, therefore, he re-
solved to secure a lodgment in Texas,
by moving upon and taking possession
of the harbors on its coast.

At this time, the position of General
Banks was the very reverse of com-
fortable. The Confederates seemed
irrepressible. Driven from one place,
they quickly reappeared in another.
Towards the end of September, Gen-
eral Dick Taylor, of the Confederate
army, became more than usually active.
He was still west of the Atchafalaya.
General Green, his most efficient lieu-
tenant, with his bushwhackers, was con-
stantly depredating in the neighborhood
of Port Hudson. It had become neces-
sary to make a bold effort to suppress
those bands of marauders. With this
end in view, General Herron was sent
with a body of men to Morgansia.
Deeming it advisable to establish an out-
post some miles in the interior, Herron
sent Colonel Lake with the Nineteenth
Iowa and Twenty-Sixth Indiana, also
6 guns and a support of 150 cavalry.
under Colonel Montgomery. The entire force was under 1000. The existence of this post became known to Green. On the night of the 30th of September, he advanced stealthily across an adjoining bayou, surrounded and surprised the camp, and captured Lake and about 400 of his men. The cavalry escaped with the loss of 5 men. There were 54 killed and wounded.

In this connection may be related with propriety the unfortunate affair which happened at Grand Coteau. When General Banks was about to set out on his expedition to Texas, he thought it proper to make a demonstration in the direction of Opelousas, so as to create the impression that a movement which had Alexandria or Shreveport for its objective was really commenced. Four divisions of the army of the Gulf, consisting of two divisions of the Nineteenth army corps and two divisions of the Thirteenth army corps, the whole under the command of Major-General Franklin, were ordered to Opelousas. The march was completed without difficulty; and the army encamped at Opelousas and Barre's Landing, remaining about eight or ten days. On the 27th of October, the backward movement commenced, the First division, of the Thirteenth corps, falling back upon New Iberia. On the 1st of November, the other two divisions—the Third and Fourth—commanded respectively by Washburne and Burbridge, fell back, in obedience to orders, as far as Carrion Crow Bayou and Grand Coteau.

On the same day, the Nineteenth corps fell back in the same direction. Washburne and Burbridge were ordered to encamp at the places just mentioned, while the rest of the army continued to fall back. Washburne assumed supreme control of the two divisions of the Thirteenth corps, who were thus left to guard the rear. On the morning of the 3d, the Confederates showed themselves in considerable strength in the neighborhood of Burbridge's position, which was about three miles in advance of that of McGinnis, with whom Washburne had his headquarters.

Burbridge, with one brigade of the Fourth division, about 1200 strong, with one 6-gun battery of 10-pounder Parrott, and with about 500 mounted infantry, under Colonel Fonda, and a section of Nim's battery, was on the north side of what is called Muddy Bayou. McGinnis, with the Third division, 3000 strong, and one battery, was at Carrion Crow Bayou. The two bayous run in parallel lines to the east, the banks being fringed with wood. The intervening ground was a smooth, level prairie. Burbridge's right rear rested on a dense thicket; his left stretched out about twenty rods into the open ground; the whole fronted to the northwest, in the direction of Opelousas. Later in the day, the Confederates fell with tremendous fury on Burbridge's position, attacking him with an overwhelming force in front and on both flanks. The shock was irresistible; and for a time it seemed as if the entire force would be cap
tured or destroyed. Washburne, who had reached the front in time to see the commencement of the struggle, had already ordered up the Third division. McGinnis was ill, and unable to command in person; but his troops were hurried forward, at the double-quick, by Brigadier-General Cameron, of the First, and Colonel Slack, of the Second brigade. They did not arrive a moment too soon. Burbridge's command had been driven entirely out of the woods; and the Confederate cavalry were charging on his left, and coming down with force upon his rear. As soon as it came up, the Third division formed in line; and the guns, already within range, poured shot and shell on the almost triumphant foe, and checked his advance.

In the heat of the fight, and before the arrival of the Third division, a tremendous struggle took place for the possession of Nim's battery. Exposed to charge after charge of the enemy, the gunners were ultimately overpowered. An infantry regiment—the Twenty-Third Wisconsin—was sent to their support; but it was soon overwhelmed and compelled to surrender. One section of this battery was commanded by Lieutenant Marland. In spite of the strength and fury of the enemy, that gallant officer, after an almost unparalleled display of coolness and audacity, succeeded in carrying off his own section of the battery. But for the bravery of Marland, those guns would have been lost. As it was, Burbridge, although compelled to fall back, managed to take with him every wagon and all the guns, with the exception of a 10-pounder Parrott.

As soon as McGinnis' division came up, Burbridge got his guns again into position, and opened upon the Confederates, now just checked in their advance, a raking cross-fire, which tore their ranks in pieces. The tide of battle was now turned. What was a pursuit, became a retreat. The Confederates sought shelter in the woods. Thence, however, they were quickly driven, the infantry pursuing for about a mile and a half, the cavalry for about three miles. The loss of life was not so great as the severity of the fight might have seemed to imply. The number of killed was 26; of the wounded, 124; of the missing, 566. The Confederate loss was about 60 killed. The wounded were carried off with them in their retreat; 65 were made prisoners. Such was the battle of Grand Coteau. It cannot be called great or decisive; but it was one of the most severely contested battles of the war.

The Nationals lost heavily in officers. Among the officers who won distinction that day was Captain Guppy, of the Twenty-Third Wisconsin. After having displayed great gallantry, he was wounded and made prisoner, with the greater portion of his regiment. Burbridge, Guppy, Fonda and Robinson received the special commendation of General Washburne. The Nationals marched back in safety to Brashear City.

Meanwhile, General Banks, at the head of an expedition consisting of 6000 troops and some war vessels, had
sailed from New Orleans directly for the Rio Grande. Banks, although he accompanied the expedition, had placed in immediate command General Napoleon J. T. Dana, an accomplished and skilful officer, and supposed to be well acquainted with the country about to be visited. This expedition was attended with very considerable success. But little opposition, in truth was encountered, the enemy always retreating as the Nationals advanced. On the 2d of November, the troops debarked at Brazos Santiago, and advanced in the direction of Brownsville, some thirty miles up the river. Point Isabel was reached on the 8th. Banks having established his headquarters at Brownsville, sent as many troops as he could spare, further up, to seize and occupy the water-passes between the Rio Grande and Galveston. Some steamers were obtained on the Rio Grande; and troops were transported to Mustang Island, off Corpus Christi Bay. From that port, General Ransom advanced to the Aransas Pass; and, on the 18th of November, he carried the place by assault, capturing 100 prisoners. On the same day, the National troops entered and occupied Corpus Christi. About the end of the month, General Washburne, now in command of the Thirteenth corps, moved upon Pass Cavallo, at the entrance to Matagorda Bay, where there was a strong fort called Esperanza, garrisoned by 2000 men. The place was invested; but the Confederates blew up the magazine and fled. Banks had reason to be proud of the success which attended this expedition. In one month he had made himself master of every important position on the coast between the Rio Grande and Galveston, except the works at the mouth of the Brazos, and those on Galveston Island. He was anxious to prosecute the work, especially towards the east; but he knew that Magruder was there in great force, and that with the troops now at his disposal, it would be hazardous to risk a battle with an antagonist of so much daring and so much skill. Had it been possible for him to obtain sufficient reinforcements, he might have been able to sweep the territory clear of the Confederate troops. As reinforcements could not be found, Banks, leaving Dana in command on the Rio Grande, returned to New Orleans.

We have already, in an earlier chapter, recorded the military events which took place in Missouri and Arkansas in 1862. In the chapter devoted to the guerrillas, the record is brought down as far as the battle of Prairie Grove, in which the Nationals were completely victorious. It seemed for a time as if, in the entire region west of the Mississippi, the National authority was firmly established. It was not long, however, until, as has already been related, the Confederates appeared in force in Texas, recapturing Galveston, and establishing their authority over the entire State. Early in 1863, the guerrillas again made their presence felt in Missouri and Arkansas, to the great inconvenience of the loyal inhabitants of those States. About the beginning of January, Marmaduke,
with some 4000 men, for the most part mounted, burst suddenly out of Northern Arkansas and fell upon Springfield, Missouri, with great fury. The place was well fortified with earthworks; but the National forces were scattered over the country; and it was with some difficulty that Generals Brown and Holland, who were in command there, were able to bring together about 1000 militia-men to resist the onslaught of the guerrilla chief. It was about one o'clock, on the afternoon of the 8th, when the Confederate force, some 3000 strong, appeared before the town. Firing was commenced at once; and severe but somewhat desultory fighting was maintained during the remainder of the day. The National troops, although raw and inexperienced, fought with great bravery; and, as evening approached, they had compelled the Confederates to abandon one position after another, until the latter were glad to retreat under cover of the darkness. The battle had lasted five hours. The Nationals sustained a loss of 164 men, of whom 14 were killed. General Brown was severely wounded, and lost the use of his right arm. Marmaduke lost about 200 men, of whom 41 were killed and 80 were left in the town as prisoners.

Marmaduke now marched eastward; and, at dawn on the 10th, his advance encountered the Twenty-First Iowa, under Colonel Merrill. After a sharp skirmish, he succeeded in flanking the National troops, and pushed on towards Huntsville. Merrill, however, was there before him and was reinforced by the Ninety-Ninth Illinois, and portions of the Third Iowa and the Third Missouri cavalry, with a supporting battery, under Lieutenant Wald Schmidt. The engagement which followed on the 11th was sharp but brief, Marmaduke being compelled to retreat, after sustaining a loss of 300 men, including a brigadier-general and three colonels. The Nationals lost 71 men, of whom 7 were killed. Marmaduke was glad to abandon Missouri. Moving southward, he took position, with a portion of his forces, at Batesville, Arkansas, on the White River. At this point he was attacked, on February 4th, by the Fourth Missouri cavalry, under Colonel G. E. Waring, and driven across the stream, with a considerable loss in killed and wounded, one colonel and a number of privates having been made prisoners. After the battle at Huntsville, a portion of Marmaduke's men made their way to Van Buren Creek; and 300 of them were captured on the Julia Roan, on the 28th of January. His men dispersed or fell into the hands of the enemy. Marmaduke, greatly discouraged, repaired to the headquarters of the Confederate army corps at Little Rock.

During the next two months there was comparative quiet in those regions, although the guerrilla leaders at Little Rock were busy increasing and disciplining their forces and preparing for future efforts. The guerrilla bands, during this period, were not, however,
wholly inactive. At this time occurred the Sam Gatty affair—an affair which, being characterized by great brutality, revealed the true spirit of the guerrillas, and brought much discredit on the Confederate cause.

It was the middle of April before the Confederate commanders assembled at Little Rock felt emboldened to resume active operations. Fayetteville, since the early spring, had been occupied by some Union cavalry and infantry, under Colonel Harrison. On April 18th of April, shortly after sunrise, Harrison and his little band were attacked by General W. L. Cabell, who had come by forced marches over the Boston Mountains from Ozark. Although Harrison's men were greatly outnumbered, they not only resisted the attack, but, after six hours' fighting, compelled the enemy to fall back, with considerable loss, in the direction from which he came. Harrison had lost 71 men, of whom 4 were killed; but Cabell had left behind him 55 prisoners, 50 horses, and 100 shot-guns.

A little later, Marmaduke himself was again in motion. With the full consent and approval of his superior officer, Major-General Sterling Price, he set out at the head of a large force of infantry and cavalry, with the intention of moving on Cape Girardeau, which was at that time the depot of supplies for a portion of General Grant's army. Cape Girardeau, with its stores, was in charge of General John McNiel. When Marmaduke reached Frederickton, on the 22d, McNiel was at Bloomfield, in Stoddard County; but hearing of the presence of Marmaduke in that neighborhood, and divining his object, he hurried to the menaced point, and, arriving at Cape Girardeau on the 23d, calmly awaited the approach of the guerrilla chief. Marmaduke came up on the 25th, two days after the arrival of McNiel. It was not without reason that the Confederates counted on an easy victory; for while Marmaduke had under him a choice corps of 8000 men, known as "Price's First Corps of the Trans-Mississippi Department," McNiel could only muster some 1700 men, and these, for the most part, belonged to the militia. But McNiel, who was a brave and indefatigable officer, had made good use of the two days of grace. A powerful force was immediately transported into Illinois; four guns, rudely mounted, were placed in advantageous positions; and the entire ranks were considerably strengthened. On the 25th, after April 25, called upon McNiel to surrender, giving him only thirty minutes to decide and return his answer. McNiel's answer was prompt and decided. He believed he was able to defend the place, and he meant to do so. He would not surrender. At ten o'clock next morning, after a slight artillery display, the call was again made for immediate surrender. This time McNiel answered with his guns. After five hours' fighting, during which the National guns were admirably handled, Marmaduke, on seeing some armed vessels in the Mississippi coming to the
aid of the besieged, beat a hasty retreat across the St. Francis River, and hurried into Arkansas, burning the bridges behind him. At this time, McNeil was ranked by General Van- derver; and the pursuit of Marmaduke was conducted by, perhaps, overmuch caution. The Confederate loss at Cape Girardeau was some 60 killed and about 300 wounded, many of whom were left behind in the retreat.

This defeat of Marmaduke did not put an end to the Confederate raids in those regions. The guerrilla bands seemed almost ubiquitous. On the May

20th of May, the Confederate colonel, Coffey, acting as brigadier-general, at the head of five regiments, fell upon Fort Blunt, not far from Fort Gibson. The attack was made with great energy and determination. But Colonel William A. Phillips, with his garrison of about 1200 men, some of them Indians, who could not be relied upon, made a stubborn and successful resistance. Coffey, after the loss of a considerable number of men, was driven back in disorder, and compelled to seek safety on the other side of the Arkansas River. On the July

16th of July, a bold but unsuccessful attempt was made by a mixed Confederate force, composed of Texans and Creek Indians, to capture a train of wagons, laden with supplies for Fort Blunt. The assailants were repelled with loss; and the train was saved. About the same time, another attack was meditated on Fort Blunt. General Cooper, with a body of Confederates, some 6000 strong, was lying at Honey Springs, behind Elk Creek, and about twenty-five miles south of Fort Blunt, waiting for the arrival of General Cabell, with three regiments from Texas. It was Cooper's intention, so soon as Cabell came up, to move on Fort Blunt. Happily, General Blunt had been made aware of the danger which threatened the post; and, by forced marches, he pushed on from Fort Scott, arriving at the menaced point in time to save it from the threatened peril. In five days he had accomplished a journey of 175 miles. Blunt did not wait for the attack, but moved at once on Cooper's camp, with 3000 troops, infantry and cavalry, and 12 cannon of light calibre. He left Fort Blunt at midnight on the 16th; and at ten o'clock next day he had, with his columns, led respectively by Colonels Phillips and Judson, fallen heavily on Cooper. The battle lasted for two hours; but Cooper, although he had superior numbers, never recovered from the suddenness and severity of the attack. The Confederates were completely routed. They fled, in wild disorder, through the woods into the open prairie, leaving on the field 150 killed, 400 wounded, with a large number of prisoners, one disabled gun and nearly 200 small arms. Blunt lost 77 men, of whom 17 were killed. When Cabell came up with his Texans, 3000 strong, the battle was ended. Not deeming it prudent to attack the victorious Nationals, he moved towards the South, and disappeared beyond the Canadian River. The Nationals returned to Fort Blunt. After several
other skirmishes, of greater or lesser importance, General Blunt descended the Arkansas River, and occupied Fort Smith.

At that time, the army of the frontier, as it was called, was greatly depleted, by furnishing reinforcements to General Grant, at Vicksburg; and the Confederate generals, in the Trans-Mississippi Department, seized the opportunity to make an attack on Helena. The attack was made on the 4th of July, with a force of about 15,000 men, and was under the special direction of Price and Marmaduke. It was made about daybreak, and with great fury. At first, the Confederates were successful in carrying a small fort which formed part of the outworks; but the gunboat Tyler coming up and opening with its heavy guns, the fort was reclaimed, and the assailants were driven back with a severe loss in killed and wounded. Their purpose, however, to carry the place by storm was not all at once abandoned. The assault was repeated with great bravery, Marmaduke's men falling in heavy masses on the defenses of the town, attacking now the north and now the south, but everywhere meeting with the most stubborn resistance, and being terribly cut up by the National fire, at short range, and by the heavy missiles from the gunboat. Foiled at every point, the Confederates were compelled to fall back, having sustained a loss of over 1000 men in killed and wounded, and more than 1000 prisoners. Seeing that the Nationals were being reinforced, they retreated, after a day or two, into the interior of Arkansas.

After the surrender of Vicksburg, the pressure on General Grant's army was relieved, and expeditions were sent out in different directions, either to repel or to check the movements of the Confederates, who were still committing depredations on both sides of the Great River. One of these expeditions was under the care of General McPherson, who, with the divisions of Logan and Tuttle, pushed out in the direction of Canton, where the Confederates were known to be assembled in force. McPherson, not having sufficient numbers at his disposal to warrant a vigorous or persistent attack, deemed it prudent to withdraw, and fell back to Vicksburg by way of Clinton. Another and more successful expedition was entrusted to the care of General Frederick Steele, who was sent to Helena with instructions to organize a body of troops, and to proceed to the capture of Little Rock, the headquarters of the guerrillas. At the beginning of August, he had collected and equipped about 6000 men; he had also secured 22 guns. He was soon joined by General Davidson, who had been operating in Arkansas, under the command of General Hurlbut, and whose force consisted of about the same number of men, with 18 guns. Davidson's men were mostly mounted. The united force, numbering in all some 12,000 men and 40 guns, set out from Helena on the 10th of August, Davidson and his horsemen taking the lead. The White River was
crossed at Clarendon; and a reconnoissance was made as far as Brownsville. The details of this movement are numerous; but as there was comparatively little fighting, it is unnecessary to enumerate them. Marmaduke had been sent out to Brownsville to offer Davidson resistance. Brownsville was abandoned without a battle, Marmaduke falling back to Little Rock, and burning the bridges in his rear. The National forces were again concentrated at Brownsville, Steele having been reinforced by True's brigade, sent from Memphis. After a series of successful encounters, and having marched over a most difficult country, forcing their way across rivers and bayous, the Nationals reached the outer defenses of Little Rock on the 10th of September. The final struggle was protracted and severe; but on the evening of that day the place was surrendered to General Davidson. Much of the public property had been destroyed; eight steamers were found in flames, and beyond recovery, when the National troops entered the city; but the arsenal was uninjured. About 1000 men were made prisoners. The entire National loss did not exceed 100 in killed, wounded and prisoners. It was a campaign of which Steele had just cause to be proud. Only forty days had elapsed since he arrived at Helena. With the capture of Little Rock perished one of the most important centres and nurseries of rebeldom in the western country. The Confederates ultimately fell back to Red River; and the National troops, on the 28th of October, occupied Arkansas.

On the 20th of August, one of the guerrilla leaders, named Quantrell, at the head of a body of 800 men, entered the city of Lawrence, Kansas, and murdered, in cold blood, 175 of its citizens, and destroyed by fire property to the value of over $2,000,000. He was pursued as soon as troops could be raised, and some 40 or 50 of his men were killed. Oct. 12.

On the 12th of October, a vigorous encounter took place about eight miles southwest of Arrow Rock, between the Nationals, under General E. B. Brown, and a powerful band of guerrillas and Indians, under Generals Shelby and Coffey. The Confederates were broken and routed after a sharp contest, and pursued as far as the Arkansas line. Early in this month, a desperate attempt was made to murder General Blunt and his staff, who were marching towards Fort Scott, Kansas. About 300 Confederates had dressed themselves as Union soldiers, and by this means surprised and captured 78 of the 100 men under Blunt, all of whom, including Major Curtis, son of General Curtis, were wounded. Blunt and 15 of his men made a vigorous resistance, and contrived to escape. It was believed by the Confederates that General Blunt was among the killed; and they rejoiced accordingly. On the 20th of October, Blunt was relieved of the command of the army of the Frontier, General McNiel taking his place. Towards the end of October, Marmaduke, at the head of 2000 men, marched
from Princeton upon Pine Bluff, a post on the south side of the Arkansas River, and about fifty miles below Little Rock, then in command of Colonel Powell Clayton. That officer was not unprepared for the attack; and after a vigorous fight, which lasted about five hours, Marmaduke was forced to retire, having lost in the struggle 150 men killed and wounded, and 33 prisoners. Clayton's loss was Oct. 18, 57, of whom 17 were killed. On the 18th of October, Quantrell and the Creek chief, Sandwatie, made an attack on Fort Gibson, in the Indian country. Fort Gibson was one of Colonel Phillips' outposts. After a contest of four hours, the assailants were dispersed, and driven across the Arkansas River. Peace now reigned for a time between the Red and Missouri Rivers.

In the late winter months and early spring of 1863, further trouble was given by the Sioux Indians, under Little Crow, whose brutalities at Yellow Medicine, at New Ulm, and at Cedar City, in Minnesota, have already been described. The spirit of those warriors was greatly broken by the execution of thirty of their number at Markato, towards the end of February. It was not, however, until the following summer, when General Pope took command of the department, that the "Sioux War" was brought to a close. Vigorously attacked and pursued from place to place, the savage bands were broken and dispersed among the wilds of the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains. Little Crow himself, "the foremost hunter and orator," was finally shot near Hutchinson, in Minnesota, by a Mr. Lamson. The skeleton of the chief is preserved in the collection of the Minnesota Historical Society.

At the close of the year, practical progress had been made in reducing to subjection the entire western country. Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen; and the Mississippi, throughout its entire length, was under the control of the National government. Missouri was placed beyond the danger of invasion. The military power of the enemy was broken in Arkansas and Kansas. A firm foothold had been secured in Texas. Much work had yet to be done; but it was now evident that the end of the great struggle was approaching, and that the Union was to be saved.

Note.—After the fall of Vicksburg, General Herron, with a force of troops numbering 5000, was ordered to Fort Hudson. He had already embarked, when the news arrived announcing Banks' victory. Transferring his troops to lighter-draft vessels, he proceeded, on the 12th of July, in obedience to orders, up the Yazoo River, as far as Yazoo City, under the convoy of the De Kalb and two tin-clad vessels, under the command of Captain Walker. A combined attack of the army and navy on the enemy's works resulted in the flight of the garrison. Unfortunately, the De Kalb was sunk by a torpedo, opposite the city. Herron won an easy victory, capturing and destroying a Confederate vessel, formerly a gunboat, which was sheltered there. He returned to Vicksburg on the 21st July, bringing back with him 300 prisoners, 6 heavy guns, 250 small arms, 800 horses and 2000 bales of Confederate cotton.
CHAPTER XXXI.

The Opening of 1864.—Promise of Success.—Much Work yet to be Done.—The Confederacy Crippled, but Not Subdued.—Three Important Strongholds.—Meridian.—Shreveport.—Mobile.—Sherman's Purpose.—Delay.—After Chattanooga and Knoxville.—Preparations for the Meridian Expedition.—Instructions to McPherson and Hurlbut.—Sooy Smith.—Pontotoc.—Okolona.—Sherman's Army in Motion.—The Big Black.—The Positions held by the Confederates.—Folk in Command.—Stephen E. Lee.—The Pearl River.—Brandon.—Tallahatta.—Oktibbeha.—Meridian.—Demopolis.—A Burning Train.—An Easy Victory.—Terrible Destruction of Property.—"Jeff. Davis' Neckties."—Quitman.—Lauderdale Springs.—Non-Arrival of Smith.—Cause of His Delay.—Struck by Forrest.—A Panic.—A Stampede.—Smith's Retreat.—Colliersville.—The Negroes.—Strange Scenes.—Devastation.—Report of an Eye-Witness.—A Great Work Done.—Sherman Returns to Vicksburg.—Dissatisfied with Smith.—Forrest in Favor.—The Yazoo Expedition.—A Rush into Kentucky and Tennessee.—At Jackson.—Union City.—Colonel Hawkins.—Surrender.—Forrest Moves on Paducah.—Fort Anderson.—Bravery of Colonel S. G. Hicks.—The Confeder ate General, A. P. Thompson, Killed.—Fort Pillow.—The Garrison.—Booth and Bradford.—Description of the Fort.—A Savage Assault.—A Heroic Resistance.—Booth Killed.—Bradford in Command.—The New Era.—A Flag of Truce.—A Call for Unconditional Surrender.—A Treacherous Game.—Brutal Massacre.—No Quarter.—Horrible Scenes.—Report of the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.—Cruel Treatment of Major Bradford.—Infamous Notoriety.—Buford at Columbus.—In Imitation of Forrest.—A Brutal Threat.—Forrest Retreats.—Sturgis' Order to Pursue.—Escape of Forrest.—Gum Town.—A Severe Engagement.—Defeat of the Nationals.—General Smith in Command.—Another Expedition Against Forrest.—A Series of Encounters.—Smith at the Tallahatchie.—Forrest in Memphis.—His Mission so far Accomplished.—Reflections.

The year 1864 opened with promise of final success to the National cause. The outlook, however, was not without a shadow of gloom. Richmond still engaged the attention and baffled the efforts of the army of the Potomac; Charleston held out against the genius and energy of Gillmore and Dahlgren; Mobile and Wilmington continued to invite and reward the daring but unprincipled enterprise of foreign traders; and powerful Confederate armies, zealous and eager for the fight, were yet in the field. But great battles, involving great issues, had been won by the Northern armies during the previous year; and nothing had happened to undo the results, or to prevent the Nationals from reaping the full benefit of the victories at Vicksburg, at Port Hudson, at Gettysburg, and at Chattanooga. The waters of the Mississippi now rolled unchecked from Cairo to the Gulf, thus cutting the Confederacy in twain; Chattanooga being held by the Nationals, the Richmond government was shut out from the valley of the Mississippi, and exposed also to attack in the rear; while the victory at Gettysburg had effectually delivered the Northern mind from all fear of further invasion.

On neither side, however, had the
war spirit died out. In the North, there was a more vigorous determination than ever to force the contest to an early and a final issue. In the South, although signs of distress were apparent, there was no disposition to abandon the struggle. Great armies, as has been stated, were yet in the field. There were, besides, in every Confederate State, organized bodies of armed men; and the States in which the National authority had been restored were exposed to frequent and dangerous incursions by those military freebooters.

The loss of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson had terribly crippled the Confederacy in the west and southwest. Existence, however, was still possible. There were several important points from which the means of subsistence could be obtained. Of these, the most important were Meridian, Shreveport and Mobile. In the present chapter, we shall confine our attention to Meridian. A glance at the map will show the importance of this position. Situated at the intersection of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which runs north and south, and the South Mississippi, which runs east and west, it was a place of the highest advantage to the Confederates, and greatly aided them in prolonging the struggle. It was in easy communication with Selma, the great iron centre of the Confederacy, and also with Mobile, the one port, besides that of Wilmington, which was now open to the blockade runners. After the fall of Vicksburg, it was intended to move a strong force on Meridian; but the weather being intensely hot, a drought prevailing, and the men already greatly exhausted, the movement was deferred. It became impossible when Sherman was ordered to Chattanooga, to the assistance of Rosecranz. After Chattanooga, and the relief of Burnside, at Knoxville, Sherman was again in a condition to direct his thoughts to Meridian. Having returned to Mississippi, his command was stationed, for a time, along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Towards the end of January, he received instructions to proceed to Vicksburg, and place himself at the head of an expedition which should move eastward from that city, and perform such service for the National cause as circumstances might allow.

With as little delay as possible, the necessary arrangements were completed, Hurlbut, whose headquarters were at Memphis, was ordered to draw in all public property to Cairo and Memphis, to evacuate all places of minor importance, and especially to abandon Corinth and Fort Pillow. He was at the same time ordered to provide two divisions, of 5000 each, and to have them ready for embarkation not later than the 25th of January. McPherson, who was in command at Vicksburg, received somewhat similar instructions. He also was to provide two divisions, of 5000 each. General W. Sooy Smith, chief of cavalry, in the division of the Mississippi, was at Memphis, with a mounted force of about 2500. This force was increased to about 10,000 strong, by additions from Hurlbut's corps.
The objective point was Meridian. Smith was to move direct on that place from Memphis. Hurlbut was to join Sherman and McPherson at Vicksburg, whence the united forces should move on Meridian, and there form a junction with the cavalry under Smith. Meridian was distant from Memphis 250 miles; from Vicksburg, 150. What Sherman proposed to accomplish by this expedition, he himself tells us. In a letter to General Banks, he says: "I propose to avail myself of the short time allowed me in this department here to strike a blow at Meridian and Demopolis. I think I can do it; and the destruction of the railroads, east and west, north and south of Meridian, will close the door of rapid travel and conveyance of stores from the Mississippi and the Confederacy east, and so make us less liable to the incursions of the enemy toward the Mississippi. I intend to leave Vicksburg about the 25th instant, and hope to be near Meridian about February 8th and 10th." He requested Banks to make a feint on Mobile, so as to prevent the enemy at that place from sending reinforcements to Meridian. It was his conviction that if he were not resisted by superior numbers, he would be able to cut off Mobile from all connection with the interior, except by way of the Alabama River. Success at Meridian, and a similar success afterwards at Shreveport would, he thought, settle the main question in the southwest.

To give effect to the purposes thus indicated, Sherman ordered Sooy Smith to move from Memphis on or before February 1st, taking with him an effective force of 7000 cavalry, lightly equipped. He was to march on Pontotoc, Okolona and Meridian, making it an object to reach Meridian on or about the 10th. His instructions were "to disregard all minor objects; to destroy railroad bridges and corn not wanted; to break the enemy's communications from Okolona to Meridian, and thence eastward to Selma; if convenient, to send to Columbus, Mississippi, and destroy all machinery there, and the bridge across the Tombigbee, which enabled the enemy to draw resources to the east side of the valley." With the understanding that Smith was already on his way, Sherman set out from Vicksburg, on the 3d of February, at the head of an army of about 23,000 effective men. A considerable proportion of this force was mounted. The four divisions of which the army was composed were arranged in two columns, which were commanded, the one by McPherson, the other by Hurlbut. Sherman marched in the advance with McPherson's column. McPherson crossed the Big Black, at the railroad bridge; Hurlbut crossed at Messenger's. The soldiers were provided with twenty days' rations. All unnecessary baggage was left behind. No tents were taken; and, throughout the march, all, from the commanding-general to the private, bivouacked by camp-fires in the open air. The weather was all that could be desired, the days being beautiful and the nights cool, with a slight frost.
roads, fortunately, were in excellent condition.

Sherman was not ignorant of the position and strength of the enemy. By means of a spy, who had brought from Meridian an official report, it was learned that Polk was in chief command there. Scattered all over the State, there were companies of infantry and cavalry collecting taxes and forcing conscripts. Loring was at Canton with his infantry division, some 7000 strong, and 18 guns. French was at Brandon, with 3000 men and 10 guns. This force was increased to 5000 men, by reinforcements from Mobile. Forrest commanded the cavalry in the district of North Mississippi; the South cavalry district was in charge of Stephen E. Lee. Each of these latter commanders had under him a mounted force of 4000 men. Unless Polk was largely reinforced, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the expedition would result in complete success.

For the first two days, Sherman was allowed to march unopposed. On the Feb. 5th, the enemy was encountered; and, for eighteen miles, there was continual skirmishing. That night Sherman's advance reached Jackson, and found that the Confederates had just made a precipitate retreat. It was evident that the appearance of the Nationals had been a complete surprise. A pontoon bridge across the Pearl River was left comparatively uninjured. The bridge having been quickly repaired, Sherman pushed forward, passing rapidly through Brandon, and reaching Morton on the 9th. At this place, McPherson, who led the advance, was halted to break up and destroy the railroads. Hurlbut now took the lead, and kept it until he reached Meridian. At Tallahatta, some twenty miles from Meridian, obstructions were encountered in the shape of felled timber. Suspecting that the Confederates were trying to gain time, in order to cover the movement of railroad property from Meridian, Sherman dropped his trains, leaving them in charge of strong escorts, and hastened to the Oktibbeha. The bridge was found in flames and beyond recovery. With material obtained from an old cotton-gin close at hand, a new bridge was speedily constructed; and on the 14th, at 3.30 o'clock in the afternoon, Meridian was entered and occupied, the Confederates having already retired. Polk had gone to Demopolis that morning at 10.30. One entire train was found burning at the depot. With this exception, all the rolling-stock had been removed to Mobile or Selma. It was only eleven days since the expedition had left Vicksburg. Meridian, as we have seen already, was in the very heart of the enemy's country, yet the Nationals, in their eleven days' march, encountered almost no opposition. This expedition did much to reveal the inherent weakness of the Confederacy. It was a preliminary to the march to the sea; and there can be no doubt that his experience on this occasion encouraged Sherman to undertake that later and more daring enterprise.
As General Smith had not arrived, it was not deemed prudent to pursue the Confederates. Sherman's object was to destroy this stronghold of the Confederacy. The work of destruction was commenced at once. Ten thousand men, armed with axes, sledges, crowbars and clawbars, went to work with a will; and, at the end of five days, Meridian, with its depots, warehouses, arsenal, offices, hospitals, hotels, and cantonments, was utterly destroyed. Fire completed the terrible work of destruction. The inhabited houses alone were spared. Hurlbut had charge to the north and east of the town. McPherson was entrusted with the south and west. They did their work thoroughly. Hurlbut reported the destruction of 60 miles of ties and iron burned and bent, one locomotive destroyed, and 8 bridges burned. McPherson reported 55 miles of railroad destroyed, 53 bridges, 6075 feet of trestle-work below Quitman, 19 locomotives, 28 cars and 3 steam saw-mills burned or ruined. To make the work of restoration more difficult, the rails, in large quantities, when torn up, were placed on the blazing piles of timber, brought to a red-heat, and then twisted round a tree or other object into what the men playfully called "Jeff. Davis' neck-ties." A twisted rail was henceforth useless. In addition to the destruction wrought in the town itself, the railroads were ruined as far south as below Quitman; east as far as Cuba Station; north to Lauderdale Springs, and west the whole way to Jackson; and among the places which shared the fate of Meridian were Jackson, Enterprise, Marion, Quitman, Hillsboro, Canton, Lake Station, Decatur, Bolton and Lauderdale Springs. It was rough work, which will not soon be wholly forgiven or forgotten; but it was rendered necessary by the exigencies of the situation; and, rough as it was, it was not a violation of the principles of civilized warfare.

Sherman remained at Meridian for several days, impatiently waiting for Smith and his cavalry. But he waited in vain. Smith, it will be remembered, who was at the head of 7000 mounted troops, a brigade of infantry, and a respectable artillery force, was ordered to leave Memphis on the 1st of February, and so to regulate his movements as to be able to effect a junction with Sherman on or about the 10th. Sherman did not arrive until the 14th. Smith, according to the arrangements made, ought to have been forward. Day after day passes by; cavalry are sent out in all directions; but tidings of Smith or of his troops are nowhere to be found. What has become of this force? Let us see. Smith, it appears, had from some cause delayed his departure from Memphis. His second in command was Brigadier-General Grierson, who had won so much distinction by his famous raid from La Grange to Baton Rouge in the spring of the previous year. The troops were gathered in from Middle Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, and concentrated at Collierville, some twenty-four miles east of Memphis. It was not until the 11th of the month
that they commenced their march from Collierville, a day later than that fixed for their arrival at Meridian. Pushing on as rapidly as possible, they crossed the Tallahatchie, at New Albany, at noon, and encamped four miles south of that place. Continuing their march, they pressed on in the direction of Okolona, passing through Pontotoc at one o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th, and reaching Okolona on the 18th. On the 20th, they encountered the enemy for the first time, in the neighborhood of West Point. They were now joined by large bodies of negroes, who, for the first time, saw the National troops. There was some hard fighting on the 20th. It was resumed on the 21st; and, on the 22d, Forrest fell with tremendous force on the National rear and flank at Okolona. A scene of the wildest confusion followed, the Second Iowa becoming panic-stricken, and stampeding the whole of Colonel McCrellis' brigade. Order was speedily restored; the Seventh Indiana and the Second brigade rallying, holding the enemy in check, and doing splendid work. As twilight approached, a magnificent charge was made by the Seventh Indiana, under the eye of General Smith himself, driving the enemy back with terrible slaughter. It was now dark; and Smith, ignorant of the strength of the enemy, and believing that he was greatly outnumbered, ordered a retreat. The dead and wounded were left on the field. The mules, prisoners and negroes were placed in the advance. At ten o'clock, a halt was made until four in the morning, when the march was resumed. The Confederates continued to follow. The National rear was incessantly engaged, but was successful in holding the enemy in check. On the afternoon of the 23d, the Tallahatchie, at New Albany, was recrossed, and the bridge destroyed. Collierville was reached on the 27th, and the weary and dispirited troops, the regiments torn and tattered, were again in camp. It was an unfortunate affair, and resulted in the loss of at least 200 men. A little more bravery on the part of the National troops, and the result must have been altogether different; for the entire force under Forrest did not exceed 3000 men. As it was, Smith had the satisfaction of knowing that he had burned about 3000 bales of cotton and over 1,000,000 bushels of corn, and that he had captured over 100 prisoners, about 1000 mules, and a large number of negroes, up to that date held in bondage.

Sherman, meanwhile, had left Meridian on the 20th, making his return march through Canton, Feb. 26, north of the line of the advance. At Canton, 15 locomotives were captured, but the train was spared. All along his line of march, crowds of fugitive slaves flocked to the army for protection. An eye-witness has given us a vivid picture of this strange scene. "From 4000 to 7000 slaves accompanied the return of the expedition. I defy any human being to look on the scene unmoved. Old men, with the frosts of seventy years upon their heads; men in the prime of manhood; youths, and children that could barely
run; women with their babes at their breasts. They came, some of them it is true, with shouts and careless laughter, but silent tears coursed down many a cheek—tears of thankfulness for their great deliverance. There were faces in that crowd which shone with a joy almost inspired. Smile who will, but the story of the coming of the Children of Israel out of the land of Egypt can never recall to my mind a more profound emotion than the remembrance of that scene. When I looked upon the long line of National soldiers filing through roads in which our slaughtered brothers lie thicker than sheaves in a harvest field, and reflected on the horrors to which this race has been subjected by the foes whom we are fighting, I felt faith in a God of justice renewed in my heart." From Canton, the fugitive negroes were sent forward in an advance train to Vicksburg. Sherman had again won for himself fresh laurels. He had done a great work. If he had not accomplished the great object of the expedition, and, by moving upon and destroying Selma, by wheeling around and taking possession of Mobile, and thus rendering unnecessary the future march to the sea, he had, at least, severely punished and greatly crippled the Confederacy. He had destroyed 150 miles of railroad, 10,000 bales of cotton, 2,000,000 bushels of corn, 20 locomotives, 28 cars, 67 bridges and 7000 feet of trestle-work. He had captured 200 prisoners, several thousand horses and mules and 300 wagons. He had done what was still more noble—he had liberated not fewer than 8000 negroes. His own loss scarcely exceeded 170 men.

Sherman left the expedition in care of General Hurlbut on the 27th, Feb., and proceeded to Vicksburg, whence he started, on the 28th, on a hurried visit to New Orleans, to confer with Banks and Porter regarding the projected campaign against Shreveport. It was not until his return from New Orleans to Vicksburg that he learned the result of Smith's attempt to co-operate with him at Meridian. He was ill-satisfied with Smith's own account of the affair. "His reports to me," he says, "are unsatisfactory. He delayed his start until the 11th, when his orders were to be at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew that I was marching from Vicksburg. The mode of his return to Memphis was not what I had expected; he had nothing to deal with but Forrest and the militia. I hope he will make these points more clear to the general-in-chief."

When Sherman set out for Meridian, two important diversions were made in his favor—one by Farragut against Mobile Harbor, another by a portion of Porter's fleet and a body of armed men, up the Yazoo. The Mobile diversion was completely successful; for, although no fighting was done, the appearance of the National fleet led the Confederates to expect an attack, and prevented them from sending reinforcements to Polk. The expedition up the Yazoo was attended with considerable success. The boats, four in number—Petrel, Marmora, Echange and Romeo—were commanded by Lieutenant E
K. Owen. The land troops, which consisted of the Eleventh Illinois infantry, Eighth Louisiana infantry and First Mississippi cavalry—the two latter colored—were commanded by Colonel James H. Coates. This expedition pushed its way as far as Fort Pemberton. After spending some days in loading cotton, Coates re-embarked his men; and the vessels returned to Yazoo City, with 1600 bales of cotton. Having established his headquarters here, a Confederate force soon appeared in considerable strength, under Ross and Richardson. On the morning of Mar. 5, the 5th of March, a severe en- counter took place; and Coates' headquarters were literally riddled with shot and shell. The fight lasted the greater part of the day. It raged most fiercely at an earth-work, in the form of a redoubt, about half a mile from the town. Into this work Coates had thrown Major McKee, with three companies of his own regiment, the Eleventh Illinois. While Ross was engaged with the troops in the town, Richardson fell with great fury on McKee, flinging into the redoubt shot and shell with terrible precision. Richardson made a call for surrender, under the pretense that all the Nationals had been taken prisoners. McKee returned an indignant refusal, telling him "if he wanted them, to come and take them." Another call for surrender was made—this time, in the name of God and humanity, and coupled with the threat that, in case of refusal, the place would be stormed and reduced in ten minutes. The answer was the same. Richardson might come and take it. McKee expressed his regret that he should have coupled his demand with a threat, and assured him that if the fight was to go on with that understanding, he should kill every man he captured. At this juncture, the Confederates in the town were yielding to the steady pressure of the Nationals. At five o'clock in the afternoon, the route became general, Coates and McKee remaining masters of their respective positions. It was a spirited contest, and reflected the highest credit on Colonel Coates and his entire command. His fighting force, including the negroes, scarcely exceeded 1000 men, while that of the enemy was scarcely under 2300. The negroes, it was observed, fought with great bravery. In this engagement, the Nationals lost 18 killed, 85 wounded and 19 missing—the larger proportion of the killed and wounded being colored.

With the results of the expedition up the Yazoo, Sherman was but little satisfied. It was his opinion, at the time, that Coates would have done better if he had retained the boats and pushed up the river. Coates, however, was best qualified how to judge. He had, by means of a reconnaissance, made by Colonel Osband and the First Missouri cavalry, ascertained that Forrest was in force in Grenada. As it was, the expedition drove the guerrillas from the banks of the Mississippi, and, no doubt, occupied troops which otherwise might have given Sherman annoyance.

The unsuccessful effort of General Smith to reach Meridian, and unite his
forces with those of Sherman, rebounded somewhat to the glory of General Forrest. He was not unwilling to take some praise to himself; and the Confederate authorities, fully aware that but for him the disasters which had befallen them, through the Meridian Expedition, might have been much more serious, were pleased to enlarge his sphere of duty and to increase his authority. Although still subordinate to Stephen D. Lee, commander-in-chief of the mounted men in that region, he was granted a sort of roving commission. It was evident that a great struggle was impending, and must soon take place between the opposing forces in Northern Georgia. Forrest was charged with the special duty of keeping well employed the National forces then on the line of the Mississippi, from Vicksburg to Cairo, and so prevent them from reinforcing the army opposed to Johnston. The arrangements which were being made for the Shreveport or Red River Expedition had the immediate effect of withdrawing large numbers of troops from Vicksburg, and thus of weakening the National line in the direction just mentioned. Forrest at once took full advantage of his opportunity. At the head of a band of about 5000 men, all imbued with his own fierce and truculent spirit, he made a rush up from Northern Mississippi into West Tennessee. He rested for a time at Jackson, and then pushed on towards Kentucky. At that time, Union City, a fortified place in the northwestern part of Tennessee, was garrisoned by 450 of the Eleventh Tennessee cavalry, under Colonel Hawkins. Against Union City, Forrest sent a detachment, under Colonel Faulkner. That officer appeared before the place on the 24th of March, and demanded its surrender. Hawkins refused, and was attacked. He succeeded, however, in driving the enemy back. A second attack was made; and Hawkins, against the wishes of his men, surrendered the garrison, with about 200 horses and 500 small arms. A little more stubborn determination on the part of the National commander, and Union City and the garrison might have been saved; for, at the moment of surrender, General Brayman, who had hurried from Cairo to Hawkins' relief, was only six miles distant. Hickman, on the Mississippi, after the fall of Union City, fell an easy prey to the Confederates. Forrest, emboldened by success, accompanied by Bu- ford and General A. P. Thompson, moved directly from Jackson on Paducah. This latter place was then occupied by a force not exceeding 700 men, under Colonel S. G. Hicks. Made aware of the approach of Forrest, Hicks threw his troops into Fort Anderson, in the lower suburbs of the town. Having made a furious but unsuccessful assault on the fort, Forrest made a demand for its surrender, threatening, in the event of refusal, to carry the works by storm and massacre the garrison. The threat was unheeded; and the garrison, obtaining some effective assistance from the gunboats Peosta and Paw-Paw, the Confederate
The general was compelled to content himself with what plunder he could find. Hearing of the approach of reinforcements from Cairo, he decamped on the 27th, having lost, it was estimated, over 300 men killed and wounded. Among the killed was General Thompson, who was torn in pieces by a shell. The National loss was 14 killed and 46 wounded.

Forrest's attention was next turned to Fort Pillow. Hurlbut, it will be remembered, was instructed by Sherman to evacuate that post, before he joined him at Vicksburg to take part in the expedition to Meridian. These instructions, for some reason or other, were not fully carried out. The place was still garrisoned by about 550 men, excluding officers. Of the soldiers, 200 were colored, and under the immediate command of Major L. F. Booth. The remainder were under the command of Major W. F. Bradford. Booth had

April 13. of the 13th of April, Forrest approached the fort, drove in the pickets, and commenced the assault.

The situation of the fort was peculiar. It stood on a high bluff, which descended precipitately towards the river, that side being covered with trees, bushes and fallen timber. Above and below the fort, and extending back from the river, was a ravine or hollow. The ravine above the fort, known as Cold Creek, was covered with trees and bushes. The ravine below was covered, for the most part, with government buildings. The armament of the place consisted of 2 six-pounder and 2 twelve-pounder howitzers, and 2 ten-pounder Parrots. The assault was savagely made. The garrison, however, fought with great bravery, fiercely resisting the attempts made by the Confederates to force their way into the outworks. Both officers and men fearlessly exposed themselves. The gunboat New Era, Captain Marshall, was at hand, and attempted to render the garrison some assistance; but the nature of the ground enabled the Confederates to elude the fire of its guns. About nine o'clock, Major Booth was killed. Bradford immediately took command; and, having called the whole force within the fort, he made a gallant resistance, until it was past the hour of noon. About this time, to allow the guns to cool, the fire of both parties slackened. The New Era withdrew for a similar purpose, having fired 222 rounds of shell, shrapnel and canister, which nearly exhausted her ammunition. At this stage, Forrest sent a flag of truce, with a demand for unconditional surrender. Bradford asked time to consult with his brother-officers and with the captain of the New Era. Another flag of truce, and another demand more peremptory than before. Bradford must surrender within twenty minutes or the assault will be renewed. Bradford declined, and prepared to renew the struggle. It was not long until it became apparent that Forrest had been playing a most treacherous and cowardly game. During the progress of the negotiations, he had been pushing his men stealthily forward into the ra-
vines, and, under cover of the trees and bushes, securing advantageous positions, from which, at the word of command, they could effectually spring upon the fort. This shameful violation of one of the most sacred principles of civilized warfare was noticed by Captain Marshall, but he refrained from firing on the foe lest, in the event of defeat, it should be made a pretext for a cruel and barbarous revenge.

Pretext for brutality, it was soon discovered, was not necessary. A brutal massacre had already been resolved upon. As soon as Bradford's answer was received, the signal was given; Forrest's men rushed from the positions which they had so treacherously obtained; and, with fierce yells, and such cries as "No quarter," "Kill the damned niggers," "Shoot them down," they went bounding over the parapet and into the fort. But little opportunity was allowed for resistance. Panic-stricken, the troops, black and white, threw down their arms, madly rushing to places of shelter, and vainly and piteously calling for mercy. The scenes which followed were harrowing beyond all description. An indiscriminate slaughter was at once commenced. No work of the tomahawk or scalping-knife ever surpassed in pure savagery what then took place. No respect was paid to age or sex, to white or black, to soldier or civilian. It was a ruthless butchery. Some, in pure despair, rushed down the steep bluff, seeking shelter in vain under cover of the trees. Some flung themselves into the water, only to become targets for the Confederate rifles. The massacre was as deliberate as it was brutal. The hospitals were entered, and the sick and wounded were either butchered where they lay, or dragged out to be shot. Men, in some instances, were gathered together in groups, and shot down where they stood. The instances of special and wanton cruelty were numerous. One poor soldier, who was wounded and unable to stand, was compelled to get to his feet, that his tormentors might have a fair shot at him.

A negro boy was seen holding a horse which a Confederate was mounting. As soon as the savage was in the saddle, the boy was shot dead for his pains. The murderous work went on until the darkness. It was resumed, however, with the return of day.

A Committee of Congress subsequently took evidence on the affair. The facts brought to light were horrible beyond description. Men, it was proved, were not only shot in cold blood, and drowned, but were even crucified, buried alive, nailed to the floors of houses which were then set on fire. "No cruelty," says the report of this committee, "which the most fiendish malignity could devise, was omitted by these murderers. From 300 to 400 men are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least 300 were murdered in cold blood, after the post was in possession of the rebels, and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance." The case of Major Bradford deserves special mention. He
was being conveyed under guard to Jackson, Tennessee, when he was suddenly led aside about fifty yards from the line of march, and deliberately murdered. After having pled in vain for his life, on the ground that he had made a fair and honorable fight, he fell, pierced by three musket balls. Bradford was a Southern man by birth. He had chosen to remain loyal to the Federal government. This was his one offense; but it was unpardonable in the eyes of Forrest and his myrmidons. The moral effect of the Fort Pillow massacre was highly detrimental to the Southern cause. It revealed a spirit which was offensive to the entire Christian world; and from that day the number of Confederate sympathizers was sensibly diminished. Forrest won for himself an infamous notoriety; and the odor of his iniquity attached more or less to every member of the Confederate government.

On the day after the capture of Fort Pillow, Buford appeared before Columbus, and, imitating the example just set him by Forrest, demanded an unconditional surrender. "Should you surrender," he said, "the negroes now in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I be compelled to take the place by force, no quarter will be shown negro troops whatever." The demand was refused; and Buford, not deeming it advisable to attack, retired and joined Forrest, when both made a rapid retreat out of Tennessee. General Sturgis, at the head of 12,000 men, then at Memphis, was ordered to follow in pursuit. Forrest, however, had a good start; and by the time Sturgis reached Bolivar, the Confederate raiders had crossed Wolf River, and carried their plunder safely into Northern Tennessee. A few weeks later it became known that Forrest was gathering together a powerful force, much larger than he had ever yet commanded; and the supposition was that he meditated another raid into Tennessee and Kentucky. Sturgis, who had now been reinforced by General A. J. Smith, who had just returned from the Red River region, was again sent after the bold and dashing Confederate. The National commander had under him a force of 9000 infantry and artillery, with some 3000 cavalry, under General Grierson. At Gum Town, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, Grierson, who led the advance, came into contact with some of Forrest's horsemen. The Confederates were well posted on a commanding ridge. The battle soon became furious; and Grierson notified Sturgis, who, with the infantry and artillery, was some six miles in the rear. Sturgis hurried forward at the double-quick. The day was intensely hot; and the inconveniences of the march were increased by a train of about 200 wagons. When Sturgis came up, he found that Grierson was being sorely pressed; and, without resting his men, or taking time to consider the propriety of a flank movement on the enemy, he hurried his men into the very thick of the fight. It was a rash act; and it resulted most disastrously. The Confederates, flushed with success in their
encounter with Grierson and his cavalry, fell with tremendous fury on Sturgis' infantry; and, in a brief space, the entire National force, utterly defeated, and hopelessly cut off from the wagon train, was driven back in confusion. But for the gallant resistance made by the Second brigade, under Colonel Winslow, the retreat would have been most disastrous. As it was, when Sturgis reached Memphis, he found that he had left behind 3500 men, with everything in the shape of stores.

This happened in June. Early in July, another expedition was sent against Forrest. It was placed in charge of General A. J. Smith. Forrest, it was known, was in the neighborhood of Tupelo, where he had established his headquarters. It was estimated that he had under him a force of about 14,000 men. General Smith, proceeding from Salisbury, about fifty miles east of Memphis, marched in the direction of Tupelo, with an estimated force of 12,000. At Pontotoc, on the 12th of July, Smith felt the presence of the enemy. A vigorous encounter having ensued, the Confederates were repulsed. At Tupelo, on the 13th, the enemy was encountered in still greater force, and again repulsed, after a sharp battle. On the same day, the attack was repeated, the Confederates, this time, being severely punished, and driven from the field with heavy loss. Smith now retraced his steps towards Memphis, and, for the space of three weeks, rested his men. On the 4th of August he again set out, at the head of 10,000 men, and, entering Mississippi, he advanced as far as the Tallahatchie. He could find no trace of Forrest or of his men. The Confeder ate chief, however, was not idle. In the absence of Smith from Memphis, he made a dash upon that city, entering it on the morning of the 21st, and making directly for the Gayoso House, where he expected to find Generals Hurlbut, Washburne and Buckland. He failed of his intended purpose; but he made some prisoners, and carried off considerable booty. It was thus that Forrest, during the spring and summer of 1864, gave occupation to the National troops in those regions, and prevented reinforcements from being sent to operate against Johnston's army in Northern Georgia.

In this chapter, it has been our duty to present war in one of its least attractive aspects. Of the pomp, the splendor, the magnificence of the battle field we have had nothing to record. We have seen the war fiend rioting in destructiveness and savagery. We have had no occasion to admire the generous impulse, or to applaud the noble motive. The fearful destruction of property accomplished by Sherman was well fitted to aggravate the South, and to arouse the spirit of revenge; but his conduct was justified by all the higher necessities of war. The brutality of Forrest at Fort Pillow was not only without excuse—it was in open violation of every principle of honor, of every high and generous motive; and the infamy of the deed must ever attach to his name.
CHAPTER XXXII.

Preparations for the Campaign.—Sherman and Banks.—Reasons for the Campaign.—Mistaken Opinions.—Banks and Porter.—A. J. Smith.—The Plan of Operations.—The Confederate Forces.—Banks and Franklin.—Smith Reconnoitering.—Fort de Russy.—A Brisk Cannonade.—The Gunboats.—Destruction of Fort de Russy.—The Way to Alexandria Opened.—At Alexandria.—Porter's Letter.—Arrival of Banks.—Off for Shreveport.—The Fleet at the Rapids.—Low Water.—Discouraging Circumstances.—The Fleet Above the Rapids.—Banks at Natchitoches.—Porter at Grand Ecore.—Obstructions in the River.—The New Falls City.—The Fleet at Springfield Landing.—Unpleasant News.—Battle at Natchitoches.—General A. L. Lee in Pursuit of the Enemy.—Crump's Hill.—Arrival of Franklin at Natchitoches.—The Enemy at Bay.—Wilson's Farm.—Patrick's Bayou.—Sabine Cross Roads.—The Confederates in Force.—Kirby Smith.—Banks at the Front and Taking Personal Control.—Order of Battle.—The Battle Begun.—The Confederate Attack.—The Nationals Driven Back.—Arrival of Franklin and Cameron.—A New Line Formed.—A Disastrous Onslaught.—A Panic.—A Rout.—"Bull Run Nothing in Comparison."—Pleasant Grove.—Emory's Division Checks the Retreat.—Another Fierce Encounter.—The Nationals Victorious.—The Retreat Resumed.—Pleasant Hill.—Emory Again Attacked.—A Fierce Onslaught.—Arrival of A. J. Smith.—The Confederates Resisted and Routted.—A Council of War.—The Retreat Continued.—Banks as a General.—His Management Defective.—The Fleet on its Backward Course.—The Osage Aground.—Gallantry of Kilby Smith.—General Green Killed.—The Eastport Aground.—Attempts to Save Her.—Blown Up.—The Battery at the Mouth of the Cane River.—The Cricket Under the Fire of the Battery.—A Narrow Escape.—The Army at Cane River.—Battle of Cane River.—A National Victory.—Battle at Clouterville.—The Army at Alexandria.—The Fleet at the Rapids.—The Red River Dammed.—A Great Engineering Feat.—Exciting Scenes.—The Rapids Passed.—Honors to Colonel Bailey.—The Army Reinforced.—The Signal, Covington and City Belle Captured.—Alexandria in Flames.—Departure of the Army and Fleet.—A Terror-Stricken People.—The Army and Navy at Simmsport.—General Canby in Command of the Army.—Porter Resumes his Station on the Mississippi.—The Army at New Orleans.—Smith Proceeds to Memphis.—Steele's Movements in Arkansas.—Steele at Camden.—His Retreat.—Battle at Jenkins Ferry.—The Nationals Victorious.—Steele's Army Safe in Little Rock.—End of an Expedition which was Disastrous in All its Parts.

General Banks, as has already been mentioned, was making active preparations for a grand movement up the Red River, at the time Sherman was engaged on his Meridian campaign. As soon as Sherman returned from that expedition, he proceeded to New Orleans, and had an interview with Banks. A plan of campaign up the Red River was agreed upon; and all necessary arrangements were completed with the utmost despatch.

There were many reasons why it was deemed desirable by the Washington government, and particularly by the military authorities, to obtain a firm hold on the Red River, and to convert Shreveport into a National stronghold. The operations of the French in Mexico had occasioned some disquietude in Washington; and the possession of Shreveport, it was thought, with the necessary communications, would make it more easy to re-establish the National authority in Texas. It was the opinion of the president that the possession of Shreveport would make it less difficult to establish a loyal government in
SHREVEPORT.

Louisiana. Banks, it is understood, although not greatly in favor of the expedition, on account of the difficulties to be encountered and overcome, was yet not unwilling to run the risk, because of the advantages which success would ensure. There were immense supplies of cotton in Texas. If these could be secured, it would be a pecuniary benefit to the National government. Halleck had long been in favor of some such movement as that which was about to be made. As early as November, 1862, in his letter of instructions to Banks, he says: "Having the Red River in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas." Grant, with a clearer insight into the situation, never expected much from the expedition, believing it to be greatly more important to win victories in Virginia or Georgia, than in Louisiana; and Sherman, although disposed to lend it encouragement, was of the opinion that if it could not be accomplished with the utmost rapidity, say in thirty days, it had better not be undertaken at all.

Shreveport, before the war, was a place of considerable importance and wealth. At its port there were annually shipped over 40,000 bales of cotton, besides large numbers of cattle for the supply of the New Orleans market. The capital of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, 150 miles west of Vicksburg, and 155 miles northwest of the mouth of the Red River, as the crow flies, it is at the head of navigation for large steamers, and the only accessible point on the west side of the river, for more than 100 miles.

By the beginning of March, the arrangements were completed; and the expedition was ready to start. Banks was to move from New Orleans, by railroad, to Brashears City, and thence by the Bayou Teche and Opelousas to Alexandria. Admiral Porter was to move from Vicksburg, with a powerful fleet of armed steamers, and proceed to the mouth of the Red River. Smith, with some 10,000 of Sherman's veterans, was to embark at Vicksburg, to join Porter and his fleet at the mouth of the Red River; thence to proceed up the river, and, after capturing Fort de Russy, to form a junction with Banks, at Alexandria. It was distinctly understood that General Steele, who was at Little Rock with a force of some 15,000 men, would co-operate in the general movement, and form a junction with Banks and Smith at or near Shreveport.

The Confederate forces, it was known, were strong in that region, and favorably posted for offering resistance to an invading army. Magruder was in Texas, in the neighborhood of Galveston and Houston, with about 15,000 men; Walker, with 7000 men, guarded a line which stretched from Opelousas to Fort de Russy; Mouton, with 6000 men, lay between the Black and Washita Rivers, from Red River to Monroe; while Price, with about 5000 infantry, and from 7000 to 10,000 cavalry, occupied a line extending from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia. This entire force was under the direction of General Kirby Smith. After leaving a sufficient number of men to guard the Texan coast, and providing
for the wants of Arkansas more to the north, it would not be difficult for that general so to concentrate his forces as to have a serviceable army of, at least, 30,000 men on the line of the Red River, and so disposed as to be able to give serious annoyance to an invading army.

General Banks, in consequence of other and important duties, which required his presence temporarily at New Orleans, entrusted his part of the expedition to General Franklin, formerly of the army of the Potomac. Franklin had instructions to move on the

Mar. 7th of March, and to be at Alexandria, if at all possible, on the 17th. It was the 13th before he was able to reach the Teche region. Admiral Porter was at the mouth of the Red River on the 7th, with a fleet of 15 iron-clads and 4 light steamers; and there, four days later, he was joined by the transports, with four divisions of Sherman's army, under General A. J. Smith, and the marine brigade, some 3000 strong, under General Alfred Ellet. On the morning of the

Mar. 12th, the entire fleet began to move up the Old River, the Eastport leading the way. The Old River is an arm of the Red River, and connects with the Atchafalaya. On the same evening, the fleet anchored off the ruins of Simmsport, that place having been destroyed during the siege of Port Hudson. Next morning, there being as yet no signs of Banks or his troops, Smith disembarked a small force for the purpose of reconnoitering. It was soon discovered that the Confederate rates had been present in considerable numbers at Simmsport, also Bayou Glacé and Yellow Bayou, but that they had fallen back to Fort de Russy, some thirty miles distant. Smith decided to land the whole column and march it overland to Fort de Russy. At daybreak, on the morning of Mar. 14, the landing was effected; and the entire column moved forward in light marching order, Moore's brigade in advance.

Fort de Russy, situated at Gordon's Landing, on the south bank of the Red River, and some seventy miles from its mouth, was a formidable quadrangular work, with bastions and bomb-proofs, covered with railroad iron, connected with a water battery, the casemates of which seemed capable of withstanding the heaviest shot and shell. The armament, as was afterwards discovered, consisted of eight heavy guns and two field-pieces.

About three o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th, after a harassing march, during which they had frequent and severe encounters with the enemy's cavalry, the Nationals reached the inner edge of the woods which skirt the open ground in front of the fort. Under cover of the woods, two batteries were hastily thrown up. The presence of the Nationals had already been discovered; and four guns on the fort were pouring forth shot and shell on their position. The batteries soon opened fire in reply. A brisk cannonade was kept up for the space of two hours, when there was a heavy fusilade, and then a vigorous charge, led by the
Fifty-Eighth Illinois and the Eighth Wisconsin. At this critical moment, the obstructions in the river having been removed, two of the gunboats—the Eastport and the Neosho—came up within range of the fort and fired a few shots. It was not deemed safe to continue the fire from the gunboats, so close now were the land troops to the fort. A few minutes later and the ditch was reached; the garrison surrendered; and the flag of the Union planted by the color-sergeant of the Fifty-Eighth Illinois, was floating over the works of Fort de Russy. The Confederate loss was 250 men made prisoners, ten guns, 1000 muskets, and all the munitions of war.

It appeared that General Walker, having left 300 men to protect the fort, had retired some hours before, with the expectation of meeting the National troops and offering them battle. Having taken a different road from that by which they were approaching, he failed to meet them. His presence might have given a different complexion to the fight; there might have been a larger loss of life; but the final result could hardly have been other than it was. A small force was left in the fort, with instructions to blow it up. The work of destruction was hastened and completed by an accident on the 17th.

The way to Alexandria, on the Red River, about 150 miles above, was now open. As soon as Fort de Russy had been captured, Admiral Porter, determined to obtain possession of Alexandria before the arrival of the fugitives, hurried forward his two fastest vessels, the Ouachita and Lexington, followed by the Eastport. General Smith's troops were at the same time put on board the transports and sent up the river; the remainder of the fleet following. Alexandria was occupied without opposition on the 16th, the Confederates, after burning two steamboats and a considerable quantity of cotton, having made their escape up the river, taking with them some of their own gunboats. At Alexandria were found several thousand bales of cotton; and food of every kind existed in abundance. "There is," said Admiral Porter, in a letter to the secretary of the navy, "a surprising abundance of every kind of food in this country, and no suffering among the people, except for luxuries. It would be folly to suppose they could all be starved out. The only way is to take possession of this rich region, hold it with a strong military and naval force, and enforce the laws. There are some good Union men here who have suffered much. I hope the day of their deliverance has come."

It has already been mentioned that General Franklin had not been able to leave the Teche region, with Banks' column, until the 13th. On his way he met with little opposition; Mar. 19, and, on the 19th, Banks' cavalry, under General A. L. Lee, began to pour into Alexandria. On the following day, Lee was joined by General Charles P. Stone, Banks' chief of staff, and other members of that officer's military family. Banks, himself, arrived and established his headquarters...
It was the earnest desire of General Banks that Porter should accompany him as far as Shreveport, so that in any encounter with the enemy, he should have the full benefit of the gunboats. Porter, although brave and ever willing, could not be expected to perform impossibilities; and difficulties almost insuperable lay in his way. Immediately above Alexandria there are rapids in the Red River. At this time the water in the river was very low—so low that, in the deeper water below the rapids, it was with difficulty Porter could move along his heavier ironclads. By main force, the Eastport was dragged over the rocks; other vessels followed; and, after more than a week's incessant toil, one half of the fleet was in the deeper waters above. The hospital ship, Woodford, was wrecked in the rapids. The transports could not be got over; and, as they were desired by McPherson at Vicksburg, they were permitted to return to the Mississippi. This was a great loss to General Banks. It robbed him directly of 3000 men, and indirectly of 3000 more, who were now needed to guard the depot of supplies at Alexandria, and the wagon-trains which conveyed the supplies from vessels below to vessels above the rapids. Banks, indeed, at this particular juncture, had much to discourage him. He had not counted on any hindrances from low water in the river. It was his belief that the troops under Smith might be spared from the expedition within, at least, thirty days after their arrival at Alexandria; and he had so told Sherman. On the 15th of March, General Grant wrote Banks, informing him that on no account could the troops detached from Sherman's army be allowed to remain with him more than ten or fifteen days longer than the time originally specified, and that, unless he felt satisfied that the object of the expedition could be accomplished within that period, he was to return the troops on the day at first agreed upon, even if the expedition should be abandoned. "I had much rather," said Grant in another despatch, "that the Red River Expedition had never been begun, than that you should be detained one day beyond the 1st of May in commencing the movement east of the Mississippi."

It had already become apparent to many that the expedition was to prove a failure. Banks must already have had his own misgivings as to the wisdom of proceeding further up the river. It was now known that it would be impossible to move the heavier gunboats beyond Grand Ecore. The supplies from that point would have to be conveyed partly, at least, in wagon-trains. These, of course, would have to be guarded; and to do this effectually would imply a further diminution of his already unduly diminished army. Then, again, information had reached him that large bodies of Confederates were arriving from Texas and Arkansas, and that Taylor and Price
and Green were concentrating in great strength in his front. It was estimated that the combined forces of these generals amounted to 25,000 men, with over 70 guns. Add to all this that he had heard nothing of Steele, and that he entertained only a doubtful hope of receiving from him any efficient assistance. Banks, however, was anxious to proceed, and accomplish, if possible, the chief object of the expedition—the capture of Shreveport. In this desire he was seconded by Smith. The men in both commands seemed as eager as their respective chiefs to complete the task they had undertaken.

April 4th He arrived at that place on the 4th of April, Franklin, his second in command, having come up with the main body of the army the day before. On the 6th the march was resumed in the direction of Shreveport, by the Mansfield road. A. L. Lee, with the cavalry, led the advance. Ransom followed with two thin divisions, of the Thirteenth army corps. Emory brought up the rear with the First division, of the Nineteenth army corps, and a brigade of colored troops which had just come up from Port Hudson. A. J. Smith, with his two divisions, of the Sixteenth army corps, followed two days later. Some 2500 of Smith's men, under T. Kilby Smith, had been sent up the river on transports to act as a guard to the fleet. Banks' available force at this time was estimated to be about 20,000 or 25,000 men. Porter had reached Grand Ecore about the same time that the army arrived at Natchitoches. It was at this place he was joined by the transports, some 20 in number, filled with supplies, and having Smith’s troops on board. Porter, without delay, completed his arrangements for a further movement up the river. The river was very shallow, much to his annoyance. He had, therefore, to content himself with his lighter vessels. The others were left behind. On the 7th, taking with him the Cricket, Fort Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho and Chillicothe, and 20 transports, with General Smith's troops on board, and abundance of supplies, Porter started for Shreveport. It had been arranged that on the third day the fleet should be opposite Springfield, and should there come to anchor and communicate with the army, a portion of which, it was expected, would be in the immediate neighborhood.

In his upward course, Porter tells us, he experienced very great difficulties. He, nevertheless, reached the appointed place within an hour of the time specified. At that point he met his first serious obstruction. The Confederates, determined to bar the navigation of the river, had sunk a large steamer, called the New Falls City. It was lying right across the current, her ends resting on each bank, and her hull, which was broken in the middle, resting on the muddy bottom. Porter had not had time to commence operations to remove this obstruction, when a messenger arrived from Banks, bringing the unwelcome and unexpected intelligence that the army had met with
a reverse, and at the same time ordering General Smith to return to Grand Ecore with the transports and the troops. It was a painful surprise to both Porter and Smith. Porter felt that a most abrupt end had come to the expedition, at least for the present. "We reluctantly turned back," he says, "after having nearly reached the object we aimed at." His own position now was one of great peril and of serious responsibility.

What had happened to Banks? Let us see. It has already been stated that General Lee, with his cavalry, led the National advance. On the 31st of March, he encountered a small force of the enemy at Natchitoches, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove them before him. He encountered the same force again on the 2d of April, a few miles to the west, put them to flight, and maintained the pursuit as far as Crump's Hill, a distance of twenty miles. Lee now waited for the arrival of Franklin with the main body of the National army. Franklin forwarded instructions to Lee to attack the enemy wherever he could find him, but to be careful to avoid a general engagement. On the 7th—the same day on which Porter left Grand Ecore—the whole army being now in motion, and the cavalry force being largely increased, Lee skirmished with great activity and energy, driving the enemy before him, until he had advanced some two or three miles beyond Pleasant Hill, about thirty miles west-northwest of Natchitoches. At this point he found himself confronted by the main body of the Confederate cavalry, some 2500 strong, and under the skilful and daring leadership of General T. Green. They were drawn up in line at the edge of a wood, with open fields in front. The place bore the name of Wilson's Farm. Active skirmishing commenced at once, and continued for at least two hours, when the Confederates were driven back into the woods near Patrick's Bayou, about nine miles from Pleasant Hill. Here Lee halted for the day. He had lost 92 men. He had, however, inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.

Lee was now in a somewhat critical and even dangerous position. So, indeed, as the result proved, was the entire National army. Lee was pushing forward too much in advance. Between him and the main body were the wagon trains. If attacked by a force superior in strength to his own, it would be difficult to fall back; and he ran the risk of being overpowered before relief could reach him. This was precisely the difficulty of the situation, and the source of all the trouble which followed. Franklin had not yet reached Pleasant Hill; Banks, who had been detained at Grand Ecore, superintending the departure of the transports, had not yet reached Franklin's headquarters; and A. J. Smith was still far in the rear. Lee, realizing his difficulty, called at once for a support of infantry, and asked permission to leave his wagon train behind. Landrum's brigade, of the Fourth division, of the Thirteenth corps, was hurried forward, Ransom following with what
remained of the division. On the morning of the 8th, Landrum having come up, Lee, who was accompanied by four batteries—Nim’s, the Chicago Mercantile, the First Indiana, and Battery G, of the regular army—pushed forward, making a liberal use of his artillery. The Confederates steadily fell back beyond the clearing at Sabine Cross Roads, until they had reached a clump of trees, about three or four miles from Mansfield. At this point, the Confederates were found to be assembled in great force. It was now manifest to all that the advance had been made too rapidly. Lee hesitated to attack, and so force a battle in the circumstances. He was disposed to wait until the main body was well forward. He was no longer, however, master of the situation. The Confederate generals, in truth, saw that their opportunity was ripe; and they were already preparing to change the current of battle, and to turn retreat into aggressive action and victory.

Ransom had come up about noon with the remainder of the Fourth division, of the Thirteenth corps; and Banks arrived at the front a little later. Banks had already assumed entire control of the field. The cavalry were in the centre. Landrum was on the right; Ransom was on the left. The skirmishing became gradually more active. The Confederates, having ceased to fall back, were already offering a stubborn resistance. It was becoming more and more apparent that they were assembled in strength, and that they were about to abandon the merely defensive, and make a bold aggressive effort. Banks sent orders to Franklin to hurry forward the infantry, instructing Lee meanwhile to hold his ground until the arrival of reinforcements. It was now about four o’clock. The skirmishing became more active and more general; and about half-past four, the entire Confederate force, some 8000 foot and 12,000 horse, fell like a thunderbolt on the whole National line, but bearing most heavily on the right flank. The shock was irresistible. The National troops, still fighting bravely, fell back over the open space at the Cross Roads to the woods in the rear. In this struggle, three pieces of Nim’s battery were lost; and but for the bravery of Lee’s cavalry, the National right would have been turned. The battle was raging furiously when Franklin came up, about five o’clock, with the Third division of the Thirteenth corps, under General Cameron. A new line was formed. It was of no avail. The Confederates, resolute to win—determined not to be balked of their prize—having gathered themselves up for a final effort, came rushing forward with redoubled fury. The onslaught was terrific. Cameron’s line was broken, as Ransom’s had been before it. The National ranks were now thrown into confusion; and large numbers of the troops, flinging down their arms, began to rush, panic-stricken, from the field. The rout soon became general. The narrow road, by which alone escape was possible, was quickly blocked up by wagon trains, by artillery, by footmen and horsemen, all
mingled together in inextricable confusion. It was such a scene as baffles all description; and it seemed as if nothing could save the National advance from complete destruction. Such was the state of things in the front about five o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th. "Bull Run," said Ransom, afterwards, "was nothing in comparison." Lee lost about 150 baggage wagons filled with supplies. Ransom lost his guns; and about 1000 of his men were captured. The National officers suffered severely. Several of them were killed, among whom were Colonel Webb, of the Seventy-Seventh Ohio; Colonel Vance, of the Ninety-Sixth Ohio; and Captain Dickey, of Ransom's staff. Among the wounded were Franklin, Ransom, and Colonel Robinson, who, with his cavalry, was protecting the wagon train. Such was the disastrous battle of Sabine Cross Roads.

The day, however, was not yet ended; nor was it doomed to close wholly in disaster and gloom for the National cause. At Pleasant Grove, some three miles in the rear, the pursuers and the pursued were both brought to a halt. General Emory with his splendid divisions, pressing forward, had just reached Pleasant Grove, when he learned of the disaster which had taken place in the front. With the instincts of a true soldier, he prepared to arrest the tide of retreat. Forming his men in line of battle at the edge of a wood, with open ground sloping down to the front, he awaited the approach of the triumphant foe. Making way for the flying columns, and allowing them to pass through to the rear, he caused his men to reserve their fire until the pursuers were close at hand. His orders were faithfully obeyed. The Confederates came up with a tremendous rush, their ranks somewhat disordered by success. Full in their faces Emory's men poured, in rapid succession, murderous volleys of musketry. Loth to yield in the hour of victory, the Confederates endeavored to press on. A fierce and sanguinary struggle ensued. It was in vain, however, that they dashed themselves on the solid front which Emory presented. They were mowed down in heaps, and compelled to retire. Night now fell upon the scene; and the National army was saved.

In this struggle, General Dwight, General McMillan, Colonel Kinsey and Colonel Benedict greatly distinguished themselves—the last-named officer, with great gallantry, having resisted and repelled repeated efforts made by the Confederates to turn the National right.

During the night, Banks retired his shattered army to Pleasant Hill, some fifteen miles in the rear, General Emory covering the retreat. Pleasant Hill, the position held by General Franklin at the commencement of the fight, was reached between eight and nine o'clock on the following morning. Happily, General A. J. Smith, who had not as yet taken any part in the strife, had arrived the night before with a portion of the Sixteenth corps. Preparations were immediately made to receive another attack. Pleasant Hill is a clear-
ing in the midst of the vast pine woods with which the adjoining country is covered. It is about thirty-five miles from Red River, on the road leading from Natchitoches, and forms a sort of plateau, which rises to a perceptible height above the surrounding country. Two lines of battle were formed—one in front by the division of General Emory, another behind the crest of the hill, and as a reserve, by the troops of General Smith. In the first line, Dwight was on the right; McMillan in the centre; Benedict on the left. The Twenty-Fifth New York battery was placed on a knoll between the right and the centre. The day was beautiful, and reminded many of a May day in the North. For the greater part of the day, as the Nationals, in battle array, awaited the attack of the enemy, the field resembled a parade-ground rather than a battle field. Noon came and went; and, although it was manifest that an attack was meditated, nothing but the slow shelling of the woods, or a stray shot from some impetuous or impatient picket, gave any indication of battle. So the day passed until about four in the afternoon. The skirmishing at that time became more active, as well as more general. There was again a lull. The storm, however, was brewing. It was now shortly after five o'clock. Suddenly, the Confederate artillery began to thunder. Under cover of this fire, the gray coats came rushing forth from the woods. In overwhelming numbers, and marching at the double-quick, they came, rolling forward in solid mass against the whole National line. The National skirmishers fell back as they approached. A tremendous onslaught was made on Emory's left, held, as we have said, by Benedict's brigade. Benedict was wounded in the arm; and, a few moments afterwards, he was shot through the head. His men fell back, fighting gallantly, and, reaching the lines of General Smith, filed behind Shaw's brigade. Sweitzer, with his Texan cavalry, in a brave but vain endeavor to penetrate the covering line, had his regiment literally cut to pieces.

Emory, for a brief space, stood firm in the centre and on the right; but, pressed at all points by overwhelming numbers, he was compelled to fall back to the shelter of the Sixteenth corps, behind the crest of the hill. The Confederates were already concluding that they were about to win an easy victory. They were in grievous error. General Smith was all readiness. His men were well trained to his peculiar mode of warfare. He did not believe in the useless waste of powder and shot, or in the useless waste of strength. The Confederates, flushed with what seems success, have pushed their way up the hill, almost to its summit. The muzzles of the National guns are almost reached. As yet, however, the guns are silent. The second line of Confederate troops is seen advancing up the hill. The opportune moment has come. The signal is given. There is a loud, deafening roar, mingled with the sharp rattle of musketry. Seven thousand rifles, and several batteries of artillery, every gun loaded to
the muzzle with grape and canister, have poured their deadly contents on the serried ranks of the advancing foe. Like a field of grain, over which a tornado has passed, the entire Confederate centre has been swept to destruction. Scarcely fewer than 1000 men lie dead or dying on the sloping ground. The word "Charge!" is heard resounding along the National lines; and 7000 brave men rush upon the shattered ranks of the enemy. Emory's division, now re-formed, joins the Sixteenth, and takes part in the final struggle. The struggle is brief; for, in a few minutes, the entire Confederate host is driven from the slope, through and beyond the woods, in broken and confused masses. The pursuit was continued until dark.

In the final charge, General Mower, distinguished throughout all this campaign, surpassed all his previous efforts. Emory, too, the hero of Pleasant Grove, proved himself worthy of the name he had already won. To General A. J. Smith, however, belongs the chief glory. It was his veteran Sixteenth corps which determined the day. It is not to be forgotten that Smith handled his own men in his own way. If Ransom had been allowed to do the same on the 8th, the result of the first day's fighting might have been different. In their flight, the Confederates left behind all their dead and wounded, 500 prisoners, three battle-standards, and a large number of small arms. Taylor's battery, which had been lost in the earlier part of the action, was recaptured. So, also, was a portion of Nim's battery, which had been lost on the 8th. A Parrott gun, which the Nationals had lost, the previous fall, at Carrion Crow, was also retaken.

It was at first intended to face again to the north, and resume the march to Shreveport. The idea was pleasing to the rank and file. It was particularly agreeable to General Smith, who was dissatisfied with the management and result of the campaign. Franklin, however, and some of the officers of the Nineteenth corps, for a variety of reasons, deemed it unwise. A council of officers was held on the evening of the 9th, when it was agreed to fall back to Grand Ecore. Banks' management of the expedition, and particularly the want of generalship exhibited by him in the first day's fighting, had lost him the confidence of his officers. As an administrator or organizer in a civil capacity, Banks, at that time, had few equals; but he was not at home on the battle field; nor was he possessed of those qualities, or that special kind of experience, which fit one for the successful management and control of a great military movement, conducted at different and possibly distant points, and by detached bodies of men. His military career acquired some lustre from Port Hudson; but the glory thus acquired came to him rather as an accident, incidental to his position, than as a necessity brought about by his great or shining military abilities. His military position was due to his political influence—an influence, however, which was fairly and honestly won. He had always under him officers greatly more
capable than himself; and he showed his wisdom most when he consulted their opinions and followed their guidance. The Shreveport Expedition ought to have been a success. As it was, the National army had lost already 18 guns, small arms in large numbers, 5000 men, 30 wagons and 1200 horses and mules, and had accomplished nothing.

While arrangements are being made for the backward movement, let us turn our attention to the fleet and transports. Porter and Kilby Smith, it will be remembered, had reached Springfield Landing, when they were made aware of the reverses which had attended the army on the 8th at Sabine Cross Roads, and that it would be necessary for them to return to Grand Ecore. It was no easy task which now devolved on Admiral Porter. Not without great difficulty had he succeeded in getting the vessels up over the rapids. Greater difficulty, he had reason to fear, would attend the return. The water in the river had not risen—it had rather fallen—in the interval; and he had the certain prospect of being seriously annoyed by the now disengaged Confederates, who were swarming along the banks of the river. The backward movement, however, was commenced at once. At a place called Coushatta, the boats first came under the enemy's fire. The Confederate colonel, Harrison, was at that point, with nearly 2000 cavalry and 4 guns. The progress made by the boats was necessarily slow. The river was narrow and snaggy; and, at night, it was deemed safest to halt, and wait for the returning light. Harrison had no difficulty in keeping up with the fleet. As he moved down the river, his numbers increased. Smith, meanwhile, was active on board the transports. In order to protect his men, he threw up barricades with boxes, barrels, bales of hay, mattresses, and everything else he could lay hold of. The water being so low, the gunboats could do little execution upon the high banks at short range; and Smith knew that the safety of the fleet depended largely on his own men. On the hurricane-deck of the Emerald, he mounted two Rodman guns, which did excellent service. On the 12th, near Pleasant Hill Landing, a fierce attack was made on the rear portion of the fleet. At this point, the Osage lay aground, a heavy transport, named the Black Hawk, being alongside of her, and attempting to pull her off. The Confederates, under General Thomas Green, opened with 2000 muskets. The gunboats and the transports replied with promptitude and effect. Smith brought his two Rodman guns to bear upon the banks of the river, where the enemy was massed in great force. The destruction of life was fearful. It seemed to be the determination of Green to capture this portion of the fleet. Again and again he pushed his men to the edge of the bank, till, in one of these encounters, a shot from one of the Rodman guns blew off his head. The Confederates again rallied, only, however, to be cut and torn to pieces by the raking canister-shot from the gunboats and the transports. While this struggle was
in progress, Harrison appeared on the opposite side of the river; but so destruc-
tive was the fire which was brought to bear upon him that he was compelled
to fall back and remain at a distance. In this engagement, excellent service
was rendered by Lieutenant Bache, with his gunboat, Lexington; also, by
Lieutenant T. O. Selfridge, of the Osage. Although ultimately compelled
to seek shelter in the casemates of the Osage, too much praise cannot be given
to Smith's men, who, on the transport, so nobly handled the Rodman guns.

These vessels, without encountering other serious difficulties, proceeded down
the river as far as Campii, where they rejoined the advance portion of the
fleet, which was grounded, and exposed to the enemy's fire from the banks.
From this point, Porter, on board the Cricket, which had just narrowly es-
caped capture at the hands of the guerrillas, hurried down to Grand Ecore,
where he found Banks, who had arrived with the land troops. At Porter's re-
quest, Banks sent a strong force up the river to protect the transports and the
gunboats. Soon after the arrival of the troops, the entire fleet began to
move towards Grand Ecore, which was reached without further trouble.

The retreat was resumed with as lit-
tle delay as possible. Porter started
with his fleet on the 17th. Banks set
out with the army on the 21st. Alex-
andria was the next point of destina-
tion. Porter's difficulties now began.
Eight miles below Grand Ecore, the
Eastport, struck by a torpedo under
her bottom and near her bow, was
sunk. This proved a great hindrance.
It was not until the 21st she was got
afloat—the day on which Banks re-
commended his backward march. Day
after day, for six days, the Eastport
passed through the same ordeal; and
the same laborious process of hauling
her over the bars had to be repeated. It
was wearisome work, and could hardly
fail, were we to enter into all the details,
to prove an equally wearisome recital.
On the 25th, when about sixty miles
below Grand Ecore, she again ground
ed. So much time had been wasted,
and so apparently inextricable she
seemed in her present position, that all
further attempts to save her were aban-
doned. About half-past one o'clock, on
the 26th of April, she was blown April
into fragments, having been pre-
viously charged with one ton of pow-
der and other combustibles. The East-
port was one of Porter's best vessels;
and both he and her commander, Phelps, did their utmost to carry her
off in safety. Almost at the moment
appointed for the blowing up of the
Eastport, the Confederates made a
daring but unsuccessful attempt to
capture the Cricket. The guerrillas
were quickly routed. The vessels
which were accompanying the East-
port, as soon as she was blown up,
proceeded down the river, encountering
no opposition until they had reached
a point at the mouth of Cane River.
The Cricket led the way, with Admi-
ral Porter on board, followed close by
the Juliet, the Champion, and the Fort
Hindman. As they neared the point,
they discovered that the Confederates
were present in considerable strength. Rounding the point, the Cricket still in front, and opening with their bow-guns, they found themselves exposed to the fire of a powerful battery of 18 guns, which the Confederates had quickly got into position. When the Cricket came fully up, each of the 18 guns poured forth its deadly and destructive missile. Every shot took effect on the little vessel, most of them penetrating through and through. The shock was terrific, and the destruction almost complete. One gun was disabled. Every gunner was killed or wounded. The chief engineer and one of the pilots were killed at their respective posts. In the fire-room only one man escaped—all the others being either killed or wounded. Strange to say, Admiral Porter escaped unhurt, and the machinery was comparatively uninjured. Making use of some negroes, who were on board, Porter manned the guns, and ran the vessel past the battery. A few miles down the river, he found the Osage and the Lexington engaged fighting a field-battery. It was his intention to take these vessels back to the assistance of those he had left behind; but darkness coming on, this was found to be impossible. Lieutenant Phelps brought the Juliet and the Fort Hindman past the battery during the evening gloom. Both, however, were severely punished. The pumpboat, Champion, having been disabled, was set on fire, and left behind. "In five minutes" says Porter, in his graphic report of this action, "the Cricket was struck thirty-eight times with solid shot and shell, with a loss of 25 killed and wounded; the Juliet about the same, with 15 killed. The Fort Hindman lost 3 killed and 4 or 5 wounded." No further interruption was experienced until the fleet reached the rapids.

While Admiral Porter was thus pushing his way down the river, General Banks, with the land forces, had made a successful march to Alexandria. His advance, under General Emory, left Grand Ecore on the 22d of April. General A. J. Smith followed with his column, his rear being covered by a command under General Kirby Smith. On the first day, the National army marched forty miles. It had reached Cane River, on the east side of which, and near a ferry, on an elevation called Monet's Bluff, the Confederates, to the number of 8000, with 16 guns, had taken a strong position. This bluff was flanked by the unfordable river on one side and by an almost impassable swamp on the other. It was the intention of General Banks to force a passage across the river at this place, by making a vigorous attack early on the morning of the 23d. It was the determination of the Confederates to offer a stubborn resistance; and it was their hope and belief that, by drawing the National advance into a sharp engagement, they would be able, with the remainder of their forces, then not far distant, to fall with destructive effect on the National flank and rear. Emory, however, had moved with such celerity that he anticipated their plans. The Confederates were not ready. Their
pickets on the west side of the stream were easily driven in; but the main portion was found to be too strong to be taken by direct assault. A flank movement was resolved upon. General Birge, taking with him his own brigade—that of Colonel Fessenden—and General Cameron's division, of the Thirteenth corps, crossed the river three miles above the ferry, and, late in the afternoon, after weary marching, reached the desired position, in the rear of the enemy's stronghold. Meanwhile, the advance of the main body of the National army was moved towards the Cane River, and within range of the guns on the bluff, on the opposite side. The Confederates immediately opened fire; and a spirited artillery duel was maintained for some hours. It had been arranged that as soon as Birge commenced the assault in the Confederate rear, the National reserves should force the passage of the river. The plan worked admirably. The assault on the rear of the Confederate position was made by Colonel Fessenden's brigade, the colonel leading his men. It was made with great gallantry and with signal success. When darkness set in, the Confederates were flying in confusion along the Fort Jesup road; and the bluff was occupied by the Nationals. In this attack, the Nationals lost about 200 men in killed and wounded. Among the wounded was Colonel Fessenden. On the morning of the 23d, the Confederates fell with great force on the rear of General A. J. Smith's column, which was covered by the command of General Kilby Smith. The last-named general turned upon the enemy at Clouterville, on the Cane River; and, after a three-hours' engagement, General Mower fighting with great bravery on his right, Smith repulsed the Confederates at every point, and compelled them to withdraw. The march towards Alexandria was resumed on the afternoon of the following day; and, on the 27th, after an absence of twenty-four days, Banks and his army were back in Alexandria. The backward march from Grand Ecore was successfully managed; and while it did honor to General Banks, it redounded, also, to the credit of Generals Emory, A. J. Smith and T. Kilby Smith, who, by their skill, bravery and promptitude of action, greatly added to the laurels they had already won.

At Alexandria, all hopes of resuming the Shreveport Expedition vanished. General Hunter had arrived with orders from General Grant, instructing Banks to close the campaign, as Sherman's troops were now all needed to the east of the Mississippi. Those orders were final. It was impossible, however, to abandon Porter and his fleet to the tender mercies of the enemy. Hunter, therefore, returned to Grant with a letter from Banks, explaining the situation, and claiming such time as might be needed to make a fair effort to save the fleet.

We left Porter at the rapids, above Alexandria. The water had become so low that he had no hope of getting his vessels over the falls. "I saw nothing before me," he says, "but the
destruction of the best part of the Mississippi squadron." The difficulty, however, had not been unforeseen; and its solution had already, for some time, been engaging the attention and taxing the genius of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, Banks' chief engineer. It was Bailey's conviction that by a system of damming, which he explained to both Banks and Porter, he could bring the fleet safely over the rapids. Banks shared in the belief of his lieutenant. Porter doubted. Banks gave the necessary orders; and, on Sunday, the May 1st of May, Bailey went to work.

1. On condition that he should be allowed the use of as many men as he might deem necessary, he promised to complete the proposed dam within ten days. It was a perilous and, apparently, an impossible task. The falls were a mile in length; the water was exceedingly low; and, in proportion as the dam approached completion, the work and the workmen would be increasingly at the mercy of a powerful current. Three thousand men, with from two to three hundred wagons, were soon busily engaged. The entire country around was ransacked for the necessary material. The neighboring steam-mills were demolished for their stone and brick and wood and iron; the adjoining forests echoed with the sound of the axe, and, yielding to the persuasive blows of the sturdy men from Maine, gave up their stalwart giants of oak and pine; the quarries resounded with the stroke of the hammer, and lent their weight and strength to the daring enterprise; wagons rumbled to the river; and flatboats conveyed the stone and wood to their destined places. Bailey commenced by running out from the left bank of the river a tree-dam made of the bodies of very large trees, brush, brick and stone, cross-tied with heavy timber and strengthened in every way which ingenuity could devise. This tree-dam was run out about 300 feet, at which point were sunk four large coal barges filled with brick. From the right bank, cribs, filled with stone, were built out to meet the barges. At all points the work went merrily on, the soldiers lightening their toil by singing favorite army songs and certain plantation melodies. In eight days the dam was all but completed; and the water on the upper falls had risen so high as to allow the Fort Hindman, the Osage and the Neosho to move down and be in a state to pass through the dam. In another day, it was calculated, all the vessels would be got down and over the falls. Early on the 9th, however, when the above-named vessels were about to pass through, the pressure of the water, which had risen rapidly, and was flowing at the rate of nine miles an hour, swept away two of the stone barges. Porter galloped to the upper falls, and ordered the Lexington to move down and endeavor to pass through the gap in the dam. The attempt was made. The vessel got over the upper falls in safety, but not a moment too soon, as the water was already falling rapidly. She then made for the opening in the dam, through which the water was now rushing with
tremendous fury. To the thousands who lined the banks, and who looked on tremulously and in silence, it seemed a foolhardy experiment—a certain rush to destruction. The Lexington had on a full head of steam, as she went bounding down the roaring torrent. Rolling spasmodically, almost like a thing of life, she hung for a moment on the rocks below; and then, yielding to the force of the current, she made one grand leap into the lower deep waters. A loud and long-resounding cheer announced the success of the undertaking and the delight of over twenty thousand men. The Neosho followed; but she made the passage with less success than the Lexington. Her pilot became frightened as she approached the abyss, and shut off the steam. It was a serious blunder, and well-nigh brought the vessel to destruction. Her hull disappeared under the water; and it seemed as if she were lost. It was, however, only for a moment. Having risen again above the surface, she was caught by the current, and swept over the rocks, fortunately reaching the deep water below with only one hole in her bottom—a damage which was promptly repaired. The Fort Hindman and the Osage passed over "beautifully," Porter tells us, and without sustaining any injury.

It was not deemed safe to make the experiment with the heavier vessels. Bailey, meanwhile, was busy repairing his dam. The soldiers, now fully convinced that they were not working towards an impossible end, resumed their toilsome task with renewed energy. The dam was speedily repaired; and the remaining six vessels—the Mound City, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Ozark, Louisville and Chillicothe—with two tugs, passed safely through, in the presence and amid the loud, hearty and prolonged cheers of the entire army. The success of this undertaking gave Porter a new idea of the possible. "Words," says he, "are inadequate to express the admiration I feel for the abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. The highest honors the government can bestow on him can never repay him for the service he has rendered the country." The government was not ungrateful. Bailey was honored by Congress with a vote of thanks and a medal; and he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general.

During the time the army remained at Alexandria, waiting for the fleet, it was reinforced by a large body of troops, which had come up from Matagorda Bay, under General John A. McClernand. A serious misfortune, during the same interval, had befallen two of the vessels of the fleet—the Signal and Covington—which had been sent down the river in advance as a convoy to the transport Warner. On the 5th of May, at Dunn's Bayou, about thirty miles below Alexandria, they were attacked and overpowered by a strong Confederate force. The Covington was set on fire, and then abandoned. The Signal and the transport were captured. It was a very unequal struggle. Of the soldiers on board the transport, about 100 were killed, and 150 made prisoners. The remainder
took to the shore and escaped. Not long afterwards the City Belle was captured, having on board 400 Ohio troops. These isolated cases seem to reflect on the management at headquarters. In such a country, it is the first duty of the naval commander to keep his vessels well together, as it is the first duty of the general in the field to move his men in masses. The principle involved is fundamental, and ought never to be departed from, except in extraordinary circumstances.

On the 13th of May, Alexandria, by some unknown hands, was set on fire. In spite of the efforts of Generals Banks and Smith, a large portion of the place was destroyed. On the following day, the town was evacuated; and both the army and navy were moving in the direction of Simmsport. It was a day of great sorrow in Alexandria. General Banks had declared his determination that the occupation should be permanent. In consequence of this assurance, the citizens in large numbers had given their allegiance to the National cause. Not a few of them had joined the army and been sent forward to Simmsport. Knowing the fate which awaited them, the women and children became frantic with grief, and, terror-sticken, begged, but begged in vain, to be taken on board the transports and conveyed to New Orleans. It was one of those sad and sorrowful circumstances which are unavoidable in war. On the 16th, the army and the fleet had both reached Simmsport, Porter's progress having been greatly facilitated by a rise in the Mississippi, which caused a back-water in the Red River. On the morning of the 16th, while pressing on towards Simmsport, the troops were vigorously attacked by a body of the enemy at Mansura. On the 20th they had crossed the Atchafalaya, when General E. R. S. Canby assumed command, and Banks hastened on to New Orleans. In obedience to counter-orders which had come from Halleck, with consent of Grant, permitting that portion of Sherman's troops to remain in the West, A. J. Smith proceeded up the Mississippi, halting on the way at Columbia, and dispersing a body of Confederates, under Marmaduke. Porter resumed his station on the Mississippi; and, in due time, the remainder of the army, under General Canby, reached New Orleans. Thus ended the Shreveport Expedition—an expedition which was conducted without capacity or discipline, and which, as we have said already, revealed the lack of true military genius on the part of General Banks.

This chapter would be incomplete without a brief allusion to the expedition which was conducted under General Steele. That general, it will be remembered, had been instructed to move southward and co-operate with Banks in the movement against Shreveport. When Banks set out on his northward march, Steele was at Little Rock. He left there on March 23d, with 12,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry, under Carr. Camden was Steele's first objective; but he expected to be joined by General Thayer at Arkadelphia, with about 5000 men.
At Camden, if no serious difficulty interposed, he was to be joined by a small force under General Clayton. Thayer left Fort Smith on the 22d; and, about the same time, Clayton marched from Pine Bluff. The roads were bad; and the junction of the forces according to instructions could hardly be relied upon. When Steele reached Arkadelphia, Thayer was not forward. After waiting for the latter in vain for two days, Steele pushed on in the direction of Washington, with the view of flanking Camden. General Sterling Price, it was known, was in the neighborhood, with 12,000 Confederates. After a toilsome march, and being constantly harassed by the cavalry under Marmaduke and Cabel, Steele reached Prairie D'Ann on April the 10th of April, where he was joined by Thayer. Price was understood to be here in great force; and Steele at once resolved to offer battle. By a series of dexterous movements, which succeeded in misleading Price as to the real objective of his antagonist, and after some desperate skirmishing, Steele wheeled around and pushed his way to Camden, taking possession of the place on the night of the 15th, in spite of the most persistent efforts of the enemy. Here he learned of the disaster which had befallen Banks at Sabine Cross Roads; and, feeling convinced that the enemy, already at least 25,000 strong, would soon be reinforced by the army of General Kirby Smith, he gave up all thoughts of moving further in the direction of Shreveport. His position at Camden soon became the reverse of comfortable. His supplies were intercepted; his foraging parties were cut off; Clayton could hardly be expected now to join him; and he began to fear for the safety of Little Rock. In these circumstances, he resolved to retreat to his former stronghold. On the April night of the 26th, he threw 26. his army across the Washita River; and, at daylight on the 27th, he began to fall back, by way of Princeton and Jenkins’ Ferry, on the Sabine River. The roads were in the most wretched condition; and the rain fell in torrents. At Jenkins’ Ferry, he was attacked by an overwhelming force, led by Kirby Smith in person. Steele got his men quickly into position; and the battle at once became general. The Confederates fell on the National lines with tremendous energy. Again and again they came up in full force, now on the left, and now on the right, and finally making a desperate effort to crush the left and centre. More than once the National lines yielded to the tremendous pressure and fierce onsets of the enemy; but nothing could cool the courage or relax the energies of those brave Western regiments. Every charge of the enemy was successfully repelled. The battle had commenced at early dawn. It was now near noon. The critical moment of the fight had arrived. The National left, which was held by the Thirty-Third Iowa, whose ammunition was exhausted, was yielding to the pressure of the heavy masses of the enemy. Four companies of the Fortieth Iowa hastened to its support,
formed under a terrible fire, and restored the line. The tide of battle now turned. The Confederates, not prepared for this fresh advent of strength and heroism, began to fall back. For one whole hour, the Nationals pressed on their front, the Confederates slowly, but steadily, yielding up the ground. At noon, the victory was complete; and the Nationals remained masters of the field. In this fierce struggle, Steele lost 700 men in killed and wounded. The Confederate loss must have exceeded 3000 men, including 3 general officers. Leaving a burial party behind, Steele crossed the Saline River and continued his retreat. He was not further molested. On the 2d May of May, after a weary march, over a swampy country, his half-famished troops, broken and dispirited, were safe in Little Rock. The battle at Jenkins' Ferry did credit to Steele and to his brave soldiers; but the expedition, like that of which it was intended to form a part, was ill-omened and disastrous.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

One of the Sources of Nourishment and Strength.—Sherman's Plan.—Farragut Reconnoitres.—The Obstructions Visible.—Need for Caution.—The Defenses.—Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell.—The Confederate Fleet.—The Tennessee, the Selma, the Gaines, the Morgan.—Farragut's Fleet.—Reinforcements.—The Monitors.—A Consultation on Board the Hartford.—Farragut, Canby and Granger.—A Land Force Promised.—Description of Mobile Harbor.—The City of Mobile.—Mobile Point.—Dauphin Island.—Sand Island.—Grant's Pass.—Swash Channel.—Middle Channel.—The Position of the Forts.—Description of the Tennessee.—Preparations for the Attack.—Arrival of Granger with 2500 Men.—Investment of Fort Gaines.—The Fleet in Motion.—August 5th.—The Tecumseh.—The First Shot.—Fort Morgan Thunders.—The Tecumseh Disappears.—Torpedoes.—The Brooklyn Pauses, and Falls Back.—A Critical Moment.—The Fleet in Danger.—Farragut's Decision and Promptitude.—A Perilous Position.—Fearful Broadside.—The Hartford Ahead.—Past Fort Morgan.—The Tennessee About to Strike.—Missed her Mark.—The Gunboats.—Their Raking Fire.—The Metacomet in Pursuit of the Selma.—The Selma Captured.—The Gaines and the Morgan Under the Shelter of the Fort.—At Anchor.—Piped for Breakfast.—Reappearance of the Tennessee.—Buchanan's Evident Intention.—Too Much Confidence.—Wooden Ships and Iron-Clads.—Monster Rams and Monitors.—The Tennessee and the National Fleet.—Magnificent Fighting.—Hard Blows.—The Tennessee Apparently Invulnerable.—A Tremendous Shot from the Manhattan.—Closing in Upon the Monster.—Admiral Buchanan Wounded.—The Crew Demoralized.—The White Flag.—The Surrender.—Traces of Punishment.—Joy in the Land.—Praise of Farragut.—The American Nelson.—Two Historical Pictures.—The Work not yet Completed.—The Forts Passed, but not Taken.—Fort Powell Abandoned.—Attack on Fort Gaines.—The Fort Surrendered.—Investment of Fort Morgan.—Siege Batteries and Engineers from New Orleans.—General Richard Arnold.—Ready for the Attack.—The Bombardment Commenced.—The Fort in Flames.—Darkness.—The Firing Discontinued.—The Bombardment Resumed.—The Morning of the 29th of August.—The White Flag.—Immediate and Unconditional Surrender.—General Page.—Unsoldierly Conduct.—Joy and Hope.

Although the great battle in Mobile Harbor did not take place until August, 1864, and, therefore, subsequent to other naval engagements of the very first importance, this seems to be the fitting time and place to tell the story. It was, as we have seen, one of the three great sources from which
in the southwest, the Confederacy drew nutriment and strength. The reduction of Mobile had long since been contemplated by the National government; and when, at the beginning of 1864, it was resolved to strike at the very heart of the Confederacy, by a movement upon Meridian and Selma, and also to cut off all communication with Shreveport, Mobile was included in the general plan. If General Sooy Smith had succeeded in joining General Sherman at Meridian, according to arrangement, Selma, not improbably, would have shared the fate of Meridian, and the final struggle in Mobile Harbor would have been antedated by several months. Simultaneously with the movement upon Meridian, a diversion, it will be remembered, was made in the direction of Mobile. Even before that date, the defenses of that harbor were occupying Farragut's attention. As early as the 20th of January, he made a personal reconnoissance of Forts Morgan and Gaines. The day was fine, and the air clear. Although he could not approach within a distance of three or four miles from the forts, he could distinctly see the guns and the men who stood by them. He could see, also, the piles and other obstructions which, running out from Fort Gaines, blocked the channel, leaving only a narrow passage-way immediately in front of Fort Morgan. The Admiral was not encouraged by what he saw to make any rash or immediate attack; but he did not the less feel that the reduction of the defenses in Mobile Harbor was the next task to which he must devote all the energies of his will and all the resources of his daring and fertile genius.

As soon as the army of General Banks returned from the Red River country, and General Canby took command of the Western military division, preparations began to be vigorously made for a movement upon Mobile. Farragut was not disposed to break through his policy of caution, until he should feel that the force at his disposal justified him in assuming the offensive; but he held his fleet in a state of readiness for any emergency, and was prepared to resist any aggressive movement which might be made by the enemy. He had need to be on his guard. The Confederate authorities had not been inattentive to the requirements of the harbor. Not contented with the forts, torpedoes, piles and other obstructions which they had placed in the channel, they had constructed several powerful iron-clads, by means of which they hoped not only to repel invasion, but to destroy the National fleet and raise the blockade. The largest of these vessels—the Tennessee—constructed on the same principle as the famous Merrimac of Hampton Roads renown, appeared in the bay on the 17th of March. Having been brought down Dog River, she was floated over the bar with camels. Referring to the circumstance, Farragut, writing to the secretary of the navy says: "Thus you perceive, I am in hourly expectation of being attacked by an almost equal number of vessels—iron-clad against wooden vessels—and a most unequal contest it will be, as the
Tennessee is represented as impervious to all their experiments at Mobile; so that our only hope is to run her down, which we shall certainly do all in our power to accomplish, but should we be unsuccessful, the panic in this part of the country will be beyond all control. They will imagine that New Orleans and Pensacola must fall." On the 24th of May, he ran in shore, and, getting a good view of the monster, which was flying the blue flag of Admiral Buchanan, he satisfied himself of her dangerous character.

Farragut's fleet consisted of fourteen wooden ships—the Brooklyn, Hartford, Richmond, Lackawanna, Monongahela, Ossipee, Oneida, Octorara, Metacomet, Port Royal, Seminole, Kennebec, Itasca, Galena. Four monitors—the Tecumseh, Winnebago, Manhattan and Chickasaw were promised in addition to these; but it was not until the latter end of July that these vessels arrived. As soon as they reached him, Farragut felt that if he was only adequately supported by a land force, he might venture to assume an offensive attitude. Admiral Farragut, Generals Canby and Granger held a consultation on board the Hartford. It was Farragut’s desire that the two principal forts—Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines—should both be invested, and that, when the attack was made by the fleet, the land forces should cooperate and create a diversion in their favor. General Canby agreed to send all the troops at his disposal. It was soon discovered, however, that he could not spare a sufficient number of men to invest both forts; and, at Farragut’s suggestion, it was finally resolved that the troops who were under the command of General Gordon Granger should give their attention first to Fort Gaines.

A general description of the city of Mobile, of the bay of the same name, and of its means of defense, will enable the reader to understand the events about to be detailed. The city of Mobile is situated at the head of the bay, about thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico, and at the mouth of the Alabama River. At the commencement of the war, it had a population of about 20,000, and was the most important place in Alabama. It was used for a time by the Confederates as a naval depot; but latterly, fearing for its safety, they had the stores removed up the river to Selma. Mobile Bay, which is large and commodious, is well land-locked, a narrow peninsula, about fifteen miles in length and terminating in Mobile Point, shutting it in on the east and southeast. On the west, it is closed in by a chain of low sand banks and by Dauphin Island, which separate Mississippi Sound from the Gulf of Mexico. Dauphin Island is about twelve miles long from east to west, narrow at its western extremity, about a mile in width towards the east, and having a narrow, projecting peninsula towards the south, terminating in what is called Pelican Point. To the north of Little Dauphin Island, there is a channel, called Grant’s Pass, which connects the bay with Mississippi Sound. This channel, however, is narrow, and never has a depth of water over seven
feet. The mouth of the bay, therefore, is between Mobile Point and the eastern extremity of Dauphin Island. About three quarters of a mile to the southwest of Mobile Point is Sand Island, about half a mile long from east to west, with an attached reef running west for about three miles. This little island, with its chain of sand banks, covers the principal mouth of the harbor. The entrance from the southeast, between Mobile Point and Sand Island, is called Swash Channel. The entrance from the southwest is known as Middle Channel.

The bay was well guarded. At its mouth, to the east and west, stood Forts Morgan and Gaines. These were old works, built by the United States government, before the war, at great expense, and on the most approved principles of modern construction. They were fully garrisoned, and well supplied with stores of all kinds. Fort Morgan was built on the western end of Mobile Point, and had an armament of 48 guns. Fort Gaines was built on the eastern end of Dauphin Island, and mounted 21 guns. Grant's Pass was guarded by Fort Powell, a pentagonal work without ditches, but surrounded by piles which served also as a breakwater. Across the Swash and Middle channels were placed rows of piles; piles and other obstructions were run across from Fort Gaines, so as to compel the vessels attacking to come fully under the guns of Fort Morgan; and the channel was filled with torpedoes, the location of which Farragut had no means of knowing. In addition to all this, there were three gunboats—the Gaines, Selma and Morgan—and the iron-clad ram, Tennessee. The gunboats were of superior construction, and were well armed. The Tennessee was of gigantic proportions, and of immense strength. She was 209 feet in length, 48 feet in breadth, and drew 14 feet of water. Her sides, 8 feet thick, had a covering of two layers of iron, each 2 inches thick. Her deck was covered with a 2-inch iron plating. Her casemates, which projected and overhung so as to protect the hull, were shielded with 6 inches of iron. She was fitted with tower and turret; and she carried six rifles—two pivots, 7½ inches bore, and four 6-inch broadsides, capable of flinging projectiles weighing, respectively, 110 and 95 pounds. She was propelled by two powerful high-pressure engines. Such were the obstructions; and such were the actual means of resistance which had to be encountered and overcome, before the harbor of Mobile could be said to be restored to the National government.

A consultation, as has already been stated, was held on the 8th of July, on board the flag-ship Hartford, by Farragut, Canby and Granger. At this consultation, it was agreed that Canby should send from New Orleans 10,000 men, under General Granger, and that the troops should invest both Fort Gaines and Fort Morgan, while the fleet was pressing into the harbor. It was subsequently found that so many troops could not be spared; and, about the 1st of August, Granger arrived with 2500 men. It
was concluded, therefore, only to invest Fort Gaines. Preparations were now made for an immediate attack.

On the 5th of August, as early as half-past five o'clock, the fleet was in motion. The vessels proceeded two abreast, and were lashed together in the following order: The Brooklyn, with the Octorara on the port side; the Hartford with the Metacomet; the Richmond with the Port Royal; the Lackawanna with the Seminole; the Monongahela with the Kennebec; the Ossipee with the Itasca; the Onondaga with the Galena. On the starboard side were the monitors, and in order as follows: The Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago and Chickasaw. The monitors were thus between the fleet and Fort Morgan. A slight wind was blowing from the southwest. The Brooklyn was permitted to take the lead, because she carried four choice guns and was armed with an ingenious contrivance for picking up torpedoes. Farragut took an elevated position in the main rigging of the Hartford, near the top, from which he could overlook all the vessels of the fleet. At 47 minutes past six o'clock, when the fleet was steaming steadily up the main channel, the Tecumseh fired the first shot. Almost immediately afterwards, Fort Morgan began to thunder. The Brooklyn replied; and at once the action became general. In a few moments more, the Tecumseh, which was about 300 yards ahead of the Brooklyn, was seen to disappear below the water, carrying with her her gallant commander, T. A. M. Craven, and nearly all her crew.* She had struck a torpedo, which exploded, tearing a great hole in her bottom. At this critical moment, when full under the guns of the fort, and when suffering severely, the Brooklyn, as if appalled by what had happened, paused and backed, so as to move round out of the way of the torpedoes. This action of the Brooklyn brought the whole fleet to a standstill, and, for a moment, threatened to huddle the ships together, and bring about a disaster similar to that which happened in Charleston Harbor, on the occasion of Dupont's attack. Farragut, however, was found equal to the emergency. Calling upon Drayton, he ordered him to push forward the Hartford, heedless of possible consequences, and gave directions for the rest of the vessels to follow. The Brooklyn was soon under headway again, and following the Hartford. No more torpedoes exploded. A very tempest of shot was now brought to bear upon the fort by the entire fleet. A light wind blew

*Captain Tunis Augustus M. Craven was a native of New Hampshire. He entered the navy in June, 1829, and served on different vessels till 1837, when, at his own request, he was placed on the Coast Survey. After having filled different commands, and done various service, he was, when the war broke out, placed in command of the Cruiser, which was stationed at Key West. In September, 1861, he was transferred from the Cruiser to the now screw-sloop Tuscarora, which was sent across the Atlantic to look after Confederate cruisers. Though he failed to overtake the Alabama, he did good service in blockading the Sumter at Gibraltar, and in finally compelling the rebels to abandon that vessel. Early in 1864 he was, at his own request, placed in command of the monitor Tecumseh, and sailed in that vessel for Hampton Roads, where he joined the James River flotilla, and arrived among the first at City Point. After some stay there, he was ordered, with the Tecumseh, to join the squadron of Admiral Farragut.
the smoke from the guns of the fleet in
the direction of the fort, thus blinding
the Confederate gunners. From the
time the Hartford turned to the north-
west to clear the middle ground, so
rapid and well-directed were her broad-
sides, that the batteries on the fort
were comparatively silenced.

At 10 minutes before eight o'clock,
when the Hartford had just passed the
fort, the other vessels following, Far-
ragut saw the Tennessee, with a full
head of steam on, bearing down, the
evident intention being to strike the
flag-ship. Happily, the monster missed
her aim. Her guns opened on the
Hartford as she passed; but Farragut
made a vigorous response, and kept
moving along. The Confederate gun-
boats Morgan, Selma and Gaines were
ahead, and were greatly annoying Far-
ragut by a raking fire, which he was
unable to return. "The shots from the
gunboats," Drayton tells us, "were
delivered with great deliberation and
consequent effect, a single one having
killed ten men and wounded five." He
could only direct his fire on one of the
gunboats at a time. Irritated by this
persistent and destructive fire, Farragut
detached the Metacomet, ordering Cap-
tain Jouett to go off in pursuit of the
Selma. Jouett executed his appointed
task nobly, and with complete success.
The Confederate gunboats were each
armed with three powerful guns at
their stern. Although exposed for a
time to the concentrated fire of each of
them, Jouett gained on his antagonist;
and, within an hour, he had captured
the Selma, with her captain and the
tire crew, and driven the Morgan
and the Gaines—the latter in a crippled
condition—under cover of the fort.
When night fell, the Morgan escaped
and made her way to Mobile. The
Gaines was run ashore and burned.

It was now 45 minutes past eight
o'clock. The forts were passed; and,
the vessels having for the most part
been brought to anchor, the men were
piped to breakfast. The repast was not
to be long or quietly enjoyed. Farragut,
from his commanding position, espied
the Tennessee again making directly
for the National fleet, with a full head
of steam on, and making splendid time.
It was his opinion that whatever might
be her ultimate purpose, she had sin-
gled out the flag-ship as the first object
of her attention. The result proved
that he had rightly divined. Without
a moment's delay, he made preparations
for the reception of the monster iron-
clad. The monitors, and such other
vessels of the fleet as he thought best
adapted for the purpose, were imme-
diately ordered to attack the ram, as
soon as she came forward, not only
with their guns, but with their "bows
on at full speed." Buchanan, the Con-
federate admiral, who was on board
the Tennessee, had evidently made up
his mind that he was more than a
match for the whole fleet. He had,
however, underestimated the power of
the National fleet quite as much as he
had overestimated the fighting qualities
of his own iron-clad. Of the fourteen
wooden vessels which constituted the
main portion of Farragut's fleet, three
of them were sloops of 2000 tons
burden, carrying heavy armaments of 9-inch Dahlgrens and 100-pounder rifles. Even the smaller vessels were heavily armed. Of the monitors, two had 11-inch guns, and one—the Manhattan—was supplied with guns of 15-inch bore. Powerful as Buchanan's vessel was, it revealed a vast amount of both daring and confidence to attack, single-handed, such a fleet as that which obeyed the behests of a commander having the skill and experience of Admiral Farragut. Yet Buchanan was not wholly without reason for trusting his own ship and distrusting the ships of the enemy. The Merrimac, it was true, had been defeated by the Monitor; but competent critics had declared that the Merrimac had not been injured by 11-inch shot. The Atlanta, a vessel of the same class as the Merrimac, had been captured; but her armor was only four inches thick; and, then, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, the Albemarle had already beaten off a whole fleet. If he could get a fair blow at each of the ships in succession, it was Buchanan's opinion he might destroy the whole National fleet, without himself being seriously injured. Buchanan's calculations might have turned out to be more correct, if the National fleet had been commanded by another than Farragut. The merits of the respective antagonists were now, however, soon to be tested.

The ram was close at hand. A warm reception awaited her. The Monongahela, a vessel of 1400 tons, carrying thirty pounds of steam, her screw working sixty revolutions, was the first to hit her. Moving in at full speed, she struck the monster a fair blow full in the side. The Monongahela punished herself more than she punished her huge antagonist. She lost her iron prow and her cutwater. On retiring, she swung around, and fired into the iron-clad her 11-inch guns. The Tennessee was yet apparently unharmed. The next blow was struck by the Lackawanna. She, too, suffered severely. Her stern was cut and crushed to the plank ends, from three feet above to five feet below the water's edge. The ram was still, to all appearance, uninjured. The Hartford was the next to move against the apparently invulnerable iron-clad. As the Tennessee shifted her helm and shied, so to speak, the blow was a glancing one. The Hartford, as she rasped along, gave her a whole port broadside of 9-inch solid shot. The Tennessee did not as yet show any signs of distress. The vessels were now moving in a sort of circle around the giant, the monitors more slowly than the others, but hitting hard blows as opportunity offered. The Chickasaw now got under the stern of the Tennessee; and a 15-inch shot from the Manhattan went tearing through the iron plating and heavy wooden backing of the casemate of the monster. Farragut, now determined to force the fighting, ordered Drayton to strike again. At this moment, unhappily, the Hartford and the Lackawanna came into awkward collision, the former being struck just forward of the mizzen-mast.
and cut down to within two feet of the water's edge. The two vessels soon got disentangled, and were making again for the Tennessee. Meanwhile, the Chickasaw was pounding away at the monster's stern; the Ossipee was about to deal a deadly blow; and the Monongahela, as well as the Lackawanna and the Hartford, was bearing down upon her at full speed. The end had now come. The Tennessee had been sorely punished. Her smoke-stack had been shot away; her steering-chains were gone; and several of her port-shutters had been so jammed that they could not be opened. Admiral Buchanan had been severely wounded in the leg; and the entire crew had become demoralized. Further resistance was felt to be vain. Before, therefore, the threatened blow could be struck, the white flag was hoisted. In a few moments more, the captain of the Tennessee came on board the Hartford, and surrendered his own sword and that of Admiral Buchanan. Such was the end of the famous naval encounter in Mobile Harbor.

This great victory had not been won without some loss. Farragut had 165 killed and drowned. Of these, 113 went down in the Tecumseh. There were 25 killed and 28 wounded on board the Hartford. The Oneida had 8 killed and 30 wounded. Among the latter was her commander, I. R. M. Mullany. It is a fact worthy of notice that, on board the monitors, no one was either killed or wounded. The ships bore signs of severe punishment, having suffered more severely at Mobile than at New Orleans. A 7-inch shell penetrated the boiler of the Oneida. The Chickasaw received one plunging shot through her deck. The turrets of all the monitors were more or less injured. All the wounded of both fleets, including Admiral Buchanan, were sent to Pensacola. Buchanan's leg had to be amputated.

The victory in Mobile Bay caused great joy throughout the entire North, and among all, everywhere, who were friendly to the National cause. Farragut became the National idol. His name resounded throughout the length and breadth of the land. Men spoke of him as the American Nelson; and, although there was a marked contrast, in many particulars, between the modest American and his brilliant English prototype, the picturesque grandeur of Farragut's two great battles—that at New Orleans and that in Mobile Bay—fully justified the comparison. Farragut in the shrouds of the Hartford, with the tempest of war raging below him, is a grand historic picture, not unworthy to hang side by side with the "Death of Nelson."

Farragut's work was not ended with the defeat of the Confederate fleet. The forts had been passed; but they had not yet been taken. On the night of the 5th, however, Fort Powell was abandoned and blown up. This was a positive gain to Farragut, as it opened up Grant's Pass, and so relieved him of all anxiety in regard to supplies. Fort Gaines and Fort Morgan remained, the latter as yet comparatively uninjured. We have
already seen that Granger, with 2500 troops, proceeded to invest Fort Gaines simultaneously with the advance of the fleet. A battery of Rodman guns had been planted on a sand hill, within three quarters of a mile from the fort. This battery was well served, under the direction of Captain Classen. The best gun in the fort was soon disabled; and so completely swept were the works that Colonel Anderson, who was in command, could render no assistance to Buchanan and his fleet. On the morning of the 6th, Farragut sent the Chickasaw to the assistance of Granger. On the 7th, deeming further resistance useless, Anderson made an unconditional surrender of the fort, with 800 men. The Western channel was now under the control of the National fleet.

Fort Morgan, the older and the stronger work, still held out. Built on the mainland, it had a better chance than Fort Gaines of receiving supplies and reinforcements. It was commanded by General Richard L. Page, a Virginian. Page had signalled to Anderson, "Hold on"; and, when that officer surrendered, he cried, "Coward!"—a slander which was echoed throughout the entire Confederacy. An opportunity was now to be given Page to display his heroism. Granger's troops were transferred from Dauphin Island to the rear of Fort Morgan. Granger soon discovered that regular siege operations would be necessary. He sent, therefore, to New Orleans for heavy siege artillery and a body of engineers. These were speedily at hand, under the care and command of General Richard Arnold. Batteries were rapidly constructed behind some sand hills, within 800 yards of the fort; and, by Aug. 20, the afternoon of the 20th, all the guns were in position. On this line of batteries there were four 9-inch Dahlgrens, on naval gun carriages, eight 30-pounder Parrots, and sixteen mortars, of which twelve were 10-inch, and four 8-inch. Another line of batteries was established about 400 yards nearer the fort. On the inner line there were four Napoleon guns and two 3-inch rifles. On the evening of the 21st, General Granger notified Farragut that he would be ready to open fire next morning at daylight. Farragut took position that night; and, on the morning of Aug. 22, at five o'clock, the bombardment commenced. It was continued with great vigor and accuracy during the whole day. It was discovered in the afternoon that a fire had broken out inside the fort. At dark the bombardment ceased. The flames were still visible; and it seemed as if the fire was gathering strength. About nine o'clock, it began to be manifest that attempts were being made to gain the mastery of the devouring element. It was not the desire of either of the National commanders that the fire should be extinguished. It was doing their work. The bombardment was therefore, resumed, and maintained for two hours, when it was discontinued for the night. At five o'clock next morning, the bombardment was again resumed. Two hours later, an officer
with a white flag, accompanied by about 40 men, carrying a boat, were seen marching out at the main sally-port. It was evidently their intention to proceed to the flag-ship with a letter from General Page. General Bailey, of the land forces, advanced towards them, obtained the letter, and handed it to General Granger. This latter officer promised to communicate its contents to the admiral, and to dictate the terms of surrender when his answer should be received. Soon afterwards, General Arnold and Captain Drayton appeared at the fort, and demanded its immediate and unconditional surrender, with the garrison and all the public property. Page wished to stipulate for the removal of the sick and wounded to Mobile. This, however, could not be allowed. At two o'clock the formal surrender was made. Out from the main sally-port marched 600 men, and stacked arms. The National flag again waved over the battered and smoking walls of Fort Morgan.

It was found, on entering, that the fire had worked terrible destruction, and no doubt hastened the surrender. Dreading an explosion of the magazine, some 90,000 pounds of gunpowder had been thrown into the cisterns. Page, whose conduct was severely animadverted on by Farragut, in his letter to the secretary of the navy, was charged with throwing his sword into a well, and with spiking the guns after the surrender. With the defenses of Mobile, there were taken 104 guns and 1464 men. Farragut's victory was now complete. The National banner floated supreme in the harbor of Mobile; and blockade-running in that quarter was ended. The joy which was occasioned by the victory over the fleet, was increased and intensified when it became known that the forts had fallen; and the conviction gathered strength all over the land, and found free and full expression, that the hour of final triumph was close at hand.
The victory at Chattanooga, although its far-reaching results were not immediately visible, marked a new departure in the progress of the war. There was, as we have seen, great joy throughout the land, when it became known that Grant had not only released the imprisoned and famishing army, but that he had again plucked glorious victory out of disastrous de-
feat, and snatched fresh laurels from the ambitious grasp of one of the most daring as well as most trusted generals of the Confederacy. General Grant now commanded the confidence of the government: he had become, also, the favorite popular hero. The crisis demanded such a man.

It had long been apparent that much of the National strength had been wasted, because of divided counsels and disunited action. The army, as a whole, had been badly managed. General Halleck was, it is true, the nominal head of the army. His office, however, was more a name than a reality. Military operations were directed sometimes by the president himself, without the consent of any of his counsellors, sometimes by Halleck or Stanton, without the consent of the president, and not unfrequently by the generals in the field at their own volition, and on their own responsibility. "The armies of the East and West," to use Grant's pithy language, "acted independently, and without concert, like a baulky team, no two ever pulling together." A step was taken in the right direction, when General Grant was placed at the head of the military division of the Mississippi—a command which virtually included the entire west and southwest. The victory at Chattanooga did much to justify the wisdom of the arrangement. Concentration of authority in the management of the armies of the Republic had become more and more a necessity. Grant was already singled out as the man who should take the reins in hand, and give unity and direction to all the troops in the field.

Early in 1864, the rank of lieutenant-general was revived in his favor; and, on the 9th of March, Grant, who had been summoned to Washington, was received in the Executive Chamber, and presented to the cabinet. In handing him his commission, President Lincoln said:

"General Grant—The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

Grant's reply was as modest as it was brief. He said:

"Mr. President—I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those a. r. es, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th, he made a rapid visit, with Meade, to the army of the Potomac. On the same day, a special order of the president assigned him to the command of all the armies. The next day, he hurried westward to Nashville, where he had made arrangements to meet Sherman for consulta-
Grant had great reason to be proud of the position to which he had attained. Success had attended his efforts on the field of battle; and a grateful people, lavish of their favors, had showered upon him their choicest gifts. His, however, was not a head to be easily turned. Vanity or vainglory found no place in his character. He bore his honors meekly; and, soldier-like, he thought of his companions-in-arms—those who had shared with him the hardships and perils of the battle field, and who were now fully entitled to participate in his honors. When first made aware of the intentions of the government, he wrote to Sherman a characteristic letter.

"While I have been eminently successful in the war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy and skill of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable, in a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction."

In his new position, heavy responsibilities devolved on General Grant. He was entrusted with the care of all the armies of the Republic. It was necessary for him to take into consideration not one army only, or one section of the country, but the entire field of actual and possible operations. The theatre was large. The National navy had succeeded in blockading almost the entire sea-coast. There were garrisons at Plymouth, Washington and New Berne, in North Carolina. Footholds had been secured at Beaufort, Folly Island, Morris' Island, Hilton Head and Port Royal, in South Carolina. The same was true of Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola, in Florida. New Orleans, with its river approaches, was in the hands of the Nationals; and a small garrison had been established at the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Mississippi was garrisoned at various points from St. Louis to its mouth. Posts were established along the entire line of the Arkansas. The line of the Tennessee and the Holston was guarded by National troops; and a small but firm foothold had been secured in Georgia, south of Chattanooga. Although Virginia was still debatable territory, the Nationals were in possession of Norfolk, Fortress Monroe and some adjoining territory. It was necessary to maintain all these garrisons, to preserve these various footholds, to protect their communications, and to provide them with needed supplies. This, however, was not all. The Confederates were yet strong in the field. One powerful army, under Lee, lay along the south bank of the Rappahannock, confronting the army of the Potomac. Another powerful army, under Johnston, was securely encamped at Dalton, guarding the approaches to Atlanta,
the second capital and stronghold of the Confederacy. A third powerful army, under Kirby Smith, held sway in Texas and Southern Arkansas. In Northeastern Mississippi, Forrest, with a strong body of cavalry, was scouring the country at will. After three years of hard fighting, during which there had been an almost unparalleled expenditure of blood and treasure, such was still the situation. In order to restore the Union, it was necessary to crush out those armies, and so break the military power of the Confederacy. Such were the onerous duties and responsibilities which now devolved upon General Grant. Success had hitherto attended his movements and crowned his efforts. It remained to be seen whether, in his new position, he would be as faithfully accompanied by the smiles and favors of fortune.

Let us now see how Grant proposed to accomplish these herculean labors. Sherman, it is to be remembered, simultaneously with the elevation of Grant, was placed in command of the military division of the Mississippi, composed of the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee and the Arkansas. General J. B. McPherson was, at the same time, assigned to the command of the department and army of the Tennessee. General Halleck, having been relieved from duty as general-in-chief, was appointed chief of staff at Washington, under the direction of the secretary of war and the lieutenant-general commanding. Grant, as we have seen, had gone to Nashville on the 11th of March, to consult with Sherman. On the 17th, and while still with Sherman, he issued General Orders No. 1. In obedience to the order of the president, he assumed command of the armies of the United States; and his headquarters were to be in the field and, until further orders, with the army of the Potomac. On the 19th, he left Nashville for Washington, and proceeded thence, with as little delay as possible, to the headquarters of General Meade, at Culpepper Court House. Steps were immediately taken for reconstructing the army, and getting it ready for battle. Meanwhile, Grant's plans were assuming somewhat of a definite shape. He had discussed with Sherman, at Nashville, the course which ought to be pursued all over the battle area. In a letter written to Sherman on April 4th, Grant stated his views with great freedom and with considerable fulness. It was his intention, if the enemy did not anticipate him, to take the initiative in the spring campaign. With this end in view, he had sent a special messenger to Banks—at that time, as has already been related, on his way to Shreveport—instructing him to finish up the expedition, to send back to Sherman the men he had borrowed, and to hurry forward preparations for an attack on Mobile. For himself, he had decided to stay with the army of the Potomac; and he was making ready to attack Lee's army wherever it might be found. In a few days he would be strengthened by the addition of 25,000 effective men, under General Burnside. Co-operative movements were to b
conducted by General Butler and by General Sigel. Butler was to be joined by Gillmore, with 10,000 men from the department of the South. His force would thus be increased to 30,000 men. With W. F. Smith commanding his right wing and Gillmore his left, Butler was to move on Richmond, from Fortress Monroe, by the south side of the James River. Sigel, who had been charged with the protection of West Virginia and the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Maryland, was to collect all his available forces, to arrange them in two columns, and to move them—one from Beverley, Virginia, and the other from Charlestown, on the Kanawha—against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Advancing from opposite points, and converging towards a common centre, it was expected that these co-operative movements would distract Lee's attention, and compel him to send detachments from his main force to protect his westward lines of supplies. For Sherman, Grant had no instructions other than those already given. He did not propose to lay down for him a plan of campaign. He was to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, to advance into the enemy's country, and to inflict what damage he could. Some ten days later, writing to Sherman, Grant was more explicit:

"What I now want more particularly to say is that, if the two main attacks—yours and the one from here—should promise great success, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defense and throw their whole strength upon a single army, believing a defeat with one victory to sustain them better than a defeat all along their whole line, and hoping, too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest perfectly satisfied with its laurels, having penetrated to a given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their whole force first upon one and then on the other. With the majority of military commanders, they might do this; but you have had too much experience, travelling light, and subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would be, if the enemy in your front shows signs of joining Lee, follow him up to the extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this army to do it."

Such was the general plan of campaign for the armies generally for the spring of 1864. It is evident, from the tenor of these instructions, that Grant's thoughts were becoming more and more occupied with two main centres of action. There was the army of Lee guarding Richmond; and there was the army of Johnston, who had succeeded Bragg, covering the approaches to Atlanta. If these two armies could be broken and scattered, or destroyed, the Confederacy would be at an end. Richmond and Atlanta, with their rival armies—these were now to become the absorbing centres of attraction. It was part of Grant's plan that when the proper hour arrived, the blow should be struck simultaneously in the west and in the east. Leaving Sherman for the present, let us now turn our faces eastward, and contemplate the mighty hosts who are preparing for battle on the banks of the Rapidan.

During the winter of 1863–4, the army of the Potomac and the army of
Northern Virginia lay, the former on the northern, the latter on the southern bank of the Rapidan. Meade’s headquarters were at Culpepper Court House, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, about seventy-five miles northwest of Richmond in a direct line. Lee’s headquarters were at Orange Court House, on the same line of railroad. The battle of Gettysburg had been fought and won on the 3d of July, 1863. On the 5th, Lee commenced his retreat back towards Virginia. The pursuit was continued as far as Williamsport, where, on the 12th, the Confederate chief succeeded in retiring his whole army across the Potomac. Meade followed into Virginia; and, after a series of daring, sometimes perilous, but withal ineffectual manoeuvres, made on both sides, the rival armies went into winter quarters, as above indicated.

In the earlier months of the year, and before the commencement of the great campaign, there were several desultory and unimportant movements, which, although not destined to exercise any perceptible influence on the war, were yet sufficient to break up the dull monotony of camp life in winter time.

The first of these movements occurred early in February, and originated with General Butler, then commanding in Virginia and North Carolina. Public feeling was greatly excited all over the North because of the cruel treatment of the National prisoners of war at Richmond. Butler resolved to make a bold effort to effect the deliverance of the prisoners. His suggestions found favor at headquarters; and arrangements were made by which he was to have a species of co-operative aid from the army of the Potomac. On the 5th of February, General Wistar, with a column of cavalry and infantry, about 1500 strong, set out from New Kent Court House, and pushed rapidly to the north. Suitable demonstration was made by the army of the Potomac, General Sedgwick pushing portions of the army across at three different fords—Ely’s, Barnett’s and Germania. Wistar reached Bottom Bridge at half-past two on the morning of the 6th, having marched forty-seven miles in sixteen and a half hours. His presence there became known in Richmond, and created the wildest excitement. A large portion of the garrison had been withdrawn to reinforce Pickett in North Carolina. It was feared that the city might be successfully invaded, and that the National prisoners would be liberated. The alarm bells were, therefore, rung, and the Home Guard assembled. The raid, however, proved a failure. Such were the obstructions at Bottom Bridge, and so well guarded was the whole line of the Chickahominy, that Wistar found it impossible to cross the stream. The attempt was finally abandoned about noon; and the return march was made to New Kent with great rapidity and without loss.

Later in the same month, there was another and more formidable movement, similar in its origin and general character, and having the same end in view—the liberation of the National
prisoners in Richmond. It was spoken of at the time, and afterwards, as Kilpatrick's raid. The movement was manifold. On the 27th, a body of infantry, under General Sedgwick, left camp near Culpepper Court House, and moved in the direction of Madison Court House, some fifteen miles to the southwest. The day following, General Birney advanced, with a division, in the same direction. Sedgwick occupied Madison Court House and the heights along Robertson's River. Birney occupied James City, somewhat to the west of Culpepper Court House. On the 28th, a body of cavalry, under General Custer, was pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville, where the railroad from Lynchburg forms a junction with that of the Orange and Alexandria. The capture of this place would have been most damaging to Lee's communications with the west. In ten hours, Custer was within four miles of Charlottesville, where he surprised a camp of Stuart's cavalry, with horse batteries. The camp equipage was destroyed; and six caissons were blown up. For the want of the necessary material, it was found to be impossible to spike the guns. The enemy rallied rapidly and in great force; and Custer found it necessary to retreat. On his backward course, however, he worked considerable damage, destroying mills and other property. Night coming on, he lost his way, and was compelled to bivouack in the woods. Next morning, about nine o'clock, having discovered his way, he found his passage completely blocked by Stuart's cavalry. He was near Stannardsville. Ordering a charge, he cut his way through in the most gallant manner, and returned to Madison Court House, without the loss of a single man, and bringing with him about 50 prisoners, a large number of negroes and some 300 horses.

General Kilpatrick, on the 28th, left Culpepper, at the head of some cavalry, 5000 or 6000 cavalry and horse artillery. Crossing the Rapidan at Germania and Ely's fords, and sweeping around Lee's right flank, he reached Spottsylvania Court House on the evening of the 29th. At this point, he dispatched Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, with about 500 of his picked men, with instructions to move in a southwesterly direction towards Frederickshall, where it was known a large number of Confederate guns were stored. It was Kilpatrick's hope that Dahlgren, after making a successful raid through Louisa and Goochland counties, would be able to strike Richmond on the south, while he himself was entering it from the north or northwest. Kilpatrick, meanwhile, pushed rapidly forward, leaving evidence of his desolating visit everywhere behind him. At Beaver Dam Station, he encountered and defeated the Confederates, under Bradley T. Johnson. He then struck across the South Anna, and cut the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, at Kilby Station. On the 1st of March, he was close upon the Confederate capital. He advanced within the first and within the second lines of defense; but he looked in vain for any signs of the
presence of Dahlgren. When within half a mile of the city, he was effectually resisted, and compelled to fall back. Seeking safety in flight, he moved in the direction of Mechanicsville, the enemy following in vigorous pursuit. Having succeeded in crossing the Chickahominy, he pushed towards the Pamunkey. This latter, however, he found it impossible to ford. Crossing the Richmond and York River Railroad, he moved in the direction of White House, where he met a relief party, which Butler had sent up from New Kent Court House. At this point the pursuit ceased, the retreat being continued down the peninsula. Kilpatrick had failed in his main purpose, and he had lost 150 men; but, by the destruction of stores and railroad property, and by the capture of 500 prisoners and a large number of horses, he had inflicted a damaging blow on the Confederacy.

What, meanwhile, had become of Dahlgren? He had faithfully, as far at least as was possible, carried out the instructions given him. Following the prescribed route, he had reached Frederickshall, and destroyed the railroad. Had he been an hour earlier, he would have intercepted Lee, who had just passed over. Pushing forward, he would have been on the outskirts of Richmond in sufficient time to co-operate with Kilpatrick, but for the treachery of a negro guide, who led him out of his way. As it was, he did not reach the outer lines until late in the afternoon of the 2d of March. Hurrying down the north bank, he passed the outer works without difficulty, and was pressing forward with great energy towards the inner, when the enemy fell upon him with overwhelming force. Observing no signs of Kilpatrick, and soon learning that his attempt had failed, Dahlgren deemed it prudent to retrace his steps. It was his only chance of safety. The situation, however, was desperate. The Confederate militia, aroused by the unwelcome visit of Kilpatrick, swarmed around him, panting for revenge. He had to fight his way at every turn and bend. In one of his encounters he, with Major Cook and about 100 men, became separated from the main body of his command. Thus isolated, he had, on the night of the 3d, fought his way to the Mattaponi, and crossed at Dabney's Ferry. Here, however, he fell into an ambush, and was completely surrounded. Dahlgren and several of his companions were killed. The remainder of his little band were made prisoners. The fate of this unfortunate young leader created great excitement in the North. He was the son of Admiral Dahlgren; and, although twenty-one years of age, he had given proof not only of great daring, but of singular ability as a cavalry officer. He had already lost a foot in the service of his country; and, at the time of his death, he was still suffering from the unhealed wound.

These expeditions, although inspired by the noblest and best of motives, and in every sense praiseworthy, all proved more or less abortive. Richmond was not to be taken; the prisoners were
not to be delivered by such means. The work, however, was now to be done in a different and more effective style.

March was drawing to a close when General Grant arrived at Culpepper Court House, and established his headquarters with the army of the Potomac. His first attention was given to the reorganization of that army. Consolidation had become a necessity, from the reduced numbers of some of the divisions. Preliminary to all other arrangements, Grant had wisely concluded to retain in chief command Major-General Meade. By his victory at Gettysburg, Meade had won the respect and confidence of the army, the approbation of the public, as well as a world-wide renown. He had proved himself to be a skilful tactician; and he had the advantage of possessing a thorough knowledge of the army in all its departments. Under the new arrangement, he sustained to Grant the same relations that the corps commanders sustained to himself. Meade and Sherman stood on the same level. They were Grant's first-lieutenants. Grant gave his instructions to Meade, who had the handling of the army and the working out of all the details. The arrangement proved to be agreeable to both parties; and it was, doubtless, the best possible in the circumstances. Grant said, afterwards:

"Commanding all the armies, as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank has drawn from him much of that public attention which his zeal and ability entitled him to, and which he would otherwise have received."

In its new form the army of the Potomac was consolidated into three corps—the Second, Fifth and Sixth—which were commanded respectively by Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick. These were men of high character and of proved ability, although their excellences were naturally not all of the same kind. Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock had long been a prominent leader in the army of the Potomac. His magnificent personal presence won for him, at Williamsburg, the title of "superb"; and he was possessed of those magnetic qualities which, on the field of battle, attract and inspire the soldier. At Gettysburg he shone like a star of the first magnitude; and while he saved the National army and converted defeat into victory, he covered himself with glory. Major-General Governeur K. Warren, placed in command of the Fifth corps, as officer of engineers, and comparatively a young man, had, on several important occasions, revealed not only dash and daring, but the higher qualities of generalship, such as quickness of perception of danger or of opportunity, presence of mind, promptitude of action, and skill in combination. But for his quick discernment and prompt and determined action, at Little Round Top, on the second day at Gettysburg, the National left might have been turned.
and the whole army thrown into confusion, and probably routed. His advance
ment had been rapid, but it had not been beyond his deserts. The com-
mander of the Sixth corps was Major-General John Sedgwick, of Frede-
ricksburg renown, the man who, more than any other, sustained the reputa-
tion of the army of the Potomac and the dignity of the National cause, at Chancellorsville. Sedgwick was as brave as he was modest, as able as he
was unpretentious. The high honor of commanding the army of the Poto-
mac he had more than once declined. Such were the three men on whom
Meade depended for the execution of his orders and the directions of the
general-in-chief. A better choice could hardly have been made.

The division commanders had been chosen with equal care. Those of the Second corps were respectively Barlow, of the First division; Gibbon, of the Second; Birney, of the Third; Carr, of the Fourth. Those of the Fifth corps were, in the same order, Griffin, Robinson, Crawford, Wadsworth. Those of the Sixth corps were Wright, Getty and Prince.

The brigade commanders, also, were men of known capacity and tried abili-
ty. They were, of the Second corps, Miles, Smyth, Frank and Brooke, of
the First division; Webb, Owens and Carroll, of the Second; Ward and Hays,
of the Third; Mott and Brewster, of the Fourth. Of the Fifth corps, they
were Barnes, Bartlett and Ayres, of the First division; Leonard, Baxter and
Dennison, of the Second; McCand-

| less and Fisher, of the Third; Cutler, Rice and Stone, of the Fourth. Of
the Sixth corps, they were Torbert, Upton, Burnham and Shaler, of the
First; Wheaton, Grant, Neill, Eustis, of the Second; Morris and Russell, of
the Third.

The inspectors-general were respec-
tively Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Mor-
gan, of the Second; Lieutenant-Colonel
H. C. Bankhead, of the Fifth; Lieute-
nant-Colonel M. T. McMahon, of the
Sixth. The chiefs of artillery, taking
them in the same order, were Colonel
J. C. Tidball, Colonel C. S. Wainwright
and Colonel C. H. Tompkins. The cav-
alry were entrusted to the able hands
of Major-General Philip H. Sheridan.
Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt re-
mained in charge of the artillery, Col-


| onel H. S. Burton being second in
command. The onerous duties of the
quartermaster's department still de-
volved on the able shoulders of Brig-
dier-General Rufus Ingalls.*

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* General Grant's staff was composed as follows, Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bowers, assistant adjutant-
general; Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, senior aide-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel O. E. B. Babcock, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Dent, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. Duff, assistant in-
spector-general; Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Rowley, secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Badeau, secretary; Captain E. S. Parker, assistant adjutant-general; Cap-
tain George K. Leet, assistant adjutant-general, in
charge of office at Washington; Captain P. T. Hudson, aide-de-camp; Captain H. W. Jones, assistant quarter-
master, on duty at headquarters; First-Lieutenant
William Dunn, junior, Eighty-Third Indiana Volun-
teers, acting aide-de-camp.

General Meade's chief of staff was Major-General A. A. Humphrey, a field-officer of engineers, who, as a di-
vision commander, had won distinction at Gettysburg.
His adjutant-general was General Seth Williams, an offi-

| cer admirably qualified for the special duties of his post.
advantage, his own right resting on the river; Hill was in the centre, at Orange Court House; Longstreet was further to the south, at Gordonsville.

By the end of April, General Grant’s arrangements were completed; and everything was in readiness for a general forward movement. Sherman, whose operations will be detailed in a subsequent chapter, was awaiting the signal to march from Chattanooga. Meade was ready to march the army of the Potomac across the Rapidan, his instructions being to turn, if possible, the Confederate right, and interpose between Lee and Richmond. Butler, who had been fully instructed as to the part he should take in the campaign, was ready to move up the James, in the direction of City Point. Sigel, having arranged his army in two columns—the one under General Crook, to operate on the Kanawha, the other under his own care, to operate on the Shenandoah—was prepared to move whenever the signal should be given.

On the night of the 3d of May, the army of the Potomac broke up May its encampments; and, in two columns, it began to move toward the Rapidan, the right from Culpepper, and the left from Stevensburg. On the same day, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe. Sigel had already set out as directed, two days before.

For the present, we shall remain with and follow the fortunes of the army of the Potomac. The right column of that army, made up of the corps of Warren and Sedgwick, moved in the direction of Germania Ford. The
left, which consisted of Hancock's corps, moved in the direction of Ely's Ford. All during the night and the greater part of the following day, the banks of the river presented a lively scene. It was such a scene as even the eye of the war-hardened veteran rarely looks upon. One hundred and forty thousand men, including some 10,000 cavalry, with artillery in proportion, and an army-train of 4000 wagons, were pressing towards the river, or crossing the bridges, or spreading themselves out in huge masses on the banks beyond. Before night, Meade had taken his entire army across the river. Warren's corps, forming the advance of the right column, with Wilson's cavalry division in front, reached Germania Ford at six o'clock on the morning of Thursday, May 4th, and, as soon as the bridge was laid, began the passage, which was completed by one o'clock. Sedgwick's column followed immediately afterwards. Hancock, with the left column, Gregg's cavalry division preceding, crossed at an early hour; and by nine o'clock he was at Chancellorsville, where he rested for the remainder of the day. Warren, after crossing the river, had pushed on to Old Wilderness Tavern, where he bivouacked. Sedgwick, who was the last to cross, remained for the night near the river. The cavalry were well thrown out towards Orange Court House, Fredericksburg and Todd's Tavern. Burnside, with the Ninth corps, was still at Culpepper Court House, where he had been ordered to remain for twenty-four hours, when, it was supposed, the first and second columns would be safely on the southern banks of the Rapidan. The wagon-trains, also, for the present, were left on the northern banks. Such was the general position of General Grant's forces on the night of the 4th and the morning of the 5th.

Lee had not been ignorant of Grant's movements. From the signal-station on the summit of Clark's Mountain, he had a wide and commanding view of the entire country; and the beacon-fires which blazed throughout the night, rendered conspicuous by the all-surrounding gloom, showed that he was concentrating his scattered forces, and preparing for the onset of the foe. It was evident that Lee had concluded that it was best for him to allow Grant to cross the river unopposed, and to offer him battle afterwards. He might have acted differently. He might have allowed a portion of the opposing army to pass, and then, by destroying the means of passage, attempted to destroy the isolated fraction. He might have directly opposed the passage of the river, and, by occupying advantageous positions, prevented them from deploying. Neither of those courses, however, commended themselves; and following the example which he had set at Fredericksburg, he gave his antagonist full opportunity to cross the river, to take position, and more fully to develop his plans. His position behind Mine Run was strong; and for a whole winter it had defied the skill of Meade, and all the valor of the army of the Potomac. Even if Grant did attempt
to turn his right, he could rely on his well-trained legions for support; and the country, with which he was thoroughly familiar, was better adapted for purposes of resistance than for purposes of attack.

We are now fairly in the Wilderness. It is a wild and desolate region of worn-out tobacco-fields, covered with scraggy oaks and pines, sassafras and hazel, and intersected with narrow roads and deep ravines. It is a strange battle-ground; yet it is here, amid these jungles, on these narrow wood roads, and in these deep ravines, that is about to be fought one of the mightiest and most bloody, if not most decisive, battles of the war. Manifestly, Grant had not intended that the battle should take place in the forest. He felt proud because of the success which had attended the crossing of the Rapidan. It was confessedly a perilous operation; and the fact that it had been accomplished "in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army," was well fitted to relieve his mind of the most "serious apprehensions." It was his hope, if not his conviction, that another day's march would enable him to push the army beyond the Wilderness, and, using it as a mask, to advance rapidly on Gordonsville, and take a position between Lee's army and the Confederate capital. It was Grant's expectation, in fact, that Lee, as soon as he was made aware of the movements of the National army, would fall back towards Richmond. With this end in view, Sheridan was instructed to move, with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions, against the Confederate cavalry in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing; Wilson, with the Third cavalry division, was to move to Craig's Meeting House on the Catharpin Road, and thence to send out detachments along the different avenues by which the enemy might approach; Hancock, with his Second corps, was to advance to Shady Grove Church, and thence to extend his right towards the Fifth corps, at Parker's Store; Warren, with his Fifth corps, was to move to Parker's Store, and to extend his right towards the Old Wilderness Tavern, where Sedgwick was ordered to take position.

On the morning of Thursday, the 5th, these orders were put in execution. As early as five o'clock, May 5, the different columns were in motion, and pushing towards the positions respectively assigned them. A blood-red sun, as if ominous of the dreadful slaughter which was soon to follow, was pouring his slanting beams through the openings in the woods, already beautiful and richly clad with the green robes of early summer. It soon became apparent that Lee was neither ignorant of the plans of his antagonist, nor willing to allow him to execute his purpose without offering at least a stubborn resistance. From the Confederate centre at Orange Court House, about twenty miles from Grant's prescribed line of march, two roads run, in a northeasterly direction, towards Fredericksburg. That to the north is an old turnpike; the other is a plank-road. There is another road, called the Stevensburg plank road, which, was
ning from Culpepper Court House in a southeasterly direction, crosses the turnpike before mentioned, and terminates in the plank road. At the junction of the Stevensburg plank road with the turnpike is the Old Wilderness Tavern. Five miles more to the southeast, where the two plank roads meet, is the Old Wilderness Church. Before the Stevensburg road unites with the plank road, there branches off another road, called the Brock road, which runs first almost due south, crossing the plank road, and then more to the southeast to Spottsylvania Court House. The two almost parallel roads running northeast from Orange Court House are generally spoken of as the Orange turnpike and the Orange plank road along these two roads, Lee, having already rightly divined the purpose of Grant, had pushed the larger portion of his army. It was his intention to strike the National army in the flank, and force a battle in the Wilderness. He had left behind him the strong defenses of Mine Run; but he could fall back upon them, as a place of refuge, in the event of disaster.

On the morning of the 5th, Ewell, who had moved by the Orange turnpike, and Hill, who had moved by the Orange plank road, were both in the near neighborhood of Old Wilderness Tavern; but the Nationals knew it not. Thus it happened that Warren, almost as soon as he commenced his forward movement, found himself in collision with the enemy.

Warren's orders, it will be remembered, were that he should resume his march by the earliest dawn, on the morning of the 5th, and that he should take position at Parker's Store on the Orange plank road, his right extending to Old Wilderness Tavern. By way of precaution, and in order to secure the route for Sedgwick's corps, he threw the division of Griffin out on the Orange turnpike; and, taking advantage of a wood road which led in a southeasterly direction towards Parker's Store, he pushed forward the division of Crawford, followed by that of Wadsworth and that of Robinson, to the point indicated. These movements were scarcely begun when the foe was felt. All of a sudden, Griffin's skirmishers on the turnpike fell back; and, at the same moment almost, Crawford's advance, which was now near Parker's Store, was surprised to see the troops in front galloping back. Griffin had touched Ewell; and Crawford had come into contact with the van of Hill's column.

Further advance was deemed perilous. The prescribed movements were, therefore, temporarily suspended. Such was the condition of affairs when, about eight o'clock, Grant and Meade arrived at Old Wilderness Tavern. It was not the opinion of either of those commanders that the Confederates were present in any great force. On the contrary, it was the belief of both that Lee had fallen back, that he was concentrating his forces further to the south, and that the troops with which Griffin and Crawford had come into contact were portions of the Confederate right, which had been left as a rear-guard to cover the retreat. To
capture or brush away this force, and to obtain possession of the defenses at Mine Run, now became their object; and orders were given accordingly. As the strength of the Confederates had been developed mainly on the turnpike and in Griffin's front, it was resolved to make the attack at that point. Crawford was, accordingly, ordered to suspend operations on the plank road, while Wadsworth's division was disposed in line on Griffin's left, with the sister division of Robinson in support. Wadsworth, having ordered McLandress' brigade to take position on Wadsworth's left, withdrew with the remainder of his division, but not without experiencing some sharp treatment at the hands of the energy, who followed and fired into the rear of his column. Meanwhile, H. P. cock, who, as we have seen, had that morning marched southward from Chancellorsville in the direction of Shady Grove Church, and who was therefore quite out of position for a battle at Chancellorsville, was recalled, and was ordered to unite with the main body, by a movement up the Brock road.

The ground on which the struggle was about to begin—a struggle greatly more severe than was anticipated by the National leaders—was a sort of clearance in the forest. As seen from Warren's headquarters, near the Old Wilderness Tavern, there was a little brook flowing in a northeasterly direction. The brook is bridged at the turnpike, which soon afterwards rises to a ridge, on the southern slope of which is Major Laey's house, in the midst of a lawn and green meadows. Beyond, the hills were covered with pines and cedars. On the right of the turnpike the thicket was very dense. A little more to the right was a ravine which divided the forces of Griffin and Ewell. On this strange battle field were soon to meet, in the deadly shock of battle, nearly a quarter of a million of civilized troops. At noon the preparations were completed; and Warren, with the divisions of Griffin and Wadsworth, advanced to the attack. It was made with tremendous energy, and at first with complete success. The Confederate advance, which consisted of Johnson's division alone, was easily driven back; and if the brigades of Ayres and Bartlett had been more vigorously supported, Ewell's corps might have been involved in hopeless disaster. As it was the Nationals, in what seemed the moment of victory, were speedily brought to a standstill. Johnson had been driven back to the main body of Ewell's command. Rodes, with his fresh division, rushed to the rescue, when the shattered column quickly re-formed. At this moment the battle raged with tremendous fury. It had been intended that Warren's right should be sustained by Wright's division, of the Sixth corps; but owing to the denseness of the woods, and the total absence of roads, Wright was unable to get up in time. On Warren's exposed flank, therefore, the Confederates fell with fearful energy. The tide of battle was now turned. Griffin's brigades, overwhelmed by the force of the
enemy, were driven back with the loss of two guns and several prisoners. Wadsworth's division, on the left, had been equally unfortunate. In striving to form a connection with that of Griffin, it had moved in a wrong direction, completely exposing its left flank. On this the Confederates opened a murderous fire, compelling the entire division to fall back in disorder. McCandless' brigade, of Crawford's division, which, as we have seen, was stationed to the left of Wadsworth, fared even worse. Occupying an isolated position, and exposed at all points, it offered peculiar temptation for attack. Not slow to take advantage of the opportunity, the Confederates rushed upon it with great fury and in overwhelming numbers. For a moment, it seemed as if the entire brigade was doomed to capture or destruction. After severe fighting, during which were performed deeds of great valor, McCandless succeeded in cutting his way through, but not without the loss of two whole regiments. Warren, having thus lost all he had gained by the first successful onset, and having sacrificed at least 3000 men, fell back and formed a new line of battle more to the rear, but still in front of the Old Wilderness Tavern, and across the turnpike.

While Warren was thus engaged in the centre, Sedgwick, with the Sixth corps, having come up, was ready to take position on his right. Hancock, however, had not had time to return, as ordered, and take position on his left. Some four miles east of Parker's Store, as has already been indicated, the plank road is intersected by the Brock road. Hill, it will be remembered, was pressing along the plank road. Hancock, by the Brock road, was pushing forward to the point of intersection. It was all-important that this strategic point should not fall into the hands of the enemy. As there was danger that Hill might reach that point before the arrival of Hancock, Meade ordered General Getty, with his division of the Sixth corps, to advance and hold the position. The order was promptly obeyed. It was not, however, a moment too soon, for Hill's divisions were already well forward; and Getty, long before the arrival of Hancock, felt the presence and pressure of the foe. In spite of the rapidly increasing weight of his antagonist, Getty stoutly held his position. The situation, however, was becoming every moment more critical. It was now near three o'clock in the afternoon. There was a lull in the fight. Suddenly there was heard a loud-resounding cheer. It came from Hancock's men, who, with almost incredible rapidity, were pushing through the defiles of the forest.

On his arrival, Hancock took position along the Brock road, facing westward. He immediately commenced to throw up breast-works. These, however, were not yet completed, when he was ordered to attack with his whole corps, Getty supporting the advance. Birney, with his own command and that of Mott, was thrown forward on Getty's right and left, on both sides }
the plank road. A section of Ricketts' battery, and a company of the First Pennsylvania artillery, followed close in the rear of the infantry. It soon became manifest that the enemy was present in great force, although such was the density of the forest that neither army could see the other. Getty, strengthened as he was by Birney and Mott, was making no headway. Hancock, now pushing forward the brigades of Carroll and Owen, of Gibbon's division, and the Irish brigade, of the Second Delaware, under Colonel Smythe, made, to use the language of General Lee, "repeated and desperate assaults"; but it was all in vain. Hill's corps, which consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, all of them West Point men, not only successfully resisted but repelled every attack. The afternoon was wearing away. The battle continued to rage with great fury, the tide of victory inclining now to this side, now to that, but remaining with neither. During the heat of the fight, and when the Confederates made one of their desperate and apparently successful onslaughts, the section of Ricketts' battery, which was moved along the plank road, was actually captured, the men and horses suffering terribly. It was soon, however, recaptured by Carroll's brigade. It was afterwards withdrawn and replaced by a section of Dow's Sixth Maine battery. Hancock had done his best, but apparently in vain. Mott's command had already given way; and Hays, while attempting to fill up the break in the line, was shot dead, at the head of his brigade.*

The heavy and long-continued firing towards the junction of the plank and Brock roads, had already attracted the attention of Grant and Meade. It was evident that the battle was fierce—that the Confederates were present in great force, and that Getty and Hancock were being taxed to the very utmost. By way of furnishing relief to these two commanders, Wadsworth, with his own division and Baxter's brigade, of Robinson's division, was

* ALexander Hays, brigadier-general of United States volunteers and brevet lieutenant-colonel in the United States army, was born at Pittsfield, Pa., in 1820. He graduated at West Point in 1844. Among his classmates were Grant, Hancock and Pleasonton. He entered the army as brevet second-lieutenant of the Fourth United States infantry. As a second-lieutenant of the Eighth infantry, he entered upon the Mexican campaign, during which he greatly distinguished himself and rose in his profession. Soon afterwards, he was appointed acting-assistant adjutant-general to Brigadier-General Lane, and won distinction in the battle near Atlixo. In April, 1848, he resigned his position in the army, and engaged in the manufacture of iron, in Venango county, Pa. On the outbreak of the Civil War, he entered the service as colonel of the Sixty-Third Pennsylvania volunteers, and was appointed captain in the Sixteenth regiment of infantry, to date from May 14, 1861. In the Peninsula he was attached, with his regiment, to the First brigade of Kearney's division, of Heintzelman's corps. At the close of the seven days' contest, he was nominated for a brevet of lieutenant-colonel. He took part in the Maryland campaign, and was appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers. He was wounded at Chancellorsville, while at the head of the Second brigade, of the Third division, Second army corps. At the battle of Gettysburg, he commanded the Third division of his corps, and, after the wounding of Hancock, was temporarily in command. When the army of the Potomac was reorganized, Hays was placed in command of the Second brigade, Birney's Third division, of the Second corps. In this capacity he fought, and gallantly met his death, in the Wilderness. Hays was frank, brave, quick and energetic, and greatly beloved by his men. Although not in the highest position, his death was a serious loss to the army of the Potomac.
ordered to move southward through the forest, and strike Hill on the flank and rear. It was a most difficult operation. Such was the density of the forest, and so great were the obstacles encountered in the face of skirmishers who were evidently familiar with every inch of the ground, that darkness had set in before Wadsworth was in a position to strike as directed. His troops rested on their arms for the night, ready to take advantage of their favored position in the morning. Towards midnight, all was silent in the Wilderness. Hancock had failed to drive Hill back on the plank road. Hill had been equally unsuccessful in his attempt to dislodge Hancock. All along the line the Nationals and Confederates lay so close to each other that the soldiers of both armies drew water from the same brook. As in the earlier part of the day, a ravine divided both the opposing armies in two. Hancock was separated from Warren and Sedgwick. Ewell was unable to form a connection with Hill. The battle-ground was thickly strewn with dead and dying men. Such was the end of the first day in the Wilderness.

It was evident to all that a great battle would be fought on the morrow. The ground was ill adapted for civilized warfare. Other ground, however, could not now be chosen. The inconveniences, it was felt, were common. On both sides the commanders were hopeful, if not confident; and the rank and file were in excellent spirits. If neither had been successful, neither had any reason to be ashamed of defeat. Lee had failed to defeat Grant by striking him on his flank. Grant had failed to carry out his purpose of turning Lee's right. Each had failed in his original purpose; but both were now face to face, with the inevitable of battle before them.

Night was spent by both commanders in preparing for the conflict of the coming day. Burnside, it will be remembered, had been left at Culpepper Court House with the Ninth corps, his instructions being to hold that place for at least twenty-four hours after the departure of the main body of the army. He had already been ordered forward; and shortly after day-break, on the morning of the 6th, he was on the field, and taking position between the troops of Warren and Hancock. He had marched with great rapidity a distance of thirty miles, and crossed both the Rappahannock and the Rappi dan. Grant's line of battle was five miles long, and was facing westward. It lay in the following order: Sedgwick on the right; Warren in the centre; then Burnside; then Hancock on the extreme left. Hancock, in addition to his own powerful corps, had Getty's division, of the Sixth corps, and Wadsworth's division, of the Fifth, both on his own right. On the Confederate side, Ewell was on the left; Hill on the right; and Longstreet, who had been left at Gordonsville, was hurrying forward to reinforce Hill. The point of convergence of both armies embraced the turnpike and plank road, and the space between. It had become evident to both commanders that the real con-
The conflict would take place in the neighborhood of the plank road, on Grant's left. It was to be the same battle field as on the previous day—ground on which it would be impossible to use either artillery or cavalry, and on which maneuvering of any kind would be totally out of the question. The 300 guns of the combatants were to remain idle; and of the 200,000 men about to meet in a great death struggle, not more than 1000 would be visible at any one moment to any one man. Grant's order was given as soon as he heard the reports of the different commanders. It was simple. "Attack along the whole line at five in the morning." Lee had decided to deliver an overwhelming blow on Grant's left; but as it would be impossible to do so before the arrival of Longstreet, he resolved to distract attention, and so gain time by making a demonstration on the National right. Just fifteen minutes before the time appointed by Grant for the general attack, a sudden discharge of musketry in the direction of Sedgwick announced the fact that Lee was as ready for battle as his antagonist. This attack, however, was not of serious moment. It was not pushed with vigor. Sedgwick was able to hold his own, and even to push his front forward a few hundred yards. The general plan of battle, as Grant had arranged it, was, therefore, undisturbed.

At five o'clock precisely, Warren and Hancock advanced to the attack. Hancock, however, was doomed to bear the principal burden of the fight. With him, therefore, we must remain and witness the tide of battle, as it ebbs and flows in his front. Dreading an attack in great force, he had taken the precaution to throw up earth-works on the Brock road. Holding these works with his left, he threw forward his right and centre, consisting of two divisions, under Birney, Getty's command, and the brigades of Owen and Carroll, of Gibbon's division. Half and half work formed no part of Hancock's calculations. He meant to strike a firm and decisive blow. While Birney and Getty made the direct attack along the plank road and on both sides of the same, Wadsworth, having worked his way across that part of the Second corps which was advancing along the right of the plank road, was ready to strike Hill clean on the left flank. The direct and flank movements were made almost simultaneously; and so furious was the onset that, after an hour's severe fighting, the ground along Hill's entire front was carried, and the line driven back through the woods for about a mile and a half. Hill's troops, in fact, could not be halted until they had overrun the trains, artillery, and even the headquarters of the Confederate commander. The rifle-pits had been captured, with many prisoners, and five stands of colors. It seemed as if the battle were already won. Another vigorous onset, and the presumption is that Lee's army will be cut in two. The divisions of Heth and Wilcox, of Hill's corps, have been literally shattered to pieces.

At this supreme moment, from some
cause not yet sufficiently explained—most probably because of the disintegration of Hancock's line, brought about by the rough and tangled ground over which it had passed—the victors paused in their triumphant progress. The pause was fatal. It was now about seven o'clock. Hancock set about rearranging his troops, and getting them into battle order. He had been reinforced by Stevenson's division, of Burnside's corps; and Wadsworth's division was now brought into proper line of battle. Getty's division, now completely exhausted, was replaced by Webb's brigade, from Gibbon's command on the left; and Frank's brigade, of Barlow's division, was pushed forward from the same flank. In making these arrangements, however, two precious hours were wasted. These hours of inaction proved a great gain to the Confederates. Hill's remaining divisions found time to come up. Longstreet, too, was already close at hand. Hancock was as yet ignorant of the near presence of Longstreet. He had looked for him in another direction. It was known the night previous that he was marching up from Orange Court House; and the unavoidable conviction was that his object was to strike Hancock in the left flank and rear. It was because of this conviction that Hancock had only advanced his right divisions, leaving his left, under Gibbon, in charge of the works on the Brock road. Hancock had correctly judged. Longstreet had really been making such a movement. So sudden, however, and so overwhelming had been the attack on his front, that Lee, fearing for the safety of his whole army, ordered Longstreet to discontinue his flank movement, and to come to the assistance of Hill. His arrangements completed, Hancock resumed the advance with great energy. The line in his front no longer yielded to his touch. Again and again he attempted to press back the enemy; but it was all in vain. The battle now raged again with great fury, deeds of daring being performed on both sides. Lee had exhibited great personal bravery. When Gregg's Texans came up, he put himself at their head, and was with difficulty dissuaded from leading them to the attack. For two hours the tide of battle ebbed and flowed. It soon began to be evident that Longstreet was present in force, and that he was directing the movements of the Confederates in Hancock's immediate front. Finding it impossible to make any headway, nay, feeling more and more the irresistible pressure of the foe, Hancock ultimately falls back, and re-forms on the original line along the Brock road. It is now about eleven o'clock. The situation is becoming more critical every moment. Wadsworth, after exhibiting great gallantry, has just fallen, pierced through the head with a bullet; and his command is in utter rout.  

*James Samuel Wadsworth, brigadier-general of volunteers, was born in Genesee, Livingston county, N. Y., October 30th, 1807. He was the son of James Wadsworth, extensive landowner and philanthropist of Genesee. He studied at Hartford and afterwards at Yale, where he graduated. Choosing law as a profession, he spent some time in the office of the great lawyer and statesman, Daniel Webster. He took an active part in the Free-Soil movement, which divided
seems as if no force can check the fierce, onward rush of the now triumphant Confederates. A few moments more and Hancock may be driven from his works, and the National left doubled up. At this supreme moment, when the Confederates seem about to reap the rewards of victory, there is a sudden pause in the battle. Why, no one could tell. It afterwards appeared that, when about to deal a decisive blow both on Hancock’s front and left flank, Longstreet was shot, by mistake, by his own men. He had been riding with his staff at the head of his column, when the cavalcade suddenly confronted a portion of the flanking force, and was mistaken for a party of National horsemen. It was an unfortunate occurrence for Longstreet, and, indeed, for the whole Confederate army; but it was the salvation of Hancock, and, probably, of the entire army of the Potomac.

Although the fighting had, so far, been mostly done by the National left, the centre and right had not been idle. Sedgwick, who was attacked in the early morning, but who had successfully maintained his position, had labored in vain to carry certain intrenchments, behind which Ewell had sheltered his men. His attempts had been frequently repeated; his losses, in consequence, were great. Two of Warren’s divisions had been detached and sent to the assistance of Hancock. The other two divisions—those of Griffin and Crawford—held a simply defensive attitude. It was part of the plan of the day that Burnside, advancing through the opening between Warren and Hancock, should co-operate in the general advance. It was not, however, until the afternoon that he became engaged with the enemy; and the results were unimportant. It had, in fact, already become apparent that a mistake had been committed, in permitting Burnside to remain in independent command.

After the repulse of Hancock by Longstreet, there was an almost unbroken lull along the whole line of battle until about four o’clock. When Longstreet was wounded, Lee took formal charge of that part of the field. He was slow, however, in making his dispositions. Hancock had turned to good account the time which had been wasted; and, by the time he reached his advanced position, he had taken possession of the highest and noblest character of the genuine patriot.
allowed him. Reinforcements had been sent him by Meade; his position had been greatly strengthened; and, his front having been cleared by a well-executed movement made by Colonel Leasure, he was fully prepared to meet the enemy. He had already received orders from Grant to resume the attack at six o'clock. He was not to be allowed to wait so long. Shortly after four o'clock, Lee, who by this time had got the troops of Longstreet and Hill well in hand, hurled them against Hancock's lines. It was evidently intended that the blow should be fatal. The Confederate columns, four in number, came rolling forward, firm, solid and resolute, as if they meant destruction. Without halting or firing a shot, they approached the edge of the abatis, less than a hundred paces from Hancock's front. Here they paused and opened a furious fire of musketry, which was kept up with great vigor. It had little effect, however, on Hancock's men, who were safe behind their breast-works, and who replied with becoming energy to the Confederate musketeers. While this was going on, a fire, which had broken out in the woods in the afternoon, communicated with the log breast-works, which soon became a mass of flame. The smoke and flame, which were driven by the wind in the faces of the Nationals, thus preventing them from firing from the parapet, gave an advantage to the Confederates. Not slow to seize the opportunity, Lee's men rushed forward, broke through the first line, pressed into the breast-works, and crowded them with their standards. At this critical moment, when some of the Nationals were already in full retreat towards Chancellorsville, Carroll, of Gibbon's division, in obedience to orders from General Birney, rushed forward by the left flank, and, falling with tremendous fury on the triumphant Confederates, routed them with great slaughter, reclaimed the works, and saved the day. At this point the attack was not resumed.

Later in the day, and just before dark, a vigorous attack was made by Ewell on the right and front of Sedgwick's corps, on the extreme National right. It was a complete surprise to the Nationals; and, although Sedgwick quickly got his corps into order, and repelled the attack, it was not until Generals Seymour and Shaler, of Ricketts' division, had been captured, with about 4000 of their officers and men. It was now dark. The sound of battle ceased. The wearied soldiers, lying in many cases beside dead or wounded comrades, fell asleep on their arms. The piteous moanings of the wounded alone disturbed the surrounding solitude. The battle of the Wilderness, properly so called, was ended.

The two days' fighting had resulted in serious loss to both armies. The loss on the National side reached the high figure of 20,000 men, of whom probably 5000 were made prisoners. On the part of the Confederates the loss was proportionately great, the lowest estimate being 10,000, of whom but few were captured. Among the killed on the
The morning was the parallel and take and Sedgwick. Lee's little an fact, the the his all that. The 7th was Saturday. On the May 7th armies still confronted each other in the Wilderness. Both were bleeding and exhausted; and on neither the one side nor the other was there any disposition to renew the contest. In the National ranks, there were not a few who were of the opinion that a backward march across the Rapidan would soon be ordered. Such thoughts, however, found no place in the mind of General Grant. His eye was fixed on Richmond; and, although seas of blood might lie between him and the Confederate capital, he was not to be driven from his purpose, or turned aside from the object of his ambition. During the course of the day, it became more and more apparent that Lee was falling back in the direction of Richmond. It was Grant's belief that Lee, convinced of his inability to maintain the contest in the open field, had decided to retire and await an attack behind his own works. His own mind was quickly made up; and he resolved, by a flank movement on the Confederate right, to interpose his whole force between Lee and Richmond. Orders were given accordingly; and, shortly after night-fall, the entire National army was on its way to Spottsylvania Court House, some thirteen miles further to the southeast. Warren led the way, followed by Hancock, both on the Brock road. Sedgwick and Burnside moved on an exterior route, by way of Chancellorsville, where, during the course of the afternoon, the army trains had been parked. By this movement, it will be perceived, Grant abandoned Germania Ford, and gave Lee an opportunity to cut off his communications. This, however, was of the less consequence, that the latter general was now under the necessity of taking care of his own communications, his right flank being already seriously threatened. Germania Ford, in fact, was now of little use to Grant; and Lee might take possession, or not, as he thought fit. Lee was not slow to discover the real object of his antagonist and to take measures accordingly. Anderson, who now commanded Long street's corps, received orders to move from the breast-works and take a position from which he would be able to advance on Spottsylvania Court House in the early morning. Not finding a suitable place for bivouacking, in consequence of the fire in the woods, Anderson kept moving on all night in the direction of the Court House. It thus happened that Warren and Anderson, the former by the Brock road, the latter by a parallel road a little further to the west, were simultaneously marching to the same point.

It was about nine o'clock in the morning when Warren began to move.
his column. His desire was to reach Spottsylvania Court House before the enemy could have time to be there in anything like force. Unfortunately, however, his course was greatly obstructed, and his progress hindered. At Todd's Tavern he was delayed for two hours, the road being blocked by Meade's cavalry escort. About two miles further on, and near one of the tributaries of the Po, he was again brought to a standstill by the cavalry division of General Merritt, who, the day before, and up to a late hour of the night, had been engaged fighting Stuart. At this point he lost three hours. It was already daylight; and when he resumed the advance, the road was obstructed with barricades of heavy trees. Considerable time was consumed in removing these; and it was not until eight o'clock on Sunday morning that the head of Warren's column, composed of two brigades, under Robinson, emerged from the woods, and took position on the open ground at what was called Alsop's Farm. This open ground or clearing covered a space of about 150 acres, and was distant from Spottsylvania Court House some two miles. At this point, the road from Todd's Tavern forks—one branch leading to the Court House, and the other to Laurel Hill. The open space was traversed by an inconsiderable stream called the Ny; and the ground beyond, which ascended towards Spottsylvania, was again covered with woods. Warren's advance was half way across the clearing, and on the point of commencing the ascent of the crest, when, all of a sudden, the ridge blazed with cannon, and a murderous musketry fire burst forth from the woods. It was an unlooked-for reception. The National line staggered, and fell back. A stampede seemed to be imminent. Robinson exerted himself to the utmost to hold his men to their work. Getting his batteries into position on the right, he returned the enemy's fire promptly and with vigor. He was soon, however, severely wounded in the knee; and his men, thus left without their leader, and retaining a lively recollection of their bitter experience in the Wilderness, fell back in some confusion to the woods, where, through the personal exertions of General Warren himself, they were, after some difficulty, rallied and re-formed. Soon afterwards came up Griffin's division, which met with a similar reception, with a like result. Meanwhile, Crawford's division and that of Wadsworth, now commanded by Cutler, had reached the battle-ground. Crawford advanced on Griffin's left; Cutler advanced on his right; and, in a brief space, the woods on both flanks were cleared of the enemy. Warren's entire corps was now drawn up in battle line; and the troops, as if convinced that another fierce and bloody battle was about to be fought, proceeded of their own accord to throw up intrenchments. Such was the commencement of the great struggle at Spottsylvania Court House. The fighting had been severe. The losses were heavy. On the National side, about
1300 men were put hors de combat. Some of the regiments were almost cut to pieces. The First Michigan, which went into the fight 200 strong, came out with only 23 men uninjured. The heat was most intense; and large numbers of the men suffered from sun-stroke. The engagement of Sunday morning, the 8th of May, is known as the battle of Alsop’s Farm.

It was the head of Longstreet’s corps, commanded, as we have already seen, by Anderson, with which Warren had come in collision. It was an unexpected collision; and, resulting as it did, it was in the last degree unfortunate to the National cause. If Anderson had not been at Spottsylvania Court House ahead of Warren, there can be no doubt that the story of that morning’s fight would have been altogether different. How mysteriously the fates seemed to be working in the interest of the Confederates! How much had been done for them by that fire in the woods! It had given them their opportunity, and almost a victory, the day before. It had prevented Anderson from bivouacking, and, by compelling him to march all night, had enabled him, without any knowledge or purpose of his own, to anticipate the arrival of Warren, and so to interpose an obstacle to the advance of Grant’s army. And how strange that Meade’s own cavalry should have blocked the way of his own infantry! Every obstruction put in Warren’s way was a benefit to Lee. Every moment Warren was delayed was a double gain to the Confederates. But for the fire in the woods, which hastened Anderson’s onward march, and but for the unfortunate obstructions which hindered Warren’s progress, the National advance, it is reasonable to presume, would first have reached the clearing at Alsop’s Farm. In such a case, the first great purpose of General Grant would have been accomplished—General Lee’s right would have been turned. As it was, Lee had succeeded in planting his army right across Grant’s line of march, and in establishing a powerful bulwark of defense on the Spottsylvania Ridge. This movement upon Spottsylvania brought prominently into view, and shed fresh lustre on, the great abilities of the two rival commanders. The hand of Lee and the hand of Grant were distinctly visible. Skill in combination, promptitude of action and rapidity of movement entitled the one to the victory; and temporary failure only served to bring into more conspicuous relief the military science which characterized the general plan of the other.

After the experience of the morning, Warren did not feel himself strong enough to renew the attack. He awaited, therefore, the arrival of Sedgwick, who came up in the afternoon, and, in the absence of Meade, assumed command. Meade, with the whole of Hancock’s corps, except the division of Gibbon, had remained at Todd’s Tavern, where, it was feared, the Confederates were about to make an attack in force. With the two corps, Sedgwick believed himself strong enough to attempt to drive the enemy from
his favored position on the ridge; but it was nearly sundown before his dispositions were completed. Towards evening, a fruitless assault was made by a New Jersey brigade, under General Neill; and General Crawford, who again attempted to advance, was vigorously encountered by Ewell, and driven back a full mile, with the loss of about 100 men made prisoners. On the whole, Sunday, the 8th, was an unfortunate day for the Nationals. In the race for Spottsylvania, the Confederates were clearly the winners; and the prize was of almost inestimable value. On the night of the above-mentioned day, Lee's army was well forward, and firmly entrenched on the high ground on the Spottsylvania side of the clearing.

On the morning of Monday, the May 9th, Meade's entire army, having arrived, was formed in order of battle in front of the Confederate lines. Sedgwick took position on the left of Warren. Burnside was posted on the left of Sedgwick. Hancock, who had come up from Todd's Tavern at an early hour, formed in line on Warren's right, on high ground which overlooked the valley of the River Po. The disposition was, therefore, as follows: Burnside on the left; then Sedgwick; then Warren, with Hancock on the right. The wings were thrown forward, so as to encircle the Confederate position. A small creek, a branch of the Ny, lay between the position of the enemy and that of Warren and Sedgwick; it also separated Hancock from Warren. Sheridan, with a strong cav-

ary force, set out, in the morning, on a grand raid, his object being to cut Lee's railroad communications with Richmond. The day was spent chiefly in throwing up intrenchments, and otherwise preparing for battle. There were frequent skirmishes; and, all day long, the Confederate sharpshooters, taking advantage of their peculiarly favored position, were unusually active. While the day was yet young, not a few of the Nationals had fallen victims to their unerring and deadly aim. Among these was General Sedgwick. He had been standing in the breastworks, on the extreme right of his own corps, and giving instructions as to the posting of some guns. He was attended by certain members of his staff. The balls of the sharpshooters were whistling past them, some of them dangerously near. One or two of those present showed signs of nervousness. "Pooh! pooh! men," said Sedgwick, "they could not hit an elephant at that distance." He had scarcely uttered the words, when he fell dead on the ground, the blood streaming from his nostrils. A bullet had pierced his face just below the left eye. Death was instantaneous. A serene smile rested on his features, as if connected with his last words. The death of Sedgwick was a severe blow to the National cause. He was one of the most competent and most trusted soldiers in the army of the Potomac. He was sincerely lamented by the entire army; and, as soon as the fact of his death became known, the nation mourned the loss of a true patriot, a brave soldier and a
true man.* General Wright succeeded to the command of the Sixth corps.

On the morning of Tuesday, the May 10th, everything indicated complete preparation for battle. Grant occupied substantially the same position as on the previous day. His line stretched about six miles on the north bank of the Po, in the form of a crescent, the wings thrown forward. The Second corps, across the Po, held a line on the right, nearly parallel to the road from Shady Grove Church to the Court House; the Fifth held the centre, on the east side of the Po; the Sixth held the left, facing the Court House; the Ninth was still further to the left; and in front of all was a dense forest. Lee held Spottsyl-}

* Major-General John Sedgwick was born in Connecticut about 1815. He graduated at West Point in 1837. Among his classmates were Benham, Hooker, Arnold and French, of the National army, and Bragg, Early and Pemberton, of the Confederate service. He took part in the Mexican War, and distinguished himself in the attack on the San Cosmo Gate, which resulted in the capture of the city of Mexico. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he held the position of lieutenant-colonel of the Second United States cavalry. On the 31st of August, 1861, he was commissioned a brigadier-general of volunteers, and placed in command of a brigade of the army of the Potomac. We soon after find him commanding the Third division, of the Second corps, under General Sumner. He fought, and won distinction, in the Peninsular campaign. At Antietam he bore himself like a very hero of romance, being twice wounded. With his record at the battle of Chancellorsville and at Gettysburg, the reader has already been made familiar. On the reorganization of the army of the Potomac, he was one of three corps commanders whom Meade wished to see retained in high command. Meade loved and trusted him, and, on more than one occasion, left him in command of the entire army. His career in the Wilderness, with its untimely end, has been related in the text. Kind and gentle in his bearing, he was yet firm of character, and a strict disciplinarian. His corps was, in consequence, one of the best in discipline and morale in the whole army.

vania and the ground to the north of the Court House. His left rested on Glady Run, bending to the north, and was sheltered by strong works; his right, curving also to the north, rested on the Ny; his centre, slightly thrown forward, was posted on commanding ground. The entire position was well supported by breast-works. Not much fighting had been done on the Monday. Towards the evening, Hancock made a movement across the Po, his object being to capture a wagon train which was seen moving along the road leading to Spottsylvania. The river was crossed without difficulty; but night came on before the operation could be completed. When morning dawned, the original object of the movement no longer existed; for the Confederate train was already safe behind the lines at the Court House. Hancock, however, was bent on giving effect to his purpose, to the extent, at least, of securing a lodgment nearer the enemy's position. In developing his movement, he found it necessary again to cross the Po, which runs first almost due east, and then, as it nears the Court House, makes a sharp bend to the south. Two miles west of the Court House, it is spanned by a wooden bridge. The approaches to the bridge, however, were all so completely commanded by the enemy, that a passage at that point was deemed impracticable. Not to be hindered in his purpose, Hancock had just succeeded in throwing across the brigade of Brooke, a short distance above, when, by order of General Meade, the whole movement
was suspended. It had been decided at headquarters to make an attack on Laurel Hill, a strong position in front of Warren and Wright; and Hancock was ordered to send two divisions to assist in the proposed assault. The divisions of Gibbon and Birney were at once retired, the enemy taking advantage of the backward movement, and falling heavily on Birney’s rear. Barlow’s division, of Hancock’s corps, was left alone on the south side of the Po. As the enemy showed a disposition to attack, this, too, was quickly withdrawn. It was already almost too late; for Barlow’s skirmishers were already yielding to the vigorous pressure of the enemy. Two brigades of the division were got off without serious difficulty; but the brigades of Brooke and Brown were fiercely attacked, and compelled to hold off the foe at every step of their backward progress. The difficulties of their position were aggravated by a fire, which broke out in the woods between them and the river. Those five brigades, however, were not to be dismayed. They succeeded at once in repelling the assailants and in recrossing the stream. The remarkable coolness and self-possession of the men alone saved them from great disaster. As it was, they sustained the loss of many men in killed and wounded, and one gun—the first gun ever lost by the Second corps. Not a few of the wounded were left to perish in the flames. This movement of Hancock was as unfortunate in its result, as it was ill-judged in its inception. It revealed the metal of the men, and the pluck and endurance of the chiefs of brigades and divisions; but it reflected no glory on the corps commander.

Meanwhile, the Nationals had made two unsuccessful attempts on Laurel Hill. This was, perhaps, the most formidable point along the entire front of the enemy’s position. It had been attacked in the forenoon by the brigades of Webb and Carroll. It was attacked more fiercely in the afternoon by the divisions of Crawford and Cutler. These attempts but revealed the enormous strength of the position. When Hancock arrived and joined Warren, arrangements were made for a united assault by the entire strength of the Fifth and Sixth corps. It was now five o’clock in the afternoon. The assault was made in splendid style. In the face of a most withering fire, the Nationals in thousands—now in steady line, now as if in broken groups, their standard-bearers always conspicuous—were seen struggling up the slopes, and, at one or two points, even penetrating the breast-works. It was found impossible, however, to effect a lodgment or to press on against the decimating fire. The Nationals were compelled to fall back, and not without dreadful loss. An hour later, notwithstanding the fearful loss of life in the previous encounter, the assault was repeated. It was made, if possible, with even greater bravery; it was repulsed with a still more dreadful slaughter. The army of the Potomac had already witnessed much dreadful work. It had never before witnessed
such work as this. Not once, since the commencement of the war, had such masses of men, in obedience to orders, marched to destruction. In these two assaults alone, the Nationals lost nearly 6000 men. Among the killed were Generals J. C. Rice* and T. G. Stevenson.

It was not, however, a day of disaster along the whole line. To the left of Warren, a vigorous assault was made on what seemed a weak point in the Confederate line by two brigades of the Sixth corps—twelve picked regiments, under Colonel Upton. The attack was a complete success. The first line of intrenchments was carried; and several guns, with over 900 prisoners, were captured. Upton expected assistance from Mott; but the latter failed to come to the rescue. Unable, without support, to maintain the advantage he had won, Upton fell back to the National lines, carrying with him his prisoners, but leaving the captured guns behind.

Such was the terrible 10th of May at Spottsylvania Court House. The losses on both sides, for the whole day, were heavy. The National loss was estimated at 10,000. The Confederate loss, including killed, wounded and missing, was probably not under 9,000. On neither side, however, was there any disposition to yield. On the contrary, both commanders were resolved to renew the conflict on the morrow; and preparations were made accordingly.

On the morning of the 11th, General Grant sent a characteristic May despatch to the secretary of war. **"We have now," he wrote, "ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result to this time is much in our favor. Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater. We have taken over 5000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken from us but few, except stragglers. I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer."** As to the wisdom of the determination expressed in this final sentence, different opinions have been entertained and expressed. General Grant had certainly another course open to him. He might have executed an effective turning operation, by moving southward and crossing the James River; and many competent critics have declared that by adopting such a course at this stage, the success which ultimately rewarded his efforts would

*JAMES CLAY RICE, a brigadier-general of volunteers, was born at Worthington, Mass., December 27th, 1829. His early life was spent in a struggle to obtain an education; and, in 1854, he graduated with high honors at Yale College. After some experience as a teacher and editor, he studied law in Natchez, Miss., and was admitted to the bar in that State. He was in New York and practising law when the Civil War broke out. He entered the service as a private in the Garibaldi Guard. He soon rose to be colonel of the Forty-Fourth New York volunteers, which he led through the Peninsula campaign, under McClellan, and at Manassas, under Pope. He was sick and unable to be present at Antietam; but he fought at Fredericksburg, at the head of his regiment, also at Chancellorsville, where he was temporarily in command of a brigade, and again at Gettysburg, where he greatly distinguished himself. After Gettysburg, on the recommendation of Meade, he was made brigadier-general of volunteers, in which capacity he fought in the Wilderness and on the banks of the Po, where he gallantly met his death. His last words were, "Turn me over, that I may die with my face to the enemy." Rice was a man of deep religious principle.
have been secured with at least equal expedition, and certainly at a less costly sacrifice of human life. It is always more easy to say what might have been done, and what could have been done, when the past is looked at in the light of the present. General Grant knew he was confronted by a powerful, wily, skilful antagonist—a commander in every respect his equal, and in some senses his superior. He knew that he could count on superior numbers; but he was aware also that he was opposed by an army which, in discipline and morale, had never been surpassed in the history of human warfare. What difficulties might be attendant on a change of base he could neither foretell nor foresee. In this overland campaign, in truth, as at Vicksburg, General Grant, while holding tenaciously to his purpose, was climbing the ladder of experience. His success had not yet been great; but it had been encouraging. Each successive day was giving force to his determination and strength to his grasp; and out of the darkness, if darkness it could be called, he was gradually working his way to a clearer light—to a fuller knowledge of the necessities and possibilities of his situation. He would fight it out on this line if it took all summer—such was his determination; but it did not by any means follow that, if another and more advantageous course offered, he would close his eyes to the opportunity. Whatever might be the inherent value of the determination, the declaration of the same gladdened the National heart, and filled it with hope; and the words in which it was couched have assumed permanent form, and added a fresh phrase to English speech.

The 11th was Wednesday. The morning rose bright and clear. The two opposing armies lay in close proximity to each other. As the day advanced there was some skirmishing; but on neither side was any attempt made to provoke a general engagement. Both commanders, it was evident, were preparing for battle; nor could doubt remain in any mind that whatever might be the result, another and even more fearful encounter at Spotsylvania was imminent. Grant was still bent on carrying out his policy of continuous hammering. His success, however, on the Tuesday, in his repeated attacks on the enemy's left and left centre, had not been encouraging. There was no reason to hope that another attack, made in the same direction, would be attended with any better results. It was resolved, therefore, to strike a bold and effective blow on the enemy's right centre. At that point, and near the Landrum House, Lee's lines formed a salient. It was Grant's conviction that the point was vulnerable. Arrangements for the attack were made forthwith. Hancock, who was chosen to strike the blow, was ordered to leave his entrenchments in front of A. P. Hill, and, by moving to the left, to take position between the Sixth and Ninth corps. The movement was to have the support of the entire army. Wright was to extend his left, and to concentrate
on that wing. Warren was to make a diversionary movement on the Confederate left, in his own front, the object being to give the enemy sufficient employment in that direction, and so prevent the withdrawal of his troops for the relief of the menaced point. Burnside, for a similar reason, was to make a vigorous assault on the extreme left. Rain fell heavily in the afternoon. When night came the rain-storm had not abated; and, as the moon was in its first quarter, the night was dark and dismal. Soon after midnight, under cover of the darkness and the storm, Hancock moved out from his intrenchments, and, guided by the compass, passed in rear of Warren and Wright, and took position within 1200 yards of the enemy's front, at the point to be attacked. Barlow's division, in two lines of masses, was placed on the left; Birney's division, in two deployed lines, was placed on the right; Mott's division, Hancock's Fourth, supported Birney; and Gibbon's division was held in reserve. Of the actual strength of the position about to be attacked, the Nationals knew nothing. It might be weak and defenseless. It might be well fortified, and proof against any attack. It mattered not. Hancock was ready, waiting for the first streak of early dawn, to launch forth his brave battalions to victory or to death.

It is now half-past four o'clock on the morning of Thursday, May 12. A heavy fog is resting on the entire surrounding country; and the feeble light of the rising sun struggles hard to penetrate the gloom. Hancock's divisions are already in motion. Steadily and silently they move towards the salient—Barlow over open ground, which extends up to the Confederate lines, Birney through the thickly wooded ground more to the right. Not a shot has yet been fired—not a word uttered. More than half of the intervening distance has already been crossed. Suddenly, there is a loud-resounding cheer, which rings along the whole line. Spontaneously, the men take the double-quick. On they roll, like a resistless wave. Nothing can now restrain their fierce impetuosity. They have reached the abatis, torn it up, and tossed it aside. With wild cries, they rush bounding over the intrenchments, Barlow and Birney's men entering almost simultaneously. Inside the intrenchments there is a terrible hand-to-hand struggle, the bayonet and the clubbed-musket being freely used. Nothing, however, can save the doomed Confederates. Some 4000 men, including General Johnson, of Ewell's corps, and General George H. Stewart, are surrounded and captured; and with them thirty pieces of artillery and as many colors. Meanwhile, the remainder of the Confederate force, stricken with terror and thrown into the wildest confusion, have fallen back, seeking safety in the rear.

This attack of Hancock's was justly regarded as the most brilliant feat of arms yet accomplished in the campaign. Never was surprise more complete or more successful. The officers
were taken at their breakfast. The captured generals were greatly mortified. When brought into his presence, Hancock received them courteously, extending his hand. Johnson took it, but, with tears in his eyes, declared that he would rather have died than been made a prisoner. Stewart behaved with less gallantry. Hancock had known him before. "How are you, Stewart?" said Hancock, as he offered him his hand. The reply was haughty and indignant. "I am General Stewart, of the Confederate army; and, under present circumstances, I decline to take your hand." "And under any other circumstances, general," said Hancock, with great coolness, "I should not have offered it."

An hour only had elapsed since the column of attack was formed. Along with the prisoners, which he sent to Grant, Hancock sent a note hastily written in pencil, saying: "I have finished up Johnson, and am now going into Early." This second task, as we shall soon see, he found to be less easy of accomplishment than the former. Early, like Johnson, commanded a division of Ewell's corps. At the point penetrated, Lee's army, as we have seen, formed a salient. Hancock had, therefore, by his first success, thrust a wedge between the Confederate right and centre. It was his hope that he would be able to cut Lee's army in two; and there can be no doubt that if sufficient provision had been made, promptly and in force, to follow up the advantage Hancock had won by his first brilliant assault, the desired end would have been accomplished. As it was, Hancock's troops, flushed with success, and incapable of being restrained after the capture of the intrenchments, pressed on through the forest in the direction of Spottsylvania, driving the flying enemy before them. At the distance of half a mile, they were suddenly brought to a halt in their triumphant career. They had reached a fresh line of breast-works. Behind these works Ewell had taken shelter; and reinforcements had reached him from the corps of Anderson and Hill. The National advance was now effectually checked. It was not only impossible to make headway—it was impossible to remain in the position in which they found themselves. The tide of battle was now turned. Gathering themselves up for a supreme effort, the Confederates, in overwhelming numbers and in magnificent array, rushed from the breast-works, and, falling with crushing weight on Hancock's men, now slightly disordered by their fearless rush through the woods, drove them back to the line which they had captured in the early morning. Here, however, Hancock managed to rally his troops; and, getting them into line on the right and left of the angle of the works, he stoutly resisted the fierce and repeated onsets of the enemy, and firmly held his position. His situation, however, was becoming every moment more critical. Lee was resolved, if possible, to recover the lost line of works; and, with this end in view, he was putting forth the most Herculean
efforts, and bringing his entire strength to bear on the one point. It was now six o’clock—one hour and a half since the first onset. Hancock was still holding his position; but relief was sorely needed. At this opportune moment, when most needed, relief came. Wright, who had been hurried forward with his Sixth corps, arrived on the ground, and took position on the right of the salient. Hancock, thus relieved, concentrated his troops on the left of the angle. A little later, about eight o’clock, and with a view to relieve the pressure on Hancock and Wright, Burnside and Warren were ordered to attack along their whole fronts. The battle now raged furiously at every point. No evidence was given that Lee had changed his purpose. The last line at the salient was still the object of his ambition. On Hancock and Wright he dealt his heaviest and most terrific blows. Again and again, and in rapid succession, he rolled against them his heavy masses. He seemed resolved to dislodge them. Seeing this, and becoming convinced that Burnside and Warren were producing no impression on their respective fronts, Grant detached two divisions from the Fifth corps—those of Cutler and Griffin—and sent them to the aid of the Second and Sixth corps at the angle which was still regarded as the prize of battle, and where was the focus of the fight. Five times did Lee hurl his heavy columns against the National lines entrusted with the defense of this position. Five times, after severe hand-to-hand fighting, in which the slaughter on both sides was dreadful, were the attacking columns repulsed. It was not until after midnight that Lee withdrew his shattered and bleeding lines and re-formed them in his interior position. Hancock held the works he had captured in the morning. The battle had lasted twenty hours. The losses on either side were about 10,000 men.

Such was the great battle of Spottsylvania Court House. Although not a decisive victory, it was a positive gain to the National cause. Its moral effect was great. It was one of the bloodiest battles of the war. The sight presented at the angle where the tide of battle surged and roared from earliest dawn till past midnight of that summer day, as described by eye-witnesses, was something shocking to witness. The bodies of the dead and wounded were piled in heaps, and mingled together in wild confusion. It was, as one has said, “an angle of death—one hideous Golgotha.” The severity of the musketry fire was evidenced by the condition of the forest after the battle. The trees were not only pierced by the bullets, but literally cut down. At Washington, as a relic of this fight, there is preserved the trunk of an oak tree which was cut through and through by bullets. The trunk is about twenty inches in diameter.

On the morning of the 13th, the two armies confronted each other, May 13. Hancock holding his advanced position, and the Confederates firmly intrenched behind an inner and shorter line. Lee’s position, in truth, was
invulnerable as ever. The troops on both sides, as well they might be, were sorely exhausted. The rain which set in on the 11th continued to fall. The ground, in consequence, was soaked, and the roads were heavy. On this day there was some manœuvring; and a severe engagement, which lasted several hours, took place between the forces of Burnside and those of A. P. Hill. Nothing was gained on either side. It was now the ninth day since the army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan. In that brief space of time, it had lost nearly 30,000 men, including a large number of officers. It was a fearful sacrifice of human life, sufficient to appal the stoutest heart. There were, indeed, throughout the land not a few, who, looking only at the sacrifice, and heedless of the results, pronounced the battles in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania useless butcheries. Such was not the opinion of the generals in the field. It was not the opinion of Secretary of War Stanton, who nobly sustained Grant, and who, by his daily bulletins, cheered and buoyed up the hopes of the people. Taking advantage of the lull on the 13th, General Meade addressed the following stirring, congratulatory epistle to his troops:

"Soldiers: The moment has arrived when your commanding general feels authorized to address you in terms of gratulation.

"For eight days and nights, almost without intermission, in rain and sunshine, you have been gallantly fighting a desperate foe, in positions naturally strong, and rendered doubly so by intrenchments.

"You have compelled him to abandon his fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire and attempt to stop your onward progress; and now he has abandoned the last intrenched position so tenaciously held, suffering a loss in all of 18 guns, 22 colors, and 8000 prisoners, including two general officers.

"Your heroic deeds and noble endurance of fatigue and privations will ever be memorable. Let us return thanks to God for the mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for its continuation.

"Soldiers! your work is not yet over. The enemy must be pursued, and, if possible, overcome. The courage and fortitude you have displayed renders your commanding general confident your future efforts will result in success.

"While we mourn the loss of many gallant comrades, let us remember the enemy must have suffered equal, if not greater losses.

"We shall soon receive reinforcements, which he cannot expect. Let us determine to continue vigorously the work, so well begun, and, under God's blessing, in a short time the object of our labors will be accomplished."

For five days more, from the 13th to the 18th, the armies remained relatively in the same position—Grant continually throwing out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and breaking the Confederate right, the enemy ever bristling out in breast-works, and successfully repelling every assault. The result of this continual manœuvring was that Grant's army, which on its arrival occupied a position four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania Court House, was, at the end of ten days, occupying a position almost due east of that place, the left resting at Massaponax Church, scene four miles distant. Grant having gradually become convinced of the impossibility of making any impression on Lee's front
or flank, at last resolved upon a turning operation, by which he hoped to bring him out of his intrenchments. On the 19th, he received from Washington reinforcements sufficient to make up for all his losses; and in the afternoon of that day, much to the delight of the soldiers, who were glad to turn their backs on the bloody lines at Spottsylvania, orders were given for a movement, to be made at midnight, towards the North Anna. Lee, quick to discern the purpose of his antagonist, and sleeplessly vigilant, from some cause or other suspected Grant’s design. Resolved to hinder the intended movement, and so gain time for the transference of his own troops to a new base, he ordered Ewell to make a vigorous demonstration on the extreme National right. Late in the afternoon, Ewell executed the movement as directed. He crossed the Ny, above the right flank, seized the road leading to Fredericksburg, and captured the ammunition-train coming up from that place. The National right flank was guarded by a body of foot artillerists who had just come up from the defenses at Washington, and who had never before been in battle. They were under the command of General R. O. Tyler. Ewell’s attack was promptly met, the artillerists, ignorant of the Indian devices to which the veterans were accustomed to resort while fighting in the woods, fearlessly exposing themselves, firing furiously, and ultimately compelling the enemy to fall back from the road and into the woods beyond. Tyler’s men suffered severely; but the honor of repulsing the enemy belongs to them. Soon afterwards, some of the veterans of the Second and Fifth corps came up, and, continuing the pursuit, captured several hundred prisoners. In consequence of this attack, the movement to the North Anna was delayed until the following night. Grant’s losses, which we have already enumerated up to the 13th, had been greatly increased in the interval, probably by not less than 10,000 men, making the fearful aggregate, since the crossing of the Rapidan, over 40,000 men in killed, wounded and missing; yet it was not without hope and confidence he turned his face towards Richmond. Fredericksburg had been the base of supplies since the army entered the Wilderness. Thither, also, had been conveyed the sick and wounded. As the army moved in the direction of Richmond, new bases were opened at Port Royal and afterwards at White House. The management of this department continued to reflect the highest credit on Chief-Quartermaster Ingalls.

It is time now that our attention should be given to certain outside movements which were being carried on simultaneously with those events connected with the main army in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania. These were Sheridan’s raid and the co-operative movements of Burnside and Sigel. Sheridan, it will be remembered, in obedience to orders, set out on the morning of the 9th with portions of the three divisions of his corps, commanded respectively by
Merrit, Wilson and Gregg. His instructions were to engage the enemy's cavalry, to destroy the Fredericksburg and Virginia Central railroads, to threaten Richmond, and finally to communicate with, and draw supplies from Butler's force on the James River. Cutting loose from the main army, he swept over the Po and the Ta; and crossing the North Anna, he struck the Virginia Central, and captured Beaver Dam Station. Sending out his men, he destroyed about ten miles of the track, also two locomotives, three trains of cars, and 1,500,000 rations. There, too, he recaptured 400 Nationals, who had been made prisoners in the Wilderness, and who were on their way to Richmond. At Beaver Dam Station he was overtaken by a body of Confederate cavalry, under General J. E. B. Stuart, who had followed him from the Rapidan. Stuart fell upon him heavily, both on flank and rear; but Sheridan, although he sustained some losses, was not hindered in his onward progress. He crossed the South Anna at Ground-squirrel Bridge; and by daylight on the morning of the 11th, he had captured Ashland Station, on the Fredericksburg road. After destroying six miles of the road, a train, and a large quantity of stores, he proceeded towards Richmond. On the same day, at Yellowstone Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, he again came into collision with Stuart. A severe contest ensued, Sheridan finally obtaining possession of the turnpike, and driving the Confederate cavalry back towards Ashland and across the north fork of the Chickahominy. In this encounter, General Stuart was mortally wounded; and thus passed out of sight one of the most conspicuous figures of the war.* Sheridan pushed on, his men greatly emboldened by their success at Yellowstone Tavern; and approaching Richmond, he made a bold dash on the outer line of works. This he easily carried—Custer's brigade capturing a section of artillery and 100 men. Finding the second line too strong to be assailed with any prospect of success, Sheridan retraced his steps, and retired rapidly to the crossing of the Chickahominy, at Meadow Bridge. There he found the bridge partially destroyed, with the enemy in some force in his front and pressing also on his rear. Repulsing the enemy in his rear, he rebuilt the bridge, under a most galling fire, and crossed a portion of his troops. The remainder made a detour by way of Cold Harbor, and crossed

* James E. B. Stuart, a major-general in the Confederate service, was born in Patrick County, Virginia about 1832. He graduated at West Point in 1854, and was commissioned a cavalry officer. He had reached the rank of first-lieutenant when he resigned, May 14th, 1861. He had seen some active service in the Indian country, and had come to be known as a brave soldier and a dashing, fearless rider. He was present and fought at Bull Run, became brigadier-general in September, 1861, and afterwards organized the Confederate cavalry in Virginia. He became conspicuous by his celebrated raid on McClellan's rear on the 13th and 14th of June, 1862. When Lee entered Maryland, in August of that year, Stuart, in the midst of a terrific thunderstorm, fell upon Pope's headquarters, and captured many private papers and some plans of campaign. In all the subsequent movements, up until his death, of the army of Northern Virginia, Stuart played a prominent part. After being wounded at Yellowstone Tavern, he was conveyed to Richmond, where he died a day or two afterwards.
the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge—ground rendered forever memorable by the Peninsular campaign. Haxall's Landing was reached on the 14th. Communication from that point was opened with General Butler; supplies were received; and the wearied troops were allowed three days to rest and refit. Sheridan then returned leisurely, by way of Baltimore Store, White House and Hanover Court House; and, on the 25th of May, he rejoined the army of the Potomac.

Let us now see what success had attended the co-operative movements. Butler, as has been stated, moved from Fortress Monroe on the 4th of May, and concentrated at Yorktown and Gloucester. He had already been joined by Gillmore, with the Tenth corps, and W. F. Smith, with a portion of the Eighteenth. He had, also, a division of horse at Norfolk and Portsmouth, under General Kautz. His entire force amounted to over 30,000 men. Gillmore had built up a great reputation by his approaches on Morris Island, and by his splendid artillery practice against the city of Charleston. Smith had won distinction under McClellan in the peninsula, and under Grant at Chattanooga, where his skilful engineering greatly contributed to the success of the Nationals. Kautz, too, was a daring and capable officer. At first, it seemed as if Butler proposed to move upon Richmond by the old route of McClellan. This view of the case received some encouragement from the fact that he had already, on the 1st of May, sent to West Point a brigade of infantry and a body of cavalry, some 1800 strong—the former by water, the latter by land. The real object of this movement was to mask his main design. It was his belief that the presence of these troops at West Point would attract the enemy towards Richmond, and that in the meantime he would be able to execute the principal part of his programme. As soon as this was accomplished, and he had reached the point intended, the troops at West Point were to march across the peninsula, and join the main body.

On the night of the 4th, Butler embarked his troops on transports, dropped down the York, passed Fortress Monroe, turned into the James, and advanced up that river, preceded by a fleet of gunboats. On the following day, and without encountering any opposition, he put on shore, on the south side of the James, at Wilson's wharf, one brigade of colored troops under General Wild, at Fort Powhatan two regiments, at City Point Hinks' division, and landed the main body a mile or two above, at Bermuda Hundred—a neck of land formed by the James and the Appomattox, and capable of being strongly fortified. Butler immediately proceeded to throw up intrenchments; and the gunboats were disposed so as to protect the flanks.

Simultaneously with this movement of the main body, Kautz, with 3000 cavalry, started from Suffolk, forced a passage over the Blackwater, and, pushing westward, struck the Weldon Rail
road at Stony Creek, and burned the bridge.

Butler’s advance had not been made a moment too soon. After the departure of Gillmore for the north—Beauregard, having no foe in his immediate neighborhood, hastened to follow. Gathering together what troops could be obtained from Charleston, Savannah and Florida, he hurried towards the James. By the time Butler reached Bermuda Hundred, the van of Beauregard’s army had reached Petersburg. The cutting of the railroad by Kautz, and the destruction of the bridge, retarded for a time the arrival of the main body; but Butler was soon to have in his front a powerful and skilful antagonist, one who would test his strength and fully tax his ingenuity.

At Bermuda Hundred, the 6th was spent in strengthening the defenses, and in making reconnoissances. Early on May 7th, General Brooks was sent, with five brigades, to destroy the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. The enemy was found in a strong position, covering the road from Walthal Junction to Chester Station. The cavalry at first fell back to the line of the infantry. A line of battle was immediately formed; and Brooks advanced to the attack, driving the Confederates from their vantage ground back upon the railroad. There, however, a determined stand was made. After some severe fighting, during which a bridge which crossed one of the tributaries of the Appomattox was destroyed, the National right was pushed back in turn; and, finally, both parties withdrew. On the 9th, another and more vigorous advance was made upon the railroad. The great object was to hinder or prevent the arrival of the troops from the South. Beauregard’s men, however, were already well forward; as Kautz, unable to hold the road, or to advance to Petersburg, had returned to City Point, and left the Confederates free to push their way to Petersburg. The attack on the 9th was made by three divisions of the Tenth corps, under Terry, Ames and Turner, with two divisions of the Eighteenth, under Weitzel and Wistar—Gillmore and Smith commanding their respective corps. They marched from camp at daylight, and reached the railroad at four different points. By noon, not less than four miles of rail were torn up and destroyed. The Confederates were encountered in force near Snake Creek, where they occupied a strong line of earth-works. A severe battle ensued, the Nationals finally driving the enemy across the creek, and destroying the railroad.

Elated by his successes on the 9th, General Butler sent to Stanton a despatch in which, taking too hopeful a view of his own position, he unwisely belittled the resources and ability of his antagonist. Ignorant as yet of the fate which had befallen Kautz, he enlarged on the successes of that general as well as of his own. He had obtained a position, he said, in which, with proper supplies, he could hold out against the whole of Lee’s army; he had cut Beauregard’s army hope-
lessly in two; he had whipped D. H. Hill, after a severe and well-contested fight; and he assured the war secretary that Grant would not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee from the army of Beauregard. A few days more will show how greatly General Butler was deceived. He had made up his mind to effect a passage across Snake Creek on the morrow, and crowd the enemy towards Petersburg. That night, however, he received information to the effect that Lee was in full retreat towards Richmond, with Grant in pursuit; and fearing that he might soon have the army of Northern Virginia on his hands, he recalled his troops from Snake Creek, strengthened his lines, and prepared to march north to take part in the investment of the Confederate capital. During the 10th, there was some fighting at Snake Creek, some charges and counter-charges—neither party gaining on the other. On the 11th, both armies rested.

How much General Butler had deceived himself, and what precious opportunities had already been lost, was soon to be made apparent. It ought to have been possible for the army of the James to capture Petersburg. It might even have succeeded in capturing Richmond. The capture of the one or the other would certainly have had the effect of placing the Confederates at a serious disadvantage; and it could hardly have failed to hasten the inevitable end. With the arrival of the army of Beauregard, the opportunity offered to the army of the James was hopelessly gone. Petersburg was secured to the Confederates; and Richmond was not to be taken from them except by the destruction of the army of General Lee. It would be unjust, perhaps, to blame either General Butler or General Grant, because richer fruit was not already plucked by the army of the James; but it is not to be denied that the clockwork-like accuracy of motion which characterized the army of General Grant at Iuka and Corinth, which was a prominent and striking feature at Vicksburg, which was, if possible, even a more prominent and still more striking feature at Chattanooga, was wanting to that huge and complicated machine which was set in motion on the 4th of May, when the army of the Potomac advanced from Culpepper Court House to the fords of the Rapidan. There is a limit, after all, to the ability of mortals. General Grant’s instructions to Butler may have been imperfect or they may have been indefinite; General Butler may, on the other hand, have been wanting in discretion; but it surely implied a condition of mind at once over-exacting and unreasonable, to expect that the original plan of campaign for the entire army would be carried out according to the strict letter of the instructions given, or that success would attend its every movement, and at every point.

After the rest on the 11th, there were signs of life and activity again inside the lines of the army of the James. On the 12th, a general advance was made in the direction of Rich
May mond. General Butler ordered 12. a heavy column northward—the right under General Smith, who moved on the turnpike, leading to Fort Darling; the left under General Gillmore, who followed the line of railroad further to the west. The Confederates fell back before them; and Generals Butler and Smith established their headquarters that night at the mansion of Dr. Friend, about nine miles from Richmond. Gillmore was equally well advanced on the National left. It was arranged that a general attack should be made next morning on the enemy's position at Proctor's Creek. When morning dawned, it was discovered that he had retired to a strong line of intrenchments in his rear. General Gillmore succeeded in turning the right of this new position; but such was the strength of the works, and so formidable seemed the interior lines of defense, that the assault was delayed until the 16th.

The night of the 15th was calm and beautiful. A lovely moon, but slightly obscured by a few fleecy clouds which floated across the heavens, lit up the scene. In the National camp all was quiet; but everything indicated preparedness for the proposed assault in the early morning. As the morning hours advanced, but before it was yet dawn, a thick fog arose from the river and enwrapped the surrounding country in gloom. As yet there were no signs of life in the National camp. All of a sudden the stillness of the early morning hours was disturbed, and the lone echoes were aroused by a fierce outburst of musketry and the loud thundering of artillery. May 16. Beauregard, taking advantage of the fog, had fallen upon the National army with his entire force. It was a complete surprise to Butler, who was ill-prepared to resist such an attack.

Beauregard had evidently made himself familiar with Butler's position. He knew the ground; and he had made his arrangements with admirable skill. The National line, although unduly extended, failed to reach the river on the right. There was a mile and a half of open, undulating country between Smith's right and the James. Beauregard's object was to turn Butler's right flank and get to his rear; but the more effectually to accomplish his purpose, he resolved to strike heavily in front, while he had given instructions to General Whiting—who had been left behind on the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, in the rear of Gillmore—to make a simultaneous onset, and so cut off the National retreat. Such a plan, if fully carried out, could hardly have failed to prove disastrous to Butler's army.

It seemed for a time as if Beauregard's expectations would be fully realized. The first fierce blow fell upon Smith's right, which was held by Heckman's brigade, of Weitzel's division. The blow was as overwhelming as it was sudden. Heckman made a gallant fight; but he was soon surrounded and made prisoner. The much-coveted position was already all but won. The right flank had been turned; and the Confederates were pressing on to seize
the road which leads to Bermuda Hundred. It seemed as if all were lost. Happily, deliverance was at hand. The night before, General Butler had ordered three regiments of Ames' division, of Gillmore's corps, to pass over and reinforce Smith on the right. During the darkness they had been pressing forward to their appointed position. The advance regiment—the One Hundred and Twelfth New York—was just coming up. It was almost immediately joined by the Ninth Maine, when the two met the Confederates at the point where the transverse road, along which they were moving, crosses the road which leads to Bermuda Hundred. At the moment of what seemed victory—when about to seize the road on which his hopes were so ardently bent, and on the possession of which so much depended—the triumphant foe was brought to a standstill; and, perplexed by this sudden and unexpected manifestation of strength, he quickly withdrew. The line of retreat, if retreat should be necessary, was so far safe.

Meanwhile, a fierce attack had been made on Smith's front. It was attended with less success than the attack on his flank. A device which had proved a means of salvation to a portion of Burnside's army in front of Fort Sanders, at Knoxville, was here again adopted with success. Telegraph wire, it appears, was found plentifully in the neighborhood. Smith, a day or two before, had caused a large amount of this wire to be wound around the tree-stumps which were abundant in the front of his lines. The wire was carried from stump to stump, and formed a species of wire net-work. When, therefore, the Confederates, unconscious of the danger which awaited them, came rushing forward through the dense fog, they tripped and stumbled, becoming inextricably entangled in the meshes of wire, and falling an easy prey to the bayonet or rifle of the National soldier. Discovering that no impression could be made on the front of the National right, and apparently indifferent to the National left, Beauregard massed his forces again, in larger numbers, against Smith's right, this time taking fuller advantage of the opening between him and the river. Smith fell back and formed a new line, his right now more close to the James. Gillmore, also, yielded to the movement and fell back. Beauregard pressed closer and closer, with increasing numbers; he evidently expected Whiting to strike, as directed, in the rear of the National army, and cut off its retreat. Whiting, however, for some reason or other, failed to obey the behests of his chief; and General Butler, trembling for the safety of his trains, his communications, and the depot on the James, ordered the withdrawal of the whole army within the lines at Bermuda Hundred. Beauregard followed him up, and, as he could not penetrate the lines, proceeded to cast up intrenchments in Butler's front. In these operations of the 16th, the Nationals lost over 4000 men. The Confederate loss exceeded 3000. Butler was now in a position in
which he had no reason to dread the enemy; but he was literally locked in on the land side. On both flanks, however, he had the rivers at his command; and it was still possible for him, taking advantage of his water communications, to strike a vigorous blow for the capture of Petersburg. He was, indeed, making preparations for some such effort, when he received orders from Grant to send two thirds of his effective force to the assistance of the army of the Potomac, then in the vicinity of the Chickahominy. Thus it was that Butler came to be “bottled up at Bermuda Hundred.”

General Kautz, meanwhile, made another successful raid; but it had no practical bearing on General Butler’s plans. We have seen already that, after his raid on the Weldon Railroad, Kautz, finding it impossible to hold the road, returned to City Point. This was on the 8th. On the 12th, he ventured forth again. Moving from railroad to railroad, over a wide extent of country, he struck a large number of stations, among which were Coalfield, Powhattan, Chula, Wilson’s, Welville, White and Black, Jarrett’s and others, and then returned to City Point on the 17th. At most of these points, he burned the depots, tore up the tracks, destroyed the stores, and made havoc generally with freight-trains and locomotives wherever he found them. It is true that this raid was not of any direct or immediate benefit to General Butler; but it nevertheless brought forth precious fruit, and, like all the other raids of a similar kind, had a most important bearing on the final issue. It weakened the South generally; and it tended to isolate Richmond, and hasten the end. So much for the co-operative movement under General Butler.

It is time now to turn to Sigel, and see how he carried out his part of the general plan. It will be remembered that he was ordered to divide his troops and make a joint movement up the Shenandoah and up the Kanawha. Sigel himself, with one portion, was to move up the Shenandoah. Crook, with another portion, accompanied by a division of cavalry, under Averill, was to move up the Kanawha. The objectives were respectively Staunton and Lynchburg. These movements, which commenced on the 1st of May, were less productive of good results than those of Butler and Kautz. Crook advanced from Charleston, with Averill’s cavalry in advance. On the 10th of May, Averill, who, with 2000 cavalry, had been ordered to move towards Wytheville, for the purpose of destroying the lead mines at that place, was met by a cavalry force, under Morgan, and was defeated. Crook himself, with 6000, moved towards Dublin Station, where he was met by a Confederate force, under McCausland; and although he proved himself the victor, after a severe fight, it was not until he had lost 700 men, of whom some 125 were killed. He destroyed some miles of railroad; but on Morgan coming up with a strong force, he withdrew, falling back to Meadow Bridge. Sigel had no better luck than his subordi-
nates. When near New Market, on the 15th, he was met by General Breckenridge, whom Lee had sent to resist the invasion. Breckenridge fell upon Sigel with tremendous fury, driving him down the valley to the shelter of Cedar Creek, near Strasburg, with a loss of 700 men, 6 guns and 1000 small arms. Sigel's expedition, in all its departments, whatever the cause, had proved a complete failure. It is not wonderful that, in the circumstances, General Grant should have thought fit to relieve him. General Hunter, who had already made a figure in the war, particularly on the southern coast, was placed in command.

Hunter, according to instructions received from Grant, at the head of about 9000 men, moved upon Staunton with the view of destroying the railroad leading thence towards Charlottesville. He had instructions, also, to move upon Lynchburg. At Piedmont, near Middle River, a tributary of the Shenandoah, in Augusta County, and not far from Staunton, on June 5th, he encountered a Confederate force of about the same number of men, under Generals Jones and McCausland. These were all the concentrated forces in that region, Breckenridge having been recalled, with the greater part of his command, to assist in the defense of Richmond. Hunter had a complete success. After a severe and obstinate battle, which ended only with the daylight, he was master of the field, having routed his antagonist, and captured 1500 prisoners, with 3 pieces of artillery. The Confederate general, Jones, was killed. On the 8th, he was joined by Crook and Averill, when he moved from Staunton towards Lynchburg, by way of Lexington. By taking this course, it appears, he disappointed Grant, who expected him to appear at Gordonsville, whither he had sent Sheridan to meet him. Arrived before Lynchburg, Hunter found the place too strong to justify any serious attempts at its reduction; and as reinforcements were coming by railroad from Lee's army, while his own supplies of ammunition were all but exhausted, he deemed it prudent to retire. Not considering it safe to fall back by the road he had come, he retreated by way of Salem, hotly pursued by the enemy. At Meadow Bridge, he expected to find abundant supplies; for only a few days before, Crook and Averill had left at that place 1,500,000 rations, in charge of two Ohio regiments. The place had been set upon by a band of guerrillas; and rations and men had equally disappeared. It was not until the 27th, nine days after his retreat from Lynchburg, five days after he had visited Meadow Bridge, that Hunter obtained rations for his troops. They had suffered terribly; but they had inflicted vast injury on the Confederates, by the destruction of foundries, factories, mills and other property. Such were the results of the co-operative movements under Butler on the one hand, and under Sigel and Hunter on the other. They weakened the South; but they were not other wise of any immediate practical benefit to General Grant.
We now return to the army of the Potomac. We left it at Spottsylvania Court House, about to resume its march towards Richmond. The movement was commenced about midnight, May 20th, with Torbert's cavalry in advance. Moving first eastward as far as Mattaponax Church, under cover of the remaining corps, he then turned to the south and pushed his way to Milford Station, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad, some seventeen miles south of his point of starting. He crossed the Mattapony at Milford Bridge, from which the enemy had been dislodged by Torbert's cavalry, and about a mile from the river, on a ridge of hills, formed his column in line of battle. Lee, no doubt, anticipated some such movement; and, although unwilling to run any risk by striking his antagonist while executing his flank march, he was not prepared to be outstripped in the race for Richmond. As soon as he was made aware of Hancock's advance, Longstreet's corps was headed southward, and set in motion. Warren followed Hancock on the morning of the 21st, when Ewell was pushed after Longstreet. Wright and Burnside, with the Sixth and Ninth corps, were still within the lines at Spottsylvania, where they were confronted by Hill. Burnside left on the afternoon of the 21st, having first made a demonstration with Ledlie's brigade, of Crittenden's division, so as to deceive the enemy and detain him in his position. Later, Wright was preparing to follow, when Hill, deeming the opportunity favorable for a deadly blow, fell upon his retiring column with great weight. The assault, however, was repulsed without difficulty; and Wright proceeded on his southward march, Hill at the same time following in the wake of Longstreet and Ewell. May 23rd. On the morning of the 23d, the National army, having marched over a country which, for beauty and fertility, presented a striking contrast to the Wilderness and the region around Spottsylvania, arrived on the northern bank of the North Anna. Lee, having the inside track, had won the race. He was already well posted on the south side of that stream.

Grant's position was now one of considerable difficulty. In pursuing his flank movement, it was necessary for him to cross the river. It was natural to conclude that Lee would offer a stubborn resistance. To accomplish his purpose Grant must needs hold his troops well together, and handle them with caution and with delicate skill.

The Grand Army, as we have said, had reached the banks of the North Anna—the right, under Warren, at Jericho Mills; the left leaning upon the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and covering Taylor's Bridge. In front of the army there were three fords, known respectively as Jericho, Island, Chesterfield or Taylor's Bridge. Grant, who had already reached the railroad crossing, was resolved to push across the river with as little delay as possible. Warren, with the Fifth corps, was ordered to cross at Jericho Ford; Han-
cock, with the Second corps, was to cross at Taylor’s Bridge. These crossings were about four miles apart.

Warren was allowed to cross without opposition. Lee’s attention had been so fully occupied with what he considered the necessities of the lower ford, that he had wholly neglected the ford above. Warren, however, was not to be allowed to have things entirely his own way. He had just got his corps into position—Cutler on the right, Griffin in the centre, and Crawford on the left—when he was set upon in the most savage manner by a strong body of Confederates, under Colonel Brown. Brown, whose force did not prove so strong as at first it seemed—being only one brigade of Wilson’s division of Hill’s corps—was easily repulsed. This brigade was quickly joined by the three other brigades of the division; and as Heth’s division, also of Hill’s corps, at the same time came up, the Confederates resumed the attack with great energy. The attack fell chiefly on Griffin, who held his ground with great firmness. While fully engaging Griffin’s attention in front, the Confederate commander detached Brown, with his brigade, for the purpose of assaulting Warren on his right flank. Brown was at first completely successful. Cutler, who, as we have seen, held Warren’s right, was just getting into position when he was struck heavily, his whole division thrown into confusion, and Griffin’s right flank exposed. Griffin saved himself by refusing the exposed flank, and by hurrying forward Bartlett’s brigade to the menaced point, thus restoring the line. It was while executing this movement that one of Bartlett’s regiments—the Eighty-Third Pennsylvania—ran full against Brown’s column, and, by securing the first fire, completely turned the tide of battle. One of McCoy’s men caught Brown, and dragged him inside the National lines. The hostile brigade turned and fled in utter confusion, the gallant Eighty-Third pouring a volley of musketry into its flank and rear. At all points, in front of the National right, the repulse of the enemy was complete. Warren had lost 350 men; but he had inflicted a much heavier loss on the enemy. He held 1000 prisoners; and he had secured the position.

Hancock, on the left, had a much more difficult task to perform. At Taylor’s Bridge, the Confederates had constructed works of great strength. The ground was peculiarly favorable for defense. On the north side there is a tongue of land, formed by the North Anna and Long Creek, which for some distance runs parallel with the river. On this piece of ground, Hancock had established himself. In his front, and guarding the northern approach to the bridge, was an extended redan, with a wet ditch in front and rifle-trenches in the rear. On the southern bank, which commands the northern, there was another work of similar construction. These works were held by McLaws’ division, of Longstreet’s corps, the larger number of troops being, of course, on the south side. Several
hundred yards intervened between Hancock's lines and the bridge-head. The ground was bare, and gradually ascended as it neared the bridge. It was necessary, in order to gain a footing on the other side, to carry the bridge and the defenses. To Birney's well-tried division, Hancock assigned the perilous duty. Birney selected for the work the two brigades of Pierce and Egan. In order to afford some protection to the storming party, Colonel Tidball got into advantageous position three sections of artillery. It was now within an hour of sundown. All things were ready for the attack. At a given signal, the storming brigades begin to advance. At the same instant, the guns of the enemy open upon them a most murderous fire. The wisdom of Tidball's arrangement is now brought prominently to light. His batteries reply to those of the enemy with excellent effect. Over the open ground, and up the incline, the brave fellows rush at the double-quick. In a few seconds, they are seen clambering over the parapet. A second more, and the National and regimental colors are floating over the redan. It was, indeed, a perilous undertaking; it was a brave, even heroic effort; but it was an easy victory. In that brief, rapid rush over the open ground, 150 brave men had perished; but the garrison had fled precipitately over the bridge, leaving behind some 80 men, who, unable to escape, were captured in the ditch. During the night, several unsuccessful attempts were made to regain what had been lost, and even to burn the bridge. On the following morning it was discovered that the advanced works on the south side of the river were also abandoned; and Hancock, without experiencing any further resistance, pushed across the bridge his entire corps; Wright, at the same time, effected a crossing at Jericho Ford, and took position on Warren's right.

Three of the army corps—the Second, Fifth and Sixth—were thus on the south side of the North Anna River. The Ninth corps—that of Burnside—forming the National centre, alone remained on the north side. It was necessary that this corps should be got across before any further advance was made by the other troops. This, it was soon found, was a difficult, nay, in the circumstances, an impossible task. Lee, as we have seen, when Warren crossed the river, flung back his left wing, resting it on Little River; and when Hancock crossed, he flung back his right, resting it on the Hanover marshes. With his centre, he still clung to the river. Thus it was that his line assumed the form of an obtuse-angled triangle, the vertex thrust out towards the North Anna. It followed from this arrangement that, while he could easily move from wing to wing by interior lines, his strongest point was his centre. By a singular coincidence, resulting also from the peculiar form his line had assumed, Grant's centre was his weakest point. When, therefore, Burnside, on the 24th, May attempted to cross, his advance division, under Crittenden, was quickly
met and repulsed, with heavy loss. An attempt was made by Warren to connect with Burnside, by sending Crawford's division in that direction. This attempt also failed, Crawford being attacked by an overwhelming force, and only after much difficulty and great loss regaining his position.

Grant was thus completely checkmated. After a pause of two days, he came to the conclusion that Lee was too firmly intrenched to be dislodged by any further movement on his front. He had recourse again to his flanking tactics. Ordering Warren and Wright to make demonstrations in their front, and sending Wilson, with a cavalry force, to destroy the Central Railroad, he recrossed the North Anna on the night of the 26th; and heading first well to the east, then to the south, he resumed his march towards Richmond. His immediate objective was the Pamunkey, which is formed by the junction of the North and South Anna rivers. The Sixth corps, preceded by two divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, who had rejoined the main army, led the van. It was followed by the Fifth and Ninth: Hancock, with the Second, held position till the morning of the 27th, when he covered the rear. On the same morning, about nine o'clock, Sheridan took possession of Hanover Ferry and Hanover town, the latter on the south side of the Pamunkey, and distant from Richmond about fifteen miles, from White House about sixteen. On the following morning, Saturday, the 28th, the entire army was south of the Pamunkey, and in communication with its new base at White House. Lee was already in motion by a shorter route, and was intrenching himself in a strong position, prepared to dispute the passage of the Chickahominy before the army of the Potomac had reached the Pamunkey; but Grant had really made a great gain by establishing a new base of supplies at White House, on the York River, and in easy communication with the waters of Chesapeake Bay.

We are now back on the old battle-ground of the peninsula—ground which, if not sacred, has at least been rendered famous by a campaign which, in spite of some noble examples of heroism and self-sacrifice, in spite of certain splendid exhibitions of military skill, in spite even of a magnificent and memorable retreat, must ever be regarded as a National disaster, and, to a certain extent, also, as a National disgrace. The great army of the Potomac is again here; but, happily, it is now in different hands. Now, as then, the public is interested and excited by frequent reports of changes of base; but the reported changes of base imply victory, not defeat. They imply that the enemy is being driven closer and closer to his last stronghold, nearer and nearer to his final harbor of hope. Lee never handled his men with more consummate skill; his war-hardened veterans were never more enduring, more active or more subservient to his will; but he is now opposed to an antagonist who is single of purpose, inflexible of will, tenacious of his grasp,
and who uses his armies to win battles, rather than to win political distinction or the praises of men.

At this stage, both armies were being considerably strengthened by reinforcements. The bottling up of Butler at Bermuda Hundred allowed Beauregard to send the greater portion of his troops to the assistance of Lee; and Breckenridge, relieved from any severe pressure in Western Virginia, was reported to be already in the neighborhood of Hanover Court House, with 5000 infantry and two brigades of cavalry, under Wickham and Lomax. Grant was also receiving reinforcements, W. F. Smith being now on his way from Bermuda Hundred, with about two thirds of Butler’s best troops. Convinced that a crisis was at hand, both parties had been vigorously concentrating. Now that the Nationals were on the southwestern bank of the Pamunkey, the direct road to Richmond was across the Chickahominy. Grant immediately made arrangements to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy. Sheridan, on the 28th, was pushed forward on the Hanover road, with three brigades of cavalry, under Davis, Gregg and Custer. At Hawe’s Store they encountered the Confederate cavalry, under Fitz-Hugh Lee and Hampton. A severe battle ensued, the troopers dismounting, and fighting for several hours with great obstinacy. The Confederates finally retired across the Tolopotomy, leaving Sheridan in possession of the position which commanded an important junction of roads. Re-

connoissances were now made by the army in force. Wright moved on Hanover Court House; Hancock moved on the road leading from Hawe’s Store, in the same direction; Warren advanced towards Shady Grove Church; while Burnside’s troops were so disposed as to be in readiness to go to the support of either the Second or Fifth corps. Wilson’s cavalry covered the right and rear of the National army; while Torbert and Gregg were moving in front of the left. These movements were not completed without some hard experience. Wright reached Hanover Court House without much opposition. It was otherwise, however, with Hancock and Warren, both of whom encountered stubborn opposition, and were temporarily held in check. Hancock’s progress was arrested at Tolopotomy Creek; and, in spite of the most vigorous efforts, he found it impossible to make any headway. Warren was brought to a standstill not far from Shady Grove Church, at a point where the road is crossed by the main branch of the Tolopotomy. At this point, it was found, Ewell was posted in great strength. It soon began to be apparent that the enemy was bent on turning Warren’s left, by moving along the Mechanicsville pike. Crawford quickly covered that road by a brigade of his reserves, under Colonel Hardin. This brigade was furiously assailed by Rodes, at Bethesda Church, and compelled to fall back to the Shady Grove road, the enemy pressing closely. At this point, Crawford brought up the remainder of
the reserves, and, with the aid of a powerful battery, effectually repelled the assailants. At dusk, the National left was extended so as to cover the Mechanicsville road. When Meade was made aware of the assault made on Warren, he ordered an attack along the whole line. Only Hancock, of the other corps commanders, received the order in time to act before dark. With characteristic promptitude, he pressed forward Barlow's division, drove in the Confederate pickets, and captured the rifle-pits. These movements had the effect of developing the enemy's position. Lee, it was found, was posted in great strength in advance of the Chickahominy; his left at Hanover Court House, and covering the railroad; his centre in front of Atlee's Station; his right at Mechanicsville, and covering, as we have seen, Shady Grove. Such was the general condition of affairs on the night of the 30th.

Grant, bent upon his purpose, impatient of delay, but realizing the difficulty, if not impossibility, of forcing his army across the Chickahominy by a direct attack on Lee's front, fell back on his old tactics—a flank movement by Lee's right. A movement was, therefore, made upon Cold Harbor—a point which commanded all the roads, leading on the one hand to White House, and on the other to Richmond. May 31. It was now the 31st of May. On that day, a division of Sheridan's cavalry, under General Torbert, captured and held the place, in spite of the efforts of a strong conjoint force of Confederate cavalry and infantry. On the following day, Wednesday, the 1st of June, an effort was made June 1. by a body of Confederates, under General Hoke, to regain possession of Cold Harbor. The Confederates were repulsed. Hoke, however, was quickly reinforced; and about noon he returned to the attack. It was now evident that the Confederate commander had divined the object of his antagonist, and that he was also fully aware of the value of the position. Sheridan sent word back that Torbert was sorely pressed. He was immediately directed to hold on at all hazards, until he was relieved by the infantry. Meanwhile, Wright, with the Sixth corps, after marching all night from the extreme right of the National army, was approaching the scene of conflict. So, too, was W. F. Smith, with the Eighteenth corps, which had been strengthened by four divisions of the Tenth, making an aggregate of 16,000 men. Smith, his command on board transports, had left Bermuda Hundred on the 29th May. After passing down the James, and ascending the York and Pamunkey, he reached White House on the following day. There he received orders to move upon New Castle. It was not until he had reached that place, and when he had gone out of his way some twelve or fifteen miles, that he was informed that a mistake had been committed, and that he must make a counter-march immediately on Cold Harbor. Without a moment's delay, the ordered movement was commenced; and about three
o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st of June, shortly after the arrival of Wright, Smith, with his command, reached Cold Harbor. His men sorely needed rest, after a continuous march of twenty-five miles; but no rest was yet to be granted them. Orders here awaited him from General Meade to take position on the right of the Sixth corps, and to co-operate with Wright in an immediate attack on the enemy. Preparations for attack were made accordingly. Wright, with the Sixth corps, took post in front of Cold Harbor—Ricketts on his right, Russell in the centre, and Neill on the left. Smith, with his command, took part on the right of the Sixth—Martindale on his right, W. H. T. Brooks in the centre, and Devens on the left.

It was now past five o'clock, and the day was fast speeding to its close. Between the two armies there was a broad, open, undulating field, about two thirds of a mile in width. Beyond this open ground, there was a thin strip of woods; and a little further beyond there was somewhat of a forest. In the interval, and immediately in the rear of the first woods, the Confederates had constructed lines of rifle-trenches. At a given signal, the Nationals rushed over the open space; and, in spite of a murderous fire, they carried the first line of rifle-trenches. The success was most complete in front of Smith's left and the right of the Sixth corps. Vigorous efforts were made to capture the second line. Several desperate struggles ensued. The second line was found to be impregnable. The first line, however, was held; and in the thin wood, under the shelter of the trees, and under hurriedly-constructed bullet-proofs, which the last few weeks' experience had taught them to make, the men went to sleep on their arms. In this encounter, Grant had lost 2000 men; but the sacrifice had not been made in vain; for he had laid his hands firmly on Cold Harbor.

Thursday, the 2d of June, was spent in making preparations for another vigorous assault. With not a little difficulty, and with some sacrifice, Grant and Meade succeeded in completing their arrangements. In attempting to take the positions assigned them, both Burnside and Warren were vigorously assailed and severely punished. The new disposition of the different corps, from left to right, was as follows:—Hancock, Wright, Smith, Warren, Burnside. The line of battle extended from Tolopotomy Creek, covering Bethesda Church, across the road from Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy. Sheridan, with a large body of cavalry, was guarding the left flank, all the lower fords of the Chickahominy, and as far east as White House. Wilson, with another cavalry force, was guarding the right flank. During the 2d, Lee had been quite as active as his antagonist. He kept himself well informed of all the movements of the opposing forces; and he greatly strengthened his position, which was naturally very strong, by means of slashings and rifle-trenches. Longstreet was in the centre, A. P. Hill on the right, Ewell on the left. Reference to
the map will show that we are here on what may be called classic or historic ground. It was here that was fought, some two years before, the battle of Gaines' Mill. The positions of the combatants, however, happened to be reversed—Lee occupying that formerly held by McClellan, and Grant occupying that formerly held by Lee. Such was the situation of the rival armies on the night of the 2d of June. But for a severe thunderstorm which broke out, accompanied by heavy rains, the assault would have been made that evening. As it was, orders were given by Grant for a general attack along the whole line, at half-past four, on the following morning. Lee was equally prepared; and, if not equally sanguine of ultimate success, he was equally resolute to win, if he could.

At earliest dawn, on the morning of June 3, the National army was in motion. A drizzling rain was falling, as the troops advanced silently, but swiftly, over the open ground towards the Confederate intrenchments, in which could already be seen, through the dim morning light, the well-known grey uniform and the rows of glittering steel. The onset was terrific, and on a scale of magnitude surpassing anything yet witnessed in the war. The resistance was equally grand, and on a scale of proportionate magnitude. Never, perhaps, in the history of previous warfare was such a shock of battle experienced. In a space of time which has been variously estimated from ten minutes to half an hour, the battle was fought and won, and some 15,000 men were killed or wounded. "It took hardly more than ten minutes of the figment men call time," says Swinton, "to decide the battle. There was along the whole line a rush—the spectacle of impregnable works—a bloody loss—then a sullen falling back, and the action was decided. Conceive of this in the large, and we shall then be able to descend to some of the points of action, as they individualize themselves along the line." Of such a battle it may safely be said that no one, during the actual minutes it covered, could think of it, far less witness it, as a whole. Unlike most of the other great battles, such as Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and the assaults on Vicksburg, which were of some duration, and could be contemplated as a whole, this could be seen and known only in fragmentary detail; and so brief was the struggle that it was a memory almost as soon as it became an experience.

Some facts, however, have been preserved, and with the help of these, we are enabled to glance along the lines at the moment of attack, and while the struggle lasted. Hancock, who held the National left, pushed forward at the hour appointed the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon, with Birney supporting. Barlow, with his division formed in two lines, encountered the enemy in a piece of hollow ground, in front of his works. Driving him from it, he pressed into the works themselves, capturing several hundred prisoners, a battle-flag and three guns, turn
They made the assault with great gallantry, and were rewarded with a temporary success. They were soon, however, repulsed, and with tremendous loss of life. The most they could do was to hold a position somewhat in advance of their original lines. The fighting in front of Warren and Burnside was unimportant. Warren's line was too thin and too extended to justify a concentrated effort. Except with his artillery, of which he made good and effective use, he remained silently on the defensive. Burnside did not advance at the hour designated; and when, later in the day, he claimed to have gained an advantageous position from which, with two of his divisions, he could fall effectively on Lee's right flank, the attack on the Confederate right had failed. Meade, therefore, countermanded the attack on the left.

General Wilson, it will be remembered, was posted with his cavalry on the extreme right of the National army. During the course of the morning he had a severe but unsuccessful encounter with the Confederate cavalry, under Wade Hampton. Later, he fell upon an infantry brigade, of Heth's division, which had been sent to envelop Burnside, and routed it, taking a number of prisoners.

The unsuccessful effort made in the early morning by the National left, and also by the National centre, had really determined the issue of the battle. It was the feeling of the officers, as well as of the men themselves, that more could not be done—that any further attempt to force the Confederate

The National centre, under Wright and Smith, was not more fortunate. 

ig the guns upon their owners, and forcing them back in confusion. It was only a brief victory; for before Barlow's second line had time to come up, Hill's men rallied in stronger force, and, returning with tremendous energy, reclaimed the captured works. Barlow was driven back some fifty or sixty yards. Here, however, in an advantageous position, far in advance of his original line, he halted; and quickly covering his front, he held his ground so firmly that he could not be dislodged. Gibbon advanced at the same time with Barlow: but his progress being checked by a swamp, which widened as he neared the enemy's works, his command was separated, and, consequently, weakened. With great bravery, however, the troops pressed forward; and in spite of the destructive fire which fell full in their faces, some of them actually gained the works. Colonel McMahon, with a portion of his brigade, reached the parapet, and planted upon it his colors. The next moment he fell mortally wounded, and died in the hands of the enemy. Among the officers of Gibbon's command who met a similar fate were Colonels Porter, Morris, McKeen and Haskell. General Tyler was wounded. Gibbon was unable to hold any part of the Confederate works; but some of his troops gained an advanced position in which they could not be reached, and from which they could not with safety escape. Hancock had already lost 3000 men.
lines would be a useless waste of life. That such was the general judgment, received a striking confirmation, during the course of the forenoon, from a circumstance which is, perhaps, without a parallel on any battle field. Some hours after the first attack, General Meade, yielding, no doubt, to the stubborn and unconquerable will of Grant, sent orders to each corps commander to renew the attack, without any regard to the troops on his right or left. The order was communicated in the usual way by the commanders to their subordinate officers, by these again to their subordinates, and so on through the accustomed channels, until it reached the men. By a singular unanimity of sentiment and will, not a man stirred. It was a silent but emphatic "No!"—an unexampled manifestation of unanimous conviction, and a striking proof of the intelligence of the American soldier.

By one o'clock, the bloody battle of Cold Harbor was ended. The National loss in this engagement and in the preliminary skirmishes, was reported at over 13,000 men in killed, wounded and missing. The Confederate loss was trifling in comparison.

For ten days the two armies confronted each other, each endeavoring to strengthen its position. There was severe but partial fighting on the 4th, 5th and 6th, the Confederate assaults in every instance being vigorously repelled. During those days, so close were the opposing lines that friendly salutations were exchanged, and much kindly, good-natured feeling manifest-

ed. The National soldier had plenty of coffee, but he was not so well supplied with tobacco. The Confederate soldier had plenty of tobacco, but he was ill-supplied with coffee. The commodities were freely exchanged, to the gratification of both parties. On the 7th, there was a brief truce of two hours, during which the dead were buried and the wounded removed.

Meanwhile, Grant had become convinced of the impossibility of accomplishing more by direct assault on the enemy's lines. It had been his hope that he would be able to beat Lee north of Richmond; and then, after destroying his communications north of the James, to besiege Richmond or follow his antagonist south, if he should retreat. It was still possible for Grant to move by Lee's left flank, and to invest Richmond from the north; but while, by adopting that course, he would still be easily able to cover the approaches to Washington, he would be exposed to other and serious inconveniences. Abiding by the example which he had followed throughout the campaign hitherto, he resolved to execute another flank movement by his own left, and, forcing his way across the Chickahominy, to press towards the James. It was all-important that Washington should be rendered as safe as possible against any incursions the enemy. It was important, also, that while pushing his way across the Chickahominy, Lee's cavalry should be engaged in some other direction. To accomplish this double purpose, Sheridan was despatched, with two divisions
of his cavalry, to destroy more effectually all the railroads in Lee's rear.

On the 7th, Sheridan started with June the divisions of Torbert and 7. Gregg. He accomplished his work with promptitude and success. He struck and destroyed the Richmond and Fredericksburg Road, at Chesterville Station. He struck and destroyed the Virginia Central, at Trevillian Station, where he encountered and routed some of Hampton's horsemen. The work of destruction was carried on as far as Louisa Court House, where a stronger force was encountered. Sheridan then fell back upon Trevillian, at which place the Confederate cavalry had concentrated in great strength. After a severe and bloody battle, Sheridan withdrew; and, sweeping around by way of Spottsylvania Court House and Gurney's Station, he reached White House, and rejoined the army of Grant.

Preparations, meanwhile, had been steadily going on, with a view to a rapid movement on the James. Still maintaining the appearance of a desire to strike some of the bridges of the Chickahominy, in the neighborhood of Cold Harbor, Grant was steadily moving more and more in the direction of his own left. By gradually refusing his right and developing his left, he had put a large portion of his army within easy distance of the lower crossings of that river. There was no evidence, as yet, that Lee had any suspicion of his real motive; although it is difficult to believe he was ignorant of some of the operations which were being carried on.

On the 10th and the 11th, Grant had caused to be destroyed the railroad from Despatch Station to White House, and had shipped on barges all the rails, sleepers and ties to the latter place for use below. The work, it is true, had been done with the utmost quietness; but still the doubt remains whether Lee did not close his eyes to a movement which, probably, he did not wish to hinder. On the night of Sunday, the 12th, the movement to the June James was commenced. Warren, 12. who took the lead, preceded by Wilson's division of cavalry, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge; and, taking position on the Long Bridge road where it crosses White Oak Swamp, he made certain dispositions calculated to mislead the enemy as to the purpose of the National commander. Hancock followed Warren, and marched at once to Wilcox Landing, on the James. Wright and Burnside, taking an exterior route, crossed at Jones' Bridge, lower down, and marched to Charles City Court House. Smith, with his command, marched at the same time to White House, where he took transports, and returned to Bermuda Hundred by water. The trains crossed the Chickahominy at Cole's Ferry.

Lee discovered the withdrawal of the National army on the morning of the 13th; but in place of following it up, he retired at once to Richmond. Some delay was experienced in crossing the James, in consequence of the absence of sufficient pontoon material. On the night of the 14th, a pontoon
bridge, over two thousand feet in length, was thrown across the river at Douthard's; and by noon of the June 16th, the entire army of the Potomac was south of the James. On all concerned, the crossing of the Chickahominy, the march to and crossing of the James, reflected the highest credit. The success of the whole movement was complete. Thus ended a campaign of forty-three days—one of the most momentous and certainly one of the most interesting in the war. It had, on the whole, been well conducted; in some respects, indeed, the management was perfect. During that lengthened period, in that tangled wilderness, where wagon travel was next to impossible, and where the base was so often changing, the vast National army, of more than 100,000 men, never suffered for want of food. It had been, however, a bloody and ruinous campaign, and fearfully destructive of human life. The losses on the one side and on the other have been variously estimated. Swinton, who in these matters is generally both careful and accurate, gives the enormous aggregate of the National loss at 60,000 men—a number greater than the entire strength of Lee's army at the opening of the campaign. Lee's loss, according to the same authority, was about 18,000 or 20,000, the ratio being one to three. Dr. Draper, who has written more recently, but who is evidently disposed to lessen the disproportion, estimates the National loss at over 54,000 and the Confederate loss at 32,000. The truth, it is possible, lies between. The presumption is that in Draper's columns, the Confederate loss is greatly exaggerated. When we remember that the Confederates fought, for the most part, behind their defenses, and that the Nationals, after the first two days' fighting in the Wilderness, were always the aggressors, the estimate of Swinton seems to be the more reasonable. Swinton's estimate, of course, includes Burnside's losses; but neither he nor Draper includes in his estimate the losses sustained by Butler's command and by that of Sigel and Hunter.

The story told in this chapter—the story of the Overland Campaign, as it has properly been named—will ever be read with pride, if not with pleasure, by the American people. The justice or the injustice, the right or the wrong attaching to the contending parties, will ultimately be forgotten; but to latest generations, men will proudly speak of the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia—of Grant and Lee; of Meade and Hancock, and Sedgwick and Warren, and Wright and Burnside; of Longstreet and Hill and Ewell; and of the glorious rank and file of both armies. It was one of those grand, protracted contests of which no section of the American people have, or will ever have, any just cause to be ashamed. On the merits of the campaign, as a whole, much has been said and written; and not a little difference of opinion exists. Harsh things have been said of General Grant; and by not a few the policy pursued in this campaign, from first to
last, has been severely condemned. He fought, we are told, when he might have flanked; he dashed his men to death against the invulnerable lines of the enemy; when he might have accomplished all he actually did accomplish with comparative ease and with but little loss of life. His tactics have been contrasted with those of his great rival Lee, on the one hand, and with those of his great lieutenant, Sherman, on the other; and the National commander has been exhibited in the unfavorable light of being unnecessarily and recklessly wasteful of the lives of his men. These judgments, based on too narrow a view of the entire situation, have had no effect on the masses of the American people, who choose to see in General Grant the hero who proved himself the saviour of his country, and who at this stage of his career was, by hard blows and continuous hammering, crushing out the life of the rebellious Confederacy. It is not claimed that the conduct of the campaign was perfect. It would not be difficult to exhibit defects—defects in the general plans themselves, defects in the mode of execution—to show where opportunities were lost and blunders committed; but in view of so much heroism, so much unexampled courage, such splendid work, we have a voice only for praise; none for censure or complaint.

The Overland Campaign was, as has been mentioned in the text, largely destructive of human life. The officers suffered severely. Among those already named, but of whom no notice has yet been given, was Brigadier-General Thomas G. Stevenson. He was killed at Spottsylvania on the 10th of May, 1864. Stevenson was a Bostonian by birth. At an early age he manifested a predilection for military life. He rose from the ranks, and was major of the 4th battalion of Massachusetts infantry at the commencement of the war. As a drill-master, he acquired a great reputation. He was colonel of the 24th regiment of Massachusetts infantry, and served under Foster in Burnside's North Carolina Expedition, in 1862. He took part in the capture of Roanoke Island and New Berne. He was appointed brigadier-general in December, 1862. He afterwards took part in the operations in Charleston Harbor, assisting in the reduction of Morris Island, and commanding the reserves at the assault on Fort Wagner. Having returned to the North to recruit his health, in the fall of 1863, Burnside, who had a high opinion of his ability, placed him in command of the First division of the Ninth corps. In this capacity he took part in the battle of the 10th of May at Spottsylvania. He was cut down at the early age of twenty-eight.
CHAPTER XXXV.

heman's Atlanta Campaign.—Strength of his Army.—General Johnston's Army.—Description of Atlanta.—Operations against Dalton.—Buzzard Roost.—Snake Creek Gap.—Kilpatrick wounded.—Johnston evacuates Dalton.—Operations against Resaca.—Johnston crosses the Etowah.—Occupation of Rome.—Johnston falls back on Allatoona Pass.—The March upon Dallas.—Battles of Pumpkin Vine Creek and New Hope Church.—Allatoona Pass turned.—General Blair joins Sherman with the Seventeenth Corps.—Garrisons left.—March to Big Shanty.—Kennesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains.—Confederate Defenses.—Georgia Militia.—Operations against Pine Mountain.—Death of General Polk.—Lost Mountain taken.—Continuous rain.—Battle of Kulp House.—Assault on Kennesaw Mountain.—Death of General Harker.—Johnston abandons Kennesaw Mountain.—Occupation of Marietta.—Nickajack Creek.—Advance to the Chattahoochee.—Johnston's Position again turned.—His Defenses on the Chattahoochee.—Mills destroyed at Roswell.—Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee.—Johnston retires upon Atlanta.—Approach to Atlanta.—General Rousseau's Raid.—Johnston superseded by Hood.—Battle of Peach Tree Creek.—Hood Abandons his Outer Line of Defenses.—Battle of July 22d.—Death of General McPherson.—Wheeler's Attack on Decatur.—Attack on the Fifteenth Corps.—Biographical Sketch of General McPherson.—General Garrard's Operations at Covington.—Expeditions against the Macon and Western Railroad.—General Stoneman's Raid.— Destruction effected at Gordon.—Defeat and Capture of Stoneman.—General McCook's Raid.—General Howard succeeds General McPherson.—Sherman's Lines extended southward.—Attack on the Fifteenth Corps.—Resignation of General Hooker.—Change in Important Commands.—Hood's Defenses.—The City shelled.—New Plans of General Sherman.—Wheeler's Raid.—Kilpatrick's Attempt on the West Point and Macon Railroads.—Movement of Sherman's Entire Army towards the Railroads.—Battle of Jonesboro.—Hood evacuates and General Slocum enters the City.—Repulse of General Wheeler at Dalton.—Defeat of General Sturgis.—Depopulation of Atlanta.

It has already been made plain to the reader that General Grant's entire attention was not given to the army of the Potomac. His battle-plan contemplated the dealing of two deadly blows—one on Richmond the other on Atlanta. To effect this double purpose he had concentrated at two separate points, two powerful armies. The one was on the northern bank of the Rapidan, its right at Culpepper Court House, and was under the immediate direction of General Meade. The other was in the neighborhood of Chattanooga, and was entrusted to the care of General Sherman. We have already traced the progress of Meade's army from the Rapidan to the James. Let us now give our attention to the army of General Sherman.

The total force under Sherman was over 98,000 men of all arms, with 254 guns. It was composed of three separate organizations, the army of the Cumberland, Major-General Thomas; the army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPherson; and the army of the Ohio, Major-General Schofield. The army of the Cumberland comprised the Fourth corps, Howard; the Fourteenth corps, Palmer; and the Twentieth corps, Hooker—in all 60,773, including 3828 cavalry. The army of the Tennessee comprised the Fifteenth corps, Logan the Sixteenth corps, Dodge; and after wards the Seventeenth corps, Blair—
all 24,465 men, including 624 cavalry. The army of the Ohio consisted of the Twenty-third corps; in all 13,559, including 1679 cavalry. As soon as Grant had crossed the Rapidan, he telegraphed Sherman to advance from Chattanooga. On the morning of the 6th of May, and when about to move, the position of the three armies was as follows: the army of the Cumberland was at Ringgold, on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, twenty-three miles southeast of Chattanooga; the army of the Tennessee was at Gordon’s Mill, on the Chickamauga, eight miles west of Ringgold; and the army of the Ohio near Red Clay, about ten miles northeast of Ringgold.

The Confederate army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Joseph E. Johnston, lay in and about Dalton, fifteen miles south of Ringgold, on the railroad, his advance at Tunnel Hill, about midway between Ringgold and Dalton. The force under Johnston, consisting mostly of veteran troops, comprised the corps of Generals Hardee, Hood, and Polk, and General Wheeler’s division of about 10,000 cavalry, numbering in all not more than 60,000 men.

In some respects the campaign before General Sherman resembled that of General Grant from the Rapidan against Richmond. Its objective point was Atlanta, the possession of which it was believed was hardly of less importance to the Confederacy than the capital of Virginia. Atlanta had been before the war an important centre of railroad communication for the Western, Atlantic, and Gulf States, and a principal manufacturing town of the South, with a population of about 15,000. Laid out in a circle two miles in diameter, in its centre was the passenger depot of four railroads, radiating to Chattanooga, Atlanta, Augusta, Macon and Montgomery. Here also were railroad machine-shops, an extensive rolling mill, foundries, manufactories of gun-carriages, pistols, tents, caps, cartridges, shot and shell, shoes, clothing, and other military supplies, under the direction of the Confederate government. The population had risen during the war, by the accession of persons employed under the government and the arrival of refugees, to not less than 20,000. It was supposed that the capture of Atlanta, with its vast military stores and costly machinery, would be a blow to the resources of the Confederacy hardly less fatal than the capture of Richmond.

The utmost efforts were put forth by the Confederate authorities to make Atlanta secure. The line of approach was made as difficult for Sherman as the nature of the country—in itself easy of defense—and the resources of Johnston would admit. Should Sherman succeed in making his way over the mountain region and in crossing the rivers, both of which afforded many strong defensible positions for Johnston’s army, he would still have his hardest task before him in the formidable works around Atlanta, with an army depleted by many battles and the necessity for leaving garrisons at various points. Sherman’s line of communication would, at the same time, be lengthened and exposed, while Johnston in falling back upon Atlanta would be approaching his base and his supplies.
A reconnaissance of General Johnston’s position at Dalton satisfied General Sherman that it could not be carried by an attack in front, even should the enemy abandon his works at Tunnel Hill. Immediately south of Tunnel Hill is a valley about three miles long and about three-quarters of a mile wide, bounded by Rocky Face Ridge, a thickly wooded, steep, and rugged mountain, which commands the railroad and other approaches to Dalton, and extends southward many miles on the west side of the railroad and of the Oostanaula. A narrow mountain pass called Buzzard Roost, about midway between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, is the outlet to the valley, and through this pass runs the railroad to Dalton. By means of abatis, formidable batteries, and a line of rifle-pits at its northern entrance, this pass had been rendered impregnable, so that Dalton was absolutely secure against attack from the northwest; on its northeast side the town was protected by strong works on Mile Creek. General McPherson was therefore directed to move rapidly southward with the army of the Tennessee from his position at Gordon’s Mill, by way of Ship’s Gap, Vllanow, and through Snake Creek Gap—a pass in Rocky Face Ridge further south—upon Resaca, a station about eighteen miles south of Dalton, where the railroad from that place crosses the Oostanaula. The object of this movement was to compel General Johnston to evacuate his position at Dalton, when McPherson would be in a position to harass his flank, while the main body of the National army pushed him southward. While McPherson’s flanking movement was in progress, General Thomas was to make a show of attacking in force in front of Buzzard Roost, and Schofield with the army of the Ohio was to close up with Thomas’ left. Accordingly on the 7th, General Thomas advanced from Ringgold to Tunnel Hill, which was easily carried by the Fourteenth corps under General Palmer, the enemy retreating to his stronger position at Buzzard Roost. The same evening the National line was established about a mile south of Tunnel Hill. A demonstration in force was made on the 8th against Rocky Face Ridge and Buzzard Roost. The Fourth corps under Howard succeeded in carrying the ridge, but its crest was found too narrow to permit of an attack being made from it on the pass with any prospect of success. General Schofield in the mean time brought up the army of the Ohio and closed with the left of Thomas, which was held by Howard.

On the same day McPherson succeeded in passing through Snake Creek Gap, surprising a force of Confederate cavalry there, and approached within a mile of Resaca, which, however proved too strong to be carried by assault. He therefore fell back to a strong position at the west end of Snake Creek Gap. General Sherman finding that McPherson’s flank demonstration had failed of its intended effect, set the whole of his army in motion for Snake Creek Gap, with the exception of two divisions of Howard’s corps and some
cavalry, left to threaten the front of Buzzard Roost. The National loss on the 8th and 9th was about 750 killed, wounded, and missing, the greater number being only slightly wounded.

Resaca is situated on a peninsula formed by the junction of the Conasagua with the Oostanaula, across which, from river to river, the Confederates had constructed a continuous line of rifle-pits with strong field-works, their flanks being protected by the two rivers. A line of retreat southward was left open across the Oostanaula.

On the 13th of May the army of General Sherman passed through Snake Creek Gap and got into position in Sugar Valley, a tract on the east side of the ridge broken by hills covered with a dense undergrowth. In covering the movement, while pressing the enemy toward Resaca, General Kilpatrick received a flesh-wound, which unfitted him for active duty for several months. The National lines were advanced during the day toward Resaca, so that the right, under McPherson, rested on the Oostanaula about two miles below the town, and extended north to the centre under Thomas—the left, under Schofield, extending from Thomas' left to the Conasagua, near Tilton, a railroad station about midway between Resaca and Dalton.

In the mean time General Johnston had observed Sherman's movement and detected its object; and considering his position at Dalton no longer tenable, he had moved southward on the 12th, and having the shorter line of march, reached Resaca with his entire force before the army of Sherman had got through Snake Creek Gap. Dalton was immediately occupied by the divisions of Howard's corps left before Buzzard Roost, which following in the rear of Johnston joined the National left on the 14th near Tilton. Sherman, in thus compelling Johnston to evacuate a position of such extraordinary strength as that of Dalton, demonstrated his ability to make his way to Atlanta, between which and Dalton no position was likely to be held by the Confederates which might not be as easily turned.

On the morning of the 14th the Confederates were in complete readiness to receive an attack, having spent the previous night in strengthening their already formidable earth-works. General Hardee held their right, General Hood their centre, and General Polk their left. At an early hour skirmishing commenced. A body of infantry with cavalry was sent across the Oostanaula to threaten Calhoun in the rear, further south on the railroad, by which movement General Sherman hoped to turn Johnston's left, and thus cut off his retreat, but this the nature of the ground rendered impossible. At noon there was heavy firing along the whole line. About one o'clock an attempt was made by Palmer's corps from the left centre to break the enemy's line and force him from an elevated position in the immediate front. To reach the point aimed at, it was necessary to descend the slope of a hill commanded by the enemy's artillery, to ford a stream bordered with a thick growth of bushes and vines, and
then to cross a space intersected by ditches and otherwise obstructed. Under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery the hill was descended and the stream crossed; but the troops becoming confused among the ditches and obstructions, and finding no shelter from which the plunging fire of the enemy might be returned, were forced to retire, after losing 1000 of their number. Further to the left, about the same time, General Judah’s division of the Twenty-Third corps and Newton’s division of the Fourth, drove the enemy from an important position on their outer line. By this means, although the position taken was not held, the National line was advanced. Artillery was also got into a position which prevented the enemy from occupying the works. At both extremities of the line heavy skirmishing took place, the density of the woods and undergrowth preventing the use of artillery.

About three in the afternoon, General Johnston massed a heavy force on the road to Tilton with the view of turning the National left flank, held by Stanley’s division of the Fourth corps. The attack was made with overwhelming numbers, who rushed on with loud yells, and with such impetuosity that Stanley’s troops were forced in confusion from the hill on which they were posted. The movement ordered by Johnston had been detected early enough to permit of Hooker’s corps being moved from the centre to reinforce the National left. The enemy’s advance was soon checked; and Stanley’s troops having been rallied, the Confederates were, about dusk, driven back to their lines with severe loss.

While this movement was going on, General McPherson sent the Fifteenth corps with a portion of the Sixteenth across Camp Creek, to carry a hill and rifle-pits on the enemy’s left in front of Resaca. This was effected, and with little loss. As this position commanded the works, the railroad, and the trestle bridges across the Oostanaula, desperate efforts were made by the enemy after dark to retake it, but in vain. Heavy columns with fixed bayonets moved up to the very crest of the hill, but were compelled to retire in confusion before the steady fire of the National troops. At ten o’clock fighting was over for the day.

Both armies strengthened their positions during the night; and on May 15, under cover of severe skirmishing, preparations were made by General Sherman for an assault upon two fortified hills, on the enemy’s extreme right, the key of the whole position. General Hooker’s corps was moved to the extreme left, Howard’s, Schofield’s, and Palmer’s to the right. Soon after one o’clock, Hooker sent Butterfield’s division forward as the assaulting column, supported by the divisions of Geary and Williams. After several attacks the Confederates were driven from a portion of their lines; and a lodgment was secured under the projecting work of a lunette mounting 4 guns. Further advance, however, was found impossible, owing to a severe fire from neighboring rifle-pits, and the troops seeking
such shelter as was available, contented themselves with holding the position gained. Towards the close of the afternoon General Hood's corps made an unavailing effort to dislodge them. Later under cover of night, and in spite of a sharp fire from the Confederates, the ends were dug out of the works and the guns hauled out with ropes. As soon as a breach was made the troops rushed in, and after a fierce struggle made themselves masters of the lunette.

General Johnston abandoned his position during the night, leaving behind another four-gun battery and a quantity of stores, and retreated toward Kingston, thirty-two miles south of Resaca on the railroad. Resaca was immediately occupied by the troops of General Thomas, who succeeded in saving the wagon road bridge. The railroad bridge, however, had been burnt. Johnston's army owed its escape from Sherman at Resaca to the impracticable nature of the valley between the town and Snake Creek Gap, which greatly retarded the passage of troops, and afforded the Confederate army time to march from Dalton by comparatively good roads, which Johnston with wise foresight had kept in order. Had the National army arrived first at Resaca, nothing could have saved the army of the Confederates. Once in their strong position at Resaca, it cost much severe fighting to make them abandon it. The total National loss in the two days' fighting was not less than 4000 killed and wounded, while that of the Confederates probably did not exceed 2500, as they fought for the most part behind earth-works.

The Confederate loss included about 1000 prisoners.

The whole army started in pursuit of Johnston, General Thomas, directly on his rear, crossing the Oostanaula at Resaca, General McPherson at Lay's Ferry, a few miles to the southwest, while General Schofield, making a wide detour to the left of Thomas, marched by obscure roads across the Conasauga and Coosawattee rivers, which unite near Resaca to form the Oostanaula. On the 17th the march was continued southward by as many roads as could be found, in a direction parallel with the railroad, but no enemy was seen till within the vicinity of Adairsville, thirteen miles south-southwest of Resaca, between the railroad and the Oostanaula. There, about sunset, the advance division under General Newton had a sharp skirmish with the enemy's rear-guard. Next morning the Confederates had disappeared, but were found again in force four miles beyond Kingston, on ground comparatively open and well adapted for a grand battle. They held strong works at Cassville, five miles east of Kingston, and on the 19th dispositions were made for a general engagement. While, however, Sherman was converging on the Confederate position, Johnston retreated in the night across the Etowah, burning the bridges at Cartersville, thus leaving the country north of the Etowah in the possession of General Sherman. It had, however, been completely stripped of supplies Sherman now gave his troops a few days' rest, the army of Thomas lying near Cassville, McPherson's about King-
ston, and Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah Bridge. In the mean time the railroad, which had received but little injury, was restored to running order. Trains laden with supplies arrived at Kingston on the 20th, and the wounded were sent back to Chattanooga, with which place telegraphic communication also was kept up as the army advanced.

General Jefferson C. Davis had on the 17th marched towards Rome, at the confluence of the Oostanaula and Etowah, fifteen miles west of Kingston. After a sharp fight on the 19th he got possession of the town, several forts, eight or ten large guns, and large quantities of stores, as well as valuable mills and foundries.

General Johnston retired upon Allatoona Pass, an almost impregnable position on the railroad, about five miles south of the Etowah River. General Sherman determined not even to attempt the pass in front, but to turn it. Accordingly, on the 23d, leaving garrisons at Rome and Kingston, and carrying with him in wagons supplies for twenty days, he put the army in motion for Dallas, a town about fifteen miles south-southwest of Allatoona Pass, and eighteen miles directly west of Marietta, hoping by thus threatening Marietta to compel Johnston to evacuate the pass. The roads through the rugged and densely wooded region to be traversed were few and bad, and the march was necessarily slow. The movement and its objects were soon detected by Johnston, who also set his troops in motion toward Dallas, to protect the approaches to Marietta. In the march upon Dallas, McPherson, holding the National right, made a detour southward by Van Wert, about fourteen miles west of Dallas, while Thomas moved nearly due south, with Schofield on his left. On the 25th, Hooker's corps, the advance of General Thomas, moving on the main road to Dallas, when near Pumpkin Vine Creek, met portions of Hood's and Hardee's corps: and a severe contest took place May 25 for a position at New Hope Church, where three roads meet, from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. The enemy, however, having hastily thrown up earth-works, and night coming on accompanied by heavy rain, he retained possession of the roads. Hooker lost 600 men in this affair. Next morning the Confederates were found well intrenched, substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. It was necessary, therefore, to make dispositions on a larger scale. McPherson was moved up to Dallas, Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and Schofield moved toward the left so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. Owing to the difficult nature of the country, these movements occupied two days, and were attended with heavy skirmishing; but as the vicinity was for the most part densely wooded, artillery could not be used, and the casualties were comparatively few. On the 28th, just as McPherson was closing up to Thomas in front of New Hope Church, he was repeatedly and desperately attacked by a large Confederate force, and the contemplated
movement was temporarily checked, but the enemy was finally driven back with a loss of 2000 killed and wounded.

After the delay of a few days the movement toward the left was resumed, McPherson taking up the position in front of New Hope Church which Thomas had previously occupied, Thomas and Schofield taking positions still further to the left. This movement was June 1. the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth were occupied. General Stoneman’s cavalry pushed into the east end of Allatoona Pass, and General Garrard’s marched around by the rear to its west entrance. These movements being effected without opposition, the pass fell into Sherman’s possession. He found it admirably adapted for use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defense and garrison, and for the reconstruction of the railroad bridge over the Etowah, thus restoring his communications by railroad, by which stores were again brought to his camps. Still working toward the left, General Sherman determined on the 4th to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and moved towards the railroad above Ackworth, which was reached on the 6th of June. Here the army remained several days; and here on the 8th General Blair arrived, with two divisions of the Seventeenth corps, and Colonel Long’s brigade of cavalry of General Garrard’s division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This addition to Sherman’s forces made up for his losses in battle and for the diminution of his numbers by garrisons left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona Pass. On the 9th, June 9. communications in the rear being secure and supplies abundant, the movement was resumed and the march continued to Big Shanty, the next station on the railroad east of Allatoona Pass.

Between Big Shanty and Marietta intervenes a mountainous district full of defensible positions, covering perfectly the town of Marietta, and the railroad as far as the Chattahoochee. Three conical peaks in this region, links in a continuous forest-covered chain, form prominent features in the landscape. These are Kenesaw Mountain, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. Kenesaw Mountain, a double peaked eminence, and hence sometimes called the Twin Mountain, 1200 feet high, lies immediately northwest of Marietta and west of the railroad. Lost Mountain lies west of Marietta. Pine Mountain, a rugged cone-shaped peak, half a mile to the north of these and opposite the space between them, forms the apex of a triangle of which the others form the base. On each of these mountains the enemy had signal stations from which the movements of Sherman’s army could be easily noted. The hilltops were covered with batteries; and on the spurs leading from them might be seen large numbers of men felling trees, digging rifle-pits and in other ways preparing for a desperate defense. The Confederate lines extended about two miles westward from the railroad, on which their right rested. Their works, which comprised several
successive lines of intrenchments, consisted of log barricades with earth thrown against them, and a formidable abatis, to which was added in many places a chevaux-de-frise of pointed fence-rails. The parapet thus formed was from six to eight feet thick at the top, for the infantry, and, where field-guns were posted, from twelve to fifteen feet thick. The force at the disposal of General Johnston at this time was, according to the reports of prisoners, deserters, and scouts, nine divisions of 7000 men each, in addition to which Governor Brown had sent to his assistance an auxiliary force of 15,000 Georgia militia, who, though undisciplined, were capable of good service behind earth-works and as laborers in the construction of fortifications. Hardee's corps held the Confederate right, Polk's the centre, Hood's the left. Their cavalry, to the number of about 15,000, operated on the right and left flanks and on the National rear.

The National lines were gradually advanced toward the Confederate positions. McPherson's command, now transferred to the extreme left, moved towards Marietta, his right on the railroad; Schofield, shifted to the right, moved on Lost Mountain; Thomas, remaining in the centre, moved on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Garrard's cavalry covered the left wing, and General Stoneman's the right. General McCook guarded the rear, the railroad communications, and the depot at Big Shanty. By the 11th the lines were close up; and dispositions were then made to break the enemy's line of defense between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. On the 14th, during June a heavy cannonade by the Fourth 14. corps, General Polk, who commanded on Pine Mountain, was struck by the fragment of a shell and killed; and the same night, Hooker's corps, moving round its base to cut off their retreat, the Confederates abandoned their works on Pine Mountain, carrying off, however, their guns and war material. On the morning of the 15th, Stanley's division of the Fourth corps quietly occupied the position.

After the abandonment of Pine Mountain, General Johnston drew back his centre to a strong line of intrenchments connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. The 15th, 16th, and 17th were occupied with incessant skirmishing. On the afternoon of the 15th, General Schofield carried the first line of the Confederate works at the foot of Lost Mountain. During the 17th, the left and centre, which were so far advanced that a general engagement would otherwise have resulted, remained quiet. The right and left centre were advanced more than a mile, to a line of defensive works which the enemy had evacuated. Towards evening, after heavy skirmishing, the enemy's left was dislodged from the intrenchments at Lost Mountain and the long line of breast-works connecting it with Kenesaw Mountain. The Confederates were pressed at all points, and skirmishing continued in dense forests and across difficult ravines, until they were again found strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw Mountain as a salient,
their right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and their left behind Nose's Creek, covering the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. They were thus enabled to contract and strengthen their lines. During these operations the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, making the narrow wooded roads mere mud gulleys and a general movement impossible. But every opportunity was taken to advance the National lines closer and closer to the enemy; and the men kept up incessant picket firing.

On the 22d the enemy made a sudden June attack on portions of Hooker's and Schofield's corps on the National right near the Kulp House. The blow fell mostly on the divisions of Generals Williams and Hascall. The ground was comparatively open; but though the skirmish lines and an advanced regiment of General Schofield's—sent out to hold the enemy in check until preparations for his reception could be completed—were driven in, yet when the enemy reached the National line of battle he received a terrible repulse. Many prisoners were taken, and the Confederates were compelled to abandon their dead and wounded. The National centre was now established in front of Kenesaw Mountain; but so many men were required to hold the railroad and the line along the base of the mountain, that only a small force was left with which to attempt a flank movement to the right. There was, however, now no alternative but to assault the enemy's lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. Both the enemy and his own officers expected Sherman to "outflank." General Sherman determined to assault. His reason for a departure from the course which had hitherto been so successful was, that an army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan likely to result in success. The part o the enemy's lines selected to be assaulted was the left centre. A strong column, if thrust through at that point, and pushed on boldly two and a half miles, would reach the railroad below Marietta and cut off the enemy's right and centre from the line of retreat which could then be overwhelmed and destroyed. On the 24th of June, therefore, General Sherman ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th, thus affording three days for preparation and reconnoissance. One of these assaults was to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, the other about a mile further south by those of General Thomas.

On the morning of the 27th, at the hour and in the manner prescribed, the assaults were made; but both failed, and many valuable lives were lost, including that of General 27. Harker. At six in the morning, Blair's corps, holding the extreme left of McPherson's line, moved on the east side of the mountain, while the corps of Dodge and Logan assaulted the adjoining northern slope. The brunt of the attack was borne by three brigades of Logan's corps, which, pushing impetuously up the hill scattered the Confeder
skirmishers and captured some of their rifle-pits, making also some prisoners. These troops pressed forward until they arrived at the foot of a precipitous cliff, thirty feet high, from which the enemy poured a plunging fire and rolled down huge stones. Here the line retired and fortified on the extreme right. For the second and more important attack, portions of the divisions of Newton and Davis were selected. When the signal was given, the troops charged up the slope of the mountain in face of a murderous fire from a battery on the summit, penetrated two lines of abatis, carried a line of rifle-pits beyond, and reached the works; but a destructive fire of musketry and artillery from the enemy soon made it necessary to recall the men. General Newton's troops returned to their original line, while the brigade of Davis threw up breast-works between those they had carried and the main line of the enemy. The entire contest lasted little more than an hour; but it cost General Sherman 3000 men in killed and wounded, while the enemy, fighting behind breast-works, suffered little.

During the day there had been some sharp skirmishing with the enemy's left wing; and General Cox's division pushed forward to a point nine miles south of Marietta and not more than three from the Chattahoochee. From his elevated position on Kenesaw Mountain, General Johnston had been able to watch Sherman's movements and to judge correctly at what point the main attack would fall, and had been ready to receive it with his main force. Though Sherman admitted that this attempt was a complete and costly failure, he yet took upon himself the entire responsibility, claiming that it was not altogether without good fruits, inasmuch as it satisfied Johnston that he would assault, and that boldly, when an assault appeared to be the surest means of success.

General Sherman could not rest long under the imputation of defeat or failure. He almost immediately commenced preparations to turn the enemy's left. On the 1st of July, Generals July Hooker and Schofield advanced about two miles to the right, and McPherson was ordered to shift rapidly his whole force from the extreme left to the extreme right of the National lines and push on to Nickajack Creek, which falls into the Chattahoochee four miles below the railroad bridge. General Garrard with his cavalry was sent to occupy McPherson's place in front of Kenesaw, while General Stoneman moved on his flanks to strike the river near Turner's Ferry, two and a half miles below the railroad bridge. McPherson commenced his movement on the night of the 2d. The effect was instantaneous. The object of the movement was at once detected by General Johnston, who without further delay prepared to evacuate Kenesaw Mountain and fall back to the Chattahoochee. Simultaneously with McPherson's movement, Johnston's rear-guard abandoned the works which for three weeks had been so resolutely defended; and before dawn on the morning of the 3d July the National pickets occupied the
rest of Kenesaw. General Thomas' whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and thence southward to the Chattahoochee; and General Sherman entered Marietta at half-past eight in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry left the town. General Logan's corps, which had not moved far, was ordered back to Marietta by the main road; and McPherson and Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack Creek, attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, harass him while crossing the Chattahoochee. Johnston was too good a general to be thus caught; and he had covered his movement well. He had constructed a strong *tête-du-pont* at the Chattahoochee with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta where General Thomas found him, his flanks protected by Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. In his retreat, Johnston left behind about 2000 men, principally stragglers, who were made prisoners.

General Johnston was obliged to leave his new position by another flank movement; and on the night of the 4th he fell back to the Chattahoochee, which he crossed with the main body of his army, leaving Hardee's corps on the right bank. General Sherman left a garrison in Marietta and moved up to the Chattahoochee. On the evening of the 5th, the troops of Thomas and McPherson occupied a line extending from a short distance above the railroad bridge to the mouth of Nickajack Creek, while those of Schofield were posted in the rear of Smyrna as a reserve. The enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering his pontoon bridges and the railroad, and beyond the river. Heavy skirmishing during the 5th along the entire front demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which it became apparent could be turned only by crossing the river, a deep and rapid stream, passable only by means of bridges, except at one or two difficult fords.

General Sherman judged that it would be easier to cross the river at once, before the enemy had time to make a more thorough preparation and regain confidence. Accordingly, Schofield was ordered to move eastward from his position near Smyrna, to cross near the mouth of Soap's Creek, eight miles north of the railroad bridge, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, *July 7*. General Schofield completely surprising the guard and capturing a gun, and immediately afterwards laying pontoon and trestle bridges, and taking up a strong position on high and commanding ground from which good roads led eastward. At the same time General Garrard moved rapidly on Rosewell a town near the Chattahoochee, nearly due north of Atlanta, and about seven miles above the point where Schofield crossed, and destroyed there some woollen and cotton mills, from which the Confederate armies had been long supplied. Garrard was then ordered to secure the ford at Rosewell and hold it till relieved by infantry. As General Sherman intended transferring the army
of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, he ordered Thomas to send his nearest division of infantry to Rosewell to hold the ford till McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack Creek. General Newton’s division was sent, and held the ford till the arrival of Dodge’s corps, which was soon followed by McPherson’s whole army. On the 9th a crossing was effected at Rosewell and a good bridge constructed, while the enemy was amused by feints, extending from Power’s Ferry, four miles above the railroad bridge, to Turner’s Ferry, three miles below it. Under cover of the same demonstrations General Howard also built a bridge at Power’s Ferry. Thus during the 9th three good points of crossing were secured above the position of the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta. General Johnston then took the alarm; and on the night of the 9th withdrew Hardee’s corps to the left bank, abandoned his tete-du-pont, burnt his bridges, and left Sherman, on the morning of July 10, master of all the country north and west of the Chattahoochee. The Confederate army then fell back to the outer fortified lines around Atlanta, abandoning the whole line of the river, except the left wing, which remained a short time in the neighborhood of Turner’s Ferry, expecting an attack in that quarter. General Sherman, however, rapidly and quietly moved the remainder of the army of the Tennessee to its old position on the extreme left.

One of the objects of General Sher-
manoeuvring on Atlanta, the requisite notice was given; and, on the 10th of July, General Rousseau commenced his march. He passed through Talladega, reached the railroad on the 16th about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it up all the way back to that place, as well as several miles of the branch railroads leading towards West Point and Columbus. Then turning northward he arrived at Marietta on the 22d, his loss not having exceeded 30 men.

The sudden abandonment of his formidable line of defenses on the left bank of the river, by General Johnston, occasioned the utmost dissatisfaction with his conduct of the campaign, especially in Atlanta, where it was expected he would make a stand on the Chattahoochee, which it was argued he could easily do, being in the immediate neighborhood of his supplies. His retreat from the Chattahoochee was the crowning offence with the enemies of this able general, whose inferiority of force had made it impossible to avoid Sherman's outflanking movements, but who had nevertheless kept his army in a compact body, with insignificant losses of guns or material of war. His removal was loudly demanded; and on the 17th, in accordance with orders from the Confederate War Department, he turned over his command to General Hood. With this change in commanders commenced a change in the character of the campaign in accordance with the difference in the genius of the two generals, which it was hoped would have an important influence on the morale of the troops, discouraged by a long succession of retreats from fortified positions.

The whole of General Sherman's army crossed the Chattahoochee July on the 17th, with the exception 17. of Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps, left to watch the railroad bridge and protect the rear, and preparations were made to move upon Atlanta. The army of the Cumberland, now occupying the right and right centre, rested on the river just above the railroad bridge. The left centre was occupied by the army of the Ohio, the left by the army of the Tennessee. The line thus formed made a grand right-wheel march, of which the army of the Cumberland was the pivot; and on the evening of the 17th came into a position along the Old Peach Tree road, about northeast of the railroad bridge. On the 18th, the left wing, swinging round rapidly, struck the Georgia Railroad about two miles west of Stone Mountain, a huge mass of granite fifteen miles northeast of Atlanta. General McPherson, with the aid of Garrard's cavalry, which moved on his flank, broke up about four miles of this road, while General Schofield occupied Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, and General Thomas moved his troops up towards Peach Tree Creek, a small stream flowing southwestward to the Chattahoochee, a little above the railroad bridge. The Confederates believing that their left was the real point of attack, and that Sherman would approach Atlanta from the southwest, and oppose these movements with an inadequate force of infantry and a few
cavalry. Thus McPherson and Schofield were able on the 19th to pass eastward of Decatur within the naturally strong defensive lines of Nance's and Peach Tree Creeks; and on the same day Thomas, moving more directly from the north, though meeting with more opposition, succeeded in crossing Peach Tree Creek in front of the enemy's intrenched lines. The National armies then lay in a curved line north and northeast of Atlanta, extending from the railroad which runs between Atlanta and the river to the Georgia Railroad and some distance south of it.

On the 20th, the National lines moved still nearer Atlanta; but as a gap existed between the lines of Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of Howard's corps of Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with Schofield. By this movement Newton's division of Howard's corps was left alone to hold an important position on the road leading from Atlanta to Buckhead. General Hood soon detected the weak point, and was not slow in taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him. He was soon, therefore, in a position in which he was ready to strike a blow which might go far towards retrieving many disasters. General Sherman had, however, sent orders to Newton and the rest of the army of the Cumberland to close up rapidly towards the left. Newton accordingly moved to a prominent ridge, where his troops stacked arms and made a temporary halt, but, beyond throwing up piles of logs and rails, made no defensive preparations, no attack being appre-
and seven regimental flags—his total loss being estimated by General Sherman at not less than 5000. The National loss was 1900, sustained principally by the corps of General Hooker, upon which fell the brunt of the battle. General Johnston's division of Palmer's corps had also been engaged, but being well defended its loss was comparatively light.

The Confederates kept within their entrenched position during the 21st, their right beyond the Georgia Railroad and their left extended towards Turner's Ferry, at a general distance of four miles from Atlanta. In the course of the day a strongly fortified hill in front of the extreme National left, which completely commanded Atlanta and the two principal roads leading north and south from the city, was carried by General Leggett's division of the Seventeenth corps, though with a loss of 750 men. Two desperate but unsuccessful attempts to regain this position were made by the Confederates, who when they finally retired left their dead and wounded on the slope of the hill.

On the morning of the 22d, the whole of the advanced line of the enemy was found abandoned, which led Sherman to suppose that Hood was about to give up Atlanta without further contest. He was, however, only preparing to repeat on a larger scale the experiment of the 20th. Pretending to be falling back upon the city, he hoped to decoy General Sherman into a rapid advance, and then suddenly, with all his force, strike the National army while in motion, at such weak points as should offer. Unsuspectingly Sherman pushed his troops beyond the abandoned works. He found the enemy occupying a line of finished redoubts completely covering the approaches to the city, and actively engaged in connecting these redoubts with curtains, strengthened by rifle trenches, abatis and chevaux-de-frise. Satisfied that Hood meant to fight, Sherman immediately resumed the dispositions for pressing towards the city on its east and northeast fronts. The National line by these movements became so contracted, that the Sixteenth corps, under General Dodge, which formed the right of the army of the Tennessee, was crowded out of its position, and was directed to march to the extreme left of the line, to aid in the defense of the hill which had been carried by the Seventeenth corps the day before, and which was still held by Leggett's division.

At ten in the morning, and about the time the movement was July 22 commenced, General Sherman, in company with General Schofield, was examining the enemy's lines, when he was joined by General McPherson, who described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. Sherman explained to him that if serious resistance were met in Atlanta, as seemed probable, he should extend to the right, and did not want much distance gained on the left. McPherson then described the hill occupied by Leggett's division as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta Railroad. Sherman therefore ratified McPherson's
disposition of his troops, and modified a previous order sent him in writing to employ Dodge’s corps in breaking up the railroad, and sanctioned its going, as already ordered by McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify the position there. McPherson remained with General Sherman till noon, when reports arrived indicating a movement of the enemy towards the left flank. He then mounted his horse and rode away with his staff.

General Sherman had the day before sent Garrard’s cavalry to Covington, on the Augusta Railroad, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, with instructions to send out detachments from that point to destroy the two bridges across the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, tributaries of the Ocmulgee. McPherson had also left his wagon train at Decatur, under a guard of three regiments commanded by Colonel Sprague.

Soon after the departure of McPherson, sounds of musketry to the left and rear rapidly growing into volume and accompanied by the roar of artillery, were heard, and about the same time the reports of guns in the direction of Decatur. There could be no doubt now as to what the enemy was about. Hood was throwing a superior force on the National left flank while he held the National forces with his forts in front, the only question being as to the amount of force at his disposal. Orders were immediately sent to all parts of the right and left centre to give full employment to the enemy along the whole line, and for Schofield to hold as large a force as possible in reserve awaiting developments. Not more than half an hour had elapsed after McPherson had parted from Sherman, when his adjutant-general, Colonel Clarke, rode up and reported him killed or a prisoner. He had ridden to General Dodge’s column, moving as before described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and taken a narrow road that led through the woods to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith’s division, which was on General Blair’s extreme left. A few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard from the direction in which he had gone, and his horse had come out riderless, with two wounds. Sherman immediately despatched a staff officer to General Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, directing him to assume command of the army of the Tennessee and hold the ground already chosen, especially the hill occupied by General Leggett’s division.

Already the whole line was engaged in battle. McPherson upon reaching the left had found the Sixteenth corps going into position to prolong the flank, and at that time facing to the left in a direction perpendicular to the main line. Between the right of the Sixteenth corps and the left of the Seventeenth was a wooded space of about half a mile. Shortly after twelve July 22 the enemy emerged from the woods in front of these corps in three columns, and attacked the Seventeenth corps. Three desperate assaults were repulsed by Dodge, in the last of which the enemy suffered severely from
the National batteries. It was during
the lull in the battle which now occurred
that McPherson had attempted to ride
through the woods to G. A. Smith's
division on the left of the Seventeenth
corps, it having been reported that the
enemy was about attempting to push
a force through the gap above mentioned
between the two corps. After sending
the only remaining member of his staff
with orders to obtain a brigade from
Logan's command and throw it across
the gap, with a single orderly he struck
into the road before mentioned. The
enemy's skirmish line, however, had
already advanced close up to the road,
and before he was aware he was within
fifty feet of it. A volley brought him
to the ground, mortally wounded.

Wangelin's brigade, the one ordered
up from Logan's command, arrived in
time to partially check the Confed-
erates, but not soon enough to prevent
a portion of their force getting in the
rear of the Seventeenth corps, while
other masses of troops were pushed
against the hill held by Leggett, whose
division, as well as that of G. A. Smith,
was attacked in front and rear, and
obliged to fire alternately from behind
their own breast-works and an aban-
doned parapet of the enemy. Leggett's
troops held firmly a fortified angle at
the top of the hill, against which the
Confederates threw their columns with
desperate but fruitless energy. In the
mean time Smith, who had been com-
pelled to draw back his more exposed
lines, and in doing so to abandon two
guns, took up a new line, whose right
connected with the division of Leggett,
his left drawn back and facing south-
east. The Confederates could make
no impression on this new formation of
the corps, whose deadly fire compelled
them to recoil again and again, mowing
down whole ranks at a time and cover-
ing the ground and ditches with dead
and wounded men. A portion of the
force that had penetrated the gap before
mentioned, renewed the attack on the
right flank of the Sixteenth corps, and
captured on its first advance a 6-gun
battery which was moving unsupported
along a narrow road through the woods.
They were soon checked, however, by
the divisions of Sweeney and Fuller,
and driven back with the loss of many
prisoners. Several of Sweeney's regi-
ments had expended their ammunition,
but charged with the bayonet, when the
enemy broke and fled. At about half
past three the Confederates desisted
from their attack on the left flank,
having sustained very heavy loss and
gained no ground.

In the mean time two divisions of
Wheeler's cavalry, with a section of
artillery, had taken a wide circuit to the
eastward and fallen upon Decatur un-
opposed—Sherman having sent Gar-
nard's cavalry to Covington, as before
stated—and attempted to capture the
wagon trains; but Colonel Sprague cov-
ered them with great skill and success,
sending them to the rear of Schofield
and Thomas, and not withdrawing
from Decatur till every wagon was
safe, except three which the teamsters
had abandoned.

A pause in the battle occurred about
four o'clock. Hood was massing troops,
for an attack on the Fifteenth corps, now commanded by General M. L. Smith, which, immediately adjoining the Seventeenth corps, held the right of the army of the Tennessee, behind strong breast-works. At half-past four, while the attention of the extreme left was occupied by a pretended attack, a heavy force of the enemy, two lines deep, marched directly on the left of the Fifteenth corps, driving in two regiments of skirmishers and capturing two guns. Lightburn’s brigade, which held this part of the line protected by breast-works, kept the enemy at bay by well-directed discharges of 20 pounder Parrott guns. Presently a second strong column of the enemy appeared, and rapidly and steadily approached, heedless of the fearful furrows made in its ranks by well-directed artillery. The attack had now become sufficiently formidable; but when a third column of the Confederates was seen pouring in on the rear through a deep cut in the Georgia Railroad, Lightburn’s troops, to avoid certain capture, retired in confusion to the second line of breast-works 500 yards from the main line; and the abandoned works with two batteries fell into the hands of the enemy. The position lost was one of the utmost importance, and Sherman sent orders to Schofield—which, however, he had anticipated—to make the Fifteenth corps regain its ground at any cost. To aid the movement, batteries from Schofield’s corps were so posted that by means of them the enemy and his works beyond might be shelled, and the approach of reinforcements prevented. The Con-

federates were on the point of turning the captured Parrott guns upon the inner National line, when the Fifteenth corps, supported by some of Schofield’s troops, advanced with loud cheers to the attack. After a fierce struggle, in which the fight was sometimes hand to hand across the narrow parapet, the enemy was driven out of the works and the guns retaken. Repeated discharges of grape and canister into the retreating masses caused fearful carnage. Thus ended the battle, by far the bloodiest that had yet been fought in Georgia. The Confederates were defeated at all points. Their dead left in front of the National lines numbered 2200 from actual count, of which 800 were delivered to them under flag of truce. Their total loss in killed was computed by General Logan at 3240; in addition to which they lost 3000 prisoners, including 1000 wounded and many commissioned officers. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the conflict, the proportion of killed was unusually large. Hood could ill afford these heavy losses, as his force was originally smaller than Sherman’s. The total National loss was 3722, the greater part being killed and wounded. Sherman’s army, however, had sustained an irreparable loss in the death of General McPherson. “He was” said Sherman: “a noble youth, of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men.” His body was recovered and carried in the heat of battle to General Sherman, who sent it, in
charge of his personal staff, back to Marietta, on its way to his Northern home. *

Garrard, with his cavalry, returned July from Covington on the 24th, 24. having thoroughly accomplished his mission to destroy the bridges over the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, besides burning a train of cars, 2000 bales of cotton, and the depots at Covington and Conger’s Station. He also broke up the railroad between those two places for seven miles, and brought in 200 prisoners and some good horses, having lost in the expedition only two men. The Georgia Railroad being now unavailable to the enemy, Sherman turned his attention to the railroad connecting Atlanta with Macon, the only avenue left by which supplies could be brought to the enemy. For this purpose he organized his cavalry into two large bodies, to move in concert from each wing of the army, while the army of the Tennessee was to be shifted at the same time by the right to East Point, a station six miles southwest of Atlanta, at the junction of the Macon and West Point roads. Stoneman was transferred to the left flank, and Garrard’s cavalry added to his own, making an effective force of 5000 men. On the right flank McCook, to whose command was added the cavalry brought by General Rousseau, had an aggregate force of 4000 men. These two well-appointed bodies of cavalry, which Sherman considered more than a match for Wheeler, were directed to move in concert, Stoneman’s by the left around McDonough, McCook’s by the right on Fayetteville. On the night of the 28th they were to meet on the Macon Railroad near Lovejoy’s, thirty miles south of Atlanta, and break up the track thoroughly. The enemy’s communications would then be all destroyed, and it was hoped the speedy evacuation of Atlanta would follow.

Just before starting on the expedition Stoneman requested permission to proceed, after accomplishing the proposed destruction of the railroad, to Macon and Andersonville, and release the Union prisoners there. To this, as there was a possibility of success, and, to use

*General James Birdseye McPherson was born in Sandusky Co., Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1838, and entered the Military Academy at West Point in 1849. He graduated at the head of his class on the 30th of June, 1853, and was then appointed brevet second lieutenant of engineers and assistant instructor of practical engineering at the Academy. He remained in this position till 1854, when he was appointed assistant engineer on the defenses of New York harbor. In 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort Delaware, and subsequently of the fortifications on Alcatraz Island, in San Francisco Bay. In 1861 he was placed in charge of the fortifications in Boston harbor. In the same year he was made captain, and in November became aide-de-camp to General Halleck in the Western Department, with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was chief engineer of the army of the Tennessee in the expeditions against Forts Henry and Donelson, and he was also at the siege of Corinth. In May, 1862, he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, and in the following month general superintendent of military roads in West Tennessee. In September of the same year he was on the staff of General Grant, with the rank of major-general of volunteers. Subsequently, he was appointed brigadier-general of the regular army, his rank dating from August, 1st, 1863. Two months later he led a column into Mississippi, and defeated the enemy at Canton. In Sherman’s expedition to Meridian he was second in command, and in the Atlanta campaign commanded the army of the Tennessee. McPherson was distinguished for bravery, industry, and indefatigable energy. In the language of General Grant, he was “one of the ablest engineers and most skilful generals.”

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Sherman's words, "something captivating in the idea," consent was given by General Sherman, on the condition, however, that Wheeler's cavalry should first be defeated, and that Stoneman should make the attempt with his own cavalry only, that of Garrard to return immediately to his own flank of the National army.

The two expedition set out on the July 27th, Stoneman marching as proposed towards McDonough, and sending Garrard to Flat Rock to cover his movement. McCook moved down the west bank of the Chattahoochee. But Stoneman, instead of proceeding to Lovejoy's, turned off almost immediately towards the Georgia Railroad, following it as far as Covington. He then struck due south to the east of the Ocmulgee, for Macon, sixty miles distant, and arrived in the vicinity of that place on the 30th. A detachment was sent eastward to Gordon, on the Georgia Central Railroad, where 11 locomotives and several trains loaded with stores were destroyed, and several bridges between that place and Macon. But having learned that on the previous day the prisoners in Macon had been sent away to Charleston, Stoneman decided to return at once, without attempting to reach either Macon or Andersonville. He accordingly turned northward in the evening of July 31, when about twenty miles from Macon, encountered a heavy force. Dismounting a portion of his command, as the country was unfavorable for cavalry operations, he threw them forward as skirmishers. He soon however, found himself surrounded by a superior force. He then gave directions to the greater part of his troops to cut their way as well as they could through the enemy's lines, while he with several hundred men and a section of artillery occupied their attention. He was finally compelled to surrender. One of his three brigades was captured with him; one, under Colonel Capron, was surprised and scattered on its way back, and the third, under Colonel Adams, arrived almost intact within the National lines. Garrard remained at Flat Rock till the 29th, awaiting orders from Stoneman, when he marched towards Covington; but learning there that he had gone southward, returned to his position on the left flank of the army.

McCook, who marched along the west side of the Chattahoochee, on arriving at Rivertown, crossed on pontoons and marched to Palmetto Station, on the West Point Railroad, twenty-five miles south of Atlanta, and destroyed the track there. He then moved eastward upon Fayetteville, and burnt 500 army wagons, killed 800 mules, and made prisoners of several hundred quartermasters' men. He reached the appointed rendezvous at Lovejoy's on the night of the 28th, burnt the depot and tore up a section of the railroad; but his work of destruction being interfered with by an accumulating force of the enemy, and hearing nothing of Stoneman, he turned off towards the southwest and marched to Newman, a station on the West Point Railroad. Here he encountered an infantry force of the
enemy on its way from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been delayed by the break he had effected on the road at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in, and he was compelled to drop his prisoners and cut is way out, in doing which he lost some 500 officers and men. The total losses of Stoneman's and McCook's commands amounted to not less than 1500 men. Owing to Stoneman's failure to co-operate with McCook at Lovejoy's, the damage done to the Macon Railroad was not effectual, and the communications of Hood in the direction of Macon were soon restored. Atlanta obtained a respite of at least a month.

While these raids against the Southern railroad communications of Atlanta had been going on, the army of the Tennessee, now under the command of Major-General Howard—appointed by the president to succeed General McPherson—had, in accordance with the plans of Sherman, been drawn out of its intrenchments on the left flank, and moved during the 27th, behind the rest of the army, to a position on the extreme right, the right flank being held by the corps of General Logan. The line of the army was thus prolonged southward beyond Proctor's Creek, and facing eastward. About ten in the morning all the army was in position, and the men were busily engaged in throwing up the usual defense of logs and rails. Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps had been ordered by Sherman, on the day before, to move down to Turner's Ferry, and thence towards Whitehall or East Point, and if possible to reach the flank of Howard's new line, so that in case Hood should attempt to repeat the experiment of the 22d, and attack any part of the army while in motion, his force might be taken in flank at an unexpected moment.

Hood was not long in finding out that the army of Sherman was swinging round towards the Macon Railroad, and massed troops in the same direction to oppose the movement. At noon, July 28, the Confederates moved out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, formed in the open fields behind a rising ground, and advanced in parallel lines directly against the Fifteenth corps, expecting to find it detached and unsupported. Fortunately Logan's troops had thrown up breast-works, and though the advance of the Confederate columns was "magnificent," as Sherman, who witnessed it, said, it was only to be followed by a recoil before steady volleys of musketry and incessant discharges of grape and canister. In spite of the efforts of their officers the men broke and fled, and though rallied again and again, at some parts of the line as often as six times, they were, about four o'clock in the afternoon, compelled to retire, with a loss of not less than 5000. Logan's loss was reported at less than 600. Had Davis' division come up at any time before four o'clock, this complete repulse of the enemy might have been made a disastrous rout. Owing to the difficult nature of the country through which his march lay and the absence of roads, Davis was unfortunately delayed. This was the last attempt of the enemy to check the
extension of Sherman's lines by the flank; and though the extensions southward were met by well constructed forts and rifle-pits between the National army and the railroad to and below East Point, the defensive was strictly adhered to. The National line was prolonged on the 1st of August still further southward beyond East Point, by transferring Schofield's army and Palmer's corps to the right.

About this time several changes in important commands took place. Hooker, offended because of the appointment of General Howard as the successor of McPherson, resigned his command of the Twentieth corps, and General Slocum was appointed in his place. Slocum was at Vicksburg, and until he arrived the command devolved on General S. H. Williams. Palmer at the same time resigned his command of the Fourteenth corps, and was succeeded by General Jefferson C. Davis. The command of the Fourth corps, vacated by the promotion of General Howard, was given to General D. S. Stanley.

From the 2d to the 15th of August, the National line was extended still further to the right, in the hope of flanking Hood in that direction. The Twenty-Third corps, supported by the Fourteenth, was transferred from the left to a position below Utoy Creek—a small stream flowing westward to the Chattahoochee—where it joined on Logan's right and formed the right flank. Reilley's brigade of Cox's division made an attempt on the 5th Aug. 5 to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy Creek, but failed, losing about 400 men. On the next day, however, the position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he could get no foothold on either the West Point or Macon Railroad. The enemy's line, in which was now a large body of Georgia militia, at this time was about fifteen miles long, extending from near Decatur to East Point and beyond, and his positions were so masked by the hills and woods that the weak parts of the line could not be discovered.

Along the west side of the railroad from Atlanta to East Point, a distance of six miles, the enemy had an admirably constructed line of defenses, within which was a second line, consisting of a series of redoubts of great thickness of parapet connected throughout by a continuous infantry parapet, covered by abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and other impediments. The inner line of works completely surrounded the city, and extended southwestward as far as and around East Point, thus covering the point of junction of the West Point and Macon Railroads. The National army had been so shifted by successive movements from its first position, in which it had threatened the city on the north and northeast, that now, while the northern approaches were covered by its extreme left, the extreme right lay southwest of Atlanta, and in a line parallel with the railroad, at an average distance of two and a half miles, the intervening space being a narrow belt of rough wooded country, the scene of
constant skirmishing. Hood’s position seemed to be impregnable; and although his numbers were inferior to those of Sherman—yet his advantage in holding the interior lines made up in a great measure for his want of men, and the contest seemed likely to be indefinitely protracted. Sherman became satisfied that the enemy’s lines could be carried by assault only at a fearful sacrifice of life, and determined to adopt another plan of operations. His object now was to get possession of the Macon Railroad, the only line left by which Hood’s army could be reinforced, and on which it was wholly dependent for supplies. This effected, Hood might be compelled to evacuate the city or surrender. To gain this end Sherman determined to move his entire army. But before moving, he had a battery of four 4½-inch rifled guns put in position, and a steady fire opened upon the city—the object being to impress the enemy with the conviction that regular siege operations were commenced. Several extensive fires were also thus caused in the city, and the running of trains on the Macon Railroad was interrupted; but the enemy resolutely held the forts, willing, apparently to see the city laid in ashes rather than abandon them. Sherman therefore commenced his new movement, which amounted to nothing less than raising the siege of Atlanta and taking the field with his main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments.

By the 16th of August, Sherman had completed his plans, according to which the Twentieth corps, under Williams, was to be moved back to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee Bridge, and the main army was to march to the West Point Railroad, near Fairborn, and afterwards to the Macon road at Jonesboro, the wagons loaded with provisions for fifteen days. But before putting these plans in execution, Sherman learned that Wheeler, with a force of cavalry, variously estimated at from 6000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east and north. Making his appearance on the National lines of communication, he captured 900 head of cattle, and made a break on the railroad near Calhoun. Sherman, therefore, thinking that in the absence of Wheeler’s cavalry, the task he had marked out for the whole army might be accomplished by a strong mounted force, suspended his orders for the grand movement by the right flank, and dispatched Kilpatrick—who had now recovered from the wound he received at Resaca—with a force of 5000 well-appointed cavalry to tear up the railroads. Kilpatrick left his camp near Sandtown on the 18th and struck the West Point Railroad at Fairborn, the Macon Railroad at Lovejoy’s; but being much harassed by a body of infantry and by Ross’s cavalry, was not able to effect any permanent damage on the roads—not enough to interrupt their use for more than ten days. He then returned northward and eastward, and reached Decatur on the 22d.

It now became apparent to Sherman that his original plan must be carried out. All the army commanders were
at once notified to send their surplus wagons, the sick and wounded, and incumbrances of all kinds, back to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee Railroad Bridge, and that the movement must commence on the night of the 25th. The Twentieth corps marched back to the bridge. The Fourth corps, under General Stanley, was drawn out of its line on the extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's Creek. The movement was continued on the night of the 26th, the army of the Tennessee being drawn out and moved rapidly by a circuit towards Sandtown and across Camp Creek; the army of the Cumberland south of Utoy Creek. The army of the Ohio remained in its position. A third movement placed the army of the Tennessee on the West Point Railroad above Fairborn, the army of the Cumberland above Red Oak, and the army of the Ohio near Diggs and Mims. The whole front of the city was thus uncovered, much to the astonishment of the Confederates, who, for a short time, not being able in any other way to account for these strange operations, supposed that Sherman had begun a retreat.

The 28th of August was devoted by Sherman to the destruction of the West Point Railroad, between Fairborn and Red Oak, and for some distance above. The work was thoroughly done. The road was destroyed for twelve and a half miles, the ties being burnt, and the rails twisted. Several cuts were made across the road and filled up with logs, trunks of trees, fragments of rock, and earth, among which were placed shells prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Sherman, after having personally inspected this work, and seen that the destruction was so complete that it would be very difficult to restore the road to working condition, ordered the whole army to move next day eastward by several roads—Howard, on the right, towards Jonesboro; Thomas, in the centre, by Shoal Creek Church to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road; and Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's Mills.

Hood now began to understand the object of these movements; but still unaware that Sherman's whole army was marching on his communications, he contented himself with sending only a part of his force, the corps of Hardee and S. D. Lee, to Jonesboro, remaining himself in Atlanta with Stewart's corps and the Georgia militia.

The several columns of Sherman's army were again in motion in a south-easterly direction on the 30th. Aug. 30. Thomas, in the centre, encountering little opposition, attained his position at Couch's early in the afternoon; Schofield being near the enemy, moved cautiously on a circle around East Point, and came into position towards Rough and Ready; Howard, who had the outer circle, and therefore a greater distance to move, met with some opposition, which, however, he easily overcame, passed Renfrew, the point indicated for him in the orders of the day, and at night halted within half a mile of Jonesboro. Next morning, finding
himself in the presence of the heavy force under Generals Hardee and Lee, Howard deployed the Fifteenth corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its flank.

Sherman had in the meantime, as soon as he learned that Howard had passed Renfrew, directed Thomas to send to that place a division of Davis’ corps, also to move Stanley’s corps in connection with Schofield’s force, towards Rough and Ready, and then to send forward a strong detachment to feel for the railroad. Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough and Ready. These movements were progressing on Aug. 31st, when the Confederates moved out of their works at Jonesboro, and attacked the position of Howard, but were steadily and repeatedly repulsed. After a contest of two hours’ duration, they withdrew, losing in killed, wounded, and captured, 3000 men, besides general officers, including Major-General Anderson, mortally wounded. Howard’s loss was slight, as his men fought behind breast-works. It was observed on this occasion that the Confederate troops had begun to lose the enthusiasm and dash which had hitherto characterized their attacks.

Hearing the sounds of battle about noon, Sherman renewed his orders to push the other movements on the left and centre, and about four o’clock received reports that Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro; that Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough and Ready and was busy breaking it up; that Stanley was on the road below Schofield, and was also breaking it up, and that General Davis’ corps had struck the road within four miles of Jonesboro. Orders were then given for the whole army to move on Jonesboro; Thomas from the north with Schofield on his left. Howard was to hold the Confederates in their fortifications till the rest of the army could close in upon them. The troops were also ordered to continue the destruction of the railroad as they moved along it. Garrard was charged to watch the roads northward, and Kilpatrick was sent southward along the west bank of the Flint River, to threaten or attack the railroad below Jonesboro. It was expected that the whole army would be able to close in on Jonesboro by noon on the 1st of September; but the corps of Davis alone, having a comparatively short distance to travel, was in time, and was deployed facing southward, its right in connection with the corps of Howard, its left on the railroad. Stanley and Schofield were moving along the Rough and Ready road, breaking it up at the same time, and Sherman fearing that night would come on before their arrival, and that the enemy would then be able to escape him without a fight, ordered the corps of Davis to assault the enemy’s works at once. The troops advanced to the attack across open fields under a withering artillery and musketry fire. After a desperate fight, which lasted two hours, they drove the Confederates from their works, capturing two 4-gun batteries—one of them Loomis’, lost at Chickamauga—some battle-flags, and a large
the main army of Sherman had got between Hardee's force and the city. Hood immediately gave orders for the evacuation of his works and the removal of as much of the ammunition and stores as was possible with his limited means of transportation, and for the destruction of the rest. Large quantities of provisions in the public storehouses were distributed to the inhabitants and to the troops. The rolling stock of the railroads, consisting of about 100 cars and 6 locomotives, were gathered together near the rolling-mill in the evening, by which time all the troops except the rear-guard had got away. The cars were then laden with the surplus ammunition, and, together with the depots, storehouses, and all that could be of use to the National army, set on fire about midnight. This occasioned the series of explosions that had been heard in Sherman's camp. Slocum, at the Chattahoochee Bridge, also hearing these sounds, sent out early in the morning of the 2d of September a strong reconnoitring column, which pushing forward without meeting any opposition, arrived at Atlanta about nine o'clock, when the mayor made a formal surrender of the city, only requesting the security of private property and protection for non-combatants, which were readily guaranteed. Ward's division then marched into the city with drums beating and colors flying, and the National banner was raised over the court-house amid hearty cheers from the troops. Eleven heavy guns were found in the fortifications, and a number which had been

number of prisoners, including the greater part of Govan's brigade, with its commander, which had formed part of the celebrated "fighting division" of Cleburne. Repeated orders were sent, urging the rapid advance of Stanley and Schofield, but the want of roads and the difficult nature of the country prevented their coming up and getting into position for attack before further operations were rendered impracticable by the approach of night. Had they been able to close in upon Hardee a few hours earlier, his entire force would in all probability have been captured. As it was, Hardee had to evacuate the place during the night and fall back seven miles to Lovejoy's, where he intrenched in a naturally strong position. About two o'clock in the morning the watchers in Sherman's camp heard in the direction of Atlanta, about twenty miles distant, the sounds of heavy explosions, followed by a succession of minor reports resembling the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. About four o'clock similar sounds were heard, indicating a night attack on the city by Slocum, or that Hood was blowing up his magazines and preparing to evacuate. Nevertheless, when the approach of day made it clear that Hardee had abandoned his works at Jonesboro, Sherman moved his army in pursuit. Hardee was found in his intrenched position at Lovejoy's, his flanks protected by a branch of Walnut Creek to the right and a small affluent of the Flint River to his left.

In the mean time, in Atlanta the utmost consternation and excitement had arisen when it became known that
buried were subsequently dug up. There were also found 3 locomotives uninjured, 3000 muskets in good order, and a quantity of tobacco and other stores. Of the valuable machinery in the Confederate Government workshops, part had been removed to Augusta and Macon, and part destroyed.

The object of Sherman's movement against the Macon Railroad having been attained, by the surrender of Atlanta, he gave up the pursuit of Hardee's force. To follow it, through a country covered with forests, would have been useless. He therefore issued orders on the 4th for the return of the army by slow marches towards Atlanta. On the 5th it was back at Jonesboro; on the 7th it moved to Rough and Ready, and on the 8th camps were selected—for the army of the Cumberland around Atlanta, for the army of the Tennessee about East Point, and for the army of the Ohio at Decatur.

Sherman's final success in compelling the evacuation of Atlanta was owing in a great degree to the mistake made by Hood in sending off his cavalry under Wheeler to operate against the National communications far beyond the reach of recall, thus enabling Sherman's cavalry, followed quickly by his main army, to fall upon the railroads south of Atlanta. Up to the time of Wheeler's raid, Sherman's railroad communications between Atlanta and Chattanooga had, owing to his skilful dispositions, been scarcely interrupted. In Chattanooga had been accumulated a sufficient quantity of stores to render the army independent of Nashville; and when Sherman heard of Wheeler's departure, which took place soon after the unfortunate raid of Stoneman, he felt no uneasiness, as it left him superior in cavalry to his adversary. Wheeler struck the railroad at Adairsville, midway between Atlanta and Chattanooga, and captured there 900 head of beef cattle; proceeding then northward, he did some damage at Calhoun. On the 14th he made his appearance at Dalton, and demanded, in order "to prevent the effusion of blood," an immediate and unconditional surrender. Colonel Siebold, who was in command of the garrison of 500 or 600 men, replied in the negative; and sending word to General Steedman, commanding at Chattanooga, he held out against the Confederates till the following day, when reinforcements arrived. Wheeler then went to East Tennessee; and the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga was immediately restored to running order. Subsequently he destroyed a large part of the railroad between Chattanooga and Knoxville; and during the latter part of August and the first week in September he endeavored to break up the railroad and interrupt telegraphic communications between Chattanooga and Nashville. He was, however, compelled to retire southward pursued by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger, towards Florence, in northern Alabama.

Having determined to remove all civilians from Atlanta and to retain the town for military purposes exclusively, Sherman issued an order dated Sept. 5th September ordering all families living in Atlanta whose male
representatives were in the Confederate service, or had gone south, to leave the city within five days. All northern citizens not connected with the army, unless they obtained from him or from General Thomas permission to remain, were also to leave the city in five days or to be liable to imprisonment. To facilitate the removal of the inhabitants, the number of whom had greatly diminished during the progress of the siege, Sherman proposed to Hood, still remaining at Lovejoy's, a truce of ten days. Hood agreed to the proposal, although he protested against the measure as one of unnecessary cruelty. Sherman replied in a characteristic letter to Hood, showing that the conduct of Johnston and other Confederate commanders afforded sufficient precedent for his action. The inhabitants who still remained in Atlanta were very unwilling to be sent away, and the mayor, James M. Calhoun, addressed a letter to Sherman, asking a reconsideration of the order to which the latter replied, showing in clear and forcible language the propriety of the measure he had determined on, at the same time demonstrating that the hardships of war so much complained of had been brought upon the Southern people by their own action. The truce agreed upon extended from the 12th of September to the 22d and was subsequently prolonged. The National Government furnished transportation as far as Rough and Ready, for such of the inhabitants as wished to move southward, and for those desiring to move northward, as far as Chattanooga. They were permitted to take with them their movable property, for which also transportation was furnished. Negroes who chose to do so were allowed to go with their masters. Of those who remained, the men were put in government employ, and the women and children were sent outside the lines. During the truce there were removed to Rough and Ready 446 families, comprising 705 adults, 860 children, and 470 servants. The amount of household goods removed was an average of 1,651 pounds to each family.
CHAPTER XXXVI.

The Army of the Potomac.—Description of Petersburg.—Movement on Petersburg under Gillmore and Kautz.—The Eighteenth Corps at Bermuda Hundred.—The Outer Defenses of Petersburg taken.—Movement of Terry against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad.—Army of the Potomac before Petersburg.—Four Days of Unsuccessful Assaulting.—The Confederate Troops reoccupy their Lines in Front of Butler's Position.—Attack on Sheridan's Wagon Train at White House.—Movement against the Weldon Railroad.—Skirmish at Davis' Farm.—Fire directed against the Appomattox Bridges.—Deep Bottom occupied by Foster.—The Movement against the Weldon Railroad resumed.—The National Line broken through.—Disastrous Consequences.—Heavy Losses in Prisoners.—Advance of Wright towards the Weldon Railroad.—The Vermont Brigade driven back.—Attack on the Tenth Corps.—Sheridan's Cavalry attacked while on the March from White House.—Friendly intercourse between Pickets.—Petersburg Bombarded.—March of the Sixth Corps to the Relief of Wilson's Cavalry.—Raid of Wilson and Kautz against the Weldon and Danville Railroads.—The Weldon Railroad cut.—Railroad Destruction at Burkesville and on the Danville Road.—Battle at Staunton Bridge.—Fight at Stony Creek and Reams' Station.—Disastrous Rout of Wilson's Column.—Escape of Kautz's Command.—Long Route taken by Wilson.—The Weldon Railroad cut by the Sixth Corps.—A Demonstration frustrated.—Confederate Assault on a National Earth-work.—The Fourth of July in the Lines before Petersburg.—A sudden Attack repulsed.—A Dead Lock.—Effect of incessant hard Fighting.—Grant retains Butler in his Command.—Change in Corps Commanders.—Occupation of Strawberry Plains.—The Mine at Petersburg.—The Feint at Deep Bottom.—Demonstrations towards Richmond.—Lee hurries large numbers of Troops to the North Side of the James.—Explosion of the Mine.—Advance of the Storming Column.—Delay.—The Repulse.—Rout of Ferrero's Colored Division.—The Fort recaptured by the Confederates.—Delay in burying the Dead.—Causes of Failure.—Explosion of a Confederate Mine.—Deserters.—Terrific Explosion at City Point.—Perseverance of Grant.—Gradual Exhaustion of the Southern Fighting Element.—The Dutch Gap Canal.—Movements North of the James.—Fight at Strawberry Plains.—Demonstrations at Deep Bottom.—Battle of Deep Run.—Ludlow's Movement from Dutch Gap.—Operations against the Weldon Railroad.—Battles at Davis' Farm.—Battles for the Weldon Railroad.—Destruction of the Track.—Battle of Reams' Station.—Pickett attacks Butler's Position.—Heavy Bombardment of Petersburg.—Gregg's Reconnaissance towards Stony Creek.—A tacit Truce broken.—Redoubt captured by De Trobriand.—Extension of the City Point Railroad.—General Hampton's great Cattle Raid.—Movement from Deep Bottom towards Richmond.—Battle of Chapin's Farm.—Capture of Battery Harrison.—Capture of New Market Heights.—Repulse at Fort Gilmer.—Reconnaissance by Kautz and Terry towards Richmond.—Attack on Battery Harrison repulsed.—Movement towards the South Side Railroad.—Capture of Fort McRae.—Repulse of Potter's Division.—Kautz's Cavalry surprised and routed.—Repulse of the Enemy by Terry.—Reconnaissances.—Simultaneous Movements North of the James towards Hatcher's Run.—Battle of Hatcher's Run.—Gregg's Raid to Stony Creek Station.—Warren's Operations on the Weldon Railroad towards Hicksford.

Without the loss of a wagon or a single piece of artillery, the army of the Potomac had been transferred from the north bank of the Chickahominy to the south side of the James. The Confederates were aware that some such movement was intended; but they had not counted on its being executed with so much celerity. As the weared soldiers marched along the dusty roads, they met with little annoyance save from the heated atmosphere and the burning sun. The column which moved from Long Bridge to Wilcox's Wharf, it is true, had a sharp engagement with the enemy near White Oak Bridge, on the borders of the swamps; but Wilson's cavalry and Crawford's
advanced division of the Fifth corps, with a loss of not more than 200 men, drove them back. Making allowance for stragglers, and for a skirmishing line cut off at Cold Harbor, the entire loss attending the movement did not exceed 400 men. It had been Grant's first intention to fall upon Lee's army again and again from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, and by a succession of heavy blows to break it up, or so weaken it, that when it should at last fall back upon Richmond, that city would prove an easy conquest for his victorious legions. His scheme failed. The numerical strength of the enemy proved greater than had been supposed; and General Lee was careful in his retrograde movements never to fight except in impregnable positions.

Petersburg was now the immediate object of Grant's attention. In any attempt to approach Richmond from the south, the occupation of Petersburg must be an important preliminary step. The holding of that city would sever the enemy's communications southward, and afford many material advantages in the investment of Richmond. Grant had wished to gain possession of it in the outset; and in his grand plan of campaign he had arranged that it should be taken and held by the army of the James, which, however, had proved inadequate to the task. Situated on the right or south bank of the Appomattox, at a distance of 22 miles south of Richmond, and 10 miles southwest of the James at City Point, and having a population at the beginning of the war of over 18,000, Petersburg ranked as the third town in Virginia. It was the focus of convergence of five railroads: the Richmond road running north the Weldon road running south to the Carolinas; the South Side road running west to Lynchburg; the Norfolk road running southeast and the short road running northeast to City Point. The town was defended by a series of skillfully constructed earth-works, consisting not only of square redoubts, but also of well-established rifle-trenches, extending around it in a semicircle, both ends resting on the river, the northern extremity being strengthened by batteries on the opposite side of the stream.

General Butler, it will be remembered, had already made a demonstration against Petersburg. Having been frequently informed by deserters that the garrison was much weakened by the withdrawal of troops to reinforce Lee, he, early in the month of June, made preparations for sending a force in that direction. A pontoon bridge was constructed, to be thrown across the Appomattox, and gun-boats were sent up the river to reconnoitre. The expedition was placed under the charge of General Gillmore, who led the infantry column, about 3500 men, consisting of Hawley's brigade of the Tenth corps, and a brigade of colored troops under General Hinks. The cavalry 1400 strong, was commanded by Kautz. It was arranged that Gillmore, having crossed to the east bank of the Appomattox by the pontoon bridge, should proceed by the turnpike road towards the town, and attack it from that direction, while
Kautz, also crossing the river, should fetch a wide circuit and make his attack on the south or southwest side of the town; the movements of the two bodies of troops to be so timed that they should enter the place simultaneously at different points. It was hoped that the town might thus be captured, and that if not held, at least all its supplies and stores of ammunition might be destroyed. Butler was to make a demonstration in the mean time against Fort Clifton.

On the 8th of June, shortly after dusk, the pontoon bridge was laid down near Point of Rocks, and about midnight Kautz’s cavalry crossed by it, quickly followed by Hawley’s brigade, which was soon afterwards joined by the colored brigade of Hinks. Before eight o’clock in the morning, Follett’s battery was brought up in front of the woods near Point of Rocks, and began to shell the Confederate lines near Fort Clifton. The gun-boats Commodore Perry and General Putnam also opened fire on the same position. A brisk fire was kept up thus till noon. A battery which the enemy brought down, and which threw 30-pounder shells at General Weitzel’s signal station, was soon silenced. In the mean time Gillmore, having pressed on, making a detour so as to avoid the fire of Fort Clifton, and were rapidly approaching Petersburg. The infantry met with no serious opposition till within about two miles of the town, when the Confederate skirmish lines were encountered, but quickly driven back. Arrived in front of the town, and sufficiently near to be able to examine the fortifications critically, Gillmore came to the conclusion that they were too strong to be attempted by the force under his command. He, therefore, withdrew his troops about noon, and got back to camp the same evening. In the mean time Kautz on his side had forced the intrenchments and actually engaged the enemy in the streets. But the Confederates concentrated against him what force they had; and he was compelled to retire, although he carried off with him 40 prisoners. His loss was only about 20 killed and wounded.

At one o’clock on the morning of the 15th, the Eighteenth corps which had arrived at Bermuda Hundred on the previous evening, in transports, by way of Fortress Monroe, set out for Petersburg. Kautz’s cavalry in the advance crossed the Appomattox by the pontoon bridge near Point of Rocks Brooks’ and Martindale’s divisions followed together with Hinks’ two brigades of colored troops. The route taken was the same as that pursued a week previous by Gillmore and Kautz. Soon after daylight Kautz, advancing along the City Point road, encountered skirmishers, and drove them out of a small earth-work. The troops of Hinks and Brooks followed rapidly, and soon afterwards, near Harrison’s Creek, a line of rifle-trenches with two 12-pounders was discovered, from which solid shot flew over the head of the column. Hinks deployed skirmishers, scattered the enemy through some neighboring woods and finally secured a position near Baylor’s Farm, from which the Fifth
and Twenty-Fifth colored regiments carried the enemy's works, capturing one of the guns and turning it on the retreating Confederates. The division of Brooks now moved up, with Burnham's brigade in the advance and entered a strip of woods which concealed the main outer line of the defenses of Petersburg, about two miles from the town. Hinks then moved his division towards the left, on the Jourdan Point road, while Martindale, with Stannard in the advance, moved on by the river road. A line was thus formed in front of the Petersburg intrenchments, in which Martindale held the right, Brooks the centre, and Hinks the left. Active skirmishing went on while these positions were being taken, and the fire of the sharpshooters told severely on the troops. Just before sunset, the order was given to carry the enemy's works by assault; and the whole line rushed forward, swept the entire range of rifle-pits in spite of a heavy artillery fire, and drove the enemy from the intrenchments. Sixteen guns, a battle-flag, and 300 prisoners were taken. Had an adequate supporting force been at hand, the second line of works might have been taken with comparative ease. The National loss was about 500 men. The Second corps began to arrive in the evening, and before morning the whole of it had reached the scene of action. During the night Birney's division held the captured earth-works, against which the enemy knowing their value, made demonstrations, but in vain. While the infantry were thus operating towards Petersburg from the northeast, Kautz, on the extreme left, with Spear's brigade in the advance, moved against the enemy's works near the Norfolk Railroad and on the Baxter road. After a brisk cannonade on the position, which was well fortified with artillery, a charge was made by Kautz's men armed with carbines; but the work proved too strong to be carried, and Kautz was compelled to retire. So far Petersburg had been defended by its local garrison, but the Confederate troops in the neighborhood were rapidly concentrating to its aid.

On the morning of the 16th, General Butler having learned that a portion of the Confederate forces in June front of his intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred had been hurried off to Petersburg, sent out General Terry with a part of the Tenth corps to reconnoitre. The Confederates gave way before them; and the reserves coming up, their line was broken through, and finally the railroad was reached near Walthal Junction. While a working party tore up the track and pulled down the telegraph for about two miles, the main body of General Terry's force moved along the road by which it was supposed Lee's advance was approaching. But the Confederates at length came down upon them in force and compelled a retreat. The result of the movement was, that travel by the railroad was interrupted for about a day.

In the mean time the National troops were gathering around Petersburg. Early on the morning of the 16th, Birney sent Colonel Egan's brigade against a redoubt on his left, which was carried
and held, with the loss of about 100 men. An attempt was made to push forward the picket lines, when skirmishing and artillery firing ensued. But reinforcements for the Confederates were now rapidly arriving from various quarters, and in such numbers that it was thought advisable not to push the troops forward till the arrival of Burnside’s corps. Kautz, however, had moved out with his cavalry to the left across the Norfolk Railroad, to occupy ground for the Ninth and Fifth corps. In the afternoon Burnside, having crossed the James by the pontoon bridge, came up with the Ninth corps, after a severe forced march from Charles City Court House. Line of battle was then formed, with the Second corps in the centre, the Eighteenth corps on the right, and the Ninth corps on the left. Birney’s division held the right of the Second corps, General Barlow’s the left. To the left of Barlow was General Potter’s division of the Ninth corps. The ground between the opposing lines, though broken and rugged, was rather open, with here and there fields of grain. At six o’clock the attack was commenced and kept up for three hours. Birney’s division carried the crest in its front, and held it. Barlow’s advanced brigade found more difficulty, the enemy being somewhat concentrated in its front. At length Miles’ brigade of Barlow’s division and Griffin’s of Potter’s division, charging in face of a destructive artillery fire, succeeded in gaining a foothold in the rifle-pits outside of the stronger works. The troops being here annoyed by the enemy’s fire, Barlow determined to make an assault on his main works; and Burnside prepared a column to make the attempt in connection with him. But the enemy having opened a severe fire upon Burnside’s troops, cutting off a skirmish line of 300 men in Barlow’s front; the assault was deferred till morning. Birney’s loss during the three hours’ fighting was about 500 men. Potter’s division in its charge on the rifle-pits lost about the same number. The right had not taken an important part in the contest and had suffered but little. The total National loss since the beginning of the action was between 1500 and 2000, while that of the Confederates owing to their advantage of position, was comparatively small.

On the morning of the 17th, at four o’clock, Burnside ordered Potter’s June division to take the works in its front; and Griffin’s brigade, supported by Curtin’s, carried it with a rush, capturing 6 guns, 16 officers, 400 men, and a stand of colors. A pause then occurred in the assault; but sharp skirmishing was carried on by the picket lines, and the artillery on both sides kept up a steady fire. In the afternoon Potter’s division was relieved by the divisions of Wilcox and Ledlie. An advance by Ledlie’s division was then ordered; and the charge was gallantly made, covered by a brisk artillery fire. The intrenchments were reached; after a short but bloody contest over the breast-works, the Confederates were driven out of them and the position was carried; and although several attempts were made by the enemy to
 recover the lost ground, it was firmly held. Burnside, now so near was actually able to throw shot into the town. The other portions of the line had, during the day, been engaged in skirmishing, but without attempting any decisive assault. The enemy's position, opposite the Second corps—temporarily commanded by Birney, in the absence of Hancock, who was suffering from an old wound—was deemed too strong to be attacked with any hope of success. Barlow's division, on the left of the Second corps, had taken part in Burnside's charge in the morning, and rendered efficient service. On the right, the greater part of the Eighteenth corps, under General Smith, was relieved from the position it had carried; and recrossing the pontoon bridge over the Appomattox at night, it regained the intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred in the morning. The divisions of Hinks and Martindale, on the extreme right, remained, as they could not be withdrawn to advantage. The Fifth corps, under Warren, came up on the left, and was massed there in the rear of Burnside. About nine o'clock at night the enemy appeared in force on Birney's front, but was driven back. Somewhat later, under cover of a vigorous shelling from the Confederate batteries, the enemy suddenly reappeared in two columns, one in front, the other in flank, and made a desperate and finally successful effort to recover the works taken by Burnside during the afternoon. Leaping the defenses in the dark, the Confederates succeeded in driving out the National troops.

On the same day, early in the morning, a body of the enemy, consisting of parts of the divisions of Pickett and Fields, attacked the National lines near the James. Foster's division of the Tenth corps, which held a line extending from near Ware Bottom Church towards the Appomattox, was pushed back some little distance.

It was now the morning of the 18th. The National line in front of Petersburg was disposed as fol- lows, from right to left: two divisions of the Eighteenth corps, under Martindale and Hinks; the Sixth under Wright; the Second under Birney; the Ninth under Burnside, and the Fifth under Warren. It had been intended to make another assault at four o'clock in the morning; but skirmishers having been sent out, it was found that the enemy had abandoned the works immediately in front for an inner series of defenses New combinations, therefore, became necessary. Skirmishing and artillery firing went on while the enemy's new defensive line was being reconnoitred. A general advance of the three corps on the left was ordered at noon. Gibbon's division of the Second corps was pushed forward, while the rest of the corps threw out double lines of skirmishers to divert the enemy's attention. Gibbon's troops moved promptly up towards the works, which were near the railroad to City Point; but when they got out from under cover they were suddenly struck by a murderous enfilading fire on the left. For a time the men pressed vigorously forward; but their ranks were so swept by incessant
volleys, that at last even the veterans recoiled. The breast-works were not even reached when the men began to retire, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. At four o'clock in the afternoon another storming party was organized. It consisted of Mott’s division, with detachments from the two other divisions, all of the Second corps. Shortly before five in the afternoon, Mott moved out his force in two columns, and the two leading brigades burst upon the enemy in gallant style; but in spite of an exhibition of the most resolute bravery, they were forced back with terrible loss, by a concentrated artillery and musketry fire. The Sixth and Ninth corps were little more successful than the Second; Martindale’s division of the Eighteenth corps, although at first attended with some success, shared the same experience as the others. The fighting was continued into the night, but gradually died away in picket firing. The losses during the day had been very heavy, especially on the part of the Second corps. During the whole operations from the 15th to the 18th of June, the estimated loss in killed, wounded and missing was not under 9000 men. The four days’ assaults had had no other result than the decimation of the storming columns.

During the 19th, arrangements were made under a flag of truce for burying the dead, and carrying off the wounded between the lines. The Sixth corps, which had been on the north side of the Appomattox, near Port Walthal, was relieved by the Eighteenth corps, and moved into line on the right.

General Ferrero’s division of the Ninth corps, also arrived, and was posted in the front. Three Confederate rams descended the James, nearly as far as Dutch Gap, but were soon driven back by the fleet. The Confederates continued to intrench on the west side of the Appomattox as industriously as the National troops did on the east side; and having no apprehensions of immediately losing Petersburg, they made some movements in other directions. Beauregard in his hurry to reinforce Petersburg had hastily deserted his old lines in front of Bermuda Hundred and the Tenth corps, as has been stated, made use of the opportunity to cut the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad; but when they were driven back, the Confederates reoccupied their works, and from these lines made a slight demonstration in front and some raiding movements in the neighborhood of the James. On the night of the 19th, they succeeded in destroying the wharves at Wilcox’s and Westover Landings, and sent small bodies of troops along the river to do whatever other mischief they could. They also threw up earth-works near Turkey Bend; but they were easily shelled out of them by the gun-boats.

On the 21st, active movements were again commenced by the main army, and once more by the left flank, with the object of severing the communications to the south of Petersburg by the Weldon Railroad. On the previous night the Second corps had been moved from its position in the right centre of the line to the left, the gap thus formed being closed up by the
extension of the Ninth corps and part of the Eighteenth. It then struck across the Norfolk Railroad, and marched rapidly southward, though under an intensely hot sun and through clouds of stifling and blinding dust, with the steadiness which had so often characterized it during flank marches in presence of the enemy. Griffin’s division of the Fifth corps was detached to follow; the Sixth corps was also moved out in support. Before noon the main column halted; but in the afternoon Barlow’s division of the Second corps, with sharpshooters skirmishing in advance, was sent forward, and struck the enemy’s lines in the neighborhood of the Jerusalem road which runs southward from Petersburg, about midway between the Norfolk and Weldon railroads. The division was then halted and put into position, and skirmishers were advanced. These met a stout resistance from dismounted cavalry pickets; and almost immediately, infantry were discovered in force with artillery planted in earth-works. It was evident that the enemy understood the value of the Weldon Railroad, and was prepared as well as determined to defend it. After a severe skirmish Barlow’s advanced line withdrew and rejoined the main column. Gibbon had in the mean time reconnoitred towards Petersburg, but without result. On the extreme left the enemy’s movements were so threatening that a squadron of cavalry was sent round to protect that flank. The Second corps was then retired to form in position for the night, with Barlow’s division on the left, Mott’s in the centre, and Gibbon’s on the right.

Beyond Gibbon’s division was Griffin’s of the Fifth corps. The Sixth corps was intended to be posted between the Second corps and the Weldon Railroad. Ricketts’ division came up and took a position on Barlow’s left, and the other division followed. There was a little cavalry skirmishing on the extreme left, and the Confederate scouts made a slight dash in the evening towards the National position; but the day closed without any more important movement. The fight in the afternoon took place on what was known as Davis’ Farm, about 3 miles from the city and within a mile of the railroad.

The day was comparatively quiet in the lines east of Petersburg. The Confederates early in the morning opened fire towards the headquarters of the Sixth corps, which had not at that time moved out; and there was more or less firing during the day, especially towards the right. The bridges over the Appomattox connecting Petersburg and Pocahontas now underwent a daily shelling from the National batteries. The fire directed on the railroad bridge caused great annoyance to the enemy, as it tended materially to obstruct the passage of cars.

Some important movements took place during the day, to the north of Petersburg. Early in the morning Foster’s division of the Tenth corps, crossed to the north side of the James River by a pontoon bridge laid by General Weitzel on the previous evening, to a point between Aiken’s Landing and Four Mile Creek. Foster advanced towards the Kingsland road, drove in the enemy’s
pickets and intrenched at Deep Bottom, about 10 miles from Richmond. On the opposite side of the river was the battery of the enemy known as Howlett's. Near this point a fight between the monitors and Confederate rams took place; but though the latter were aided by the battery, they were driven back to their usual position on the west side of Dutch Gap. The heavy Dahlgren guns soon silenced the battery; and in the evening they were opened on the enemy manoeuvring in front of Foster. Foster was thus enabled to hold his own for some time without molestation. Meanwhile the Eighteenth corps again left its camp near Bermuda Hundred, once more crossed the pontoon bridge, marched to the lines in front of Petersburg, and took the position vacated by the Sixth corps. The result of the various army movements on the 21st was, that at night the different commands lay as follows: Foster's division was north of the James at Deep Bottom; the remainder of the Tenth corps being with Butler at Bermuda Hundred. In the intrenchments east of Petersburg, the right was held by Smith, the centre by Burnside, the left by Warren. Three or four miles to the south, threatening the Weldon Railroad, were the corps of Hancock and Wright, with Griffin's division of Warren.

The movement against the Weldon Railroad was resumed early on the 22d. Now that the capture of Petersburg had come to be considered out of the question for the present, the severance of the Weldon Railroad became a primary object. The Sixth corps, the whole of which had come up during the night, prepared to move, in conjunction with the Second corps, directly against the railroad. The position of the Second corps was near the Jerusalem road, Gibbon's right resting on the left of the road, with Griffin's division on the Fifth on the further side. Gibbon's troops were already well up to the enemy's works and needed only to go into position and intrench, as any further advance on their part might bring on a general engagement before the line was properly established. The left of the line, therefore, consisting of the Sixth corps with the divisions of Barlow and Mott of the Second was ordered to advance, the movement to commence at daybreak. By some misunderstanding the march was delayed. At last the two corps began to move, at the same time, though independently of each other, each commander having been cautioned to protect his flank well in case connection were not made with the other corps. The line had been deployed in rather an open style, and covered a wide extent of ground, which being difficult and intricate, and the movement made in presence of the enemy, it was thought desirable to mass more closely. Accordingly Barlow, who held Hancock's left, pressed well in to the right and threw two brigades into reserve, the remainder of his troops forming the advance line. But on entering the woods a gap began to form between his left and the right of the Sixth corps, and he placed some regiments to guard his flank. Meanwhile, Mott had, without difficulty, obtained
the position indicated for him and had begun to intrench; Gibbon was already in position; and Barlow having moved forward sufficiently was also about to intrench, when the startling sound of musketry was heard on his flank, and soon afterwards in his rear. With a view of checking the movement against the railroad, the Confederate force under Hill was approaching in several columns, preceded by a dense cloud of skirmishers. The Sixth corps was far distant on the left and rear. A wide gap was thus left in the National line; but it was happily filled up in time to prevent fatal results. Quick to take advantage of the mistake committed, Hill pushed on an entire division, with Mahone's brigade in the advance, into the intervening space. The attack was made with tremendous energy. Barlow was the first to feel the weight of the onset. His division bending under the blow was quickly rolled up, thus exposing Mott's left flank. Mott in turn was struck heavily and fell back, leaving exposed the left of Gibbon. Gibbon shared the fate of Mott and Barlow. The intrenchments of each of the three divisions were captured. Such was the suddenness and impetuosity of the attack, and so great was the confusion resulting from it, that several whole regiments were swept off and captured almost without a fight. McKnight's battery, which had been ably handled, was surrounded and captured entire. The career of the enemy, however, was now checked by the firmness of the Twentieth Massachusetts under Captain Patten, who executed a change of front with remarkable coolness, courage and skill. The broken corps was at length rallied. Miles' reserve brigade of Barlow's division was brought up; Clark's New Jersey battery on the right of the Jerusalem road withstood successfully the concentrated fire of the enemy; Gibbon's division, or rather what was left of it, was also rallied, and the beginning of a new line was soon formed.

It was now towards evening. After an unsuccessful effort made by Gibbon to capture the lost battery, Meade came to the front. Observing that the enemy's troops were not in sufficient number to cope with his own if well handled, Meade again sent forward the Second and Sixth corps. The Sixth met with little opposition, and attained the position aimed at earlier in the day. The Second corps went through the woods in strong skirmishing lines, and succeeded, though not without some effort, in regaining a part of the ground from which it had been driven. It then went into intrenchments, and passed the night in throwing up works and placing batteries for the protection of the line. The division of Griffin also came up and covered the right. The loss sustained in this unfortunate and unskillfully managed affair was principally in prisoners, some 2000 having been taken by the enemy, including 50 or 60 officers; the number of killed and wounded was only about 500. Four guns also were lost and several colors. Picket firing was kept up all night, as the last advance had placed the opposing lines in close proximity. A reconnaissance and advance
made at daylight, disclosed the fact that the Confederates were strongly intrenched along the east side of the Weldon Railroad. To the east of Petersburg a sharp artillery and musketry fire was kept up all night; but on either side was an advance attempted.

On the 23d, Wright moving out to the extreme left, found that the enemy's lines did not extend far in that direction.

June He sent a reconnoitering force to the railroad, which was reached without opposition, and the telegraph wires were cut. The Vermont brigade, consisting of three regiments, was at once pushed forward with instructions to hold the road; but the troops had hardly reached their destination when a division of the enemy under Anderson came down upon their flank and drove them back, capturing several hundred prisoners, and then, flushed with success, after pushing back the Vermont brigade to the main body, commenced a general attack. The result was that Wright withdrew his line towards evening to the cover of breast-work. Little else of importance occurred during the day.

On the 24th the enemy opened a furious artillery fire in front of the Eighteenth corps. At its close, a charge was made by Hoke's brigade on Stannard's division of the Tenth corps. The attack fell chiefly on the brigade of Colonel Henry, who, observing that the attacking force was not large, drew in his skirmishers; and when the enemy commenced to run over his rifle-pits, he caused the Forty-third Massachusetts, armed with the Spencer repeating-rifle, to open fire upon them. This, with artillery in flank, easily separated the enemy's skirmishing line from his reserve; and about 150 prisoners fell into Henry's hands. On the evening of the same day, Sheridan's cavalry was attacked while on the march from White House to rejoin the main army. A brigade of infantry was sent to his relief; but the affair was very bloody, and the rear-guard suffered severely. The enemy was beaten off at length; and the wagon train, several miles in length, was saved, but not before a loss of 500 or 600 had been sustained. Sheridan's force crossed the James in safety on the 25th, four or five miles above Fort Powhatan, at a point where the pontoon bridges could be guarded by gun-boats.

During the 25th the enemy was busily engaged in repairing the Weldon Railroad, and the National forces in strengthening their positions. All along the line, owing to the proximity of the opposing pickets, there was skirmishing with occasional artillery firing, but no serious fighting. About ten o'clock at night a sharp attack was made on the right of the Fifth corps and on the left of the Ninth. It was commenced by a heavy artillery fire, which lasted about an hour, followed by the advance of a strong skirmish line up to the National breast-works; but the enemy was easily repulsed, and the loss was not great on either side.

From the 26th to the 29th, comparative quiet prevailed in the camps, broken occasionally by picket firing, skirmishing near the working parties, and desultory cannonading. From the front of Smith's
The 30-pounder Parrott shell was thrown into the city every five minutes, and with such regularity that it came to be called the "Petersburg express." The earth-works along the National lines underwent constant improvement until they became almost impregnable. About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the Confederates, much annoyed by the regular fire of the 30-pounder Parrott on the city, opened from their heavy guns on the west side of the Appomattox. The batteries in Smith's front, where many guns were now in position, opened in reply, and shelled the city, as well as the enemy's batteries beyond the river, till noon. The opposing pickets along some parts of the line entered into an agreement not to fire upon each other, and the result was an unusual degree of quiet for a little while; but Birney found it necessary to prohibit the more intimate intercourse which this state of things had a tendency to bring about. By the Second corps on the left, some movements were made with the view of guarding against hostile demonstrations on the flank. Hancock, now convalescent, resumed command of this corps in the evening. At one o'clock in the morning of the 28th there was a false alarm; and the Eighteenth corps got under arms. About this time some very heavy siege guns were got into position, and a bombardment of the city was commenced by bursting a shell over it every quarter of an hour during the night. This fire was continued for some time; and on the night of the 30th it caused a conflagration in the town. The weather, which for many days and nights had been intensely hot, causing great suffering to the men, whether on the march or in camp, now grew a little cooler. The excessive heat had been severely trying to the wounded. The agents of the Sanitary and Christian Commissions availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by these days of comparative quiet to distribute vegetables and luxuries among the troops, and in other ways to contribute to their comfort.

In the movement against the Weldon Railroad, it had been arranged that Wilson and Kautz should co-operate with a strong cavalry force. About two o'clock in the morning of the 22d of June, Wilson and Kautz set out from Blackwater Creek, a little south of Prince George Court House. Wilson was in command. The united force numbered 6000 to 8000 men, with 3 batteries of four guns each, half rifled ordinance, and half light 12-pounders, besides a battery of four small mountain howitzers. The column struck the Weldon Railroad at Reams' Station, tore up and burnt the track for several hundred yards, and destroyed the water tank, depot and public buildings, as well as a saw-mill at Dutch Cross Roads. Moving westward as far as Dinwiddie Court House, the command proceeded northward to the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, striking it at Sutherland Station, and marching thence westward to Ford's Station, about 22 miles from Petersburg, the brigade of Kautz being in the advance. At this point, which was reached before evening, several miles of the track were destroyed as well as 2 locomotives and
prisoners. The loss on each side was about 60. Wilson's troops bivouacked at Nottaway; Kautz bivouacked not far from Burkesville. Both commands marched towards Meherrin in the morning—Wilson's across the country. Kautz's along the railroad—formed a junction there, and moved on to Keysville, where the column bivouacked for the night, Kautz's men having worked hard all day on the railroad, of which they destroyed 18 miles of the track besides other railroad property. The march and the work of destruction were resumed early on the 25th; and the whole column pressed rapidly forward till about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the advance came up to the covered bridge over the Staunton River. From Burkesville to this bridge, a distance of about 35 miles, the railroad track had been thoroughly destroyed. Eastward of Burkesville the track had also been torn up, making an aggregate of 50 miles of railroad put out of running order. It was very desirable that the bridge also should be destroyed, as it would consume much time to replace it. But the Confederates were well aware of its value; and while Wilson and Kautz had been destroying the track, they had collected in the neighborhood of the bridge a considerable force of Virginia and North Carolina militia, some of whom had been brought up from Danville. They had also made such good use of their time as to throw up intrenchments in front of the bridge, and construct earth-works, in which they had placed some artillery. They had besides, placed a
piece of ordnance on an armored car, which could be moved on the railroad.

On the approach of the National troops June 25, the enemy opened fire with grape and canister. Kautz's four regiments at once deployed on the right and left of the main road. Sharp skirmishing, with considerable loss on the side of Kautz, was kept up for some time; but it soon became evident that under the circumstances the National troops could accomplish nothing without suffering disastrously; and they were compelled to withdraw, after having burnt the railroad depot. The chief object of the raid had, however, been now accomplished; and at night the column moved eastward reaching Weylsburg, about daylight on the 26th. After an hour's halt the line of march was again taken up, the route chosen for the return lying through Christianville and across Meherrin Creek, and thence to Double Bridges on the Nottaway. The enemy's cavalry brigade again appeared, this time on the left flank, and some unimportant skirmishing followed. The Nottaway River was reached about noon on the 28th at Double Bridges; and the pickets stationed there were easily driven across the bridge by McIntosh's second brigade, which was in the advance. It had been intended to cross the Weldon Railroad at Jarrett's Station; but information having been received that a large force composed of militia and regulars from Weldon had been collected there, the route was changed to Stony Creek, about midway between Jarrett's and Reams' stations. McIntosh's brigade with the Second Ohio and Third Indiana, dashing across the bridge, met at once a spirited resistance. Nevertheless the men all got over, and McIntosh formed line of battle; but a considerable Confederate force was found lying on the road to the station. After some skirmishing, the National troops found it necessary to act on the defensive; and they got together as rapidly as possible a breast-work of rails, logs, and earth, in the usual manner. It was not long before they had to repel several charges.

Wilson, now fearing that if he remained long in that vicinity the enemy might gather about him a force from which he could not escape, determined to withdraw; and about eleven at night he sent off the command of Kautz with the wagons and ammunition trains, and between 1000 and 2000 negroes, collected on the march, towards Reams' Station. Wilson himself followed before daylight with the remainder of his force, with the exception of 3 regiments left in the intrenchments to do what they could towards detaining the enemy. Kautz, on approaching Reams' Station, found the Confederates posted in great strength, and was at once pressed in front and rear by both cavalry and artillery. When June Wilson came up with the bulk of his force, he attempted to form line of battle; but he was very soon attacked and defeated, and his entire force thrown into confusion. Of course the detachment left at Stony Point could not long hold out; it was flanked and partly cut off. The situation of Wilson's column
now became extremely critical; it was almost entirely surrounded by a greatly superior force; and it soon became a question, not whether the National cavalry could hold their ground, but whether they could not be captured in a body. The plan finally adopted, perhaps the best under the circumstances, was for each regiment or squadron to make its escape separately as it best could. Kautz turned off nearly due south with his command. Detachments moved in various directions; and a general stampede was made for the lines near Petersburg, over ditches and fences, through swamps and woods, and along concealed by-paths, to escape the fiercely pursuing foe, who chased the fugitives close up to the National lines. On the night of the 28th, the main part of Kautz's command reached the picket reserve in a state of terrible exhaustion and excitement, and remained there through the night. They did not reach their old camp till the evening of the 30th. Squads and solitary horsemen continued to struggle back within the lines for two or three days. Badly as Kautz's troops had fared, they might have had much worse fortune had it not been for their commander's intimate knowledge of the country, which enabled him to get his men through rapidly. But they were all thoroughly used up, some of the men coming in asleep in their saddles.

Wilson was so long without being heard from, that it was feared he had been captured with all his men. The main part of his force did not ride in till the 1st of July. He had retreated in the night by the road leading south eastward towards Suffolk, and making a wide circuit, secured safety at the expense of a long route. He crossed the Nottaway about 30 miles from Petersburg, and the Blackwater at the County Road bridge; turning then northward he made his way to Cabin Point, and rode thence into the Union lines about 5 miles from Fort Powhatan. His entire force was in wretched plight when it returned. Both men and horses were worn out and jaded to the last degree. Their clothing and accoutrements were torn and spoiled, and their horses hardly able to walk. They had lost their all. The enemy had got possession of the entire wagon train—16 guns, nearly all their caissons, and many horses. The total loss in men was about 1500. Of the large number of negroes collected, the greater part were recaptured. The ambulances, filled with sick and wounded, had been left on the field at Reams' Station, under a hospital flag. Notwithstanding the unfortunate termination of the expedition, Grant expressed himself satisfied with the result, inasmuch as the Danville Railroad had received so much damage that considerable time must elapse before it could be restored to working order. The Sixth corps, which had set out for Reams' Station in the hope of relieving General Wilson's force, did not arrive until all was over. The Confederates had disappeared from that point; and the troops took advantage of their absence to destroy the railroad and telegraph for some miles. Many fugitive negroes, who had followed
Wilson's cavalry, took refuge with the Sixth corps.

It was now the 1st of July. Little of moment occurred during the day in the lines before Petersburg. About ten o'clock, however, a heavy musketry fire from the Confederates broke out in front of the Ninth corps, followed presently by a charge upon an earth-work which General Ledlie had for some days been engaged in throwing up. After a sharp but short conflict the Confederates were driven back with considerable loss, as the position was well defended by flanking batteries. The firing continued at intervals through the night. About three o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d of July a sharp artillery fire was opened by the enemy on the line of the Eighteenth corps, and was warmly responded to by the National batteries. This continued for about two hours, without any important result. On the evening of the 3d there was some firing on the right centre.

The Fourth of July was celebrated in the lines before Petersburg by a national salute of 34 shots from a 30-pounder Parrott in front of Smith's position, followed by a general play of artillery on the steeples of Petersburg. The military bands also played national airs all along the line.

Comparative quiet reigned until the 7th, when a battery of heavy guns in front of the Fifth corps opened fire upon a body of Confederates who were observed to be throwing up a new work. A general cannonading and a fire of sharpshooters followed. In the morning and early part of the 8th there was little firing. About four o'clock in the afternoon however, the Confederates springing suddenly to their feet, with their accustomed battle-yell, poured a volley of musketry into the intrenchments in front of Turner's division, on the left of the Eighteenth corps. They then quickly deployed a skirmishing line, and moved rapidly on the works along the front of Martindale and Stannard. The entire space between the opposing lines was soon covered with a dense cloud of mingled smoke and dust; and the musketry firing was very sharp for a time; but the enemy was driven back without having reached the breast-works. In the mean time the batteries all along the front of the three corps on the right were opened; and shot and shell were thrown not only into the space which the Confederates had attempted to cross, but into the city and over the Appomattox. The superior weight of metal of the National batteries soon overpowered those of the enemy. The loss in this affair was not very great on either side, although the Confederates got the worst of it, as they were uncovered in their unsuccessful charge, while their opponents were well protected. The cannonading was all over at dusk.

After this, there was again for some days a pause in the fight. It was not until the 18th, that hostilities took again any very active shape. On that day, a 13-inch mortar, which after some difficulty had been got into position in front of the Eighteenth corps, began to throw its huge shells into the
enemy's works. On the following day there was steady artillery firing in front of the Ninth and Eighteenth corps as well as from the batteries of the Fifth. A heavy rain, the first of any account since the army left Spottsylvania Court House, began to fall early in the morning, and continued all day and into the night. Its cheering influence on the army was of great value. There was enough of it to lay and thoroughly penetrate the dust, which owing to the long-continued drought and the ceaseless tread of many feet, had become several inches deep in the camps.

On the same day General Grant rescinded an order of the War Department by which General Butler was relieved of his command. Grant not only restored Butler, but in addition to the Tenth and Eighteenth corps, he gave him command of the Nineteenth corps, just arrived at Fortress Monroe from the South, and of which General Emory's division had gone to aid in the defense of Washington. Not long after this, General Smith was relieved of the command of the Eighteenth corps, and was succeeded temporarily by General Martindale, and then permanently by General Ord. General Gillmore also, who had been relieved of the command of the Tenth corps, was succeeded temporarily by Generals Brooks and Terry, and permanently by General Birney, formerly of the Second corps.

About ten o'clock in the forenoon of the 20th the fire of the 13-inch mortar was directed across the river. This was responded to by a concentrated artillery fire from the enemy, which in its turn was replied to by the National 30-pounders and 8-inch mortars, together with the light batteries. This lasted four hours without any important result. The Confederates had established a battery of Whitworth guns at Strawberry Plains, about a mile from the pontoon bridge over the James, from which they were able to deliver an enfilading fire on the gun-boats, and had disabled the Mendota. A Maine regiment was moved out to occupy the position, which it succeeded in doing on the 21st, but was driven out of it again at night. With the help of the gun-boats, the Nationals quickly recovered the position. Cannonading was kept up for the next four or five days, but there was no general engagement.

At this date there was completed an important work which had been July commenced by Burnside just a 26th month before, and when the conviction had been forced upon the National commanders by the disastrous repulse of several storming columns, that the defenses around Petersburg were impregnable against direct assault. This was nothing less than a great mine which had been constructed under one of the most important of the enemy's works. The idea of this mine originated with Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of the Forty-Eighth Pennsylvania, who, as well as many men of his regiment, had been familiar with mining operations before the war. To the men of this regiment the construction of the mine was intrusted and by them completed. The work of excavation was begun on the 25th of June, with the utmost
precautions as to secrecy, in the side of a ravine surmounted by an earthwork in front of the position of the Ninth corps, and was perseveringly pushed on towards the doomed fort, situated about 2000 yards from the city.

The distance to be mined was about 00 feet. The mine was constructed in the usual manner, the surface having been first carefully measured by triangulation. As the excavation went on, the earth was brought out and thrown on works, so as not to give rise to inquiries by being allowed to accumulate in great heaps. The gallery was made in the usual shape, about 4 feet wide at the bottom and sloping upwards so as to be narrower at the top. The height was about 4½ feet. The ground tunnel was so cut as to slope in an upward direction. Difficulties in the shape of water and quicksands were encountered and overcome, though the mine remained very damp. When the locality of the fort was reached, there was only about 20 feet of the earth intervening; and the sound could be distinctly heard overhead of the nailing of planks and timbers, indicating that the occupants of the fort were making a floor for their artillery. Wings were then extended to the right and left, in which 8 magazines were formed, 4 in each gallery, carefully 'tamped' or separated by packings of sand-bags and wood. Wooden pipes were laid along the tunnel to within 100 feet of the magazines. The ventilation of the mine was effected by sinking, just within the exterior line of works to the side of the tunnel. a shaft, at the bottom of which a fireplace was built with a grating opening into the gallery, and by means of a fire kept burning at this point a current of air was caused. The smoke issuing from the top of the shaft of course could not be concealed, but attention was diverted from it by keeping fires at various places along the line. Finally, when all was complete, the chambers were charged with about four tons of gunpowder. To keep the enemy from obtaining a knowledge of what was going on, intercourse between the opposing picket lines was strictly prohibited; and an incessant skirmishing and artillery fire was kept up in front of the Ninth corps, even while all along the rest of the line there was comparative inaction. The plan of assault was to explode the mine and immediately afterwards open a cannonade from all the guns along the line, numbering nearly 100. Then, before the enemy could recover from the confusion and dismay which would be naturally created by the explosion and sudden burst of a tremendous artillery fire, a strong storming party was to rush through the gap which it was supposed would be made in the line of the enemy's works, and endeavor to carry the position beyond—a very strongly fortified crest, called Cemetery Hill, completely commanding the city, and the key of the enemy's position. The National lines had for a long time been gradually pushed forward till they were now not more than 150 yards distant from those of the enemy, the nearest point being the undermined fort. The intervening space was swept by the enemy's
artillery; and near the fort itself abatis and various other entanglements had been placed.

To add to the probability of success, Grant determined, before exploding the mine and commencing the assault, to induce Lee to draw off a large proportion of his troops from Petersburg by making a feint in another direction. With this end in view he began a series of movements which indicated a design to transfer operations to the neighborhood of Richmond. Grant’s line at this time was not less than 20 miles long. On its extreme right, across the James at Deep Bottom, just above Four Mile Creek, Foster, with his division of the Tenth corps, had been for a long time in possession of an intrenched camp—a position of considerable importance, since, so long as it was held, the enemy could neither make a demonstration on the National right flank from Malvern Hills, which they still occupied, nor any successful attempt to obtain on the James a position from which it would be possible to blockade the river. It also constituted an excellent base for an advance on Richmond from the southeast, by three parallel roads, and thus served admirably for the feint now about to be made in that direction. A pontoon bridge, thoroughly protected by gun-boats, lay across the James in the rear of Foster’s position; but in his front was a large force of the enemy, effectually barring any advance on his part. About a mile and a half below the position of Foster, at Strawberry Plains, also held by a small National force, a second pontoon bridge was thrown across the river on the 21st of July, and on the following day a brigade of the Nineteenth corps crossed by it and secured the bridge head. The Confederates made a large addition to their force in front of Foster’s position; and on the 26th there was in that direction rapid and heavy artillery and musketry firing, in which the gun-boats took part. Skirmishing also was continued through the day by Foster’s infantry, with a loss of about 50 men. In the the mean time, at four o’clock in the afternoon of the 26th, the Second corps quietly began to march from its position on the extreme left of the line before Petersburg, soon followed by Sheridan’s cavalry, which had been lying in camps around its flank and rear. The column moved very rapidly without straggling—Barlow’s division first, Mott’s and Gibbon’s next, to Point o’Rocks on the Appomattox—and crossed the river early in the evening. The march was then continued to the James, which was reached by midnight at Jones’ Neck, and before daylight the crossing began by the pontoon bridge, which had been covered with grass and hay, to prevent noise. The cavalry followed soon after daybreak, and passed the infantry on the New Market road. A line of battle was then formed, in which the cavalry of Sheridan and Kautz held the right. The Second corps lay at Strawberry Plains, the brigade of the Nineteenth corps on its left, with Foster in his old position at Deep Bottom on the extreme left.

In front of the Second corps lay a body of the enemy under General
Kershaw, along a road skirting a pine forest, and in rifle-pits, with a battery of four 20-pounder Parrott guns. Up to this position from near the bridge ran a road, by which the Second corps, about July 27, seven o'clock, began to advance, the skirmishers spreading out across the open space in front of the enemy, while the gun-boat Mendota in the stream opened fire with her 100-pounder Parrotts. A rapid fire was opened at the same time from the enemy's battery. In the mean time, however, Miles with his brigade of Barlow's division, having made a rapid movement under cover, got on the flank of the enemy's position and made a brisk charge. Kershaw immediately retreated, abandoning his battery, which proved to be one taken from Butler at Drury's Bluff two months before.

On the 28th, the troops north of the James continued to make demonstrations; and the gun-boats occasionally shelled the woods. At nine o'clock in the morning a general advance of the cavalry was ordered; and after a march of three miles, Sheridan came upon a strong infantry force. His command then quickly dismounted and formed in a belt of woods, Greggs' division on the right, Torbert's on the left. Torbert's division on being attacked fell back into the woods, but was soon rallied; and the brigades of Merritt and Davies making a charge, the enemy broke and left the field, after losing about 150 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides the colors of two North Carolina regiments. Gregg's division, losing a gun and many men, was steadily forced back until about five o'clock in the afternoon, when it was relieved by the arrival of Gibbon's division of the Second corps. The demonstrations were continued on the 29th; and a train of about 400 empty wagons was sent over one of the pontoon bridges to the north side of the James, as if an advance in great force towards Malvern Hills were intended. Nearly 20,000 men and 20 cannon had now actually been sent over; and the suspicions of the enemy were aroused at last to such an extent as to produce the effect desired by Grant. Lee hurried off from Petersburg a large force to the Richmond side of the James; and as early as the evening of the 28th, Mott's division of the Second corps was secretly moved back to Petersburg. After dark the remainder of that corps and all the cavalry recrossed the river, and marching all night arrived before daybreak in the lines before Petersburg.

The time for the explosion of the mine had now come. Soon after midnight of the 29th all the troops were got into position. The Ninth corps, which was to head the assault, was drawn up in front of the mine, Ledlie's division in the advance, Wilcox's and Potter's next, in support, and Ferrero's consisting of colored troops, in the rear. The Eighteenth corps had been withdrawn from its position on the right of the Ninth corps and posted in its rear. Mott's division of the Second corps, just returned from the north side of the James, was moved into the position vacated by the Eighteenth corps; and the other divisions of the Second corps
as they arrived were placed in adjoining positions. The whole force was closely massed, only the necessary garrisons being left in the more distant intrenchments. Thus the assaulting force consisted of the Ninth corps supported by the Eighteenth, with the Second corps in reserve on the right and the Fifth on the left. The cavalry were to operate on the left if opportunity should offer. The time for lighting the fuse was fixed at half-past three in the morning of the 30th; and the troops at that hour were in entire readiness, impatiently awaiting orders.

At the appointed moment the fuse was lit; but the mine did not explode. The fuse was imperfect. It had been spliced in two places; and at one of the splices, the fire had stopped. Two brave men who had faith in the mine, and who had toiled at it night and day under Pleasants, volunteered to go in and apply the match afresh. Grant and Meade were at the front. It is now ten minutes to five o'clock. The earth in the neighborhood trembles; and then with a tremendous explosion, what seems a conical mountain rises in the air, streaked and serried with lightning. For a moment, it hangs poised; and then the beholder sees in mid air, timber, stone, earth, bodies and limbs of men, and some of the heavy guns of the work. Two hundred men, many of them still asleep, had been blown into fragments. It was a horrible, shocking affair. So soon as the mass fell to earth, 100 guns opened fire upon that living Golgotha.

Let us now see what advantage was gained by the desperate but not wholly unjustifiable experiment. Success depended entirely upon rapidity of action. A huge gateway had been opened to Cemetery Ridge, and thence into Petersburg. But where is the storming column? Ledlie's division which had been selected by lot was slow to move. When it did move, it halted in the centre for at least an hour. Ferrero who with his colored troops was to follow Ledlie, could not advance, as the crater was choked. Burnside was ordered to move forward all his troops; but still there was delay. Ord, now in command of the Eighteenth corps, was peremptorily ordered by Meade to press into the gap; but he declared it to be impracticable; and no doubt, he spoke the truth. There was no other way by which the troop could advance, except by the crater, and that was now crowded, literally blocked.

The scene inside the crater when first entered by the Nationals, is not to be described. It was a Pandemonium of horror. In the huge chasm, some 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet deep, were scattered the débris of the work, with the torn and tattered fragments of human beings. Some of the more fortunate victims were half-buried and piteously calling for help. Not a few were calling for water; and the cry was general "Yanks, for God's sake, take me out; I'll do as much for you some time." In such a scene of chao and agony, it is not to be wondered at if the National soldiers, left for the most part without competent leaders, should have halted, and yielded to the claims of humanity. The halting
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however, was ruinous; for it gave the Confederates time to recover from the alarm and stupor occasioned by the explosion; and the well directed fire of the guns on Cemetery Ridge falling upon the now unfortunate Nationals aggravated the horrors of that scene of agony and death. It was impossible to advance; it was impossible to retire; and the officers who were present had no longer any control. The carnage was frightful. It was not a valley of the Shadow of Death. It was a valley of Death itself.

As early as nine o'clock, Burnside was directed to withdraw his troops at pleasure. It was two o'clock before the order was carried out and not until General Bartlett who led the attack, had been captured with the greater portion of his staff. The mine had proved a great and sorrowful failure. Although no new thing in war, it was barbarous conception; and success through such a channel would hardly have been glory.

The National loss was about 5000, while that of the Confederates, including 200 prisoners, did not much exceed 1000. On Sunday, the 31st, a flag of truce was sent to the enemy with a request for permission to bury the dead and care for the wounded; but owing to an informality this was not obtained till Monday, when an armistice took place in the morning from five till nine. In the mean time many of the severely wounded died from exposure, in great suffering, much aggravated by the extremely hot weather; and the bodies of the slain had become so discolored and swollen from lying in the sun, that the remains of the white men could scarcely be distinguished from those of the negroes.

The failure of the mine was a great disappointment. It was expected by many that Petersburg was about to fall. Grant, himself, shared the disappointment; but he was not discouraged. As soon as the truce was concluded, the firing was resumed. On the 4th of August, Grant left for Washington. On this day also a short engagement took place on the James between the gun-boats and a battery on the north bank. For five days previous, intercourse between pickets had been prohibited by the enemy. This circumstance, and the report of deserters that mining was going on, led to suspicions that an attack might be expected. These suspicions proved to be well-founded. About five o'clock on the evening of the 5th, a mine was fired by the enemy in front of the Eighteenth corps, and followed up by rapid and continuous musketry firing. But the mine failed, having been exploded several rods outside of the head of a sap it was intended to reach. A considerable mass of earth was thrown into the air; but the dust and smoke had hardly subsided when the National troops were busily engaged pouring volleys into the enemy's works, from which no charge was made. There was considerable artillery firing for a time but the loss was not heavy on either side.

On the 9th, about noon, a terrific accidental explosion took place at City Point. An ordnance boat lying at the
wharf suddenly blew up with a continuous roar that was heard in all directions for many miles. The cause of the explosion is unknown, but it is supposed to have been the dropping of a case of fixed ammunition. Its effect was most disastrous, in the loss of life, in the number of persons frightfully mutilated, and in the destruction of property. The boat and another near it were blown to fragments. The bluff close by was penetrated by a vast quantity of shells, balls, bullets, and fragments of various ammunition, and a number of buildings were thrown down. Parts of vessels and houses mingled with limbs and pieces of human bodies were scattered around in all directions; and even the boats on the river did not escape. Between 60 and 70 persons were killed and about 130 were wounded. The majority of the sufferers were laborers, many of them colored.

The repulse of the National forces in the attack on Cemetery Hill, led to the belief that operations at Petersburg would cease for some time. Grant, however, was not a man to be so easily discouraged. The Confederates had, it is true, constructed near the side of the fort destroyed by means of the mine, a new work, from which they opened fire on the National lines on the 12th of August; and the defenses of Petersburg were apparently as strong and as pertinaciously defended as they had been two months before. But the war was sustained on the part of the Confederacy only by the most strenuous efforts; and its armies were kept up to a point at which the defensive could be success-fully maintained only by a conscription of the most ruthless character. The best part of the Southern fighting element had long been consumed; and old men and boys now constituted almost the only recruits that could be obtained. None knew this better than General Grant; and upon this fact he seems to have placed much reliance, and drew from it encouragement to persevere. He knew that, although the soldiers of the Confederates had no superiors, every battle and skirmish diminished their numbers. He knew also that, although the Confederate government controlled almost the entire resources of the South, they were rapidly wasting away, and that finally the States in rebellion must succumb from sheer exhaustion.

A work, which it was supposed would prove of great value, was commenced by Butler about the middle of August. This was the construction of a canal at Dutch Gap, on the James, where a bend in the river, 11 miles south-south east of Richmond in a direct line, forms a peninsula called Farrar's Island, connected with the north bank by a neck of land about 175 yards wide. A navigable channel cut across this neck would save a circuit of not less than 6 miles around the bend. The preliminary survey was made on the 7th of August, and a large number of workmen commenced digging soon afterwards. It was Butler's expectation that this canal when completed, would prove of immense service to the National army. It would, he conceived, be deep enough to allow the passage of large war vessels; and he felt confident that the iron-clads
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would then be able to ascend to the upper part of the river, without passing by the circuitous channel around the peninsula, which was full of torpedoes, and other obstructions, besides being guarded by Confederate gun-boats, whose usual station was at Dutch Gap. When completed and occupied it would also flank the enemy's strong and important position at Howlett's, opposite the southwestern extremity of Farrar's Island, from which the river was swept at this point with heavy batteries. It would be a long step in the approach to Fort Darling, and would make necessary on the part of the enemy a new and more extended line of defense, and thus find occupation for a large number of their troops. On the 10th of August a force was thrown across the river at this point; and the work was prosecuted with impunity until the 12th, when, soon after daybreak, the enemy collected in the vicinity in such force that the National gun-boats opened fire upon him and kept it up several hours. On the following morning two Confederate rams appeared, and taking a position under the lee of Farrar's Island, where they were sheltered from the fire of the National gun-boats, began to shell the negro troops engaged in digging the canal. The battery at Howlett's also opened fire, and was replied to by the National battery at Crow's Nest, near Dutch Gap. The river being full of obstructions at the extremity of Farrar's Island, the National gun-boats could not get near enough to take part in the engagement. The troops on the isthmus had already thrown up intrenchments along a portion of the line of the proposed canal; and, though exposed to a fire from Howlett's battery on the west, and from 2 gun-boats on the north, which continued till noon, they were able to remain at work. A gun at Howlett's battery was disabled by a shot from that at Crow's Nest. The enemy showed signs of a determination to dispute energetically the National advance in this direction. On the 13th, operations on the canal were covered by another movement on the part of Grant, to the north of the James, made in the hope of again inducing Lee to send away a portion of his forces from Petersburg to favor a new movement against the Weldon Railroad.

The Second corps, which had been moved up from Petersburg, was put on board of a fleet of transports at City Point; and on the 13th the vessels went down the river, with the bands playing, as if bound for Fortress Monroe. The movement was purposely made in an ostentatious manner, in order that it might be noted by the enemy, and cause him to believe that Grant was sending a portion of his forces to Washington. When night fell, the transports were headed up the river, and ascending at full speed soon reached Deep Bottom, where the troops were all put on shore by noon on the following day. On the same night, two divisions of the Tenth corps crossed the James by the pontoon bridge to the same point, as did also Gregg's cavalry division, and joined Foster in his old position there. Early on the morning
of the 14th, Foster's brigade was moved out towards Strawberry Plains, where the enemy was found strongly posted in entrenchments situated on commanding ridges covering the Kingsland road, with a line of rifle-pits in front. As the advance pressed forward, considerable skirmishing took place; but the enemy gradually fell back to the rifle-pits, which at length were charged and easily taken by the Tenth Connecticut and Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts, with about 100 prisoners. The enemy was in the mean time hurrying troops over from his right to the region of Malvern Hills; and it became essential that the National force should form in order of battle, and push forward as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, Gregg's cavalry swept out to the National right, clearing the roads of the enemy's pickets, and opening the way for the Second corps.

**Aug. 14.** Most of the day was consumed in getting the troops into position. When the line was formed, the cavalry covered the right flank of the Second corps, which stretched towards the left as far as Four Mile Creek. On the other side was the Tenth corps, its right resting on the creek, its left on the entrenched bluff at Deep Bottom. The gun-boats in the river took such positions that they were able to shell the Confederate works occasionally. An attempt was made to push the whole line forward in the evening. The Tenth corps charging the enemy's outer works in a line of woods about a mile from the pontoon bridge, after a sharp engagement succeeded in carrying them, at the same time capturing four 8-inch brass howitzers and a number of prisoners.

In the centre of the line, Gibbon's and Barlow's divisions of the Second corps moved out towards the Confederate works, and succeeded in establishing themselves some distance in advance of the position which they had carried in the faint made two weeks before. The assault was now made by Gibbon's division, Colonel Macy's brigade in the advance. Crossing a cornfield and going over a hill, they descended into a ravine, where a stream, flowing through swampy land and thick brush, formed an impervious barrier. The charge was made under a severe artillery fire of the enemy, which also raked the ravine. Natural obstacles rendering any further progress impossible, the men availed themselves of what shelter they could find, and after a short time were withdrawn. The entire loss sustained by the Tenth and Second corps was about 1000 men.

Skirmishing was kept up all day on the 15th, the object being to extend the line to the right and secure a stronger position. The Tenth corps was moved across Four Mile Creek and placed on the right of the Second, the cavalry in the mean time covering the right flank and skirmishing. Holding a position on the Charles City Road, they confronted there detachments of the enemy's cavalry, which with other reinforcements had been hurried over from Petersburg during the preceding day and night. Supposing that Grant was threatening Malvern Hills, the enemy's infantry was pushed as rapidly as possible in that direction, while his
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Cavalry was kept on the roads leading northwestward towards Richmond. There was constant manœuvring and heavy skirmishing during the day, in the course of which about 300 men were killed or wounded on the part of the Nationals, without any important advantage having been gained. The intense and debilitating heat during this and the preceding day not only had a very depressing effect on the troops, but caused some loss by sunstroke and exhaustion.

More decided efforts were made to advance on the 16th. Gregg's cavalry stretching out on the Charles City Road, on the extreme right, covered that flank. On his left was Colonel Craig's brigade of Mott's division of the Second corps; then came the Tenth corps and the remainder of the Second. The extreme left at Deep Run was held by colored troops. The region which the movements were about to take place was covered with dense forest and undergrowth, with only here and there a small cleared space. To the difficulties thus presented to the manœuvres of troops was added the intense heat of the day, which was one of the most sultry and oppressive of the season. The earliest movement was made by the cavalry of Gregg, along the Charles City Road as far as Deep Bottom Creek or Deep Run, where he was joined by Barlow's division under Miles. Further progress was disputed by a brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, which, however, was quickly driven back with the loss of its commander, who was killed while attempting to rally his men. The column then pushed forward on the same road near to White's Tavern, not more than 7 miles from Richmond, where the enemy was found intrenched in a position too strong to justify attack. Miles then withdrew his brigade towards the right of the main line under Birney, marching back by the route which he had taken in advancing. On seeing this, the enemy, collecting from various quarters a considerable force at White's Tavern, moved rapidly down upon Gregg's command in the afternoon, and drove it back to Deep Run, where Gregg made a stand, and easily maintained himself for some time. Meanwhile there had been some very sharp fighting on the centre of the line. Terry's division of the Tenth corps pushed forward into the wooded region between the Central and Charles City roads, Foster's brigade in front, Pond's and Hawley's in support, with Craig's brigade of the Second corps on the right. After a toilsome march under a burning sun, over ground much broken with ravine and jungle, the enemy's picket line was at last found and driven in. Artillery firing followed, and some slight works and a few prisoners were captured. The main works were then charged upon by Pond's brigade, supported by Hawley's and some colored troops; and after an hour's hard and close fighting at short range in the dense woods, in which the loss on both sides was severe, the intrenchments were carried, 200 prisoners being taken and some colors. The National troops then occupied the intrenchments and prepared to hold them against the
Confederates should they return in force. About this time Colonel Craig with his brigade was despatched to the assistance of Gregg's cavalry, which the enemy, having received reinforcements, was driving back rapidly. In the engagement which followed, Craig was killed; and his brigade, partly in consequence of this, being thrown into confusion, fell back, losing many prisoners. The cavalry and infantry on the right having now given way, the Confederates concentrated their efforts against the infantry in the centre, upon which they made a series of desperate assaults, and at length got possession of the works which had been won from them with such hard fighting; and notwithstanding that Birney, about six o'clock, made an effort to regain them, they held the position. Having succeeded in forcing back the right, the enemy was now able to direct an enfilading fire on the centre; and the whole National line was withdrawn at dark, having sustained during the day a loss of some 1500 men, that of the enemy being nearly as great. The line at night was substantially the same as it had been in the morning.

While these events were taking place on the right, Major Ludlow, at Dutch Gap, moved out about 1000 men on transports to Aiken's Landing, and marched thence to Cox's Ferry, two or three miles above Dutch Gap, where he intrenched. On the afternoon of the following day, Howlett's battery and a Confederate ram opened fire on the men engaged in digging the canal, which was replied to by the battery at Crow's Nest and by the monitors.

After dark, Ludlow seeing that he would not be able to maintain himself in his advanced position at Cox's Ferry, withdrew his troops and returned to his old position at Dutch Gap.

On the 17th, there was little or no fighting on the right. Between four and six in the afternoon, the killed of the day before were buried under a flag of truce, each party taking charge of its own dead. The 18th also was quiet in the immediate neighborhood of Deep Bottom; but at night a fierce assault was made on the intrenchments of the Tenth corps, by a division of the enemy, who charged in column on a portion of the line held by Terry's division and W. Birney's colored brigade. The firing was very close and very heavy for an hour, but the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of not less than 1000 men. On the 19th, there was some skirmishing, but no general engagement. The aggregate National loss in this second demonstration, at Deep Bottom, was estimated at not less than 5000; that of the enemy at 3000. But the movement had answered its purpose; and the troops were rapidly marched back to the lines before Petersburg, a division of the Second corps arriving there by the morning of the 20th.

Little of importance occurred at Petersburg while the bloody struggle was going on in the neighborhood of Deep Bottom. Artillery and picket firing went on till the evening of the 15th, when it was suspended for a short time by an extraordinary rain storm, which swept away many tents and
sutlers' booths and flooded the trenches. On the morning of the 18th, at one o'clock, the enemy opened a tremendous fire all along the line, and continued it for two hours; but no assault followed. About an hour after the cannonading eased, operations against the Weldon Railroad were commenced by the movement of the Fifth corps in that direction. Leaving camp with four day's rations, the march was directed towards Reams' Station; and between seven and eight, the advance arrived at Six Mile Station, near which a mile of the track was torn up, and the rails destroyed. Little opposition was experienced during this movement, which was quite unexpected by the enemy; and while the first division under Griffin was engaged in destroying the railroad track, the other divisions advanced two or three miles towards Petersburg, driving in the skirmishers. At Yellow Tavern, about ten o'clock, the column encountered a brigade of cavalry, which was driven back as far as Davis' Farm, two and a half miles from Petersburg. But at this point a force of the enemy, consisting of two divisions of Hill's corps under Heth and Mahone, came hurrying down the railroad. The National line was immediately formed in the open field, the Third division under Crawford on the right of the railroad, and the Second 

Aug 18. two o'clock the enemy emerged from the woods in front and made an impetuous charge. For a time the two divisions under Crawford and Ayres got the worst of it, and were driven half a mile down the railroad; but the

Fourth division under Cutler and some other troops coming up, the Nationals were enabled to stretch out around and were successful in flanking the enemy's left. This turned the tide of battle; and the Confederates were finally repulsed. The contest was over before dark; and the National troops immediately went to work throwing up breast-works. Although heavy rain fell at night, and the enemy, fearing another attack, threw shells into the lines from midnight till daybreak, the National troops were found strongly intrenched on the railroad 2½ miles south of Petersburg. The loss on the part of the Nationals, including 160 prisoners, was somewhat over 1000; that of the Confederates, including 30 prisoners, was, by their own account, only about 500.

The Fifth corps had thus secured an intrenched position on the Weldon Railroad. It was not likely, however, that the Confederates would allow it to be quietly retained. If left isolated, the troops would very soon be driven off or surrounded and captured. It was thus of the utmost importance, that this new position on the extreme left should be connected with the main line before Petersburg; and reinforcements were accordingly set in motion. The enemy having withdrawn nearer to the city during the night, leaving only a picket line in front, the National skirmishers were pushed forward early, on the morning of the 19th. The whole line followed, throwing up breast-works as they proceeded, and planting batteries to strengthen the advanced position. This went on without opposition till about
ten o'clock, when a short skirmish occurred in front of the picket lines on the right, at which point the enemy was reconnoitring. The troops had all got into line about noon; but a portion of the gap between the right of the Fifth corps and the old line of intrenchments near the Jerusalem road still remained unoccupied. The new line when arranged stood as follows: Willcox's division of the Ninth corps having just arrived held the extreme right; then came a brigade of Cutler of the Fifth corps; then Crawford; then Ayres; then on the extreme left Griffin's division and the remainder of Cutler's. The railroad ran between the divisions of Ayres and Crawford. About four o'clock, heavy rain falling at the time, General A. P. Hill broke suddenly upon the line, with both divisions of his corps, under Mahone and Heth. Mahone, having with him the brigades of Clingman and Colquitt as well as his own, attacked the right with great fury, first striking the picket line, which consisted of Bragg's brigade. The advanced regiment was quickly driven back from the cornfield where it had been posted, to the National breast-works, losing many men. The enemy had discovered the gap at this part of the line, and rushed through it like a torrent, thus getting between the divisions of Willcox and Crawford. Desperate artillery and musketry fighting ensued. But Willcox's brigades were kept closely massed, Hartranft on the right, Humphrey on the left; and they remained unbroken. Hill then, while keeping Willcox and Crawford occupied in front with Cling-

man's and Mahone's brigades, dispatched part of Colquitt's brigade to drive in that under Bragg. After desperate fighting this was accomplished, and the right of Crawford's division, where Lyle was posted, was completely flanked. Colquitt, joined by other forces, succeeded in getting a front, flank, and rear fire on a part of Crawford's division, the consequence of which was that more than 1500 men, comprising nearly the whole of Hartshorn's brigade and part of Lyle's and Wheelock's, were cut off and captured.

While this was occurring on the right of the railroad, the divisions on the left under Ayres, Griffin, and Cutler were attacked by the troops under Heth. The advance of the Confederates was made with great impetuosity; the National picket line was driven in, and the advanced intrenchments were soon taken; but at the second and main line the Confederates received a bloody repulse, not, however, before Hayes' brigade of regulars, who had held their post with great firmness, were badly cut up. The line on their right and left having been forced back; they became exposed to an enfilading fire, and sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded, besides 500 or 600 captured. Among the captured and wounded was General Hayes.

Very opportunely, just at the time when the right centre had become broken and the centre was giving way, the First and Second divisions of the Ninth corps under Potter and White came up. Although they had made a long and toilsome forced march over roads now reduced to mud by the late
heavy rains, they were immediately formed and sent in on the charge; and the enemy was overlapped and turned. In the meantime the battle had become so confused on Crawford’s right that the combatants could not be distinguished; and the artillery now directed on that point, swept down friend and foe alike. The result was, that the contest, was decided against the Confederates; and the disordered lines of the National troops were soon rallied. Night, however, had fallen before the battle was entirely over. The National loss in killed and wounded was estimated at 1500. The Confederates had lost about the same number. In prisoners they lost not more than 250, while they captured, mostly from the divisions of Ayres and Crawford, not less than 2700, including 9 field officers and 60 or 70 line officers. On the following day, the 20th, there was some cannonading, but no general fighting.

On the 21st the enemy made another effort to recover the Weldon Rail Road. The National line lay substantially as it did on the 19th, the first three divisions of the Ninth corps holding the right and the Fifth corps the left. Cutler’s division lay across the railroad, Crawford’s being on its right, Griffin’s and Ayres’ on its left. At four o’clock in the morning the Confederates opened a heavy artillery fire along the whole line, from the left to the Appomattox, and about seven o’clock made a feint towards the Ninth corps. At nine the attack commenced in earnest, with a terrific fire of both solid shot and shell from all their bat-

teries, which was replied to with at least equal power. Shortly afterwards the enemy’s column emerged from the woods and dashed in fine style across the open space in front of the National breast-works. It was intended that the attack should be made in two columns, one in front, the other in flank; but the flanking column on the left of the rail-road, instead of striking the extreme left, under Griffin, fell upon the right of Ayres’ division and the left of Cutler’s. The National skirmishers were soon driven in, and their pits taken; but on approaching the works, the Confederates were received with a steady fire of musketry, and although they again and again advanced to the charge, they were always repulsed. On the right, they did not succeed in reaching the main works, and suffered much from both artillery and musketry. On the left, a column which approached by the Vaughan road was caught with a cross fire; large numbers threw down their arms and surrendered, and the remainder exposed to a hot fire, hastily withdrew. An effort to flank the extreme left also failed. The main force of the attack, however, fell on the divisions of Ayres and Cutler. The battle was brief —lasting only two hours. It was nevertheless one of the most desperate contests of the campaign. In the struggle the Confederate generals Saunders and Lamar were killed.

On the morning of the 22d it was discovered that the enemy, had retired and intrenched himself about 3 miles from Petersburg. Skirmishers were then thrown out, and both armies went
The infantry to work industriously with the spade. The picket lines were busily engaged in skirmishing all day; but there was no general engagement. During the previous week, one division of the Second corps had been withdrawn from Deep Bottom and hurried back to Petersburg. It took possession of the intrenchments vacated by the Fifth corps when it marched for the Weldon Railroad. The other two divisions, with Gregg’s cavalry and the Tenth corps, also left Deep Bottom on the night of the 20th, where Foster’s brigade remained alone. Marching rapidly all night, the two divisions of the Second corps reached the lines of the Ninth on the morning of the 21st, and on the 22d Barlow’s division, temporarily commanded by Miles, was set to tearing up the track of the Weldon Railroad in the rear of the Fifth corps towards Reams’ Station, in which it was joined by Gibbon’s division on the following day. The Fifth corps also tore up a portion of the track towards Petersburg, so that by the night of the 24th the railroad was thoroughly destroyed from a point four miles below Petersburg down to two miles below Reams’ Station. The cavalry under Gregg covered the work of the infantry during these operations, and had several skirmishes with the enemy.

On the morning of the 25th, Gibbon’s division of the Second corps moved down the railroad below Reams’ Station, to continue the work of destruction; but when about a mile below the station, its advance, consisting of cavalry, was suddenly checked and driven back by the enemy’s picket line. Smythe’s brigade of infantry was at once pushed forward and deployed as skirmishers, the cavalry retiring behind them. Smythe drove back the enemy’s skirmish line some distance, but presently meeting a stronger force, was himself compelled to fall back to the main body of the division, which was now in line of battle, the Third brigade on the right of the track, the First on the left, the other troops in support. Before noon the enemy had appeared in some force on Gibbon’s left, making towards his rear; but this movement was checked by a party of Gregg’s cavalry, and the Confederates were driven off. A little later some cavalry of the enemy appeared in front, in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House, but were checked by Chapman’s cavalry brigade. While this desultory fighting was going on in the neighborhood of Gibbon’s division, General Hill was making preparations to attack that under Miles at Reams’ Station. It occupied the old intrenchments constructed by the Sixth corps, which in a semicircular form partially surrounded the station, and covered the railroad both above and below that point. The enemy appeared in front of Miles soon after twelve o’clock, and Hancock immediately ordered Gibbon to fall back and form a junction with the left of Miles. The cavalry followed and was disposed so as to cover the left flank and rear. Gibbon arranged his line so that it faced the south and southeast, looking down the railroad. About two o’clock the enemy’s skirmish line advanced and swept forward with the accustomed battle yell; but it soon
fell back in confusion under a sharp fire from infantry and artillery, suffering severely. Skirmishing followed till about half-past three, when the enemy’s column emerged from the woods in close line of battle, and with bayonets fixed rushed towards the National works. At the distance of twenty paces it was met by a murderous fire of musketry and of artillery from 4 batteries, when it recoiled, broke, and hastened back under cover, having suffered frightful loss. Another assault, made an hour later, had a similar result.

The Confederates now began to fell trees for the purpose of planting batteries; and notwithstanding shells were thrown among them, they succeeded at length in getting a very heavy concentric fire upon the National lines, in which they poured shell and shot without an instant’s cessation for twenty minutes, and with a most destructive effect. The result was that the National troops became to a certain extent demoralized; and when at last the shelling ceased and the enemy’s storming column again advanced with renewed fury, the fire with which it was received was less vigorous than before. The left and centre of Miles’ division, upon which the blow fell, allowed the enemy to gain the breast-works, and after a bloody hand-to-hand contest, the National lines were broken through, and a general rout followed, although some regiments and companies remained fighting with heroic determination. Of the 12 guns which had been used with such destructive effect during the day, 9 were lost. At this crisis a part of Gibbon’s division was hurried across the rear from the left, under a heavy fire, to the support of Miles, a distance of more than half a mile, and arrived in time to drive back the enemy in that quarter, though at a fearful cost in killed and wounded. Thus aided, Miles was enabled to rally his division and partially restore his lines. But while a portion of Gibbon’s troops were thus employed, a fierce attack was being made on the left by a large force of the enemy, consisting of Heth’s division of infantry and Hampton’s division of cavalry, equaling in impetus that which had been made on the centre. Gibbon’s troops, already exhausted by their exertions, were hurried back to the left, where the enemy was in great force. Although desperately resisted by some brave regiments, who allowed themselves to be cut to pieces rather than give way, the Confederates overpowered all opposition; and Hancock was finally compelled to withdraw his corps from Reams’ Station and retire towards the lines of the Fifth corps. Gregg had in the mean time brought his dismounted cavalry to the assistance of the infantry and the enemy, who had suffered very severely, did not pursue. Thus ended the battle of Reams’ Station—one of the most obstinately contested battles of the war. The National loss was very heavy, amounting to not less than 3000 of which 2000 were prisoners. Seven stands of colors and 9 cannon were also lost. The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded was about 1500. The National forces continued to hold the Weldon Railroad at Yellow Tavern.
On the 25th the Eighteenth corps, on the right of the National line before Petersburg, and the Tenth corps at Deep Bottom and Bermuda Hundred, had begun exchanging positions. These movements produced a demonstration on the part of General Pickett in front of Butler's position. Opening fire from the long silent artillery, the enemy reinforced his skirmish line and advanced it against that of General Butler. A sharp fight ensued; but the enemy soon withdrew, losing 60 prisoners. The killed and wounded were few on either side. The movement of the troops was then continued, and was completed during the night of the 26th.

The shelling of Petersburg was resumed with great vigor on the 29th, and was continued for some time all along the line with a fury unparalleled for many weeks, but the casualties resulting from it were few. There was at the same time considerable artillery firing between batteries and gun-boats on the James in the vicinity of the Dutch Gap Canal, the work on which, was being vigorously prosecuted.

Since the destruction of a portion of the Weldon Railroad the enemy had had recourse to wagons, to convey their supplies from Stoney Creek, eight miles south of Reams' Station, around by the Boydton plank road to Petersburg; and on the 2d of September, Gregg made an important reconnaissance in that direction. At daylight his cavalry, supported by Crawford's division of the Fifth corps, moved out some distance; and Smith's brigade marched up the Vaughan road towards the plank road and in the direction of Petersburg. The plank road was discovered to be well fortified. Returning, Smith was attacked by some of the enemy's cavalry, but escaped without much loss. The whole force then returned to camp.

As usual during periods of comparative inaction, friendly intercourse between pickets and the exchange of newspapers began to take place along a part of the lines. When such a tacit truce existed, the men were accustomed to walk about at their ease in front of the works, trusting fully in the honor of their antagonists. But, on the 1st of September, while a large number were thus promenading outside the trenches, the National batteries commenced playing on the town, and a volley of musketry was fired in reply from the Confederate works, on the exposed troops, of whom some 200 were killed or wounded. This put an end to amicable relations for some time. On the night of the 4th, about eleven o'clock, news of the fall of Atlanta having arrived in camp, a salute was ordered of 100 shotted guns all along the line from the extreme right to the extreme left. To the roar of the artillery the troops added their enthusiastic cheers, and the enemy, apprehending a general attack, replied briskly, but the firing was discontinued about one o'clock.

For several days along Grant's now extended lines, little of importance occurred beyond the usual desultory cannonading at intervals. On the left, near the Jerusalem plank road, the
National and Confederate lines had been for some time in such close proximity, that at one point the opposing pickets could converse without difficulty. Hancock determined to drive the enemy out of this advanced position, as being too commanding and dangerous, and gave orders to Mott, whose division lay opposite to the point in question, to direct a movement against it. Accordingly, at one o'clock Sept., on the morning of the 10th, the 10. Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania and the Twentieth Indiana were sent under General De Trobriand to carry the work. The approach was made silently, the enemy's picket line was surprised, and the position was flanked and taken, with very little firing. The affair was a perfect success. The enemy opened an artillery fire, and, somewhat later, made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort to recover the lost ground. Ninety prisoners were taken, while the National loss was less than 20.

On the 14th the long continued desultory firing was followed by a fierce cannonade directed on Petersburg, shells being thrown into the city for two hours at the rate of 20 a minute. This the enemy replied to, by bombarding the single towers which had been erected on the Appomattox, and by shelling the working party on the Dutch Gap Canal. Very early on the morning of the 15th, movements of the enemy's cavalry on the left having been reported, a brigade of the Fifteenth corps, preceded by several regiments of cavalry, was sent out towards the Vaughan road. The enemy's lines at Poplar Spring Church were broken through, and reconnoissances made in various directions; but although Dearing's cavalry was encountered and a little skirmishing took place, the troops finally returned to camp without having discovered the character of the enemy's movement, which proved to be the most daring and successful raid of the campaign. Setting out from Reams' Station on the morning of the 15th, Hampton, with a body of cavalry, consisting of 4 brigades, and 2 batteries, marched rapidly around the National left, and appeared suddenly on the morning of the 16th, in the rear of the centre. His object was to seize a herd of 2500 cattle at Sycamore Church, about a mile south of Coggin's Point on the James, and nine miles northeast of Prince George Court House. Spear's cavalry brigade was picketed around the point to be attacked; but the enemy rushed in so unexpectedly, Sept. that it was taken completely by 16. surprise. The pickets were quickly driven in; and two regiments, the Thirteenth Pennsylvania and the, First District of Columbia, were entirely broken and stampeded, the latter being captured entire with all its horses, arms, equipments, wagons, and camp. The enemy, by making a wide detour around the National left, had succeeded completely in concealing his movements. As soon as the cattle were secured, they were driven off. Hampton's troopers then set out on their return, pursued by the divisions of Gregg and Kautz, as far as Belcher's Mill on the Jerusalem plank road. At this point the
Confederates under Rosser and Dearing made a stand and repulsed an attack made on them by the brigades of Smith and Stedman. The other portions of Hampton's column moved off with the cattle at their leisure. By this daring and skilful operation, Hampton secured an abundant supply of meat for Lee's army. Besides the cattle, he carried off 300 prisoners, 200 mules, and 32 wagons. Among the captures was also a telegraphic construction corps of 40 men, with their train and 20 miles of wire. The entire loss of the enemy did not exceed 50. While Hampton's raid was in progress, the entire skirmish line of the Fifth corps was driven into the intrenchments, with the loss of 90 men made prisoners. From the 16th to the 23d, sharp picket firing was kept up along the line resulting in many casualties.

On the night of the 28th, the army Sept. of the James, under Butler, consisting of the Tenth corps under Birney, holding the right of the main line before Petersburg; the Eighteenth corps, under Ord, at Bermuda Hundred, and Kautz's division of cavalry, were quietly but rapidly moved from their positions, in light marching order, to the James, over which they crossed, on muffled pontoon bridges, the Tenth corps to Deep Bottom, and the Eighteenth to Aiken's Landing, about midway between Deep Bottom and Dutch Gap. At daylight on the morning of the 29th, the Eighteenth corps advanced by the Varina road, which runs in a northwesterly direction to the New Market road. Having proceeded about a mile the enemy's pickets were met, and skirmishing began, Stannard's division in the advance. Two or three miles from Aiken's Landing, a long line of intrenchments was found running westward from the road to the James and ending there in a well-constructed fort. The region traversed by these intrenchments is in the neighborhood of Chapin's and Ball's bluffs, and was known as Chapin's Farm. In front of the fortifications was an open plain. Line of battle was formed in the woods on the edge of this plain, Stannard's division on the left near the river, Heckman's on the right. The third division under Paine was operating with the Tenth corps on a different road. In front of Stannard were strong connected forts, including the works known as Battery Harrison. The latter was well provided with artillery and surrounded by a wide and deep ditch. In front of Heckman was a line of rifle-pits defended by infantry. The troops having been formed under cover of the woods, dashed across the plain under a heavy fire from the forts and rifle-pits and from the gun-boats in the river, and carried the entire line of works, including Battery Harrison, capturing 16 pieces of artillery and 200 prisoners. The attack was, in fact, a surprise. Fortunately there were but few troops in the works, and these mostly inexperienced, or the affair would have been much more bloody. As it was, the success was purchased at a heavy cost, the National loss being about 800. The fighting was all over by ten o'clock, and the men were set to work throwing
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up breast-works and strengthening their position. The Confederate gun-boats and batteries on the other side of the James, however, kept up such an annoying fire that it was found impossible to hold the portion of the works on the left near the river. They were therefore abandoned.

The Tenth corps had in the mean time marched from Deep Bottom towards New Market, crossing Four Mile Creek. The enemy was found at the junction of that road with the New Market road, where strong breast-works had been constructed in a commanding position called New Market Heights, a marshy tract of ground in front, covered with stunted trees and a dense undergrowth besides being obstructed by an abatis. Over this piece of difficult ground Paine's colored troops were directed to charge. In spite of the formidable obstacles in their path, and under a very destructive musketry fire, they rushed to the works and carried them at the point of the bayonet without firing a shot. This position being the key-point of the line of defenses, was stoutly defended by the Confederates; but nothing could withstand the impetuous onset of the colored troops. Terry's division of the Tenth corps pushed in on the right and flanked the enemy, who fell back from the heights and Terry immediately occupied them. The National loss was about 1500, sustained chiefly by the colored division; that of the enemy was much less. Birney then pushed on in the direction of Richmond, along the New Market road, to the point where the Mill road enters it, three miles west of New Market. After carrying some feebly defended earth-works here, the advance drove the enemy as far as the junction of the Varina and New Market roads, six miles southeast of Richmond. Here, on Laurel Hill, was found a substantial fortification called Fort Gilmer, consisting of a semicircular main work with other works on each side, a wide and deep ditch extending in front of the intrenchments. The advance was immediately deployed on the right, and W. Birney's colored brigade on the left. About two o'clock an assault was ordered, and several charges were made; but each time the troops were compelled to retire with great loss, a severe artillery and musketry fire from both flank and front completely sweeping the open space over which the storming parties had to move. The colored troops on the left succeeded in reaching the ditch; but the few men who mounted the parapet never returned. It soon became evident that the position was too strong to be taken, and before dusk the troops were called off. The enemy was left in secure possession of Laurel Hill, having suffered but little loss, while that of the Nationals was not less than 500.

Kautz having early in the morning reconnoitred the roads before the advance of the infantry columns, turned off about nine o'clock to the right and moved up the Central road towards Richmond, in which direction he met no opposition till within two or three miles of the city, when a fort near the tollgate opened upon him. Terry also
whose division had been sent to the support of Kautz, marched across from the New Market to the Central road, and pressing on rapidly came within sight of the spires of Richmond. But both withdrew about sundown. The country had been found full of fortifications, and the enemy everywhere showed a disposition to resist. The line of the army at night was formed with the Tenth corps in the centre, the cavalry on the right, and the Eighteenth corps on the left.

About two in the afternoon of the 30th, the Confederates, having been largely reinforced from Petersburg during the night and morning, appeared in great force in front of Battery Harrison and the line of captured works now held by the Eighteenth corps. Their plan of attack was, to break through these and separate the Eighteenth and Tenth corps. The blow fell, therefore, on the right of the Eighteenth and the left of the Tenth. The action was commenced by a cannonade from the enemy of fifteen or twenty minutes’ duration, followed by a charge on Paine’s colored division, now getting position on the right of the Eighteenth corps, and on W. Birney’s colored brigade, on the left of the Tenth. But Paine and Birney held their ground well, delivering a withering fire of musketry, while the batteries made great devastation in the charging column. The weight of the attack fell, however, on Stannard’s division. Forming in three strong lines on the edge of the woods, the Confederates charged upon it with great fury under cover of a hot shelling from their gun-boats and an enfilading fire from the batteries on the other side of the river. Stannard’s men had been instructed to lower their pieces; and their fire was incessant and murderous. Three times the Confederates charged; but each time, although they got near the works, they were driven back with great slaughter to their cover in the woods. They lost in this affair, including 200 prisoners, of whom 20 were officers, nearly 800 men. The National loss did not exceed 200. At night heavy rain fell, continuing through the following day and night; and the surface of the country was soon covered with deep mud, rendering the movement of artillery and wagons, and even the march of troops, exceedingly difficult.

These movements on the north side of the James having, as was intended, induced Lee to send off a great part of his forces in that direction, Grant, who had for several days been making preparations for the movement, dispatched on the 30th a column from the left flank. The National force remaining near Petersburg while the army of the James was operating towards Richmond, consisted of three corps and the second division of cavalry. Of these the Second corps and parts of the Fifth and Ninth were now left to hold the long line of the Weldon Railroad and Petersburg intrenchments, while two divisions of the Ninth corps with two division and a brigade of the Fifth were constituted a column of advance under Warren. On the 29th, a reconnaissance had been made by Gregg’s cavalry
supported by two brigades of infantry, towards the Poplar Spring Church road beyond the Vaughan turnpike. On reaching the Weldon Railroad Gregg struck off to the south of Yellow Tavern, but after sending the different brigades in various directions fell back again. About five o'clock the enemy, who had followed Gregg on his return, attacked him with two pieces of artillery; and skirmishing, resulting in little loss to either side, continued till dark, when Gregg returned to his former lines.

On the following morning the column under Warren set out from Four Mile Station on the Weldon Railroad, the headquarters of the Fifth corps, the cavalry under Gregg on the extreme left, while the divisions of Griffin and Ayres, with Hoffman’s brigade of the Fifth corps, followed by the divisions of Willcox and Potter and several batteries, moved out in the direction of Poplar Grove, on the South Side Railroad, 15 miles west of Four Mile Station. The march was made in a northwesterly direction; and soon after twelve o’clock, having struck the Squirrel Level road, Peebles’ Farm was reached, about three miles from the railroad and four or five southwest of Petersburg. Here was discovered a redoubt, called Fort McRae, in which were several small rifled guns, and connected with it a strong line of intrenchments commanding ridges. In front was an open space of ground swept by the guns of the redoubt. The task of charging over this and capturing the crest was assigned to Griffin’s division, which advanced in three lines one behind another, and carried the works, driving the enemy out at every point and taking about 50 prisoners and one gun. The National loss was about 150. The column then re-formed; and the march being resumed the enemy was found occupying a strong work on a hill half a mile further on. At five o’clock Potter’s division, attempting to press up the acclivity on which the Confederates were posted, sustained a severe repulse, and being in its turn charged, was thrown into confusion. A flanking column of the enemy now appeared in great force, broke in between the divisions of the Fifth and Ninth corps, and swept off more than 1500 prisoners, chiefly off from Potter’s division. The further progress of the enemy, however, was checked by the rapid approach of Griffin’s division. The National loss was over 2500, of which 1600 belonged to Potter’s division. The Confederate loss did not exceed 500.

On the 1st of October the enemy made two attacks on the division Oct. under Ayres, but both were easily 1. repulsed. Another was made, in the pouring rain, by Hampton’s cavalry division, upon Gregg, who covered the left flank beyond the Vaughan road. Hampton succeeded in driving him back from one line of intrenchments to another, but finally retired taking with him 100 prisoners. The National force continued to hold intrenchments four miles from the South Side Railroad, connecting on the right with the old line of works at Petersburg; but the enemy retained and used the railroad. On the 2d, General Mott moved out
towards the Boydton plank-road, over which supplies were now conveyed in wagons to Petersburg; but the enemy was found strongly intrenched in front of the road, and Mott was compelled to retire, with a loss of 100 men.

Meanwhile, there had been some activity on the north side of the James. On the morning of the 1st of October, General Terry, preceded by Kautz's cavalry, made a reconnoissance towards Richmond on the Central or Darbytown and Charles City roads. When within 3 miles of the city the Confederate skirmishers were encountered and driven in, and Terry continued to advance until he approached the main line of defenses, which ran across both roads; but further progress was prevented by vigorous shelling on the part of the enemy. After reconnoitring carefully, Terry and Kautz returned at night, having suffered but little loss. The rain and mud caused a suspension of operations, beyond reconnoitring and intrenching. Nothing of importance occurred till the 7th, when the enemy made a sudden and partially successful attempt to turn the right flank of the army of the James. This flank lay in a line running to the northeast of Battery Harrison, where the Eighteenth corps was firmly intrenched, about 7 miles south of Richmond. To the right of the Eighteenth corps lay the Tenth, across the New Market and Central roads; and on the extreme right was the cavalry of General Kautz, consisting of only two brigades under Spear and West, with two batteries, each of four 3-inch rifled guns, resting on the Charles City road, at a distance of 5 miles southeast of Richmond. At an early hour in the morning a large force of the enemy under General Anderson, consisting of two full divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, approached by the Darbytown and Charles City roads, and fell unexpectedly upon Kautz's cavalry. Taken completely by surprise Kautz's troops broke into a perfect rout and scattered over the country in the rear, followed by the batteries, which being left without support could not remain in safety. They were soon imbedded in mud, and captured with all the caissons and most of the horses. Kautz lost 300 of his men in captured, killed and wounded. The Confederates having now stampeded the National cavalry and got possession of the Central road, advanced towards the Tenth corps, which lay in a strongly intrenched line, its right held by Terry who with the first division covered the New Market road,—the troops being disposed in rifle-pits in the thick woods. On the left of the line of the Tenth corps the ground was open; and on this side was posted the artillery, consisting of four 6-gun batteries, so planted as not only to sweep the ground in front, but to some extent that over which the right must be approached by the enemy. Of Terry's division, upon which the attack fell, Pond's brigade held the left, Abbott's the centre, and Plaisted's the right. Curtis' brigade of Foster's division was also brought up and placed in line with these. When the Confederates approached, between nine and ten o'clock, they found themselves under a
cross fire of artillery from the National left. An attempt was made to reply by two batteries; but these were soon overpowered. In the meantime Field's infantry division dashed over the open space at the double-quick, and in spite of the felled trees, succeeded in gaining the woods on the National right. The National troops in the woods remained quiet till the enemy got very close, in front of the centre under Abbott, when the four brigades above mentioned rose from their places of concealment and poured into the advancing column a most destructive fire—that of Abbott's brigade, which was partially armed with the Spencer repeating rifle, proving very deadly, as the fighting took place within short range. The Confederates, however, continued the struggle for some time. At length, after a vain though desperate rush on Pond's brigade, they were compelled to withdraw. Terry's division was then put in motion to follow and, if possible, to flank the enemy, causing him to fall back to the Charles City road, leaving the Central road to the National troops. While the struggle was proceeding on the right of the army of the James, a demonstration was made by the enemy on the left, at Battery Harrison, but without result. The National loss during the day did not exceed 500.

There was another breathing spell, which lasted for several days. The Nationals continued to intrench busily along the lines they held. The enemy's iron-clads near Cox's Ferry annoyed to some extent the picket line on the left flank of the Eighteenth corps with an enfilading fire; but comparatively few casualties occurred. The work on the Dutch Gap Canal was prosecuted industriously, subject to an artillery fire from Howlett's battery, which, however, the National gun-boats and batteries succeeded in temporarily silencing on the 11th. On the 13th, General Butler put 87 prisoners at labor under the enemy's fire at the canal, in retaliation for Confederate ill-treatment of National colored soldiers at Fort Gilmer.

On the 12th, General Terry, temporarily commanding the Tenth corps, made a reconnaissance in force towards Oct. the right, taking with him the first 12. division under Ames, the colored division under W. Birney, and a part of Kautz's cavalry division. The column set out in the evening, but halted during the night. In the morning it moved again, and struck the Central road near the point from which Kautz's command was driven on the 7th. The cavalry then stretched out to the Charles City road, dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, thus covering the extreme right between that road and the Central road; while W. Birney deployed on the left of the Central road, and Ames on the right towards the left of the cavalry. About seven o'clock the Confederate vedettes were encountered on the Charles City road, and driven back over a mile towards a series of intrenchments which blocked the way. There they halted and as soon as the Nationals were within easy range, they opened a sharp and merciless fire. This was quickly returned; but Terry's object being to discover the length and strength of this
new line of the enemy, he kept his troops as much as possible under the shelter of a strip of woods in front of the works. Continuing to push out brigades in reconnoitring charges, at various points, he soon felt the whole series of intrenchments; but made no serious demonstrations, except on the enemy's extreme left, which, it was supposed, was overlapped by the National right, and which Pond's brigade was ordered to turn. The works at this point were, however, found to be refused; and as the National troops rushed forward they were caught by an enfilading fire and suffered severely. This encouraged the Confederates to sally from their breast-works on other parts of the line, and charge with all their available force. It was not, however, attended with much success; and soon after four in the afternoon the National troops were withdrawn unbroken. Before darkness fell, they were back within their own intrenchments. The losses were unimportant.

On the left, to the west of the Weldon Railroad, a reconnaissance was made on the 8th, somewhat similar to that made by Terry and Kautz. It was a general advance of the Fifth and Ninth corps, the object being to feel the enemy's position, to push forward the lines, and to occupy if possible all the series of works connected with Fort McRae which had been taken. The Fifth corps, temporarily under Crawford, moved out on the West Halifax, Vaughan, and Squirrel Level roads; and of the Ninth corps, temporarily under Parke, Potter's division pushed out near the Pe-

gram House, and Willcox's took the Church road, Ferrero's division being left in reserve. Willcox got as far as the Boydton plank road, but found it strongly defended by lines of intrenchments. After a day spent in skirmishing and hard marching, both corps returned to camp.

In front of the Second corps at Petersburg a great deal of skirmishing and mortar firing occurred from time to time, especially at the redoubt where the picket lines were closest—a work which had been captured by De Trobrand about a month before, and since named Fort Sedgwick. The soldiers gave it the name of "Fort Hell." On the 8th this firing was very severe, and on the 11th the enemy's cannonading was so vigorous and prolonged that it was thought a general attack on the National lines was intended.

There was comparative quiet again until the 26th. In the meantime, Grant had been completing his plans for an other movement against the stubborn defenses of Richmond. He proposed to make a strong feint on the right by the army of the James, which was to move as if aiming to get round the left flank of the enemy, and at the same time to execute a series of operations of a more determined character by the army of the Potomac, with the object of turning the enemy's right flank near the South Side Railroad. On the evening of the 26th the whole army was ordered to be in readiness to move at daybreak, on the following morning. Up to this time the proposed movement had been kept, as was supposed, pr-
foundly secret; and nothing was done which could give rise to a suspicion, on the part of the enemy, that an advance would be made for some days. On this evening, however, all disguise was abandoned; and such arrangements were made that if the contemplated movement proved successful, it would be possible without inconvenience permanently to leave the old camp. The sick, the baggage, the commissary stores, camp equipage, and other property, were sent to City Point; the sutlers also took their goods thither. Rations for three days were issued to the cavalry, and for four days to the infantry. The intrenchments at Petersburg were to be held by the artillery, with only such infantry support as was absolutely necessary.

The great movement of the army of the Potomac commenced on the 27th. Before dawn the entire army, with the exception of the detachments from each corps left in the trenches, was on the march—Gregg's cavalry on the extreme left moving towards Reams' Station and then in a westerly direction; next on the right Egan's second and Mott's third division of the Second corps, with three batteries under Major Hazard, moving southwesterly down the Vaughan road; then Warren's Fifth corps on the Squirrel Level road; and last of all, on the extreme right, the Ninth corps under Parke, moving as did all the columns in a southwesterly direction towards Hatcher's Run—a small stream rising near Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, and flowing in a southeasterly direction to Rowanty Creek, a tributary of the Nottaway. It was intended that the two divisions of the Second corps and Gregg's cavalry should march as secretly and as rapidly as possible by a wide detour around the enemy's right flank, and should then seize the line of defenses on Hatcher's Run at the point where the Boydton road crosses it, from which to the South Side Railroad it was supposed little opposition would be met. The Fifth and Ninth corps were at the same time to demonstrate against the works at Hatcher's Run, directly in front; and the Fifth was to form connection with the Second corps there, the Ninth remaining on the right of the Fifth. Hancock and Gregg reached Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road at half-past seven. The road, at this point, was found much obstructed with felled trees; and the banks of the stream, partially cleared so as to give range from a line of rifle-pits on the opposite bank, were held by a small force of dismounted cavalry. Egan's division rapidly deployed; and Smyth's brigade, forming the first line, quickly forded the stream, carried the slight defenses, took about 20 prisoners, and dispersed the remainder of the small force. About noon Hancock and Gregg reached the Boydton road. The enemy was found fully on the alert; and Gregg's troops, covering the left, were opened upon from artillery and the carbines of Young's dismounted cavalry. Grant and Meade were both on the ground at this time; and although it was evident that the enemy had received information of the movement in time to de
prive it of the character of a surprise, it was thought that an advance might yet be attended with success. Accordingly Egan's division was deployed on the right of the Boydton plank road, acting towards the bridge over Hatch-
r's Run, Mott's division on the left of the road, De Trobriand's brigade connecting with Gregg on the extreme left; while McAllister's brigade of Mott's division was placed in the rear to watch the enemy, who had a battery at some distance down the plank road. The bridge was then seized by a skirmish line in the advance of Egan's division and the stream crossed. The next thing to be done was to carry the enemy's works beyond; and in order to prepare for this, Egan's division was, about one o'clock, disposed with Price's brigade in the centre, Rugg's on the left, and Smyth's on the right, Beck's battery co-operating on the latter flank. McAllister's brigade was withdrawn from watching the enemy in the rear and deployed in support of Egan. The Fifth corps being now heard firing rapidly on the right, the attack on the works was delayed till it should approach and co-operate. Owing however, to the difficult nature of the thickly wooded country in which the operations were being conducted, and the intricacy of the roads, the Fifth corps failed to connect; and after waiting until four o'clock, Hancock prepared to make the assault. The enemy, in the mean time, having discovered that while the left flank of Hancock's force was covered by Gregg's cavalry, his right was entirely unprotected, took the offensive. Ma-
was commenced by the route taken in the morning. It occupied the entire night and part of the next day. The old camps were regained by the Second corps with comparatively little loss. Many of the wounded, however, had been left on the field, the column not being provided with the means of transportation.

The task of the Fifth and Ninth corps had been to demonstrate against the enemy's works at Hatcher's Run in front, so as to cover the movement of the Second corps by the left and finally to co-operate with it; but this they had only partially succeeded in accomplishing. Having only a short distance to march, they had indeed soon made their appearance in front of the works and got into position, the Ninth on the right, the Fifth on the left. Skirmishing was carried on during the greater part of the day by the infantry; but the use of artillery was made extremely difficult in that region by the almost impenetrable woods, which rendered military manoeuvres almost impossible. The enemy being familiar with every inch of the ground had in this respect greatly the advantage. Although the commands of Hancock and Warren were during a great part of the day not very far apart, a junction was rendered altogether impracticable by the natural obstacles presented in the shape of dark, dense woods and swampy ground. The obscurity of the few miserable roads was such that troops got into the opposing lines, and staff officers lost their way in the forest gloom. The two corps found the enemy's defenses in front, too strong, to be pierced, and had to content themselves with maintaining their position, which they retained all day and through the night until orders arrived from Grant to fall back. The loss thus sustained in manouevring and skirmishing was about 500. The aggregate losses attending the entire movement by the left flank were not much short of 1500 men. The enemy suffered less in killed and wounded, but lost many more in prisoners. Thus ended what is known as the battle of Boydton Road.

The demonstrations made by Butler and his Tenth corps were comparatively barren of any good results. On the Williamsburg road he was attacked and defeated. On the York River Railroad he captured a fort which he afterwards abandoned. His loss was about 1500 men. The Confederates lost about 200.

At dusk in the evening of the 27th, General Miles, who had been left in the Petersburg lines with the first division of the Second corps, under cover of a terrific cannonade, sent a small storming party, consisting of 100 volunteers, under Captain Price, against a fort which was situated near the spot where the mine had been exploded in July. This small party, having moved quickly, and as silently as possible across the intervening space, clambered over the parapet; and although Price who led the assault was killed, they actually drove the enemy out of the works. Had the attack been made by a larger force it might have resulted disastrously for the enemy; but as it was impossible for so small a body of men to hold an important fort against the overwhelming
force which was immediately thrown upon them from right and left, they promptly retreated, losing 10 of their number, but carrying off 30 prisoners, among whom were several officers.

About ten o'clock on the night of the 30th, the Confederates having obtained information as to the strength and position of a portion of the National picket lines in front of Fort Davis, undertook, and successfully carried out, one of those little surprises which, as practised against themselves, they had had frequent and painful experience. A body of Confederates getting in the rear of the National pickets called to them to "fall in." These troops, being mostly raw recruits, and believing themselves to be among friends, promptly obeyed the call, and the entire line, consisting of 380 men, was captured. The immediate result of this surprise was to uncover the National intrenchments at the point of junction of the corps of Warren and Hancock. On this unprotected point, the enemy advanced. Fortunately, the National officers had been put on their guard by a sentinel who had escaped his captors; and when the Confederates came within range they found themselves under a heavy musketry fire, to which was soon added that of artillery. After about an hour's fighting, in which the loss did not exceed 100 on either side, the enemy withdrew.

On the 4th of November there was harp skirmishing in the neighborhood of Fort Sedgwick; and, on the night of the 5th the enemy succeeded, by a sudden attack, in getting possession of a considerable portion of the National picket line in that vicinity, and immediately began to reverse the works and to intrench. At the same time another body of the Confederates carried the picket line opposite the crater. The skirmishing was attended with little loss on either side. It was necessary, however, that the enemy should be promptly dislodged; and a furious cannonade having been opened upon them from the forts and batteries to the right and left, the whole line was aroused. At daybreak, after some desperate fighting, the captured works were recovered; and the line was reestablished from Fort Sedgwick to the crater. On the 6th, a similar attack was made by the enemy on the left, but was quickly repulsed. This desultory fighting, with little result beyond its tendency to wear out both the combatants, had become constant, and in fact, almost monotonous. The men about this time began to build log huts, the weather having become uncomfortably cold.

On the 1st of December a raid was undertaken by Gregg's cavalry against the Weldon Railroad, at Stony Creek Station, 18 miles south of Petersburg. At half-past three in the morning Gregg broke camp and set out in a southerly direction, his second brigade in the advance, the first brigade next, the third in the rear. The enemy's pickets were met before daybreak; but no serious opposition was encountered until the column arrived at Rowanty Creek, where a cavalry force disputed the advance, but was quickly
dispersed. The third brigade was then left to cover the rear; and the column passed on to Duvall’s Station, where the first brigade also was dropped, to destroy certain manufacturing establishments and to protect the flanks. The second brigade then went on to Stony Creek Station, two miles further on. There they found a well-built fort, which they captured and destroyed, spiking the guns and carrying off the greater portion of the garrison as prisoners. While this work of destruction was going on, a brigade of Hampton’s cavalry came upon the scene. Gregg deemed it convenient to retreat. The Confederates followed, harassing his rear as far as Rowanty Creek. At that point the pursuit was discontinued. The entire loss sustained by Gregg was not over 40, all of whom he managed to carry off, together with 175 prisoners and about 100 negroes.

A few days afterwards another movement, on a much larger scale, was made against the Weldon Railroad, which it was of the utmost importance that the enemy should not be allowed to recover. On the 6th of December a heavy column, consisting of the Fifth corps, Mott’s division of the Second corps, and Gregg’s division of cavalry, Dec. in all about 20,000 men, with 22 6. pieces of artillery, under General Warren, was massed on both sides of the Weldon Railroad between the Halifax and Jerusalem roads. There the troops bivouacked for the night. Heavy rain extinguished the camp-fires; but before daybreak the troops were on the march, the cavalry starting at four o’clock. The column took the Jerusalem road, and struck the Nottaway at the point where Freeman’s Bridge had formerly been, about 18 miles south-south east of Petersburg. The cavalry crossed the river, which was about three feet deep, by fording; the infantry crossed by a pontoon bridge; and the whole column was on the south side of the stream before daylight on the morning of the 8th. The cavalry bivouacked at Sussex Court House; the infantry between that place and the river. At three o’clock the cavalry set off in a southwesterly direction towards Jarrett’s, a station on the railroad about 30 miles south of Petersburg, the infantry following rapidly. About twelve o’clock the cavalry advance reached the point where the railroad crosses the Nottaway, seized and burned the bridge, and then began to tear up the track. The infantry arrived soon after and completed the work of destruction by burning the sleepers and twisting the rails. This work was continued for 5 miles, as far as Jarrett’s Station, where the depot and water tank were destroyed. The following day the column, still moving southward, destroyed the track as far as Bellfield, on the Meherin, 37 miles south of Petersburg. At Three Creek, 3 miles north of Bellfield the enemy burned the bridge and disputed the passage of the cavalry; but Dennison’s battery having opened upon them, and the Tenth New York having forded the stream on the National left, and flanked the position, the Confederates fell back to Bellfield. Hicksford, opposite Bellfield, was found protected
on both sides of the river by strong intrenchments, within which were some of Hampton's cavalry and a body of militia; and when the National troops got within range, a hot fire was directed on them. Several charges were made on the enemy's works; but Warren finally drew the troops off, and most of the cavalry bivouacked that night north of Three Creek. Up to this time during the march a cold rain had poured down, making the roads almost impassable; but now the increasing cold was accompanied with a storm of hail and snow, and the situation of the troops became one of extreme discomfort. It was determined, therefore, not to prosecute operations against Hicksford, the strategic value of which was not sufficiently great to warrant any heavy sacrifice of life.

On the morning of the 10th Warren commenced his march back towards the National lines, the enemy following and attempting to harass his rear. His troops got back to camp on the 12th much exhausted, but without having sustained any great loss.

With the exception of two reconnaissances which were made with a view to direct attention from Warren, this was the last operation of importance in the year. The holiday season came on. The men were allowed some rest, numbers of them obtained furloughs. The festivities proper to the season were not overlooked; and the Christmas of 1864 spent in the lines before Petersburg will not soon be forgotten.

At this period in the History of the War the railroad had become not only a useful but a most potent military factor. It had been, as we have seen, of signal service at Chattanooga. It had rendered possible Sherman's movement on Atlanta, and had greatly facilitated his March to the Sea. Without the railroad, Thomas would have found it impossible not only to resist the fierce onsets of Hood, but even to maintain himself, in Tennessee; and the advantages which it secured for the army in front of Petersburg and Richmond were many and invaluable. To the end of the war it continued to be an agent of first-class utility and power; nor is it any disparagement to the rank and file to say that but for the railroad and the admirable uses to which it was put, the war would have assumed a different character and been attended probably by a different result. The establishment of this branch of the service was due to the active brain and far-reaching vision of Secretary Stanton; its successful management is to be credited to the skill, experience, activity and untiring energy of General D. C. McCallum. On the 11th of February, 1863, McCallum was appointed military director and superintendent of railroads, in the United States, with authority controllable only by the War Department; and commanding officers everywhere were directed, on pain of dismissal from the service, not to interfere with the working of the new Department. The responsibilities of the head of the Railroad Department were scarcely second to those of the General-in-chief. One of the greatest feats accomplished by McCallum was when he transferred Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, over 20,000 strong, with artillery, trains, baggage and animals, by the Rapidan in Virginia, to Stevenson, Alabama, a distance of 1192 miles, within the brief space of seven days. But for the railroad, Hooker could not have been present at Chattanooga; and few will deny that the success on Lookout Mountain contributed to the final victory at Missionary Ridge. The work done between Chattanooga and Atlanta in repairing 136 miles of railroad, was scarcely less wonderful. In his report, General McCallum gives it as his opinion that but for the railroad, Sherman's campaign, in place of being a success, "would have resulted in disaster and defeat." An idea of the Department and of the magnitude of its work may be obtained from the following figures. At one time, such was the pressure brought to bear on this branch of the service, McCallum had under him as many as 24,964 men. During the war he operated in all 2105 miles, and made use of 419 engines and 6330 cars. Of bridges he built over 26 miles, and of track he laid or relaid 641 miles. The expenses of the Department amounted to $42,462,145.55. The property when sold realized $12,636,965.83. General McCallum had several able assistants, among whom were General Anderson, General Devereaux and Col. W. W. Wright.
CHAPTER XXXVII.

On more than one occasion already, it has been our duty to linger with the reader in the valley of the Shenandoah. Almost from the commencement of the war, the tide of battle surged in or around this now famous valley. It was already memorable as the scene of Jackson's first great campaign—the scene of the humiliation, if not defeat, of Banks and McDowell, of Fremont and Shields. In connection with the investment of Petersburg and the approach to Richmond, it has again become the scene of important operations. In a previous chapter, and in their proper place, some of these operations have been described in detail.

At the commencement of the Wilderness campaign, General Grant entrusted certain co-operative movements which were to be conducted in the Shenandoah and Kanawha Valleys, to the care of General Sigel. It will be remembered that Sigel was singularly unfortunate in a series of encounters which he had with Breckenridge; and about the middle of May he was superseded by General Hunter. Hunter, it will also be remembered, although he won a battle and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, found it necessary to fall back from Lynchburg, which he was investing; and, much to the annoyance and disappointment of General Grant, he
made an unfortunate, even disastrous retreat by way of Meadow Bridge towards the Kanawha.

It had been arranged that General Burbridge, who was commanding in Kentucky, should co-operate with Hunter in the movement against Lynchburg. While Hunter, with the combined forces of Crook and Averill, was to move direct on Lynchburg, Burbridge was to enter Virginia on the extreme southwest, with the view of engaging the attention of the enemy, and preventing any movement on Hunter's rear. It was not doubted at the time that this two-fold movement would be attended with complete success; for, as General Breckenridge, with his command, had been withdrawn to the assistance of General Lee, there was no Confederate force of any importance to the immediate west of the Blue Ridge. We have already seen that Hunter failed in carrying out his part of the programme. It remains to be seen that Burbridge, in all that regarded the general plan, was equally unsuccessful. The object of Burbridge's movement was discovered by the Confederates; and as they could not hope to defeat it by a direct attack in front, they resolved to thwart it by detaining the general and his command in Kentucky. With this end in view, the ever-vigilant and the ever-ready Morgan made a dash into that State. Dividing his troops, he sent them out in different directions. Encountering almost no opposition, they moved through Pound Gap, and struck successively Paintville, Hazel Green, Owingsville, Flemingsburg, Maysville, and other places, seizing property, breaking up railroads, burning bridges, and capturing a body of National troops under General Hobson, some 1600 strong. On the 12th of June, in the vicinity of Cynthiana, Burbridge, who had returned from Virginia and also 12, had been working his way back with great rapidity, fell upon Morgan with his whole force, routing him utterly, with a loss of 300 killed and wounded and as many prisoners. Of Hobson's command 1000 horses and 160 men were recaptured. Burbridge's loss was 150. Morgan's men, utterly demoralized and flinging down their arms, fled in all directions; but they had, nevertheless, accomplished their purpose. They had brought Burbridge back to Kentucky, where his wearied troops remained until they were required by Sherman.

The failure of this conjoint movement, coupled as it was with the retreat of Hunter across the mountains, left Washington exposed and the Shenandoah Valley practically unguarded. Lee, quick to seize his opportunity, resolved to make a demonstration in the direction of Harper's Ferry. His object seems to have been three-fold — to induce Grant to withdraw some of the troops from before Petersburg, to procure supplies, and to make an attempt on the National Capitol. Early, who, during the disability of Ewell, was in command of the upper part of the valley, having been reinforced by a body of Breckenridge's troops, was quickly in motion at the
head of some 20,000 or 25,000 men. In spite of the hot weather, he marched at the rate of about 20 miles a day.

As soon as Grant became aware of this new movement of the enemy, he ordered Hunter, who was then on the Kanawha in Western Virginia, to transport his troops, with all possible haste, by river and rail, to Harper's Ferry. Insuperable obstacles, however, lay in Hunter's way. The river was low, and the railroad was broken in several places. As Hunter was not able to be forward in time, other arrangements had to be made to meet the emergency. The Sixth corps was taken from its lines in front of Petersburg, and sent to cover Washington. The Nineteenth corps, under General W. H. Emory, which had just arrived in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, was, without being allowed to disembark, pushed after the Sixth.

Meanwhile, Early was advancing. On the 3d of July he was at Martinsburg, where Sigel was in command. July 3. Sigel, unable to offer any effective resistance, retired across the river, and took possession of Maryland Heights, leaving to the enemy the rolling stock, heavy trains laden with supplies for General Hunter, and other valuable stores. A panic seized the entire surrounding country. It recalled the memory of the two former invasions, that which preceded Antietam and that which preceded Gettysburg. Preparations were everywhere made to leave the menaced region. At Frederick, on the 5th, the railroad trains were loaded with government stores; and arrangements were made for the evacuation of the city. On the same day Hagerstown was occupied by the cavalry of the enemy; the stores were July 5. plundered, and a requisition was made on the inhabitants for $20,000. The money was paid, and the raiders left. President Lincoln, yielding to the excitement, and realizing the presence of danger, at the same time issued a call for militia—12,000 from New York, 12,000 from Pennsylvania, and 5000 from Massachusetts. The call was promptly responded to by each of the different States.

General Lewis Wallace was at that time in command of the Middle Department, having his head-quarters at Baltimore. Wallace had heard some vague rumors regarding the disasters which had befallen Sigel. More positive information soon reached him; and he became aware that the enemy having crossed the Potomac was already in Couch's Department. Convinced that a movement was intended against Baltimore and Washington, Wallace with all haste possible, adopted measures for checking the progress of the invaders. On the 5th of July, with the few available troops at his command, he took a strong position on the Monocacy River. There he concentrated his forces; and the ground chosen was such as enabled him to cover the Baltimore and Ohio crossing, and the principal roads leading to the cities now supposed to be in danger. On the 6th all the men, who could be spared from watching the railroads, were gathered together at the appointed rendezvous. There was some...
skirmishing on the 7th with varying success. On the evening of that day, however, the Confederates who had assembled in some force in front of Frederick were charged by Colonel Charles Gilpin at the head of his regiment, and driven back to the woods. The situation was now becoming serious not only for Wallace but for Baltimore and Washington. Happily, however, relief was at hand. Ricketts' division, the advance of the Sixth corps, reached Washington late on the night of the 6th of July. Ricketts with his division was sent to Baltimore the same night, with orders to push on towards the Monocacy as quickly as possible. On the 8th Wallace was joined by Ricketts, and made aware that Wright with the remainder of the corps, and Emory with the Nineteenth corps, were on their way to Washington. Becoming more and more satisfied that the Confederates were bent on marching to the Capital, he withdrew what troops he had sent for the defense of Frederick to his chosen position on the Monocacy. There on the morning of the 9th he made dispositions for battle. His right was under E. B. Tyler, and cov. ered the railroad at the Baltimore pike. His left was under Ricketts and held the Washington pike. On the left wing the main attack was expected. Each wing had 3 guns—Colonel Brown, with his own command and a body of mounted infantry guarded a stone bridge on Tyler's extreme right; and the lower fords were protected by a body of cavalry under Clendennin. Near the railroad at a block-house, was a rude earth-

work, mounted with a 24-pounder howitzer. Of Ricketts' division, three regiments were yet behind. It was expected, however, that they would arrive by rail at one o'clock. Wallace's entire force was about 8000. Early was already in his front with 16 Napoleon guns, a strong body of cavalry, and some 16,000 infantry.

It was near nine o'clock when Early opened the fight. The attack was made with tremendous fury. The shock was felt almost instantaneously on both wings of the National army. Brown soon found it difficult to maintain his position on the National right. At the same time, a bold move, as it proved, successful movement was executed against the National left. A large body of Confederates having moved by their own right, succeeded in crossing the Monocacy out of range of Ricketts' guns. Ricketts, finding himself outflanked, wheeled an and so as to face the foe; but in his new position he found himself exposed to an overwhelming force in his front, as well as to an enfilading fire from Early's guns across the stream. The battle lasted for many weary hours, the Nationals offering a stout and stubborn resistance to the repeated onsets of vastly superior numbers. Tyler while holding his own position, sent all the assistance he could to Ricketts. It was confidently expected that Ricketts' three regiments would be forward by one o'clock. It was now, however, far in the afternoon; and as yet there were no signs of coming relief. Towards four o'clock, Wallace, despairing of as
sistance and seeing the Confederates issuing from the woods in two strong columns to deliver a crushing and perhaps final blow, ordered Ricketts to retreat by the Baltimore road. Brown still held the stone bridge. Fighting desperately he continued to hold it until Ricketts' column was safe. At five o'clock Brown was compelled to give way. He fell back by the Baltimore pike. Tyler, with his remaining force, had no choice but follow. It was only by the narrowest chance that he and his staff, cut off from the rest of the troops, contrived to make good their escape. At New Market, the fugitives were joined by the three absent regiments of Ricketts' division; and the retreat towards Ellicott's Mills was covered. The wearied troops bivouacked some 12 miles from the field of strife. The battle of the Monocacy was a defeat to the small body of National troops engaged; but it was a gain to the National cause. Wallace had lost nearly 2000 men, of whom over 1200 were missing; but he had given Wright and Emory time to reach Washington. He had, in truth, saved the Capital. It was not denied that Early, if he had advanced immediately after the battle, might have captured Washington. His troops, however, had been severely tried; and they needed rest. He halted for a day. That pause made the Capital secure. Wright and Emory were forward in force; and the former at Grant's urgent request was placed in command of all the troops which could be made available for the defense of Washington.

For some days the wildest excitement prevailed; and it was feared that both Baltimore and Washington were in danger. Johnson, with his cavalry moved towards Baltimore; but finding all the approaches to the city so well guarded that success was not to be expected from any attack which he could hope to make, he contented himself with a general destruction of the railroads. He burned the bridges and tore up the tracks; and in the work of vandalism he was exceeded by his lieutenant the notorious Gilmore, who stopped the trains, plundered the passengers and the mails, and burned the cars. Early moved on Washington, advancing with great caution. On the 12th he was within 4 miles of the July city, on the north side, and in front of Forts Stevens and de Russey. His skirmishers and sharpshooters began to be a source of some annoyance; and with the view of developing his strength General Augur sent out from Fort Stevens a brigade of veterans. These had not advanced far before they felt the foe in very considerable force. A severe struggle ensued, each party losing about 300 men. Made aware of the concentration of troops in Washington, and deeming success impossible, if not trembling for his own safety, Early now beat a hasty retreat. On the night of the 12th he crossed the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, carrying with him a large amount of booty, including some 2000 head of cattle and some 5000 horses.

On the 13th Wright commenced the pursuit, taking with him the two divi
sions of the Sixth corps, and the Nineteenth corps under Emory. Moving northward from Washington to Poolesville, he crossed the Potomac just below Edward’s Ferry, and marched to Leesburg, where he was joined by Ricketts. On the 17th Duffie’s cavalry, of Crook’s command, had overtaken and captured a portion of the enemy’s train at Snicker’s Gap, near the Shenandoah, and Crook himself coming up soon afterwards, the Confederates were driven through the gap after a sharp fight. They held the ferry, however, on the west side of the river, where they planted two guns and put a stop to the pursuit for a while. On the 18th the whole of Wright’s and Crook’s forces had passed through Snicker’s Gap, except Duffie’s cavalry, sent northward to Ashby’s Gap to guard against an attempt of the enemy to flank the National right. Shortly after mid-day the infantry crossed at Island Ford, two and a half miles below Snicker’s Ferry, the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts in the advance and driving the enemy. Crook’s force also was soon over the river; and line of battle was formed, Colonel Wells with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts being on the left and Colonel Thorburn’s brigade on the right. A sharp engagement ensued. The Sixth corps also had commenced crossing, when the enemy, under Breckenridge, finding the rear attacked, returned quickly, and charged and drove back Colonel Thorburn’s brigade, compelling it to recross the river. Colonel Wells then withdrew his force in good order; and the enemy retained possession of the west bank. Duffie had no better fortune at Ashby’s Gap. He had driven Imboden through the gap and across the river; but the enemy having returned in force, he was himself compelled to retreat. A loss of about 500 was sustained in these two fights; and some of the wounded were left in the hands of the enemy, who was then allowed to pursue his way leisurely towards Winchester and Strasburg. The column under Wright crossed the river. It soon, however, returned and marched back to Leesburg, where it was divided, Crook with his portion of the force going to Harper’s Ferry, and Wright with the Sixth corps to Washington.

On the 19th, Averill, moving up the Shenandoah Valley from Martinsburg, encountered and drove back a body of cavalry at Darksville. Next morning he continued his march in the same direction. As he approached Winchester, General Early came out of his old intrenchments to meet him. The battle which ensued lasted three hours, when the Confederates, after losing about 400 men in killed and wounded, retired to their intrenchments, leaving Averill master of the field, with 4 cannon, several hundred small arms and about 200 prisoners. Averill’s loss was about 250.

Soon afterwards General Averill was rejoined by General Crook with his infantry, just returned from the unfortunate affair at Island Ford. The force under Crook was now about 10,000 men, consisting of Averill’s and Duffie’s cavalry and two divisions of infantry
On the 23d, after some skirmishing at Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester, the National cavalry was forced back, by the enemy, on the main body; and on the following day they were driven through Winchester in confusion towards Bunker Hill, thus completely uncovering the flanks of the infantry. General Crook had drawn up his force in line of battle; but when his cavalry broke he was compelled to beat a retreat. The Confederates, who had received reinforcements, and who were in much superior force, were able completely to outflank Crook's line. The retreat continued on the Bunker Hill road till night. The National loss was under 1200, including prisoners. Among the killed was Colonel Mulligan, whose brigade covered his retreat.

On the 25th, Crook halted at Martinsburg, to gain time for getting off his trains; but after a sharp artillery engagement he again fell back, and on the following day crossed the Potomac into Maryland, leaving the Confederates in possession of the west bank of the river from Williamsport to Shepherdstown. Another panic seized the people of Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. On the 28th, General Kelley crossed the Potomac and reoccupied Martinsburg, which the Confederates had already evacuated. On the morning of the 30th a force of 200 or 300 cavalry, under McCausland, crossed the Potomac and marched towards Chambersburg. McCausland, on his arrival, offered to spare the place for the sum of $500,000; but as this was not forthcoming, he set fire to the town; and two-thirds of it were laid in ashes. McCausland withdrew about eleven o'clock; and immediately afterwards Averill, who, with his cavalry, had just arrived at Chambersburg, set out in pursuit. Averill followed McCausland as far as Hancock, at which place the raiders, who were well mounted, succeeded in crossing the Potomac.

At the beginning of August, great excitement was produced in the border regions of Maryland and Pennsylvania by the reported reappearance of the Confederate raiders. Mosby had crossed the Potomac at Cheat's Ferry, with a small body of cavalry; but he quickly retired, carrying with him considerable plunder. Early, it was rumored, had entered Pennsylvania, at the head of 40,000 men; but General Wright, with the Sixth and a portion of the Nineteenth corps, scoured the country and failed to find him or any trace of his presence. Pennsylvania, however, was now thoroughly aroused. It was known that the Confederate general, Johnson, was raiding and working destruction in Maryland. On the 7th of August, Averill fell upon this force on Aug. the Romney road, as they were retiring towards Moorefield, and routed them, capturing all their artillery, with many wagons and small-arms, and 500 prisoners.

These successive raids had convinced General Grant that a powerful force, under a competent leader, was now needed in the valley of the Shenandoah. Without delay he consolidated
the Washington, Middle, Susquehanna, and Southwest Virginia Departments into what he called the Middle Military Division, and placed it under the command of General Hunter. Grant visited Hunter, who was concentrated on the Monocacy, and gave him his instructions. These raids must be ended; and to prevent their repetition everything which can not be consumed must be destroyed. Hunter expressed a willingness to be relieved; and on the 7th of August, the command was given to Sheridan, who promptly entered upon his duties.

The force under the command of Sheridan consisted of the Sixth corps under Wright, and the Nineteenth under Emory, the old army of Western Virginia, comprising the Eighth corps, under Crook; the entire first division of Potomac cavalry; Averill's division; Lowell's brigade, which had been usually kept near Washington, and Kel-ley's command; to which was soon afterwards added Wilson's second division—in all about 40,000 men, of which 10,000 were cavalry, with about twenty 6-gun batteries. The force under Early, including the two infantry corps of Rodes and Breckenridge, consisted of about 30,000 men, of which 10,000 were cavalry, with fourteen 6-gun batteries, and at this time was at Winchester, 27 miles west-southwest of Harper's Ferry.

At sunrise on the morning of the 10th of August, Sheridan began the movement of his forces from Halltown, about 4 miles west of Harper's Ferry. Marching at first westward, he reached Charlestown in two hours, from which point the Nineteenth corps, preceded by the cavalry brigades of Custer Aug. and Gibbs, struck off to the left 10. for Berryville, 15 miles southwest. Further to the left marched the command of Crook, while on the right the Sixth corps, preceded by the brigades of Devin and Lowell, moved along the Winchester road, turning off a few miles towards Berryville to join the Nineteenth. The weather during the march was oppressively hot; and the roads, in rainy seasons almost impassable from deep mud, were now covered with a thick layer of dust, which the rapid tread of many thousand feet, with horses, artillery and wagon trains raised in stifling clouds. About noon the several cavalry brigades of Custer, Devin, Gibbs, and Lowell formed a junction at Berryville. Four miles west of this place, on the road to Winchester, a body of the enemy's skirmishers was found and driven off. The infantry bivouacked in the neighborhood of Berryville, on the different roads by which they had approached, the Sixth corps on the right, the Nineteenth in the centre, the Eighth on the left. The cavalry, posted in the advance, held the roads leading to Winchester and Millwood, the latter place being occupied by Colonel Cesnola's regiment. On the 11th the army took the road leading to Winchester, the cavalry in the advance. Custer's brigade, on arriving at Sulphur Springs Bridge, about 4 miles east of Winchester, en countered a body of the enemy. A sharp skirmish took place, lasting two
On the morning of the 12th, it having been ascertained that the enemy had retreated, Sheridan's army Aug. moved forward again. The cavalry advanced, skirmishing most of the way, to Cedar Creek. About noon they found a force of the enemy on a hill in front of Strasburg. The Confederates shelled and drove back the cavalry skirmishers, till they were relieved by the Eighth corps, which had now arrived. The remainder of the army in passing through Newtown and Middletown met with no opposition, and on arriving at Cedar Creek bivouacked on the east bank, on the west side of which the enemy held a position in some old breast-works. There was active skirmishing during the remainder of the day, and in the evening some shelling across the creek, but no general engagement. On the following day, the enemy having fallen back in the night, the National skirmishers got into Strasburg, but were compelled to retire again. On the evening of the 14th the heights in front of the town were captured; and on the following morning the small force of the enemy which had held Strasburg for two days withdrew. The works on Fisher's Hill, however, still commanded the place.

News, however, had now arrived which caused Sheridan with his whole army to commence a rapid retreat towards Harper's Ferry. On the 13th, while the National army was lying in front of Strasburg, Mosby with a few light troops dashed through Snicker's Gap, crossed the Shenandoah, and fell suddenly on the rear of Sheridan's
supply train near Berryville on its way to Winchester, about 4 miles from the gap. The guard, consisting of Kenly's brigade of hundred days' men, became panic-stricken when Mosby made his charge. A few brave men fought well or a while, but the rest made off as rapidly as possible. Mosby captured and destroyed 75 wagons, chiefly laden with cavalry baggage, besides securing 200 prisoners, 600 horses and mules, and 200 head of cattle. He then re-tired, having lost only two men killed and 3 wounded. The National loss was not much greater. But this disaster in the rear, though not fatal in itself, caused it to be reported that Longstreet with his entire corps was getting into a position across Sheridan's line of communications, and was cutting off his whole army. The consequence was that on the 15th Sheridan got his Aug. 3 corps and the various cavalry brigades in readiness to retreat. The movement commenced about eleven at night, the Nineteenth corps taking the lead towards Winchester, followed the next day by Crook's command, the Sixth corps bringing up the rear. To prevent flanking operations on the part of the enemy from the gaps in the Blue Ridge, and to cover the retreat in that direction, Devin's cavalry brigade had been sent a few miles to the southeast towards Front Royal. In the meantime a body of the enemy, forming a part of Kershaw's division, which had taken part in the recent actions near Malvern Hills, had come by railroad to Mitchell Station, and marched thence to Front Royal; and on the morning of the 16th Custer's brigade, followed not long afterwards by that under Gibbs, was sent to the support of Devin. Custer arrived soon after noon and took position on the left of Devin. The line had not been long formed, however, before the enemy suddenly appeared marching in two columns, one of infantry, the other of cavalry, along the road leading northward from Front Royal to the Shenandoah. A brisk artillery fight then took place, the Confederates using 8 pieces, though without much effect. Their cavalry having crossed by the bridge and their infantry by the ford, they advanced to carry the National batteries, but were repulsed on the right by a charge from two regiments of Devin's brigade, each of which captured a flag. The Confederates were thus again driven over the river. Meanwhile, having secured a good position for their artillery, they attempted to turn the National left. At this time a brigade of Kershaw's division crossed the river, when a series of charges and counter-charges took place with the brigade of Custer. The fighting continued till after dark; and when the Confederates fell back to recross the river 150 of them were made prisoners at the ford. The killed and wounded did not exceed 100 on either side. This affair took place near Crooked Run, a small tributary of the Shenandoah, a little below the confluence of the north and south forks. Early the next morning Custer's and Devin's brigades fell back on the road leading northward to Winchester to
follow the infantry column, carrying out as they went orders which had been given for the capture or destruction of all the stock, grain, hay, and everything else which could contribute to the sustenance of man or beast. Fields and gardens were ravaged and swept clean.

The enemy followed closely upon the heels of Sheridan. The Sixth corps, which brought up the rear of the infantry column, had left Winchester on the morning of the 17th, Colonel Penrose's brigade, consisting of only about 500 men, having been left behind as a support to Torbert's cavalry. About Aug. 17, enemy, approaching by the Newtown and Winchester turnpike, attacked Penrose, who had deployed his small brigade in skirmishing order, with the cavalry on his flank, about a mile out of the town on the road leading to Kemstown. The cavalry, however, gave way, leaving Penrose to make the best fight he could behind fences, trees, and walls. Just before dark, the enemy having received large acceptions of numbers, was able to flank Penrose's little force; and it was soon broken, losing 800 prisoners, the remainder, with Penrose and a few officers, making their way through Winchester, escaped towards Clifton and Martinsburg. That night the enemy occupied Winchester. The National cavalry oivouacked at Berryville, next day taking up the line of retreat towards Harper's Ferry, being much harassed on their flanks and rear by the Confederate cavalry.

On the 18th, some men in citizens dress, killed a corporal and two men belonging to an advanced post of the Fifth Michigan Cavalry, picketing at Snicker's Gap, and hastily made off. Several other similar occurrences took place; and on the 19th, General Custer ordered some houses of disloyal citizens to be destroyed in retaliation. While a squad of men from the Fifth Michigan were engaged in carrying out this order, they were set upon by Mosby's men and compelled to fly in confusion: 18 of them were overtaken; and of these 15 were killed. This affair which took place near Snicker's Gap turnpike, was followed by another retaliatory order for the destruction of more houses of disloyal citizens.

During the retreat of Sheridan's army, Averill, who commanded at Martinsburg, continued to hold the place; but the alarm had become so great on the 18th, that he abandoned it with his main force, leaving only one company, which was driven out on the following day. Another panic then arose in that neighborhood and spread into Maryland. In Hagerstown, merchants packed their goods and sent them northward; the quartermasters' stores were loaded on railroad trains in readiness to be rapidly transported to Frederick the sick and wounded were sent to Harrisburg. In the mean while Averill took possession of the fords of the Potomac from Shepherdstown to Williamsport. Once more preparations were made to resist an attempt on the part of the enemy to cross over to Maryland; and on the 19th Sheridan's wagon
train was reported to be "safe" back at Hagerstown. The panic soon died out; and the enemy, a few of whose advanced cavalry had actually got near the Potomac, began to retire. On the 20th some of the National cavalry again entered Martinsburg.

On the 21st, Sheridan had disposed his army advantageously about two miles out from Charlestown towards Summit Point. It extended in a line from the Smithfield to the Berryville road, the Sixth corps on the right, the Eighth in the centre, and the Ninth on the left. About eight in the morning Early came up, and with a part of his force attacked the advanced cavalry skirmishers on the right and left, easily driving them in. The main body of his army moved off across the National right; but with a small force he drove back Wilson's division of cavalry from a good position on Summit Point with severe loss. He then threw a few brigades against the Sixth corps and the right of the Eighth; and fighting ensued, which lasted from ten o'clock till the close of the day, in the course of which the Sixth corps steadily advanced till it came upon the enemy's line of battle; but it sustained heavy losses in the continuous heavy skirmishing, and retired to its original position at dark. Cannonading was kept up for some time; but the result of the battle was, that Sheridan's army again fell back and took a position on Bolivar Heights, his right resting on the Potomac, his left on the Shenandoah, his headquarters at Halltown. The position of the army here was exceedingly strong, far outnumbering the enemy; and reinforcements with supplies were being sent to it daily. In the mean time the enemy's cavalry ranged the country in all directions at will. On the 24th, a reconnoitring force of 3 brigades sent out towards Charlestown discovered that Early was there in force, with his pickets out towards Bunker Hill. On the 25th, Torbert's cavalry was sent to reconnoitre in full force in the direction of Leetown, Wilson's division moving out from Halltown and uniting with Merritt's at Kearneysville, from which point the enemy's skirmishers retired. The National troops had the advantage for a little while; but the face of affairs soon changed, and the Confederates drove back the divisions of Wilson and Merritt, which were very badly handled, and compelled to abandon Kearneysville, and make the best of their way towards Harper's Ferry. A running fight ensued, lasting from eleven in the forenoon till dark, by which time Merritt's division was safe in camp at Bolivar Heights; but Custer's brigade, which had the rear in the retreat, did not fare so well. At Shepherdstown Custer found himself cut off from the Halltown road, by which he intended to march, and was finally compelled to seek safety by crossing the Potomac. The enemy did not venture to follow, but held the river from Shepherdstown to Williamsport, and on the following day made demonstrations as if designing to cross at the fords. In the afternoon Thorburn's division of Crook's corps and Lowell's cavalry pushed out or
The infantry soon encountered the Confederates, and after a contest, which lasted only twenty minutes, drove them to the cover of their artillery. Lowell with his cavalry then dashed in on the flank and cut off 69 prisoners, including 6 officers. The result of this reconnaissance was that the enemy was found to have left Sheridan's front; and about seven o'clock in the morning of the 28th he was again on the march in the direction of Charlestown, his cavalry in the advance carefully reconnoitering in various directions. By ten o'clock the Nineteenth corps reached Charlestown; and the entire army pushed on to the old line of battle held during the engagement a week before, about 2 miles beyond the town, the Sixth corps holding the right, the Nineteenth the centre, and the Eighth the left. Then having formed line of battle, the army awaited the result of the cavalry advance. On the morning of the 29th Aug. the Confederates were found near Smithfield; and General Merritt making a vigorous attack upon their cavalry drove it back through the town and over Opequan Creek. A reconnaissance was then made beyond the creek by General Custer's cavalry with Ransom's battery; but encountering the Confederate skirmishing line he retired again across the stream in the direction of Smithfield, followed by the enemy's infantry, which, however, on the advance of General Ricketts' division fell back again rapidly. Sheridan's army then again retired upon Charlestown, and remained quiet till the morning of the 3d of September, when it was again put in motion in a southwesterly direction, Crook's command occupying the left, the Nineteenth corps the centre, and the Sixth the right. Between ten and eleven the second cavalry division on the extreme right was attacked by Lomax's cavalry about 7 miles south of Martinsburg. Lomax's troops, however, were driven from the field. About noon Crook's command reached the vicinity of Berryville, where it was attacked by a large Confederate force, approaching from the direction of Winchester. Crook hastily formed his men; and a battle ensued, which lasted till dark, when the enemy retired, having suffered severely. The remainder of the army then coming up, got into position in the neighborhood of Berryville, and threw up substantial breast-works. Here Sheridan remained about two weeks, content to hold his own in the valley, without attempting any venturesome expedition, but keeping his force well in hand, so as to check any movement on the part of Early. During this time frequent reconnaissances were made both by the Confederate and the National cavalry.

Sheridan had now been considerably over a month in the valley, with an army decidedly superior to that of Early; and his marches and counter-marches had been a source of much perplexity and some dissatisfaction with the Northern public. His campaign so far had been one of manoeuvres, in which decisive fighting was avoided. The enemy, however, had been kept constantly occupied; and a force which
Lee could ill spare had been kept away from Petersburg, or from reinforcing Hood at Atlanta. When Atlanta fell, it ceased to be a part of Grant’s policy to keep Early with a large force idle in the valley; and about the middle of September he paid a hasty visit to the upper Potomac, had an interview with Sheridan, and gave him permission to change the character of the campaign by commencing a series of offensive operations.

A reconnaissance made on the 13th by the first cavalry division supported by Getty’s division of the Sixth corps, to Lock’s Ford on the Opequan, showed that the Confederates were on the west bank in some force. Three days later it was discovered that they had disappeared entirely from the neighborhood of the left wing of the National army on the Winchester and Berryville turnpike, and that they had but a weak line on the right. On the 18th the Confederate general, Gordon, with his division of infantry, occupied Martinsburg, but was speedily driven out of it again by Averill. Sheridan now having become satisfied that the main body of the Confederates had moved to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Stephen- son’s Depot, resolved by a rapid movement westward towards Winchester, to get into their rear. On the afternoon of the 18th, therefore, the troops were placed under arms and held in readiness to march at a moment’s notice. At three o’clock on the morning of the Sept. 19th the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were set in motion, the Sixth being directed to march in parallel columns on each side of the Winchester and Berryville turnpike with the artillery, ammunition, and supply trains between them on the road, the Nineteenth corps following by the same road in similar order. Crook with the Eighth corps was ordered to move at five o’clock from his position in the vicinity of Summit Point, across the country in a southwesterly direction, and form a junction with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps at the point where the Winchester and Berryville turnpike crosses the Opequan, 5 miles east of Winchester. Torbert and Averill, with their large cavalry force, were directed to occupy the enemy’s attention by demonstrating on his left. Shortly after daylight Wilson’s division of cavalry crossed the Opequan and skirmished with the enemy, who were discovered to be in force on the west bank. The march of the Nineteenth corps was by some means so delayed that it did not cross the Opequan till about noon, and thus Early had time to draw in his left from its advanced position near Bunker Hill. Such was the resistance offered that the first and second lines were thrown into some confusion, and forced to retire behind the third; but as soon as Sheridan got his batteries into a position from which they were able to silence the enemy’s guns, order was restored, and they again advanced, retaking the position from which they had been driven, and holding it until reinforced by Crook, whose troops had been kept in reserve on the east side of the creek. Then followed one of the most fiercely con
tested battles of the war, the opposing lines being at some points not more than 200 yards apart. About three in the afternoon Crook's first division got into position on the right and his second in the rear, supporting a division of the Nineteenth corps. About this time, also, Torbert, with Averill's and Merritt's cavalry divisions, arrived on the extreme right. Sheridan then ordered an advance along the entire line. The Confederates stubbornly maintained their ground against the National infantry, but gave way finally before a most brilliant and successful charge of the cavalry, made at a critical moment. The battle lasted till five in the evening. The victory, however, was of the most decisive character. Early's troops were driven from the field in confusion; and, according to a despatch of Sheridan's, they were sent "whirling through Winchester," whence they retreated rapidly to Fisher's Hill, 3 miles south of Strasburg. Night prevented Sheridan from continuing the pursuit. Such was the battle of Winchester. Sheridan captured 2500 prisoners, on the field and in the pursuit. In the hospitals at Winchester he found nearly 3000 wounded. The Confederates left behind them, also, 5 guns and 9 battle flags. Early's entire loss must have amounted to 6000. Sheridan's entire loss could hardly have been much under 5000. On both sides several prominent officers were killed, among them General David Russell and the Confederate general, Rodes.

The position of Early at Fisher's Hill was one of extraordinary natural strength. His line extended in a westerly direction across the Strasburg valley, the right resting on the North Fork of the Shenandoah, the left or Little North Mountain. From this position Sheridan soon made preparations to drive him; and after a good deal of manœuvring, his army about noon on the 22d lay as follows: Sept. Crook's corps on the right, the 22d Sixth in the centre, and the Nineteenth on the left. While Wright and Emory made demonstrations on the left and centre, and Averill drove in the enemy's skirmishers, Crook moved out to the extreme right. After a long and arduous march, he got round and flanked Early's left between four and five in the afternoon, and made a furious attack, sweeping down behind the enemy's breast-works, and driving the Confederates out of them in the greatest confusion. While Crook was thus carrying everything before him on the enemy's left, Wright attacked the Confederate centre, separating the two wings. The enemy broke and fled towards Woodstock, leaving behind him 16 guns and 1100 prisoners. The victory at Fisher's Hill was the more easily won from the fact that Early dreaded an attack from Torbert, who, it was known, was coming through the Luray Valley with his cavalry. Torbert, however, had been effectively held in check by an inferior force near Melford.

Sheridan marched, the night after the battle, to Woodstock, but halted there in the morning to give his troops rest and to await the arrival of rations.
Averill pushed on in advance, drove the Confederates to Mount Jackson, where they made a stand and resisted his further progress. Sheridan soon afterwards advanced to Mount Jackson and hence to New Market; and on the 25th his headquarters were at Harrisonburg, his cavalry moving towards Staunton. On the 24th, Torbert had a sharp engagement near Luray with the enemy's cavalry, who were trying to operate in Sheridan's rear; but he succeeded in driving them up the valley; and on the 26th he rejoined the main army. Early retreated to Port Republic, and thence to Brown's Gap, a depression in the Blue Ridge 15 miles southeast of Harrisonburg, which he held in force, and retained, in spite of several attempts to drive him from it. Torbert, with Wilson's division of cavalry and a brigade of Merritt's, entered Staunton on the morning of the 26th and destroyed a quantity of the enemy's property; then marching along the railroad to Waynesboro, he tore up the track for the entire distance, as well as the bridges over Christian's Creek and the South River, finally retiring to Harrisonburg by way of Staunton, destroying or carrying off large supplies of forage and grain.

Several reconnaissances made towards Early's position at Brown's Gap showed that he enjoyed unusual facilities for defense. He had thrown up intrenchments and prepared to make a determined stand. An advance on Lynchburg on the part of Sheridan, with Early in his rear now receiving reinforcements, would have been extremely hazardous. His communications would have been at once interrupted. As it was, numerous guerrilla bands, under the lead of Mosby, White, and other partisan chieftains, kept up an annoying warfare between Strasburg and the Potomac; and ever since the army left Harper's Ferry, every small party and every straggler had been "bushwhacked" by the people of the valley, many of whom had obtained protection passes from earlier commanders. Lieutenant John Meigs, of the engineer corps, was overtaken and murdered in a narrow wooded road between Harrisonburg and Dayton; but in retaliation for this, all the houses within five miles were burned by order of Sheridan. Nothing was to be gained by staying any longer in the neighborhood of Port Republic and Cross Keys; and it remained only to fall back down the valley to some point which could be easily and firmly held, and to which the winter supplies for the army might be conducted in safety. On the 6th of October, Oct. 6, forces from the various advance points which they had occupied, and marched northward, destroying on his way, in accordance with orders from Government, all the hay, grain, and forage to be found, beyond what was necessary for the use of his own army. In a despatch dated October 7th, Sheridan says:

"The whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain has been made untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements, over 70 mills filled with wheat and flour. Four herds of cattle have been
driven before the army, and not less than 3000 sheep have been killed and issued to the troops. This destruction embraces the Luray and Little Fork valleys as well as the main valley.”

As Sheridan returned down the valley towards Cedar Creek, he was closely followed by the Confederate cavalry under Rosser, supported by the main body of Early’s army. On the Oct. 9th, the head of Sheridan’s infantry column having entered Strasburg by the east road, while the rear was still some miles further south, the enemy following the cavalry on the west road had advanced so far as to get on the left flank of the infantry column. Custer and Merritt then turned and attacked with their cavalry, when a report having spread among Rosser’s men that the National infantry were at the same time flanking them, they immediately gave way and broke into a stampede. The pursuit was continued 7 miles. The loss of the enemy was not great, being only about 300 men, including prisoners; but he abandoned 11 guns, 4 caissons, and an ammunition train. Things remained quiet for several days after this affair; but on the 12th the Confederates again appeared in the neighborhood of Strasburg and opened an artillery fire on Emory’s and Crook’s corps. These troops were then partially withdrawn and Crook pushed out a reconnaissance, which brought on a smart engagement of three hours’ duration. Night, however, closed upon the scene without any advantage and with little loss to either side.

On the 15th, Sheridan went to Washington on important business, leaving the army under the command of General Wright, whose corps Oct. was, in the meantime, intrusted to 15. General Ricketts. Fisher’s Hill had been abandoned as not affording any good defensible line on its southern slope, on which side Early would be likely to approach; and the army had now lain for several days in front of Strasburg, behind breast-works thrown up on rising and rolling ground, mostly along the east side of Cedar Creek—Crook with the Eighth corps on the left, the Nineteenth corps in the centre, the Sixth on the right. On the right of the Sixth, a little in the rear and in reserve, were the two cavalry divisions of Custer and Merritt. The line was 4 or 5 miles long, and following the course of the creek, nearly north and south. Crook’s corps rested its left flank on the North Fork of the Shenandoah and its right on the Winchester and Strasburg turnpike, the principal highway in that region. Behind Crook’s left and at right angles to it, with a view to guard against any turning movement on that flank, lay a force about equivalent to a brigade, known as Kitching’s provisional division. North of the turnpike came the Nineteenth corps, Grover’s division holding its left and resting on the turnpike, where it joined Thorburn’s division of Crook’s command. The Sixth corps on the right, and the second cavalry division, were not strongly protected with works, as was all the rest of the line, but were well posted on high ridges, and held firmly the Middle road, or that which
runs next north of the turnpike. A small stream called Meadow Run flows into the creek between the two roads mentioned. In front the National position was considered impregnable, except by surprise, and to turn it would be, it was believed, an undertaking of extreme temerity. To guard against surprise on the left, the North Fork was picketed by Powell's cavalry division from Cedar Creek all the way to Front Royal. Weir's battery commanded the fords, supported by cavalry, which were so posted as to prevent surprise from the direction of the Luray Valley. Artillery was posted in front of the positions of Crook and Emory, so as to command the ford and the bridge over Cedar Creek, as well as the rising ground on the west side. The wagon trains and reserve artillery lay in the rear on the turnpike. On the 17th the cavalry on the right under Custer was attacked by Confederate cavalry and infantry; and a severe skirmish ensued, resulting in the repulse of the enemy. Next day a careful reconnaissance was made from the left towards Strasburg and Fisher's Hill; but no sign of movement on the part of the enemy was discovered. Despatches, however, were captured; and it was thus ascertained that reinforcements had been sent to Early, for the purpose of enabling him to attack and defeat Sheridan.

Early, in fact, had just received a reinforcement of some 12,000 men. His actual strength was thus increased to 27,000. His army was still smaller than that of Sheridan. Encouraged, however, by so large an accession of strength, Early prepared to put in execution one of the most audacious movements of the war. Before break of day on the 19th, he arranged his troops at Fisher's Hill and began to move against Sheridan's lines. His cavalry and light artillery were directed to advance against the National right, so as to occupy the attention of Torbert and the Sixth corps. His infantry marched in five columns, of which Gordon's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's were ordered to place themselves by Oct. daybreak on the left rear of the whole National position, while Kershaw's and Wharton's were to endeavor to get, about the same time, close under the intrenched rising ground on which lay Crook's command. To turn the National left, it was necessary that Early's columns should descend into the gorge at the base of the Massanutten Mountain, ford the North Fork of the Shenandoah, and skirt Crook's encampment for some distance, in some places within 400 yards of his pickets. It was a hazardous as well as audacious experiment; but it was executed with wonderful skill and, as the result proved, with complete success. The movement was conducted quietly, and with great caution. The result was that before daybreak the Confederate infantry, formed and ready for battle, lay within 600 yards of the National camps. Gordon's column was diagonally in the rear of the Nineteenth corps; on the left of Crook, facing Kitching's provisional division, was Ramseur supported by Pegram; in
front of Crook was Kershaw supported by Wharton. Under cover of the morning mist, Kershaw's column moved rapidly through Crook's picket line, and with tremendous fury rushed upon the intrenchments. The onslaught was fearful. The surprise was complete.

In a quarter of an hour Crook's gallant army of Western Virginia became a disorganized mass of fugitives in rapid rout towards the position of the Nineteenth corps. Crook lost several batteries, some 700 men made prisoners, and about 100 in killed and wounded. The Sixth corps was at the same time menaced; and its attention occupied by the enemy's cavalry and light artillery. It fell to the lot of the Nineteenth corps to resist unaided the shock of Gordon's column, now advancing solidly massed up the slope of a broad bare hill which commanded Emory's camp. The Confederate force, including the divisions of Ramseur and Pegram, was as strong as Emory's, and was supported by another column coming up through the woods on the left, and along the turnpike in front. The Nineteenth corps was thus not only taken in the rear, but outnumbered. Still it held out for about an hour; and then its left gave way, leaving a part of the artillery in the enemy's hands. The left and centre of the National army had now fallen into complete confusion; and all the trains that could be got away were sent off in haste along the turnpike towards Winchester. The sun was now high in the heavens; and the extent of the disaster was rendered visible. The Confederates had succeeded in rolling up the left of the line, and in severing Powell's cavalry division on the extreme left from the rest of the army, and they were now forcing back the entire centre, and occupying the intrenchments of the Nineteenth corps as they had those of Crook's command. They had also captured 18 pieces of artillery, thus not only lessening the National power for defense, but increasing their own power for attack. The captured cannon were turned with terrible effect on their late possessors. The Sixth corps was now ordered over from the right; and these troops, executing quickly a change of front which brought them at right angles to their former line, were soon engaged in desperate battle. The resistance made by the Sixth corps in covering the retreat afforded opportunity for re-forming the fugitives to some extent; but the Confederates increased their artillery and musketry fire to the utmost, and still pressed the National left flank, with the view, apparently, of getting full possession of the turnpike, that they might seize the trains and get between the National army and Winchester. The enemy pressed the left much more vigorously than the right. Merritt's and Custer's cavalry were transferred from the right to the left; and a severe contest took place in the thickly wooded country near Middletown, in which the left had been placed by its rapid retreat. About nine o'clock Sheridan's army had got into line of battle again, and made desperate efforts to check the enemy. Both sides used artillery;
but the Confederates had greatly the advantage in this arm, having not only their own batteries, but the captured guns of their antagonists besides. The Sixth corps held its ground well; but Crook's corps on the left was forced back, and the whole line gradually gave way, the enemy again getting past the National left flank, and finally gaining the village of Middletown, about 3 miles northeast of the position from which Sheridan's army had been driven. The principal aim of the National commanders now was to cover the trains and draw off the army with as little loss as possible to Newton, where they hoped to be able to re-form and offer an effective resistance. The battle had been completely lost. Camps, earth-works, some 24 guns and 1800 prisoners—all were left in the hands of the enemy. The routed Nationals were flying in all directions, large numbers of them making their way to Winchester.

The National army fell back, as we have seen, first towards Middletown, and afterwards in the direction of Newton. About a mile or so in the rear of Middletown, Wright succeeded in restoring something like order. Sheridan was still absent. He had been, as we have mentioned, on a visit to Washington. On his return, he spent the night at Winchester. It was not until his army had been defeated that he was made aware of Early's attack. He was in his saddle in a minute. He had scarcely left Winchester when he beheld sad evidences of the disaster which had befallen his army. The road was covered with wagon trains and crowds of weary fugitives. As he rode along on his splendid charger, the air was rent with cheers. The fugitives felt abashed and halted; and the wounded by the way-side feebly waved a joyful salute. He did not slacken his pace to rebuke or encourage. Waving his hat to the cheering crowds, his horse still at full gallop, he shouted, "Face the other way, boys! Face the other way! We are going back to our camps. We are going to lick them out of their boots."

The words were electric. The tide of fugitives began to turn. As he neared the main body, the enthusiasm became unbounded. Officers and men tossed their hats and cheered to the echo. He repeated his fiery words, "Boys, if I had been here this would never have happened. We are going back. We'll have all these camps and cannon back again." What Sheridan said, he meant; and the men believed him. He was in the field shortly after ten o'clock.

There was a lull in the fight, which lasted several hours. Wright, as has been mentioned, had already restored order, and made dispositions, if not for attack, at least for effective resistance. Sheridan approved of the arrangements; and amid the most enthusiastic cheers, he rode along the lines, studying the ground and encouraging them. About one o'clock Early made a charge, which was vigorously repulsed by Emory. About three o'clock Sheridan gave the order, "The entire line will advance. The Nineteenth corps will move in connection with the Sixth.
The right of the Nineteenth will swing to the left, so as to drive the enemy upon the pike." The order was promptly obeyed. The entire line moved forward—Getty's division leading the charge. Merritt's cavalry covered the left flank; Custer's cavalry was thrown out on the right. As the Nationals advanced they were checked for a moment by a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry. The check, however, was but momentary; for Emory swung around upon the foe and by two gallant charges greatly disordered his lines. Almost at the same moment, the National cavalry fell upon Early's flank. The tide of battle had already turned. The Confederates fought with bravery and determination; but Sheridan's boys now fighting in the presence of their favorite chief were not to be resisted. The battle, in fact, was already won; and what was so recently a retreat, was now changed into a pursuit. It was a perfect rout. On his arrival, Sheridan said "we'll have all those camps and cannon back again." His word was made good. That night, the National infantry halted within their old camps; but the cavalry pursued, hanging upon the flanks and rear of the retreating foe, until he was beyond St. asburg, and night fell upon the scene. Early halted for the night at Fisher's Hill, and in the morning resumed his retreat southward. In the pursuit, all the captured guns were recovered. The Nationals captured not only their own guns, but 23 of those of the enemy, together with 1500 prisoners, and any quantity of horses, mules, ambulances, wagons and stores of various kinds.

Such was the Battle of Cedar Creek; and such was the end of the great campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. It was one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war. It was characterized by vigor and skill; and it was crowned with success. Sheridan had captured during the campaign 18,000 prisoners and killed and wounded 10,000 men. His own loss, however, was great—reaching the high figure of 16,000 men. He had now taken his place among the great captains of the age. His praise was in every mouth. His famous ride from Winchester has been immortalized by the combined influences of poetry and song. It was a proud honor which was conferred upon him when some three weeks afterwards on the occasion of the resignation of General McClellan, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General in the regular army; but it was an honor to which he had entitled himself by daring, by energy, by unwearied activity and by success.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Sherman at Atlanta—How the Men were Occupied—Position of the National Forces—Hood Rallies at Jonesboro—Speech of Jefferson Davis at Macon—New Confederate Policy—Thomas sent to Nashville—Movements of Hood—Allatoona Pass—Arrival of General Corse—General French demands its Surrender—Corse's Reply—Ready for the "Useless Effusion of Blood"—The Assault—Corse Wounded—Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain—The Confederates Retreat towards Dallas—Sherman at Kingston—Sherman at Rome—Hood Before Resaca—Demands its Surrender—Colonel Weaver's Reply—The National Post at Dalton Captured—Sherman at Resaca—Communications with Rome Re-opened—Affairs at Snake Creek Gap and Ship's Gap—Rapid Retreat of Hood to Gadsden—Beauregard Assumes Command—Sherman at Gaylesville—New Plan of Campaign—Sherman's Proposal to Grant—The March to the Sea Suggested—Grant Consents—Sherman Prepares for the March—He Sends some of his Troops to Thomas—Sherman's Army Re-organized—Atlanta in Flames—The Railroad Routes to the Sea—Order of March—Troops to Live on the Country—"Uncle Billy" and the Troops—The Men in Fine Spirits—Feint on Macon—Battle of Griswoldville—Occupation of Milledgeville—Flight of the Legislators—Howard Crosses the Oconee—Occupation of Sandersville—Sherman at Tennille Station—Kilpatrick Defeats Wheeler—Crossing the Ogeechee—Approach to Savannah—The Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers—Captain Duncan and two Scouts Reach the Fleet—Rejoicing in the North—Foster's Co-operative Movement—Fort McAllister—Preparing to Assault—The Fort Reduced—Arrival of Foster and Dahlgren—Sherman on board the Nema—The Surrender of Savannah Demanded—Hardee Refuses—Kilpatrick Cuts the Gulf Railroad—Savannah Invested—Union Causeway—Corduroy Road—Vigorous Preparations for the Assault—Hardee's Resignation—Desperate—After Destroying all the Confederate Property, he Retreats during the Night—Sherman Enters the City—His Christmas Present to President Lincoln—Halleck and Grant's Congratulations—A Compliment from Grant—A Successful Campaign—The Inherent Weakness of the Confederacy Demonstrated—Fearful Destruction of Property—General Geary Appointed Military Governor of Savannah—Resolution of Submission to the Laws of the United States—Sherman Perfecting his Plan for the March through the Carolinas.

After the fall of Atlanta, there was a lull in the campaign. The weared armies on both sides were permitted to enjoy a brief period of repose. They were not, however, allowed to be wholly idle. Hood collected and recruited his forces at Lovejoy's Station. Sherman's head-quarters were at Atlanta. Some of his men obtained leave of absence. Those who remained were employed in the construction of huts and barracks, in strengthening the defenses of the city, and in repairing the railroads. Supplies and recruits were hurried forward from Chattanooga. It seemed as if Sherman intended to hold Atlanta with a strong garrison, and to make it the base for further operations towards the South. Before the end of September the place was so strengthened and filled with supplies that, with a small garrison, it would have been able to resist the attacks of vastly superior numbers.

The city was held by the army of the Cumberland under Thomas. The army of the Tennessee, under Howard, was grouped about East Point, and the army of the Ohio, under Schofield, held Decatur. The cavalry consisted of two
divisions: one stationed at Decatur,
under Garrard; the other, under Kil-
patrick, was posted near Sandtown,
with a pontoon bridge over the Chattaa-
hoochee, from which position any
movement of the enemy towards the
west could be watched. Numerous
changes occurred in the composition of
the armies. The term of service of
many of the regiments had expired,
and the temporary suspension of active
operations afforded an opportunity to
consolidate and reorganize, to reclothe
and equip the men, and to make prepa-
rances for another campaign. The
barrisons in the rear also, and at points
along the railroad, were strengthened
to make the communications more se-
cure. Wagner's division of the Fourth
corps and Morgan's division of the
Fourteenth corps were sent back to
Chattanooga.

General Hood, recovering with sur-
prising elasticity from the stunning
blow which he received in the loss of
Atlanta, rallied and reorganized his
forces at Jonesboro, receiving his sup-
plies by the Macon Railroad. His
army numbered about 40,000 men, ex-
clusive of the Georgia militia, which,
as if to give the impression that no
immediate offensive movement was con-
templated, were withdrawn by Gov-
ernor Brown soon after the evacuation
of Atlanta. The governor expressed a
hope, however, that he should be able
to return the militia force to Hood's
command in greater numbers and with
equal efficiency when the interests of
the public service should require it.

It was not the intention of the Con-
federate authorities, however, to allow
their principal Southern army to remain
inactive. Whatever declarations they
might make to the public in the hope
to belittle Sherman's successes, they
were well aware that the capture of
Atlanta was a blow at the heart of the
Confederacy, and that it would be so
considered by the Southern people. It
was evident that if Georgia and the
Gulf States were to be saved to the
Confederacy, something must be done,
and that without delay, to arrest the
victorious progress of the National
army. While affairs were in this posi-
tion, Jefferson Davis set out on a tour
of inspection through the South; and
at Macon, on the 23d of Septem-
ber, he delivered an address on the
crisis, marked by so many indiscreet
admissions that some of the Confederate
journals refused to believe the reports
to be genuine. In this address he
spoke with undisguised vexation of the
depletion of Hood's ranks by desertion
and absenteeism; and he promised that
if all the men away, without leave would
return to their duty, Sherman's army
should meet the fate that befell that of
the French empire in its retreat from
Moscow.

The new policy to be inaugurated in
the South by the Confederates was in
a measure foreshadowed by the speech
of Davis at Macon. It was borrowed
from that which Sherman had himself
so successfully carried out in his cap-
ture of Atlanta, and had the merit of
boldness if not of originality and far
sightedness. In accordance with this
new plan of the Confederates, Hood's
whole army was to move rapidly in a compact body to the north of Atlanta, and after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and there destroy the great railroad bridge over the Tennessee River. Atlanta would then be cut off from Chattanooga and the latter from Nashville. Sherman thus separated from his primary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest. It would, indeed, have been difficult for him to hold it; for he would soon have found himself in perplexity from the want of provisions and supplies, which would be intercepted in all directions by the Georgia militia. Forrest, undoubtedly the best of the Confederate cavalry officers, was already operating in southern Tennessee, where the National force was barely adequate to the task of protecting the communications between Nashville and Chattanooga. It was anticipated, also that the resumption of offensive movements on the part of Hood would restore the morale of his army, which had become dispirited by its long series of retreats and reverses; and that the opposite effect would be produced on the army of Sherman if compelled to abandon conquests effected at the cost of so many severe battles and painful marches. Such was the plan devised by the Confederate authorities—a plan which if vigorously carried out, and against a less able general than Sherman, might have been productive of the most disastrous consequences to the National arms. It will be seen that

Sherman was fully equal to the emergency, and that the prophecies of the Southern press, that the "great flanker" was about to be "out flanked," were not to be fulfilled. On the 28th Sept. of September, as soon as he became convinced that the enemy intended to assume the offensive, Sherman sent Thomas, his second in command, to Nashville, to organize the new troops expected to arrive there, to make preliminary preparations, and to look after Forrest.

In spite of strenuous opposition, Hood was retained at the head of the Confederate army, with Cheatham, S. D. Lee, and Stewart, commanding his three corps. Wheeler remained in command of the cavalry, which had been largely reinforced. Hood soon moved westward towards the Chattahoochee, taking a position facing Sherman and covering the West Point Railroad about Palmetto Station. He also threw a pontoon bridge over the Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry detachments beyond it in the direction of Carrollton and Powder Springs. About the 2d of October his whole Oct. army was over the Chattahoochee, and on the march towards Dallas, where his three corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was able to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga, while there remained open to him in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwestward into Alabama. Advancing eastward from Dallas to the railroad, he captured Big Shanty and Ackworth Stations, broke the tele
graph wires, and destroyed the railroad between those places. He also sent an infantry division under General French against the National post at Allatoona Pass, through which lay the railroad and Sherman’s line of communications. Here were stored more than 1,000,000 rations for the National army, the capture of which would prove an important acquisition to Hood’s impoverished commissariat. The natural strength of the position at Allatoona Pass was such, that 1000 men could hold it against ten times their number so long as supplies held out. Its redoubts were at this time garrisoned by only three small regiments under Colonel Tourtellotte. In the possession of the Confederates it would have effectually interrupted the National communications between Chattanooga and Atlanta, and might have necessitated the evacuation of the latter city. It will be seen, therefore, that Hood had excellent reasons for striking suddenly and with a large force at this point.

Well aware that his seat at Atlanta was insecure while his long line of communications lay exposed to interruption, Sherman, on hearing that Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, despatched General Corse with a division of the Fifteenth corps to Rome. Slocum was ordered to hold Atlanta and the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee with the Twentieth corps. A freshet of the river having carried away the bridges, three pontoons were laid on the 4th of October, and the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Third corps were put in motion towards Smyrna camp-ground. The following day they were moved to the strong position about Kenesaw Mountain. Anticipating the enemy’s movement against Allatoona Pass, Sherman had already signalled and telegraphed to Corse to reinforce that post from Rome, and hold it until the main body of the National army could come to his assistance. On receiving the message, Corse immediately placed a brigade of 900 men on the cars and reached Allatoona on the night of the 4th, just in time to be ready to meet the attack of French’s division. With this addition the garrison numbered 1000 men, with 6 guns.

Early on the morning of the 5th, French with 6000 men, and supported by two other divisions, approached Allatoona, and sent a letter to Corse demanding an immediate surrender, in order to avoid “a useless effusion of blood,” giving only five minutes for an answer. Corse was ready within the time specified. His reply was that he and his command were ready for the “useless effusion of blood” as soon as it was agreeable to French. This was immediately followed by a Confederate attack which commenced at eight o’clock and continued till two in the afternoon. Driven by the desperate assaults of overwhelming numbers, Corse’s troops contested the ground foot by foot, from their intrenchments to the hill, and from the hill to the fort. Corse, although bleeding and at times insensible, having been wounded early in the action, still fought on with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of
the great stake for which he contended. During the heat of the contest, about ten o'clock, Sherman reached the Kennesaw Mountain, 18 miles distant from Allatoona, and from its summit saw the smoke of battle and heard faintly the sounds of artillery. The distance being too great to send troops to take part in the battle, Sherman directed General Cox with the Twenty-Third corps to move rapidly westward from the base of Kennesaw, strike the road from Allatoona to Dallas, and threaten the rear of the attacking force. He also succeeded in getting a signal message to Corse notifying him of his presence. Sherman had great confidence in that general and in the result of the battle, and said while reviewing it from his remote stand-point: "I know Corse; so long as he lives, the Allatoona Pass is safe." The assaulting columns of the enemy, thrown back again and again, were finally compelled to retire towards Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by apprehensions of the co-operating movement of Cox towards the only road by which they could escape. Unfortunate delays, arising from rain and mud, prevented Cox from intercepting the Confederates on the road back to Dallas; but they left 800 killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the hands of Corse. The garrison lost nearly half its number, in killed and wounded. The little town of Allatoona was reduced to a mere wreck by the severe fire of the Confederates. All the artillery and cavalry horses were killed. The valuable stores, however, were saved, and the fort and pass were held. This battle was the decisive event in the pursuit of Hood. Corse notwithstanding his severe wounds, was able to return the same night to Rome with the remainder of his command. The only important injury done by the Confederates in this vicinity was the destruction of 6 or 7 miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Allatoona, which was immediately put in course of restoration. Sherman remained several days in the vicinity of Allatoona, watching the movements of Hood, suspecting he would march for Rome, and thence towards Bridgeport, or else to Kingston.

On the 6th and 7th, Sherman pushed out his cavalry towards Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and discovered that the enemy had moved westward. Inferring from this that Hood would attempt to break the railroad again in the neighborhood of Kingston, he put his army in motion on the morning of the 8th through Allatoona Pass and arrived at Kingston on the 10th. There he learned that Hood had threatened but passed by Rome, and that he was crossing the Coosa by a pontoon bridge 11 miles below. He therefore, on the 11th, moved his army to Rome, and sent Garrard's cavalry and the Twenty-Third corps under Cox across the Oostanaula to threaten the flanks of the enemy as he passed northward. Garrard drove a Confederate cavalry brigade beyond the Narrows leading into the valley of the Chattooga, and captured 2 field pieces.

Hood, however, moved with great
rapidly on his northward march, and
Oct. 12. on the 12th appeared with Stewart's corps in front of Resaca, and de-
manded its immediate and un-
conditional surrender. He promised
that all the white officers and soldiers
would be paroled in a few days, but
he threatened that if the place should
be captured by assault, no prisoners
would be taken. To this demand
Colonel Weaver, who held the defenses
of the place with 600 men and 3 pieces
of artillery, replied: "If you want it,
come and take it." The garrison
manned the rifle-pits surrounding the
works, and kept the enemy's skirmishers at bay. During the day masses
of Confederate troops continued to
pass the fort; but no serious attack
was made on them, the enemy being
more intent on destroying the railroad
towards Dalton. Sherman had at first
intended to move his army into the
Chattooga Valley, to interpose between
the enemy and his line of retreat down
the Coosa, but fearing that Hood
would then move eastward by Spring
Place and down the Federal road, he
determined to move against him at
Resaca. Although repulsed at that
place by Colonel Weaver, Hood had
succeeded in breaking up the railroad
from Tilton to Dalton. At Tilton,
during the night of the 12th, he cap-
tured a blockhouse garrisoned by a
part of the Seventeenth Iowa, after a
gallant defense. At Dalton, owing to
the negligence of the National scouts,
the Confederates were able to surround
the fort garrisoned by the Forty-Fourth
colored regiment, under Colonel John-
ston, before adequate preparations for
defense could be made. A summons
to surrender, signed by Hood, similar
to that sent Colonel Weaver being sent
in, Colonel Johnston, finding that Buzz-
ard Roost and other important points
commanding his position were already
in the enemy's hands, complied with
the demand. During the 14th and
15th the enemy was occupied in com-
pleting the destruction of the railroad
as far as Tunnel Hill. The rolling
stock had been mostly removed; and of
this kind of property only a few box
cars were destroyed.

With the main body of his army,
Sherman arrived at Resaca on the 14th,
where he encamped for the night.
Determining to strike Hood in flank or
force him to battle, he directed the
army of the Tennessee, under Howard,
to move to Snake Creek Gap, where
a portion of the enemy's forces held the
old National lines, and General Stanley
with the Fourth and Fourteenth corps
to march by way of Tilton across the
mountains to the rear of the gap in the
neighborhood of Villanow. Howard
skirmished with the Confederates dur-
ing the forenoon of the 15th, Oct.
with the view of detaining them
15. till Stanley should have time to get in
their rear; but they gave way about
noon, and though followed through the
gap, escaped before Stanley had been
able to reach the further end of the
pass.

The approach of the National columns
now warned Hood to move off west
ward; and the 16th of October found
him in full retreat for Lafayette
Towards that place also Sherman moved his army, with the view of cutting off Hood's retreat. At Ship's Gap, Hood left some troops intrenched, to detain his pursuers; but Wood's division of the Fifteenth corps rapidly arried the advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina regiment, making the men prisoners. The remainder of the regiment escaped to the main body near Lafayette. Next morning Sherman's force passed over into the valley of the Chattooga, the army of the Tennessee moving in pursuit, by way of Lafayette and Alpine, towards Blue Pond; the army of the Cumberland by Summerville and Milledgeville Post Office to Gaylesville, and the army of the Ohio and Garrard's cavalry from Villanow, Dirt-town, and Goover's Gap to Gaylesville. Hood, however, was little encumbered with trains; and as he marched with great rapidity in a southwesterly direction, through a broken and mountainous country, he succeeded in getting into the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout range abutting against the Coosa River in the neighborhood of Gadsden.

During this retreat of Hood into northern Alabama, he had frequent opportunities to join battle with his pursuers. Of these, however, he declined to take advantage. He remained at Gadsden till near the end of October, receiving a few reinforcements brought up by Beauregard, who on the 17th assumed command of the Confederate Military Division of the West, Hood still retaining his special command; though subject to the super-

vision or direction of Beauregard. The latter published an address appealing to his countrymen of all classes and sections for their support and confidence, and urging soldiers absent without leave to return to the army. The address seems to have had little effect.

On the 19th the National armies lay grouped about Gaylesville, in the Oct rich valley of the Chattooga, a 19. region abounding in corn and cattle. Here Sherman resolved to let his men live on the country for a while, content for the present to watch his enemy without wearing out his troops in a useless pursuit. Hoping that Hood would turn towards Huntersville and Bridgeport, he posted the army of the Tennessee near Little River, with orders to keep within supporting distance of the cavalry, which was directed to watch Hood in the neighborhood of Hill's Valley, and give the earliest notice possible of his turning northward. The army of the Ohio was posted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon bridge across the Coosa and reconnoitre towards Center and in the direction of Blue Mountain. The army of the Cumberland was kept in reserve at Gaylesville. In the mean time communications were opened to Rome, and a large force was engaged in repairing the railroads. The injuries done to these were confined to two sections, one 7 miles long between Big Shanty and Allatoona, and the other 21 miles long, between Resaca and Tunnel Hill. By the 20th the road was in running order again from Resaca to Atlanta. On the 28th, trains left Chattanooga for the
latter place. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with provisions; but forage was scarce; and Slocum was instructed to send strong detachments in the direction of South River, for the purpose of collecting corn and fodder. He was also to put his wagon trains in good condition for further service.

Hood had not succeeded in interrupting the National communications to such a degree as would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. Having failed permanently to disable the railroad, he had been driven into southern Alabama, where he was now separated from that admirable railroad system by means of which his army had been so well and so long supplied. Georgia and the whole southeast was left exposed to the invaders; but on the other hand there seemed open to Hood the opportunity of carrying the war into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, where the richly stored cities and farms afforded tempting chances for plunder. His experience during the retreat had been such as to satisfy him that he was able, with the army at his command, to endanger at any moment Sherman's communications. It was his conviction that Sherman would not be able to follow him, and that even then, he would have but little chance of overtaking his army. Sherman, however, had resolved upon a bolder course, and one promising greater and more important results. He had previously submitted to General Grant the outlines of a plan for the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to be followed by a march through the heart of Georgia to one of the Atlantic seaports. This proposition he now renewed from Gaylesville, and it received the sanction of the commander-in-chief. On the 2d of November, Grant wrote to Sherman "with the force you have left with General Thomas he must be able to take care of General Hood, and destroy him. I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say then, go on as you propose." On the 8th, in a letter dated the 7th, came Grant's adieu. "Great, good fortune attend you."

The original plan of the campaign had been, after capturing Atlanta, to hold it, and, using that city as a secondary base, to move an army eastward through Georgia, leaving garrisons at points along the railroads across the State, and thus cut the Confederacy in two from west to east, as had been done from north to south by the opening of the Mississippi. The execution of this plan would have required large details of troops, and it was willingly abandoned. Sherman's plan, which was substituted for this, effectually secured the same advantages. When Hood crossed the Chattahoochee on his flanking march upon the National communications, he was moving in the very direction in which Sherman wished him to go; and it was with feelings not unmixed with anxiety that the National commander watched the movements of his antagonist until, instead of returning to Jonesboro, he moved off from Gadsden to the neighborhood of Decatur. The ill-advised strategy of Hood gave
Sherman the very opportunity he desired; and he prepared at once to avail himself of it.

On the 26th of October, considering his army unnecessarily large for his purpose, and having ascertained that Hood had moved westward across Sand Mountain, Sherman detached the Fourth corps under General Stanley, with orders to proceed to Chattanooga and report to General Thomas at Nashville. On the 30th, the Twenty-Third corps, commanded by Schofield, was also sent to Thomas, to whom Sherman delegated full power over all the troops subject to his command, except the four corps with which he designed to move into Georgia. This gave to General Thomas the Fourth and Twenty-Third corps, the two divisions under General A. J. Smith—then en route for Tennessee from Missouri—all the garrisons in Tennessee, as well as all the cavalry of Sherman's Military Division, except one division under Kilpatrick, which was ordered to rendezvous at Marietta. General Wilson, who had arrived from the army of the Potomac to take command of the cavalry of Sherman's army, was sent back to Nashville, with all dismounted detachments, and with directions to collect as rapidly as possible the cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize, and equip them, and report to Thomas for duty. These forces it was hoped would enable Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga to Nashville, and, at the same time, leave him an army which would be a match for that of Hood, should he cross the Tennessee and move northward. Thomas was also fully informed of Sherman's plans, and at the same time assured that until he felt fully confident of being able to cope with Hood, the eastward movement on the part of Sherman would not be commenced.

By the 1st of November Hood had moved his army from Gadsden and appeared in the neighborhood of Decatur. Sherman then began preparations for his march through Georgia. The army of the Tennessee returned by slow and easy marches to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp ground. The Fourteenth corps was moved to Kingston, from which point all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for the contemplated movement, and all the sick and wounded, and the refugees, were directed to be sent back to Chattanooga. The troops were at the same time put in the most efficient condition for a long and difficult march. From the 2d to the 11th of November every locomotive and car on the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad was put in requisition. The vast supplies of provisions, forage, stores, and machinery, which had been accumulated at Atlanta, Rome and other points, and everything likely to impede the movements of the army, were sent safely to Chattanooga. On the night of the 11th the last train left Atlanta for the north. Everything being now ready Corse, who still remained in Rome, was ordered to destroy the bridges there, as well as all the foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to the enemy, and move on Kingston. At
the same time the railroad near Atlanta and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee was directed to be effectually destroyed. The garrisons north of Kingston were ordered to withdraw to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and railroad stock, and to take up the rails north of Resaca and preserve them for future use. The railroad between the Etowah and the Oostanaula was left untouched, as it might be necessary to reoccupy the country as far as the line of the Etowah.

On the 12th of November the message Nov. 12. "All is well" was telegraphed to Thomas; the wire was then cut, and Sherman's army stood alone, without any communication in the rear. By the 14th, all the troops had arrived at or near Atlanta, and by orders of Sherman was grouped into two wings; the right and left, commanded respectively by Generals O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum. The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth corps, Gen- P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth corps, General Frank P. Blair commanding. The left wing was composed of the Fourteenth corps, General Jeff. C. Davis and the Twentieth corps, General Slocum. The Fifteenth corps had four divisions, those of Woods, Hazen, Smith and Corse. The Seventeenth had three divisions, those of Mower, Leggett and Smith. The Fourteenth corps had three divisions, those of Carlin, Morgan and Baird. The Twentieth corps had also three divisions, those of Jackson, Geary and Ward. The cavalry division was held separate, and was subject to orders from Sherman only. It was commanded by Judson Kilpatrick, and was composed of two brigades, commanded respectively by Colonels Eli H. Murray of Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins of Illinois. The total strength of the army was about 60,000: — infantry about 54,000, cavalry nearly 5000, artillery nearly 2000. General Barry, in fitting out the artillery, which was reduced to the minimum, withdrew every doubtful or suspicious horse. Each artillery carriage had eight horses, and each battery a reserve of twelve. Sherman issued orders to regulate the conduct of the troops on the march. The whole force moved rapidly southward, and on the 14th of November lay again around Atlanta.

On the 15th all the buildings in the city, except the dwelling-houses and churches, were destroyed under the direction of Captain Poe, the chief of engineers. The several corps having been supplied with clothing and such equipments as were necessary, from the depots, and everything valuable to the Government removed, the torch was applied in the evening to the various buildings, the most substantial of which had been previously mined. For many hours the heavens were lighted up by the flames of this vast conflagration, which was rendered more awful by the explosion of shells and magazines. By the dawn of the 16th all that was valuable of the city lay in ashes. The property destroyed included all the buildings connected with the railroads, the passenger depots, freight houses, a number of locomotives
SHERMAN LEAVES ATLANTA.

...cars, and every description of rolling stock; the machine shops, mills, arsenals; the laboratory, the armory, many business houses, the institutions of learning, and all the hotels except the Gate City; in all about 1800 buildings, exclusive of woodsheds and outhouses, the whole valued at about $2,000,000. As far as possible private property was spared, the object being merely to render the city useless to the enemy when he should reoccupy it.

Connecting Atlanta with the seaboard are two great lines of railroad, nearly parallel and having a general southeasterly direction, one terminating at Charleston, 308 miles distant, the other at Savannah, 293 miles distant. The former line is composed of the Georgia Railroad, 171 miles long, extending from Atlanta to Augusta, and of the South Carolina Railroad, 137 miles long, extending from Augusta to Charleston; the latter consists of the Western and Macon road, 103 miles long, connecting Atlanta and Macon, and of the Georgia Central Railroad, 190 miles long, connecting Macon with Savannah. From Augusta there runs a cross railroad due south to Millen, on the Georgia Central Railroad, 53 miles long, affording a second route to Savannah from Atlanta, 10 miles longer than that through Macon. The belt of country between the two main lines of railroad, as far east as Augusta and Millen, is of an average breadth of 40 miles; east of these points the country between the roads gradually expands to a width of nearly 100 miles. The Georgia road, after the capture of Atlanta, had lost much of its importance. All the others, however, including that between Augusta and Millen, were important links in the chain of communications between the northern and southern portions of the Confederacy. The feeling was prevalent, therefore, that the destruction of these links would be a severe blow to the enemy. The region included within these railroads was probably the richest and most populous of Georgia, containing Milledgeville, the capital of the State, and other important towns. It was reported to be rich in all kinds of agricultural produce and abundantly able to supply the wants of a large invading army.

While Atlanta was yet in flames, Sherman's army began its march eastward in four columns. The two constituting the left wing under Slocum, followed the railroad towards Slocum, while the two composing the right wing under Howard, accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry, marched in the direction of Jonesboro and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planter's Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days. Slocum moved by way of Decatur and Stone Mountain, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the important railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and then to turn southward and rendezvous at Milledgeville on the seventh day. Sherman himself left Atlanta on the 16th in company with the Fourteenth corps, which marched...
by way of Lithonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, also towards Milledgeville. All the corps were provided with good wagon trains, in which the supplies of ammunition were abundant, but with only twenty days' bread, forty days' sugar and coffee, beef cattle equal to forty days' supplies, and a double allowance of salt. Three days' forage in grain was also taken. The instructions were that the army should live, during the march, chiefly if not altogether on the country, which abounded in corn, sweet potatoes, and cattle. It was not at first known to the men whither they were marching. The opinion prevailed that they were off for Richmond. The day was unusually fine; and a feeling of exhilaration seemed to pervade all minds. As he moved about, Sherman was frequently greeted with the words "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is waiting for you at Richmond."

At what point, on the seaboard, Sherman would come out could not be definitely fixed. It was not impossible, as he would be obliged to subsist at least partially on the country, that a force inferior to his own might compel him to abandon his plans and seek a point different from that intended. The blindness of the Confederate authorities, however, allowed them to send Hood's army—the only considerable force they had between Richmond and the Mississippi—northward on an offensive campaign, thus leaving the whole southeast open, with little opposition to be dreaded by the National forces on any route they might take. Sherman's first object was to place his army in the heart of Georgia, interposing it between Macon and Augusta, and thus obliging the Confederates to scatter their forces in order to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston. It was his opinion that by means of pretended demonstrations on places widely separated, leaving it doubtful whether the immediate objective was Augusta or Macon, or both, he would be able to perplex the enemy and insure a speedy and uninterrupted march to the coast.

Howard's command, of which the Fifteenth corps formed the right following the railroad southward as far as Jonesboro, encountered the mounted troops of Iverson; but these were quickly dispersed by Kilpatrick's cavalry. The column then moved eastward through McDonough and Jackson to the Ocmulgee, crossed it at Planter's Mills and passing southward through Monticello and Hillsboro, and between Milledgeville and Clinton, struck the Georgia Central Railroad on the 22d, the left at Gordon, 20 miles east of Macon, the right extending westward towards Griswoldville. In conjunction with the operations of Howard's column, the greater part of the National cavalry under Kilpatrick made a circuit by the right, through Griffin and Forsyth, towards Macon. At first the Confederates supposed this to be only a raid on a grand scale; but on the approach of Howard's column—and still remaining ignorant of Slocum's movement in the direction of Augusta—they began to think that Sherman was aiming at the capture of Macon.
They, therefore, concentrated at that place all their available force, consisting of some cavalry under Wheeler, a small body of veterans, and several brigades of militia. On the 20th, 800 of Kilpatrick’s cavalry with 4 cannon, made a pretended attack on East Macon, two miles east of the city, and drove the enemy within his intrenchments. Little loss was sustained on either side; but the movement very effectually accomplished its purpose of confirming the Confederates in the belief that Macon was Sherman’s objective. The National cavalry then, after destroying several miles of railroad east of Walnut Creek, withdrew to Griswoldville. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps having struck the Georgia Central Railroad on the 22d, as already stated, immediately commenced to destroy the track and the road-bed between Gordon and Griswoldville.

While this work was going on, one of the severest battles of the campaign took place. Walcott’s brigade of infantry, with a section of artillery and some cavalry, forming the extreme right of the Fifteenth corps, had been thrown forward to Griswoldville to cover that flank, and also to continue the demonstration on Macon commenced by Kilpatrick. At the same time Howard’s trains were closing up, and his men were destroying the railroads. Walcott, after burning the principal buildings in Griswoldville, posted his troops in a wood protected in front by an open morass, and threw up a rail breast-work. About two in the afternoon a force of the enemy, about 5000 strong, moved out of Macon and approached the National position. Falling back slowly, the National cavalry placed themselves in connection with the infantry so as to protect them in flank and rear, and leave the enemy no alternative but to make a direct front attack. The Confederate force, consisting of a part of Hardee’s old command brought up from Savannah and several brigades of militia, advanced boldly; and, being mostly inexperienced troops, and ignorant of the strength of the National position, they attempted to carry it by storm. They made six desperate assaults, which Walcott’s veterans, well protected by their breastworks, repelled with ease, and with little loss, while the Confederates moving with difficulty through the morass, were exposed to a steady fire from men conscious of security, and suffered severely. When they retired, they left 300 dead upon the field. The Confederate loss, according to their own account, was 614, including General Anderson severely wounded. It was probably nearer 2000. After this battle, Macon might easily have been taken by Howard, but now that the railroad connections were destroyed, its possession was no longer an important object.

In the mean time, the left wing of Sherman’s army continued its march along the Augusta and Macon Railroad in two parallel columns, the Twentieth corps on the left, the Fourteenth, accompanied by Sherman, on the right. The latter corps having thoroughly destroyed the railroad as far as Covington, turned south. on the 19th, towards
Milledgeville; while the Twentieth corps, which had previously marched on the north side of the railroad, continued the work of destroying the track and the bridges as far as Madison 30 miles north of Milledgeville and 90 miles west of Augusta. To strengthen the conviction that this movement was intended to threaten Augusta, the cavalry, moving on the left wing, was sent as far east as Union Point, 70 miles west of that city. From Madison the Twentieth corps turned off nearly due south, and passing through Eatonton, its advance arrived at Milledgeville on the 21st, followed, next day, by the Fourteenth corps, which passed through Shady Dale and Eatonton, neither corps having encountered any opposition during its march.

When Sherman's army set out from Atlanta, the Georgia legislature was in session at Milledgeville, but the approach of Kilpatrick's cavalry caused no alarm there, as the movement was supposed to be only a raid, and that its object was Macon. When, however, on the 18th, it was discovered that Howard with the right wing was moving through McDonough in a southeasterly direction, and that Slocum was also approaching from the north, a panic seized the whole body of legislators, who fled with all possible haste to Augusta. After this exodus, several days of quiet passed, when on a bright sunny morning an advanced regiment of the Twentieth corps entered the capital of Georgia, with the band playing the national airs.

Only a few of the National troops entered Milledgeville. Two or three regiments were detailed under the orders of engineers to destroy government and certain other property. The magazines, arsenals, depot buildings, factories of various kinds, with storehouses containing large amounts of government property, and about 1700 bales of cotton, were burned. Private houses, even those of noted Confederates, were left uninjured, as well as the Capitol; and the inhabitants were protected as far as possible from pilage or insult from the soldiery. The hospital surgeons, the principal of the Insane Asylum, and others, expressed their thankfulness for the excellent order preserved during the National occupation. Some stores and about 2500 small-arms fell into the possession of the National troops; and a number of Union prisoners were liberated from the penitentiary.

While Sherman's left wing was enjoying a temporary rest at Milledgeville, the right, under Howard, moved eastward along the Georgia Central Railroad, with orders to destroy it thoroughly as they went, as far as Tensville Station. The Confederates now became aware that Macon was not to be seriously attacked; and Wheeler, marching with all speed, got across the Oconee near the railroad bridge, and, aided by a body of militia under General Wayne, prepared to dispute the passage. When Howard arrived on the 23d, he found the guard there so strong that a crossing could be effected only at considerable loss. After skirmishing near the river a day or two to
occupy the enemy’s attention, the Fifteenth corps was moved to a ford 8 miles below, and a pontoon bridge was laid without much difficulty. The Confederates then retreated; and by the 26th the whole right wing had crossed the river, and moving eastward as engaged in destroying the railroad. The left wing crossed the Oconee near Milledgeville on the 24th, and moved by two roads in a southeasterly direction towards Sandersville, a small town 33 miles from Milledgeville, and a little north of the railroad. The Fourteenth corps now took position on the left of Slocum’s column, and Sherman accompanied the Twentieth corps towards Sandersville. On approaching this place on the 25th, the bridges across Buffalo Creek were found to have been burned. Next day the two corps, marching by parallel roads, entered the town almost at the same moment, skirmishing with and driving out Wheeler’s cavalry, which had attempted to impede their progress. On the 27th and 28th both wings lay encamped between Sandersville and Irwin’s Cross-Roads, a few miles south of the railroad. About this time also Sherman shifted his quarters from the left wing to the Seventeenth corps, then at Tennille Station, opposite Sandersville.

Kilpatrick, after the demonstration at Macon which ended with the action at Griswoldville, shifted his cavalry force to the left wing, and remaining a day at Milledgeville to recruit, was directed to move rapidly eastward and break the railroad between Millen and Augusta, thus threatening Augusta and covering the passage of the main body of the army across the Ogeechee, the next great river on Sherman’s route east of the Oconee. After breaking the railroad, Kilpatrick was ordered to turn southward and move rapidly upon Millen, to rescue the National prisoners supposed to be confined there. On the 27th, a few hundred of his cavalry, under Captains Hays and Estes, dashed into Waynesboro, on the railroad, 30 miles south of Augusta, where they did some damage; but it having been ascertained that the prisoners had for several weeks previous been in the course of removal from Millen to some less exposed point in southern Georgia, no demonstration was made on that town. The advanced cavalry detachment now fell back to its main body, which lay east of the Ogeechee near Louisville. Kilpatrick had retired thence to meet the infantry, with instructions from Sherman not to risk a battle unless circumstances should greatly give him the advantage. But the appearance of the cavalry on the left flank of the National army, led the Confederates to suppose that Augusta was the real objective of the campaign. Sherman, therefore, ordered Kilpatrick to leave all his wagons and other incumbrances with the left wing and to move towards Wheeler’s cavalry, which was hovering around in the direction of Augusta; and if Wheeler desired fighting to give him all he wanted. Accordingly, Kilpatrick, supported by Baird’s division of infantry of the Fourteenth corps, again moved
in the direction of Waynesboro. Encountering Wheeler in the neighborhood of Thomas’ Station, on the 3d of December, Kilpatrick attacked him in position, driving him from three successive lines of barricades, through Waynesboro and across Brier Creek, the bridges over which he burned. Marching rapidly southward from Waynesboro, he rejoined the left wing at Jacksonboro, 20 miles east of Millen, on the 5th.

On the 28th of November the Fourteenth corps struck the Ogeechee at Fenn’s bridge, 15 miles north of Sandersville. The river was crossed by pontoons; and marching along its north bank, the corps arrived at Louisville on the 29th. Upon reaching Buckhead Creek, it then turned eastward to Lumpkin’s Station, on the Augusta and Millen Railroad, 10 miles south of Waynesboro. On the 3d and 4th of December it destroyed a considerable portion of the track, and then marched in a southeasterly direction for Jacksonboro. At the same time the Twentieth corps moved along the railroad, which from Davisboro Station runs parallel with the Ogeechee for about 20 miles. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps moved along the south side of the railroad, the Fifteenth, with which was General Howard in person, keeping on the right flank and about a day’s march ahead, so as to be ready to turn against the flank of any force of the enemy that should attempt to oppose the progress of the main body. The Twentieth and Seventeenth corps had been some days engaged in destroying the railroad between Tennille Station and the Ogeechee. This river, being here about sixty yards wide, and naturally a strong defensive line to the enemy, might have been rendered a serious obstacle. On the 30th, however, a crossing was effected with little difficulty, the Nov. Twentieth at the railroad bridge 30. and the Seventeenth near Barton Station, a few miles further east. These two corps advanced steadily along the railroad, and on the 2d of December the Seventeenth reached Millen; the Twentieth, passing a little north of that town through Birdsville, moved in a southeasterly direction, while the Fifteenth in two columns, still a day’s march in advance of the main body, kept along the west bank of the Ogeechee. The whole army then turning slowly round from its easterly course, moved directly southward in parallel columns, all except the Fifteenth corps—which was directed to cross to the east bank on arriving at Eden Station—between the Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers, the Seventeenth corps following the railroad and tearing it up while advancing, the Fourteenth keeping along the Savannah River road, and the Twentieth marching down the middle road by way of Springfield. Kilpatrick covered the rear, and kept at bay such scattered bodies of the enemy’s cavalry as attempted to harass the columns while in motion.

The advantage of the feint which had been made towards Augusta now became apparent. A considerable number of Confederate troops had
been concentrated at that place. Had
Sherman's true object been known,
these might have been used to obstruct
his march to Savannah, towards which
he was now moving. The weather
which had been for the most part
favorable during the first half of the
campaign, became rainy after the col-
umns passed Millen. As the army
approached Savannah, the country was
found more marshy and difficult. Great
obstructions were met in the shape of
felled trees where the roads crossed the
creek swamps or narrow causeways;
but these the well-organized pioneer
companies rapidly removed. No im-
portant opposition was encountered till
the heads of the columns were within
about 15 miles of Savannah. Here all
the roads leading to the city were again
found obstructed with felled timber;
but the imperfect defenses thus formed
were easily turned and the enemy
driven away.

By the 10th of December the Con-
 Federates had retired within their
Dec.
10. lines at Savannah. These follow-
ed a swampy creek which falls into the
Savannah River about 3 miles above
the city and extended thence to the
head of a corresponding creek which
falls into the Little Ogeechee. These
streams formed excellent cover for the
enemy, flowing through marshes and
rice fields, which could be flooded either
by the tide-water or from inland ponds,
the gates of which were covered by
heavy artillery.

To prevent an attack on the Gulf
Railroad, at that time employed to its
utmost capacity in bringing supplies
and reinforcements to the city, the Con-
federates sent a force across the Ogee-
chee, which they supposed would be
able to check the advance of the Fif-
teenth corps. The greater part of this
corps had, however, passed over to the
east bank of the river on the 7th near
Eden Station; and the next day Corse's
division was pushed forward between
the Little and Great Ogeechee, in ad-
Vance of the main column, to the canal
connecting the Ogeechee with the
Savannah. A position was taken up
on the south side of the canal and in-
renched; the Confederates abandoning
the portion of their advanced line there
and retiring within the fortifications of
Savannah. Reinforcements from the
Fifteenth corps were sent to Corse;
and on the 9th a detachment moved
forward to the Gulf Railroad, tore up
the track for several miles, and cap-
tured a train of 18 cars with many
prisoners, thus cutting off communi-
Cations between Savannah and the south.
No supplies could reach the city but
the accustomed channels; while the
investing forces had large herds of
cattle, brought with the army or
gathered from the country on the
March; and although still without
communication with the fleet, they
had yet remaining in the army wagons
a considerable supply of breadstuffs
and other necessaries. The fine rice
crops, along the Savannah and Ogee-
chee rivers, afforded abundance of
fodder for the cattle, as well as food for
the men. The country south of the
Ogeechee was also open as foraging
ground.
THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

The only approaches to Savannah were the two railroads, and the Augusta, Louisville and Ogeechee dirt roads, all narrow causeways and commanded by heavy ordnance, against which it would have been useless to oppose the light field guns with which Sherman's army was provided. The strength of the enemy at that time was also unknown to the National commander, and he determined not to assault immediately, trusting that the operation of time would bring about the desired result. Sherman, therefore, instructed his army commanders to invest the city as closely as possible from the north and west, and to reconnoitre the ground well in their front. The 11th and 12th of December were passed in putting the troops in position, erecting breast-works, and establishing batteries. The army lay in a semicircular line about ten miles long—Dec. 12. the left resting on the Savannah River at a point 3 miles distant from the city, the right on the Gulf Railroad at a distance of 11 miles—everywhere confronted by the enemy's strong line of earth-works, which constituted the exterior fortifications of the city.

In the mean time, in order to facilitate communications with the fleet, Captain Duncan, with two scouts, was sent down the Ogeechee in a small skiff, on the night of the 9th. Concealing themselves in the rice swamps during the following day, they resumed the perilous voyage at night, and succeeded in getting past Fort McAllister and the Confederate picket-boats during a rain-storm. They then made their way into Ossabaw Sound, where on the morning of the 11th they were picked up by the National gun-boat Flag, and immediately conveyed to Hilton Head. General Foster was at that time operating against the Charleston and Savannah Railroad with the view of destroying the communications of Savannah with the north. He was immediately sent for, and received Howard's dispatch of the 9th: "We have had perfect success, and the army is in fine spirits." This was the first direct intelligence from Sherman's army since its departure from Atlanta, and its reception caused universal rejoicing in the North.

The co-operative movement of Foster against the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, the object of which was to effect a lodgment at Pocotaligo or Grahamville, had only partially succeeded. The expedition dispatched for this purpose, consisting of 5500 men under General Hatch, together with a naval brigade under Commander Preble, and gun-boats from Admiral Dahlgren's squadron, arrived soon after daylight at Boyd's Point, where the troops were landed. They advanced skirmishing some miles; but not being acquainted with the country did not succeed in reaching the railroad, and at night were compelled to withdraw. Next day, however, the march was resumed; and the troops were pushed on towards the enemy's position near Grahamville. Strong works, consisting of a fort and battery, with rifle-pits, were found at Honey Hill, 3 miles from Grahamville. The garrison, however
Sherman took measures to reduce Fort McAllister, a strong redoubt on the right bank of the river, which its guns commanded. This fort, situated 6 miles from the sound and about 18 miles southwest of Savannah, was highly important to the security of the city in the rear. It was one of the strongest of its class in the South; and it had successfully resisted the attacks of a small fleet of iron-clads in the early part of the year 1863. It mounted 23 guns en barbette and one mortar, including several 8-inch and 10-inch pieces. Every line of approach to the fort was commanded by howitzers and field pieces placed on the bastions. A deep ditch 40 feet wide, into the bottom of which were driven palisades, extended along its front; and a formidable line of abatis ran along the outer edge of the ditch, beyond which the approaches were thickly planted with torpedoes. Fortunately the garrison was not strong, consisting of only two companies of artillery and three of infantry, in all about 200 men, in command of Major Anderson. It would doubtless have been reinforced in a few days. On the evening of the 12th, Hazen's division of the Fifteenth corps was marched from its position on the Gulf Railroad to the Ogeechee, just below the mouth of the Canochoie, where the bridge, known as King's Bridge, having been destroyed was rapidly reconstructed in a substantial manner. At daybreak of the 13th Hazen crossed to the west bank and pushed on towards Fort McAllister, his orders being to carry it by assault. Hazen reached the
vicinity of the fort about one o'clock, and deployed his division in such a manner that both flanks rested on the river. His skirmishers were posted behind the trunks of trees whose branches had been used by the enemy in constructing the *abatis*. About five o'clock the assault was made, with 9 regiments, at three points. In a very short time, the intervening space of 600 yards was crossed, the *abatis* surmounted, and the ditch reached. A few minutes sufficed to tear down enough of the palisades to permit the passage of the troops, who with loud cheers and great enthusiasm rushed in swarms over the parapet and planted their colors on the rampart. In twenty minutes from the time the assault was commenced the fort was won. The struggle was brief. The losses were not great on either side. The victory, however, was complete. Sherman himself, was an eye-witness of the operations from a rice-mill on the opposite bank of the river.

No communication had yet been effected with the fleet. From a signal station at the rice-mill, Sherman's officers had been for two days gazing anxiously over the rice fields and salt marsh, in the direction of Ossabaw Sound, but no vessel came in sight. While the preparations for assaulting Fort McAllister had been going on, the smoke-stack of a small steamer evidently approaching became visible on the horizon. Just before the assault was made, the steamer was signalled. Answer was given; and, as soon as he saw the colors fairly planted on the fort, Sherman, in company with Howard, proceeded in a small boat to meet Hazen; but finding that he had not yet been able to communicate with the steamer, which was hid from him by some intervening woods, he took another small boat with a crew, and pulled down the river to it. It proved to be the tug Dandelion, Captain Williamson, who announced that Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster were on their way and might be hourly expected in the sound. Sherman, after writing a despatch to the War Department, his first since leaving Atlanta, returned immediately to Fort McAllister. Before daylight on the 14th he received intelligence that Foster had actually arrived in the steamer No. 14, Nemaha and was anxious for an interview. Sherman immediately went on board the Nemaha, and after a consultation proceeded in that steamer to meet Dahlgren, whose flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, was in Warsaw Sound. Measures were at once concerted for opening permanent communication between the army and the fleet; and Dahlgren, having agreed to engage the attention of the forts at Wilmington and Rose dew, Sherman returned to Fort McAllister the following day, confident of being able to carry the defenses of Savannah as soon as his heavy ordnance from Hilton Head should arrive. Or the 17th a number of 32-pounder Parrott guns were landed from transports, at King's bridge, on the Ogeechee, where the new base was established, the obstructions in the river below having been removed; and
HARDEE RETIRES FROM SAVANNAH.

Sherman despatched from Slocum's headquarters, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of the city. This was refused by General Hardee, who was in command there with about 15,000 men. Hardee expressed a determination to hold the city to the last, saying that his communications were yet open, that he was fully supplied with subsistence stores, and was able to withstand a long siege. On the same day, a large body of cavalry under Kilpatrick, with infantry supports, were sent down the Gulf Railroad as far as the Altamaha River, for the purpose of destroying the track. This work was thoroughly accomplished for the entire distance, including 4 miles of trestle-work immediately adjoining the river.

The city was now invested on every side except along the Savannah River. That river, which was filled with obstructions and commanded by the guns of Forts Jackson, Lee, and Lawton, was in possession of the enemy nearly as far towards the sea as Fort Pulaski. Opposite the city is Hutchinson's Island, several miles long, the west end of which was in possession of Slocum's troops; but the lower end still remained in the hands of the enemy. A little below the island, on the South Carolina side, the Union Causeway which runs north through the swamps intervening between Savannah and Charleston, afforded a way of escape to Hardee.

Reconnaissances from the left flank had shown that it was impracticable to push a considerable force across the Savannah River with a view to occupy the causeway, as the enemy holding the river opposite the city with iron-clad gun-boats, would be able to destroy any pontoons laid down between Hutchinson's Island and the South Carolina shore. Sherman, therefore, ordered Slocum to get his siege guns into position, and prepare for an assault; while he himself, proceeded to Port Royal and made arrangements to have the Union Causeway occupied from the north by the troops of Foster. In the meantime a substantial corduroy road had been constructed across the swamps and rice fields from the Ogeechee, at King's Bridge, to the vicinity of the city. Along this road the heavy siege guns were transported to their position, as well as supplies for the army.

Hardee seeing this, and well aware that the avenue of escape northward would not be allowed long to remain open to him, immediately made preparations for evacuating the city. On the afternoon of the 20th he caused his troops to destroy the navy yard and the Confederate Government property; while the two iron-clads Georgia and Savannah moved up the river, and, supported by several batteries, opened on the National left a furious fire, which was continued all night, with a view to cover the retreat. The Confederate troops were conveyed across the river, during the night, in steamboats and row-boats and on rafts and on the morning of the 21st, having blown up the iron-clads and the forts below the city, they were well on their way towards Charleston.

Hardee's retirement was discovered
by the National pickets at dawn on the 21st; and several regiments were sent forward to occupy the deserted intrenchments. A few hours later Sherman, who had just returned from Hilton Head, entered the city at the head of his body-guard and received the formal surrender from the municipal authorities. On the same day Foster communicated with the city by steamers, taking up what torpedoes could be found and passing safely over others. Measures were also taken for clearing the channel of all obstructions. The captures included 800 prisoners, 150 guns, 13 locomotives in good order, 190 cars, a large supply of ammunition and material of war, 4 steamboats, besides the iron-clads and transports blown up by the enemy, and 33,000 bales of cotton safely stored.

Writing to President Lincoln on the 22d of December, Sherman said: "I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton." Lincoln replied, thanking Sherman for his gift. Halleck and Grant both wrote letters of congratulation to the victorious general. "I never" wrote Grant "had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him that with the army you had, and with you in command of it, there was no danger but that you would reach salt water in some place. But I should not have felt the same security—in fact I would not have entrusted the expedition to any other living commander"

Thus ended the great march to the sea—a march which, while it commanded the attention of the world, and established on solid foundations the military reputation of General Sherman, demonstrated, in the most striking manner, the inherent weakness of the Confederacy. The campaign had lasted over five weeks; and, during that time, an army 65,000 strong, with 10,000 horses, over a tract varying from 20 to 60 miles in width, traversed a distance of 300 miles. Sherman had lost only 567 men, of whom 63 were killed, 245 wounded, the remainder missing. A track of desolation marked the progress of the army. Over 20,000 bales of cotton had been destroyed, and probably over 25,000 bales captured. There were captured besides some 10,000,000 pounds of corn, and an equal amount of fodder; nearly 1,500,000 rations of meat; about 1,000,000 rations of bread; 483,000 rations of coffee, 581,000 of sugar, about 1,150,000 of soap, and 137,000 of salt. This, however, was not all. Over 320 miles of railroad were destroyed; and so complete was the work of destruction that communications between the Confederate armies in Virginia and those in the west were finally and effectually severed. Sherman had, during his march, forced into his service some 5000 horses and 4000 mules, and captured 1328 prisoners, with 167 guns. His army entered Savannah, accompanied by more than 10,000 negroes, who everywhere hailed the National troops as deliverers. According to Sherman's own estimate, damage was done to the
State of Georgia to the extent of $100,000,000, of which $20,000,000 at least insured to the advantage of the National government.

General Geary was appointed military commander of Savannah, immediately after the surrender. On the 26th from his head-quarters in the field, General Sherman issued special orders, giving instructions as to the course of conduct to be pursued by the military authorities towards the inhabitants of the captured city. The orders were strict; but they were not unjust, nor could they even be called severe. The property of the peaceful citizens was to be respected. Industry of all kinds was to be encouraged. Assistance was to be tendered to all deserving families or individuals who, from whatever cause were in need by circumstances. The Mayor was instructed to give public notice that the time had come when all must choose their course, and decide whether they were willing to remain within the National lines, and conduct themselves as good citizens, or depart in peace. Those who preferred to leave were to report their names to the Chief-Quartermaster; and measures would be taken to secure them safe transport beyond the lines. Sherman deemed it his duty to lay his hand somewhat heavily on the press. Only two newspapers were to be published in the city; and their editors and proprietors were to be held to the strictest accountability.

In the grave emergency in which they now found themselves, the inhabitants of Savannah conducted themselves with the utmost propriety. Their behavior, indeed, was in striking contrast with that of the inhabitants of other Confederate cities. No ill feeling was manifested towards their captors by word or deed. On the contrary there was evidence that the occupation of the city by the Nationals, was felt to be a deliverance. A latent Union sentiment soon began to reveal itself; and as early as the 28th of December, a meeting of influential citizens was held at the call and under the presidency of Mayor Arnold, and resolutions were passed—acknowledging the duty of submission to the laws of the United States, and asking protection accordingly, respectfully requesting his Excellency, the Governor of Georgia, to call a convention of the people of that State, and thus afford an opportunity of voting upon the question whether the war between the two sections of the country should continue. and finally tendering thanks to the military commander for his "urbanity" and his "uniform kindness."

The year 1864 was all but ended. Before the close, however, Sherman had perfected his plans for the projected march through the Carolinas.
CHAPTER XXXIX.


In the chapter immediately preceding, we have seen that General Sherman about the end of September, and while his head-quarters were still at Atlanta, sent General Thomas, his second in command, to Nashville, with instructions to organize such troops as might be placed at his
SHERMAN DIVIDES HIS ARMY.

...to keep a watchful eye on the movements of the great Confederate raider, General Forrest. Later, towards the end of October, and while the main body of the National army was halting at Gaylesville, Sherman, who had now obtained Grant's consent to advance to the coast, divided his army into two parts. Under his own personal command, and for the purpose of pushing his way through Georgia, he retained four corps. The other two corps—the Fourth, under General Stanley, and the Twenty-Third, under General Schofield—he sent to Thomas. General Wilson, who had quite recently arrived from the army of the Potomac and taken command of Sherman's cavalry, was also sent to Nashville to report to Thomas for duty. He took with him some dismounted detachments, and had instructions to collect, mount, organize, and equip all the cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee. It was Sherman's conviction that thus reinforced, Thomas would be quite able to cope with any forces which Hood might succeed in bringing against him.

It is now generally understood that the Confederate authorities were completely taken by surprise at Sherman's audacious movement. His lines of defense were of enormous extent. The distance from Atlanta to Louisville is 474 miles; from Atlanta to Nashville, 289. The railroads connecting the army with these lines, it was necessary to protect. It was the belief of Davis and his associates that, as soon as the National lines were seriously threat-ened, Sherman would abandon Georgia. They had no conception that he would of his own accord sunder his communications and boldly march to the sea. When Sherman did march, one read with surprise that Hood did not follow him. "Hood," says General Grant in his report, "instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders, under which he seemed to be acting." Sherman, before his departure, made Thomas fully acquainted with his plans, delegated to him the command of all troops and garrisons, not absolutely in the presence of the commander-in-chief, and instructed him to pursue Hood, if he should attempt to follow the main army, but, by all means, to keep a firm hold on Tennessee.

Long before Sherman divided his army, attempts were made by the Confederates, to destroy the communications of Nashville with the southeast. On the 23d of September, Forrest Sept. at the head of 7000 cavalry, after 23, having crossed the Tennessee, near Waterloo, made his appearance before Athens, a small town on the railroad from Decatur, and about 90 miles south of Nashville. The place was held by Colonel Campbell, with 3 colored regiments and about 150 men from the Third Tennessee cavalry. Campbell, on the approach of Forrest, retired to the fort. On the morning of the 24th the town was completely invested; and a vigorous fire was opened upon the
garrison from a 12-pounder battery. The guns of the fort replied. Campbell, however, was unequally matched; and after an artillery contest of two hours' duration, he yielded to the demands of his antagonist and surrendered. Had he held out about half an hour longer, he might have been reinforced by the Nineteenth Michigan, and the One Hundred and Second Ohio regiments. As it was, these regiments were overpowered and captured. Forrest then advanced to Pulaski. That place, however, had been well cared for by General Rousseau; and the Confederate general moved eastward, cutting the railroads as he advanced. Meanwhile, it began to be seen that Forrest was bent on serious work; and National troops were pushed forward from all directions to resist his progress. Rousseau at the head of a body of troops moved by rail to Tullahoma. Steedman advanced from the Etowah district to the north side of Tennessee. Newton's division of the Fourth corps arrived from Atlanta on the 28th and replaced Steedman's command at Chattanooga. Morgan's division of the Fourteenth corps, also from Atlanta, and accompanied by General Thomas, arrived at Nashville on the 3d of October.

Forrest had by this time divided his forces. One column consisting of 4000 men, under Buford, he sent south, towards Huntsville. The other column, consisting of 3000 men, he led, himself, in the direction of Columbia. Buford, as early as the 30th of September appeared before Huntsville, and in vain summoned the garrison to surrender. Moving off, he appeared before Athens on the afternoon Oct. 2 of the 2d of October. That place had, in the meantime been re-garrisoned by the Seventy-Third Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Slade. After a useless attack made almost immediately after his arrival, and another equally useless attack on the following morning, Buford, pursued by some of Granger's cavalry, was compelled to retreat towards the Elk River. Forrest had little better success than his lieutenant. He did not venture to make an attack on Columbia; but on the 3d he destroyed about 5 miles of railroad between Carter's Creek and Spring Hill. He then parolled his prisoners and moved off in the direction of Mount Pleasant Hill. It now became apparent that both Buford and Forrest were aiming to make good their escape to the south side of the Tennessee; and the various National commands, particularly those under Rousseau, Washburne and Morgan, closed in upon them, with a view to prevent their crossing the river, and if possible to effect their capture. The Confederates, however, knew every inch of the ground; and in spite of a most vigorous pursuit, both accomplished their purpose, Buford crossing the Tennessee on the 3d and Forrest on the 6th. The ferry-boats and other means of crossing were destroyed; but the pursuit was not continued.

Thomas now spent some time in re-arranging and re-distributing his troops. His great object was to guard
well all the avenues of approach, and yet to have his troops so in hand that he could concentrate with ease and rapidity in the event of the enemy attacking him in force. It was not until the 26th that Hood made any further demonstrations. On that day, a large force of Confederate infantry appeared before Decatur, and attacked the garrison, but without effect. Granger held the place; and on the 27th reinforcements were sent him with instructions to hold out to the bitter end. It seemed as if the enemy was bent on serious business; for he proceeded at once to establish a line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the town. On the 29th, however, after having had on the previous day some bitter experience of the daring and energy of Granger's men, who made two separate and successful sorties, the Confederates retired in the direction of Courtland. On the same day, it was reported to Thomas that a body of the enemy was crossing the river, near the mouth of Cypress Creek, about 2 miles below Florence. General Croxton was in command at that point; and on receipt of the intelligence, Thomas immediately sent to his aid a division of cavalry under General Hatch, with instructions to guard the passage of the river until the arrival of the Fourth corps, now on its way from Georgia.

It now became evident that Hood intended to invade Middle Tennessee; and Thomas hurried forward preparations accordingly. Before, however, we enter upon a detailed account of the events which led to the great battles of Franklin and Nashville, and the subsequent pursuit and destruction of Hood's army, it is fitting to refer to certain events which were taking place or were about to take place, in Missouri and Eastern Tennessee.

After the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecranz, who was superseded by Thomas, was assigned to the command of the Department of the Missouri. He reached St. Louis in the beginning of January, when he found the State of Missouri in a very troubled condition. It was menaced by foes without, and by hidden but not less dangerous foes within. The failure of the Red River expedition, and the expulsion of Steele from the country below the Arkansas River, had a most disastrous effect upon the National cause, to the west of the Mississippi. At least two-thirds of the State of Arkansas was left in undisturbed possession of the Confederates. It was well known that General Sterling Price, the great guerrilla chief in that region, was making active preparations for another raid into Missouri. Missouri was still under the authority of the National Government; but the inhabitants of the State were largely in sympathy with the Confederacy. The loyal people of the State were over-awed and compelled to conceal their sentiments. Secret associations—such as the "Knights of the Golden Circle," the "Order of American Knights," and the "Sons of Liberty"—abounded; and it was reported to Rosecranz that when Price should invade Missouri, the members of these societies would join him in numbers to
the extent of at least 23,000 men. Rosecranz had good reason to believe that the reports regarding these secret societies and their purposes were not without foundation. He accordingly communicated his information to the government, and asked for reinforcements. The government was at first incredulous, believing the danger to be more imaginary than real, and was encouraged in this belief by the report of General Hunt, who had been sent to make a tour of observation throughout the State. On being informed that arrangements had been made to initiate the revolution in St. Louis by murdering the Provost-Marshal, and seizing the State government, Rosecranz arrested the Belgian consul, who was the State commander, with his deputy, secretary, lecturer, and about 40 members. The government, still incredulous, ordered their release; but Rosecranz was resolute; and the government, on receiving fuller information, justified his course, and countermanded the order. There can now be no doubt that the promptitude and vigilance of Rosecranz at this crisis did much to prevent the threatened rising. The arrest of the State commander struck terror into the hearts of the conspirators.

Price and his friends, meanwhile, were preparing to carry out their part of the programme. It was now the first week in September. Rosecranz received information from Washburne who kept a keen eye on the movements of the Confederates in Arkansas, that Shelby was at Batesville, in Northern Arkansas, and that, as soon as he was joined by Price, the invasion would be commenced. Rosecranz communicated the intelligence to Washington; and Halleck without a moment's delay telegraphed to Cairo, directing A. J. Smith, who was then on his way, with 6000 troops to join Sherman in Northern Georgia, to halt and proceed to St. Louis, where he was to report to Rosecranz.

On the 23d of September, the advance of Price's force, under Shelby, occupied Bloomfield, in Stoddard County, which had been evacuated by the National troops on the night of the 21st. On the 26th the Confederates moved on Pilot Knob, which fortunately had been occupied the day before by General Hugh S. Ewing with a brigade of A. J. Smith's command. With this force, and the garrison of Pilot Knob and some outlying posts, Ewing undertook to make a stand against the Confederates, who without delay made preparations to carry the place by assault. The fort occupied by the National forces was a strong one, mounting four 24-pounders, four 32-pounders, and four 6-pounder Parrots, besides two 6-pounder Parrots mounted outside. The enemy advanced against it on the 27th, in full confidence of being able to carry it by assault; but he was driven back with a loss of about 1000 men, by a well-directed artillery and musket fire. The fort, however, was commanded by a neighboring height called Shepherd Mountain, and the enemy having occupied this position Ewing determined to abandon the work. He had previously
sent away his stores to St. Louis. Blowing up his magazine, he fell back, keeping up a running fight with the enemy as far as Harrison Station, on the Southwest Branch Railroad. Here he prepared to make another stand, behind breast-works left by a party of militia who had previously occupied the place. Ewing in his defense of Pilot Knob rendered important service by detaining the entire force of Price, and affording time to put St. Louis in a state of defense, then covered only by a portion of A. J. Smith's infantry and some regiments of cavalry thrown out as far as practicable towards the enemy. The Confederates followed him up closely, and cut the railroad on both sides of him, thus severing his communications with both Rolla and St. Louis. He was only saved from another assault by the opportune arrival of Colonel Beveridge, of the Seventeenth Illinois cavalry, with 500 men. The enemy taking these to be only the advance of large reinforcements, delayed the intended attack, and Beveridge, in the night, with the main body of the troops, succeeded in reaching Rolla.

In the mean time, Springfield being considered secure, General Sanborn moved with all his available cavalry to reinforce Rolla, where General McNeil was in command and preparing to protect the depots and great supply trains. A. J. Smith's infantry, aided by the militia and the citizens, the whole under the command of General Pleasonton, made St. Louis secure. General B. Gratz Brown was placed by Rose cranz in charge of the militia. Brown concentrated at Jefferson City, the troops of the Central District; and being reinforced by General Fisk with all the available troops north of the Missouri, as well as aided by the enthusiastic exertions of the citizens, he made thorough preparations to drive back the invaders from the State capital. Towards this point Price, who had remained a day or two at Richwood's, threatening St. Louis, was rapidly marching. On the 7th of October he had crossed the Osage not far from the city. But McNeil and Sanborn, moving with all their available cavalry succeeded by forced marches in reaching the city first; and having united their commands with those of Fisk and Brown, they so increased the defensive force within the city, that Price deeming it prudent not to attack, moved off in a westerly direction. Pleasonton arrived at Jefferson City on the morning of the 8th, and assumed chief command. Sanborn with all his mounted troops, about 4000, was ordered to follow and harass the enemy, but not to attack until the remaining cavalry and infantry supports could come up.

On the afternoon of the 9th, the Confederates entered California, 25 miles west of Jefferson City, on the Pacific Railroad, and burnt the depots and a train of cars. From California, after tearing up the railroad track some distance on each side of the town, they moved on to Booneville, in Cooper County. Price was already a sorely disappointed man. He had, it is true,
obtained a few recruits; but the "Sons of Liberty," the "Knights of the Golden Circle," had sadly failed him at the critical moment, when at least a temporary success was possible.

On the 13th the Confederate chief withdrew from Booneville, and, continuing his march westward, occupied Lexington, in Lafayette County, on the Oct. 17th. For the purpose of foraging and obtaining recruits and conscripts, detached bodies of his force were sent in various directions, some as far as the borders of Kansas, some as far east as Danville and High Hill, Montgomery County. Wherever they made their appearance they worked terrible destruction. The militia were driven out of Sedalia, in Pettis County, with severe loss; and at Glasgow, in Howard County, 6 companies of the Forty-Third Missouri were compelled to surrender.

The National troops did not pursue actively until Pleasonton came up, when they advanced towards Booneville and harassed Price's rear. Most of the National cavalry were concentrated at the Black Water, awaiting the arrival of Colonel Winslow from Washburne's command. He came up, on the 19th, bringing with him 1500 troopers with whom he had followed the enemy from Arkansas. Pleasonton, having now at east 6500 mounted men, exclusive of escort guards, moved from Sedalia in pursuit of Price. At Independence, on the 22d, he came up with and routed the Confederate general, Fagan, capturing 2 guns.

On the morning of the 23d, Pleasonton approached the Big Blue at Westport where General Curtis, then in charge of the Department of Kansas, had been vigorously but unsuccessfully attacked, the day before he found the main body of the Confederates. Pleasonton fell upon them with tremendous energy at the early hour of seven. The battle raged with great fury, until about one in the afternoon, when the Confederates gave way and fled towards Little Santa Fé. Pleasonton and Curtis who had now united their forces followed in close pursuit. At Marais des Cygnes, at four o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the National troops came up with the fugitives, when Pleasonton surprised and aroused the camp by a heavy fire of artillery. Price arose and fled, leaving behind him his camp equipage, one cannon, several hundred head of cattle, and 20 wagons full of plunder. The Confederates, keeping up a running fight, fell back to Little Osage Crossing, where two advanced brigades under Benteen and Phillips charged upon and broke their lines, capturing Generals Marmaduke and Cabell, 4 field officers, about 1000 prisoners, 8 pieces of artillery, and some 1500 stand of arms. The pursuit was continued, Sanborn's brigade again leading the way. The Confederates were overtaken; and after a brief but stubborn resistance, they crossed the Marmiton, and fled under cover of the night, into Arkansas. In six days 204 miles had been traversed. Price was falling back at panic speed. The line of his retreat was strewn with the wrecks of wagons.
and other necessaries and accompaniments of the battle-field. Pleasonton had retired to Fort Scott to rest his tailed men and horses. Sanborn, however, was still in close pursuit. At Newtonia, Price made another and a final stand; and for the timely arrival of Sanborn, he would have won a decided victory over the National troops under Blunt. As it was, Price made his escape into Western Arkansas followed by Curtis. The last struggle in connection with this Missouri invasion was at Fayetteville. The place was held by Colonel La Rue, with the First Arkansas cavalry—a body of men who, amid great trial and hardship, remained true to the Union. Colonel Brooks had surrounded Fayetteville with some 2000 Confederates. He had been joined by Fagan’s division of Price’s flying army. La Rue might have held out against Brooks; but it would be a hopeless struggle against the combined forces of Brooks and Fagan. At the critical moment Curtis came up; the Confederates were driven off with heavy loss, and La Rue was saved. Such was the end of the invasion; and no further attempt was made on Missouri. Sterling Price’s name had long been a tower of strength to the Confederate cause in the West. His prestige was gone forever. Missouri was no longer—and, indeed, had no reason to be—in sympathy with secession. The State, which had suffered much, now began to enjoy some degree of tranquility.

Price had accomplished little by his raid, beyond the destruction of about $5,000,000 of property, and laying waste the country through which he passed. He obtained 5000 or 6000 recruits or conscripts, took 1500 stand of arms, one cannon, many horses, and large herds of cattle, with a vast amount of plunder, in the shape of clothing, forage, and provisions; but of this he lost nearly all in his precipitate retreat, besides 10 guns and 1958 prisoners. In his flight from Newtonia, he abandoned or destroyed most of his wagon-trains; and his men and horses suffered severely. Large numbers of his followers left him; and when he recrossed the Arkansas, his force had been reduced by desertion and losses to less than 5000 men, only partially armed and mounted. His artillery had dwindled down to 3 Parrott guns and one 12-pounder mountain howitzer; and of his train, which originally consisted of 200 wagons, but 53 remained. The entire National loss, according to the official report of General Rosecranz, was, in killed, wounded and missing, only 346 officers and men.

General Grant was ill-satisfied with the whole affair. In his judgment, the invasion ought to have been nipped in the bud. In his report he says: “the impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecranz should not have concentrated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.” Rosecranz could hardly, in truth, have made a more wretched use than he did.
of a large portion of his troops. He was slow to act; and when he did act, he did not act with wisdom. During the entire pursuit, the troops of A. J. Smith were practically neutralized. If instead of ordering him to follow Pleasonton in the direct pursuit of Price, he had ordered him to continue his movement westward, Price ought to have been captured. As it was, Price obtained time, and when pressed, he had to deal with Pleasonton and the cavalry alone. It was the 23d of October when Smith arrived at Independence; but it was too late, for Pleasonton was already engaged with the enemy and the loud thunders of artillery were heard in the direction of the Big Blue River. His troops were weary and footsore; and believing that his services were no longer needed, he marched them to Harrisonville, where they enjoyed a brief interval of rest. The fame of Rosecranz was clouded at Chickamauga. It was permanently injured by his conduct of affairs in Missouri.

Less immediately connected with the Georgia and Tennessee campaigns, but still having a most important bearing on the general issue, were some minor operations which took place in Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee in the fall of the year. It had been a favorite theory with some experienced military men that in the event of Lee sustaining any great disaster in the East, he would retire with his army to Southwestern Virginia, and passing thence into East and Middle Tennessee, there concentrate the remaining forces of the Confederacy. He would then be in a position to threaten Nashville, Chattanooga, or Louisville; and it was predicted that the decisive battle of the war would be fought somewhere in the Southwest. For this reason, a considerable National force was retained in East Tennessee. Knoxville was well fortified; and outlying bodies of infantry and cavalry were pushed well up the railroad and the Holston River Valley towards the Virginia line. But after the commencement of the great Atlanta and Richmond campaigns, in May, affairs in East Tennessee lost much of their interest, the forces on both sides being concentrated, as much as possible, on the more important scenes of operations. The presence of scattered bodies of irregular Confederate cavalry in Southwestern Virginia proved a source of constant alarm in Eastern Kentucky. These rough riders, dashing through the gaps of the Cumberland Mountains, would fall upon isolated posts, capture their garrisons, and after plundering in the adjacent country would get back again to their mountain retreats before they could be overtaken. It was on one of these plundering expeditions that Morgan, in the month of June, and after the burning of Cynthiana, as has already been mentioned, was overtaken and badly defeated by General Burbridge. For some time afterwards, Morgan did not venture to take the offensive. He was of too restless a nature, however, to remain long inactive; and by the beginning of September he had again set his band of guerrillas in motion. He occupied Greenville, East Tennessee on the 3d
but his command was surprised the same night by General Gillem, who had made a forced march from 3. Bull's Gap. The Confederate chief with a portion of his staff was in the house of a Mrs. Williams. The house was surrounded; and Morgan while attempting to escape was shot dead. The death of Morgan was followed by another short season of comparative inaction, both parties being content to remain on the watch, awaiting the development of events around Atlanta.

About the beginning of October, General Burbridge with 2500 men set out on an expedition from Kentucky against the salt-works in Southwestern Virginia, which were of great importance to the enemy. After heavy skirmishing he succeeded in driving the Confederates from Clinch Mountain and Laurel Gap. Oct. 2d of October, about 4 miles from Saltville, he drove them back within their defenses in the immediate neighborhood of the salt-works. Here, however, they bade defiance to the National troops; and Burbridge, his ammunition being exhausted, found it necessary to retire. He had sustained a loss of 350 men.

General Gillem having fallen back after General Burbridge's withdrawal into Kentucky, from Greenville to Bull's Gap, and thence to Morristown, 42 miles from Knoxville, was followed by a Confederate force, under Vaughan. On the 26th of October, Vaughan ventured to attack Gillem but was repulsed. Two days afterwards Vaughan attacked again, but, receiving a still more severe repulse, retreated, pursued by Gillem as far as Limestone, 98 miles east of Knoxville. After remaining in that advanced position until the 7th of November, Gillem, whose force was only 1500 men, consisting of 3 regiments of Tennessee cavalry, retired to Bull's Gap, where Breckenridge, now at the head of the Confederate forces in East Tennessee, some 3000 strong, attacked him on the 11th. He too was repulsed. On the 12th, Gillem withdrew his forces from Bull's Gap, and began to retreat in the direction of Knoxville. In the evening Breckenridge got his force on Gillem's flank and rear by moving through Laurel Gap. His cavalry, under Vaughan and Duke were in front. Soon after midnight Breckenridge attacked Gillem's retreating column near Morristown, charging upon both flanks and at the same time breaking his centre. The National force was routed, one regiment after another giving way till men and horses became mixed up together in inextricable confusion. A panic ensued. Owing to the darkness few casualties occurred; but the men threw away their arms and sought safety in flight. All the artillery and the baggage were left in the hands of the enemy. The Confederate general claimed to have captured 70 wagons, six 11-pounder Parrott guns with their horses and ammunition, 18 stand of colors, 316 prisoners, and about 200 horses and mules. The remainder of Gillem's command, about 1000 in number, escaped to Strawberry Plains and...
thence to Knoxville. Breckenridge assumed the air of a conqueror in East Tennessee, and issued a proclamation promising protection to all who should lay down their arms and become peaceable citizens. He continued to advance, by way of Strawberry Plains, in the direction of Knoxville. On the 18th he withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced; and on that day General Ammen, reinforced by 1500 troops from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains. On the 23d of November the main force of the enemy was reported to be at New Market, 8 miles to the north.

About this time General Stoneman was ordered from the West to take general direction of affairs in East Tennessee. As soon as he arrived he instructed Burbridge to march, with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumberland Gap, to the relief of Gillem. Stoneman was directed by Thomas to concentrate as large a force as he could, and move against Breckenridge, with the object of either destroying his force or driving it into Virginia. He was also directed to destroy, if possible, the salt-works at Saltville, and the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering his command. Learning on the 6th of December that Breckenridge was falling back towards Virginia, Stoneman made preparations to follow him; and having concentrated the commands of Burbridge and Gillem at Bean's Station, he set out on the 12th for Bristol. The advance under Gillem reached Jonesboro the same day, and drove the rear-guard of Vaughan's cavalry through the town. Gillem then turned northward to Kingsport, on the North Fork of the Holston, crossed the river, scaled the bluff, on which Duke was posted defeated him, and killed, captured, or dispersed the whole command. The Confederates left in his possession 8 wagons and the entire camp equipage. Burbridge moved upon Bristol, where he struck Vaughan, and skirmished with him until Gillem's column came up. Vaughan was also completely defeated, with the loss of some 300 prisoners and much property. Burbridge then pushed on to Abingdon, cut the railroad between Saltville and Wytheville, to prevent reinforcements coming from Lynchburg to the force defending the salt-works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th. The enemy under Vaughan had in the mean time reached Marion, having marched by a road parallel with that by which Stoneman's force had advanced, and had begun to entrench. But Gillem pushed on after Vaughan, and after a hard march of 29 miles he came up with him, early on the 16th. He attacked him instantly, and after completely routing him, drove him to Wytheville, 30 miles further, capturing the place, with 200 prisoners, 7 pieces of artillery, and a large wagon train. All the enemy's stores and supplies were destroyed, as well as the extensive lead-works near the town, and the railroad bridges over Reedy Creek. Stoneman now turned
his attention towards Saltville. His troops entered that place on the 20th, Dec. capturing 8 pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition of all kinds. They also destroyed the buildings belonging to the Confederate government, as well as nearly all the machinery, kettles, vats, engines, and boilers of the salt-works, said to be among the most extensive in the world, and an immense quantity of salt.

In this great raid, besides the damage done to the salt-works and lead-mines, there were captured 20 pieces of artillery, 900 prisoners, 200 negroes, 8000 hogs, many cattle, and 200 mules. Eleven foundries, 90 flour and saw mills, 30 bridges, and the depots at Glade Spring, Marion, and Wytheville, were destroyed, as well as 13 locomotives, about 100 cars, and many miles of railroad track. It was estimated that the loss to the Confederates in stores alone amounted to $2,000,000. The rapidity, with which Stoneman moved, enabled him to take the entire region he traversed by surprise, so that the citizens had not time to run off their stock. After these disasters, Breckenridge made no further attempts to threaten East Tennessee. Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by Gillem's command; Burbridge marched back to Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap.

We now return to Hood and Thomas. Hood, we have already said, had made such movements as left Thomas in no doubt that he intended to invade Middle Tennessee. He had been for some time repairing the Mobile and Ohio Railroad for the purpose of supplying his army; and trains were running as far north as Corinth and thence eastward to Cherokee Station, transporting supplies from Selma and Montgomery. Wood's division of the Fourth corps reached Athens on the 31st of Oct., October, and the other two divisions rapidly followed. The Twenty-Third corps under Schofield, awaiting at Resaca the orders of Thomas, as soon as it was known that Hood had appeared in force along the south side of the Tennessee River, was directed to concentrate at Pulaski, and was now also on its way in the rear of the Fourth corps. The Confederates having on the 31st effected a lodgment for their infantry on the north side of the Tennessee River about 3 miles above Florence, and driven Croxton above Shoal Creek, General Stanley was directed also to concentrate the Fourth corps at Pulaski.

In the mean time Forrest, with 17 regiments of cavalry and 9 pieces of artillery, had commenced moving northward from Corinth, and from Paris, Tennessee. On the 28th of October he appeared before Fort Heiman, an earth-work on the west bank of the Tennessee about 75 miles from Paducah, where he captured a gun-boat and 3 transports, having previously burned the steamer Express. On the 2d of November he had succeeded in planting batteries both above and below Jacksonville, an important base of supplies, and the terminus of the Northwestern Railroad. He thus completely blockaded the river and prevented the
escape in either direction of 3 gun-boats, 8 transports, and about a dozen barges. The garrison consisted of about 1000 men under the command of Colonel Thompson. The naval forces under Lieutenant King attacked the enemy’s batteries below Johnsonville. They were repulsed, however, after a severe contest, but not until they had captured a transport, with two 20-pounder Parrots and a quantity of ammunition and stores on board, and compelled the enemy to destroy one of the captured gun-boats. On the 4th the Confederates opened fire on the town, as well as on the gun-boats and transports, from batteries on the west bank. In the artillery contest which ensued the gun-boats were soon disabled; and, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy they were set on fire, with the transports. Unfortunately the flames spread to the buildings of the commissary and quartermaster’s departments, which together with a large amount of stores on the levee, were totally destroyed, involving a loss to the Government of about $1,500,000.

On the 5th, after directing upon the garrison a furious cannonade of an hour’s duration, the enemy withdrew, crossed to the east bank above the town, and marched off in the direction of Clifton. On the same day Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-Third corps, arrived at Nashville; and being sent immediately by railroad to Johnsonville, he arrived there at night, only to find that the enemy had disappeared. Schofield was directed to leave a body of troops at Johnsonville sufficiently numerous for its defense.

With the rest of his force he was ordered to join the Fourth corps at Pulaski, assume command of all the troops in that vicinity, and, watching the movements of Hood, retard his advance into Tennessee as much as possible. He was not, however, to risk a general engagement till A. J. Smith should arrive from Missouri, and until Wilson had remounted the cavalry regiments whose horses had been taken for the use of Kilpatrick’s division in Georgia.

General Thomas, now found himself confronted by that army of veteran troops which, under General Johnston, had made such persistent opposition to the advance of Sherman’s largely superior force from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, reinforced by 12,000 well-equipped cavalry under Forrest—perhaps the boldest and ablest, as well as the most unscrupulous of the Confederate cavalry officers. Hood’s army now consisted of about 45,000 infantry and from 12,000 to 13,000 cavalry. The available force of Thomas at this time was less than half that of Hood, comprising only about 12,000 men under Stanley, 10,000 under Schofield, about 4000 cavalry under Hatch, Croxton’s brigade of 2500 men, and Capron’s of 1200, in all about 30,000 men. The remainder of his force was stationed along the railroad to keep open communications at Chattanooga, Decatur, Huntsville, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Murfreesboro, and intermediate posts. It was necessary that all these points should be well guarded.
Hood remained inactive in the neighborhood of Florence from the 1st to the 17th of November, influenced doubtless by his uncertainty respecting the movements of Sherman. He had laid a pontoon bridge over the Tennessee River in place of the destroyed railroad bridge, and had sent over to the north side S. D. Lee's infantry corps and two cavalry divisions, which skirmished continually with the commands of Hatch and Croxton along the line of Shoal Creek. His other two corps remained on the south side of the 

Tennessee till the 17th of November. Lee, when Cheatham's corps also crossed to the north side, and Stewart's prepared to follow. On the same day a portion of Lee's corps moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough's Mill on Shoal Creek, skirmishing a little with Hatch's cavalry, and then retiring to some neighboring bluffs, went into camp.

This delay, on the part of Hood was a great gain to the National commander. Thomas was anxiously awaiting the arrival of promised reinforcements. In a few days or weeks at most, the term of service of a large number of his troops would have expired; but 20 one year regiments were on their way to take their place. A. J. Smith, with two veteran divisions, already well advanced on his journey, was approaching from Missouri. Wilson, having all but completed his arrangements, would soon join him with 12,000 effective cavalry. In addition to these which could be confidently counted upon, there had been collected at Chattanooga, some 7000 convalescents which, if not available for marching, would at least be serviceable for garrison duty. These forces, when all concentrated, would increase Thomas' available force to an army almost as large as that of the enemy. Had Hood delayed his advance one week or ten days longer, Thomas would have been able to meet him at some point south of the Duck River. Hood, however, began 19. his advance on the 19th, moving by parallel roads from Florence towards Waynesboro, and driving Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg, on the 22d. It then became the policy of Thomas to retire in the direction in which his reinforcements were approaching, and at the same time to delay the enemy as much as possible. Schofield began to remove the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back towards Columbia—two divisions of Stanley's corps having been sent to Lynnville, 15 miles north, to protect the railroad and secure the passage of the wagon-trains. Capron's brigade of cavalry was stationed at Mount Pleasant to cover the approaches from the southwest to Columbia, where was held in position, a brigade of Ruger's division of the Twenty-Third corps. Of the other two divisions of that corps, one was directed to move to Columbia, and the other by way of Waverly to Centerville, to occupy the crossings of the Duck River, near Columbia, Williamsport, and Gordon's Ferry. On the 23d Granger withdrew by rail, without any opposition, on the part of the enemy, the garrisons at Athens,
Decatur, and Huntsville to Stevenson, sending 5 new regiments from that place to Murfreesboro, and retaining the original troops of his command. On the same night, Schofield evacuated Pulaski and retired towards Columbia, where he arrived on the 24th. The officer, commanding at Johnsonville, was ordered to remove all public property and retire to Fort Donelson and thence to Clarksville.

On the 24th and 25th some dismounted cavalry of the Confederates skirmished with Schofield's troops at Columbia; and, during the 26th and 27th, the infantry having come up, they made more decided demonstrations, but did not assault. Their movements, however, indicated an intention to cross the Duck River, above or below the town. Schofield, therefore, withdrew to the north bank on the night of the 27th, and took up a new position, in which he remained undisturbed during the 28th. In front of the town, two divisions of the Twenty-Third corps were placed in line, holding all the neighboring crossings, while Stanley's corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin turnpike, was held in readiness to repel any attempt, on the part of the enemy, to force a passage. General Wilson, with a body of cavalry, held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry; but, about two o'clock on the morning of the 29th, the Confederates drove him back and pushed over the river at the Lewisburg turnpike, and, a little later, a body of their infantry crossed at Huey's Mills, 6 miles above Columbia. Schofield now finding his communication with the cavalry interrupted, and his line of retreat towards Franklin threatened, prepared again to fall back. Stanley, with a division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill to protect the passage of the trains, and keep open the road for the retreat of the main force in that direction. He arrived just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry, and to save the trains. Soon afterwards, he was attacked by both infantry and cavalry, and had considerable difficulty in maintaining his position till dark. Schofield, though not attacked at Huey's Mills, was actively engaged all day resisting the enemy who attempted a crossing at Columbia. Late in the afternoon, and, after giving direction for the retreat of all the troops northward at dark, he took with him Ruger's division and hastened to the relief of General Stanley, at Spring Hill. Leaving a brigade to hold the turnpike, at this point, he pushed on to the crossroads, near Thompson's Station, whence a body of the enemy's cavalry hastily made off at his approach, leaving their camp-fires burning. The main body of Schofield's command withdrew safely from Columbia after dark, on the 29th, passed Spring Hill without molestation, at midnight, the cavalry moving on the Lewisburg turnpike, on the right of the infantry line of march. The whole command got into position, at Franklin, 18 miles south of Nash-ville, early on the morning of the 30th. Line of battle was formed at once on the south side of the town in expectation of the enemy's immediate approach.
The battle-ground was well chosen. Franklin is situated on the west bank of the Harpeth River, a bend of which incloses more than half of the town on the east and north, leaving only a part of the west and south sides exposed. The National troops were disposed in a line running southeast, both flanks resting on the river—the Fourth corps on the right, the Twenty-Third on the left. The cavalry were posted on both sides of the town on the north bank, where also was a fort on the hill commanding the town and the railroad, besides earth-works and some artillery. From the outset the troops worked energetically in the erection of breast-works of logs and earth, while the skirmishers in front endeavored to check the enemy's advance. Between the lines of the two armies extended a broad plain, broken by slight undulations and little hills, interspersed by clumps of bushes and groves of trees.

The object of Schofield in making a stand at Franklin was to detain Hood until the trains could be got off safely over the Harpeth Bridge and well on their way to Nashville. To refuse battle would have been to expose his command to certain attack from superior forces while on the march, the result of which would, doubtless, have been the destruction of the wagon-trains and the greater part of the artillery. Such a calamity might have been followed by the fall of Nashville, and the abandonment of a large part of Tennessee. Hood's object was to overwhelm Schofield at once, or at least compel him to sacrifice his artillery and stores. He therefore hurried up his troops and massed them behind a screen of thick woods, in a line parallel with that of Schofield, Stewart's corps being on the right, Cheatham's on the left, and Lee's in reserve in the rear. These movements were made with such celerity that Hood very nearly took Schofield by surprise. The Confederate chief rode along his front, telling his men that the National lines were weak, and that when these were once broken Thomas would be compelled to leave Tennessee. His own army was in excellent condition. With his usual boldness and confidence of success, Hood determined to attack the centre of Schofield's line, hoping to pierce it, and then to push in through the town to the bridges, when he would capture the trains, and at the same time cut the opposing army in two. At four o'clock in the afternoon he advanced to the attack. The National skirmishers slowly retreated to their works, exchanging a sharp fire with those of the enemy; and then a tremendous cannonade was opened from the artillery along Schofield's line. The cloud of hostile skirmishers was quickly followed by the long and massive lines four deep, of Cheatham and Stewart. As the Confederates approached, they were received by a tremendous musketry, as well as, artillery fire. On they came, however, with fierce energy. A terrific struggle ensued. At length one of Cheatham's divisions gained the outworks held by Wagner, and forced him back on the stronger lines held by Cox and Ruger. The Confederates
then re-forming their lines, again rushed on, and after a most desperate and bloody contest, penetrated the second line of defenses, and captured two guns. The situation had already become critical in the last degree. It seemed as if Hood had already victory in his grasp. At this supreme moment, Stanley rode forward to the head of Opdyke’s brigade, of Warren’s division, which was posted behind the works, and ordered it forward with Conrad’s brigade in support. Opdyke’s voice was immediately heard ringing loud and clear above the tumult. “First brigade, forward to the works,” he cried, himself leading the way. His brave men promptly responded to the call. On they went with firm and steady step. With crushing weight they fell upon the exultant columns of the foe. The Confederates, at the very moment when victory seemed secure, were not only checked in their triumphant career; they were driven back with fearful slaughter. The gap was closed—the National line restored. By this gallant charge the works and guns were recovered; and 300 prisoners with 10 battle-flags were captured. Hood, however, was unwilling to give up the contest. Again and again, in four successive assaults, he flung his men, as if with the energy of despair, on the now compact National lines; but it was all in vain. After dark the Confederates, moving to their own left, made a vigorous attack on the National right; but this too was repulsed by Hanley’s first division, under Kimball. It was midnight when the sounds of musketry and artillery ceased. Hood, bitterly mortified at the result of the contest, had withdrawn his men. Such was the battle of Franklin—a battle which did honor to the genius of Schofield, but which, according to the concurrent testimony of Wood, Stanley and Thomas himself, was won by Opdyke and his gallant brigade. It was the voluntary testimony of each of these generals, that but for Opdyke and his men, their skill, promptitude and gallantry, “disaster instead of victory would have befallen the National arms at Franklin.” Opdyke had already figured at Shiloh, where he was twice wounded, at Chickamauga, at Missionary Ridge, at Rocky Face, and at Peach Tree Creek. He was spared at Franklin to perform equally noble deeds at Nashville.

On both sides the losses were severe. Hood’s loss was about 6000, some of his best generals had perished; and many of them were severely wounded. Schofield’s loss was not so heavy—2326 in all, of whom 189 were killed, 1033 wounded, and 1104 missing. Among the wounded were Generals Stanley and Bradley.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of the victory at Franklin. It checked Hood’s advance; it gave Schofield time to remove his troops and his property to Nashville; and what was of equal value, from a National point of view, it greatly discouraged and bowed down the spirits of the Confederate rank and file.

After the battle, Schofield in compliance with orders from Thomas, fell
back to Nashville, in front of which, by noon on the 1st of December, a line of battle was formed. The army of Thomas was now about 56,000 strong. Steedman had come up from Chattanooga with 5000 men. A. J. Smith with his command had arrived from Missouri on the 30th. Other reinforcements were rapidly arriving. Thomas had taken every care to strengthen his position. Forts Nogley, Morton, Confiscation, Houston and Gillem, situated on commanding heights, guarded the approaches from the south. Behind these, and in front of Nashville, lay Thomas' army; A. J. Smith on the right, resting on the river; the Fourth corps commanded by Wood in the absence of the wounded Stanley, in the centre; and the Twenty-Third corps, under Schofield on the left. Wilson with the cavalry, was stationed, to secure the interval between Schofield and the Cumberland above the city. Steedman arrived in the evening, and took up a position about a mile in advance of the left centre of the main line and on the left of the Nolensville turnpike. This position, however, was considered to be too much exposed, and the cavalry were directed to take post on the north side of the river at Edgefield, Steedman's troops taking their place in the line between Schofield and the river. On the afternoon of the 2d of December small parties of the enemy's cavalry engaged the National skirmishers; but their infantry did not appear in force till the latter part of the following day, when Hood began to establish his main line. Early on the 4th he occupied the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's Creek, extending from the Nolensville turnpike —his extreme right in a westerly direction across the Franklin and Granny White turnpikes to the hills south and southwest of Richland Creek, and along that stream to the Hillsboro turnpike. Both flanks were covered by the cavalry. The enemy's salient was on Montgomery Hill, within 600 yards of the National centre. An artillery fire was opened on his lines from several points, but brought no reply. In this position Hood's army remained till the 15th of December.

During this interval, there occurred some operations of a minor character. Murfreesboro was then held by General Rousseau. The garrison at Murfreesboro had been considerably strengthened by the arrival of a body of troops under General Milroy, who had been ordered up from Tullahoma. Thomas was particularly anxious that nothing should be allowed to disturb his communication with Chattanooga. He kept, therefore, a watchful eye on the railroad. Hood was not ignorant of the importance of this line of communication; and on the same day on which the latter took position in front of Thomas, Bates' division of Cheatham's corps appeared at Overall's Creek, and made an attack on the block-house at the railroad crossing. The little garrison made a stout resistance; and on the arrival of Milroy who was sent with 3 regiments from Fort Rosecranz, Bates was compelled
Hood and Thomas in Tennessee.

...retire. During the three following lays, Bates was largely reinforced with both cavalry and infantry; and it seemed as if he were bent on making an assault on the fort. On the 8th, Buford dashed into Murfreesboro. Attacked by a regiment of National infantry, Buford found it necessary to retire from the town. Determined that his day's labor should not be altogether fruitless, he swept around by way of Lebanon, and along the Cumberland, with the evident intention of cutting Thomas' communication with Louisville; but the gun-boats on the river made it impossible for him to carry out his designs. On the same day, Milroy encountered the Confederates in some force on the Wilkeson turnpike, and after a severe struggle, routed them, inflicting a loss of 30 killed, and 175 wounded, and capturing over 200 prisoners and 2 guns. Milroy's loss was about 205 men killed and wounded.

Thomas' protracted delay was misunderstood and misinterpreted at Washington. Grant, himself, who had great faith in Thomas, was dissatisfied. Hood, it was thought, was having matters too much his own way. Grant, resolved to have the mystery of the delay explained, hurried from City Point for Nashville. He had only proceeded as far as Washington, when he received from the West, telegraphic messages fully explaining the situation, and convincing him that he had not mistrusted his man, and that all was well in Tennessee. Grant did not pursue his journey.

...the best possible use of his time. His numbers were superior to those of Hood, but he was deficient in cavalry. Time was of the utmost importance to Wilson, who was organizing with all the rapidity possible in the circumstances. The weather, besides, had been unfavorable. On the morning of the 9th, there was a heavy sleet-storm, which covered the ground with ice. For a week the ground was such, that it was impossible to move; and the cold was most intense.

On the 14th, the weather moderated considerably. In both camps the utmost activity prevailed. It was evident that both armies were fully prepared for a great test struggle. Thomas convened his corps-commanders; and a plan of battle was discussed and agreed upon. The left flank of the enemy was his weak point. It was the general conviction that the point was vulnerable—that it could be turned. It was resolved, therefore, to make a feigned attack against Hood's right, and to follow it by an effective blow against the left. The morning of the 15th was gloomy. A dense fog overhung the entire country around. It was not until the morning was far advanced, that it was possible to move the troops to their assigned positions. Steedman had received instructions, the night before, to advance against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville turnpike. As soon as daylight permitted, he proceeded to carry out his instructions.

Immediately after the completion of Steedman's movement, Smith and
Wilson pushed out along the Harding turnpike, and, wheeling to the left, advanced against Hood's position, across the Harding and Hillsboro turnpikes. At the same time, Johnson's division of cavalry was sent to operate against a battery of the enemy at Ball's Landing, on the Cumberland, 8 miles below Nashville; and, late in the afternoon, in conjunction with some gun-boats, he engaged it, continuing the firing till dark, and with such effect that the Confederates disappeared from that vicinity during the night. The remainder of Wilson's cavalry, moving on the right flank of A. J. Smith's troops, Hatch's division leading and Knipe's in reserve, struck the enemy at Richland Creek, near Harding's House, drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners and wagons. Continuing to advance, and still swinging a little towards he left, they came upon a redoubt containing 4 guns. The redoubt was carried by assault; and the captured guns were turned upon the enemy. The same troops then advanced against another and stronger 4-gun redoubt, capturing it with 300 prisoners. At this stage it was discovered that Smith had not advanced sufficiently to the right. Schofield, therefore, with the Twenty-Third corps, was directed to leave his position in reserve, and advance to Smith's right. This movement Schofield rapidly accomplished; and the cavalry were thus enabled to operate more freely on the enemy's rear. The Fourth corps, under Wood, formed on the left of Smith's command, and as soon as the latter had struck

the enemy's flank, assaulted Montgomery Hill. This position, the most advanced in Hood's line, was carried, at one o'clock, by a brigade of the second division. The Fourth corps, still connecting with Smith's left, continued to advance, carrying by assault all that portion of Hood's line in its immediate front, and capturing several pieces of artillery, with 500 prisoners and some colors. The Confederates were driven out of their original line of works, and forced back to a position along the base of the Harpeth Hills, still holding their line of retreat by the Franklin and Granny White turnpikes.

The National line was readjusted at rightfall so as to run along the east side of the Hillsboro turnpike—Schofield on the right, Smith in the centre, and Wood on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield. Steedman continued to hold the position he had gained in the morning, east of the Nolensville turnpike. The day's operations resulted in the forcing back of the enemy at all points, with a loss of 16 pieces of artillery, 1200 prisoners, several hundred stand of arms, and 40 wagons. The National loss was slight. The original plan of battle had been strictly adhered to, and, with but few alterations, fully carried out. The entire army bivouacked in the line of battle formed at dark; and preparations were made to renew the contest on the following day at an early hour.

On the 16th, at six in the morning, the struggle was resumed. Wood pressed back the Confederate skirmishers across the Franklin turn...
pike; and then swinging a little to the right he advanced in a southerly direction, driving the Confederates before him until he came upon their new main line of works, at Overton's Hill, about miles south of the city, and on the east side of the Franklin turnpike. Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville turnpike, and formed his command on the left of Wood, whose left flank he thus effectually secured. Smith moved on the right of Wood's corps and established connection with it, thus completing a new line of battle. Schofield's corps remained in the position taken up at dark on the 15th, in which his troops faced eastward and towards the enemy's left flank, while those of Smith and Wood faced towards the south. Wilson's cavalry was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield. These dispositions having been completed, it was determined to continue the movement against the enemy's left flank; and the entire National line moved to within 600 yards of that of the enemy at all points. About three in the afternoon an assault on Overton's Hill was ordered to be made by two brigades of Wood's corps, aided by a colored brigade from Steedman's command. But as the ground on which the assaulting columns were formed was open and exposed to the view of the Confederates, they anticipated the movement, and drew reinforcements from their left and centre to strengthen the menaced position; and, when the assault was made, they directed a tremendous fire of grape, canister, and musketry upon the National troops. Wood's men, however, moved steadily onward up the hill until near its crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose suddenly and opened upon their assailants a most destructive fire, which caused them to waver and ultimately to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded lying among the felled trees. The troops were immediately re-formed in their old position by Wood, in readiness for a renewal of the assault.

Smith and Schofield then moved against the works in their respective fronts, and carried all before them, breaking the enemy's lines in a dozen places, capturing all his artillery with thousands of prisoners, including four general officers. Wilson's cavalry dismounted, attacked the enemy at the same moment, gained firm possession of the Granny White turnpike, and thus closed one of the routes which had remained open to the Confederates for retreat in the direction of Franklin. Wood's and Steedman's troops, now hearing the shouts of their victorious comrades on the right, again rushed impetuously forward to renew the assault on Overton's Hill. Although received with a very heavy fire, their onset proved irresistible. The Confederates broke, and, leaving their artillery and a large number of prisoners, fled in confusion to the Brentwood pass through which runs the Franklin turnpike, closely followed till dark by the Fourth corps. Wilson, at the same time, hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions of his command, and sent them in pursuit along the Granny
White turnpike, with directions to reach Franklin, if possible, in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon a body of Confederate cavalry under Chalmers, behind barricades constructed across the road. The position was charged, at once, by the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, under Colonel Spalding, when the Confederates broke and scattered in all directions, leaving a number of prisoners, among whom was General Rucker. Such was the battle of Nashville.

During the two day's operations 4462 prisoners were taken, including 287 officers, from the grade of major-general downward, besides 53 pieces of artillery and thousands of small-arms. The Confederates left 3000 of their dead and wounded on the field of battle. The total National loss did not exceed 3000, and of this number very few were killed.

Next morning, the pursuit was continued, the Fourth corps pushing Dec. 17. towards Franklin by the direct turnpike, and the cavalry by the Granny White turnpike to its intersection with that road, beyond which point they moved in advance of the infantry. Johnson's cavalry division was sent by Wilson direct to the Harpeth River by the Hillsboro turnpike, with instructions to cross and move rapidly towards Franklin. The main cavalry column, Knipe's division in the advance, overtook the enemy's rear-guard 4 miles north of Franklin, at Hollow Tree Gap, and carried the position by simultaneous charges in both front and flank, capturing 413 prisoners and 3 stand of colors. The Confederates then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the crossings of the Harpeth; but, Johnson's division coming up from below on the south side of the stream, they were compelled to retire. The National forces took possession of the town, in which were the enemy's hospitals, containing over 2000 wounded, of whom about 200 were Union soldiers. Wilson continued the pursuit towards Columbia, the Confederate rear-guard slowly retreating before him to about 5 miles south of Franklin, where it halted in some open fields on the north side of the West Harpeth River, apparently disposed to make a stand. Wilson at once deployed Knipe's division as skirmishers, with Hatch's division in support, and ordered his body-guard, the Fourth United States cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Hedges, to attack the Confederates. Forming on the turnpike in column of fours, the gallant little band charged with drawn sabres, and succeeded in breaking their centre, while Knipe's and Hatch's men drove back their flanks, scattering the entire command and capturing their artillery. Night came on; and the fugitives escaped. The Fourth corps had followed, in the rear of the cavalry, as far as the Harpeth River. There, however, their progress was stayed. The bridges were destroyed, and there was too much water in the stream to permit the crossing of infantry. The construction of a trestle bridge was commenced; but it was not completed before night-fall. Steedman's command followed the Fourth corps and encamped
near it on the banks of the Harpeth. Smith and Schofield, with their corps, also joined in the pursuit, marching along the Granny White turnpike to its intersection with the direct road to Franklin. At that point they encamped for the night.

The pursuit was resumed by the cavalry, and pushed the next day as far Dec. 18. from Columbia. The Fourth corps crossed to the south side of the Harpeth and closed up with the cavalry, the enemy offering no opposition during the day. Heavy rains having succeeded to the cold which had delayed Thomas' operations at Nashville, not only made the roads almost impassable, but swelled the streams and rivers to such an extent that the pursuit became extremely difficult. Rutherford's Creek had swollen so rapidly, that it was found to be unfordable soon after the enemy had crossed. The splendid pontoon train with its experienced pontoniers, belonging to the army of Thomas, had been taken by Sherman for his Georgia campaign. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville, was on its way; but the wretched state of the roads retarded its arrival. During the 19th, efforts were made by the advanced troops to get across Rutherford's Creek. They were only partially successful, only a few skirmishers effecting a lodgment on the south bank. Smith's and Schofield's commands crossed to the south side of the Harpeth, the former advancing to Spring Hill, the latter to Franklin. On the morning of the 20th, Hatch having succeeded in throwing a floating bridge over Rutherford's Creek, got his entire division over, and pushed on for Columbia; but on reaching Duck River he found that the Confederates had got everything across the night before by a pontoon bridge, which they had carried off, and that the river was impassable. In the course of the day Wood constructed a foot bridge over Rutherford's Creek; and by nightfall having crossed all his infantry, as well as one or two of his batteries, he pushed on to Duck River.

The pontoon train came up about noon, on the 21st; and, in spite of the severe cold which had now set in, the bridge was completed before nightfall and Smith's command pushed across Materials for the construction of another bridge were hurried forward to Duck River. This bridge was finished in time to permit Wood's command to cross to the south side, late in the afternoon of the 22d, and to get into position on the Pulaski road, about two miles south of Columbia.

Notwithstanding the severity of the weather and the vexatious delays which he had experienced, Thomas resolved to continue the pursuit. This duty he assigned to Wilson's cavalry and the Fourth corps. The infantry was to move along the turnpike—the cavalry was to march on its flanks, across the fields. Smith's and Schofield's corps were to follow more leisurely, and to be used as occasion demanded. Hood had now formed a powerful rear-guard, composed of Forrest's cavalry and about 4000 infantry under General Walthall, made up of detachments from all his organized
force. This rear-guard, undaunted and firm, did its duty to the last. All the rest of Hood’s once noble army became a disheartened rabble of ragged, barefooted, and half-armed men, whose privations and discouragement led them to take every opportunity of escape from the Confederate service.

Wilson crossed the Duck River on the 23d; and on the following day, supported by Wood, he came up with the enemy at Lynnville and at Buford’s Station. A stand was made at both these places; but the Confederates were quickly dislodged with considerable loss, and followed up so rapidly that they had not time to destroy the bridges over Richland Creek. On the morning of the 25th they evacuated Pulaski, Dec., and were pursued in the direction of Lamb’s Ferry, over an almost impracticable road and through a country devoid of sustenance for men or horses. During the afternoon Colonel Harrison’s brigade found them strongly intrenched, at the head of a deep and heavily wooded ravine, through which the road ran. Their skirmishers were driven in; but the attack was delayed until the remainder of the cavalry should come up. The enemy then, recovering some of its old audacity, took the opportunity to sally from his breast-works, driving back Harrison’s skirmishers, and capturing one gun. The Confederates were ultimately driven back, with a loss of some 50 prisoners; but the gun was not recovered. The cavalry, in pursuit, moved so rapidly that their supply trains were left far in the rear; and both men and animals suffered much in consequence.

Wood’s corps following the cavalry on the night of the 26th encamped 6 miles out from Pulaski, on the Lamb’s Ferry road, and reached Lexington, Alabama, 30 miles from Pulaski, on the 28th. The Confederates, by this time, Dec. had made good their escape 28. across the Tennessee River at Bainbridge; and Thomas ordered the pursuit to cease. At Pulaski 200 of the enemy’s wounded and sick were found in the hospital; and 4 guns were taken out of Richland Creek. The road, all the way from Nashville to Bainbridge, was strewn with wagons, limbers, small-arms, and blankets, affording conclusive evidence that the retreat of Hood’s troops had been of the most disorderly character.

Although the pursuit of Hood, by the main army, had been discontinued, a force of 600 cavalry under Colonel Palmer, made up from various regiments, set out from Decatur, in the direction of Hood’s line of retreat. Palmer ascertained at Leighton that Hood had passed through that place on the 28th, and marched in the direction of Columbus, Mississippi. Avoiding the cavalry of the Confederates, and moving rapidly by way of LaGrange, Russellville and the Cotton-Gin road, Palmer overtook their pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons and 78 pontoon boats, about 10 miles from Russellville, the whole of which he destroyed. Then, having ascertained that a large supply train was on its way to Tuscaloosa, he set out on the 1st of January towards Aberdeen, Mississippi, and succeeded in surprising it
about ten o'clock the same night, just beyond the Mississippi boundary line. This train, consisted of over 100 wagons and 500 mules. The wagons he burned; the mules he sabred or shot. After encountering and pressing back Roddy's cavalry, near Leighton, Alabama, and capturing and destroying Hood's pontoon train, about 10 miles from Russellville he pushed on for Moulton. Meeting a body of Confederates at Thorn Hill, he attacked and routed them. He arrived safe at Decatur on the 6th of January.

While Hood was before Nashville, he sent into Kentucky a force of about 800 cavalry with 2 guns, under General Lyon, with instructions to operate against the railroad communications with Louisville. To protect these, McCook's division of cavalry was on the 14th of December sent to Bowling Green and Franklin. Lyon captured Hopkinsville, but was soon afterwards met and routed by Lagrange's brigade near Greenburg. Then, making a wide detour by way of Elizabethtown and Glasgow, he succeeded in getting to the Cumberland River, at Burkville, where he crossed. Proceeding thence, by way of McMinnville and Winchester, to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, he attacked the little garrison, at Scottsboro on the 10th of January, but was again repulsed. This time, however, his command scattered and was pursued to the Tennessee River, beyond which he managed to escape with about 200 men, the rest of his force dispersing in squads among the mountains. Palmer

with 150 men crossed the Tennessee River and went in pursuit of Lyon and on the 14th of January, he surprised him in camp at Red Hill, on the road from Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, capturing Lyon with 100 of his men, and his one remaining piece of artillery Lyon, however, shooting a sentinel, effected his escape.

The total National losses in the various operations of the campaign in Tennessee, including killed, wounded, and missing, did not exceed 10,000 men; while that of the enemy in prisoners alone was 13,189, including nearly 1000 officers of all ranks, 72 serviceable pieces of artillery, and a large number of battle-flags. More than 2000 deserters also came within the National lines and took the oath of allegiance.

The success which attended General Thomas, in this campaign, was in some respects without parallel in the entire history of the war. In many of the campaigns larger numbers were engaged, and the fighting was more severe; but in none of the campaigns was an opposing army so thoroughly demolished. It was the first time that a Confederate army had been annihilated. Thomas had reason to be proud of his victory. With an army hastily made up of fragments of three separate commands, numerically weaker, and greatly inferior in discipline to that to which he was opposed, he not only held his own, not only repelled successive attacks, but won a signal, even a crowning victory. It has already been mentioned that Grant was impatient of what he called Thomas' "unnecessary delay
before the battle of Nashville. Although not abandoning the opinion that the delay was perilous and to a certain extent unnecessary, the Lieutenant-General afterwards declared that Thomas' success would be accepted as vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. In his letter to Sherman on the 18th of December, Grant says "Thomas has done magnificently." Thomas was slow but he was sure. He was already renowned as the "Rock of Chickamauga." As the conqueror of Hood, the hero of the great Tennessee campaign, he was henceforth to take a foremost place, with Grant and Sherman and Meade and Sheridan. The government evinced its appreciation of his great services by appointing him major-general in the regular army, his rank to date from the 15th of December—the day on which he won his crowning victory at Nashville.

On the 30th of December, Thomas proclaimed the campaign at an end, and gave orders for the distribution of his troops in winter-quarters, at Eastport, in Northern Mississippi, at Athens and Huntsville, in Alabama, and at Dalton, in Georgia. This arrangement, however, was not satisfactory to General Grant and the War Department. The Secession cause must now be crushed—such was the determination of General Grant; and in this determination he was fully supported by the government. Until this result should be achieved, there was to be no rest for the National armies. Thomas was, therefore, instructed to countermand the orders given, and to make a new disposition of his troops. Wood with the Fourth corps was to go to Huntsville. Smith, Schofield and Wilson were to concentrate at Eastport, and to hold themselves in readiness for further orders.

Hood with a shattered fragment of his army had made his way to Tupelo Mississippi. There, on the 23d of January, he was relieved of his command, at his own request; but it would be useless to deny that his resignation had become a necessity. A capable and dashing officer, he was Longstreet's tower of strength at Gettysburg, where he lost an arm. He fought with equal energy and daring at Chickamauga, where he lost a leg. He held himself responsible for the conception of the Tennessee campaign; and he strove hard, he tells us, to do his duty in its execution; but his plan and mode of battle would have been more perfect, if he had awaited, not made, the assaults. As it was, he acted precisely as his antagonist wished him to act. Hood added another name to that list of capable men, who had figured on both sides—men who as corps or division commanders were equal to any emergency; but who, being unequal to the responsibilities of uncontrolled authority, were found wanting, when entrusted with supreme command.

Simultaneous with these operations in Tennessee, and having for their object the occupation of the Confeder ate forces to the west of both Sherman and Thomas, there were some minor and co-operative movements of which it is necessary to give a brief account.
One of these was sent out from Vicksburg, in the latter part of November, against Hood's communications with Mobile. The force employed, consisting of about 2000 cavalry, with 8 pieces of artillery, under Colonel Osband, after well executed flank movement on Jackson on the 24th, started northward for the Mississippi Central Railroad Bridge over the Big Black. The bridge was reached on the 27th, captured 27. after a sharp fight and destroyed. The wagon-road bridge and 30 miles of railroad track were also destroyed, with all the intermediate depots and buildings, besides 2600 bales of cotton, several locomotives and cars, and a large amount of stores at Vaughan Station. Hood's army was thus cut off from the supplies accumulated for its use at Jackson; and the railroad was rendered unavailable for months. The expedition, although considerably harassed on its return by bodies of the enemy, got back to Vicksburg on the 4th of December, without having suffered any material losses.

Another expedition, under General Davidson, set out from Baton Rouge, with a similar object, on the 27th of November, comprising a force of 4200 men in two divisions, commanded by General Baily and Colonel Davis, with 96 wagons and 8 guns, and reached Tangipaha, on the Jackson Railroad, on the 1st of December. Five miles of the track were torn up and the railroad buildings and bridges burned. Unfortunately, some dwelling houses caught fire; and a part of the town was consumed. The column then proceeded to Franklinville; and there, also, the track was torn up. Columbia and Augusta were also visited. The enemy's cavalry under Scott, now made its appearance and a sharp skirmish occurred, on the Yazoo City and Vicksburg road on the 2d. After a weary march, over roads rendered almost impassable 2d by heavy rains, the command arrived at West Pascagoula, on the 12th. On the 16th, the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad was cut at Pollard's, 72 miles northeast of Mobile, by a column of infantry and cavalry, under Colonel Robinson. A few miles of the track were torn up, and the depot, 8 cars, and a large amount of stores, including 2000 stand of arms, were destroyed.

Another co-operative movement, from Memphis, had greater success. On the 21st of December, General Dana Dec. sent General Grierson, with some 21. 3000 cavalry, to cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The column moved directly eastward, threatening Corinth. Detachments, sent for the purpose, cut the telegraph wire between Grand Junction and Corinth, as well as that between Booneville and Guntown, on the Mobile and Ohio road. On the latter road they also destroyed 4 bridges between the same points. The main column, moving rapidly on Tupelo, surprised and captured or dispersed Forrest's camp of dismounted men at Verona. At this place, were destroyed 32 cars, loaded with new wagons, pontoons, and supplies, 300 army wagons, most of which had been captured from General Sturgis at Guntown, 4000 new English-made carbines intended for the
use of Forrest’s troops, also large amounts of ordnance stores, quarter-
masters’ and commissary stores for Hood’s army. On leaving Verona the
column moved southward along the line of railroad, which was thoroughly
destroyed, to a point between Egypt and Prairie Stations. Telegrams were
taken from the wires at Okalona from Generals Taylor and Gardner, ordering
Egypt to be held at all hazards, and promising reinforcements from Mobile
and elsewhere. Egypt was held by a garrison of about 1200 infantry and
cavalry, with 4 guns on platform cars.
Dec. Grierson attacked the place on the 28th. While the attack was
28. going on, two trains loaded with infantry, under Gardner, came in sight.
Grierson sent a force to meet them and to hinder their approach. The
expected aid not coming up, the garri-
son, after a fight of about two hours, was dispersed with a loss of 500 pris-
oneers and General Gholson killed. At
Egypt the Nationals destroyed a train of 14 cars and 1000 stand of arms.
The further prosecution of the raid was
now given up, the hostile force in front and the great number of prisoners and
captured animals making rapid move-
ment impossible. The column, accord-
ingly, turned to the southwest, and
marching through Houston and Belle-
fontaine, struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona. A detachment,
sent to Bankston, destroyed the large
and valuable factories which supplied
the Confederate army with clothing and
shoes, as well as large quantities of
wool, cloth, and leather. Another de-
tachment destroyed the new machine-
shops and all the Confederate govern-
ment property at Granada. A brigade,
sent southward from this place, tore up
the railroad track and pulled down the
telegraph wire for 35 miles, and meet-
ing a brigade of Confederate troops
under Wirt Adams at Franklin, charged
and drove it from the field with a loss
of 25 killed. The column, after destroy-
ing an immense amount of property,
arrived safely at Vicksburg, on the
5th of January, bringing in 550 pris-
oneers, 1000 negroes and 800 horses and
mules.
CHAPTER XL.


Naval and coast operations have already, at different times, occupied our attention, in the course of this work. These operations had for their primary object, the establishment and maintenance of an effective blockade of all the ports on the coast, through which the Confederacy might
obtain succor or supplies. It can well be understood that the maintenance of such a blockade was a severe strain on the energies of the North. It implied the presence of armed vessels, all along he extended seaboard, gun-boats in the /vers and bayous, and large bodies of armed men at suitable points, and at convenient distances all along the coast. Blockade-running, which offered peculiar temptations to the foreign trader, was at first beset with little difficulty. The reward was great; and the risk was small. Time, however, and the progress of the war worked a great change. The Navy grew in strength; and the perils and risks of the blockade-runner multiplied. At the close of 1863, there were of iron-clad steamers 75; of side-wheels 203; of screws 198; of sailing vessels 112—in all 588. Theumber of guns was 4443, and the aggregate tonnage 467,967. On the 1st of July in that year, there were 34,000 seamen; and during the year enlistments for the naval service averaged over 2000 per month. In 1864 the number of vessels had increased to 671; the number of guns to 4610; and the tonnage to 510,896. At the beginning of the war, there were in the service 7600 men; at its close the figures were 51,500.

In the spring of 1864, the naval forces were divided into four separate squadrons, of which one was stationed in the James River, one in the Sounds of North Carolina, the other two lying off Cape Fear and the adjacent inlets. Each of these squadrons was placed under a competent officer; and the head-quarters were established at Beaufort, North Carolina. Fort after por had gradually been wrested from the Confederacy, until in almost every harbor and along the banks of the Mississippi, the National flag floated supreme. After the destruction of the forts in Charleston Harbor, and in Mobile Bay Wilmington was the only port of first class importance, which continued to invite the enterprise and to tempt the cupidity of the blockade-runners. As we have already brought down the story of the naval and coast engagements to the year 1864, and as separate chapters have been devoted to Charleston Harbor and to Mobile Bay, we propose to make this chapter exhaustive of all the remaining naval and coast operations, for whatever purpose, covering, of course, those connected with the blockade and the privateering interests of the South.

Although not in any direct way connected with the blockade, yet having all the essential characteristics of a coast operation, place must be found at the outset here for a brief record of the ill-starred expedition which was sent to Florida, in the early months of 1864. Towards the close of 1863, reports were freely circulated, to the effect, that Florida, tired of the war, was sighing for amnesty and restoration to the Union. Gillmore, since the demolition of Fort Sumter, his troops comparatively unemployed, had remained a Hilton Head. It was the opinion of that officer, that such being the state of feeling in Florida, his men might be used to some advantage in an expedition
to that State. In January, Lincoln gave his consent to the proposed expedition—at the same time commissioning as major, Mr. John Hay, one of his private secretaries, and sending him to Hilton Head, to join Gillmore and proceed with him as the representative of the Executive. Gillmore hurried forward the necessary preparations; and the expedition, under the immediate command of General Truman Seymour, consisting of 4500 infantry and 400 cavalry, on board 20 steamers and 8 schooners, left Hilton Head, on Feb. 6, the 6th of February. On the following day, they entered the St. John's River, and proceeding upwards, landed at and occupied Jacksonville, in the afternoon. Jacksonville was found to be in ruins, and, with the exception of a few women and children, abandoned by the inhabitants. On the 8th, the army in three columns—commanded respectively by C. C. Barton, Forty-Eighth New York, J. R. Hawley, Seventh Connecticut, and Guy V. Henry, Fourtieth Massachusetts, set out from Jacksonville in the direction of Baldwin. Henry, who commanded the cavalry, led the advance. On the way, Henry found the Confederates in some force, at Camp Vinegar. Passing the camp, he surprised and captured, somewhat in the rear of the Confederates, 4 guns, and a large amount of commissary stores. Baldwin was reached about sunrise, on the morning of the 9th, when another gun was captured, together with 3 cars, a large quantity of cotton, and stores of all kinds, to the value of about $500,000. Henry pushed forward in the direction of Lake City; but discovering that the Confederate general, Finnegar, was in the neighborhood, and not knowing the exact strength of his command, he fell back about 4 miles, and telegraphed to Seymour for orders and supplies.

Gillmore had accompanied the expedition as far as Baldwin. It was not his intention to penetrate further into the interior. Giving Seymour instructions to that effect, he returned to Hilton Head, which he reached, on the 15th. Seymour, however, having been informed that Finnegar had fallen back from Lake City, gave way to his own strong impulses and assumed the responsibility of pushing forward his troops, bare almost of supplies, in the direction of the Suwannee River. Thence he telegraphed to Gillmore, notifying him of the fact and asking him to make a demonstration against Savannah, with one of the iron-clads, so as to prevent reinforcements being sent to Finnegar. Gillmore was astounded. He saw, at a glance, the peril to which Seymour was exposing himself and his 6000 troops. There was no reason why Finnegar should not receive reinforcements from both Georgia and Alabama. In such a case, Seymour's force would be overwhelmed and probably destroyed. Gillmore, without a moment's delay, sent a message to his lieutenant remonstrating against the folly of such conduct.

It was too late, Seymour was already caught in a trap. On the morning of the 20th, he had pressed forward, from Barber's Station, along the road which runs parallel with the rail
road. He was within three miles of Olustee Station. At this point there was a swamp and a heavy pine forest. Under cover of these, Finngagan had disposed his men. It was now near two o'clock in the afternoon. The head of Seymour's column had no sooner come up, than the woods blazed with the fire of musketry and artillery. Henry's cavalry with Stevens' battalion and Hawley's Seventh Connecticut were the first to suffer. Hawley hurried forward the Seventh New Hampshire, Colonel Abbott, with the batteries of Hamilton, Elder, and Langdon. The National artillery suffered terribly. In the brief space of twenty minutes 40 out of 50 horses were killed, and 45 out of 82 men. What remained of the artillery force fell back, leaving behind two guns.

The battle, however, continued to rage with great fury. Seymour almost atoned for the blunder he had committed, by his activity and daring. He was everywhere present, and the bullets of the enemy whistled around him in vain. Hawley's brigade having suffered terribly, the Eighth United States, a negro regiment from Montgomery's brigade, was sent to its support. This regiment, which had never before been under fire, behaved with the utmost gallantry. For two hours it held an exposed position in front; and its losses—including its brave commander and amounting in all to 350 men—attested the severity of the fighting. Barton's brigade, composed of the Forty-Eighth, Forty-Ninth, and One Hundred and Fifteenth New York, was brought up in turn. On the part of this brigade nothing was wanting in the matter of bravery; but it proved of no avail. It advanced only to repeat the experience and to share the fate of that which had gone before. For a while the struggle was prolonged. Barton's men, already severely punished, were showing signs of weakness. The Confederates seemed to think that their opportunity had come for a final and crushing charge. Gathering up their strength, and as if resolved to make short, sharp work with their antagonists, they came rolling forward in overwhelming numbers and with resistless energy. It was a critical moment. Montgomery, with his two remaining negro regiments, the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts and the First North Carolina, rushed forward to the rescue, and received the full weight of the Confederate onset. This was the turning point in the fight. The negroes fought with the energy of despair, and although their comrades were falling on every side, they firmly held their ground. Although ultimately overpowered and driven back, it was not until Seymour had found time to rally and re-adjust his lines and get his guns in position. Four volleys of grapeshot from the National batteries compelled the Confederates to halt. It was now about four o'clock. Seymour ordered a retreat. The Confederates attempted to pursue; but the National guns, handled with skill and fired with great rapidity, made such havoc in their lines that they were compelled to desist. Seymour fell back with the wreck of his command to Jacksonville; and finally the whole
command returned to Hilton Head. The estimated loss of the Nationals in this campaign was nearly 2,000 men. At Jacksonville, Seymour destroyed stores valued at $1,000,000. The Confederate loss was under 1000 men. Such was the battle of Olustee, and such was the result of the test applied to the loyal sentiment of Florida.

From the date of Seymour's unsuccessful experiment, Florida no longer commanded attention until the close of the war. Early in the year 1864, however, the east coast of North Carolina became the theatre of some important operations. Since 1862, when they were captured by General Burnside, New Berne, Plymouth, and Washington had been held by National garrisons. In February 1864, an unsuccessful attempt was made by a body of Confederates, under General Pickett, to recapture New Berne. After setting on fire the gun-boat Underwriter, Pickett claimed a victory and retired. It was, however, a barren victory; for he had left the defenses of New Berne untouched.

About the middle of April, a more daring as well as more successful effort was made against Plymouth, at the head of Albemarle Sound, and at the mouth of the Roanoke River. The place was well fortified, and was held by General Wessels, with a force of some 2400 men, consisting of the Eighty-Fifth New York, One Hundred and First and One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania, Sixteenth Connecticut, and 6 companies from other regiments. In the river, in front of the town, were the gun-boats Southfield, Miami, and Bombshell. In the immediate neighborhood, and guarding the approaches to the town were four forts—Fort Warren, Fort Williams, Fort Wessels, and Fort Comfort. On the 17th of April, General Hoke, with about 7000 Confederates, appeared in the vicinity of Plymouth; and, on the same day, he made an attack on Fort Warren, which was about a mile above the town. On the morning of the 18th, the attack was resumed with greater energy; and powerful assistance was rendered by the Confederate ram Albemarle which came down the Roanoke River. The National gun-boat Bombshell came to the aid of the garrison, but was soon disabled and captured. Hoke then fell upon Fort Wessels, a mile nearer the town; and, although a vigorous resistance was offered, the fort was at length captured. Plymouth was now closely invested. Hoke pressed the siege with great energy; he brought his batteries closer upon the town; and the Albemarle, having run past Fort Warren, fell upon the unarmed gun-boats. The Southfield was first struck. The blow was fatal; for she speedily went down. The Miami was next attacked; and although she managed to escape down the river, it was not until her commander was killed, and many of her guns were disabled. The Albemarle then turned her guns upon the town, pouring upon it a perfect storm of shot and shell. On the following day, Hoke, having pushed his batteries within 1100 yards of the town, opened upon it a tremendous fire. He then made s
general assault. Wessels made an obstinate defense; but he was ultimately compelled to surrender the place with 1600 prisoners, 25 guns, and 2000 small arms. The fall of Plymouth rendered necessary the evacuation of Washington, a little town at the mouth of the Tar River, some 32 miles north of New Berne.

Pursuing his victorious career, Hoke then pushed towards New Berne. Arrived in front of the place he demanded its surrender, which was refused. He then commenced a siege. Captain Cooke of the Albemarle somewhat over-estimated by his success at Plymouth, and feeling confident that a similar success would attend him in the broader waters further down, pushed on again to the assistance of Hoke. He was ignorant of the fate which awaited him. Captain Melancthon, with his blockading squadron, was then guarding the waters of Albemarle Sound. His principal vessels were the Mattahesset, the Miami, the Wyalusing, the Whitehead, and the Sassacus. It was now May 5. the 5th of May. The Albemarle was accompanied by the captured boat Bombshell. The Sassacus gave the Bombshell a broadside which compelled her to strike her flag. She then butted the Albemarle, forcing her hull under the water. The Sassacus, however, was severely punished for her temerity, a 100-pound Brooks bolt passing through one of her boilers, killing 3 men, and wounding 6, and filling the vessel with scalding steam. When the cloud of steam passed away, the Albemarle was seen moving off in the direction of Plymouth, firing as she fled. The Bombshell was left behind. Hoke was compelled to abandon the siege of New Berne. It was a National victory.

For some months there was quiet in Albemarle Sound, and all along the coast of North Carolina. The conquests made by Burnside, in 1862, had for the most part been recovered by the Confederates; but Roanoke Island and New Berne remained in the hands of the Nationals. The Albemarle continued to be a source of annoyance and even terror to the blockading vessels. Towards the end of October, Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, one of the bravest of the young officers in the naval service, undertook to destroy the monster. It was lying at the time in the harbor of Plymouth, behind a raft of logs, some 30 feet in width. A small steam launch, fitted up as a torpedo boat, was placed in Cushing's charge. On the night of the 27th of October, with a crew of 13 officers and men, he moved up the Roanoke, and arrived, before he was perceived by the enemy, within twenty yards of the Albemarle. The torpedo was under the ram and exploded before the enemy had time to fire a shot. Cushing's own account best tells the story: "The torpedo," he says "was exploded at the same time that the Albemarle's gun was fired. A shot seemed to go crashing through my boat and a dense mass of water rushed in from the torpedo, filling and completely disabling her. The enemy then continued to fire at fifteen feet range, and demanded our surrender, which I twice refused." Cushing escaped into the
water, and, in spite of the bullets of the enemy, managed to reach the shore. Most of his crew were captured or drowned. In the morning, he learned that his work had been effectually accomplished. The Confederate ram was completely destroyed. A few days later, Plymouth was recaptured by Commodore Macomb, and the National flag was unfurled over the sunken Albemarle.

It has already been stated in this chapter that Wilmington, North Carolina, was the one seaport remaining to the Confederacy through which foreign supplies could be obtained. Charleston had not yet fallen; and Mobile was still a stronghold of the Confederates; but the blockade of both harbors was complete, and there were few who deemed it possible to run the gauntlet of either the one or the other. Of all the Confederate ports Wilmington was the most difficult to close against the blockade-runners. It was peculiarly and favorably situated, some thirty miles up Cape Fear River. It could not be approached without passing certain formidable works which, at the mouth of the river and on the borders of the sea, the Confederates had erected for purposes of defense. There are two channels admitting to Cape Fear River. The southwest or main channel is about 24 miles wide, with a depth of from 10 to 14 feet of water on the bar. It was protected by Fort Caswell on Oak Island, and by the Light-house battery on Smith's Island. The northwest channel, called New Inlet, less than 2 miles wide and the water less deep than in the other, was protected by Fort Fisher—a first-class casemated earthwork, on the mainland, near Federal Point. The interior of the peninsula which lies between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic Ocean is for the most part sandy and low, in few places rising higher than 15 feet above high tide. To reach Wilmington it was necessary to pass through one or other of these inlets. So long as the Confederates held the works, ingress was easy to a friend, perilous to a foe.

As early as the beginning of 1864, the government at Washington, had made arrangements for the capture of Wilmington. General Burnside, who was intrusted with the expedition, was collecting troops for the purpose, at Annapolis, when he was summoned by General Grant to join the army of the Potomac. Later, in the summer of the same year and simultaneously with the preparations for the attacks on the forts in Mobile Bay, arrangements were made for reducing the works at the mouth of Cape Fear River. With this end in view, gun-boats armored and unarmored were assembled in Hampton Roads; and in October, Admiral Porter, charged with the execution of the naval portion of the task, found himself at the head of a fleet of 50 war vessels, including the New Ironsides and several monitors. The plan which had been first suggested to Burnside by Mr. Kidder, a Boston gentleman, and which had been approved of by the government was again accepted; and Grant agreed to send the bulk of Sheridan's force to co-operate with Porter.
in the intended movement. Sheridan's men, however, it was soon found, could not be spared from the Shenandoah Valley; and the expedition against Wilmington once more fell through.

It was now resolved to make a direct attack on Fort Fisher and its dependencies. Preparations were hurried forward; and a reconnaissance of Fort Fisher was made, with the help of the blockading squadron, by Generals Godfrey Weitzel and Charles K. Graham. Rumors of the projected movement against Wilmington reached the ears of the Confederates. General W. H. C. Whiting, an accomplished and skillful engineer was then in charge of that region. Under his direction, new works were thrown up to strengthen Fort Fisher; and the garrison was increased. Another delay took place; and it was not until December that the expedition actually set out. Grant having detached 6500 troops from the forces under Butler, placed them under the immediate command of Weitzel. The object of the expedition, as stated in Grant's instructions to Butler, was, first, the closing of the port of Wilmington, and, second, the capture of that city. It was not intended that Butler should accompany the expedition.

On the 8th of December, the troops destined to take part in the proposed movement—Ames' division of the Twenty-Fourth corps, and Paine's division of the Twenty-Fifth (colored) corps—left Bermuda Hundred in transports. On the following day they were at Fortress Monroe; and Butler notified Porter that his troops were ready to proceed. On the 14th, at noon, when off Cape Henry, Butler joined the transports in his flag-ship, the Ben Deford. The transport fleet then put to sea. Porter's formidable fleet had preceded it by 36 hours. On the evening of the 15th the transports, with the troops on board, arrived at the appointed rendezvous, about 25 miles east of Fort Fisher. The weather had been beautiful, since the 13th. For three days more, while the army waited for the navy, the ocean was perfectly calm. It was not until the evening of Sunday, that the fleet made its appearance. Then, however, the weather which had been so propitious had become gloomy and threatening. A strong wind was coming up from the southeast; and the sea was covered with white-caps. The wind increased in violence until, on the 20th, it blew a perfect hurricane. It was one of those storms which are common on that coast, and which have given its name to Cape Fear. By advice of Porter, the transports returned to Beaufort, some 70 miles up the coast. There they found shelter and took in coal and water. The storm lasted for 3 days, and was one of the severest experienced in 30 years. Porter's fleet, while it lasted, rode at anchor. On Dec. 23, Butler, who had accompanied the expedition, and, contrary to Grant's expectation, had taken personal command, sent Captain Clarke, one of his aids, in the armed tug Chamberlain to inform Porter that the fleet would be at the rendezvous by sunset.
next day. Clarke returned to Butler on Saturday at sunrise, with the report that Porter could not wait the arrival of the troops, and that his purpose was to fire the powder-ship at one o'clock that morning. Butler was indignant, because he considered the presence of the troops essential to the success of the experiment. The powder-ship was exploded as Porter declared it would be; but the experiment was fruitless.

What was the experiment? It appears that on the first of October 1864, an accidental explosion of 150,000 pounds of gunpowder took place at Erith, in England; and such was the force of the concussion that 100 yards of embankment was blown away, and a large number of houses destroyed. Butler, taking a hint from this fact, conceived the idea that a similar explosion in the near neighborhood of Fort Fisher would have a similar result. It was his expectation that it would shake down, at least, a portion of the walls and demoralize the garrison. He had grievously miscalculated. The experiment was fairly made. Two hundred and fifteen tons of gunpowder were exploded, without any appreciable result.

Porter, not discouraged by the failure of the gunpowder experiment, resolved to proceed without delay to the attack. The squadron selected for that purpose consisted of 33 vessels, carrying over 400 guns, with a reserve of 17 small gunboats, carrying about 100 guns. The first line was composed of the New Ironsides, the Monadnock, Canonicus and Mahopac—all iron-clads. The second line was composed of the heavy frigates Minnesota, Colorado, Wabash and other vessels of similar weight and construction. There was yet another line in rear of the second; and two divisions took side positions, to the north and east, and to the south and southeast, so as to be able to direct an enfilading fire on the works. The bombardment was "magnificent for its 24 power and accuracy." Clouds of dust arose from the fort, and concealed everything from view. It was impossible for the garrison to make any show of resistance. The gunners retired behind their bomb-proofs; and in less than an hour and a quarter the fort was silenced. For five hours, the bombardment continued; and at sunset when Butler arrived in his flag-ship with some of the transports, Porter signalled his fleet to retire for the night.

Arrangements were made, early on the morning of the 25th, for a joint attack by the troops and the fleet. It was agreed between Porter and Weitzel that, as soon as the transports arrived, the troops should attempt to effect a landing under cover of the fire from the ships, and proceed to take the place by storm. It was an hour past noon before the transports were fully forward. The fleet had already for some hours been firing upon the works. Without delay, and by the help of launches, a landing was effected about 3 miles above Fort Fisher. General Curtis with about 550 men, was the first to reach the shore. The National flag was quickly planted on a deserted battery as soon as it was
seen, the air was rent by cheers from the men still on board the transports; and the bands struck up "Yankee Doodle." Curtis pushed along the shore, until his skirmish line was within 50 yards of Fort Fisher. It was Porter's belief that there was "not a rebel within five miles of the fort." Weitzel had a very different opinion. He had landed with Curtis, and advanced to within 800 yards of the work. It would be "butchery" he thought, to make an assault under the circumstances; and returning to Butler on board the gun-boat Chamberlain, he so reported. Butler after some consideration came to the same conclusion; and about five o'clock in the afternoon, when about one-half of his troops were landed, he ordered them to re-embark. In the meantime Curtis, still pressing forward, had captured the half-moon battery with 220 men. He had notified General Ames of the fact, calling for assistance, and declaring his belief that he could take the fort. Ames, ignorant of the order which had been given to re-embark, sent Colonel Bell's brigade to the support of Curtis. It was now after sunset; and before Curtis could make a further advance, the firing of the fleet ceased, and night closed in upon the scene. As soon as Ames became aware of the order to withdraw his troops, he put them on board the launches and returned to the transports. The attack on Fort Fisher from which so much was expected, thus resulted in total failure. On the following day, the transports, with the troops on board, left for Hampton Roads.

The result of the experiment on Fort Fisher was a source of deep and general disappointment. No one was more disappointed than General Grant himself. He was greatly displeased. It was his opinion, as it was that of Admiral Porter, that the place might have been taken, if the land forces had acted with sufficient determination, and if the advance had been adequately sustained. Several of the officers voluntarily reported to Grant that, when recalled, they had nearly reached the fort, and that, in their judgment, it could have been taken without much loss. Which was right in this instance, General Weitzel, who landed and inspected the works, or Admiral Porter, who saw them only from his flag-ship, will possibly always be a divided question. It does not seem fair, however to blame General Butler for acting on the advice of Weitzel who, according to Porter's own confession, was a thorough soldier and an able engineer, whose business it was to know more about assaulting than he did. Whatever may have been the fact, in the circumstances, it was Grant's determination that the fort should be taken and the blockade of Wilmington reduced. While therefore the South was rejoicing over what they claimed to be a victory, the Lieutenant-General was making arrangements for dealing a more effective, and, as it proved to be, a decisive blow.

For some days after the departure of the transports, Porter, with his fleet, was still off New Inlet, in 1865. the neighborhood of Fort Fisher. Here he received instructions from Grant,
ordering him to remain, and promising to send him an effective land force, with a proper leader. It was still his belief that the fort could be taken. In addition to the troops which had gone back in the transports to Hampton Roads, he sent a brigade of 1500 men, and a small siege train. General Terry was to command. The new expedition left Hampton Roads on the 6th of January, and on the 8th rendezvoused off Beaufort, where Porter was taking in coal, ammunition and other needed supplies. The weather was boisterous; and it was not until late on the night of the 12th that the combined forces arrived off New Inlet.

It had been arranged that the troops should be landed some distance above the fort, and that they should then intrench across the point to Cape Fear River, so as to prevent reinforcements being sent from Wilmington. The landing effected, and the position secured, the assault was to be made simultaneously by the troops and by the fleet. Fort Fisher, as we have seen already, was a place of wonderful strength. Admiral Porter, who was at Sebastopol during the siege, pronounced it much stronger than the famous Malakoff. With the immediately connected works, it mounted 75 guns. The armament of the whole works guarding the approaches to Wilmington was about 160 guns, among which were some 150-pounder Armstrongs. The attacking squadron carried 500 guns, some of them the largest in the world. It was a concentration of destructive machinery unparalleled in the world's history.

On the morning of the 13th, at an early hour, the landing of the troops commenced. Some 200 boats and a large number of steam-tugs were employed in the operation. The fleet, divided into 3 columns, covered and protected the boats and the landing; and as early as three o'clock in the afternoon 8000 troops were on shore. Each man carried with him 3 days' rations and 40 rounds of ammunition. There was put on shore also an abundant supply of entrenching tools. During the entire process of landing, the fort was pouring shot and shell into the fort. The bombardment had been terrific. It was calculated that, while it lasted, four shots were fired from the fleet every second, and that during the course of the day, the iron-clads alone—the New Ironsides, Sangus, Mahopac and Canonicus—fired upwards of 2000 shells. It is not wonderful that under such a fire, the Confederates should have been compelled to take shelter under their bomb-proofs. At dark, about an hour after the landing of the troops had been effected, the wooden vessels were drawn off for the night. The iron-clads remained at their anchorage, firing slowly at intervals, during the darkness.

As soon as the troops were landed, they were set to work, throwing up intrenchments; and as early as eight o'clock on the morning of the 14th, they had constructed a good breast-work stretching from the river to the sea, and partially covered by abatis. During the course of the day, a reconnaissance was made to
SECOND ATTACK ON FORT FISHER.

Within 500 yards of the fort. The principal result of this reconnaissance was that General Terry, in view of the difficulty of conducting a regular siege on the narrow and exposed peninsula, came to the conclusion that the wiser course would be to make an immediate assault. In this Admiral Porter concurred; and it was decided that the assault should be made at three o'clock, on the afternoon of the 15th. Arrangements were made for the army to assault the western half of the land face, while a co-operating force of sailors and marines should attack the northeast bastion. The troops were kept busy strengthening the line of breast-works, and getting the guns into position as soon as they were landed; and, all day long and all night through, a slow and deliberate fire was maintained by the fleet. Fort Fisher, before the sun went down on the 14th, was badly pounded. Most of the guns were injured; not a few of them were silenced; and what with the slow but continuous fire of shot and shell during the night, sufficient openings were made to warrant an assault, in the morning.

On the morning of the 15th, everything was ready for the attack. Jan. 15. The ships were in position; and the soldiers and marines were prepared to move at the word of command. At eleven o'clock, the fleet opened a fire which was unparalleled in the history of naval warfare. Under its cover 1000 sailors and 400 marines, commanded by Fleet-Captain K. R. Breese, were landed on the beach; and by digging rifle-trenches, they worked their way to a point within 200 yards of the sea-front of the fort, where they lay awaiting the final signal for attack. The troops selected for the attack were the brigades of Curtis, Pennybacker and Bell, of Ames' Division. Paine's division of colored troops and Abbott's brigade were left in charge of the intrenchments facing Wilmington. It was now three o'clock. All this time the fleet continued to thunder against the fort, working terrible destruction. At half-past three o'clock the signal was given. All the steam whistles screamed and roared. The ships directed their fire to the upper batteries. The sailors, led by Captain Breese, eager to win the laurels of the day, rushed forward, with reckless energy, towards the parapet of the fort, already swarming with Confederate soldiers and blazing with the fire of musketry. It was intended that the marines should cover the assaulting party; but for some unknown reason they failed to fire upon the Confederates who exposed themselves on the parapet. It was Porter's opinion that if the marines had made a proper use of their guns, the first assault would have been a complete success. "I saw" he says "how recklessly the rebels exposed themselves, and what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no precision." In spite, however, of the murderous fire to which they were exposed, the sailors pressed forward, some of them actually reaching the parapet. The advance was swept away like chaff before a mighty rushing wind. The
men in the rear seeing the slaughter in front, were seized with a panic and fell back in some confusion. The attack on this part of the fort was a failure, except in so far as it diverted attention from the action of the troops.

Before the signal for assault was given, the soldiers had, under cover of hastily constructed breast-works, approached within a few hundred yards of the fort. At the word of command, they sprang forward and went bounding towards the palisades. These, already much damaged by the fire from the fleet, soon yielded to the vigorous blows of the axemen. Curtis' brigade, which led the attacking force, pushed on in the face of a severe enfilading fire. A lodgment was quickly effected on the west end of the land front. Here a terrible hand-to-hand struggle commenced. The cannoniers rushed to their guns; and the parapet bristled with bayonets. Curtis, one of the bravest of the brave, was sore beset. He was soon, however, joined by Penny-backer, who took position on his right, and by Bell, who occupied the space between the fort and the river.

"Hand-to-hand fighting" says General Terry, "of the most desperate character ensued, the huge traverses of the land face being used successively by the enemy as breast-works, over the tops of which the contending parties fired in each other's faces." Nine of these traverses were carried one after the other by the National troops. It was now about five o'clock. The battle had lasted a full hour and a half. It became apparent that more troops were needed to support the assaulting column. Terry, therefore, ordered up Abbott's brigade from the line of intrenchments facing Wilmington. Breese being, at the same time, ordered to occupy that position with his sailors and marines. Paine, also, being ordered to send down one of his best regiments forwarded the Twenty-Seventh, a negro regiment, under Brigadier-General A. M. Blackman. Meanwhile, the combat waxed fiercer and fiercer. There was no lull—no interruption. Amid the ruins of barracks and storehouses, in the deep sand-hollows, and over the bodies of dead and dying comrades, the terrible struggle was prolonged. While this desperate fight was going on, inside the work, the fleet was not idle; and by means of signals, which were exchanged with great accuracy, such of the ships as were in position were enabled to pour upon the fort a well-directed and most destructive fire, without in any way interfering with the action of the troops. Some of the ships, from the moment the action commenced, continued to sweep the ground more to the south, so as to make it impossible for any reinforcements to reach the fort from that direction.

The battle commenced at half past three o'clock. It was now dusk. Nine of the traverses which had been used as breast-works, one after the other had been carried. It was about this time that Blackman reported to Ames, and that Abbott, with his little band, entered the work. The arrival of these reinforcements gave intensity to the struggle. Blackman's troops, after
having been under the heavy fire for a little while, were withdrawn. It was now near nine o'clock. The fighting still continued for the possession of the traverses. At length two more of them were carried; and the Confederates fell back, Abbott pressing them with great vigor, and finally driving them from their last stronghold. The entire work was now in the hands of the Nationals. Some of the garrison had fled down the Point to Battery Buchanan. Thither they were hotly pursued by Abbott and by Blackman; and about midnight, Colonel Lamb, the commandant of the fort, and Major-General Whiting, and such of the garrison as were not in the hands of General Terry, were made prisoners. Hemmed in between the water and their antagonists, they had no choice but to surrender.

About four o'clock in the afternoon, General Hoke approached the line of intrenchments which had been thrown up across the peninsula, so as to guard against any surprise from the north; and it seemed for a time as if he meant to make a vigorous attack. Paine was in readiness to receive him. Hoke, however, after a slight skirmish with the National pickets, retired. His departure was a relief to General Terry. A vigorous and well-sustained attack in that direction, might have changed the fortunes of the day.

Such, then, was the great struggle for the possession of Fort Fisher; and such was the result. No more gallant assault was ever made. No more glorious resistance was ever offered. To both North and South, Fort Fisher will ever be a source of common pride. On both sides were revealed the intelligent purpose and indomitable spirit of the American soldier.

The garrison originally numbered over 2300 men, of whom 1971 with 112 officers were captured. General Whitney and Colonel Lamb were both severely wounded. The National loss in killed, wounded and missing was about 690. Ames' brigade commanders, Curtis, Pennybacker and Bell, were each of them wounded, the two former severely, Bell mortally. On the part of the fleet, there was a loss of about 250 or 300 men; and two 15-inch guns were exploded on board the monitors. On the morning of the 16th a fearful accident occurred. From some unknown cause, the principal magazine of the fort exploded, scattering death and ruin all around. Some 200 men were killed; and about 100 were wounded.

On the 16th and 17th the Confederates blew up Fort Caswell on the right bank of the river. They abandoned also Battery Holmes, on Smith's Island, together with all the works at Smithsville and Reeve's Point. The Nationals were thus left in entire and absolute control of all the works which commanded the mouth of Cape Fear River. In the different works were found 169 pieces of artillery, most of them of heavy calibre and some of them of the best English make; over 2000 stand of small arms, with stores and ammunition in large quantities. The blockade of Wilmington was thus effectually secured; and Wilmington itself was now...
to command the attention of General Terry and Admiral Porter.

Some weeks were allowed to elapse before active operations were resumed, in the direction of Wilmington. It was not deemed advisable to make an advance, until the land troops were considerably reinforced. It was known that Hoke, with a strong force of Confederates, was occupying an intrenched line which extended across the peninsula, from the sea, at Masonboro Inlet to Sugar Loaf Battery, on the east bank of Cape Fear River, and almost to Fort Anderson, a strong work which stood on the west bank of the river. General Terry having supplied the requisite number of men to guard the different works, strengthened his line of intrenchments, which, as we have seen, extended across the peninsula, some two or three miles to the north of Fort Fisher. Meanwhile, Admiral Porter had pushed some of his lighter vessels through New Inlet into Cape Fear River; and Cushing, in obedience to the orders of the Admiral, had raised the National flag over Fort Caswell, and the works at Smithsville.

General Grant had not been unmindful of the difficulties, as well as opportunities, which might follow upon the capture of Fort Fisher. Occupied as he was, with the work immediately before Petersburg and Richmond, his mental eye continued to survey the whole vast field of war operations. Sherman was already, with the consent of the Lieutenant-General, making preparations for his return march through the Carolinas. Thomas' success had been such that he was left almost without a rival in Tennessee. He had about him more men than he could use, and he had already ordered Schofield with the Twenty-Third corps, to go into winter-quarters at Eastport, Mississippi. Grant, however, had work for Schofield and his men. It was his determination to hasten matters to a close; and with this end in view, he had resolved to concentrate the armies of the republic. When about to carry out the orders of Thomas and retire to Eastport, Schofield received instructions, from Grant, to proceed to the coast of North Carolina. The instructions of the Lieutenant-General were promptly obeyed. Proceeding by steamers down the Tennessee and up the Ohio to Cincinnati, and thence by rail, he reached Washington and Alexandria on the 23d of January. His troops were again embarked; and on the 9th of February, Schofield, with Cox's division arrived at Fort Fisher. The remainder of the troops followed, some of them going to New Berne. After the capture of Fort Fisher, Butler had been superseded by Ord, in the command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. A separate Department was now made of North Carolina, and intrusted to Schofield. Schofield, however, was to act under orders from General Sherman and to co-operate with him. Sherman was expected to be in the neighborhood of Goldsboro, between the 22d and the 28th of February; and Schofield, marching from Wilmington or New Berne was to join him at that place. There
were now in the immediate neighborhood of Fort Fisher some 20,000 men.

No time was now lost in moving towards Wilmington. Two days after the arrival of Schofield, Terry advanced against Hoke. Driving in the pickets, he threw up a fresh line of intrenchments close to those of his antagonist. An unsuccessful attempt was made to turn Hoke's left. The attempt to turn his right was more successful; and Fort Anderson was speedily enveloped by the divisions of Ames and Cox. It was the 18th of February. On the same evening, the garrison, convinced of their danger, abandoned the fort, taking with them 6 guns and some valuable property, but leaving behind them 10 heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition. The work was occupied next morning; and over waved the National flag. After the capture of Fort Anderson, Ames crossed to the east side of Cape Fear River to assist Terry. Hoke abandoned his intrenchments and fell back towards Wilmington. The National troops pressed forward on both sides of the river. Fort Strong and Fort St. Philip were successively deserted by the Confederates. On the 21st, Cox was on Eagle Island and flinging shells into Wilmington. Feeling his situation to be desperate, Hoke ordered a general destruction of property. Several steamships, including the Chickamauga and Tallahassee were destroyed by fire, together with large quantities of military and naval stores. On the morning of the 22d, it was discovered that the Confederates had abandoned the town; and Schofield and his victorious troops entered unopposed. The fall of Wilmington was a serious blow to the Confederate cause. It had long been a fruitful source of supplies; and it could ill be dispensed with. Lee, it was known, had manifested much anxiety regarding Wilmington; and after the capture of Fort Fisher, there was found in the work a letter, in which he informed the officer commanding that if Wilmington should be taken, Richmond could not much longer hold out. Grant's plans were working admirably; and the end, day after day was more visibly drawing nigh.

In a separate chapter, we have already given a detailed account of the operations in Mobile Bay—operations which, in August, 1864, resulted in the capture of the forts which commanded the entrance. In the upper portions of the bay, the waters are shallow. It was found impossible, in consequence, to move the fleet sufficiently near the town to make bombardment possible; and as the land force was too small to attack without the aid of the fleet, operations were suspended until the spring of 1865.

Mobile, however, still commanded Grant's attention; and when Sherman had completed his triumphal march through Georgia to the sea, and Thomas had cut to pieces Hood's army in Middle Tennessee, fresh arrangements were made for the reduction of this Confederate stronghold. The conduct of the movement against Mobile was intrusted to General Canby, then commanding the West Mississippi army with head-
quarters at New Orleans. A co-operative movement was placed in charge of the famous cavalry leader, General J. H. Wilson, who was to act under orders from General Thomas. Admiral Thatcher, then in command of the West Gulf Squadron, was also ordered to proceed to New Orleans and confer with General Canby. It was believed that by using vessels of light draught, the fleet would be able to co-operate with the army. Canby proceeded at once to collect his forces; and he soon had around him, or acting under his orders, and towards a common end, an army of about 45,000 men. It consisted of Granger's newly organized corps, the Thirteenth, 13,200 strong; A. J. Smith's corps, the Sixteenth, 16,000 strong; Steele's column, which came up from Pensacola, 13,200 strong; with artillery, cavalry and engineers to the number of 3000. The Confederate forces in the Department, were under the command of General Richard Taylor, who was at Meridian. General D. H. Maury, with 9000 men was immediately in charge of Mobile, and its defenses.

About the middle of March, everything was in readiness for the forward movement. Wilson, who as we have seen, was to co-operate with his cavalry, was also ready to swoop from the north, down through Alabama. During the course of the three years of the war, Mobile had been made a place of great strength. On the western side particularly, it was considered impregnable. A direct attack on that side was deemed too hazardous. It was, therefore, determined to make a flank movement, up the eastern shore, and, in concert with the fleet, which Thatcher had contrived to bring up, to seize the fortifications on the islands and the mainland at the head of the bay. On the Mar 24th of March, the Thirteenth 24. corps, having marched along the peninsula from Fort Morgan, reached Danley's, on Fish River. The Sixteenth corps which had crossed the bay in transports, and had landed under cover of the fleet, was already at the appointed rendezvous. On the 25th, the Thirteenth and Sixteenth corps advanced from Fish River, up the east side of the bay, along the Belle Rose and Blakely Roads. The roads were strewn with torpedoes, some of which exploded, killing men and horses. On the 26th, having encountered only a few skin mishers by the way, the National advance was in the neighborhood of Spanish Fort, some 7 miles east from Mobile. The reduction of this fort was deemed a preliminary necessity; and, on the following day, it was completely invested on the land side, Smith being on the right, and Granger on the left. This fort was of great strength, the works extending about two miles. It was garrisoned by nearly 3000 men, under General R. Gibson.

The siege of Spanish Fort lasted for two weeks. On the 27th, as the day advanced, and all during the night, the firing was on a scale of unusual magnificence. Besiegers and besieged vie with each other, the bombardment and the response being equally terrific; and a spectacle unique in its character, as grand and imposing as it was fitted to
alarm, was furnished to the citizens of Mobile. Canby, day after day, drew his lines closer and closer, the fire telling more and more effectually on the works. Excellent work was done by the vessels of the fleet. They not only neutralized the vessels of the enemy, but succeeded, from time to time, in throwing 100-pound shells into the fort. On the 8th of April an assault was made by Colonel Bell's Eighth Iowa regiment, of Gedde's brigade of Carr's division. The garrison was composed mainly of Texans, who fought with tremendous energy. The Texans received the advancing column with a tremendous musketry fire. Bell, however, pushed his men forward in greater force, cheering them by his words and sustaining them by his example. The Iowa men charged over the works in the most gallant manner; and after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, they found themselves in possession of about 300 yards of the intrenchments, with several colors, and about 350 prisoners. Gibson, convinced that the position was no longer tenable, proceeded to withdraw his troops. About midnight, the firing from the fort ceased; and, shortly after two o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Bertram's brigade entered and took possession of the place, without encountering any opposition. The immediate fruits of victory were 600 prisoners, the entire works, with 30 heavy guns, and military stores in abundance.

On the night of the 11th, Forts Huger and Tracy, which commanded the mouth of the Blakely River, were also abandoned; and the key to Mobile was now in the hands of the Nationals. The fleet moved up the Tensas April River towards Mobile, picking up, as it advanced, some 35 torpedoes, and coming to anchor within shelling distance of the city. In crossing Blakely Bar, two of the vessels were sunk. The army moved along the east bank of the river towards Blakely, where the Confederates had constructed a strong line of works, about three miles in length, both extremities resting on high ground, and extending to the river. These works comprised nine redoubts, or lunettes, and were armed with forty guns. The garrison, which was under the command of General St. John Lidell, was composed of veterans from Hood's army, and was about 3500 strong. Lidell had for his immediate subordinates, Generals Thomas and Cockerell.

Blakely had been closely invested by Hawkins' negroes since their arrival from Pensacola. On the afternoon of Sunday, the 9th of April, Canby arrived at Blakely with the troops, which had been engaged in the capture of Spanish Fort. Immediately after his arrival, he decided upon an assault. It was, he knew, a perilous undertaking; but much precious time would necessarily be wasted in a siege. He resolved to run the risk. The ground to be traversed was covered with chevaux-de-frise, abatis and torpedoes; in the immediate iron of the works was a broad, deep ditch and forty guns, with their angry mouths, threatened every avenue of approach. Canby drew up his divisions in line of
battle. Hawkins, with his negroes, was on the right; Veatch and Andrews of the Thirteenth corps, were in the centre; and Garrard's division of the Sixteenth corps was on the left. The remainder of the Sixteenth corps was held in reserve. Half past five o'clock was the hour fixed for the assault. The appointed moment had all but arrived; and the men were waiting impatiently for the signal. The sky was overspread with gloom; and low growling sounds of distant thunder came rolling from the west. These sounds were soon rendered inaudible by the nearer and more alarming thunders of rival artillery. While the National guns thundered over the intervening space, the advance was made almost simultaneously, along the whole line. Never did troops behave more nobly. Never was attack made in circumstances of greater difficulty. It was a rush into the very jaws of death. Torpedoes were exploding, at every step; the abatis and other obstructions made progress next to impossible; while the terrific fire from the enemy's guns, swift and unerring, ploughed long lanes in the advancing columns. Nothing daunted, however, the brave fellows pressed forward. Here, as at Port Hudson, the negro troops were on the right; and here, as there, they rivalled their white companions-in-arms, by feats of valor. They were the first to advance—the first engaged in deadly conflict with the enemy. Garrard, on the left, when the signal was given pushed forward only a portion of his men, his object being to discover a suitable avenue to advance in force. No such avenue being discovered he gave the word "Forward;" and his brave fellows, heedless of the withering fire from the Confederate breastworks, went bounding forward. The centre also was quickly at work. From the extreme right to the extreme left, the whole line, extending about three miles, was engaged in the assault. At all points the experience was very much the same. The great difficulty was to reach the works. For more than half an hour, the entire line, struggling with the obstacles which lay in the way, and thrown into disorder from time to time by exploding torpedoes, was exposed to the guns of the enemy. At length, as the day was waning, victory dawned on the National left. Garrard's men, cheered by the example of their chief, had worked their way through the obstructions. Harris' brigade swept over the ditch, and clambered up the face of the works; while those of Gilbert and Rinaker, having turned the right of the fort, rushed in, and captured General Thomas, with 1000 of his men. The struggle was more protracted, in the centre and on the left. Veatch and Andrews met with a most stubborn resistance, and suffered terribly from the enemy's fire, as well as from the exploding torpedoes. The presence of the negroes seemed to rouse the wrath of the Confederates; and the struggle on the left raged, for a time, with tremendous fury. At length the cry was raised "Remember Fort Pillow." "Remember Fort Pillow" rang along the line. The words were electric; and Hawkins' dusky brigades, as if
yielding to a new and overwhelming impulse, and filled with superhuman energy, with wild cries, went rushing over the embankments, and swept the enemy before them, like chaff before the wind. The battle of Blakely was ended. It was only one hour and a half since the Nationals advanced to the assault; and already they were in possession of all the works, with 40 pieces of artillery, 4000 small arms, 16 battle flags, and a large quantity of ammunition. They had captured over 3000 men, with several officers of high rank, including Generals Lidell, Cockerell and Thomas. The Confederate loss was estimated at 500 in killed and wounded. The National loss was much more severe—probably not much under 1000.

With the fall of Fort Blakely perished the last hopes of the Confederates in Mobile. On the 11th, Maury retired from the place, and, with 9000 men in gun-boats and transports made his way up the Alabama River. Before his departure, he caused to be sunk the two powerful rams, Huntsville and Tuscaloosa. On the evening of the 12th the place was surrendered. On the following day, Yeatch’s division entered the town; and the National banner was hoisted on the public buildings. Thus ended another successful campaign.

The story of the capture of Mobile would be incomplete without a brief reference to the co-operative movement which was conducted under the immediate direction of General Wilson. After the expulsion of Hood from East Tennessee, Thomas, as has been stated already, had a large unemployed force on hand. We have already seen what use was made of Schofield and his command. It remains for us to follow Wilson on his famous cavalry raid through Alabama. Wilson had been, for a brief space, with the cavalry of the Military Division of the Mississippi, on the north side of the Tennessee River, in Lauderdale County, Alabama. On the 23d of February, he was visited by General Thomas who gave him instructions regarding the intended movement. It was designed to be co-operative with that of Canby; and it was expected that while he would be giving the Confederates sufficient occupation, and so preventing them from sending reinforcements against Canby, he would be able to destroy Selma, Tuscaloosa, and the other great iron centres of the State. The cavalry were in excellent condition; and the necessary arrangements being quickly completed, they set out on the 22d of March. Mar. The entire force under Wilson, 22, numbered about 13,000, all mounted except some 1500 who were detached to guard the numerous supply and baggage trains. The troops were arranged in three divisions, and were commanded respectively by Long, Upton, and McCook. They were accompanied by 6 batteries. There were 250 wagon trains, together with a light pontoon train of 30 boats, borne by some 56 mule wagons. Each trooper carried with him five days’ rations, 24 pounds of grain, an extra pair of horseshoes, and 100 rounds of ammunition. The
expedition, it was expected, would not last over 60 days. As but little opposition was encountered, it is unnecessary to dwell minutely on the details of this raid. Wilson was at Elyton on the 30th. Thence he despatched Croxton's brigade, of McCook's division, to Tuscaloosa, with instructions to destroy the foundries and factories, and other public property. Wilson, himself pushed forward to Montevallo, which he reached on the afternoon of the 31st. There, he destroyed a large number of iron works, rolling-mills and collieries. There, too, he encountered and defeated a body of Confederate cavalry, capturing 3 guns and several hundred prisoners. At Ebenezer Church, near Boyle's Creek, he was confronted by Forrest, with 5000 men. Forrest was routed and driven in confusion towards Selma, leaving behind him 2 guns and 200 prisoners. At four o'clock, in the afternoon of April 2d, Wilson's troopers were in sight of Selma. Preparations were made for an immediate assault. The place was well fortified; and Forrest was there at the head of 7000 men. Forrest had manifested an unwillingness to attempt a defense with so small a force; but Taylor, who made good his own escape, ordered him to hold it at all hazards. The attack was made without any delay. It was made at two separate points, and with tremendous energy, Long and Upton both distinguishing themselves by their bravery. It was not yet dark when the Confederates were fleeing from the place in wild confusion. Forrest, Roddy and Armstrong contrived to escape by the Burnsville road. Selma, with 32 guns, 2700 prisoners, of whom 150 were officers, was now in the hands of the Nationals. Twenty-five thousand bales of cotton were found blazing. Wilson fired 10,000 more, together with the foundries, arsenals, machine-shops and other public property.

On the 12th of April, Wilson was at Montgomery, the original seat of the Confederate government. April 12. The place had been in charge of Wirh Adams. Adams, however, had already fled, having set on fire before he left, some 90,000 bales of cotton. Montgomery was formally surrendered by the city authorities. Wilson remained in the place two days, during which he destroyed 5 steamboats, several locomotives, one armory, and several foundries, and then entered Georgia. On the 16th, he captured Columbus, taking 52 guns and 1200 prisoners. He caused to be destroyed a large quantity of property—about 115,000 bales of cotton, 200 cars, 15 locomotives, with the navy yard, arsenal, and factories of various kinds, and a vast quantity of stores. Among the property destroyed was the Confederate ram Jackson, which mounted six 7-inch guns. On the 21st, Wilson, pushing on, had reached Macon, which was surrendered under protest. Here he heard for the first time of the armistice between Sherman and Johnston. Here also he was joined by Croxton, who, it will be remembered was sent to Tuscaloosa. He captured that place on the 3d of April, and proceeded thence through Jasper, Talladega and Newman, thus completing a march of
650 miles in 30 days. During this raid, which was in the last degree disastrous to the Confederate cause, Wilson captured 5 fortified cities, 288 pieces of artillery, 23 stand of colors and 6820 prisoners. The property he destroyed was enormous. His own loss did not much exceed 700, of whom 90 were killed.

From an early period, in the history of the war, the North suffered severely, while the South equally benefitted, by the blockade-runners, and also by privateers on the high seas. By closing the ports of Charleston, Wilmington and Mobile, the business of the blockade-runners was effectually ended. Towards the end of 1864, the privateers had been for the most part swept from the seas; but it was not until after the fall of the Confederacy, that the depredations of these vessels wholly ceased. A brief account of the origin, doings, and fate of what were called the Confederate cruisers, will, it is thought, form a not inapt conclusion to the present chapter.

Scarcely had the war broken out, when certain vessels specially built or reconstructed for the purpose, heavily armed and floating the Confederate flag, began to prey on the commerce of the North. One of the first of these vessels was the Savannah, a schooner of 50 tons, and carrying an 18-pound swivel. Early in June, 1861, she succeeded in eluding the blockading-squadron off Charleston, and captured a Maine brig, laden with sugar and bound for Philadelphia. Soon afterwards, however she came in the way of the United States brig-of-war Perry and was obliged to surrender. Another of these vessels was the Petrel. She, too, successfully ran through the blockade of Charleston, and was about to commence her work of destruction when she was pursued, and blown to pieces by the United States frigate, St. Lawrence. The Juda, another privateer, was burned on the 14th of September, 1861, in the harbor of Pensacola. The Nashville was another of the vessels of the privateer class. She destroyed a valuable merchant ship called the Harvey Birch, near the English coast. She then proceeded to Southampton; but the Tuscarora being there, she returned, and escaping from the National ship, made her way back safely to Southern waters. The Nashville, as has been narrated elsewhere, was finally destroyed on the 22d of February, 1863, on the Ogeechee River near Fort McAllister. Of all the original privateers, the most destructive was the Sumter. During her brief career, under the guidance of Captain Semmes, she played terrible havoc among American merchant ships. She was finally forced to take refuge in the waters of Gibraltar, where she was blockaded by the Tuscarora. Finding that he was not likely ever to be able to take his vessel out, Semmes sold the Sumter, and, afterwards, with his officers, proceeded to Liverpool, where he awaited the completion of the Alabama.

The privateers of a later date were of a more formidable character. They were constructed, for the most part, in
British ship-yards. The first of these vessels was the Oreto, built at Birkenhead. She was finished in the fall of 1862, and immediately left England, flying the British colors, for Nassau, New Providence. Thence, her colors unchanged, she sailed for Mobile, which in spite of the blockade, she reached on the 4th of September. About the end of December, she moved out from Mobile, ran the blockade, and commenced her work of destruction. She was now named the Florida, and was fully armed. In the space of three months, during which she remained mostly in American waters, now cruising among the West India Islands, and now sweeping along the coasts of the United States, she captured 15 vessels, 2 of which were afterwards converted into cruisers, the rest destroyed. In August 1863, she crossed the Atlantic, reaching Brest on the 4th of September. At Brest she was for a brief period forcibly detained. Set at liberty, she again crossed the Atlantic; and, running along the coast of Brazil, she destroyed the bark Mandamom, off the port of Bahia, and then ran into that harbor. There, contrary to law, she was captured by the U. S. steamer, Wachusett, and conveyed to Hampton Roads, where not long afterwards, she was sunk. The Florida was first commanded by Maffit, later by Morris.

Besides the Florida and the Alabama, of which latter we shall have something to say presently, there were other vessels, most of them British-built, all of them powerful, and every one of them destructive, according to opportunity. The Tallahassee, in a cruise of ten days, destroyed 33 vessels. The Chickamauga, during her career, destroyed property at sea, to the amount of $500,000. Those vessels were ultimately compelled to take shelter in the inland waters at Wilmington, where as has been mentioned in a previous chapter, they were both destroyed by the Confederates. The Georgia, originally called the Japan, and built at Glasgow, was, after she had accomplished a vast amount of destruction, captured by the National frigate, Niagara, about 20 miles off Lisbon. The Olustee, a powerful vessel of 1100 tons, schooner-rigged, with two propellers, appeared in 1864, and, in November of that year, captured many vessels bound for New York. The Shenandoah, built at Glasgow, under the name of the Sea King, in 1863, was purchased by the Confederates in 1864, and taken to Madeira, where she took in her arms, stores and crew. Thence she sailed for Australia, and the North Pacific. During her marauding career, which lasted for some time after the war was over she destroyed some 25 ships. She was eventually taken back to Europe, and surrendered to the British government.

Another of those vessels, named the Stonewall, was built in France for the Danish government. She became Confederate property by right of purchase. At the close of the war, she was surrendered to the Spanish officials a Havana, and given up by them to the United States.

The great naval event on the high seas, during the course of the war was...
the fight between the Alabama and the Kearsarge. The Alabama was built at Birkenhead, by Laird, and was first named the “290.” When completed in July, 1862, she was taken to Terceira, one of the Western Islands, under the command of a British captain. There she was joined by another British vessel from which she received her armament. On the day following, the British screw steamer Bahama arrived, bringing with her Captain Semmes and the other officers, formerly of the Sumter, and 20 more of her crew. On Sunday, August 26th, she steamed out of port. When out in the open sea, Captain Semmes appeared on deck, in full uniform, mustered the crew, read his commission, as post-captain, in the Confederate navy, and announced that the “290” was henceforth to be known as the Confederate sloop-of-war, Alabama. The British flag was hauled down; and the Confederate ensign and pennant were hoisted and saluted. On the 29th of August, she went forth on her mission, which was to “sink, burn, and destroy everything which flew the ensign of the so-called United States of America.” For well nigh two years, she continued faithful in the performance of this terrible work. By the end of October, she had made 27 prizes. Most of the vessels attacked, being unarmed, fell an easy prey. In January, 1863, she encountered the Hatteras, one of the blockading ships off Galveston. The Hatteras was lightly armed; and in one-quarter of an hour, she went down under the heavy fire of her antagonist. After cruising for a time in the West Indies, and then along the coast of Brazil, Semmes crossed the Atlantic to Cape Town, where he remained for some time. Thence he proceeded to the Malay Archipelago, which he reached in November; and after an unproductive cruise of three months he returned homewards. On the 11th of June, 1864, he went into the French harbor of Cherbourg. In her protracted wanderings, the Alabama had captured 47 vessels, of which 45 were destroyed.

At that time the U. S. steamer Kearsarge, Captain John A. Winslow, was lying in the Dutch port of Flushing. Of the presence of the Alabama at Cherbourg, Winslow was immediately made aware, through the American Consul at that port. On the 14th, the Kearsarge appeared off Cherbourg. On the day following, Winslow received a note from Semmes, in which the latter requested him not to depart, as it was his intention to take the opportunity offered for testing the merits of the two ships. Winslow, perfectly willing to oblige, remained. In proportion and armaments, the vessels were about equal. The Alabama was about 220 feet, and 1150 tons; she carried one 7-inch Blakely rifle, one 8-inch smooth bore 68-pounder, and six 32-pounders. The Kearsarge was 214$\frac{1}{2}$ feet long, and 1080 tons; and carried two 11-inc Dahlgren guns, one 30-pounder rifle and four 32-pounders. The Alabama had about 140 officers and men. The Kearsarge had 22 officers and 140 men. Winslow, for the sake of protection,
hung his anchor cable over the midship section of his vessel on either side; and in order to make the addition less unsightly, he caused the chains to be boxed over with inch deal boards. The same experiment had been made by Farragut, when moving up the Mississippi, in 1862.

On Sunday morning, the 19th of June, about twenty minutes past ten, the Alabama was seen steaming out of Cherbourg, accompanied by the French iron-clad Courronne, and followed by the steam yacht Deerhound, owned by an Englishman, of the name of Lancaster. Winslow, on seeing the Alabama approach, steamed out to sea, in order that no questions should be raised as to the line of jurisdiction. When about 7 miles out from the breakwater at Cherbourg, the Alabama being about a mile behind, Winslow wheeled round and made direct for his antagonist. The Alabama opened fire at once; and loading with wonderful rapidity, she fired a second and a third broadside, without receiving any response. The Kearsarge had received no harm as yet, except in the rigging; but Winslow, being now within 900 yards of his antagonist, and fearing the effects of another broadside, sheered his vessel and opened fire. The two ships were soon broadside to broadside. Semmes, however, fought shy. It was evident that he did not seek close action; and Winslow, fearing that in the event of his antagonist being sorely pressed he might make for the French shore, attempted to run under the stern of the Alabama. The effect of this movement, on the part of the Kearsarge, was to force the Alabama, with a full head of steam, into a circular track. The Kearsarge followed. For an hour the two vessels kept moving in a series of circles, starboard bearing upon starboard, both firing heavily and drifting with the tide further from the shore. It was now about noon. The combat had lasted an hour. The vessels had described seven circles. They were thus about 4 miles further from the French coast, than they were at the commencement of the action. The Alabama was already at the mercy of her adversary. The firing from the Confederate from the first had been rapid and wild. The firing from the Kearsarge was slow, steady and deliberate. The result was that while the Kearsarge was comparatively uninjured, the Alabama was sorely damaged. She had received several 11-inch shells. Of these, one had disabled a gun, killing or wounding some 18 men; and another had penetrated the coal bunker, where it exploded, and blocked up the engine room. Her sides were shattered, and pierced with holes. On her seventh rotation in the circular track, the Alabama winded, setting fore try-sail and two jibs, with head in shore. Her port broadside with only two guns, was now presented to the Kearsarge; and she was moving slowly. Winslow was now in a position to use grape-shot with effect. A few more guns were fired; and the flag of the Alabama disappeared. A white flag was then displayed over her stern; and Winslow, respecting the signal of distress,
discontinued firing. Within two minutes, the Alabama again opened fire from her two guns on the port side. The Kearsarge quickly responded; and then steaming ahead, Winslow placed his vessel right across the bow of the Alabama, and was about to open a raking fire. The white flag, however, was still floating; and Winslow again reserved his fire. Almost immediately afterwards, the boats of the Alabama were lowered; and in one of them came an officer who informed Winslow that the Confederate vessel had surrendered, and that she was fast sinking.

Twenty minutes after the surrender, the Alabama went down in the deep waters of the English Channel. She went down stern foremost, her bow rising high in the air, and her main-mast breaking off, as she disappeared. Semmes flung his sword into the sea. He and his officers, and some of the crew, were picked up by the Deerhound, and carried to England. Some 65 or 70 men, a number of them wounded, were rescued by the boats of the Kearsarge. Several others were got on board by two French pilot boats, and taken to France. Although the Alabama had fired some 370 shot and shell, the Kearsarge was but little injured; and the casualties on board amounted to only 3 wounded. This great naval duel, the greatest perhaps in the century, was witnessed by thousands of people on the French shore. Such was the end of the Alabama—a privateer which, during her career, had captured and for the most part burned 65 vessels, which had destroyed property estimated at $10,000,000, and which, more than any ship of her class, had driven American commerce from the sea. On sea, as well as on land, the National cause was now gaining the ascendency. Time was working steadily in favor of the right.
CHAPTER XLI.

1865. General Sherman had demonstrated the holiness of the Confederacy, by his almost unopposed march to the sea, General Grant, impatient of delay and determined to force matters to a final issue, was anxious that his lieutenant should return northward, and bring his army into conjunction with the army of the Potomac and the army of the James, then confronting General Lee at Petersburg and Richmond.

The question was, how was this transfer of so large an army to be accomplished? There were two modes which at once suggested themselves. The army could be transferred by sea. It could also be transferred by a land march through the Carolinas. Both modes of transfer would be attended with difficulty. It was mid-winter.
There were many and serious objections to conveying so many thousands of men, with all the appurtenances of war, on board transports, along such a coast, at such a season. There were also many and serious objections to the march overland. Of the two modes, Sherman very wisely concluded in favor of the transfer by land. Grant, however, had ordered that the army should be carried to Virginia by sea. Sherman prepared to obey. It was with the utmost reluctance, however, that he was taking such a course. "I have now completed my first step" he writes to Grant. "I should like to go to you by way of Columbia and Raleigh, but will prepare to embark as soon as vessels come. You know well how much better troops arrive by a land march than when carried by transports." Still later, when the movement had actually commenced, and when he was about to embark his troops, he wrote from Pocotaligo to Grant. "I know," he says, "that this march is necessary to the war. It must be made sooner or later, and I am in the proper position for it. I ask no reinforcements, but simply wish the utmost activity at all other points, so that the enemy may not concentrate too powerfully against me. I expect Davis will move heaven and earth to resist me, for the success of my army is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than is Columbia." Grant yielded. "I am gratified," writes Sherman in reply, "that you have modified your former orders, as I feared the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and morale of my army, now so perfect."

In refitting the army, which was about 60,000 strong, in regulating the local government, and in making the proper disposition of the captured cotton and other property, Sherman consumed nearly a month. During that time he had a visit from Secretary Stanton. Grant sent Grover's division of the Nineteenth corps to garrison the forts; and on the 18th of January Sherman transferred these and the city itself to General Foster. Foster was, at the same time, instructed to follow the movements of the army inland by occupying, in succession, the city of Charleston and such other points northward along the coast as were of any strategic value. Sherman had already made up his mind to make Goldsboro the point from which he would re-open communications with the seaboard; and he had given orders to Colonel Wright, superintendent of military railroads, to proceed in advance to New Berne, and extend the railroad from that point to Goldsboro—a distance of about 45 miles—by the 15th of March. Schofield, as has been mentioned in a previous chapter, was directed to move with the Twenty-third corps, from New Berne and Wilmington upon Goldsboro, so as to be there if possible on the arrival of Sherman.

Before commencing the march, Howard was directed to embark his command and proceed by sea to Beaufort South Carolina, and from that point to send a force to make a lodgment on
the Charleston Railroad at or near Pocotaligo. This was effected on the 15th of January by the Seventeenth corps under Blair; and a depot of supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, having easy water communication with Hilton Head. Slocum with the left wing of the army, and Kilpatrick with the cavalry, were ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and Coosawhatchie, in South Carolina, with a depot of supplies at Pureysburg or State’s Ferry on the Savannah River. Slocum, accordingly, had a pontoon bridge laid over the river opposite Savannah. He also repaired and corduroyed the Union Causeway, which traverses the rice-fields northward from the city. Heavy rains, however, welled the river and overflowed all the adjacent low grounds, covering the causeway with water 4 feet deep and breaking the pontoon bridge. Compelled to seek a crossing higher up the river, he moved to Sister’s Ferry; but as the bottom-lands were overflowed there also, he was again detained.

On the 22d of January, Sherman went to Hilton Head, where he had a conference with Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster. He then proceeded to Beaufort, and on the 24th to to Pocotaligo, where the Seventeenth corps, under Blair, was encamped. The Fifteenth corps had not yet concentrated, Wood’s and Hazen’s divisions only being at Beaufort. J. E. Smith’s division was marching from Savannah to join them by the coast road; and that of Corse was detained by storms and the floods. On the following day, and in order to Jan. strengthen the conviction on the 25th part of the enemy that Charleston was to be the objective of Sherman’s movements, a demonstration was made against the Combahee Ferry and the railroad bridge across the Salkahatchie. Feigned movements were made, as if it was intended to cross. No real movement, however, was made until the waters abated.

By the 29th, the floods had retired from the roads west of Savannah sufficiently to permit Slocum to put the left wing in motion, at Sister’s Ferry. A gun-boat, sent thither by Dahlgren, covered the troops while crossing. Three divisions of the Fifteenth corps also had closed up at Pocotaligo; and the right wing being ready to start, Howard was directed to move the Seventeenth corps along the Salkahatchie as far as River’s Bridge, and the Fifteenth by Hickory Hill, Loper’s Cross-Roads, Anglesey Post Office, and Beaufort’s Bridge. Hatch’s division was directed to continue the feints at the railroad bridge and the ferry, till Sherman’s movement should turn the enemy’s position and compel him to fall back behind the Edisto. The march of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth corps began on the 1st of February; and though all the roads leading north were obstructed by felled trees, the pioneer battalions cleared the path of the army so rapidly, that, on the 2d, the Fifteenth corps reached Loper’s Cross-Roads, and the Seven
teenth, River's Bridge. Slocum was still hindered by the floods at Sister's Ferry; but he had managed to push to the east bank two divisions of the Twentieth corps under Williams, with Kilpatrick's cavalry. Kilpatrick was ordered to Blackville by way of Barnwell. Williams was ordered to Beaufort's Bridge. Slocum was directed to get the remainder of his command over as rapidly as possible, and join the right wing, on the South Carolina Railroad. The right wing was ordered to cross the Salkahatchie—which was still held by the enemy in force, with infantry and artillery intrenched at River's and Beaufort's Bridges—and to push on to the South Carolina Railroad at or near Midway. River's Bridge was carried, on the 3d of February, by two divisions of the Seventeenth corps, those of Mower and G. A. Smith. Mower and Smith led their troops in person, wading the swamp, which was nearly 3 miles wide. A lodgment was effected below the bridge; and the brigade which guarded it was driven towards Branchville.

The line across the Salkahatchie was thus broken; the enemy retreated at once beyond the Edisto at Branchville. Sherman's army moved rapidly to the South Carolina Railroad, at Midway, Bamberg, and Graham's Station. The track of the railroad was then torn up all the way from the Edisto as far west as Blackville. To this point Kilpatrick had, in the mean time, brought up his cavalry. Ordered to proceed towards Aiken and threaten Augusta, he skirmished heavily with Wheeler's cavalry at Blackville, Williams, and Aiken. The destruction of the railroad was continued as far as Windsor, 20 miles east of Augusta. By the 11th, the entire army was on the railroad from Midway to Johnson's Station, thus dividing the enemy's forces, which lay westward at Aiken and Augusta and eastward, at Branchville and Charleston. A movement on Orangeburg was commenced, the Seventeenth corps crossing the South Fork of the Edisto at Binnaker's Bridge, and moving straight on that place, the Fifteenth crossing at Holman's Bridge and moving to Poplar Springs, in support. On the 12th, the Seventeenth corps finding the Confederates intrenched in front of the Orangeburg Bridge, carried their position at a dash, compelling them to retire, beyond the bridge, to the protection of a battery which was covered by a rampart of cotton and earth. Blair keeping G. A. Smith's division near the bridge, sent the other two divisions to a point, two miles below, where Force's division, crossing by a pontoon bridge, and moving rapidly up to the position held by the Confederates, compelled them to retreat. Smith immediately pushed over the bridge and took possession of the enemy's abandoned battery. The bridge, which had been partially burned, was then repaired; and the whole corps was in Orangeburg by four o'clock in the afternoon, and, at 12, work, tearing up the railroad. By the 14th, Blair had destroyed the track, as far northward as Lewisville, and drove the Confederates across the Congaree.
As they retired, they burned the bridges in their rear.

Sherman, without making demonstrations on Branchville or Charleston, which his movements had already made untenable, set all his columns in march for Columbia, the Seventeenth corps following the State road; the Fifteenth crossing the North Edisto from Popular Springs, at Schilling’s Bridge, and taking a country road which enters the State road at Zeigler’s. On the 15th, this corps found the enemy strongly posted at the Little Congaree Bridge, having a tête-de-pont on the south side, and on the north side a well-constructed fort, the artillery of which commanded the bridge. The ground in front was level and open. It was covered with a fresh deposit of mud, from which the water of a freshet had only just retired. General Wood, however, by sending a brigade through a cypress swamp to the left, succeeded in turning the flank of the tête-de-pont; and, promptly following up his advantage, he got possession also of the bridge and fort. Some delay was occasioned in repairing the bridge, which had been partially burnt, so that the column did not arrive at the Congaree, opposite Columbia, till the following morning. By that time the enemy had burnt the fine bridge at that point.

The inhabitants could now be easily seen running about the streets; and small bodies of cavalry occasionally showed themselves. Against these was directed, for some time, the fire of one gun; but, subsequently, it was turned by order of Sherman against the walls of the unfinished State House. A few shells were also thrown at the railroad depot to scatter the crowds who were carrying off sacks of corn and meal. Of course no white flag was visible, or any sign of a disposition to surrender. Slocum came up with the left wing within an hour after the arrival of Howard’s column; and the latter was directed to cross the Saluda River about 3 miles above the city, to proceed thence across the Broad River and to approach the city from the north. Slocum was directed to cross the Saluda at Zion Church, to proceed thence northward towards Winsboro and to break up the railroad and bridges in the vicinity of Alston. On the night of the 16th, Howard had thrown a flying bridge across the Broad River about 3 miles above the city. By this means he got one brigade over. In the morning a pontoon bridge was laid, and preparations were made for an advance upon the city.

Meanwhile the mayor had appeared and made a formal surrender to Colonel Stone, of the Twenty-17. Fifth Iowa, at the Saluda Bridge. A small party, from the Seventeenth corps, had also crossed the Congaree, in a skiff, and entered the city, from the west. Stone’s brigade was then posted in the streets of the city; and, for some time, good order prevailed. Subsequently, however, half drunken soldiers and released prisoners, entered stores and private dwellings and helped themselves to any valuables they could find, robbing ladies and gentlemen of their watches and jewelry.
in the streets, and committing various other crimes when not immediately under the eyes of their officers. Orders were given for the destruction of all arsenals and such other public property as could not be made use of by the army, as well as all railroads, depots, and machinery that might be subsequently made available to the enemy. They were to spare private dwellings, as well as schools, colleges, and such institutions. The Fifteenth corps passed through the city in the course of the day, marching out by the Camden road. The Seventeenth corps did not enter the city at all; and the left wing halted about 2 miles distant.

General Wade Hampton, who was in command of the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, before leaving the city, ordered that all cotton, whether belonging to the Confederate government or to individuals, should be collected in the streets and burned. The bales were cut open; and the loose cotton, scattered and blown about by a high wind, which prevailed at the time, lodged in trees, on the roofs of houses, and on piazzas and verandahs, thus offering great temptation to the floating fire which filled the air. Some of the great heaps of cotton were still burning when the National troops took possession. The flames, however, were soon extinguished by the exertions of the soldiers. Sherman's instructions had not yet been put in execution, when the smouldering heaps of cotton, fanned by the wind, broke out again into flames, which were communicated to some of the adjacent buildings. About dark, the conflagration spread to such an extent, as to be altogether beyond the control of the single brigade stationed in the city; and Wood's whole division was ordered in, to check the progress of the flames. By midnight, the fire became quite unmanageable. Drunken soldiers had cut the hose; and, in some instances, they went round with torches, deliberately setting fire to buildings which would otherwise have escaped. In spite of the exertions of Sherman, who was up nearly all night, and of Generals Howard, Logan, and Wood, the fire was not got under control until about four o'clock in the morning, by which time the whole of the business portion of the city was in ruins. The arsenals, railroad depots, machine shops, and other public property, were destroyed on the 18th and 19th, as well as the railroad track as far as Kingsville and the Wateree Bridge, and also towards Winnsboro.

Columbia, the political capital of South Carolina, fell on the 17th of February. On the following day fell Charleston, the commercial capital. The destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply, by the army of General Sherman on its march through the Carolinas, made the whole sea-coast northward, from Savannah to New Berne absolutely worthless and even untenable. The National fleet occupied the entrance to Charleston harbor. Morris Island was also held; an artillery fire was, at intervals, directed against Fort Sumter and the city itself; but the capture of either had proved
to be a task of extreme difficulty, and in fact impossible by the navy, without the aid of a large co-operating land force. The strategic value of Charleston was not, however, so great as to warrant the sending against it an expedition of the magnitude which would have been necessary for its reduction. The closing of the harbor, by a blockading fleet, effected nearly all that would have been accomplished by the actual occupation of the city. This had been secured by the presence of Admiral Dahlgren’s fleet of iron-clads.

Some thought was entertained, early in the summer of 1864, of attacking Fort Sumter and attempting the passage with monitors; but the idea was finally abandoned. It was not until Feb. 8, 1865, that the 8th of February, 1865, when General Gillmore succeeded Foster in command of the Department of the South, that active measures were taken to reduce the city.

General Hardee was at that time in command, in Charleston, with a force of about 15,000 men, comprising the regular garrison and troops with which he had retreated from Savannah. On the 10th, operations were commenced by the construction of a bridge across the creek separating Folly and Cole’s islands from James Island; and a force under General Schimmelpfenig, 3000 strong, effected a lodgment on the latter about 3 miles southwest of Charleston. Skirmishers, who were thrown forward, encountered the enemy at Grimball’s, on Stono River. A mortar schooner and two tin-clads also moved up the Stono River and shelled the enemy, and at the same time covered the flank of the National troops.

About half-past four, General Hartwell moved his whole brigade forward in columns, doubled on the centre, and carried the enemy’s rifle-pits at the double-quick. The contest was brief, as the Confederates retreated rapidly to their main works, abandoning then dead and wounded, and losing about 20 prisoners. The National loss was about 80. As this movement was only a feint, the troops of General Schimmelpfenig were soon afterwards withdrawn. On the 12th and 13th, demonstrations were made, by a force under General Potter, along the approaches from Bull’s Bay towards Mount Pleasant, with the view of threatening Charleston from the north. General Hatch’s column, moving northward from Pocotaligo, threatened Charleston from the south. Hardee soon became aware that his hold on the city was very precarious. His railroad communication with Branchville, as well as with Savannah, was destroyed. The railroad running northward to Florence, the only remaining one, was in danger. A prolonged defense of the city could only end in his being encircled by National forces, and compelled to surrender his whole army. If he could effect a junction with Johnston, he might yet render important service to the Confederacy. About midnight of the 17th, therefore, as the last of Feb. 17, the Confederate troops were leaving, they fired the upper part of the city, where were the railroad buildings containing several thousand bales of
cotton. In these buildings were stored, in addition to the cotton, a large quantity of rice, and 200 kegs of gunpowder. About half-past three in the morning a terrific explosion took place, killing about 150 people, and mutilating about 200, among whom were women and children, who were carrying off the rice. At daylight, several rams in the inner harbor, near the city, were blown up. The mayor, soon afterward, sent a note to Gillmore, stating that the Confederate military authorities had withdrawn; and at nine o'clock on the morning of Feb. 18th, the city of Charleston, with Forts Sumter and Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, and all the defensive works, were formally surrendered. Gillmore's troops were promptly moved up to the city; and the National flag was restored to the parapet of Fort Sumter amid the deafening cheers of the troops.

The soldiers were, immediately, set to work to check the progress of the flames, in the upper part of the city. The fire, however, had already got such headway that the cotton warehouses, arsenals, quarter-masters' stores, the railroad bridges, some vessels in the ship-yards, and a large number of dwellings were destroyed before this could be effected. The lower part of the city, within range of the fire of the fleet, had suffered much from shot and shell, in the course of the protracted siege, and had long been in a ruinous condition. The wealthy residents had deserted the city; and the population, now reduced to about 10,000, mostly negroes and poor whites, had no means of escape. "Any one," said Sherman, "who is not satisfied with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray, louder and deeper than ever, that the country may in the long future be spared any more war." Several hundred deserters from Hardee's army, who had concealed themselves in houses, while the evacuation was going on, surrendered when Gillmore's troops entered the city. Among the captures were 450 cannon, found in the forts and other defenses, 8 locomotives, and a large number of passenger and platform cars, all in good condition.

The memorable siege of Charleston commenced actually, on the 10th of July 1863, when Gillmore landed on Morris Island. The city had been under fire 542 days; and the surrender took place on the fourth anniversary of the inauguration of Jefferson Davis, as president of the Southern Confederacy. The moral effect of the fall of Charleston was very great, not only in the North and in the South, but in Europe also.

The circumstances of the surrender of Fort Sumter, by General Anderson had produced an impression on the public mind too deep to be readily erased; and President Lincoln, desirous to commemorate its restoration, made arrangements for a celebration worthy of the occasion. The old flag was restored, with great pomp and solemnity, on the 14th of April. A large number of citizens, on board the steamer Oceanicus, arrived from New York to take part in the ceremonies. Colonel S. L. Woodford took general charge of the day's proceedings.
Gathered around the flag-staff, the entire company, led by W. B. Bradbury, sang his song, "Victory at Last." This was followed by "Rally round the Flag." Prayer was offered by the Rev. Matthew Harris, chaplain of the United States Army. Selections from the Book of Psalms were read by Dr. R. S. Storrs, of Brooklyn. General Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General, read Major Anderson's despatch of April 18th, 1861. This done, Anderson's faithful servant, Sergeant Hart, appeared with a new mail-bag containing the identical flag which had been taken down on the day of surrender, four years before. The precious relic, now a memorial of victory as well as of defeat, was attached to the halyards. Anderson then delivered a brief but touching address, after which, he hoisted the old banner to the peak of the flag-staff, amid heaven-rending cheers, the whole multitude then breaking forth into singing "The Star-Spangled Banner." As soon as the singing was over, deafening peals were thundered forth from four guns on the fort. These were responded to by all the batteries which had taken part in the bombardment, in 1861. The proceedings were concluded by an address from the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, an address which, for power, pathos, grandeur of thought and all the other elements of first-class oratory, has seldom been equalled, rarely surpassed.

Confederate forces. On the 25th, Admiral Dahlgren entered and took possession.

In the mean time, General Slocum, with the left wing and the cavalry, had crossed the Saluda and Broad rivers, breaking up the railroad near Alston, and as far as the bridge over the Broad River, on the Spartanburg road. The main body moved towards Winnsboro, where it arrived on the 21st of February. Destroying the railroad, as far as Blackstakes Depot, Slocum then turned towards Rocky Mount, on the Catawba. He arrived there, with the Twentieth corps, on the 22d, and having laid a pontoon bridge, crossed the next day. Kilpatrick's cavalry crossed over, the same night, during a heavy rain, and pushed on to Lancaster, whither Beauregard had retired with the Confederate cavalry. Heavy rains prevailed from the 20th to the 26th, making the roads almost impassable and swelling the rivers. The Catawba became so swollen that the pontoon bridge gave way before the Fourteenth corps had effected a crossing; and much difficulty was experienced in the work of reconstruction. When General Davis got his command over, the whole left wing was put in motion for Cheraw.

The right wing had crossed the Catawba before the heavy rains set in, and pushed on for Cheraw. Detachments were sent, from the Fifteenth corps to Camden, to burn the bridge over the Wateree, as well as the railroad depot and public stores. At Lynch's Creek the right wing was delayed by the badness of the roads, just as the
left wing had been at the Catawba. The leading division of the Twentieth corps entered Chesterfield on the 2d of March, skirmishing with Butler's cavalry; and about noon, on the 3d, the Seventeenth corps entered Cheraw, the Confederates falling back across the PeeDee and burning the bridge after them. A large amount of ammunition and numerous pieces of artillery were destroyed at Cheraw, as were also the railroad bridges and trestles, as far as Darlington. Without delay, the columns were put in motion in the direction of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the right wing crossing the PeeDee at Cheraw, the left wing and the cavalry at Sneed'sboro, Kilpatrick's cavalry, keeping well on the left flank. In spite of the unfavorable weather and the wretched roads, the Fourteenth and Seventeenth corps, on the 11th of March, reached Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear River. There they had a sharp skirmish with Wade Hampton's cavalry, the rear-guard of Hardee's retreating army, which, after crossing the river, burnt the bridge. On the morning of the 10th of March, at daylight, Kilpatrick, who was on the left, and exposed, was suddenly attacked by Hampton and his cavalry. Hampton gained possession of the camp of Spencer's brigade, and the house in which Kilpatrick and Spencer had their quarters. Kilpatrick, who was asleep at the time, escaped, with only pantaloons and slippers; but succeeding in rallying his men, on foot, in a neighboring swamp, he attacked the enemy so vigorously, that he regained his camp, horses, and artillery. The Confederates rapidly made off, taking with them a few prisoners, but abandoning their dead. The army remained during the 12th, 13th, and 14th at Fayetteville. The buildings of which was called the Arsenal of Construction which covered 50 acres of ground and which contained a vast amount of machinery, brought from Harper's Ferry, were destroyed. All the buildings were burnt, and the machinery destroyed, under the supervision of Colonel Poe, the chief engineer of the army.

Up to this time, Sherman had succeeded in keeping his army between the divided and scattered portions of the enemy's forces. The latter, however, were now concentrating on Sherman's left flank. The troops, with which Beauregard left Columbia, had been reinforced by Cheatham's corps from Hood's broken army, and by the garrison of Augusta. Hardee also had got across the Cape Fear River; and he would soon be able to join the other armies. These various bodies of the enemy, when united, would constitute a formidable force, superior, in fact, to Sherman's in cavalry, and but little inferior in infantry and artillery. Commanded as they were, by the skilful and experienced Johnston, Sherman had need to move with caution. Before arriving at Fayetteville, he had sent two trusty scouts to Wilmington, with intelligence respecting his position. The scouts made their way safely; and on the morning of the 12th of March, a small steamer arrived at Fayetteville.

FAYETTEVILLE.
from Wilmington. It returned, the same day, with despatches for General Terry, and for General Schofield, at New Berne, informing them that the army would move on the 15th, for Goldsboro, and directing them to move their forces on the same point.

As delay would be highly dangerous, in face of the probable combination of the enemy's forces, Sherman moved out of Fayetteville, on the 15th. The weather was still unfavorable; and the roads had to be corduroyed to allow the passage of wagons and artillery. Kilpatrick was directed to move by the plank road, as far as Averysboro and beyond. He was to be followed by four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible. The remainder of the train, under the escort of the other two divisions of the left wing, were ordered to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro. Howard, with the right wing, was ordered to send his trains well to the right, towards Faison's Depot and Goldsboro, holding four divisions in readiness to aid the left wing, if it should be attacked while in motion.

General Sherman accompanied the left wing, with Kilpatrick's cavalry in advance, as far as Kyle's Landing. At Taylor's Hole Creek, Kilpatrick encountered the rear-guard of the enemy's cavalry; and a brigade of infantry was sent at his request to hold a line of barricades. On the morning of the 15th, the column, advancing in the same order, found a large force of the enemy under Hardee, in an intrenched position, in the vicinity of Averysboro, where the road branches off towards Goldsboro. Hardee's intention was, evidently, to detain Sherman, so as to give Johnston time to concentrate his forces. It was necessary, therefore, to get possession of the Goldsboro road without delay; and at the same time desirable to keep up, as long as possible, a pretense of moving on Raleigh.

Sherman, immediately, made preparations to dislodge Hardee's force. Slocomb was ordered to push forward and carry the position. The Twentieth corps, under Williams, led the attack; and Ward's division, which was in the advance, found a brigade of heavy artillery, armed as infantry, posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery which commanded the open ground in front. A brigade, sent round by the left, turned this line, and then made a quick charge. The Confederate brigade broke, and fell rapidly to a second and stronger line. In doing so, it suffered severely, from the fire of a well-posted battery under Major Reynolds. Ward's division advanced over this ground, capturing 217 men and 3 guns. On approaching the enemy's second line, Jackson's division was deployed on the right of Ward's; and two divisions of the Fourteenth corps were deployed on the left, well towards the Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with Williams, got a brigade on the road; but it was furiously attacked by a Confederate division under McLaws, and compelled to fall back to the flank of the infantry. Late, in the afternoon, the whole line

Mar. 15.
advanced, and drove the Confederates within their intrenchments. During the dismal and stormy night which followed, they retreated over a wretched road in the direction of Smithfield. Such was the battle of Averysboro. The National loss was 77 killed and 477 wounded. The enemy lost 108 of their dead on the field.

Ward’s division kept up a show of pursuit for some distance. The remainder of Slocum’s command, turning to the right, crossed the South River and took the Goldsboro road. Kilpatrick crossed more to the north, with orders to move eastward and guard the flank in that direction. The wagon-trains, with their escorts, and Howard’s column, were, in the mean time, slowly toiling along the miry roads towards Bentonville and Goldsboro.

Sherman remained with Slocum and the left wing, on the night of the 18th, on the Goldsboro road, about 5 miles from Bentonville. Howard was at Lee’s Store, some 2 miles to the south. The pickets of both columns were well thrust forward. There was no sign to indicate that the enemy intended to offer further opposition to the march.

Mar. 19. Sherman, therefore, on the morning of the 19th, ordered Howard to move, with the right wing, by the Goldsboro road. A little later, he rode on himself in the same direction. His object was to advance with the column, and open communications with Schofield and Terry, who were known to be moving up from New Berne and Wilmington. He was only about 6 miles on his journey, when he heard cannon-
of Mitchell and Vandevere were in line; and Fearing’s brigade was in reserve. General Davis, then in command of the Fourteenth corps, which was thus savagely attacked, realizing the danger, with which the whole army was threatened, rode to the front, faced Fearing’s brigade to the left, and hurled it upon the Confederate’s flank. “Push right in the direction of that heaviest firing,” shouted Davis to Fearing, “we’ll whip them yet.” “We’ll whip them yet,” echoed the boys; and on they went, over the swampy ground, and fell like a thunderbolt on the unsuspecting foe. The Confederates reeled and staggered and fell back; and such was the confusion into which they were thrown, that it was an hour, before they were able to resume the attack. The day was saved; for Sherman was thus afforded time to re-form Davis’ left and centre. In that gallant charge, young Fearing was disabled by a bullet, and hundreds of his brave men were either killed or wounded. Davis’ line was drawn back and formed, in open fields, half a mile to rear of the old line; and the artillery were massed on a commanding knoll, so as to sweep the whole space between the new line and the enemy. Morgan’s troops, on that day, won for themselves imperishable renown. Again and again, did the Confederates come up to the attack. Again and again were they repulsed, with heavy loss. “If Morgan’s troops can stand this,” said Davis, “all is right. If not, the day is lost.” In the midst of the hottest of the fight, Coggswell’s brigade, of the Twentieth corps, came up and moved into the gap between Custer and Morgan. This position it gallantly held, until the end of the struggle. The National forces, said Sherman, received “six distinct assaults, by the combine forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy’s ranks.” The Confederates suffered terribly from the National artillery, they themselves being weak in that arm. During the night of the 19th, Slocum’s wagon-train, with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen’s division, came up, as ordered, and, taking position, rendered the left wing almost impregnable.

The right wing, moving to the relief of the left, experienced at first but little opposition. It soon, however, encountered a body of cavalry, posted behind a barricade, at the fork of the road, near Bentonville. The cavalry were quickly dislodged, and the forks of the roads secured. It was now discovered that the left flank of the enemy was thrown back, and that he had constructed, in his front, a line of parapet, in the form of a bastion. The salient of this line was on the main road to Goldsboro, between Slocum on the west, and Howard on the east. The flanks rested on Mill Creek, and covered the road back to Smithfield. By four o’clock, on the afternoon of the 20th, Howard had established a strong connection on his left with Slocum. Line of battle was formed, in front of the enemy’s intrenched position, and
Johnston was put on the defensive, with Mill Creek, and only a single bridge in his rear. Sherman, however, having little to gain by a battle, was in no haste to strike. Skirmishing was kept up all day; and there was some heavy artillery firing.

On the 21st, skirmishing and artillery firing were kept up. Some bold and dashing efforts were made to displace cover a weak point in the enemy's lines. On one occasion, General Mower, with his division of the Seventeenth corps, pushed his way around the Confederate flank, almost to the bridge at Mill Creek. He was glad, however, to return to the defenses of his own lines. During the night, Johnston retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets behind him, his dead unburied, and his wounded in field hospitals. He was pursued some 2 miles beyond Mill Creek.

Such was the battle of Bentonville. It cannot be called one of the greatest; but it was certainly one of the most important battles of the war. If Sherman's army had been defeated at Bentonville, and Johnston thus set free to join Lee at Petersburg and Richmond, the result might have been disastrous in the extreme. As it was, the country was brought one stage nearer the desired end. In the three days' fighting, the Nationals lost 1646. The Confederate loss was probably not under 3000.

Sherman had now accomplished his purpose. He had already, to all intents and purposes, effected a junction with Schofield and Terry. Schofield had entered Goldsboro on the 21st, Terry was in possession of the Neuse River at Cox's Bridge.

As soon as Wilmington fell into his hands, Schofield took measures to carry out Grant's orders, with regard to the movement on Goldsboro. General Palmer, then commanding the New Berne district, was sent from Wilmington, with instructions to march from New Berne, with 5000 men, to occupy Kinston—a small town on the Neuse River and on the railroad to Goldsboro, about 22 miles from that place and 32 from New Berne. Ruger's division, of the Twenty-Third corps, was sent from Fort Fisher to reinforce him. The immediate object of this movement was to get possession of and hold the railroad, in order to establish a depot of supplies at Kinston, and so facilitate the subsequent movement upon Goldsboro, when Sherman should arrive. Palmer was not able to complete his preparations for an advance so soon as was expected; and, on the 6th of March, General Cox arrived at Kinston. New Berne, assumed command, and commenced the forward movement. The Confederates, after being driven out of Wilmington, had retreated northward to Goldsboro; and having determined to defend that place, they decided to make their first stand at Kinston, at which point about 1200 troops were concentrated under General Bragg. The march to Kinston was one of extreme difficulty. The morasses were impassable; and the Neuse River was too shallow to admit the heavy gun-boats. It became, therefore, a matter of the last importance, that
the line of railroad to Kinston should come under the control of the National army.

The 6th, was spent in clearing the roads and in building bridges. On the morning of the 7th, the enemy was found in some force, at the point where the Dover and Jackson roads meet the Trent road. Classon drove him back to Jackson's Mills, 4½ miles from Kinston. On the 8th, there was some sharp fighting; the Confederates, in course of the day, rushing from their works at Jackson's Mills, falling upon Curtis' division with great force, and overwhelming the Twenty-Seventh Massachusetts and the Fifteenth Connecticut. The Nationals were compelled to fall back, and form a new line of battle.

During the whole of the 9th, there was lively skirmishing, but without any decisive result. On the 10th, however, the enemy, who had received large reinforcements, attacked in a bold and determined manner, hoping to defeat Schofield, before Couch, who was now on his way from Wilmington, could come up. The National forces were well intrenched at the junction of the Trent and Upper Trent roads. Schofield and Cox were both on the field, as were also Bragg, Hill, and Hoke on the side of the Confederates. The enemy made two fierce attacks—one falling on Carter's division on the left, the other on Ruger's division in the centre. Both assaults were decisively repulsed, with heavy loss to the enemy. Bragg withdrew his troops, leaving behind him his dead and wounded with several hundred prisoners. His total loss was about 1500 in killed, wounded, and missing. Couch came up from Wilmington, on the morning of the 11th; and Bragg fell back across the Neuse to Kinston, where he burnt the bridge and, for a short time, held the north bank of the river.

Schofield, having no pontoon train, could not cross the Neuse until the 14th. On that day, Bragg abandoned Kinston, and set out to join Johnston, who was then concentrating for the purpose of attacking Sherman's left at Bentonville. Immediately after getting possession of Kinston, Schofield set a large force at work in the reconstruction of the railroad, under the direction of Colonel Wright. He, also, re-built the wagon-bridge over the Neuse, brought forward supplies, and prepared for a further advance. On the morning of the 20th, he left Kinston; and on the evening of the 21st, he took possession of Goldsboro with little opposition. Terry left Wilmington on the 15th, and moving steadily northward reached Faison's Depot on the 20th; and, in obedience to Sherman's orders, he advanced thence to Cox's Bridge, 10 miles above Goldsboro, and secured a crossing of the Neuse, on the 22d. The three armies were united; and the object of the campaign was accomplished. The railroads from Goldsboro to Wilmington and New Berne were quickly repaired; and supplies in abundance were moved forward to Kinston. On the 23d, the different commands had camps assigned to them, in the vicinity of Goldsboro. On the 25th, the railroad from New Berne was again
in working order; and the first train of cars came in. The troops were soon supplied with abundance of food and clothing. In harmony with an arrangement already made, Sherman, leaving the army in charge of Schofield, proceeded by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point. There, in the upper saloon of the River Queen, on the evening of the 27th of March, he met President Lincoln, General Grant, and Admiral Porter; and then occurred that famous consultation, which is one of the memorable incidents of the war. Lincoln looked care-worn and anxious. Grant sat silent and imperturbable, smoking his cigar. Pleased with the promising aspect of things, and convinced that the hour of victory was at hand, Lincoln was yet most desirous to put an end to further bloodshed. "As long as the rebels lay down their arms, I don't care how it is done." "Stop this bloodshed;" he added, "stop this horrible war; I know I can manage all the rest. What signify the terms, so long as we get peace?" On hearing Sherman's account of his own position, he expressed the fear that Johnston might escape southward by the railroad, and thus render necessary further pursuit. "He cannot move southward," said Sherman, "without breaking up his army, which, once disbanded, can never again be re-united; and I have destroyed the railroads, so that they cannot be used for a long time." At this point, Grant, who had not taken any part in the conversation, interjected the question, "What is to prevent them laying the rails again?" "Why" answered Sherman, "my bum mers hav'n't done things by halves. All the rails have been twisted; and they are as crooked as rams' horns. They can never be used again." The conversation turning upon the terms of surrender which should be allowed Johnston, Sherman said: "I can command my own terms; Johnston will have to yield." Lincoln said: "Get his surrender on any terms." Sherman never saw Lincoln again. It was the opinion of Grant and Sherman that one or the other would have to fight one more bloody battle, but that it would be the last. Sherman returned to New Berne by the steamer Bat.

In the march across the Carolinas, as in that from Atlanta to Savannah, the army of Sherman wasted a wide belt of country, of an average breadth of not less than 40 miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, and corn meal. Hundreds of miles of railroad were destroyed and thousands of bales of cotton burned. There were captured 85 cannon, 4000 prisoners and 25,000 animals. Many thousand negroes also were set free.

These results were no doubt important; but the grand result which Sherman had achieved, and one of the grandest results of the war, was that no Confederate force could now hinder the junction, if necessary, of his own forces with those of Grant.

Simultaneously with these converging movements of the several armies, Stoneman made his last great raid. It was part of General Grant's plan that
Stoneman should aid Sherman's movements by a cavalry raid into South Carolina. Before Stoneman was ready to move, Sherman had advanced so far on his march backward from the sea, that the co-operative movement of the cavalry was not necessary. Stoneman was, therefore, ordered to march eastward, and destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, in the direction of Lynchburg. On the 20th of March, he collected the cavalry brigades of Palmer, Miller and Brown, of Gillem's division, at Mossy Creek. His whole force was about 6000 strong. Having moved eastward, to Bull's Gap, he divided his troops, sending Miller to make a demonstration in the direction of Bristol, himself proceeding with the rest to Jonesboro, where he crossed over Stone Mountain to Boone, in North Carolina. At Boone, on the 28th, he skirmished with the enemy, and captured 200 Home Guards. The day after, he was at Wilkesboro, where he captured stores and some prisoners. Continuing his march, he crossed the Yadkin River, at Jonesville; and then, facing to the north, he advanced to Cranberry Plain, Carroll County, Virginia. Thence, having sent Miller to Wytheville to destroy the railroad, he himself, with the main body, moved on Salisbury. From Jacksonville he sent out raiding parties in all directions. One of these, under Major Wagner, having advanced on Salem, swept along the railroad to the east, destroying it from New River Bridge to within 4 miles of Lynchburg. Another, and a larger party, under Stoneman himself, advanced on Christiansburg, and destroyed about 90 miles of rail. Stoneman's prescribed task being thus accomplished, he collected his forces, and returned to Jacksonville.

There was still, however, work to be done; and Stoneman was not disposed to rest his troopers until that work was accomplished. On the 9th of April, his face now turned to the south, we find him on the North Carolina railroad, between Danville and Greensboro, his whole command at work tearing up rails and demolishing bridges. Palmer destroyed the railroad between Greensboro and Salisbury, burned the factories at Salem, and captured some 400 men. Stoneman, with the main body, moved on Salisbury, which was a provision depot, and known to be guarded by a Confederate force, some 3000 strong, under General W. M. Gardiner. The Confederates were found at Grant's Creek, 10 miles to the east of Salisbury, well posted, with 18 guns. The entire force was under the command of Pemberton, Grant's old opponent, still faithfully serving the Confederates, although reduced to the rank of Colonel. The Nationals charged the Confederate position. The struggle was brief. The Confederates broke and fled, leaving behind them some 1200 men, who were made prisoners, all their guns, 3000 small arms, and a vast quantity of stores. Salisbury was occupied without further resistance. The work of destruction was repeated. Ammunition, provisions, clothing, medicine, 10,000 small arms, 4 cotton factories, 7000 bales of cotton, all were
The prison pens, from which the Union prisoners had already been moved, were fired; and the rails for miles on both sides of the town were torn up and destroyed. Stoneman now set out for East Tennessee, taking with him the prisoners and the captured clothing, and followed by thousands of negroes.

On the 18th, General Palmer, whose command was at Lincolntown, sent Major E. C. Motherwell, with a body of some 250 mounted men, belonging to the Twelfth Ohio cavalry, towards the point where the Charlotte and South Carolina Railroad crosses the Catawba River. His instructions were to destroy the railroad bridge. By this time, Richmond had fallen; and Davis, the Confederate president, was at Charlotte with a considerable force. Vaughan and Duke, who had come down from the borders of Virginia, it was ascertained were also in the neighborhood. Motherwell, in consequence, found it necessary to move with great caution. At Dallas he encountered the cavalry leaders. He cunningly, however, evaded battle. On the following morning, the 19th, at day-break, the National troops were well formed. Advancing to the bridge, they captured the picket and surprised the guard. April 19. The torch was soon applied; and in about thirty minutes the splendid structure, some 1150 feet in length, and about 50 feet above the water, was completely destroyed. After skirmishing with some Confederate cavalry, under Ferguson, Motherwell’s men began to move backwards in the direction of Dallas. Early on the 20th, having marched all night, they rejoined the main body of the brigade, with 325 prisoners, 200 horses, and two pieces of artillery.

This last raid of Stoneman was one of the most destructive during the war. He captured from first to last some 6000 men, about 56 pieces of artillery, small arms in great abundance, with other property of untold value. If the fate of the Confederacy had not been already sealed, it must have hastened the end. As it was, it helped to complete the punishment of the South, and, by throwing some darker lines upon the canvas, made more horrible the picture of civil war.
CHAPTER XLII.

...holding on to the Weldon Railroad—Sheridan master of the Shenandoah Valley—Dutch Gap Canal—
The Explosion—James River Flooded—Confederate Fleet in the James—Fort Brady—Battery Parsons—
Preparing for Attack along the Whole Line—Rowanty Creek—Hatcher's Run—Smyth at Armstrong's Mill—
The Boydton Plank Road—Dabney's Mills—The Second Battle of Hatcher's Run—Movement from the Shenandoah—Hancock in Command of the Middle Military Division—Sheridan at Kernstown—At Strasburg—At Woodstock—At Staunton—Custer at Waynesboro—Sheridan's Troops at Scottsville and New Market—Hardwicksville—Amherst Court House—Sheridan at Ashland Station—Terrible Destruction of Property—Richmond in Consternation—Lee Preparing to Penetrate the National Lines—Grant on his Guard—Lee's Attack on the Ninth Corps at Fort Steadman—Fort Steadman Captured by the Confederates—A Terrific Struggle—Fort Steadman Re-captured by the Nationals—General Advance of the National Left—Wright and the Sixth Corps Heavily Engaged—The Advanced Position held by the Nationals—Grant's Plan of Attack—His Old Tactics—White Oak Road and Five Forks—The National Line—Its Vast Extent—Disposition of the Troops—General Directions—The Night of the 29th of March—
The National Troops in Motion—Warren and Humphreys on the White Oak Road—In Front of the Enemy's Right Flank—Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court House—Grant's Instructions to Sheridan—The Position of Lee's Army—Lee's Extended Line—His Difficulty—His Plan of Battle—Longstreet left in front of the National Right—The Morning of the 30th—Bad Road—Grant in no Haste to Strike—The Delay a Gain to Lee—The Confederate General Preparing to Act on the Offensive—Warren on the Boydton Plank Road—Ayres, Crawford and Griffin—Warren's Disposition of his Troops—His Advance—The Battle Begun—Fierce Sortie by Lee—Ayres and Crawford Driven Back—Griffin Stands Firm—Chamberlain's Brigade—The Confederates Driven Back—Warren Attacks the Works at Hatcher's Run—Lee's Sortie a Failure—He Attacks Sheridan at Five Forks—The National Cavalry Driven in Confusion—Dinwiddie Court House—Devin and Davies isolated from the Main Body—Sheridan in Great Straits, but Equal to the Situation—The National Cavalry Recruited—Severe Fighting—Sheridan Dismounts his Men—The Confederates Pressed—Night and Relief—Sheridan Praised by Grant—An Anxious Night—Alarming Rumors—Warren Ordered to Sheridan's Relief—Gravelly Run—Lee Falls Back from Dinwiddie—He Takes Position at Five Forks—A Junction Effected by the National Infantry and Cavalry—Sheridan Assumes Command of the Entire Force—Saturday, April 1st—The Key-Point of the Position—A Morning Struggle—Sheridan Preparing to Attack—His Plan of Battle—He Blames Warren for Delay—Four o'clock—Assault on the Confederate Position at Five Forks—Warren's Advance—A Warm Reception—
Ayres and Crawford Badly Punished—Griffin Again to the Rescue—The Rally—The Battle Raging—Advance of the Cavalry—The Confederates Routed—A Brave Remnant—A Complete Victory—Difference Between Sheridan and Warren—Sheridan's Charges not Sustained by Facts—The Disaster at Five Forks a Sad Blow to Lee—His Right Flank was Turned—Grant and Meade Quick to Act—The Thunder of the National Guns—A Hideous Night—The General Assault—Parke and Wright Carry all Before Them—Ord at Hatcher's Run—He Unites with Wright—The Clayborne Road—Sutherland's Station—The South Side Railroad Lost to the Confederates—Forts Gregg and Alexander—Gibbon's Heroic Attack—Capture of the Forts—The Investing Line Drawn Close—Lee's Inner Line—Bold and Aggressive to the Last—An Offensive Sally—Heath's Division of A. P. Hill—Death of Hill—The End at Hand—"Richmond Must Be Evacuated"—Scene in St. Paul's Church—A Sad Sunday—A Night of Horrors—Richmond and Peters- burg Evacuated—Entrance of the National Troops—The Old Flag Restored—Joy and Gratitude.

We return now to the neighborhood of Petersburg and Richmond, where after the battle of Hatch- er's Run and at the conclusion of Warren's expedition, as before described, the army of the Potomac and the army of the James went into winter quarters. With the left of the
army of the Potomac, Grant maintained a firm hold on the Weldon Railroad. His right, which consisted of the army of the James and which was stationed on the north side of the river of that name, extended to within a few miles of Richmond. Sheridan, now undisputed master of the Shenandoah Valley from Harper's Ferry to Staunton, had his headquarters at Kemstown, near Winchester.

It was not until near the end of March, that Grant was ready for a general movement upon the Confederate lines. The opening months of the year, however, were not spent wholly in idleness. Several events of minor importance served to disturb the monotony of winter quarters. On New Year’s day, the bulkhead of the Dutch Gap Canal was partially blown out by the explosion of mines. The earth was thrown up to a considerable height; but, instead of being cast forward, as was desired, it fell back into its former position. Connection with the river was not established; and of course the canal remained useless for the purposes for which it was intended.

Heavy rains, about the middle of January, swelled the James River to several feet above its ordinary level, flooding the low grounds along its banks, and tearing away the pontoon bridges at Aiken’s Landing and Dutch Bottom; and the enemy, taking advantage of the high water, during the absence of Porter’s fleet, prepared his iron-clads in the James for a descent on City Point. A fleet composed of 3 iron-clads, the Virginia, Richmond and Fredericksburg, each carrying 4 guns; the wooden vessels Drewry, Nansemond and Hampton, each of 2 guns; the Bedford, one gun; the steamer Torpedo, and 3 torpedo boats, at a very early hour on the morning of the 24th, dropped down from their anchor-age above the Howlett batteries. Moving silently under cover of the darkness, they had all but passed Fort Brady, when the guns of the fort opened upon them a tremendous fire. The vessels made a vigorous response, and moving onward were soon beyond the range of the guns. In the brief struggle one of the guns of the fort, a 100-pounder Parrott, was dismounted. On reaching the obstructions at Dutch Gap, the Fredericksburg pushed through under a full head of steam. The Richmond, the Virginia and the Drewry grounded in attempting to follow; and the Fredericksburg was compelled to return to their assistance. The Drewry could not be got off; and as daylight was approaching, and the fleet was now within range of Battery Parsons, she was abandoned. A shell from the battery subsequently falling into her magazine, she blew up and was totally demolished. The remainder of the fleet retired up the river. The loss in killed and wounded did not exceed 20 on either side.

About this time some futile attempts were made to renew negotiations for peace. After the entire breaking up of Hood’s army by Thomas, and the march of Sherman, almost unopposed, from Atlanta to Savannah, a conviction
began to prevail very generally in the South as well as in the North, that the strength of the rebellion was broken. Without Sherman’s command, the National forces in the field were sufficiently numerous to ensure final success. The North had, therefore, one great army to spare, while the Confederacy, in men, in resources of every kind, and in the spirit with which the contest was carried on, was known to be failing rapidly. A belief came to be generally entertained in the North, that a large portion of the Southern leaders were not indisposed to accept peace, even on condition of entire submission to the National authority. Some of the best and more sagacious of the Confederate leaders had long seen that success was hopeless; and they were only solicitous of bringing the war to a close in some way which should not wound too keenly the pride and self-respect of the Southern people. A large class in the North were also desirous that efforts should be made to put a stop to the war as soon as it could be done without materially sacrificing the national interests. Into the details of these peace efforts we shall not enter. They were all failures, and they had no appreciable effect on the war.

It was now the 31st of January. There were signs of unusual activity all along the National lines. Grant, resolved to put in execution a long projected movement towards the enemy’s right, had issued marching orders to the entire army in front of Petersburg—the Second, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth corps. The hospitals were cleared, and the sick sent back to City Point; the quartermasters’ and commissary stores also were sent out of harm’s way. The cars were kept running constantly to City Point until the afternoon of Saturday the 4th of February, when Gregg’s division of cavalry received orders to march at three on the following morning. The Fifth corps was to follow at five, and the Second at six. The object of the movement was to get possession of the South Side Railroad, which, it was hoped, would cause the evacuation of Petersburg. Gregg’s division started at the hour appointed; and, moving along the Jerusalem plank road, the advance reached Reams’ Station soon after daybreak. The Fifth corps moved along the Halifax road—Ayres’ division in the advance, Griffin’s next, and Crawford’s in the rear. These troops formed the expeditionary or flanking column. Along the Vaughan road marched Smyth’s and Mott’s divisions of the Second corps. These troops had the duty assigned them of moving directly on the enemy’s works at Hatcher’s Run, while the Fifth corps and Gregg’s cavalry marched around their right. The weather and the roads were good; and the troops, carrying four days’ rations, were in excellent spirits. Gregg’s cavalry column, advancing from Reams’ Station towards Dinwiddie Court House, encountered, at Rowanty Creek, a body of Wade Hampton’s cavalry, dismounted and in trenched. After a sharp skirmish, the bridge across the creek, and the works were carried; and 22 of the garrison
were made prisoners. The Nationals lost 20 men. The stream was, at this time, about 20 feet wide. As it was too deep for fording, it was necessary to construct bridges to enable the Fifth corps to get over with its ordnance, supply trains, and ambulances. This caused a delay of several hours. The cavalry, however, moved on rapidly to Dinwiddie Court House, where they captured an empty wagon train, and sent out scouting parties in various directions. At nightfall Gregg returned to Rowanty Creek, and encamped.

General Humphreys, with the second and third divisions of his corps, moved down the Vaughan road to Hatcher's Run—Mott with the third division in the advance, De Trobriand's brigade leading. De Trobriand deployed his brigade in line of battle; and, sending the Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania over in skirmishing order, he carried the works and secured the ford. The Confederates were compelled to take refuge in the woods. The brigade then taking position on a hill beyond the ford, threw up intrenchments. But the cavalry battalion, which had crossed a little to the south of the Vaughan road, while pursuing the enemy and reconnoitring on the left, met a small force in ambush, from which it received a sharp volley, and lost a number of men and horses.

General Smyth, in the mean time, before the run was crossed and while his division was yet half a mile from the stream, turned off to the right, following a by-path, leading northeastward towards Armstrong's Mill and Ford. After an advance of about a mile, a heavy force of the enemy, under Gordon, was found in a strong position, with pickets thrown out in front. The Confederates having retired within their breastworks, Smyth formed his men in line of battle, his left connecting with Mott's right. Earth-works were also thrown up and other preparations made to resist an attack. Skirmishing went on till about two o'clock, when a furious artillery fire was begun by the enemy. About half-past four, the enemy fell with great weight on Smyth's right flank, striking principally McAllister's and Murphy's brigades. With their accustomed yell, the Confederates pressed through a difficult swamp upon which Smyth's right partly rested, but the troops, standing firm behind their breast-works, received them with such a musketry fire that they fell back again to the woods. This attempt to carry the works on the right flank, and thus turn the National position, was repeated a second and a third time, but with the same result. It was not until darkness fell that the fighting was discontinued. Smyth's lines remained intact. When morning dawned, it was found that the Confederates had abandoned their ground in front of the Second corps. During the night the lines were re-formed so that the Fifth and Second corps were brought into connection, the Second on the right, the Fifth on the left, the latter covered by Gregg's cavalry. The Sixth and Ninth corps were also so disposed as to be able to render
assistance to the Fifth and Second, if necessary. The lines, as usual in the presence of the enemy, were covered with rude breast-works. Early in the forenoon, De Trobriand and McAllister moved out their brigades and reconnoitred in the direction of Petersburg. About noon, Crawford's division of the Fifth corps was sent towards Dabney's Mills with the view of getting to the Boydton plank-road. The entire region, to be traversed in this direction, was ill adapted for marching or manoeuvring. It was covered with thick woods, and broken up in all directions with swamps and ravines. There was but one road; and it was so narrow that two wagons could not pass each other. The troops, advancing in skirmishing order on the right and left of the road, were more unfortunate than those moving along it, as the ground was softer, covered with thick underbrush, and swarming with Confederate sharp-shooters. The men lost their shoes in the mud; and their muskets and ammunition were made useless by water. About two miles above the Vaughan road, Crawford's skirmishers met those of the enemy under Pegram, and drove them back. Pegram sent for assistance, and was quickly reinforced by Evans' division. The persevering advance of Crawford was at length checked, but not before the enemy had been driven beyond Dabney's Mills.

Gregg with the cavalry, on the left of the Vaughan road, had been fighting for some time, the enemy's cavalry having commenced the day by pressing his rear so that Davies' brigade, and subsequently the entire division, became engaged. During a lull in the fighting, the cavalry threw up breast-works, which proved of immense advantage. Towards evening the enemy attacked again in force, driving in the picket and forcing the troops to take refuge behind their intrenchments. Heavy firing followed, the Nationals, some of whom were armed with the Spencer rifle, inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy. The battle became very severe; and Gregg, who was finally driven out of his breast-works, was forced back to Hatcher's Run.

While the cavalry had thus been desperately engaged on the left, the infantry on the right of the Vaughan road had to withstand repeated shocks. Soon after five o'clock, the enemy came down upon the Fifth corps. As it was apprehended that Crawford's division, entangled in the woods, might be cut off, Ayres' division was sent to its support; but while moving in column it was attacked and driven back. Wheaton's division of the Sixth corps, which arrived about five o'clock, was also ordered up to the support of Crawford, and part of it was, for a time, hotly engaged. This division, however, shared in the general reverse, and soon joined the Fifth corps and Gregg's cavalry, both of which were falling back in confusion. The force of the enemy consisted of Pegram's and Evans' divisions of Gordon's corps, and Mahone's division of A. P. Hill's corps. In the presence of these veteran troops, and in a broken and swampy country, in which the enemy had greatly the
advantage, in being well acquainted with the ground, a retreat could not be conducted with anything like a regular formation. The scattered troops fought as they fell back, every man for himself, firing from behind trees and such shelter as they could find; nor was it until the Vaughan road and Hatcher’s Run were reached and the intrenchments regained, that the routed columns could be rallied. Flushed with success, the Confederates dashed out of the woods into the open space in front of the works. Received with a sharp fire they fell back quickly to their cover, without attempting to carry the defenses. Thus ended the second battle of Hatcher’s Run. The Confederate loss was about 1000 in killed and wounded. Among the former was General Pegram. The Nationals sustained a loss of nearly 2000 men. General Crawford’s division suffered severely.

The National troops busied themselves all night, and during the morning of the 7th, in strengthening their defenses, believing that the Confederates would attack again; but, as they showed no disposition to do so, Crawford’s division was sent out to reconnoitre. The enemy was found in a strong position higher up the stream, between Armstrong’s and Burgess’ Mills. A sharp musketry fire was kept up for some time; but as Crawford was not strong enough to force the enemy’s lines, he fell back again towards the intrenchments. There was also considerable artillery firing during the day. On the 8th there was no fighting. The troops, however, were kept busy during the entire day throwing up intrenchments and defensive works. The result of the entire movement was the prolongation of the National line in the direction of the South Side Railroad, as far as Hatcher’s Run, to which the City Point Railroad was continued.

Before commencing a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond and Petersburg, it was of the utmost importance that all the enemy’s communications, north of the James, should be cut off. To accomplish this object, and with a view also, if possible, to reinforce Sherman, who was inferior to his opponents in cavalry, Grant determined to set in motion an expedition from the Shenandoah Valley. Placing General Hancock temporarily in charge of the Middle Military Division, with his headquarters at Winchester, Grant directed Sheridan to proceed with an adequate cavalry force to Lynchburg, and after thoroughly breaking up the railroad and canal, to push southward and join Sherman. Accordingly, Sheridan, on the 27th of February, left his camp at Winchester with about 10,000 cavalry, comprising Merritt’s first division, Custer’s third division, and a brigade under Colonel Capehart, with 4 guns. For some days before the march commenced, heavy rains had prevailed. The roads therefore, were very bad; and the streams and rivers were greatly swollen. The troops, however, marched along the turnpike, which, being macadamized, was in comparatively good condition, and passed successively through Kerns-
town, Middletown, and Strasburg, reaching Woodstock, without encountering opposition. At Woodstock the column bivouacked, having marched 30 miles on the first day. Thence the march was continued, on the 28th, through Edenburg and Hawkinsburg to the North Fork of the Shenandoah, which was crossed by a pontoon bridge between Mount Jackson and New Market.

After a march of 27 miles, the troops bivouacked at Lincoln's Mills, between Harrisonburg and New Market. On the 1st of March, the column moved 26 miles, passing through Harrisonburg, Mount Crawford, and Mount Sydney, and, crossing Middle River, encamped about 4 miles from Staunton. At this place, it was known, Early had his head-quarters. The Confederate chief, however, had anticipated Sheridan's approach, and warned the inhabitants, who removed from the town much of their money and valuables.

The only skirmishing, so far, had been at the North River, near Mount Crawford, where Capehart's brigade had a sharp contest with some cavalry of Rosser's division, who were trying to burn the bridge. The bridge, however, was saved; and 37 prisoners and 21 wagons were captured, with a loss of only 6 men. The weather had been good, permitting 83 miles of the march to be easily accomplished. During the night of the 1st of March, the rain began to fall. About nine o'clock, while the troops were encamped outside of Staunton, Devin's brigade moved up to the town, drove out the pickets, and occupied it without opposition. Turning then towards the left, the brigade marched 7 miles along the road leading to Rockfish Gap, and destroyed the trestle bridge of the Virginia Central Railroad at Christian's Creek.

On the 2d of March, Sheridan's column, heedless of the rain, Mar. which still continued to fall in 2. torrents, moved through Staunton; and the march was continued towards Waynesboro, on the South River, 13 miles southeast, whither Early had retreated with the forces under his command. At Fisherville, Custer's division, in the advance, encountered the enemy's videttes and drove them back towards Waynesboro. On arriving near the latter place, the Confederates were found in an intrenched position, with 5 guns. Custer then, placing Colonel Pennington's brigade on the right, and Colonel Welles' on the left, with Capehart's in reserve, deployed two regiments of the advanced brigades as skirmishers, who moved to the attack firing briskly. Much to the surprise of their assailants, the Confederates, after firing a single volley, broke and attempted to retreat; but Custer's troops, rushing in and surrounding them, captured some 1600 men, about two-thirds of Early's whole command. Among the captures were 11 guns, 17 battle-flags, over 100 horses and mules, and about 200 wagons loaded with subsistence stores. Early's personal bag gage was taken, but he himself escaped to Charlottesville. This was the end of Early as a military leader.

Custer's division and Capehart's brigade crossed the South River and
moved on rapidly in pursuit as far as Greenwood Station, destroying the de-
pot and a train, in which were 6 pieces of artillery with commissary and ord-
nance supplies, which Early had in-
tended to send away. The prisoners were sent to Winchester under an escort of 1500 men. On the 6th, the escort was attacked, while crossing the North Fork of the Shenandoah, by a small force under Rosser. Rosser, however, was beaten off, and the number of prisoners was increased. The detachment arrived at Winchester, with its charge, safe. Sheridan's entire col-
umn having come up to Waynesboro, the march was resumed, on the morning of the 3d, in the direction of Charlottesvile, 18 miles to the east. The rain was still falling; and the roads were wretched. The troops, destroying the railroad and bridges, as they moved long, arrived at Charlottesville on the day of starting; but they were de-
tained there two days, awaiting the arrival of the wagon trains, which were delayed by the wretched condition of the roads. In the mean time bodies of troops sent out, destroyed the railroad in the direction of both Lynchburg and Richmond, as well as the large iron bridges over the North and South forks of the Rivanna River.

The delay, occasioned by the detention of his trains, finally caused Sheridan to abandon the idea of capturing Lynch-
burg; and, on the morning of the 6. 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one southward to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock between those towns, and working destruction gener-
ally. From New Market a detachment was sent on to Duguidsville, to secure the bridge at that point. It was found, when the front was reached, that the bridge was already destroyed, as was that also over the James at Hardwicks-
ville. The other column, which moved in a southwesterly direction, succeeded in destroying the railroad as far as Am-
herst Court House, 16 miles north of Lynchburg. Thence it moved across the country to New Market, where the two columns effected a junction. The James River was now so much swollen, that the pontoons were found to be useless. The Confederates had also destroyed the bridges by which Sheridan had hoped to get to the South Side Railroad. He had, therefore, only two alternatives, either to return to Winches-
ter or to march as rapidly as possible to White House. Choosing the latter course, he followed the James River Canal towards Richmond, and destroyed every lock, besides cutting through the banks wherever that was practicable, as far east as Goochland. On the 10th, at Columbia, at the confluence of the Riv-
anna with the James, he concentrated his whole force. Remaining there one day, he sent scouts to Grant, with information as to his position and intentions, with a request that supplies be sent to meet him at White House. His scouts Mar. arrived at head-quarters, on the 12. night of the 12th; and an infantry force was immediately sent by Grant to take possession of White House, whither abundant supplies were forwarded.
Sheridan, then moving as if he intended to threaten Richmond, arrived at the Central Railroad, near Ashland station. He then crossed the South Anna and the North Anna; and having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of railroad, he proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House, where he arrived on the 19th, his men and horses in great need of rest and supplies.

The amount of property destroyed, in this great raid, was enormous. It was estimated that the property destroyed by Custer alone amounted to $2,000,000. Not a bridge was left standing over the James between Richmond and Lynchburg. Every railroad bridge was destroyed between Staunton and Charlottesville, as well as between the latter place and Buffalo. The aqueduct at Columbia was badly damaged. No kind of property was spared. It was a general and complete destruction. Richmond was filled with consternation. The Confederate government was paralyzed. On the 24th, Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at Jones' Landing, and on the 27th, formed a junction with the army of the Potomac, in front of Petersburg, taking position in Gregg's old camp on the left and rear of the army.

The course of events in North Carolina had now made it the most prudent policy for Lee and Johnston to unite their forces; and Grant's great source of anxiety at this time was the probability that the Confederates would leave their strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of accomplishing this union of the two great Confederate armies. "I had spent days of anxiety," says General Grant in his report, "lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary." From the reports of deserters and from other sources, Grant had become fully convinced that some such movement was intended, and that Petersburg was about to be abandoned. Lee, in truth, had already resolved to penetrate the National lines, and, whatever the risk, to attempt to force his way from the Appomattox to the Roanoke.

To prevent such a movement, and with a view to force a final issue, Grant had made arrangements, as early as the 24th of March, for a general attack on the 29th. Lee, however, was also bent on carrying out his perilous purpose; and, on the morning of the 25th, he fell with crushing weight on the lines of the Ninth corps in front of Fort Steadman—a square work on Hare's Hill, about a mile from the Appomattox. It was the second regular fort in the right of the National lines. The first was Fort McGilvery, close by the river. The third, to the south, was Fort Haskell. Fort Steadman mounted 9 guns, and was supported by mortar batteries on the right and left. The National line, at this point, was guarded by McLaughlin's
good and effective use of the captured guns. It soon became manifest, however, that he was engaged in a hopeless struggle. The concentrated fire of the different batteries was working terrible destruction. Hartranft's men pressed towards the captured fort, with an energy and a determination seldom equalled in war. For a time the battle raged fiercely. Finally, however, the Confederates, recently so elated with victory, were forced back into, and out of Fort Steadman. Some of them made the rash attempt to regain their own lines; but such was the enfilading fire from the National artillery, which swept the intervening ground, that they were literally cut to pieces. About 1900 surrendered, rather than make the perilous attempt. Fort Steadman and the other works were of course recovered. The entire Confederate loss was about 2500. The National loss was estimated at 68 killed, 337 wounded, and 506 missing. The contest was over by ten o'clock. At Gordon's request, a brief truce was agreed upon; and the dead were buried.

A general advance of the National left was ordered a little later in the forenoon. The Sixth corps which lay on the left of the Ninth, and the Second which was on the left of the Sixth, moved out against the Confederate picket line, which was far in advance of the main line of works. The picket line was captured, without much difficulty; and many prisoners were taken. It was not to be supposed, however, that the Confederates would allow the advanced position to remain in the possession

The victors moved upon Fort Haskell, then commanded by Major Woermer. The situation had become extremely critical; and, if Gordon had been well supported, a serious disaster might have befallen the National army. From some cause or other, Lee lost his opportunity. It was his last. Wilcox's men were rallied; Hartranft, with his division, came to the rescue; and all the neighboring batteries concentrated their fire on Fort Steadman, and the Confederate advance. The enemy made
of their antagonists, without making a bold effort to reclaim it. Accordingly, about half-past two in the afternoon, a vigorous assault was made upon the Sixth corps. A little later, about half-past four, a similar assault was made on the Second corps. The fighting was protracted and severe; but the Confederates were ultimately driven back. and, at night, the advanced position was held by the Nationals.

Grant's original purpose, which was to open the campaign by a general movement by the left flank, on the 29th, was not in any way affected by the events of the 25th. Adhering to his plan, he pushed forward preparations for the grand movement. It will be observed that the movement, contemplated by Grant, was, in its main features, a repetition of those tactics, with which we were made familiar, during the Wilderness campaign. It was his purpose to mass on his own left, and, using his right as a pivot, to fall with overwhelming force on Lee's right and vulnerable flank. With the exception of the Ninth corps, which was to form the National right and to be the pivot of the movement, the turning column was to embrace the entire army of the Potomac, Sheridan's cavalry force, and nearly the whole army of the James. The right of Lee's intrenched line, running southwestward from Petersburg, crossed Hatcher's Run at the Boydton plank road. Thence it extended some distance westward, parallel with Hatcher's Run and along the White Oak road. This line covered Lee's main communication by the South Side Railroad. About 4 miles further to the west of the termination of this intrenched front, there was a detached line, running also along the White Oak road, and covering an important strategic point, known as Five Forks. Such was the position which Grant proposed to turn.

On the 27th, General Ord, then in command of the army of the James, moved over with the greater portion of his troops, from the Richmond front to the lines before Petersburg. The force, thus transferred, consisted of two divisions of the Twenty-Fourth corps, under General Gibbon; one division of the Twenty-Fifth corps, under General Birney; and a small division of cavalry, under General McKenzie. They took position on the extreme left of the National line, on the ground occupied on the 25th, by the Second and Fifth corps. The Ninth corps, under General Parke, and the remainder of Ord's command, under General Weitzel, were left to guard the extended line of intrenchments.

On the 29th, at an early hour, the Fifth and Second corps, commanded respectively by Warren and Humphreys, led the general advance. The distance to be traversed was not great; but the roads were in a wretched condition, and progress was necessarily slow. Warren, marching well to the left, crossed Rowanty Creek, and then, turning to the right, moved northward along the Quaker road. Humphreys advancing by the Vaughan road, crossed to Hatcher's Run, some 4 miles above Rowanty Creek, and then, like
warren, turned his face to the north. The two corps, on roads nearly parallel, were thus marching towards the flank of the Confederate intrenchments. Warren had advanced to within 2 miles of the Confederate works, before he encountered anything like serious opposition. The enemy was then felt in some strength. A sharp contest ensued, the weight of the resistance being chiefly borne by Chamberlain's advance brigade, of Griffin's division. Griffin not only held his own—he repulsed the Confederates, who left behind them 100 men as prisoners, with a considerable number of dead and wounded. The National loss, in the encounter, did not exceed 370 men. Warren pressed on, and drew fire from the Confederate works on the White Oak road. Humphreys, whose pathway was more difficult than that of Warren, had neared, but not reached the Confederate works, when night compelled him to discontinue his advance. Sheridan, meanwhile, having moved by a more circuitous and more adventurous route, had reached Dinwiddie Court House, about 6 miles southwest of the position occupied by the right of the National advance.

Such was the situation on the night of the 29th. The National line was practically unbroken from Dinwiddie Court House, to the Appomattox, and was in the following order: Parke, Wright, Ord, Humphreys, Warren, Sheridan. It had been Grant's intention—and instructions had been given accordingly—that Sheridan should cut loose from the rest of the army, and set out on an expedition against the South Side and Danville Railroads. The Lieutenant-General, in the brief interval, had changed his mind with regard to the disposition of the cavalry; and on the 29th, he so informed Sheridan. "I now feel" wrote Grant, "like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose, and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push around the enemy, and get on his right rear. We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy."

The position of Lee had now become extremely critical. To a man of weaker nerve, and less fruitful of resource, it would certainly have seemed desperate. He knew that Grant was massing his troops on his own left, and that a vigorous attack was contemplated in the direction of the Confederate right. As yet, however, he was ignorant of the actual condition of the National right. He did not know that Grant had so concentrated on his own left, that he was incapable of making any offensive movement with his right. It was all-important that effective resistance should be offered to the threatened movement, on his right; for if success should attend his antagonist in that direction, his only remaining lines of communication with the rest of the Confederacy would be effectually severed. It was also of the utmost importance, as he conceived, that his long intrenched line—some 35 miles in length—which covered Petersburg and Richmor
should be preserved intact; for if the line should be penetrated, at any one point, the struggle would be rendered hopeless. To oppose the threatened movement, and to protect his intended line, he had only 37,000 muskets, and a small body of broken-down horse. In the emergency, the Confederate commander was not found wanting. Of the two evils which stared him in the face, and from one or other of which escape was impossible, he chose the less. He stripped his intrenched lines, as far as was possible, and concentrated his strength on his threatened right flank. It was unfortunate for Lee that he was ignorant of the strength of the Nationals, in front of his own left. Two divisions of Longstreet's corps, some 8000 strong, guarded the lines of Richmond; and Mahone's division of Hill's corps protected those in front of Bermuda Hundred. On the Petersburg side were the divisions of Wilcox, Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, and the remnant of Ewell's corps, now under Gordon. Longstreet was ordered to remain where he was for the present; he was to move to the Petersburg side, as soon as he discovered any weakening of the lines in his front. From the troops on the Petersburg side he drew two divisions and three brigades—a force of about 15,000 men; and to these he added what remained of Fitz-Lee's cavalry. Leaving only some 6000 or 7000 men in the Petersburg intrenchments, he hastened, during the stormy night of the 29th and 30th, and placed the troops thus collected in front of the position in which Warren and Humphreys were arrested by the darkness.

On the morning of the 30th, the National troops were in position and ready to strike. The storm had ceased; but the ground was soaked with rain, and the roads were wretched. It was found next to impossible to move the heavy trains. Such in fact, was the condition of the entire surrounding country, that Grant was in no haste to force a decisive issue. Humphreys and Warren were pushed forward, and placed close in front of the Confederate line on the White Oak road and Hatcher's Run. Sheridan despatched a body of cavalry under Devin, supported by Davies' brigade of Crook's division, in the direction of Five Forks. The Confederates, however, were found there in great force; and the cavalry returned to Dinwiddie Court House. During the course of the day, Grant became convinced, from reconnaissances made by his subordinates, that the Confederate lines were weak, and that they might be penetrated without great difficulty. He resolved, therefore, to reinforce Sheridan rather than extend his line, and while leaving it to that officer to execute the flanking movements, to assault the enemy's lines with the other corps.

It was now Friday, the 31st. The ground was still unfavorable for moving large masses of men with all the impediments of war. Grant, believing his position secure, and influenced by the weather and the impassable character of the ground, was still unwilling to make too much haste. Lee, however, had decided differently,
Grant's delay in striking what was meant to be a decisive blow, had been a great gain to Lee. He was, indeed, but ill prepared to resist an attack on the morning of the 30th. His troops, however, were now well forward; and he had got them into position. The weather had given him time. His position, however, was pregnant with peril. Further delay would be no gain to him; it might be his ruin. Brave and full of resource to the last, he resolved to repeat the experiment which had been so successful in the past, and by reason of which he had foiled so many turning movements. Warren held position, on the Boydton plank-road, with the divisions of Griffin and Crawford. The division of Ayres was thrown forward to the west of that road. Early on the morning of the 31st, Griffin was relieved by Miles' division of the Second corps, and was thus enabled to develop more fully towards the left. Warren, in fact, moved his entire corps to the westward of the Boydton road, and pressed forward, in the direction of the extreme right of the Confederate line. Ayres' division was in advance; Crawford's was in the rear, and somewhat to the right of Ayres'; Griffin's was in the rear and to the right of Crawford's. Sheridan was so far to the left that several miles intervened between the National cavalry and Warren's left flank. Warren has been found fault with for this disposition of his troops; but, in the circumstances, it is difficult to see how he could have arranged them differently, without acting in opposition to the first principles of military science. He could not know at what point the enemy would strike; and so, in place of extending a thin weak line from Humphreys' left, he disposed his troops in masses en échelon, so as to be ready to resist attack from whatever direction it might come, with reinforcements close at hand. Warren was desirous to obtain possession of the White Oak road, beyond the extreme left of the Confederate line of intrenchments; and after he had received instructions to suspend operations for the day, he obtained permission from General Meade to reconnoitre and take possession of the position, if he found it possible to do so.

It was this movement which precipitated the conflict. It was now half-past ten o'clock. Ayres' division, with Winthrop's brigade in advance, had been pushed forward in the direction indicated. The reconnaissance was scarcely begun, when the enemy was felt; and Lee, with the swiftness of lightning and with the weight of an avalanche, fell upon Warren's advance. Ayres was stunned by the blow, and forced back upon Crawford. Crawford in his turn, pressed by the foe, and disorganized by the fugitives, broke and fell back upon Griffin. The wisdom of the échelon arrangement was now made visible. Griffin stood firm and immovable; and, in the more open ground in which his division was posted, the other two divisions were quickly rallied. The Confederates, elated with what promised to be a complete victory, were effectually held in check, and Warren, as soon as his lines were re-
were thus occupied with Crook, and the Confederate infantry were engaged with Warren, Five Forks was left comparatively unprotected; and the place was seized without difficulty by Devin and Davies. His infantry safe behind their works and Warren's progress effectually checked, Lee resolved that Five Forks should not be left in the hands of his antagonist. Detaching part of the two divisions of infantry under Pickett and Bushrod Johnson he sent them to regain the lost position. Advancing by the White Oak road, they soon reached Five Forks. The National cavalry were driven from the place and forced back in confusion on Dinwiddie Court House. Pursuing vigorously, with cavalry and infantry, the Confederates reached Chamberlain's Creek, which they attempted to cross; but, being stoutly resisted by Smith's brigade, they were compelled to seek a crossing further up the creek. Falling upon Davies' brigade, with great weight, they forced it back against the left flank of Devin's division. Both commands were thus isolated from the main body, which was at Dinwiddie Court House. Devin and Davies were thus compelled to make a long detour, by the Boydton plank-road, in order to rejoin their chief and the main body. Deceived by this movement, and believing it to be a forced retreat, the Confederates made a left wheel, and were about to make a vigorous pursuit. Sheridan, quick and ready, always, in truth, equal to the situation, realized at once his new difficulty, and the opportunity which was so promptly and
Unexpectedly presented. With the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs he charged upon the now exposed flank and rear of the Confederates, and compelled them to face about and so give up the pursuit. Devin and Davies soon rejoined the main body, upon which the Confederates now fell with tremendous fury, and with the combined strength of the cavalry and infantry then at hand. The numbers were not unequal; but the fire-arms of their infantry gave the Confederates an advantage. Plucky as he had always shown himself, on every battle-field on which he had been actively engaged, and determined to bear his own burden and do his own work, Sheridan dismounted his troopers, and, placing them behind light breast-works, he opened upon the Confederates, a musketry fire, so swift and so deadly, that they were compelled to fall back. The National cavalry, although successful in repelling the attack of the enemy, had been somewhat severely handled; and a renewed assault might have been attended with some danger. Happily, darkness intervened, and, for the night, made a fresh assault impossible.

Grant was greatly pleased with Sheridan's conduct. He displayed, he said, great generalship. He did not retreat on the main army, "to tell the story of superior forces encountered." On the contrary, "he deployed his cavalry on foot," and, by compelling the enemy to do the same, "made his progress slow." This was high praise from the Lieutenant-General; but it was justified by the fact. Sheridan had undoubtedly, done well—all indeed he could do; but no one knew better than himself that the shades of evening had fallen like a blessing.

The night of the 31st of March, was an anxious night, at the head-quarters of the National army. It was known that the cavalry had been attacked and driven from Five Forks, and that they had been attacked again, in force, at Dinwiddie Court House. It was the general conviction, that Sheridan could not hold his own, unless strongly reinforced. Warren, accordingly, was ordered to his relief with the Fifth corps. Warren promptly obeyed, and hurried off Ayres, with his division. Unfortunately, however, the bridge at Gravelly Run, over which it was intended that Ayres' troops should pass, was found to be destroyed. The construction of a bridge, sufficient to pass in infantry, necessarily occasioned some delay. It was near two o'clock on the morning of April 1st, when the division was crossed and on its way to Dinwiddie. When made aware of the condition of the crossing at Gravelly Run, Meade suggested to Warren the propriety of sending troops both by the Boydton road, and by the Quaker road, considerably further to the east. It was a distance of about 10 miles to Dinwiddie by the Quaker road; and Warren not unjustly judged that the wiser course was to abide the issue of the movements already commenced, retaining the divisions of Griffin and Crawford where they were, until he should hear that Ayres had reached Dinwiddie. The result proved that he
acted not unwisely. While this anxiety prevailed at head-quarters, Sheridan, himself, had ceased to have any fear regarding his position. Before midnight, indeed, he became aware that Lee had withdrawn the greater part of his troops from his immediate front. Fearing for the welfare of the isolated force in the immediate front of Warren, Lee, as early as ten o'clock, on the night of the 31st, had recalled his troops from Dinwiddie, and taken position at Five Forks. In such a position, in the event of any attack being made by Warren, he would be better able to render the needed assistance. At earliest dawn, April 1st, shortly after he had been joined by Ayres, Sheridan put his whole force in motion, in the direction of Five Forks. Warren, meanwhile, had marched across the country, with his two other divisions; and, by seven o'clock, he formed a junction with the cavalry, midway between Dinwiddie and Five Forks. Sheridan, who ranked Warren, assumed command of the entire force. He had now under his immediate control, four divisions of cavalry, and three of infantry—an aggregate force, at least 25,000 strong. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Lee to oppose him at Five Forks with more than half of that number.

Such was the condition of affairs on Saturday, April 1st. Lee's line, as we have seen, all the way between Hatcher's Run and the Appomattox, was thinly guarded. There was hardly more than one man to five yards of front. Confronting this line, as has also been mentioned, were the corps of Parke, Wright, Ord and Humphreys. At any one point that line might have been easily penetrated. The original plan of battle, however, was strictly adhered to. Grant remained resolute in his determination to turn the Confederate right flank; and to this end he was bending all his energies. The key-point of the entire situation was Five Forks. For the defense of this position, Lee had accumulated all his available force. Towards this point Sheridan was now marching with both cavalry and infantry. As early as four o'clock, on the morning of the 1st, an attack was made by the Confederates on Foster's division of the Twenty-Fourth corps. The blow, which was unexpected, was swiftly and skillfully delivered, and was attended with momentary success. Foster's men yielded to the pressure; and the Confederate flag was raised on the deserted parapet. The Nationals quickly rallied; and the enemy, glad to escape to his lines, left behind him some 50 prisoners. For a time the artillery thundered; and there were demonstrations made by the Nationals along the whole line. This morning affair, however, was only an episode; it was not the great feature of the day. During the morning and forenoon, Sheridan kept pressing forward, in the direction of Five Forks. By two o'clock, he had forced the Confederates inside their works. Merritt with his cavalry, while he was to hold the enemy firmly in his front, was instructed to make a vigorous demonstration, as if his real object was to turn
his opponent's right flank. Warren, with the Fifth corps, was ordered to move, so that, at the proper time, his whole weight would fall on the Confederate left. In order the more completely to enclose his antagonist, in his toils, Sheridan directed McKenzie, with his brigade, to move along the White Oak road, and take place on Warren's right, thus guarding against any hostile movement, which might be made from the direction of Petersburg. It was a well arranged plan; and there was every reason to believe that, if promptly executed, it would be attended with complete success. McKenzie, when advancing to take the position assigned him, encountered and routed a body of the enemy's cavalry, driving them towards Petersburg. He had returned and joined the main body, on the White Oak road, just as Warren advanced to the attack.

It was now four o'clock. Sheridan had expected to make the attack, at an earlier hour. He had, himself, as we have seen, reached the ground about two o'clock. He blamed Warren for the delay. That general, before resuming his march to the point assigned him, deemed it wise to form his whole corps in battle order. This, of course, consumed a certain amount of time; and Warren informed his chief that he could not be ready for an assault before four. At the hour named, he was ready. Ayres was on the left; Crawford was on the right; and Griffin was behind Crawford in reserve. Each of the two advanced divisions had two brigades in front; and each brigade was in two lines of battle. The third brigade of each was also arranged in two lines of battle, behind the centre of the two former lines. Griffin's division which, as we have said, was in the rear of the right, was arranged in column of battalions in mass. The lines, as they advanced, were to keep closed to the left; and they were to preserve their direction, in the woods, by keeping the sun over their left shoulders. The point, immediately aimed at, was on the White Oak road, and a little beyond the enemy's left flank. That point reached, they were to swing around pivoting on the left; and then, having formed perpendicular to the White Oak road, they were to advance and fall on the Confederate left.

The entire distance, between Warren and the White Oak road, was only about 1000 yards. A few minutes was sufficient to enable the Fifth corps to accomplish the intended movement. The enemy had, in the meantime, refused his left in a crotchet, about 100 yards in length, and turned northward to the main line. This refused line was covered by a strong breastwork, and by a dense undergrowth of pines. Ayres' division which, as we have said, was to be the pivot on which the other two divisions were to wheel, as soon as it effected its change of front, encountered the enemy's skirmishers in front of the crotchet. Crawford's division, in taking position, was exposed to a heavy fire on its left—a fire which was, at the same time, working some mischief on Ayres' right. Crawford, in order to obtain the shelter of woods and a ridge
his forces at right angles with the White Oak road. Warren experienced a most stubborn resistance. At this stage, the personal courage of that general was conspicuously revealed. His troops, somewhat disorganized, halted without orders, in their forward movement. Warren sprang to the front, and called on his men to follow him. The action was electric. The call was irresistible. There was one wild rush; the works were carried; and all that remained of the enemy was captured. In this final effort, Warren had his horse shot under him; and, but for the timely interference of Colonel Richardson, who was severely wounded in shielding his loved commander, he himself might have perished. Pickett and Johnson had done their best; but their best had failed. Those of the Confederates, who were not captured, were now retreating in wild confusion, in a western direction, hotly pursued by the mounted divisions of Merritt and McKenzie. The trophies of the day were several guns and colors, with more than 5000 prisoners. Of these last, 3244 were taken by the Fifth corps. The National loss was comparatively trifling, not exceeding 1000 in all, of which 634 belonged to the infantry.

Such was the battle of Five Forks. Of all the battles of the war, few were more brilliant or more decisive. It redounded to the honor and increased the already great reputation of General Sheridan. It was equally a credit to General Warren. It was his Fifth corps which, under his direction, fought
and won the battle. The plan was Sheridan's. The execution of the plan, which was perfect, was mainly done by Warren. For some cause, not satisfactorily explained, although both generals have written and published on the subject, Sheridan, after the battle, relieved Warren from duty; and General Griffin was assigned to the command of the Fifth corps. An unpleasantness seems to have existed from the moment that the Fifth corps was ordered to co-operate with, and act under instructions, from Sheridan. It is not so clear on whom the blame for the existence of such a feeling should rest. Sheridan was dissatisfied with Warren at Dinwiddie Court House. His conduct, he thought, was dilatory. The cause of the delay has already been explained. The bridge at Gravelly Run, by the Boydton plank-road, had been destroyed; and before the run could be crossed, a new bridge had to be constructed. Successful, though he was, General Warren failed to please Sheridan, at Five Forks. In preparing for battle, he thought, he was slow. He seemed to be lukewarm, or, as Sheridan himself put it, "his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed." This, however, was not all. He blamed him because some of his troops gave way, at the commencement of the contest; and he charged him, with not exerting himself sufficiently to inspire them with confidence. Such charges, the reader will perceive, are not sustained by our narrative. They are not justi-

fied by the actual facts of the battle. It is difficult, indeed, to acquit Sheridan of something like rashness or inconsiderate haste in his treatment of Warren. The Lieutenant-General, of course, was made aware of the difficulty between the two commanders; and it is only just to General Grant to say, that his sturdy common sense was never more strikingly displayed, than when, refusing to take any part in the quarrel, he appointed Warren to the chief command in the Department of the Mississippi, then in need of a first class man.*

The news of the disaster, at Five Forks, was soon known to General Lee. It was a terrible blow. He knew its full meaning. His right flank was turned. The enemy was in his rear. A general assault was certain; and all he could do now was to hold on, and provide for a retreat. The news, of course, was as quickly known to Meade and Grant. Nor were they slow to act. Instantaneously, from their multitudinous throats, the National guns, all along the line before Petersburg, opened their murderous fire; and night was made hideous by the roar of artillery and the hissing and bursting of shells. The cannonade continued the entire night. Wright, Parke and Ord were ordered to attack in the early morning; and Miles' division of Humphreys' corps was ordered to the support of Sheridan.

The 2d was Sunday. At earliest dawn, the assault was opened from the Appomattox to Hatcher’s Run. Parke, with the Ninth corps, was on the right. Wright, with the Sixth corps, was on the left of Parke. Ord was on the left of Wright. Parke quickly carried the outer line of intrenchments; but he was compelled to halt before an inner cordon of works, on which he could make no impression. Wright, carrying everything before him, and attaining the Boydton plank-road, swept to the left, down the Confederate intrenchments, and captured many guns and several thousands of prisoners. Ord forced the lines at Hatcher’s Run, and formed a connection with Wright. Their combined forces then swung to the right, and advanced by the Boydton road, in the direction of Petersburg. Humphreys, who was still more to the left, when he heard of these successes, advanced with two divisions of the Second corps—the divisions of Mott and Hays—storming and carrying a redoubt in his front, and making a connection with the Sixth corps. Miles, with the remaining division of Humphreys’ corps, had, in the meantime, joined Sheridan, and, under his orders, attacked the remains of the Confederates who had gathered together, west of Hatcher’s Run, at the intersection of the Clayborne road, and driven them to Sutherland’s Station, on the South Side Railroad. Sheridan, at the same time, was hotly pursuing the enemy with the divisions of Bartlett and Crawford of the Fifth corps. At Sutherland’s Station, Humphreys reclaimed Miles’ division; and Sheridan, returning to the Five Forks, moved across the South Side Railroad, at Ford’s and Wilson’s stations, with the view of striking the Confederates at Sutherland’s, in the rear. Miles, meanwhile, had attacked and routed the foe, at that point, capturing 2 guns and 600 men. The South Side Railroad, their most important line of communication, was thus lost to the Confederates.

While these events were taking place, Gibbon’s division of Ord’s command, had pushed its way to Forts Gregg and Alexander, two strong, enclosed redoubts, the most salient and commanding to the south of Petersburg. Fort Gregg was strongly manned by Harris’ Mississippi brigade; and, for a time, Gibbon’s men dashed themselves against it, in vain. Ultimately, however, and at the early hour of seven, the fort was carried. It had been a terrific and most determined struggle. Gibbon had lost 500 men; and of the 250 defenders of the work, only 30 remained. Fort Alexander, which was but imperfectly protected, was more easily taken. The investing line was now drawn tight and close around Petersburg.

In this inner line, which was well protected, and which admitted of greater concentration, Lee was still strong. It was now about ten o’clock. Longstreet, having at length discovered that the force which confronted him, on the north of the James, was a mere mask, and having withdrawn several of his brigades, had just joined Lee a
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Petersburg, with Banning's brigade of Field's division. Thus strengthened, Lee, having made the best arrangements possible for the defense of the city, resolved to make an offensive sally, in the direction of the National right, and with the view of regaining some works which had been captured by the Ninth corps. Heth's division of A. P. Hill's corps was pushed forward to the attack; and such was the vigor of the onset that the Ninth corps was able with difficulty to maintain its ground. The National troops, then holding City Point, were ordered to its support; and Heth, after a bold and most determined effort, was repulsed. In this final struggle, A. P. Hill, one of Lee's best generals, and one who during the four years of strife, had taken a conspicuous part in the defense of Richmond, was killed. He had been conversing with Lee and Mahone. The sounds of battle were coming nearer and nearer.

"How is this, General?" said Lee to Hill, "your men are giving way." Flinging over his uniform a rough coat, Hill, accompanied by a single orderly, rode forward to reconnoitre. In a wooded ravine, he came upon half-a-dozen soldiers, in blue. They raised their rifles and fired. Hill fell dead on the spot.*

*AMBROSE POWELL HILL, who came to his untimely end during the final assault on the lines before Petersburg, was born in Culpepper County, Virginia, in 1834. He was thus at the time of his death, only 41 years of age. In the county, which gave him birth his father was a leading merchant, and a prominent politician. Young Hill entered the military academy in 1843, and graduated in 1847, in the same class with General Burnside. He became lieutenant in September, 1851; and in 1855 he was promoted to the rank of captain. Later, in the same year, he was appointed an assistant in the Coast Survey. This position he held until March, 1861. When Virginia seceded, he joined the volunteers of that State, becoming colonel of the Thirteenth regiment. He took part in the battle of Bull Run. He fought at Williamsburg, where he held the rank of brigadier-general. For his bravery in that fight, he was made major general; and on the 23rd of June, 1862, he formed one of the council of war, held at Richmond. He was present at Mechanicsville, and took part in all the subsequent battles of the "Seven Days." He fought against Pope, throughout the Virginia campaign. He was present at Antietam, at Fredericksburg, at Chancellorsville. When "Stonewall" Jackson received his death wound, the command devolved upon Hill, who was himself severely wounded, almost immediately afterwards. For his gallant conduct at Chancellorsville he was made a lieutenant-general, and put in command of one of three great corps into which the army of Virginia was divided. He took part in the three days' fighting at Gettysburg. He was more fortunate on the first day, than he was on the second and third. From that date on to the end, including the maneuvering in the neighborhood of Mine Run, the battles in the Wilderness at Spotsylvania, at Cold Harbor, before Petersburg and Richmond, he was a prominent actor in the army of Virginia. He lived to see almost the bitter end: but he was spared the humiliation which rested so heavily on some of his associates. Whatever may be the opinion entertained regarding the cause, in which and for which he fought, to Ambrose Powell Hill must be accorded a high place among the great soldiers begotten, on either side, by the Civil War.
The Falls of Richmond and Petersburg. The Episcopal Church of St. Paul. A vivid pallor passed over the face of the ruined president; and he quietly left the church. It was evident to the assembled congregation that something dreadful had happened. The deepest silence prevailed, and the religious services were closed. In dismissing the congregation, the rector, Dr. Minnegerode, gave notice that General Ewell, the commander in Richmond, desired the local forces to assemble at three o'clock, in the afternoon. The news passed from lip to lip, and from church to church; and the sorrowful utterance came from many a pulpit that the same congregation might never meet again.

It was, indeed, a sad Sunday in Richmond. The government would give the citizens no positive information. As the afternoon advanced, however, there was no longer any doubt that the city was about to be abandoned. At all the Departments, the utmost activity prevailed; and wagons laden with trunks and boxes were being hurried thence to the station of the Danville Railroad. Davis left the city, about eight o'clock. The members of the Confederate Congress and of the Virginia Legislature had all departed, by nine o'clock. At midnight, all that remained of the Confederate government was the War Department; and it was represented by Major Melton, alone.

The tumult had already become great during the afternoon. It became more violent, when darkness set in. The City Council, dreading the consequences which might result from a drunken soldier and an intoxicated rabble, ordered the destruction of all liquors. By midnight, wine, spirits, beer, and other intoxicating liquids ran down the streets in streams; and the authorities soon became aware, from the number of drunken and disorderly stragglers, that they had committed a grave blunder, and unwittingly created the very evil, they wished to prevent. As no one could leave the city without a pass from the Secretary of War, and as no one could find that functionary, Richmond, during the weary night hours, became a very Pandemonium. Nothing was sacred. Nothing was safe. The horrors of the situation were aggravated when, at three o'clock in the morning, Ewell, in obedience to orders from Major Melton, set fire to the warehouses. The conflagration was soon beyond control. One thousand houses, covering thirty squares—one-third of the city—were on fire. The War Department, the Treasury, many churches and public buildings, were consumed. In the midst of the confusion, the howling mob liberated the prisoners from the State Penitentiary, and then fired the place. Towards morning, when the tumult was at its height, a magazine near the almshouse exploded, with a concussion which shook the city to its foundations. Another explosion soon followed. I was the blowing up of the Confederate ram Virginia. A little later, the Fredricksburg and Richmond, also iron clad, were blown up; and the receiv
ing ship Patrick Henry was scuttled and sunk. In the early morning, Ewell, wrapt in a faded cloak and a slouched hat, rode away on an iron-gray horse.

As soon as it was light on Monday, General Weitzel, who was holding the National lines north of the James, crossed the abandoned defenses; and, at six o'clock, he and his staff, with the second brigade of the third division of the Twenty-Fourth corps, commanded by General Ripley, were in the suburbs of the city. At that time the fire was raging fiercely; and shells, exploding in the burning arsenal, were screaming over the doomed city. At eight o'clock, Weitzel and his staff entered Richmond; and Lieutenant De Peyster, having ascended to the roof of the Virginia State House, hoisted over it the old flag of the Republic. The city was placed under military rule. General Shepley, the same who was put in command of New Orleans, when it was captured, was put in command of Richmond. Lieutenant-Colonel Manning was made provost-marshal.

The flames were soon got under; and order was restored. With Richmond were captured 1000 prisoners, 5000 sick and wounded in the hospitals, 500 cannon, 30 locomotives and 300 cars. Petersburg was taken possession of simultaneously with Richmond.

The fall of Petersburg and Richmond naturally enough filled the North with joy and satisfaction. With the speed of lightning, the glad intelligence was carried broad and wide over the land; and before nightfall, on that memorable day, the sentiments of the people had found expression in the most enthusiastic demonstrations of delight. In the larger centres of population, business was suspended, the public places were crowded; patriotic speeches were delivered; cannon boomed and church bells chimed; while, in most cases, the assembled multitudes, controlled by a common sentiment, recognized the hand of the God of Battles who had given them the victory, by spontaneous outbursts of grateful song.
CHAPTER XLIII.


The bloody and protracted tragedy which was commenced on the 1865 12th of April, 1861, when the first Confederate shot was fired against Fort Sumter, was now drawing rapidly to a close. The fall of Richmond and Petersburg was the true beginning of the end. The backbone of the Confederacy was broken. At an earlier stage of the contest, these places might have been abandoned without radically injuring the Secession cause. Lee, however, had been pleased to stake his all on the defence of those famous lines; and now that they were broken, it was all but impossible for him again to rally his forces in any position, in which he could hope to offer an effective or protracted resistance.

Richmond and Petersburg were, as we have seen, occupied by the National troops on Monday the 3d of April. April 3. While, had concentrated his forces at Chesterfield Court House, a point midway between Richmond and Petersburg, and then pushed out in a westerly direction. The evacuation and retreat were conducted with wonderful skill. It was Lee’s intention to push on as quickly
as possible to Burkesville, a station about 52 miles west of Petersburg, and where the South Side and Danville Railroads cross each other. If he could reach that point and destroy the bridges, in his rear, he might succeed, by pushing his way towards Danville, not only in putting distance between himself and his pursuers, but in effecting a junction with Johnston. In that case, as he not unreasonably concluded, he might, at least, be able to exact more favorable terms from the conqueror. His past experience encouraged him to hope for the best. He had already successfully conducted two famous retreats—one after Antietam and another after Gettysburg. On the morning of the 3d, he had already succeeded in putting 16 miles between his army and Petersburg. Lee was in excellent spirits. On Tuesday the 4th, April he reached Amelia Court House, and struck the Danville Railroad. He had made arrangements to receive here 250,000 rations which were to be sent from Danville. His stores were already exhausted; for he had started on the march, with provisions only for a single day. At Amelia Court House, however, there were no supplies. They had, it appeared, been promptly sent. The loaded trains had reached their destination on the afternoon of Sunday. Immediately on his arrival, however, the officer in charge received an order from the Richmond authorities to bring on the train to Richmond, and take on board the personnel and effects of the Confederate government. The officer obeyed, and proceeded to Richmond without unloading the cars. The surprise, sorrow and indignation of the Confederate commander, when the sad fact was disclosed to him, may well be imagined. His men were already famishing. It was impossible to proceed until they collected what supplies could be obtained from the surrounding country. The delay, thus occasioned, not only robbed Lee of all the advantages of the start; it proved the ruin of all his plans and prospects.

The National army, meanwhile, was not permitted to remain idle. Grant had taken possession of both Richmond and Petersburg. With the exception of the troops under Weitzel, all the rest of his forces were south or southwest of Petersburg. We have already said that Lee's objective was Burkesville. Towards the same point, and advancing in two lines, the Nationals were now converging. It was Grant's great object to reach Burkesville, before Lee should be able to attain that point. The troops of the army of the James, under Ord, were moving by the South Side or Lynchburg Railroad. Sheridan, with the cavalry and the Fifth corps, followed by the Second and Sixth corps, was moving in a line, more to the north, and nearer the Appomattox. On the afternoon of the 4th, at the head of the cavalry, he struck the Danville Railroad, at Jettersville, some 7 miles southwest of Amelia Court House. The Fifth corps was following close in the rear of the cavalry. Lee, who, as we have seen, had reached Amelia Court House, on the morning of the same day, was compelled to halt at that place, in order to
obtain provisions, his supplies having been carried on to Richmond. On reaching Jettersville, Sheridan soon learned of the whereabouts of Lee, and was naturally overjoyed at the thought that he had been able to fling himself across his antagonist’s line of retreat. To Meade, who was some 16 miles in the rear, sick and encamped for the night, Sheridan sent a message urgent him to push forward the Second and Sixth corps, with all possible haste. “Do I understand” said Meade “that General Sheridan believes that Lee’s army will be destroyed or captured, if my troops reach the Danville Railroad by morning?” “Yes sir” was the prompt reply. Without a moment’s delay, the worn-out men were again in motion. To Grant, Sheridan at the same time wrote, saying “I wish you were here, yourself. I feel confident of capturing the army of Northern Virginia. I see no escape for General Lee.” On the afternoon of the April 5th, Meade had come up with the Second and Sixth corps, and joined Sheridan at Jettersville. Grant, meanwhile, was pressing forward, with Ord and the army of the James. On the evening of the 4th, he had encamped with the main body of that army at Wilson’s Station. At half past six on the following day, close by Nottoway, about 9 miles southeast of Burkesville, and some 12 miles south of Jettersville, and when about to encamp for the night, Grant received Sheridan’s letter. With all possible speed, he hurried forward two divisions of the Twenty-Fourth corps to Burkesville, leaving Birney with the remainder of the column at Blacks and Whites. At eleven o’clock, the advance had reached Burkesville Junction; and about the same hour Grant joined Sheridan at Jettersville. When the Lieutenant-General arrived at the unpretentious little building, which Sheridan had made his head-quarters, the latter was in bed and asleep. In a few seconds, however, he was in the presence of his chief and sketching on the back of a letter, the relative positions of his own troops and the columns of General Lee. Grant took in the situation at a glance. “Lee is caught” he said. “It will be hard work for him to get away.”

Lee’s position had already become sufficiently desperate. He was not only cut off from his main line of retreat; he was overtaken by the vastly superior numbers of the enemy. The two days’ delay had indeed been fatal. On the night of the 4th, and during the earlier portion of the 5th, he had a choice of two possible courses. He might have fallen upon Sheridan’s isolated command, and attempted to cut his way through, and so make himself master of the Danville route; or, by doubling on his track, and striking out in a westerly direction, he might have endeavored to push his way to Lynchburg and the mountains beyond. The former of these courses was no longer open to him, on the evening of the 5th; for Meade, as we have seen, had already arrived with the Second and Sixth corps of the army of the Potomac. Sheridan has since given it as his opinion, that Lee might, during the earlier portion of the 5th, have attacked him with success, and pursued his way to
Burkesville Junction. In this opinion we do not concur. Sheridan had with him an excellent force, about 18,000 strong, including infantry and cavalry; and he had already found time to throw up in his front a powerful line of breastworks. Lee's entire force, weary, dispirited and hungry, did not exceed 20,000; and on the 5th, as on the 4th, it was broken up into foraging parties. At all events, no such experiment was made; and now it was questionable whether the other alternative could be adopted with any prospect of success. On the afternoon of the 5th, Brigadier-General Davies, whom Sheridan had sent out early in the day, with a mounted force, to operate to the left and in front of Jettersville, struck a train of 180 wagons, escorted by a body of Confederate cavalry at Paine's Cross-Roads. Davies fell heavily upon the cavalry and routed them, capturing 5 pieces of artillery and a number of prisoners. The wagons, he destroyed. Almost immediately afterwards, Davies was beset with a considerable body of Confederate infantry; and it might have gone hard with him and his men, had he not, at the opportune moment, been reinforced by the brigades of Gregg and Smith, of the Second cavalry division. As it was, the fighting was severe; but the National troops found their way back to Jettersville.

On the morning of the 6th, the entire army of the Potomac, which, the night previous, had concentrated at Jettersville, moved northward, in the direction of Amelia Court House. Meade had resumed control of the Fifth corps; and Sheridan thenceforward operated with the cavalry alone. It was soon discovered that Lee, who had, at nightfall, on the previous day moved on from Amelia Court House, had slipped past the left flank of the National army and that, with all his forces, he was now moving rapidly westward, in the direction of Deatonsville. The order of march was immediately changed. The Sixth corps was moved from the right to the left. The Second corps was then ordered to push forward by the Deatonsville route; the Fifth corps was to move by a parallel route on the right and the Sixth corps was to move by another parallel route to the left. There were thus three pursuing columns—one close on the enemy's rear, one on a parallel line to the north, and another on a parallel line to the south. Sheridan, with the cavalry, led the van of the left or southern column.

While the army of the Potomac was thus pressing hard upon the retreating foe, the army of the James, under the skilful direction of General Ord, was pushing its way rapidly from Burkesville Junction, in the direction of Farmville. Ord, as we have seen, had reached Burkesville, with the advance of the army of the James, on the night of the 5th. On the morning of the 6th, his troops being well forward, he set out, at an early hour for Farmville, as above mentioned, his object being to anticipate the arrival of the van of the Confederate army, and to destroy the bridges which at that place cross the Appomattox. Eager to accomplish his purpose, Ord pushed forward a light
column, consisting of two regiments of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas Read. On the way, and when just approaching Farmville, Read encountered the van of Lee's army. There was an immediate collision. The Confederates, who were greatly superior in numbers, fought with the energy of men who knew that their last hopes, if not gone, were at least trembling in the balance. Read, however, presented a bold and determined front. Fighting at the head of his men, he held the Confederates at bay, until Ord had time to come up with the main body. It was a noble service, nobly done. In the struggle Read was shot and killed, in a hand-to-hand contest with General Dearing; and his command was overwhelmed. The Confederates had saved the bridges; and when Ord arrived they intrenched themselves.

Meanwhile the three columns of the army of the Potomac were pressing forward with all possible haste. Sheridan with his cavalry, as we have seen, moved at the head, and in advance of the left column. He was already close upon Deatonsville, when he espied the whole Confederate army struggling towards the west. It was evident, at a glance, that Lee's men were greatly exhausted. In this terrible march the splendid training and high morale of the army of Northern Virginia were conspicuously revealed. Never was army in so severe a plight. It was marvellous, indeed, that, in the circumstances, the troops could be held together. They knew that the entire army of the Potomac was pressing close upon their heels; and it was scarcely a surprise when the van was struck by the army of the James. Escape was hardly to be hoped for; but strong nerve and high purpose amply supply the place of hope. Sheridan was not slow to see his opportunity; nor was he dilatory in turning it to account. He made his arrangements with admirable skill. Right in front of him was a Confederate wagon-train escorted by a powerful force of infantry and cavalry. Crook was ordered to attack the train. Custer was ordered at the same time to press forward and attack a point further in advance. If Crook should not succeed in his attack, he was to move on again, ahead of Custer; and this mode of action was to be kept up, until finally a weak point should be discovered. The experiment was attended with almost immediate success. Crook, unable to make any impression in his front, was compelled to fall back. Custer, however, was more successful. Gaining the road at Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox, he immediately engaged the enemy. Crook and Devin with their respective divisions, having hurried to his aid, the Confederate line was pierced; and there were captured
400 wagons, 16 pieces of artillery, with a large number of prisoners.

One of the most immediate as well as most important effects, produced by this onslaught, was the cutting off from the main body of Lee's army, the entire corps of General Ewell, with a portion of Pickett's division. It was all-important that this force should not be allowed to escape. With the view of detaining them, until Wright, with the Sixth corps, should have time to come up, Sheridan ordered a mounted charge, which was made in a most spirited manner by Colonel Stagg, and his brave brigade. It was not long until the advance division of the Sixth corps, under General Seymour, made its appearance. Seymour was ordered to carry the road on which the Confederates were posted. Pushing his men onward with great energy, Seymour compelled the Confederates to fall back. This, however, they did slowly, contesting every inch of the ground, and turning and striking heavily at almost every step. So vigorous, in truth, became the resistance, that Seymour found it necessary to halt his men and await the arrival of Wheaton's division, also of the Sixth corps. Wheaton was speedily on the ground, and in position on Seymour's left. The advance was then renewed. The Confederates, no longer able to resist the tremendous pressure on their front, fell back, until the lines of the Sixth corps had reached Sailor's Creek. Sheridan's cavalry could now be seen on the high ground to the south of the creek; and the long lines of smoke, arising from the burning wagons, gave sad evidence of the destructive work which had been going on. It would be difficult to imagine a situation more critical than that in which Ewell and his brave followers now found themselves. Encompassed on every side, and barred from every possibility of escape, they still gave blow for blow; and, almost at the last moment, they poured so deadly a volley into the ranks of their assailants, that a portion of Wright's veteran line bent and gave way. It was impossible, however, to maintain the struggle against the vastly superior numbers of the Nationals. Pressed in front by the Sixth corps, and charged in flank and rear by Sheridan's cavalry, Ewell's veterans threw down their arms in token of surrender. Over 6000 men were made prisoners; and among the captured were General Ewell himself, and four other general officers. The National loss in this encounter at Sailor's Creek, was about 1000, in killed and wounded.

The National victory at Sailor's Creek, might have been less easily won—it would certainly have been less decisive—if the movements of the Second corps had been conducted with less energy. Following, as we have seen, right in the rear of the retreating Confederates, Humphreys never gave them a moment's rest, until, at evening, he crowded them together, at Sailor's Creek. In the confusion which prevailed, when the Confederates thus found themselves pressed on all sides, Humphreys' men captured a large train, and many hundreds of prisoners, together with 13 flags and several pieces of artillery.
During the night of the 6th, and the morning of the 7th, Lee with the shattered remains of his once magnificent army, crossed the Appomattox, April 7, by the bridges, a few miles east of Farmville. Resolved, if possible, to make the Appomattox an impassable barrier between himself and his pursuers, he ordered the bridges to be destroyed. Humphreys, however, with the Second corps, was close upon his heels. The second span of the railroad bridge was already burning; it was left to the mercy of the flames. The wagon-road bridge was just fired; it was saved. Humphreys' troops were pushed across without much difficulty, Barton's division leading. The Confederates, who seemed to be posted in considerable force, on the heights on the opposite side, disappeared as the Nationals approached, leaving behind them several pieces of artillery. Ten guns had also been left on the south of the river. Signs were already abundant that Lee, and his whole army, brave and indomitable as they all were, could not much longer hold out. Men and horses were sinking by the wayside from pure exhaustion; and thousands had let fall their muskets from sheer inability to carry them. Without food and sleep, more could not be expected from man or beast; but neither food nor sleep was to be granted them until the bitter end. The horrors of that march have not, perhaps, been equalled since the famous Moscow retreat.

The impossibility of continuing the march westward began to be apparent to all. On the night of the 6th, when the army of Northern Virginia was well across the Appomattox, several of the chief officers of that army met around the bivouac fire, and consulted as to what it was best to do, in the circumstances. General Lee was not present. Three lines of conduct were suggested:—to disband, allowing the troops to make their way, as best they might, to some fixed rallying point; to abandon the trains and cut their way through the opposing lines; or to surrender. After a short consultation, it was agreed that two of the suggested lines of conduct were impracticable; and the voice of the council was in favor of surrender. General Pendleton was commissioned to communicate the result of their deliberations to General Lee. The probability is that Lee's private opinion did not differ from that of his officers; but, refusing to regard the situation as so desperate, he lent an apparently unwilling ear to their advice. It would be time enough, he thought, to surrender when he had absolutely no other choice. He was not yet reduced to that extremity. Pendleton was still with his chief, when the conversation was broken short by the loud thunders of artillery—sounds which too plainly told that the relentless and unerring pursuer was again upon the track. In his determination not to surrender, Lee was, no doubt, encouraged by the fact that Davis and his colleagues were at Danville, and making strenuous efforts to reorganize the government. Lee was still aware that the Confederate authorities—if such authorities could be said now to exist—
had no intention as yet of giving up the contest; and he was hardly to be blamed—especially when we remember that he was the most trusted and honored man in the Confederacy—if he was unwilling to incur the odium of abandoning the sinking vessel, while a single ray of hope remained.

The army of Northern Virginia, or rather what remained of that once magnificent organization, was now concentrated, in a strong position, some four or five miles north of Farmville, and covering both the stage and plank roads. The ground in front, which was open, and gently sloping downwards in the direction of Appomattox, was covered with intrenchments and batteries. Humphreys, as soon as he had crossed the river with the Second corps, renewed the pursuit. Barlow, with the first division, moved in the direction of Farmville, which the Confederates, on his approach, abandoned, after firing the bridges, and destroying 130 wagons. Humphreys, himself, with the divisions of Miles and De Trobriand, making a more direct pursuit, soon found himself confronted by Lee's army in its intrenched position. He saw at a glance how vain it would be to make any attempt in front. Having sent instructions to Barlow to come up without delay, he proceeded to execute a flank movement, in the hope of dislodging his antagonist. He soon discovered that his own lines were outflanked by those of the Confederates, both on the right and on the left; nor was he any longer in doubt that he had in front of him all that remained of the army of Northern Virginia. Extending his right the length of one division, Humphreys ordered Miles to make an attack with three regiments. Miles made a bold and vigorous attempt; but he was compelled to fall back, with a loss of over 600 men in killed and wounded. Among the former were General Smyth* and Major Mills. Among the latter were Generals Mott, Madill and McDougall, as also Colonel Starbird, of the Nineteenth Maine. It was night before Barlow came up; and it was agreed not to repeat the assault until the morning.

On the morning of the 7th, Sheridan had despatched two mounted divisions under Merritt, to Prince Edward Court House. The remaining division of his cavalry, commanded by Crook, he sent to Farmville. The bridges having been destroyed at Farmville, Crook's troopers were compelled to wade the stream—a task which was not accomplished without considerable difficulty. On the north side of the Appomattox, they fell upon a body of Confederate infantry who were guarding a wagon-train. A sharp skirmish ensued. The Confederates, however, were greatly in the

*BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS A. SMYTH was born in Ireland. At an early age he came to the United States, and settled at Wilmington, Del., becoming engaged in course of time in the coach-building business. When the war broke out, he recruited a company in Wilmington. Proceeding thence to Philadelphia, he joined a three months' regiment, then leaving for the Shenandoah Valley. On his return home, a Delaware regiment was just about to proceed to the seat of war. Smyth accepted the post of major. He rose gradually, becoming successively lieutenant-colonel, and colonel, until finally he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, for his bravery at Cold Harbor. In the engagement near Farmville, where he received his death wound, he commanded the second division of the Second army corps.
To this letter Lee wrote an immediate answer; but it was not until April the following morning that it reached Grant at Farmville. It was couched in these words:—

"April 7th, 1865.

"General: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and, therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer, on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. Lee, General.

"Lient.-General U. S. Grant."

On the instant Grant replied as follows:—

"April 8th, 1865.

"General: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being my first desire, there is but one condition that I insist upon, viz.: That the men surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely, the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. Grant, Lient.-General.

"General R. E. Lee."

We left Lee in a strongly intrenched position, a few miles to the north of the Appomattox. As soon as he indicted his reply to Grant's first message, he resumed his retreat under cover of the darkness; and so quietly was it conducted that Humphreys was ignorant of the fact, until morning, when he was prepared to renew the attack. Lee's
skilful generalship was again conspicuously revealed. Ever vigilant, ever fertile in resource, and ever active, he had again put miles between himself and his pursuers. The fact that Lee had retreated during the night was at once made known to Grant, who immediately gave orders for the renewal of the pursuit. The Second and Sixth corps, under the immediate direction of Meade, who was accompanied by the General-in-chief, were pushed forward with all possible haste along the north bank of the Appomattox. Sheridan, meanwhile, had made excellent use of his troops and of his time. Lee was pressing along that gradually narrowing neck of land which lies between the head waters of the Appomattox and the affluents of the James. It was of the utmost importance that Sheridan should be able to interpose his troops between Lee’s army and Lynchburg. If he could close the outlet in the direction of that city, it would be all over with Lee, pursued closely as he was by the Second and Sixth corps, under the direction of Meade and the General-in-chief. This was precisely what Sheridan was aiming at, and what, within a few hours, he actually did accomplish. Having learned from one of his scouts, early on the morning of the 8th, that four trains of cars, with supplies for Lee’s army, were at Appomattox Station, he at once notified Merritt and Crook, and briskly pushed the whole command towards that point. Lee was not ignorant of the extreme peril of his situation; but he kept pressing eagerly forward, still clinging to the skirts of hope, and, in spite of almost irresistible evidence to the contrary, indulging the thought that he might yet find refuge among the ranges of the Blue Ridge, beyond Lynchburg. In these circumstances he received Grant’s second letter, and replied as follows:

“April 8th, 1865.

“General: I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday, I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would tend to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but so far as your proposition may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten, A.M., to-morrow, on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

“R. E. Lee, General

“Lieut.-General U. S. Grant.”

This note was received by Grant about midnight; and he replied next morning in the following terms:

“April 9th, 1865.

“General: Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M., to-day, could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself; and the whole North entertain the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled, without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,

“U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

“General R. E. Lee.”
As soon as he had finished this letter, Grant left Meade in charge of the Second and Sixth corps and hurried on to join Sheridan and Griffin. While the letter was on its way, and before the General-in-chief had joined the one or the other, further parley had become unnecessary. Sheridan had already settled the question. On the morning of the 8th, after a forced march of about 30 miles, his advance, under Custer, had reached Appomattox Station, about four miles to the south of Appomattox Court House. Lee's vanguard had just arrived with four trains of cars, laden with supplies. Custer, with lightning-like rapidity dashed upon the rear of the trains, and captured them. Supported by Devin, who had come up, he then rushed with fierce energy on the vanguard, and drove it back to Appomattox Court House, near which was the main body of Lee's army. Twenty-five guns, a hospital train, a large number of additional wagons, with many prisoners, were captured by the National cavalry. Sheridan, hurrying forward with the remainder of his command, flung himself across the line of Lee's retreat, with the determination of holding his ground at any and every risk until the morning, when, he knew, he would be joined by Ord, and the army of the James, and by Griffin with the Fifth corps. He knew also that by that time, Meade, with the Second and Sixth corps, would be well forward and able to fall with effect on the Confederate rear. Such was the situation of affairs on the night of the 8th. Lee was completely cut off from his own line of retreat Brave and resolute to the last, and believing that he had nothing but cavalry in front of him, he decided to make an attempt, at least, to cut through Sheridan's lines.

Early on the morning of the 9th Lee was ready to carry out his purpose. His heart, however, must have April bled within him, when he looked around him, and beheld the wretched remnant of what was once the proud and invincible army of Northern Virginia. It consisted of two thin lines—the one composed of what was left of Hill's, now Gordon's command, the other of the wreck of Longstreet's corps. Between these lines were the debris of the wagon-train, and some thousands of miserable creatures who were too weak to carry arms. Lee gave orders to Gordon to cut his way through, at all hazards. The charge was made with tremendous energy. Such, in truth, was the violence of the shock, and so persistent was the pressure, that Sheridan's men who had dismounted to resist the attack, were forced back. At this critical moment, Sheridan, who had been to Appomattox Station for the purpose of hurrying forward Ord, arrived on the scene of action. Knowing well the purpose of the enemy, and keenly alive to the value of time, he directed his troopers to fall back gradually, but to continue to offer a firm and steady resistance, so as to allow Ord, with his infantry, to come up and form his lines. This done, they were to move to the right and mount. Sheridan's orders were admirably
executed. As soon as the cavalry moved towards their own right, the Confederates beheld to their amazement, the glittering arms and serried ranks of the infantry. The unlooked for vision had all the effect of a stunning and unexpected blow. The Confederates immediately discontinued their pressure, and began to give way. The National infantry were now pressing upon the confused and bewildered multitude. Sheridan had ridden round to the Confederate left flank; his buglers had sounded the order to remount; and he was just about to fall with all his weight on the already disordered mass, when a flag of truce was presented to Custer who led the advance. Sheridan rode to Appomattox Court House, where he was met by General Gordon and General Wilcox. Gordon asked for a suspension of hostilities, and informed Sheridan that Grant and Lee were, even now, making arrangements for the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia. There was no more fighting between the two great rival armies—the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia.

On the morning of the 9th, a heavy fog enveloped the entire country around Appomattox Court House. Long before that fog dispersed, Lee, clad in a new gray uniform, might have been seen at a camp-fire with Mahone and Longstreet. Care and anxiety were written on each of their countenances. Longstreet, his arm in a sling, and a cigar in his mouth, sat on the trunk of a felled tree. Gordon had been sent on his mission. It was agreed that if success were denied him there was no longer any chance of escape. Of Gordon's failure to penetrate the National lines, they were soon made aware. Lee mounted his horse. "General Long street," he said, "I leave you in charge. I am going to hold a conference with General Grant." He then rode off. On his way he received Grant's letter, before quoted. He replied immediately:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I received your note of this morning, on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposition of yesterday, with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"Lieut-General U. S. Grant."

To this Grant replied as follows:

"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL: Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received. In consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am at this writing, about four miles west of Walter's Church, and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road, where you wish the interview to take place, will meet me.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"General R. E. Lee."

The scene and the main features of the interview have been preserved for us by an eye-witness. It took place at the house of Mr. Wilmer McLean—a square brick building surrounded with roses, violets, and daffodils. Grant—with his slouched hat, dark blue frock-coat unbuttoned and covered with mud, gray
pantaloons tucked in his soiled boots, and a dark waistcoat, and with nothing to indicate his rank, except the double row of brass buttons and the three silver stars—walked up to the house, accompanied by Ord, Sheridan, and their respective staffs. Lee had already arrived; and his blooded iron-gray horse, in charge of an orderly, was nibbling at the grass. Grant and two aids entered the house; the others who accompanied him, sat down on the porch. Lee was standing beside a table, wearing a bright bluish-gray uniform, a military hat, with a gold cord, buckskin gauntlets, high riding-boots, and the splendid dress-sword which had been presented to him by the State of Virginia. Tall and erect, he had a fine soldierly bearing. It was noticed that his hair was long and gray. He was attended only by Colonel Marshall, his chief of staff. On Grant’s entrance the two shook hands, sat down and proceeded to business. As Lee made no special request, Grant at once wrote out his terms:

"APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, 
April 9, 1865."

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles, not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of his command. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General

"General R. E. Lee."

The following is Lee’s letter of acceptance:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date, containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"Lieut.-General U. S. Grant."

The signatures had just been attached, when Lee, after a moment’s reflection, said that he had forgotten one thing. Many of the cavalry and artillery horses belonged to the men who had charge of them. It was too late, however, to speak of that now. Grant replied, “I will instruct my paroling officers that all the enlisted men of your cavalry and artillery, who own horses are to retain them, just as the officers do theirs. They will need them for their spring ploughing, and other farm work.” Lee seemed greatly pleased with Grant’s prompt compliance with his only half-expressed wish. “General,” he said earnestly, “there is nothing which you could have accomplished more for the good of the people or of the government.”

Grant’s terms were in the last degree magnanimous and liberal. They
revealed nobility of soul and delicacy of sentiment on the part of the conqueror who granted them, on the part of the government which sanctioned them, and on the part of the people who gave them their approval. The agreement was such as sufficiently sustained the dignity of those who had triumphed without unnecessarily wounding the feelings of those who had been vanquished. It was one of the grandest examples yet given to the world of the refining and softening influences of modern civilization—an example which contrasted strangely and strikingly with the barbarous habits of the past. General Grant will live in history as a great soldier; he will be remembered also as a high-souled hero in the hour of victory. If battles must still be fought, blood be shed, and valuable lives sacrificed, it is gratifying to think that cruelty, under the guise of justice, is no longer to be a necessary adjunct of party, sectional, or national triumph.

After the surrender, Lee rode back to his troops to bid them farewell. His reception was something unparalleled, in such circumstances "Whole lines of battle," says an eye-witness, "rushed up to their beloved old chief, and choking with emotion, struggled with each other to wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of the moment must be to him, strove with a refinement of selfishness and tenderness, which he alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, General Lee, at length, commanded voice enough to say: 'Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best that I could for you.' Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry."

On the 12th of April, three days after the surrender, the Confederates marched by divisions to an appointed place in the neighborhood of Appomattox Court House, and stacked their arms and deposited their accoutrements. Of nearly 28,000 men, only about 8000 had muskets in their hands. Among the surrendered property there were 30 cannon and 350 wagons. Paroles were distributed to the men; and the army of Northern Virginia passed out of existence. The war was now practically ended. It was impossible for the other armies for any length of time to prolong the struggle. The army of Northern Virginia—as Swinton, at the close of his masterly history of the army of the Potomac, puts it—was the "keystone" of the Confederate structure. The keystone removed, the structure fell with "a resounding crash."

A year, all but three weeks, had elapsed since Grant crossed the Rapidan. It had been one of the severest and most protracted campaigns on record. When it commenced, Lee had under him 65,000 men. We have seen what a miserable remnant was left. Between the Rapidan and Appomattox Court House, Grant lost, as nearly as possible, in killed, wounded and missing 100,000 men—an enormous sacrifice; but it saved the Union, and perpetuated the Republic.

It was natural, that, in the circum
stances, there should be great joy all over the North. The secretary of war issued the following order:

"That a salute of two hundred guns be fired at the head-quarters of every army, and at every post and arsenal in the United States, and at the Military Academy at West Point, on the day of the receipt of this order, in commemoration of the surrender of General R. E. Lee and the army of Northern Virginia, to Lieutenant-General Grant and the army under his command—report of the receipt and execution of this order to be made to the Adjutant-General at Washington."

These orders were gladly obeyed; and in addition to the demonstrations thus brought about, there were public and voluntary rejoicings in every township and every city throughout the Northern States.

On the day of the surrender of General Lee, President Lincoln returned to Washington. He had been for some days at City Point, where, as has been mentioned in a previous chapter, he had a conference with Generals Grant and Sherman, and Admiral Porter. After the occupation of Richmond, by the National troops, Lincoln, on board the Malvern, Porter's flag-ship, moved up the James. Leaving the Malvern near Rocketts, the president and the admiral proceeded to Richmond in the commander's gig. Lincoln's reception was most cordial, the emancipated slaves crowding around him to such an extent, that a file of soldiers had to be called in, to clear the way. Halting for a time, and resting at Weitzel's quarters, he entered an open carriage and rode rapidly through the principal streets, and was soon again on board, and on his way back to City Point. He visited Richmond again on the 6th of April, two days later, and granted permission to the Virginia Legislature to assemble, on the understanding that the members would adopt measures for the withdrawal of the Virginia troops and all other obstructions, which might tend to hinder the action of the general government. In a few days, however, it was discovered that the gentlemen of the State Legislature of Virginia were abusing their privilege; and almost immediately after his return to Washington, Lincoln directed Weitzel to revoke the safeguard which he had granted them, and to allow said gentlemen to return to private life. The return of the president to the National capital, associated as that return was, with a crowning National victory, was made the occasion of great rejoicing and festivity. Each successive day had its special excitement. On the 11th, Lincoln issued two proclamations—one declaring that certain ports in the Southern States would be closed until further notice, and another, demanding for vessels of the United States, in foreign ports, those privileges and immunities which, during the war, had been denied, on the plea that equal rights had to be accorded to each belligerent. In the evening the city was illuminated. At the Executive Mansion, which was especially brilliant with light, the president addressed a large assemblage of citizens. He spoke hopefully and encouragingly regarding the future, and set forth his views regarding the reconstruction of the South. It
As noticed there was nothing like bitterness or ill-feeling towards the, now all but subjugated, foe. There were no suggestions of vengeance, retaliation, or punishment of any kind. It was a speech which revealed a heart full of joy and satisfaction, because a great and destructive war was all but ended, and because the sunshine of peace was about to rest upon the entire country and people. All this joy, however, was soon to be clouded. The last sad act of the protracted drama had yet to be witnessed.

The 14th day of April, 1865, is destined to immortal memory in the history of the United States. On that day, with imposing solemnities, General Anderson hoisted over Fort Sumter the same old flag which, four years before, he had taken down and stowed away in hope of its future usefulness. This story, however, has already been told in its proper place. It was a gladsome day throughout the republic; and preparations were being made over the length and breadth of the land for a day of National thanksgiving. On the morning of the 14th, General Grant arrived in Washington. He was accompanied by Captain Robert Lincoln, the president's son, one of his staff officers. A Cabinet council was held at eleven o'clock. General Grant was present. Lincoln, it was observed, was in excellent spirits. Although not ignorant of the reports which were in circulation as to the existence of a conspiracy which threatened not only his own life, but the lives of all the principal members of the government, as well as those of Grant and Sherman, he seemed to have no forebodings of evil. Delighted at the course events had taken, and pleased with the prospect of peace, his conversation turned chiefly on the policy of conciliation to be pursued towards the South. At the close of the Cabinet meeting, he made an arrangement with General Grant to visit Ford's Theatre in the evening; and a box was immediately engaged. The news spread like wild-fire; and when the doors were opened, the theatre was speedily crowded in every part. The play for the night was "Our American Cousin." Between eight and nine o'clock the presidential party arrived. It consisted of Lincoln himself, Mrs. Lincoln, Miss Clara Harris, daughter of Senator Ira Harris, and Major H. R. Rathbone. General Grant, it was observed, was not with them. He had, it was afterwards learned, been summoned to New York on important and pressing business. The box, prepared for and occupied by the party, was in the second tier. Along its spacious front was draped the American flag.

It was now a few minutes after ten o'clock. The performance was drawing to a close. The attention of the audience was completely absorbed. All of a sudden, there was heard the sharp crack of a pistol. The sound came from the president's box. At the same instant, there appeared, in front of that box, a man, who, brandishing a gleaming dagger, exclaimed "Sic semper tyrannis"—so may it be always with tyrants—the motto engraved on the seal of the State of Virginia. Placing
his hand on the rail, he sprang from the box towards the stage. In his descent, one of his spurs—for he was booted and spurred on the occasion—becoming entangled in the folds of the National flag, his leap was broken; and he fell heavily on the floor. Quickly pringing to his feet, but showing that he was severely injured, especially in one of his legs, he again brandished his weapon in the face of the excited and bewildered audience, and shouted “The South is avenged.” Rushing to the rear of the stage he disappeared, before either actors or audience could recover themselves or realize what had happened. So sudden was the whole affair, that it almost seemed as if it formed an incident in the play. It was far otherwise. The play had become a real tragedy. A foul murder had been committed. The murdered man was President Lincoln. The assassin was John Wilkes Booth.

Booth was an actor by profession, and well acquainted with the building. He was well known, also, to all the employees, and had no difficulty in gaining admission to any part of the house. It appeared that immediately before the tragedy occurred, he passed near the box in which were seated the president and his friends. Presenting a card to Mr. Lincoln’s messenger he looked, for a minute, upon the orchestra and the audience. Then, entering the vestibule of the box, he fastened the door with a piece of plank, which had evidently been provided previously for the purpose, the object being to make it impossible to open the door from with-
with woe, and covered it with sack-cloth. Every one felt as if he had lost a personal friend. No one felt the blow more than Stanton, the stern and unbending secretary-of-war. Leaning over the body of the dead president, and overwhelmed with grief, he mournfully said, "No one will ever know the anxious hours that you and I have spent together. You were my only witness. Now, you are gone, and I am left alone." Lincoln's funeral in many particulars was, perhaps, unprecedented in modern times. The body having been embalmed lay, in state, in the East Room of the White House. On the 19th of April, after the funeral services, the remains were removed thence by way of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Albany, to Springfield, Illinois, where they were interred. In each of those cities multitudes crowded to look on the face of the dead president; and it is but truth to say, that the entire people of the North were mourners on the occasion. No chief-ruler of any people—no monarch in all the past—was ever more loved in life, or more honored in death. His grave is now, and ever will be, a point of attraction, not only to the American people, in whose service he lost his life, but to liberty-loving pilgrims from all lands. He died a martyr to liberty. His murder made his name immortal.

On the same evening on which Lincoln was shot, a murderous assault was made on Mr. Seward, the secretary of state. Although the assassin, in this case, was less successful in the accomplishment of his purpose, the enterprise was quite as daring, and revealed, equally with the other, the foul character of the conspiracy, and the villainous methods, as well as desperate energy, of its agents. Mr. Seward, a few days before, had been thrown from his carriage, and was, in consequence, confined to his bedroom. About the same time that the tragedy occurred in the theatre, a man called at Mr. Seward's house. On being refused admittance, he rushed past the porter and flew up two flights of stairs straight to Mr. Seward's room. At the door of that room, he was met and resisted by the secretary's son, Mr. Frederick William Seward. With the butt-end of his pistol, he struck the younger Seward to the floor, fracturing his skull. Then, pushing aside Miss Seward, who had been attracted by the noise, he rushed into the sick-room, sprang upon the bed, and inflicted some fearful wounds on Mr. Seward's face and neck. An invalid soldier named Robinson, who was in attendance on Mr. Seward, seized the assassin from behind, and struggled with him; while Mr. Seward himself, his arm in a sling, and the blood streaming from his gaping wounds, resisted with what energy he could command. Meanwhile the cry of "Murder!" rang through the house; and the assassin becoming alarmed, and shaking himself free of Robinson, made his way down stairs and into the open street. Mounting a horse which was there waiting for him, he was soon out of sight. The assassin, in this case, was Lewis Payne Powell. He was the son of a Florida clergyman; and he had
served in the war. He belonged to the same gang with Booth.

The principal agents of the conspiracy were afterwards captured and brought to trial. Summary justice was dealt out to Booth. He was shot and killed by his pursuers in a tobacco-barn, at Garrett's Farm, some 20 miles below Fredericksburg. Harold, who was with Booth when he was shot; Mrs. Surratt, who had harbored the conspirators; Atzerott, who had been appointed to kill Vice-President Johnson; and Payne who made the attack on Mr. Seward—all these were found guilty and executed on the 6th of July. Several other conspirators—among them Dr. Mudd, who set Booth's broken limb—were sentenced to imprisonment for longer or shorter terms. It was suspected, at the time, that the conspiracy had the encouragement of some of the Confederate leaders. This suspicion has not been justified by any facts, hitherto made public.

The assassination of the president, painful as the blow was felt to be by the whole people, did not, in any serious way, disorganize the government machine or impede its working. Within six hours after Lincoln's death, Andrew Johnson, the vice-president, was sworn into office as president. Mr. Johnson on taking the chair of Washington, and assuming the reins of government, requested the members of the cabinet to retain their offices. The tide of affairs thus rolled on, neither checked nor diverted by what had happened.

The reader must now return with us to Goldsboro, where we left the army of General Sherman, resting, and preparing for another march which, it was hoped, would result in the destruction or capture of the Confederate army under General Johnston. In a previous chapter, we have given an account of the visit made to City Point by General Sherman, and of the interview which he there had with President Lincoln and with General Grant. While at City Point, Sherman obtained permission from Grant to make some radical changes in the organization of his forces. On his return to Goldsboro, he proceeded at once to the work of reconstruction. His left wing he constituted a distinct army, under the title of "the Army of Georgia," and entrusted it to the command of General Slocum. This army consisted of two corps, which were commanded respectively by Jeff. C. Davis and Jos. A. Mower. The Tenth and Twenty-third corps he named "the Army of the Ohio," and placed it under the command of General Schofield. The corps commanders of General Schofield's army were J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry. These changes were considered necessary for various reasons, but mainly for the purpose of discipline and efficiency in the entire command; and they were made, as we have seen, with the consent and approval of General Grant. Sherman had thus, under his direct command, three separate armies—the army of the Tennessee, under Howard the army of Georgia, under Slocum and the army of the Ohio, under Schofield. Howard was on the right; Slocum
was on the left; Schofield was in the centre. The cavalry force was under the immediate direction of Kilpatrick. The effective strength of the entire command was 88,948. Of this force 2443 belonged to the artillery, and 5537 to the cavalry.

Sherman’s preparations were not completed when, on the 6th of April, he learned of the victory which had been won at Five Forks, and of the subsequent evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg. Wisely judging that Lee would attempt to effect a junction with Johnston, he countermanded the orders which had already been given, and made arrangements to march directly on Johnston’s army, which was at Smithfield, some 35,000 strong. On the 10th, Sherman’s entire army was in motion, towards the point indicated. The left wing, supported by the centre, moved on the two direct roads, leading to Smithfield and Raleigh. Howard moved more to the right, feigning the Weldon road. Terry and Kilpatrick pushed along the west bank of the Neuse River, in the same general direction. Smithfield was reached on the 11th, when it was found that Johnston had retreated with his whole army towards Raleigh, and that he had burned the bridges in his rear. The bridges, of course, had to be rebuilt—a task which consumed the remainder of that day. During the night, Sherman received a message from Grant, informing him of the surrender of Lee and the army of Northern Virginia, at Appomattox Court House. On the morning of the 12th, the joyful intelligence was communicated to the army, amid the wildest demonstrations of delight. It was felt by all, that the war was April all but over. “Glory to God,” said Sherman, “and our country, and all honor to our comrades in arms, towards whom we are marching. A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race is won, and our government stands regenerated after four long years of war.”

The pursuit was resumed on the 12th. On the evening of that day, Sherman was at Gulley’s, with the head of Slocum’s column. On the 13th, he entered Raleigh, and ordered the several heads of column towards Ashville, in the direction of Salisbury or Charlotte. It was feared by Sherman and, indeed, by all the officers, that Johnston would retreat into the hill country of South Carolina and Georgia, break up his army into small bands, and thus indefinitely prolong the war. They were all desirous that the surrender of that army should be secured on any reasonable terms. It was not, therefore, without a feeling of grateful relief that Sherman, on the morning of the 14th, and while still at Raleigh, April received from Johnston a note, inquiring whether “in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property,” he was willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to General Grant the request that he would take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate
the existing war. To this note, Sherman replied as follows:

"April 14th, 1865.

"General: I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column, to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the University, and expect that you will also maintain the present position of your forces until each has notice of a failure to agree. That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee, at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th inst., relative to our two armies; and furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General."

On the 16th, an answer was received from Johnston, agreeing to a meeting to be held, on the following day, at a point midway between the National advance at Durham's, and the Confederate rear at Hillsboro. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 17th, a car and a locomotive were waiting to convey Sherman and his attendants to Durham's Station. The general was just entering the car when the telegraph operator approached him in great haste, and informed him that he was just now receiving in cipher from Morehead City, a most important dispatch, which, he thought, it might be well for him to see. Sherman delayed the train, until the message was translated and written out. It was from the secretary-of-war; and it conveyed the sad intelligence of the fate which had befallen President Lincoln, of the attack which had been made on Mr. Seward and his son, and of the suspicions that were entertained, that the conspirators had intended to assassinate General Grant and all the principal officers of the government. The operator alone, hitherto, had seen the message. Assured of this, Sherman enjoined him to preserve the utmost secrecy, until he should return. The train was then permitted to start. About ten o'clock, the party reached Durham's Station, where General Kilpatrick, with a squadron of cavalry, was waiting to receive his chief. Led horses had been provided for Sherman and his staff. Mounted on these, and preceded by a small platoon and the bearer of a white flag, they were soon on their way to the appointed place of meeting. The morning, we are told, was exceptionally beautiful. Nature was clad in her robes of richest green. The air was vocal with the songsters of the grove, and laden with the fragrance of the fruit trees, just bursting into bloom. Everywhere there was that which appealed to and pleased the senses; and there was, besides, an invigorating freshness in the surrounding atmosphere. It was not wonderful that in such circumstances, and on such a mission, a feeling of elation, a sense
of gladness, should have been experienced by the entire party—by Sherman quite as much as by the others, soul-burdened though he was by the sad intelligence which he had just received, and which he could not as yet reveal.

About five miles from Durham's the flag-bearers met; and the announcement was made that General Johnston was near at hand. He was soon in sight. By his side rode General Wade Hampton; and close by, and forming part of his personal staff, were Major Johnston and Captain Hampton. General Sherman had a larger retinue, which included, among others, General Kilpatrick, General Barry, and Colonel Poe. Sherman and Johnston who, although thirteen years in the regular army, had never met before, saluted and shook hands, and then introduced their respective attendants. This done, and still on horseback, they repaired to a small farm house, on the Chapel Hill road—a wooden structure situated on the brow of a hill, and owned and occupied by a Mr. Bennett and his family. At the request of the two generals, the inmates vacated the premises and retired to one of the adjoining buildings. Pen, ink and paper were brought into one of the rooms by an orderly. The orderly having retired, the two generals were left alone. "I have just received," said Sherman, "bad news—the worst news, general, in my judgment, that we have had for a long time. It is especially damaging to your cause." He then handed Johnston the despatch, and watched him closely while he read.

Johnston's exclamations showed how utterly he was shocked; and the perspiration, which came out in large bead-like drops on his high forehead, revealed the inner agony of the man. He denounced the act as a disgrace to the age, and expressed the hope that Sherman did not charge it to the Confederate government. Sherman was willing to exonerate Johnston himself and Lee, and indeed, all the higher officers of the Confederate army; but, he confessed, he had his doubts regarding such men as Davis, Sanders, and others of that stripe. He told Johnston that his own army was as yet ignorant of what had happened, and that he had not revealed the painful intelligence even to his own staff. He dreaded the result which might follow from the communication of the news to the soldiers; for with his army, as indeed, with all the armies of the Union, Lincoln was a great favorite. If the spirit of retaliation seized them, and was by any provocation forced into open expression, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to hold them in restraint; and the fate of Raleigh might be more fearful than the fate of Columbia. He expressed the belief that Johnston, himself, must be convinced of the folly and even cruelty of prolonging the contest, and offered to accept his surrender and that of all the troops subject to his orders, on the identical terms which had been granted to General Lee.

Johnston admitted that the cause with which he was identified, was lost. Any further fighting, he said, would be "murder." For himself he asked
nothing. He was anxious only for his men. The terms granted to Lee were, he thought, in the last degree magnanimous. He wished, however, to obtain some general concessions which, he considered, were necessary to secure the safety of his followers; and he insisted upon certain guarantees which Sherman had no authority to concede. "Why," he asked, "can we not make this surrender universal?" "I know," he said, "I can get an order from Mr. Davis that all the Confederate armies shall disband." It was Johnston's earnest, anxious desire that the surrender should cover not only his own army, but all the Confederate forces east and west of the Mississippi. The two generals could not come to an agreement; and Johnston asked that the conference be postponed for some days. Sherman would grant one day only. It was arranged that they should meet at the same place the following day at noon; and the interview, which had lasted three hours, was brought to a close.

On his return to Raleigh, Sherman issued an order to the army, making public the contents of the telegraphic message. The impression produced was, as he had expected, painful in the extreme. Every countenance gave evidence of deep and genuine sorrow. Sherman watched the effect closely. He saw and felt that the slightest circumstance might provoke a terrible revenge. Happily, however, in no single instance was there any attempt at retaliation. Summoning together his general officers, he conferred with them as to the course to be followed with Johnston and his army. It was felt by all that, if the enemy could only be brought to bay, he could be easily destroyed. That, however, was the difficulty. The country was peculiarly in Johnston's favor. If the worst should happen, it would be possible for the Confederate leader to break up his army into separate bands and scatter them in different directions. Such an event was dreaded, as it would lead to an indefinite prolongation of the war. The general voice was, therefore, in favor of leniency. It was, in the last degree, desirable that the war should be ended at once. On the following day the two generals-in-chief met, as April agreed upon, at Bennett's house. 18. Sherman arrived at noon. Johnston did not come up until it was about two o'clock. He was accompanied, as on the day before, by General Wade Hampton. Johnston had not changed his mind since the meeting on the previous day. He had authority, he said, over all the Confederate armies. He wished the surrender to be universal. He insisted, however, upon obtaining some guarantee which would secure the political rights of his officers and men. Sherman argued that all such rights were covered by the example which had been set at Appomattox Court House. Lincoln's proclamation of December 8th, 1863, was still in force; and that instrument enabled every Confederate soldier and officer, below the rank of colonel, to obtain an absolute pardon by laying down his arms and taking the common oath of allegiance. General Grant had extended the principle
so as to include all the officers, General Lee, himself, not excepted. At this stage Johnston informed Sherman that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and asked whether he might not be permitted to take part in the conference. Sherman, at first, objected, on the ground that negotiations should be confined strictly to belligerents. It was finally agreed, however, that Breckenridge might be allowed to be present in the capacity of a major-general, but not as the Confederate secretary-of-war. Breckenridge confirmed all that Johnston had said regarding the state of feeling which prevailed among officers and men concerning their political rights, in case of surrender. After the lapse of some hours, Sherman, recalling the conversation he had with Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, and anxious to embody the views there presented to him, as well as to conform somewhat to the wishes of his opponents, sat down and drew up a "memorandum" or basis of agreement. This document, which will be found below,* was signed by both parties, and sent to Washington for the approval of President Johnson. Mean while, it was agreed that both armies should remain in statu quo, until an answer should be received from Washington.

Major Henry Hitchcock reached Washington, with the memorandum, on the 21st of April. The public mind was still intensely excited over the assassination of Lincoln, and over the brutal, although less successful, attack which had been made upon the life of Secretary Seward. The terms which Sherman proposed to grant to the South accorded ill with the tone of public feeling. The blood of Lincoln was calling loudly for vengeance; yet, one of the most trusted and honored generals of the Union was proposing to grant, to the now conquered South, terms which implied an utter forgetfulness of all the events of the war. The memorandum, in fact, was universally condemned. It was disapproved by the president, by the secretary-of-war, by the Lieutenant-general, and, indeed, by

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*"Memorandum or Basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, and Major-General William T. Sherman, commanding the army of the United States in North Carolina, both present:

1. The conflicting armies now in the field to maintain the statu quo, until notice is given by the Commanding general of either one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say forty-eight hours—allowed.

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenals; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and abide the action of both State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

4. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their
very member of the cabinet; and, later, when it found its way into the newspapers, it called forth against Sherman a perfect howl of indignation. Time, however, has set this whole matter forth in its true light; and General Sherman’s patriotism shines not the less brightly that it, temporarily and most unjustly, suffered an eclipse.

General Grant set out immediately for Raleigh, with instructions from the secretary-of-war to declare the rejection of the memorandum, and to assume direction of military affairs. From Morehead City, he telegraphed to Sherman the decision of the government; April 24. he reached the head-quarters of the army at Raleigh. Grant directed Sherman to communicate the decision of the government to Johnston, to notify him that the truce would expire within forty-eight hours after the receipt of the message, and to demand, at the same time, the immediate surrender of his army. This was the full extent of Grant’s interference. Sherman was permitted to carry on and conclude the negotiations with Johnston. On receiving Sherman’s message announcing the decision of the government at Washington, Johnston requested an other interview. It was promptly granted; and on the following day, the 26th of April, the two commanders met again, at the same place, when articles of agreement were signed. The following is the document as approved and signed by General Grant.

“Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 26th day of April, 1865, at Bennett’s House, near Durham’s Station, North Carolina, between General Joseph E. Johnston, Commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding the United States Army, in North Carolina.

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston’s command to cease from this date. 2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro, and delivered to an ordnance-officer of the United States Army. 3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation, in writing, not to take up arms against the Government of the United States, until properly released from his obligation. 4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage to be retained by them. 5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they

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Davis was anxious, if possible, to reach Taylor, who was beyond the Chattahoochee; and it was his hope that a vigorous resistance might yet be made, if the forces of that general could be united with those of Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi. All such hopes were soon blasted. At Washington, Ga., there was a scramble among Davis’ ministers for what gold they had been able to carry with them. Well aware that they were being pursued, and alarmed by the rumors which were reaching them of the near presence of the National troopers, they now scattered—Postmaster-general Reagan alone of all the members of the cabinet, remaining with Davis. At this stage, Mrs. Davis, her children, and her sister, Mrs. Howell, were pushing towards the Gulf in wagons, on a nearly parallel route, about 18 miles distant. Learning that their property was in danger of being attacked and robbed by a band of Confederate soldiers, who imagined that Mrs. Davis and her party were carrying off a large amount of specie, Davis hastened to their assistance. He joined them as they were approaching Irwinsville, the capital of Irwin County, Ga., nearly due south of Macon. There the weary fugitives encamped for the night.
Meanwhile two detachments of General Wilson's cavalry—one under Colonel Pritchard, the other under Colonel Harnden—who for some days had been in hot pursuit, were rapidly closing in upon them. A prize of $100,000, which was to reward the successful captor, was, no doubt, lending some intensity to the purpose of the pursuers. At day-break, on the 10th of May, the camp was surrounded, and the entire party were made prisoners. Pritchard's men had the honor of the capture. Conveyed first to Wilson's headquarters at Macon, the prisoners were sent thence by way of Savannah to Fortress Monroe. Alexander H. Stephens, who was captured about the same time, was sent to the same prison. He and Reagan were afterwards transferred to Fort Warren, in Boston harbor.

On the 11th of May, General Jeff. Thompson, who commanded in Arkansas, surrendered at Chalk Bluff, with about 7500 men. One Confederate army still continued to hold out. It was that of General Kirby Smith. Long after the surrender of Lee, Smith professed, at least, to be sanguine and hopeful. Towards the very last days of April he addressed his soldiers as "the hope of the nation," and exhorted them to fight on for their liberties and their homes. "You possess," he said, "the means of long resistance; you have hopes of succor from abroad. Protract the struggle, and you will surely receive the aid of nations who already deeply sympathize with you." Smith was encouraged in his attitude of resistance by the sentiments which prevailed among the people of the South-west. In Louisiana and in Texas, in several of their more populous centres, public meetings were held and resolutions adopted in favor of continuing the contest. Of the existence of this feeling in those States, and of the stubborn energy of Kirby Smith, the authorities at Washington were not ignorant. Preparations were made for a vigorous campaign in Texas; measures were adopted for the collection of a large force at New Orleans; and General Sheridan received instructions to hold himself in readiness to assume the command. These arrangements, becoming unnecessary, were never fully carried out. The end, for which all were impatiently longing, was rapidly approaching. It was not to be deferred by the stubbornness of any general, or by the wishes of any section of the people.

Meanwhile, collisions were taking place between portions of the rival forces on the borders of the Rio Grande. One of these, which happened near Brazos Santiago, and which resulted somewhat unfavorably for the Nationals, proved to be the last battle of the war. Colonel Theodore H. Barrett, who was in command of the National troops at Brazos Santiago, was short of horses for his men. In order to supply this want, he sent Colonel Bronson, on the evening of the 11th of May, with some 300 men, to surprise and capture a Confederate camp on the Rio Grande. The surprise was complete. Bronson drove the foe before him, captured a number of horses and made some prisoners. Having
fallen back, he was joined on the morning of the 13th by Colonel Morrison, at the head of some 200 men. Barrett now assumed command in person. The Confederates, it was discovered, were collected in considerable force in the vicinity of what was known as Palmetto May Ranche. Resolved to disperse 13 them, Barrett ordered another attack. After some skirmishing which lasted during the greater part of the forenoon, the Confederates were driven back some miles, when the Nationals halted on a piece of rising ground about a mile from the ranche. The National left rested on the Río Grande. In this position, about four o'clock in the afternoon, Barrett was fiercely attacked by a strong Confederate force, under the command of General Slaughter. Barrett was without guns. Slaughter was well supplied with both cavalry and artillery. Barrett was compelled to fall back. This, however, he did with great skill and with very considerable success. For three hours the running fight was kept up. The Confederates made repeated and savage onsets on Barrett's front and right flank. The recoiling force, however, was admirably covered by a body of colored troops belonging to the Sixty-Second regiment, who boldly and firmly maintained their line and successfully repelled every attack of the enemy. In the struggle some 48 men of the Thirty-Fourth Indiana, who had been thrown out as skirmishers to protect the flank of their regiment, were cut off and captured by Slaughter's cavalry. About sunset, the pressure ceased, and the fighting was discontinued. Such was the battle of Palmetto Ranche, famous as being the last in the Civil War.

A few days later came the last surrender. Kirby Smith had, at length discovered the hopelessness of his cause He had heard of the surrenders of Johnston and Taylor and Thompson. He had heard also of the arrival of Sheridan at New Orleans. The expected foreign aid had not yet arrived. Further resistance, he saw, was useless. He sent messengers to General Canby, who was at Baton Rouge, to ascertain the terms of surrender; but, before the negotiations were completed, Smith had abandoned his post and made his escape into Texas. General Buckner, who it will be remembered, was left in a similar plight at Fort Donelson, assumed command; and on the 26th of May, May all that remained of the Confederate army in the Trans-Mississippi Department, was surrendered to Canby, at New Orleans. The Civil War was ended.

The struggle which extended over four weary years, was as severe as it was protracted. To the entire people, north and south, it was a long-continued baptism of fire. The whole nation, so to speak, passed through the burning fiery furnace. On both sides the war had been conducted at a fearful cost of blood and treasure. The total number of troops called for by the National government, was 2,942,748. The total number obtained was 2,690,401. Making allowance for the terms of service which varied from six months to four years, it is safe to conclude that there were in actual service about 1,500,000
men. Of these some 60,000 were killed in battle, 35,000 were mortally wounded, and 184,000 died in the hospitals of disease. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say, that, on the part of the Nationals alone, 300,000 men died on the battle-field or in the hospitals, and that as many more were crippled or otherwise disabled for life. The Confederate armies in point of actual numbers, were not equal to the National armies; but their losses could hardly be less. It would certainly not be an over-estimate to say that, through the war, the entire country sustained an actual loss of 1,000,000 able-bodied men. An idea of the pecuniary cost of the war may be obtained from the fact that the National debt, which in June, 1861, was only $90,867,828, had, at the beginning of January, 1866, reached the high figure of $2,749,491,745. On a bare calculation, it is estimated that the expenditures of the government, during the last year of the war, exceeded the whole expenditures of the government from the inauguration of Washington to the inauguration of Buchanan. These figures do not cover the enormous sums paid out by individual States, and by local bodies, in fitting out their several contingents; they do not include the millions voluntarily contributed by the people to the Sanitary and Christian Commissions; nor do they make any account of the fact that the once blooming and wealthy South was literally exhausted, prostrated, and laid waste. It was a fearful sacrifice—one of the greatest ever made by any people. Whether it was a necessary sacrifice will probably for ever remain a debatable question. One thing, however, is certain: it was not made in vain. Out of the fiery ordeal came forth a regenerated America—a grander and more glorious Union. Great questions, involving ever-recurring, never-ending trouble, were finally settled. The Southern Confederacy was crushed, and, with it, the spirit of rebellion. Slavery was abolished; and freedom was proclaimed to be the birthright of man, irrespective of race or color. And, what will be found to be of equal importance to the future of America, and, indeed, to the future of mankind, the original National Union was saved.

The end which had, at last, come had been foreseen; and, even before the assassination of President Lincoln, arrangements had been made to continue all drafting and recruiting, to curtail purchases of army supplies, to reduce the number of general and staff officers, and to remove whatever military restrictions had been laid on trade and commerce. Preparations were made, at Washington, for the reception of the victorious legions which had followed the leadership of Grant and Sherman. On the 22d and 23d of May, the grand review took place. In the presence of multitudes of their rejoicing fellow-citizens, over 200,000 veterans, victors in many a hard-won fight, marched before the president and his cabinet. On those two days, in Washington, an element of sadness mingled with the general joy. One prominent figure was missed. Lincoln, the beloved of all, was in every man's
thoughts; but he was not there. His work, however, had been nobly done; and amid the imposing grandeur and magnificence of the spectacle, men's minds were impressed with the old truths, that "the good which men do lives after them," and that when the blessed rest from their labors "their works do follow them."

A difficult task had yet to be performed by the government, before it could be said that the nation had fairly entered upon the enjoyment of peace. In crushing out the rebellious elements of the States recently in revolt, and in bringing back those States to their allegiance and restoring them to the Union, it had been necessary, as we have seen, to call into existence and to sustain large military and naval organizations. For the purpose for which they were created, these war forces were no longer necessary. What was to be done with them? They must be retained or disbanded; and each alternative was beset with difficulty. If retained, how were they to be employed? If disbanded, might they not be provoked into open resistance? The problem to be solved was not entirely new; but there was somewhat of novelty in the circumstances; and the entire civilized world was interested in the mode and character of its solution. It was not the first time that huge armies, after having saved, had proved the ruin of the commonwealth. Thoughtful men remembered the experience and fate of Rome, and, later, the experience and fate of France. Once more the crucial test was about to be applied. What was to be the result? The test was applied; and the result was in the last degree satisfactory. The problem was solved in a manner which did honor to the American soldier, to American institutions, and, indeed, to the general intelligence of the nineteenth century.

It had never, in truth, been a serious question with the government or with the people, what should be done with the soldier, when the war was over. It was taken for granted by all, the soldier himself included, that he should return to his home, and resume the duties of peaceful citizenship. Accordingly, before the end of May, arrangements were made for disbanding the armies. Sherman, in a touching address, bade farewell to his command, on the 30th of May; and, on the June 2d of June, General Grant issued, to all the armies, the following order.

"Soldiers of the Armies of the United States:—By your patriotic devotion to your country, in the hour of danger and alarm, your magnificent fighting, bravery, and endurance, you have maintained the supremacy of the Union and the Constitution, overthrown all armed opposition to the enforcement of the laws and of the proclamation forever abolishing slavery—the cause and pretext of the rebellion—and opened the way to the rightful authorities to restore order and inaugurate peace, on a permanent and enduring basis, on every foot of American soil. Your marches, sieges, and battles, in distance, duration, resolution, and brilliancy of results, dim the lustre of the world's past military achievements, and will be the patriots' precedent, in defense of liberty and right, in all time to come. In obedience to your country's call, you left your homes and families, and volunteered in her defense. Victory has crowned
your valor, and secured the purpose of your patriotic hearts; and with the gratitude of your countrymen, and the highest honors a great and free nation can accord, you will soon be permitted to return to your homes and families, conscious of having discharged the highest duty of American citizens. To achieve these glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the blessings of free institutions, tens of thousands of your gallant comrades have fallen, and sealed the priceless legacy with their blood. The graves of these a grateful nation bedews with tears, honors their memories, and will ever cherish and support their stricken families."

The work of disbandment, which had been already commenced, was carried on steadily, the government giving to it a large share of its attention; and, as early as the 15th of November, over 800,000 troops had been transported, mustered out and paid. At the beginning of November, 1866, when the mustering process was completed, as many as 1,023,021 soldiers had been restored to their homes, and to the avocations of peaceful life. There was no jarring, no resistance. It was a grand experiment; and it resulted in a splendid success. Such an experiment, attended by such a result, had never before been witnessed. The disbandment, without any serious disturbance to the community, of so many thousands of men, most of them inured to all the habits, as well as hardships of the soldier's life, was, at the time and not unjustly, regarded as another great victory—a victory, in some respects, even greater than that which had just been won by the sword. It was a real triumph of popular government—another genuine proof of the inherent strength of the republic.

We have now completed the task we assigned ourselves at the commencement of this volume. We have traced the History of the Great Civil War from its commencement at Fort Sumter, in 1861, to its triumphant close in the disbandment of the Armies of the Union, in 1865. We have shown the causes which brought about the struggle, and have traced our troubles to their true source. We have swept the whole horizon of the war, pointing out to the reader the various complex movements of the contending forces, and seeking to separate each, yet so blend all as to enable him to understand not only each separate operation, but its general bearing upon the whole great drama. We have seen the tide of victory roll backward and forward, at times seeming to engulf the hopes of those whose prayers were for the triumph of the Union, yet after all sweeping onward in one grand irresistible swell to victory and peace. We have seen the Union preserved, the contending armies quietly returning to their homes, and a new reign of peace and good will inaugurated.

Such a story, the most sublime and thrilling that human pen can relate, can point but one moral—that the institutions which were worth fighting for so nobly are worth preserving; that the Union which has cost us so much blood and treasure, which has brought us freedom and prosperity, must be cherished as the most precious possession we can transmit to future generations.
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